"Clinton’s March: A Strategic and Logistical Study of the Crown Forces’" by Colin Edward Zimmerman

Date

1-16-2025

Department

College of Arts and Sciences

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)

Chair

Nathan J Martin

Keywords

American Revolution, Monmouth Campaign

Disciplines

History

Abstract

This paper reexamines the British army's march through New Jersey in the summer of 1778, led by Sir Henry Clinton, challenging the traditional narrative that portrays Clinton’s movements as a mere retreat following the loss at the Battle of Monmouth. Instead, it argues that Clinton’s actions were part of a calculated strategy to provoke General George Washington’s Continental Army into a decisive engagement that could potentially end the Revolutionary War. By analyzing Clinton’s leadership decisions, logistical considerations, and the army’s experience during the march, this work reveals a more nuanced intention behind the British movements. The paper contends that Clinton’s use of deception, manipulation of terrain, and psychological warfare were designed to force Washington into a position where he would be tempted to offer battle. When these elements are considered within the larger context of the Monmouth Campaign, they suggest that Clinton was not merely retreating but was actively seeking a confrontation that could secure a conclusive victory. Through this lens, the paper reevaluates the significance of the march and its place in the broader strategic goals of the British campaign during the summer of 1778.

Included in

History Commons

Share

COinS