Abstract
In April of 2020, then-candidate Joe Biden promised that, if he were elected to the Presidency, he would “[i]mmediately cancel a minimum of $10,000 of student debt per person, as proposed by Senator Warren in the midst of the coronavirus crisis.” Once in office, the Biden administration found that Congress would not pass the type of extensive student loan debt forgiveness that the President wanted. Accordingly, President Biden did what has become all too common in recent presidential administrations— he acted by executive fiat through an administrative agency to accomplish a policy goal that he could not get passed through Congress. The resultant Biden student loan forgiveness plan was challenged in the federal courts, eventually being decided by the United States Supreme Court as Biden v. Nebraska.
In Biden v. Nebraska, the Court ruled that the Biden administration had exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating the plan. While this particular attempt to take action by executive fiat was thereby stymied, there is no indication that President Biden and future Presidents will cease trying to enact policy in this way. Further, the administrative state—of which action by executive fiat and the usurpation of legislative power by the Executive Branch is a concomitant part—continues to grow, posing a serious threat to our constitutional order, the rule of law, and our liberties guaranteed thereby. Only by returning to the Christian view of law and policy, which undergirds and provides the foundation for our constitutional system of government, can we hope to address the threat posed by the administrative state and again “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”
Recommended Citation
Chrisman, Rodney D.
(2024)
"Biden v. Nebraska: Student Loan Debt Forgiveness and the Dangers of the Administrative State,"
Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 18:
Iss.
2, Article 2.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol18/iss2/2