Journal Article
15 June 2026
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Volume 20, Issue 5 (2026)Read More
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- Journal Article15 June 2026
And Scene: Cross-Border Torts and the “Last Act” Under Virginia’s Lex Loci Delicti Rule
How does a court go about determining which jurisdiction’s substantive law applies to the parties in a particular dispute? Usually, the resolution of this question is straightforward: if the parties are from one jurisdiction and the event giving rise to the lawsuit occurred entirely within that jurisdiction, then that jurisdiction’s substantive law applies. However, when the parties are domiciled in one state, but the entirety of the liability-producing event occurred in another state (i.e., a multi-state tort), courts will apply one of several approaches to determine which substantive law applies. Some courts apply a flexible approach that evaluates the factual scenario of the case, while other courts apply the Lex Loci Delicti, or the “place of the wrong” rule. Relevant here, Virginia has adopted the Lex Loci Delicti rule in the context of multi-state torts. Further distinct from multi-state torts, the Virginia Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of which state’s substantive law applies to a crossborder tort. Cross-border torts occur when the elements of a tort are split amongst multiple states. In Hazlewood v. Lawyer Garage, LLC, the court applied the Lex Loci Delicti rule to cross-border torts and held that the “last act” giving rise to liability determines which state’s substantive law applies. In Hazelwood, the defendant’s alleged tortious conduct took place exclusively in Virginia, but the plaintiff was injured in Arizona; thus, the court applied Arizona’s substantive law to the parties. This Article argues that the court’s decision in Hazlewood and the Lex Loci Delicti rule, as applied to cross-border torts, produces an unworkable result. Namely, the applicable substantive law is determined solely based on happenstance alone: the geographic location of the plaintiff at the time of injury. Instead, the court should adopt the approach taken by the Restatement (Third) Conflict of Laws, which considers more than simply the place of the harm or the last act giving rise to the claim. Rather, it focuses on the facts of the case, the elements of the tort at issue, and the parties’ domicile. Accordingly, when another cross-border tort case comes before the Virginia Supreme Court, the court should abandon the antiquated Lex Loci Delicti rule and instead adopt the Third Restatement’s approach.
Current Articles
- Journal Article15 June 2026
A.A. v. J.M.: The Virginia Court of Appeals Excludes a Whole Class of Prospective Adoptive Parents
A set of “bad facts” ultimately led to undesirable legal precedent and unintended consequences with respect to the “power to render” adoptions in Virginia. In 2019, Baby Doe was left orphaned in Afghanistan after her parents were killed as a result of military operations in the country. After Baby Doe was taken to the U.S. Bagram Air Force Base for treatment, Joshua Mast (J.M.)—a member of the Marine Corps Judge Advocate—attempted to obtain custody of Baby Doe out of fear for the adequacy of medical care if she were to remain in Afghanistan. J.M. and his wife petitioned the Fluvanna Circuit Court to adopt Baby Doe. The court granted the Masts’ petition for an Interlocutory Order of Adoption and eventually granted the Masts’ petition for adoption of Baby Doe. Subsequently, a legal dispute arose between the Masts and Baby Doe’s extended family for custody of the child. Baby Doe’s extended family initiated a collateral attack on the circuit court’s final order of adoption, which occurred over a year after the court granted the Masts’ adoption of Baby Doe. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the circuit court lacked the power to render both adoption orders and, as a result, such orders were void. The court reasoned that the Masts’ adoption did not fit within one of the five traditional categories of adoption provided in the Code of Virginia: (i) agency, (ii) parental placement, (iii) stepparent, (iv) close relative, and (v) adult adoptions. Because the Masts’ adoption did not fit within any of these categories, the circuit court lacked the power to render the adoption. This Note argues that the court of appeals should have considered the sixth or “default” category of adoption that has been utilized by trial and appellate courts in Virginia for decades, namely, guardian/custodian adoptions. The court of appeals’ holding that the trial court lacked the power to render the adoption due to the adoption being “non-categorized,” without considering this category of adoptions, will lead to undesirable consequences. If Baby Doe’s extended relatives could collaterally attack a final order of adoption over a year after the circuit court finalized the adoption, any prior adoption granted by a Virginia court outside the five statutory categories could be subject to collateral attack by the birth parent. The court’s holding raises the likelihood that prior final orders of adoption will be set aside, thus leading to devastating consequences for adoptive parents and adoptive children. In response, Virginia lawyers representing adoption clients should argue in court that when the prospective adoption does not fit one of the five statutory categories of adoption cited by A.A., the circuit court still has the “power to render” the adoption under the sixth or default category of adoption. Additionally, the Virginia General Assembly should address the issue created by the court’s holding in A.A. by amending the Virginia Code and creating a new category of adoption entitled guardian/custodian adoption, the provisions of which would align with close relative adoptions. This legislative clarification would further the public policy to encourage adoptions and implement finality to adoption orders in Virginia courts. Ultimately, such a correction would protect adoptive parents from collateral attacks that potentially divest them of custody of their adopive child that occur after that child has been in the parents’ care for a significant amount of time, in some instances, for years. - Journal Article15 June 2026
And Scene: Cross-Border Torts and the “Last Act” Under Virginia’s Lex Loci Delicti Rule
How does a court go about determining which jurisdiction’s substantive law applies to the parties in a particular dispute? Usually, the resolution of this question is straightforward: if the parties are from one jurisdiction and the event giving rise to the lawsuit occurred entirely within that jurisdiction, then that jurisdiction’s substantive law applies. However, when the parties are domiciled in one state, but the entirety of the liability-producing event occurred in another state (i.e., a multi-state tort), courts will apply one of several approaches to determine which substantive law applies. Some courts apply a flexible approach that evaluates the factual scenario of the case, while other courts apply the Lex Loci Delicti, or the “place of the wrong” rule. Relevant here, Virginia has adopted the Lex Loci Delicti rule in the context of multi-state torts. Further distinct from multi-state torts, the Virginia Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of which state’s substantive law applies to a crossborder tort. Cross-border torts occur when the elements of a tort are split amongst multiple states. In Hazlewood v. Lawyer Garage, LLC, the court applied the Lex Loci Delicti rule to cross-border torts and held that the “last act” giving rise to liability determines which state’s substantive law applies. In Hazelwood, the defendant’s alleged tortious conduct took place exclusively in Virginia, but the plaintiff was injured in Arizona; thus, the court applied Arizona’s substantive law to the parties. This Article argues that the court’s decision in Hazlewood and the Lex Loci Delicti rule, as applied to cross-border torts, produces an unworkable result. Namely, the applicable substantive law is determined solely based on happenstance alone: the geographic location of the plaintiff at the time of injury. Instead, the court should adopt the approach taken by the Restatement (Third) Conflict of Laws, which considers more than simply the place of the harm or the last act giving rise to the claim. Rather, it focuses on the facts of the case, the elements of the tort at issue, and the parties’ domicile. Accordingly, when another cross-border tort case comes before the Virginia Supreme Court, the court should abandon the antiquated Lex Loci Delicti rule and instead adopt the Third Restatement’s approach. - Journal Article15 June 2026
Timing Isn’t Everything: Rethinking the Intersection of Virginia Standing Doctrine, Bankruptcy Law, and Virginia’s Statute of Limitations Applicable to Personal Injury Causes of Action
This Article posits that the interaction between Virginia standing doctrine, bankruptcy law, and Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury causes of action creates a timing issue that can lead to harsh and unnecessary consequences for certain plaintiffs. Under the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decisions in Kocher v. Campbell and Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia, P.C. v. Shaw-McDonald, the continued viability of a plaintiff’s personal injury cause of action can depend entirely on whether the plaintiff—who mistakenly fails to properly claim the personal injury claim as exempt on the bankruptcy schedules—files for bankruptcy before or after filing the personal injury complaint. If the plaintiff files the bankruptcy petition first, the personal injury claim automatically becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, leaving the plaintiff without standing and thus rendering the plaintiff’s subsequent personal injury complaint a legal nullity that does not toll the statute of limitations. By contrast, if the plaintiff files the personal injury complaint before filing for bankruptcy, the personal injury claim still automatically becomes part of the bankruptcy estate when the bankruptcy petition is filed, but the plaintiff’s standing is considered only temporarily suspended during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. This allows the personal injury claim to continue to toll the statute of limitations the entire time. Thus, as it stands, two plaintiffs can suffer the same injury, make identical bankruptcy errors, and exercise a similar degree of diligence and yet meet radically different fates based solely on the order in which they file. This Article takes the position that such a distinction is unnecessary, overly technical, and inconsistent with the purposes of both Virginia’s standing doctrine and statutes of limitations. To address this problem, this Article proposes that Virginia adopt a unified rule: when, due to a reasonable mistake or misunderstanding, standing is artificially jeopardized by the automatic creation of a bankruptcy estate, standing should always be treated as temporarily suspended, not terminated, regardless of the order of filing. Under such a rule, the Supreme Court of Virginia can simply treat a cause of action as sufficiently “commenced” for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations when the plaintiff’s standing to bring that cause of action is merely suspended as opposed to terminated. - Journal Article15 June 2026
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The Fallacy of Systemic Racism in the American Criminal Justice System
Critics of the criminal justice system have repeatedly charged it with systemic racism. It is a tenet of the “war” on the “War on Drugs,” it is a justification used by the so-called “progressive prosecutors” to reject the “Broken Windows” theory of law enforcement, and it is an article of faith of the “Defund the Police!” movement. Even President Joe Biden and his chief lieutenants leveled the same allegation early in this administration. Although the President has eschewed the belief that Americans are a racist people, others have not, proclaiming that virtually anyone who is white is a racist. Yet, few people have defined what they mean by that term. This Article examines what it could mean and tests the truth of the systemic racism claim under each possible definition. None stands up to scrutiny. One argument is that the American citizens who run our many institutions are motivated by racial animus. But the evidence is that racial animus is no longer tolerated in society, and what is more, the criminal justice system strives to identify it when it does occur and to remedy it. Another argument says that the overtly racist beliefs and practices of the past have created lingering racist effects, but this argument cherry-picks historical facts (when it does not ignore them altogether) and fails to grapple with the country’s historic and ongoing efforts to eliminate racial discrimination. It also assumes a causal relationship between past discrimination and present disparities that is unsupported and often contradicted by the evidence. Yet another argument relies psychological research to claim that white Americans are animated by a subconscious racial animus. That research, however, has been debunked. Still another argument says that the criminal justice system is systemically racist because it has disparate effects across racial groups, but this argument looks only at the offenders’ side of the criminal justice system and fails to consider the effect of the criminal justice system on victims. Proponents of the systemic racism theory often proffer “solutions” to it. This Article examines those too and finds that many would, in fact, harm the very people they aim to help. In the context of the “War on Drugs,” where so much of the rhetoric is focused, the authors examine these arguments and solutions. The bottom line is this: the claim of systemic racism in the criminal justice system is unjustified. - Journal Article1 September 2015
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