Date
11-11-2026
Department
College of Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)
Chair
John T Broom
Keywords
Vietnam War, US Army, Cold War, Military Manpower, Civil-Military Relations, National Guard, Army Reserves, Reserve Components
Disciplines
History
Recommended Citation
Holycross, Jeffrey A., "Unguarded: The Effects of Non-Mobilization of the Reserve Components on the U.S. Army during the Vietnam Era" (2026). Doctoral Dissertations and Projects. 9054.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/doctoral/9054
Abstract
During the Vietnam Era, the United States Army experienced a profound institutional and disciplinary collapse, which resulted in a hollow force with major disciplinary issues. Historians often cite the turbulent social climate of the 1960s and the controversial 12-month individual rotation policy as the primary causes of this organization's decline. This dissertation argues that the primary catalyst for the Army's deterioration was President Lyndon B. Johnson’s politically motivated decision in July 1965 to commit American ground troops but not to mobilize the reserve components. This deviated from the American military tradition of using a small force of regulars augmented by the military reserve components and draftees. Without access to the organizational support and experienced mid-grade leadership of the reserve components, the active army relied on short-term draftees to meet global commitments in Vietnam, Europe, and Korea. Focusing on the Army from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, this study utilizes records from the Department of Defense, including the Army Build-up Progress Reports, readiness reports of active and reserve component units, disciplinary records, the record of other military branches and mobilized Reserve Component units, and Congressional oversight committee transcripts. By comparing the Active Army's severe decline in good order and discipline with the relative stability of the other branches and the mobilized Reserve units, this research demonstrates that social turbulence and the 12-month tour were compounding factors but not the root cause of the Army’s issues. The enduring shortage of experienced non-commissioned and junior officers created a downward spiral that desperate measures, such as Project 100,000 and abbreviated training courses, intensified. This left the Army culturally weakened and vulnerable to ethical and disciplinary failures.
