Date

4-7-2026

Department

Helms School of Government

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration (PhD)

Chair

Joseph Wiegand

Keywords

Federalism, bureaucracy, cooperation, Civil Servants, intergovernmental relations, conflict, Oromia, Amhara, Ethiopia

Disciplines

Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration

Abstract

This qualitative case study examined how civil servants and bureaucratic institutions serve as mechanisms for managing interethnic conflicts between the Oromia and Amhara regional states. While earlier research has explored the institutional design of Ethiopian federalism in relation to conflict, it has largely overlooked the dual roles of civil servants and the capacity of their institutions to resolve conflict. The study utilized the framework of cooperative intergovernmental relations within a federation, combined with Max Weber’s principles of bureaucracy, to examine how civil servants and bureaucrats handle conflicts in the regions studied. Data were collected through interviews, focus groups, and document analysis and systematically organized, coded, and examined using MAXQDA. The findings show that bureaucracy in the study areas is deeply rooted in favoritism, heavily influenced by party politics, inefficient, and serving a dual purpose—managing and escalating interethnic conflicts. In addition, neither the Ethiopian federal civil service laws and regulations nor the principles of meritocracy have yet been implemented in the study areas, as favoritism and party loyalty outweigh meritocracy. Further research is necessary to examine how civil servants handle conflicts across regional states, focusing on horizontal cooperative IGR and its role in the federalization process to enhance public service delivery. Additionally, applying subsidiarity principles to empower local governments and foster citizen participation is crucial for addressing interethnic conflicts, promoting ethnic harmony, and maintaining territorial integrity.

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