Date
4-7-2026
Department
College of Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)
Chair
Aaron Palmer
Keywords
Continental Congress, Continental Army, American Revolution, George Washington, civil-military relations, standing armies, military administration, supply crisis, army finance, currency depreciation, requisitions, quartermaster, commissary, officer corps, Conway Cabal, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania Line Mutiny, Newburgh Conspiracy, Robert Morris, political culture
Disciplines
History
Recommended Citation
Hatfield, Stuart D., "Victory in Spite of Themselves: The Continental Congress, the Continental Army, and the Politics of Failure in the American Revolution" (2026). Doctoral Dissertations and Projects. 8055.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/doctoral/8055
Abstract
This dissertation examines the civil–military relationship between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War, arguing that the American victory occurred despite persistent structural, ideological, and administrative deficiencies within the revolutionary government. The study addresses six central research questions concerning the composition and authority of the Continental Congress, the formation and operational parameters of the Continental Army, the influence of congressional decision‑making on military strategy, the development of conflict between Congress and the officer corps, the effects of Congress’s logistical and financial failures on the Army’s ability to sustain operations, and the role of George Washington in mediating between civilian authority and military necessity. Using congressional journals, military correspondence, officer papers, and modern historiography, the dissertation demonstrates that long‑standing colonial distrust of standing armies, regional factionalism, and the absence of a coherent national administrative structure produced a civil–military relationship marked by mistrust, interference, and chronic mismanagement. The analysis shows how congressional control over promotions, foreign commissions, and strategic directives contributed to internal rivalries and operational setbacks, while Congress’s inability to provide adequate supplies, pay, and logistical support generated widespread discontent, mutiny, and declining morale. The study concludes that the Revolution was shaped by a dual struggle: the external conflict with Great Britain and the internal conflict between Congress and the Army. By documenting the political, logistical, and ideological sources of this tension, the dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of early American governance and the foundations of American civil–military relations.
