Location

Military and Diplomacy

Level of Education

Doctoral

Secondary Session

Confrontations with China

Keywords

IAMD, China, US-Japan Alliance, Counterstrike, Active Defense

Presenter Names and Speeches.

Carl Rehberg

Abstract

Over the last two decades, China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) and other PLA entities have provided the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a complex array of offensive capabilities, focused primarily on the U.S., allies, and partners in the Pacific. There has been explosive growth in ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, HGVs, and other threats. These salvo attacks are explicitly designed to attack theater air bases, seaports, and other facilities critical to U.S. military operations. These PLA weapon systems undermine U.S. security assurances with its allies and partners. They could incentivize China to strike first in a crisis with a surprise attack or fait accompli.[1] The CCP's malevolence and USINDOPACOM warnings regarding actions against Taiwan and other scenarios now demand prompt and decisive actions by the U.S., Allies, and partners—especially in the area of IAMD.

Effective IAMD needs to be more holistic, focused on its three broad categories: 1) Counterstrike, 2) Active defenses, and 3) Passive defenses. Focusing on emerging Japanese counterstrike and active defenses and integrating with the U.S. can enhance and improve IAMD for the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

Significantly, there is an exploration and examination of CCP and PLA strategies against the U.S.—Japan Alliance, the apparently ignored strategies, and the needed response at the strategic levels. An effective IAMD can mitigate many of the PLA strategies and plans. Finally, the implications of the U.S. strategies and the recent new Japanese National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the new Defense Buildup Plan (DBP) from December 2022 could provide a bulwark of capabilities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance with counterstrike capabilities and a holistic IAMD in the top tier of Japan's priorities which could be foundational for an improved conventional deterrence linked to a strategy of denial.

[1] Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense In An Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).

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The Future of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Against China

Military and Diplomacy

Over the last two decades, China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) and other PLA entities have provided the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a complex array of offensive capabilities, focused primarily on the U.S., allies, and partners in the Pacific. There has been explosive growth in ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, HGVs, and other threats. These salvo attacks are explicitly designed to attack theater air bases, seaports, and other facilities critical to U.S. military operations. These PLA weapon systems undermine U.S. security assurances with its allies and partners. They could incentivize China to strike first in a crisis with a surprise attack or fait accompli.[1] The CCP's malevolence and USINDOPACOM warnings regarding actions against Taiwan and other scenarios now demand prompt and decisive actions by the U.S., Allies, and partners—especially in the area of IAMD.

Effective IAMD needs to be more holistic, focused on its three broad categories: 1) Counterstrike, 2) Active defenses, and 3) Passive defenses. Focusing on emerging Japanese counterstrike and active defenses and integrating with the U.S. can enhance and improve IAMD for the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

Significantly, there is an exploration and examination of CCP and PLA strategies against the U.S.—Japan Alliance, the apparently ignored strategies, and the needed response at the strategic levels. An effective IAMD can mitigate many of the PLA strategies and plans. Finally, the implications of the U.S. strategies and the recent new Japanese National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the new Defense Buildup Plan (DBP) from December 2022 could provide a bulwark of capabilities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance with counterstrike capabilities and a holistic IAMD in the top tier of Japan's priorities which could be foundational for an improved conventional deterrence linked to a strategy of denial.

[1] Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense In An Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).