Date

4-29-2026

Department

Helms School of Government

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy (PhD)

Chair

Carl D. Rehberg

Keywords

Defense Acquisition Theory, Major Defense Acquisition Program, Milestone B, Acquisition Program Baseline, Acquisition Reform, Military Industrial Congressional Complex

Disciplines

Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration

Abstract

According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), approximately equal numbers of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are successful and unsuccessful when measured against Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) established at the Milestone B decision point. While the systems engineering-based Defense Acquisition System (DAS) assumes that sufficient knowledge is available to support making significant resource commitments at the Milestone B decision point, the substantial incidence of cost and schedule overruns suggests otherwise. This research employs an explanatory mixed-methods design to investigate why DAS processes that develop knowledge to support Milestone decisions do not develop adequate information to support reliable program baselines (knowledge timing), and how unnecessary requirements introduced by the Military Industrial Congression Complex (MICC) increase MDAP complexity and program risk (external influences). Statistical and logistic regression analyses of data from ten years of Selected Acquisition Reports quantify MDAP performance and model the probability of a baseline breach (a cost or schedule increase greater than 10 percent) based on knowledge sufficiency at Milestone B, program complexity, decision timing, and decision-maker risk tolerance. Analysis of transcripts of semi-structured interviews with acquisition executives validates the results of the statistical and regression analyses, adds depth and breadth to the causes of unreliable APBs, and provides the insights to create a modified theory of defense acquisition that includes a MICC theoretical framework.

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