Abstract
Humans crave companionship. This companionship comes first from a relationship with God and second from an inferior yet ordained relationship with other humans. But what about the creatures not made in God’s image? What about the previously wild creatures we bring into our homes as pets? Many cherish these animals with a love akin to family, especially dogs and cats. But is this the proper pedestal for pets?
This is an ongoing struggle humans have debated since as far back as dogs and cats have been domesticated. As time progressed, select cultures of various geographical backgrounds have subjugated animals, using the animals of the Earth as a means to an end to produce products or services. Other cultures have exalted specific animals to have an inherent value equal to humans. Still, others have gone further by deifying specific animals or, at least, by sanctifying a species for its connection to the divine. This indeterminacy of a pet’s inherent value continues. In the United States today, the subjugation of some animals—notably livestock—remains commonplace, and the valuation of these animals is based on their productive capabilities. Alternatively, Americans have taken select animals, primarily cats and dogs, into their homes for companionship. This is the issue: How do we value these companion animals, and do we attempt to quantify the owner’s emotional connection to their companion animal?
This is not a new question, and there is no consensus on an answer, but this has not stopped courts from trying. Most jurisdictions in the United States view companion animals as personal property. Issues arise when an owner sues in tort to recover for injury to their companion animal. As with other types of personal property, most jurisdictions have taken the stance that an owner may not recover for their emotional distress or sentimental loss as a result of a pet’s injury. Virginia is one such jurisdiction. Despite the General Assembly not restricting the amount recoverable by plaintiff-owners, the Supreme Court of Virginia has previously noted that such recovery is impermissible until the General Assembly opts to allow it. However, in Blue Pearl Veterinary Partners, LLC v. Anderson, the Court of Appeals of Virginia recently repeated that emotional distress recovery is impermissible but decided that a plaintiff may present evidence and recover all veterinary expenses incurred by the defendant’s tortious harm.
Thus, under Blue Pearl, plaintiffs may incur thousands of dollars in veterinarian expenses for an animal they only spent hundreds on or is only worth hundreds on the market. This is not a problem on its own, but when coupled with the disallowance of recovery for emotional distress, an issue arises. This issue is not facially apparent but instead requires another question: What would cause someone to spend thousands on an “item of personal property” worth only hundreds to them or to the market? This Note proposes that the answer is the owner’s deep emotional and sentimental connection to the animal. Thus, in a roundabout manner, Virginia now allows recovery for veterinarian damages that stem directly from an owner’s emotional connection with the animal while denying such recovery outright if sought under the label of “emotional distress.”
This Note requests that a stance be taken and proposes two potential, yet opposite, solutions. First, the Supreme Court of Virginia could overrule Blue Pearl. This solution has the benefit of maintaining tradition and the status quo: it recognizes that pets are statutorily personal property, so pets must be treated as other forms of property. Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia could lean into a changing valuation of animals and allow for emotional distress recovery. This is the solution this Note prefers. This solution appreciates that the legislature has not expressly disclaimed recovery of emotional distress damages, that the primary tenet of tort law is to place the plaintiff back into the position they would have been before the harm occurred, and that the Virginia courts have long found the jury to be a trustworthy vessel for making difficult legal decisions.
Recommended Citation
Payne, Ethan
(2025)
"Disguising Emotional Distress Damages: Why Permitting Recovery of “Reasonable and Necessary” Veterinarian Expenses Creates Inconsistency in Virginia,"
Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 19:
Iss.
3, Article 6.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol19/iss3/6