Abstract
One of the most discussed topics on the nature of God, in Christian circles today, is the subject of God’s knowledge. There are a few popular positions today that are engaged in a serious debate as to what the true biblical and philosophical position on the nature of God’s knowledge is. One such position, which has become increasingly popular and has found support among many leading Christian philosophers, such as Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, and William Lane Craig, is called Molinism. While Molinism does have an abundance of supporters, there are many detractors as well. Calvinist’s, Thomists and open theists like William Hasker have been waging a war against Molinism. One of the most popular objections to Molinism is the “grounding objection.” In this paper, I will argue that the grounding objection fails to defeat Molinism because it is based on a theory of the connection of truth and reality, called truth-maker theory, which is controversial. I will also show how, even if one were to accept truth-maker theory, a Molinist could still avoid the grounding objection.
Recommended Citation
Crown, Tyler
(2018)
"Truth-Makers and the "Grounding Objection" to Molinism,"
Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion: Vol. 4:
Iss.
1, Article 2.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lujpr/vol4/iss1/2