Abstract
Both Great Britain and her thirteen American colonies faced strategic dilemmas at the start of the American Revolution in April 1775. The British possessed overwhelming military power, yet their government could not agree on a strategy to suppress the rebellion. By contrast, the Americans began without a functioning national government and army. Raising a national Continental army was easier than developing a strategy, according to historian Don Higginbotham, “No military genius stood among the [Congressional] delegates––no Hannibal, Turenne, Saxe, Wolfe…” This statement included George Washington, whose service as a militia colonel offered few lessons to influence his role as Continental commander in chief. Early successes at Boston and Ticonderoga encouraged Washington to risk his inexperienced Continentals in the defense of New York City. The Americans’ amateurish efforts to hold the city failed against the skilled British opponents, but Washington succeeded in preserving a small but solid cadre of soldiers and officers with demonstrated battlefield skill––a group that included Major General Nathanael Greene. Washington then adopted a defensive-oriented “war of posts” strategy, centered on preserving a professional Continental Army that, by its very existence, conferred legitimacy on the American cause. Washington envisioned using his Continental forces to hinder British efforts to obtain supplies and recruit Loyalists, and to fight only when the odds were favorable. Washington’s strategic acumen was matched, if not exceeded, by Greene, who presided over the campaign to end British control of the southern states, despite never winning a single major battle. Yet historians have not fully assessed how both commanders visualized, articulated, and executed military strategy. This paper addresses that gap by using information derived from The Papers of Nathanael Greene (University of North Carolina Press, 1976-21015) to analyze how Washington and Greene’s shared strategic vision guided the American military's efforts toward victory.
Recommended Citation
Skinner, Harold Allen
(2026)
"Where There is no Vision, The People Perish: The Evolution of Strategy during the American Revolutionary War, 1775-1783,"
Bound Away: The Liberty Journal of History: Vol. 8:
Iss.
3, Article 32.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/ljh/vol8/iss3/32