Date
6-26-2025
Department
Rawlings School of Divinity
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Theology and Apologetics (PhD)
Chair
David Beck
Keywords
Philosophy, Morality, Ethics
Disciplines
Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Pycraft, Micah Andrew, "A More Robust Ethics: The Weakness and Theistic Dependence of Godless Normative Realism" (2025). Doctoral Dissertations and Projects. 7147.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/doctoral/7147
Abstract
This dissertation is centered on the metaethics and moral ontology of Erik Wielenberg. The central task of the dissertation is to examine Wielenberg’s metaethical view termed “Godless Normative Realism” and ascertain the ontological implications therein. I contend that Wielenberg’s moral ontology ultimately fails to establish moral realism and aspects of his metaethics are better explained by the existence of God rather than his non-existence.
Chapter One presents Erik Wielenberg’s metaethics within the background of the historical progression of moral ontology and contemporary approaches to moral realism. Tracing from ancient foundations of theistic moral realism I show how moral antirealism grew out of the modern period with a contemporary response of non-natural moral realism. It is within this historical context that Wielenberg presents his specific moral ontology which he calls “Godless Normative Realism”. I then provide a few methodological clarifications by which the arguments of chapters 2-4 will develop.
Chapter Two addresses Wielenberg’s moral ontology, specifically the existence of the sui generis, metaphysically necessary states of affairs on which moral objectivity rests. Upon critically developing his moral ontology I concentrate on Wielenberg’s view of intrinsic value which gives both foundation and motivation to his ontology. I then show how Wielenberg’s approach utilizes theological principles within his own explanations as well as show how the implications of his approach lend themselves more plausibly to a theistic worldview. I conclude the chapter with two possible theistic approaches that better explain Wielenberg’s moral ontology.
Chapter Three addresses the supervenience relationship broadly and the making relationship more specifically in Wielenberg’s approach. I then explain the key problematic issues behind the combination of atheism and supervenience. Again, I show how Wielenberg’s approach utilizes theological principles and incurs implications that lend itself more plausibly to a theistic worldview. I conclude with an argument from moral fine-tuning whereby Wielenberg’s approach is more plausible on a theistic worldview.
Chapter Four is concerned with the relationship between moral reasons and moral obligations within Wielenberg’s approach. Two major issues arise within this relationship, that of moral authority and what I term “moral weight”. Additionally, residual implications of Wielenberg’s view of moral obligations are then discussed. Finally, I propose a theistic solution that removes the concerns of moral authority and “moral weight” within the confines of Wielenberg’s greater moral ontology.
Chapter Five provides an epilogue which summarizes the entirety of Wielenberg’s moral ontology, its shortcomings, and the advantages of theistic solutions.
