Date

1-16-2025

Department

College of Arts and Sciences

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy in History (PhD)

Chair

Martin Scott Catino

Keywords

Grand Strategy, Cold War, Truman, Stalin, Germany, Korean War, NSC-68

Disciplines

History

Abstract

The early Cold War (1945-1953) was a defining period for the 20th century, setting the grand strategic approach to the post-World War II era for the United States and Soviet Union. A common method employed by both sides was to overstate the power, capability, and aggression of the Soviet Union to enable grand strategic planning objectives. While acknowledging the tangible menace of communist expansion, President Truman used the illusion of an immediate Soviet existential threat to stoke fear, reject traditional isolationism, and facilitate American international engagement to protect free and open markets in Europe. Josef Stalin made use of American rhetoric and illusion to underline the appearance of the Soviet Union as a rival superpower to spread Moscow’s sphere of influence, either by military threat or government subversion. Truman leveraged Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia and Berlin to successfully gain approval for critical parts of his strategy, including the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Subsequent events, including the development of a Soviet atomic bomb and a communist victory in China, resulted in Truman struggling to control and limit his narrative of Soviet strength. The authors of the NSC-68 report, building on Truman’s rhetoric, argued for a more confrontational and contentious relationship with the Soviets, including a dramatically increased budget for rearmament. This new and more militant grand strategy gained approval when Stalin authorized the Korean War as part of his globally connected strategy to gain a Soviet advantage in Europe. The new American grand strategy defined by NSC-68 ushered in an extended era of contentious and dangerous nuclear brinksmanship.

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