Abstract
In this article, the physicalism of Trenton Merricks is examined in relation to the Christian doctrine of the future resurrection of the body. Merricks' position is found to have serious issues relating to how a person can maintain numerical identity through a process of death and being brought back into existence at the resurrection. Merricks never provides any way of understanding how this is possible. Further, his argument seems to presuppose that human beings are merely physical beings without sufficiently grounding this point. The article concludes that Merricks' physicalism cannot account for the numerical identity which is necessary for the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body.
Recommended Citation
Mitchell, James
(2020)
"An Evaluation of Trenton Merrick's Physicalism Regarding the Resurrection,"
Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion: Vol. 5:
Iss.
1, Article 4.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lujpr/vol5/iss1/4