Date

4-17-2024

Department

College of Arts and Sciences

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)

Chair

Brian Cervantez

Keywords

MacArthur, Engineers, Pacific, Army, Doctrine, Leadership, Amphibious

Disciplines

History

Abstract

The immense scope and scale of World War II required its combatants to conduct operations in every conceivable climatic condition and topographical setting. This fact has continued to represent a double-edged sword for the historiography of this conflict. The researcher may pursue any number of elements of this war to pursue and have done so. That said, aspects remain not yet mined from the cavernous topographical lode eight decades after this war. One such angle of this war not yet fully researched and analyzed by historians is that of General Douglas MacArthur and the US Army’s operational record and experiences in the Southwest Pacific. More specific within this wider consideration is the record of the Army’s combat engineers and their tactical contributions to MacArthur’s strategic victory. While authors have often analyzed and critiqued the general himself, that is not the case for the Army at the tactical level, especially in this theater of the war. This work aims to fill only a small portion of that gap by discussing the combat engineers’ tactical employment through doctrinal development, evolution, and employment.

Included in

History Commons

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