Within this paper, I examine Godless normative realism, a naturalistic explanation of morality given by Erik Wielenberg and determine whether the theory poses a threat to abductive moral arguments for the existence of God. In particular, I argue that Wielenberg’s theory is a possible explanation for the existence of moral facts and that it offers a motivation for one to act morally, but that theism, as a whole, remains a better explanation for the moral aspects of the world. To do so, I defend the legitimacy of weak forms of DCT, identify a few areas in which Godless normative realism fails to explain moral aspects of the world, and conclude with a few reasons for thinking that the explanatory scope of theism is superior to that of Wielenberg’s theory. I conclude that abductive moral arguments for the existence of God remain largely unscathed by Godless normative realism.
"Abductive Moral Arguments and Godless Normative Realism: An Evaluation of Explanations for Moral Facts and Motivations for Moral Behavior,"
Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion: Vol. 5
, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lujpr/vol5/iss1/3