Publication Date

Spring 4-25-2019


College of Arts and Sciences




moral argument, problem of evil, existential, direct inductive argument, existence of God, ethics, philosophy, religion


Ethics and Political Philosophy | Ethics in Religion | Metaphysics | Philosophy | Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion


Within this paper, it is shown that certain ethical assumptions are implicit within the claim that certain kinds of evil exist. When taken in tandem with the moral argument for the existence of God, these assumptions can be arranged in such a way as to provide a contradiction. To avoid this contradiction, I posit a non-existential alternative to direct inductive arguments from evil, but the non-existential alternative gives rise to novel objections. When considering their respective ethical implications, both the existential and non-existential variations of direct inductive arguments fail. Since any direct inductive problem of evil must be either existential or non-existential, without an adequate response to such objections, the success of direct inductive arguments is greatly diminished.