Abstract
Freedom, and in particular, the freedom of human beings, is a hot topic within the field of metaphysics. In this paper, instead of arguing for the truth of a particular position on freedom, I explore whether a particular position, compatibilism, might be consistent with the existence of moral responsibility and retributive justice. To alleviate ambiguity, I construct a model by which the four primary positions on freedom might be clearly understood. I then distinguish between what I call ‘common-sense’ views of moral responsibility, and ‘complex’ views of moral responsibility. I select a particular complex view, which I term the ‘virtue’ theory of moral responsibility, offer some justification for the sensibility of such a theory, and demonstrate how the virtue theory is consistent with compatibilism. Finally, I propose that retributive justice is consistent with the virtue theory of moral responsibility, and consequently, that retributive justice is consistent with compatibilism.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Jonathan
(2020)
"Moral Responsibility, Justice, and Freedom,"
Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion: Vol. 5:
Iss.
1, Article 6.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lujpr/vol5/iss1/6