Date
5-20-2026
Department
College of Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)
Chair
William Skiles
Keywords
SHAEF, strategy, Eisenhower, Western Europe, 1944, WWII
Disciplines
History
Recommended Citation
Glover, Josh, "Crisis of Command: SHAEF, Strategy, and the War in Northwest Europe, Fall 1944" (2026). Doctoral Dissertations and Projects. 8341.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/doctoral/8341
Abstract
This dissertation examines the strategic debates among the Supreme Allied Commander, U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his subordinate commanders, British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and U.S. Generals Omar Bradley and George Patton, in the fall of 1944. Most historians have focused specifically on the military campaigns throughout the fall of 1944, the commanders who executed them, and the missed opportunities and failures that occurred. The question left unanswered is why the Allies missed the opportunity to end the war in 1944. To answer this, I analyzed the numerous strategic debates among these four commanders and many others that took place between late August and December 1944.
I argue that the strategic debates among the Allied commanders cost the Allies valuable time in 1944, delaying the end of the war. Subordinate commanders like Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton were ordered to advance across a broad front, with all forces attacking simultaneously. Nevertheless, the commanders often criticized or evaded Eisenhower’s orders, raising questions about SHAEF’s ability to control Allied commanders and forces. Further, based on these protests, I argue that the strategic debates called into question whether Eisenhower’s strategy was correct or whether he knew how to command the Allied forces effectively. In the final section, I examine the mistakes Eisenhower and SHAEF made throughout the fall and argue that Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, and many others were also responsible for the Allies' mistakes, missed opportunities, and inability to end the war in the fall of 1944. My research demonstrates that the strategic debates among the Allied commanders over strategy and command consumed critical time from the Allied advance. Yet, because of these debates and the lack of progress, the boundaries and status of post-war Europe could have been very different had the Allied commanders been able to work cooperatively.
