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Joseph Nye, Jr.: Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 10th ed.

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Joseph Nye, Jr.: Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 10th ed.

Steven Alan Samson
CHAPTER ONE: ARE THERE ENDURING LOGICS OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN WORLD POLITICS?

Outline

A. WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS? (3-5)
   1. World Imperial System
      a. Western: Roman, Spanish, French, British
      b. Regional Empires: Sumerian, Persian, Chinese
   2. Feudal System
      a. Crosscutting, Non-Territorial Loyalties and Conflicts
   3. Anarchic System of States
      a. Examples
         1) City-States
         2) Dynastic Territorial States
      b. Absence of a Common Sovereign
         1) Self-Help System
         2) Thomas Hobbes: State of Nature
      c. Domestic (Municipal) vs. International Politics and Law
         1) Domestic Monopoly on the Use of Force vs. International Anarchy
         2) Domestic Sense of Community vs. Absence of a Common Loyalty
         3) Result: Gap between Order and Justice
   4. This Last System (Anarchic or Westphalian) Is the Most Relevant to Contemporary International Politics

B. DIFFERING VIEWS OF ANARCHIC POLITICS (5-11)
   1. Political Philosophy: Two Views
      b. John Locke: People Can Make Contracts
      c. They are the precursors of realism and liberalism
   2. International Politics: Two Current Views
      a. Realism is the dominant tradition; it is more pessimistic: e.g., Henry Kissinger [Hans Morgenthau was a leading theorist]
      b. Liberalism (often called idealism), the more optimistic tradition, traces back to Baron Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Woodrow Wilson
   3. Presuppositions
      a. Liberals emphasize economic and social interdependence
         (1) They see a global society that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for states (e.g., trade, the UN)
      b. Realists claim liberals overstate the difference between domestic and international politics
   4. Realist Rejoinder: “A State of War Does Not Mean Constant War”
   5. Resurgence of Liberal Claims in the 1970s and 1980s
      a. Richard Rosecrance: States can increase their power either aggressively by territorial conquest or peacefully through trade
         (1) Illustration: Japan
a. Ozone depletion
b. AIDS and drugs
c. Richard Falk anticipates new non-territorial loyalties
d. Transnational forces are undoing the Peace of Westphalia

7. Formal, Deductive Theories
a. Neo-realism (Kenneth Waltz)
b. Neo-Liberalism (Robert Keohane)

8. Realist Rebuttal: Critique of “globaloney” [Russell Kirk coined the term]

9. Constructivists
a. Concepts are socially constructed, subjective, and impermanent [cf. medieval nominalism, deconstruction, and Chomsky’s deep structures]
b. Focus on ideas and culture
c. Understanding of “national interest” and “security” evolves
d. Rejection of the search for scientific laws
   1) Seeks contingent generalizations and thick descriptions
e. Debates over basic concepts: sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, etc

10. Other Approaches
a. Marxism: economic reductionism, historical materialism
   1) Analytical weaknesses
b. Dependency Theory
   1) But once peripheral countries of the Pacific Rim become economic tigers in the 1980s and 1990s
   2) Cardoso changed to a free market view and served as the Brazilian president
c. Feminist critiques
d. John Maynard Keynes’ dead scribblers

C. BUILDING BLOCKS (11-17)

1. Actors
a. States
b. Non-state actors
   (1) TNCs or MNCs (multinational corporations)
c. Middle East as an Illustration
   (1) MNCs
   (2) IGOs (intergovernmental organizations)
   (3) NGOs (non-governmental organizations)
   (4) Transnational ethnic groups such as the Kurds

2. Goals
a. National security

3. Instruments
a. Stanley Hoffmann: Link between military strength and positive achievement has been loosened
b. Reasons
   (1) Nuclear weapons
   (2) Expense of conventional forces
   (3) Internal constraints
   (4) Alternatives to force
c. Basic game of security goes on
   (1) Hegemonic states
   (2) Hegemonic wars
   (3) New treaty sets the new framework of order: e.g., the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713; the Congress of Vienna, 1815; and the United Nations system, 1945

D. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (17)

1. Thucydides: The Father of Realism
a. Thucydides was a strategos (general) who did his research after defeat in battle
E. A SHORT VERSION OF A LONG STORY (18-20)
1. Initial Alliance of the Greece City-States during the Persians Wars
2. Athenian Empire
   a. Delian League
3. Civil War in Epidamnus
   a. Democrats sought help from Corcyra [the metropolis=mother city] but were turned down
   b. Democrats turned to Corinth, an Athenian rival, but the Corcyreans sent a fleet to recapture their former colony and defeated the Corinthian fleet
   c. Corinth declared war and Corcyra turned to Athens for help
4. Athenian Dilemma: Break truce or allow a shift in the power balance?
   a. Athenians pursued a deterrence strategy: show of force against Corinth did not succeed in forcing Corinth to back down
   b. Corinth stirred up problems in Potidaea, which was an Athenian ally
   c. Sparta had promised aid to Corinth if Athens attacked Potidaea
   d. Athens sent forces to put down an uprising
5. Great Debate in Sparta
   a. Spartans voted in favor of war in order maintain the balance of power by checking the increase of Athenian power
6. War (431-404 BC)
   a. Peace of Nicias
   b. Disastrous Sicilian Expedition
   c. Four Hundred Oligarchs
   d. Athenian Defeat

F. CAUSES AND THEORIES (20-22)
1. What Made War Inevitable
2. Pericles
3. Athens’ Security Dilemma
   a. Security dilemmas are characteristic of anarchic organization
4. Prisoner’s Dilemma
   a. Cooperation
   b. Issues of Trust and Credibility
5. Balance of Naval Power
6. Question of Cheating

G. INEVITABILITY AND THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE (22-25)
1. Belief in War’s Inevitability as a Cause
2. Robert Axelrod
   a. Tit-for-Tat strategy
3. Belief in the Inevitability of War Is Corrosive in International Politics
   a. If you suspect your opponent will cheat, you rely on yourself
4. Thucydides’ View of Human Nature
   a. Donald Kagan contends that Thucydides erred; Sparta feared a slave revolt more than it feared Athens
   b. Kagan’s Conclusion: Precipitating Causes – Policy Mistakes by the Chief Actors – Were More Important
5. Very Little Is Truly Inevitable in History
   a. Marx: Men make history but not in conditions of their own choosing
   b. Prisoner’s dilemma situations
6. Modern Lessons
   a. Be aware of both regularities and changes
   b. Beware of patently shallow historical analogies
   c. Be aware of the selectivity of historians
   d. Historians are affected by their contemporary concerns; consequently the questions they ask change
7. The Cure to Misunderstanding History Is to Read More, Not Less

H. ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (26-27)
1. Uses of Moral Arguments
   a. They move and constrain people
      (1) e.g., Corcyra’s appeal
   b. They are used rhetorically as propaganda to disguise less elevated motives
      (1) e.g., the Melian Debate

2. The Basic Touchstone for Moral Arguments Is Impartiality

3. Kantian Tradition (deontological emphasizes duties and rules) vs. the Utilitarian Tradition (consequentialist); some add Virtue Ethics (aretaic)

4. Moral Arguments Can Be Judged in Three Ways:
   a. Motives or intentions involved
   b. Means used
   c. Consequences or net effects

I. LIMITS ON ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (27-29)
   1. Weak International Consensus on Values
   2. Different Standards of Behavior: Private vs. Public
      a. Collective abstractions like the State not held to the same standard
   3. Complexity of Causation
      a. Oxford Union debate, 1933
      b. Hamburger argument
   4. Order and Justice Are Both Important
      a. Absence of institutions to preserve the order that precedes justice

J. THREE VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF MORALITY (29-36)
   1. Skeptics
      a. Example: Thucydides
         (1) Melian Debate: might makes right
      b. Morality Requires Choice
      c. Criticisms: Some Choices
         (1) Thomas Hobbes: balance of power
         (2) International law and customs
         (3) International organizations
      d. Just War Doctrine in Wartime
         (1) Answer to pacifism
      e. Why Complete Skepticism May Be Rejected
      f. Realists Who Are Not Complete Skeptics
         (1) Emphasis on order
         (2) Moral crusades disrupt balances of power [cf. Thomas Hobbes and Reinhold Niebuhr]
      g. Tradeoffs between Order and Justice

   2. State Moralists
      a. Example: Michael Walzer
         (1) States represent the pooled rights of individuals
      b. A Society of States with Certain Rules
         (1) Sovereignty: Good fences make good neighbors
         (2) Frequent violations
      c. Intervention is a long-standing problem
         (1) Examples of Panama and Kuwait

   3. Cosmopolitans
      a. Need to focus on distributive justice
         (1) Problem of the “brain drain”
      b. National boundaries have no moral standing
      c. Limited cosmopolitan view looks at people’s multiple loyalties: pluralism
      d. Different responses to Rwanda and Darfur

   4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach
      a. Outrage may lead to heightened risk
d. The issues recur throughout history

Study Questions

1. **What Is International Politics?** Identify three basic forms of world politics. Identify the chief varieties of the anarchic system of states. What does the author mean by calling international politics "a self-help system?" What is life like in Thomas Hobbes's state of nature? Identify two ways international law differs from domestic law? With what result? (3-5)

2. **Differing Views of Anarchic Politics** Identify the two major traditions in thinking about international politics that in some ways began with Hobbes and Locke. Who are some of the leading exponents of each? What is the central perception of each? What are some of the arguments pro and con? Identify five other approaches. How do constructivists differ from neorealists and neoliberalists? What is the practical importance of theories? (5-11)

3. **Building Blocks** Identify three concepts that are basic to theorizing about international politics. How is each concept changing? (For example, actors include not only states but also IGOs, NGOs, and transnational ethnic groups). Identify three changes in the role of force. What other factors may play a larger role than force? How is the balance of power supposed to work? What are hegemonic wars and how are they resolved? (11-17)

4. **The Peloponnesian War** Summarize the key events and circumstances that led to the Second Peloponnesian War. What was Athens's dilemma? (17-20)

5. **Causes and Theories** What did Thucydides believe caused the war? What was the view of Pericles? What is a security dilemma? What is the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario in game theory? What was Athens's security dilemma, as described by the Corcyraeans? (20-22)

6. **Inevitability and the Shadow of the Future** What does Robert Axelrod believe to be the most effective strategy in Prisoner's Dilemma? What does it take to develop trust? (Trust is the title of a recent book by Francis Fukuyama). Compare Donald Kagan's view of the precipitating causes with Thucydides's theory of inevitability. What three lessons may be drawn from this ancient history. How did Thucydides's questions differ from those we might ask today? (22-25)

7. **Ethical Questions and International Politics** How may moral arguments be used? What views did the Athenians and Melians take in 416 BC? With what result (p. 22)? Contrast the Kantian (intrinsic ethical norms, duties) with the utilitarian (consequentialist ethical norms) tradition. [Aristotelian virtue ethics is not considered]. Identify three ways moral arguments may be judged. (26-27)

8. **Limits on Ethics in International Relations** Identify four reasons why ethics plays less of a role in international than in domestic politics. Why is the “hamburger argument” unsound? (27-29)

9. **Three Views of the Role of Morality** Identify three different views of ethics in international relations. Which views do realists tend to take? Idealists? Give three reasons why the argument of skeptics is inadequate. According to Thomas Hobbes, what does escaping the state of nature require? What role may be played by international law and customs? International organizations? What takes priority: justice or order? What is the problem with moral crusades? (29-32)
10. What are the chief considerations for **state moralists**? What circumstances might justify intervention? What are the chief considerations for **cosmopolitans**? What is distributive justice? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each view? What is the place of morality? [In the Morgenthau reading later, we will consider the issue of morality from a classical realist perspective]. What has changed since the time of Thucydides? (32-36)

**Review**

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**CHAPTER TWO: EXPLAINING CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE TRADE**

**Study Questions**

1. **States, Nations, and Nation-States** What makes the concept of the *sovereign state* the most important in the study of world politics? What are the two crucial characteristics of the state? Abraham Lincoln's use of the word nation indicates that he believed America to be a new kind of nation. What is a nation-state? Are EU members "sovereign states?" In the absence of self-determination, many ethnic groups, such as the Welsh and the Catalonians, enjoy the privileges of *devolution* (a degree of autonomy). What issues are considered in order to determine whether to recognize a new sovereign state? Somaliland, Puntland, South Sudan, and Abkhazia all claim independence, but how should we regard failed states? (40-44)

2. **International Actors, Power, and Authority** What makes states the most important actors? Define: power, *power conversion, power resources, hard power* vs. *soft power*. How has power been transformed in the age of information-based economies and transnational interdependence? (44-50)

3. **International System and International Society** What is an *international system*? What are its two major components? Although its ordering principle is anarchic, why is the system not chaotic? How did Chancellor Otto von Bismarck engineer the Franco-Prussian War? (50-52)

4. **System Stability and Crisis Stability** Why are distributions of power crucial to system stability? How do the different types of polarity work? Why was the Cold War system stable? A previous edition summarized the importance of process of an international system. It is determined by: (1) its structure (bipolar structures tend to produce less
flexible processes), (2) the cultural and institutional context that surrounds the structure and determines the incentives and capabilities states have for cooperation, and (3) whether the states are revolutionary or moderate in their goals and instruments." (52-53)

5. The “National Interest” Proximity to a Hobbesian situation is an important variable. James Chowning Davies showed how Maslow’s hierarchy of needs reflects degrees of security as a variable. (53-54)

6. Levels of Analysis What are some of its intangible aspects? In light of the issue of morality (p. 28), why are the unintended consequences of a system (such as the market system) important? How did the existing international system affect Bolshevik behavior? [Revolutionaries sometimes refer to the pattern as “co-optation,” which justifies destroy existing institutions]. What is the geopolitical view of the distribution of power among states, as understood by Kautilya and Machiavelli? What accounts for a checkerboard pattern? (55-56)

7. The Individual Level Identify three levels of causation (Kenneth Waltz’s “images”). What does Nye mean by overprediction or unfalsifiable explanations? [The philosopher Karl Popper developed the “falsifiability” theory]. (56-59)

8. The State Level How may the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the onset of the Austro-Hungarian War, and the end of the Cold War be understood at the state level (i.e., domestic politics)? How did Karl Marx and classical liberals like Richard Cobden view the relationship between capitalism and war or peace? How well did Marxist and liberal theories account for the onset of the First World War and other events based on domestic politics? The term bureaucratic politics was popularized in Graham Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. How does it shed light on the origin of WWI? What is Miles’s Law? (59-63)


10. Paradigms and Theories The term paradigm was popularized by Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. What are hypotheses and axioms? (65-66)

11. Realism What are some of the varieties of realists? Classical realists would be considered soft; Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism would be considered hard. Lord Palmerston appears to say that there is not an immutable logic to world politics. (66-67)

12. Liberalism Why were liberal theories discredited? What are the three strands of recent liberal thinking? Why is trade important? Illustrate with the case of Japan in the 1930s, as noted by Eugene Staley, and recently. According to neoliberals, why do international organizations matter? How do institutions stabilize expectations? What did Karl Deutsch mean by “pluralistic security communities?” What circumstances might cause security dilemmas to reemerge in Europe? Are democracies less apt to go to war? Why did Kant believe so? According to Michael Doyle, why do liberal democracies not fight other liberal democracies? Here a distinction might be made: a mere plebiscitary democracy differs from a liberal democracy in lacking stable and mature democratic institutions? (67-71)

13. Marxism What are some of the weaknesses of Marxism? (72)
14. **Constructivism** What are the crucial insights of constructivism? What is path-dependency? (72-74)

15. **Counterfactuals and “Virtual History”** What are counterfactuals? How may they be used to define causal claims? Identify four criteria that can be used to test counterfactual thought experiments. (75-78)

**Review**

- sovereignty
- self-determination
- power
- soft power
- bipolar
- system
- Kauttilya
- neoliberals
- levels of analysis (causation)
- Miles’s Law
- paradigm
- poorly integrated countries
- ideologies of nationalism and democracy
- low-level generalization about variations in foreign policy
- counterfactuals

- territorially
- five issues
- power conversion
- authority
- multipolar
- structure and process
- overprediction
- expectations of stability
- Occam’s razor
- hypotheses
- Japan’s behavior in the 1930s
- Marxist and liberals on relationship between war and capitalism
- rule of parsimony
- Lord Palmerston
- Eugene Staley
- Michael Doyle
- path dependency

**CHAPTER THREE: FROM WESTPHALIA TO WORLD WAR I**

**Study Questions**

**PART A (SECOND TEST)**

1. **Revolutionary and Moderate Goals and Instruments** What were the two largest political units of all time? What is Europe’s most successful export? What has been accomplished by the Peace of Westphalia (1648)? What is Charles Tilly’s view? How did Britain happen to become the greatest power in the 19th century over such rivals as the Netherlands and France? What were the rules of the game in the eighteenth century (a period defined in part by the Treaty of Utrecht)? Why did states’ goals change? How did the Napoleonic Wars change the process or means? What makes the French Revolution exogenous to a structural theory? How did technology change the means? The French revolutionary levée en masse (conscription) marked a radical departure from professional armies and became the norm during the First World War. (82-84)

2. **Managing of Great Power Conflict: Balance of Power** Compare and contrast David Hume’s, Richard Cobden’s, and Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about the balance of power. Following the unprecedented Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the ten hegemonic wars that followed the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) were: the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697); the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713); the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748); the Seven Years War (also the Third Silesian War, 1756-1763); the War of American Independence (1775-1783); the War of the First Coalition against France (1792-1797); the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815); the First World War (1914-1918); the Second World War (1939-1945), and the Cold War,
of which the war on terror may be only the most recent phase. Why do states balance power? (85)

3. **Balances as Distributions of Power** Identify three meanings of balance of power. What is the hegemonic stability theory? [Its opposite is the hegemonic transition theory]. What dog did not bark in 1895 [over disputed territorial claims between Venezuela and British Guiana]? (86-87)


5. **Balance of Power as Theory** What is bandwagoning? Why is it risky in international politics? What does balance-of-power theory predict? Identify five reasons countries join the stronger rather than the weaker side. (87-90)

6. **Balance of Power as Multipolar Systems** What are the distinguishing features of a classical balance of power system? (90)

7. **The Nineteenth-Century Balance of Power System** What changes resulted from the Congress of Vienna? Identify the three structural phases. When did the big structural change occur? Why did it not produce instability? How did the balance of power system following German unification break down? Identify five periods in the process of the nineteenth-century balance of power system [known as the Pax Britannica]. What were the hallmarks of Bismarck’s alliance system? What were the most important trends that drove change? The Concert of Europe, which was led by Prince Metternich of Austria, sought to suppress even liberal reform in Europe. Although the Revolutions of 1848 were all suppressed, the old system that had sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind was quickly swept away. (90-94)

8. **A Modern Sequel** How has the German problem changed over the years? What made possible Germany’s reunification? Identify three ways things have changed. (95)

**Nye Review, Part A**

examples of revolutionary goals and instruments  
the idea of popular sovereignty as spread by Napoleon through Europe  
Frederick the Great's seizure of Silesia from Maria Theresa  
the once popular notion in France that all monarchs should be executed  
the French use of the levée en masse instead of mercenaries  
David Hume Woodrow Wilson Richard Cobden  
hegemonic stability theory realpolitik alliances  
balance of power strategy bandwagoning phenomenon exceptions to balance of power  
1815-1822: the Concert of Europe  1822-1854: the rise of nationalism and democracy  
1854-1870: nationalism and the unification of Italy and Germany Count Berchtold  
1870-1890: Bismarck's alliance system [a revived Concert] Emperor Franz Josef

**PART B (THIRD TEST)**

1. **The Origins of World War I** Identify some of the major international consequences of the First World War. (98-99)

2. **Three Levels of Analysis** What were the two key structural changes at the systems level of analysis? What role was played by: the Tirpitz Plan, the Boer War, the Crowe
memorandum? When did Britain stop playing the critical role of balancer (maintainer of the balance of power)? What was the effect of the Triple Entente? Identify four changes in the process? [Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn has a different insight into the “Dear Nicky” letter, noting that Nicholas was deceived by two of his generals]. [Correction: Herbert Spencer articulated the “survival of the fittest” philosophy]. Why does Lenin’s imperialist theory fail to explain what happened at Fashoda in 1898? Why did the rise of nationalism in the Balkans prove so threatening? According to Fritz Fischer, why did the Coalition of Rye and Iron favor German expansionism? What is meant by the “cult of the offensive”? How did the personalities of Franz Josef, Count Berchtold, Nicholas II, and Wilhelm II contribute to the tragedy? (99-105)

10. **Was War Inevitable?** What were the deep causes of the First World War? The intermediate causes? The precipitating cause? What was the Schlieffen Plan? What possibly would have made its assumptions obsolete by 1916? (105-08)

11. **What Kind of War?** Counterfactually, what four other wars were possible? [Incidentally, United States entry into the war came shortly after the British intercepted the Zimmermann note, which offered Mexico incentives to ally itself with Germany if the Americans entered the war]. What three lessons does the author draw? (108-10)

12. **The Funnel of Choices** The authors neglect to mention that at the time of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, the German Navy was holding a grand review during Kiel Week. A British naval squadron paid a visit and Kaiser Wilhelm toured a British dreadnought wearing a Royal Navy admiral's uniform. (110-11)

13. **Lessons of History Again** What point made by constructivists do some realists miss? (111-12)

**APPENDICES TO PART B: OTHER TAKES ON THESE ISSUES**

1. **Eyre Crowe, Memorandum, January 1, 1907**

Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendance, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England; Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her foreign commerce, spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of her national energies, and create fresh German interests all over the world wherever and whenever a peaceful opportunity offers. . . . It will, however, be seen, upon reflection, that there is no actual necessity for a British Government to determine definitely which of the two theories of German policy it will accept. For it is clear that the second scheme (of semi-independent evolution, not entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into the first, or conscious-design scheme. Moreover, if ever the evolution scheme should come to be realized, the position thereby accruing to Germany would obviously constitute as formidable a menace to the rest of the world as would be presented by any deliberate conquest of a similar position by “malice aforethought.”

2. **Donald Kagan**
Bismarck's unification of the Germans under the leadership of Prussia was an astonishing achievement. His ability to solidify the place of the new and threatening entity in a European system shattered by its emergence and to create a new international order in which Germany could live in peace and prosper may have been even more remarkable. For the two decades after 1871 that he remained in power there were no wars among the great powers. Even after he was dismissed in 1890 by the new German emperor, William II, it took his successors another quarter of a century to undo and reverse his policies and so distort the system he created as to produce a major war.

Bismarck's second great achievement rested, in part, on Germany's strong military and industrial power, which gave his policies weight and respect. . . . Central to his goal was the need to convince the other powers that Germany was what he repeatedly asserted: a "saturated" power that needed to turn inward to consolidate in peace what had been gained in three swift wars.

[Following the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the first and most important part of Bismarck's system to be sacrificed was a flexible accommodation (the Reinsurance Treaty) with the Russians that kept them isolated from France and kept Germany from becoming too closely linked to Austrian ambitions. A few years later the two-front Schlieffen Plan grew in response to a Franco-Russian alliance that Bismarck had so skillfully prevented].

3. David W. Ziegler

German preparation for war followed the Schlieffen Plan, which rested on several assumptions. One was that any major war in Europe would be for the Germans a two-front war, against Russia in the east and France in the west. Another assumption was that the huge Russian army would be impossible to defeat; the most the Germans could hope to do would be to keep the Russian army from defeating them. The one advantage that the Germans had, the Schlieffen Plan assumed, was technological superiority, particularly the ability to mobilize quickly. They assumed they could mobilize in two weeks; the Russians, with more territory and a less-developed railroad network, would need six weeks. Therefore, the Schlieffen Plan called for a major offensive first against France, to knock it out of the war before turning the German army to the more difficult task of fighting the Russian army. For this reason, the Russian mobilization was greeted with alarm in Berlin. If the Schlieffen Plan were to work (and for all practical purposes it was the only plan the Germans had), then it was essential that the Germans begin mobilizing as soon as the Russians did. Otherwise they would lose the advantage afforded them by their superior technology. Never mind that the Russian mobilization was directed against Austria. The crucial factor, in German eyes, was mobilization.

Thus when the Germans in their turn delivered an ultimatum to Russia on July 31, demanding that they demobilize, it was not so much in defense of Austria as
in defense of their own strategic situation. When Russia declined to demobilize, the Germans mobilized. The French, realizing what was coming, did so too. . . .

The connecting thread, from the assassination in Sarajevo to the German attack on France, was military planning.

4. **Erik von Kuehnelt-Ledhihn:**

[At the end of the war the Reichstag appointed a commission to determine responsibility for the war. Dr. Arthur Rosenberg, a Social Democrat who headed the commission, exonerated Wilhelm II almost completely. Erik von Kuehnelt-Ledhihn describes the emperor as] a gifted but rather loud-mouthed and most undiplomatic ruler. . . . He was a victim of too much adulation and misinformation, but was by no means a villain, as Walter Rathenau has pointed out. . . .

Harry Elmer Barnes, an American historian who tried to assess the guilt for this silliest of all major wars, named Serbia first, Russia second, Austria-Hungary third, France fourth, the German Reich fifth, and Britain sixth. What could have been a local intervention by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was transformed into a pan-European war by the actions of two Russians, War Minister Sukhomlinov and General Yanushyévich, chief of the Russian general staff. They lied constantly to their emperor about their mobilization not only along the Austrian, but also along the German frontier. An exchange of telegrams between “Willy” and “Nicky” (unfortunately, there was no “hot line” yet) caused the Kaiser to believe that his cousin and friend was trying to deceive him. He thereupon declared war on Russia. (Footnote: The Bolsheviks tried Yanushkievitch and Sukhomlinov in 1918 – at that time a fair trial was still possible. Both insisted that they had acted as patriots. In retrospect it become clear that they acted less as patriots than as faithful servants of France. Lord Grey was very right when he wrote: “Let it never be forgotten that it was the energy and tremendous sacrifice with which Russia made this advance [i.e. into East Prussia] that saved the Allies in the summer of 1914. . . . The whole-hearted efforts and all the strength of Russia were needed in the early stages to save the Allies”). Russia was tied to France by a military alliance; and thus began a war that could have been ended by a compromise as late as 1917, which would have saved us the misery Europe has been living in ever since. But the American intervention made compromise impossible. The Germans, most of the time victorious in this war about Austria-Hungary, were forced to their knees primarily by the hunger blockade.

**Appendices Review, Part B**

two theories of German policy  Bismarck’s achievements  hazards of the Schlieffen Plan  war guilt  

**Nye Review, Part B**

causes of World War I: key factors at the individual and structural levels of analysis  changes in the process  Kaiser Wilhelm II  Czar Nicholas II
CHAPTER FOUR: THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND WORLD WAR II

Study Questions

1. **The Rise and Fall of Collective Security: The League of Nations** What change was Woodrow Wilson determined to introduce into the international system (which is reflected in his famous **14 Points**)? Identify the three major points of the collective security system? Identify three ways in which it differed from the balance of power approach. What were some of the ambiguities in the Covenant of the League of Nations? What was its understanding of international law? (117-20)

2. **The United States and the League of Nations** [American opponents of the Versailles Treaty were divided into two camps: reservationists and irreconcilables]. Henry Cabot Lodge, a political ally of the late Theodore Roosevelt, led the reservationists. [Intellectual animosity long characterized the relationship between Wilson and Lodge]. (120-21)

3. **The Early Days of the League** What did the French want? The British? Why did the French form alliances with Poland and the Little Entente? What was the state of Germany after the war? How did the Versailles Treaty make things worse? Why were the Italians unhappy with the peace (consider the Treaty of London)? What commitments did Germany make in the Treaty of Locarno? What was the Kellogg-Briand Pact? (121-23)

4. **The Manchurian Failure, the Ethiopian Debacle** Why did collective security fail in Manchuria and Ethiopia? [Discrimination against Japan by the United States in the Washington Conference’s 5:5:3:1:1 formula for postwar naval size was also a sore point]. Why did the sanctions against Italy finally take a back seat in 1936? [The Haitian delegate showed a real understanding of Thomas Hobbes’s point about equality in the state of nature]. (123-26)

5. **The Origins of World War II: Hitler’s War?** How was the German problem solved after the Second World War? What kind of war did Hitler want? What is the significance of the Hossbach memorandum? (126-28)

6. **Hitler’s Strategy** What were Hitler’s four options when he came to power in 1933? Identify the four phases in which he pursued the fourth option. How did Hitler outmaneuver his foes at Stresa and in the Rhineland? [The Anschluss is the name given Hitler’s seizure of Austria in 1938]. What excuse did Hitler use to justify seizing the Sudetenland? The Munich Conference is now synonymous with the word “appeasement” (see pp. 107-08). Hitler’s “brilliant diplomatic coup” (p. 97) was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an alliance of two predatory regimes. The seizure of western Poland in September 1939 was followed by the “Phony War,” which lasted until May. But neither the Russians, who had seized eastern Poland in mid-September, nor the Germans were quiet. Russia annexed the Baltic states, then invaded Finland at the end of November, resulting in its expulsion from the League of Nations. The Phony War
became a shooting war in the West when the Germans seized Denmark and Norway in April and then launched the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France in May. All through this period Hitler monopolized the initiative; his foes merely reacted. The real issue is: Why did Hitler finally fail? (128-32)

7. **The Role of the Individual** What aspects of Hitler’s personality brought on global war and failure? How did he misjudge the United States? (133)

8. **Systemic and Domestic Causes** At the structural level, what made the Versailles Treaty too harsh and too lenient at the same time (here analogies might be made with the conclusion of the Gulf War)? Identify three domestic-level changes. Food for thought: What domestic-level factors shape American policy today? How do the various causes fit together? (133-35)

9. **Was War Inevitable?** What might the Western democracies have done differently? When did war become virtually inevitable? (135-36)

10. **The Pacific War** What was the economic and political context in which Japan began to impose its East Asia Co-Prospertiy Sphere? After Japan’s seizure of French Indochina following the fall of France, what three options could the militarists have exercised? Why did they choose to move against the United States? How did the three levels of analysis work together? (136-40)

11. **Appeasement and Two Types of War** In the author’s judgment, when was appeasement appropriate? Inappropriate? (140-42)

**Review**

collective security systems vs. balance of power systems sovereignty
appeasement Henry Cabot Lodge Treaty of Locarno
war-guilt clause crises over Manchuria and Ethiopia in the 1930s
League of Nations sanctions the four phases of Hitler’s breakout strategy
precipitating cause of World War II Franklin Roosevelt
Sudetenland [Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact] appeasement
Greater East Asia Co-Prospertiy Sphere oil embargo
precipitating causes of the Pacific War what might have forestalled World War I
what might have prevented World War II

**CHAPTER FIVE: THE COLD WAR**

**Study Questions**

1. **Deterrence and Containment** Distinguish between **deterrence** and **containment**. Give examples of each. (147-48)

2. **Explaining the Cold War: Three Approaches** Identify the three main **schools of opinion** on the causes of the Cold War. What evidence does each school of opinion cite in favor of its view? How do **hard revisionists** differ from **soft revisionists**? Basically, what view does **John Lewis Gaddis** take today? (148-51)

3. **Roosevelt’s Policies, Stalin’s Policies** Why did Roosevelt demand unconditional surrender? What are some examples of Soviet pragmatism during the war? (151-52)
4. **Phases of the Conflict** Identify the six issues that contributed to the eventual change from Roosevelt’s strategy to the onset of the Cold War. What happened to the **lend-lease** aid program? From Kennan’s and Litvinov’s perspectives, why would appeasement have failed to work? What did Kennan object to in the **Truman Doctrine**? What was the rationale for the **Marshall Plan**? What caused Truman finally to sign NSC-68 in June 1950? (153-59)

5. **Inevitability?** Where do the different schools get the picture right or wrong? What alternative strategies may eased the tensions? But the nature of Communism should be kept firmly in mind, particularly the terrorist component cited an article by Anna Geifman. (159-60)

6. **Levels of Analysis** What did Alexis de Tocqueville predict (in 1835)?

   There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limited can be perceived. . . . The American struggles against the obstacles which nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men. The former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its arms. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

   What changed between the two powers after the war? What were the two roots of Soviet foreign policy? Identify four peculiarities of Russian political culture. What did the communist system add? Identify four peculiarities of American political culture. How has the affected the American foreign policy process [which is often described as oscillating between **introversion** and **extroversion**]? (160-62)

6. **U.S. and Soviet Goals in the Cold War** Distinguish between **possession goals** and **milieu goals**. How did Soviet expansionism differ from Hitler’s? Is there evidence of a more threatening nature? What was George Kennan’s idea of **containment**? What was the rationale for American aid to Yugoslavia? What change after the Korean War? What were some signs of a thaw in the Cold War after Stalin’s death? Why did Khrushchev’s approach fail? What was détente? How did the Nixon Administration make use of it as a means to pursue the goals of containment? Identify three trends in the 1970s that undercut it? (162-64)


8. **Motives, Means, and Consequences** What are the three dimensions of judgment
associated with the just war tradition? Why do the authors believe the Vietnam War failed to meet any of the three dimensions? How did changes in containment policy lead to intervention in Vietnam? Why did George Kennan become disillusioned with containment? (165-67)

9. The Rest of the Cold War How did Nikita Khrushchev’s actions weaken the Soviet Union and intensify the Cold War? Identify three trends in the 1970s that undercut détente. (171-73)

10. The End of the Cold War Identify some of the explanations for the end of the Cold War. How do the three types of causes help clarify the timing of the end of the Cold War? Why was an individual, Mikhail Gorbachev, the most important precipitating cause? [A case can be made for adding Ronald Reagan]. How did Gorbachev’s policies, glasnost, perestroika, and the new thinking, contribute to the Soviet collapse? [The 1980s arms race also contributed]. What was the role of liberal ideas and what Paul Kennedy calls imperial overstretch? What are some of the evidences of a loss of legitimacy? Identify some deeper consequences of de-Stalinization in 1956, repressive measures in the Soviet empire, and Soviet incompetence in face of the creative destruction (Joseph Schumpeter’s term) of capitalism? What were the effects of IMF shock therapy? (173-78)

11. The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Physics and Politics What was the Baruch Plan? Identify five significant political effects of the H-bomb. (178-82)

12. Balance of Terror, Problems of Nuclear Deterrence What made bipolarity a particularly stable type of system? What is the reasoning behind nuclear deterrence (especially in the context of a second-strike capability)? What accounts for early self-restraint? (182-85)

13. The Cuban Missile Crisis Identify various views that attempt to account for the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. What were the American options? How did its resolution a compromise? (185-88)

14. Moral Issues How could nuclear war fit the just war theory? What are some of the continuing concerns about the potential use of nuclear weapons? (189-91)

Review
deterrence containment traditionalists
soft revisionists hard revisionists postrevisionists
George Kennan William Appleman Williams John Lewis Gaddis
Stalin’s use of Russian nationalism and communist ideology in World War II
signs of the onset of the Cold War phases of the conflict Truman Doctrine
Marshall Plan Baruch Plan Alexis de Tocqueville
U.S. and Soviet goals Vietnam War just war tradition
changes in containment Nikita Khrushchev secret speech
Cuban Missile Crisis and superiority in nuclear weaponry resurgence in hostility
end of Cold War: causes Gorbachev’s personality glasnost
perestroika
democratization Gorbachev’s new thinking
fall of the Berlin Wall Paul Kennedy’s idea of imperial overstretch
Communism’s loss of legitimacy Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction
Soviet economic decline shock therapy political effects of the H-bomb
credibility U.S. military buildup
CHAPTER SIX: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Study Questions

1. **Managing Conflict on the World Stage**  What are the four main types of goods from an economic standpoint? Garrett Hardin coined the term tragedy of the commons, which refers to the dilemma created when multiple actors, who are otherwise rationally pursuing their own self-interest, deplete a shared limited resource. Mineral depletion allowances, fishing license, grazing fees, and common law riparian rights have been traditional mechanisms for helping conserve commonly held resources. Some communities in Oregon claim all of the rain that falls within a given watershed. How does cooperation affect the allocation and use of private goods and club goods? What of the international dimension? How were Cold War conflicts usually managed? (201-04)

2. **International Law and International Organization**  Why is international organization not an incipient world government? How does international law differ from domestic law, especially regarding enforcement and adjudication? (204-07)

3. **Predictability and Legitimacy**  Why are states interested in international law? (207-08)

4. **The United Nations: Collective Security, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding**  Identify some of the formal steps taken in the development of international law and collective security? How does the U.N. Security Council work? What are some of the difficulties in defining aggression? Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson took the lead in developing what was called preventive diplomacy as part of the UN’s peacekeeping missions. UNEF became the model for subsequent “blue helmet” missions. Why was U.N collective security used in 1990 for the first time since the Korean War? What are some of the remaining practical limitations on collective security? What is meant by peacebuilding? Why is it difficult to reform the United Nations? What are some proposals for doing so? (208-15)

5. **Post-Cold War Armed Conflict**  How are the worst ethnic or communal wars generally fueled? What are failed states? How do constructivists analyze such conflicts as the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and the ethnic violence that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia? Some theorists attribute ethnic conflict to a Freudian “narcissism of small differences?” Political entrepreneurs and violent groups seek to shape or reconstruct the political identity of political groups by manipulating ethnic myths and fears.

6. ** Intervention and Sovereignty**  What is the basis for humanitarian intervention? Why is nonintervention a powerful norm of international law? (219-20)

7. **Defining Intervention**  Illustrate some of the forms intervention may take, as in the case of economic assistance, support for the opposition (a form of electioneering), and the sending of military advisers? What makes intervention hard to define? (220-22)

8. **Judging Intervention**  How do realists, cosmopolitans, and state moralists differ in their views of intervention? Which school of thought is most apt to support humanitarian intervention? What were the Brezhnev Doctrine [the Soviet Union committed itself to prevent any parts of its empire from seceding or being overthrown] and the Reagan Doctrine? [A book entitled Reagan’s War argues that Ronald Reagan made the defeat of Communism the central goal of his Administration, capping his own decades-long struggle against Communism in Hollywood and public life]. (222-23)
9. **Exceptions to the Rule of Non-Intervention** Identify Michael Walzer's four situations in which war or military intervention may be justified. What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments? (223-24)

7. **Problems of Self-Determination** What are some of the problems with intervention on behalf of secessionist movements? Why is the question of voting (in a plebiscite) so complicated? Does secession harm those who are left behind? Why did Biafra's secession (1967-1970) create a problem for the rest of Nigeria? What factors complicated the issue of how to respond to **ethnic cleansing** in Bosnia? Why then is self-determination "an ambiguous moral principle?" (224-27)

8. **Genocide and the “Responsibility to Protect”** How are state responsibilities to be balanced? What is R2P? What are some of the obstacles to internationalizing responsibility for peace? How is genocide defined? Political groups, however, were deliberately excluded from the definition at the time it was drafted. What made Darfur an early acid test of R2P? The “mission creep” that resulted in the overthrow of Gaddafi, which was not the express purpose of Res. 1973, has made Russia and China reluctant to take similar steps against Syria. (227-29)

**Review**

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<th>types of goods</th>
<th>rivalry</th>
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**CHAPTER SEVEN: CURRENT FLASHPOINTS**

**Study Questions**

1. **Interstate Conflict** Why does John Mueller argue that major interstate war has become “obsolescent?” Why are the authors unconvinced? (232)

2. **Eastern Europe: A New Cold War?** Why was the post-Cold War honeymoon between the West and Russia short-lived? Evaluate the four competing paradigms concerning this deterioration. Why are the Marxist and liberal paradigms inadequate? How do the realist and constructivist differ? Given the economic rise of China, realism would be more likely to predict a U.S.-China rivalry. Discuss some of the weaknesses of the realist position with regard to per capita GDP, life expectancy at birth, and nuclear weapons. How is the constructivist paradigm helpful when it comes to the following: NATO expansion, Kosovo, Ukraine and Crimea? (232-41)

3. **Fragmentation and Ferment in the Near East and Middle East** Identify three factors at the root of so much Middle East conflict? What miscalculations led to the Iran-Iraq War? How does nationalism cause war? What are the implications of the word being both descriptive and prescriptive? How did this idea arise and spread? How has decolonization changed the nineteenth century model of states? What role has been played by the “pan” movements? The so-called Arab Spring (or Awakening) may prove
to be part of a transition from the predominance of pan-Arab national socialism to Islamist communitarianism in the Middle East. (243-46)

4. **Israel** Identify wars produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict, including non-state actors. What are some of the ambiguities of Resolution 242? What changed following the Yom Kippur War which led to the Camp David Accords? Why were these wars generally short? What was the superpower role during the bipolar Cold War? The shift from interstate to intrastate war and from regular military combat to **asymmetrical conflict** is part of a global pattern. (247-53)

5. **Iraq** What reasons did Iraq have for invading Kuwait? Why did the United States respond as it did? Was the war necessary? What did it solve? Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its allies overthrew the Taliban government in Afghanistan and then the Iraqi regime. What have been some of the effects of Saddam Hussein’s removal from power? (257-60)

6. **Iran** What are the sources of Iranian power? A factor in the destabilization of Iran that is not mentioned is British/Soviet occupation of the country during WWII and the continued occupation of the north by the Soviet Union for a year after the war and the declaration of a People’s Republic of Azerbaijan and a Kurdish People’s Republic. What caused the Islamic Revolution? What has been the Western response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions? (263-65)

7. **Afghanistan** What makes Afghanistan the “graveyard of empires?” An incubator for radical ideas and groups? (268-69)

8. **Syria** How did ISIL (ISIS) emerge as a result of the Arab Awakening and the Syrian Civil War? (271)

9. **Yemen** What three distinct battles are raging in Yemen? (272-73)

10. **Uneasy Standoff: India and Pakistan** The maharaja of Kashmir, a Hindu, actually acceded to India, although the population is predominantly Muslim. What factors make conflict between India and Pakistan especially worrisome? (274-76)

11. **The Rise of China?** What were the concessionary (or unequal) treaties and how did they weaken Chinese sovereignty (under the Manchu Empire)? Why is China so sensitive to perceived slights? What is meant by “Middle Kingdom” primacy (or hegemony)? What is at issue with such terms as pivot, rebalance, and containment? What are two major bones of contention? (278-80)

12. **The South China Sea** How important is the sea in terms of resources and why is the potential for international conflict there so serious? (280)

13. **The Taiwan Strait** What is the historical background to the conflict? Why does the Strait remain dangerous? (283-84)

14. **The East China Sea** What is at issue with various island chains (including the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and the Paracels and Spratlys in the South China Sea) and EEZs? (288-89)

15. **Rogue Wild card: North Korea** Why does this impoverished, underdeveloped country pose a serious regional security threat? (290-92)

**Review**
post-Cold War paradigms  Kosovo  Crimea
Iran-Iraq War  Islamic Revolution  Sunnis vs. Shi'ites
different uses of the ideology of  nationalism  nineteenth-century model of nation-states
“pan” movements  roots of the Middle East conflicts  Arab-Israeli wars
Six-Day War  Yom Kippur War  Hezbollah and Hamas
asymmetrical conflict  attitude of small states about the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War
Saddam Hussein  9/11  sources of Iranian power
Islamic Revolution  Kashmir  Indo-Pakistani rivalry
South China Sea  Taiwan Strait  North Korea

CHAPTER EIGHT: GLOBALIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE

Outline

A. INTRODUCTION (299)
   1. Fault Line Between Those with Skills and Mobility and Those Without
   2. New Competition Among States in “geoconomics” [cf. Walter Russell Mead’s millennial capitalism]

B. THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (299-301)
   1. Globalization: Worldwide Networks of Interdependence
      a. It does not imply universality
   2. It Has Made National Boundaries More Porous
      a. Homogenization does not follow from globalization
   3. Three Dimensions:
   4. Environmental
      a. Smallpox
      b. Black Death
      c. HIV/AIDS
      d. Exotic flora and fauna
      e. Global climate change
   5. Military
      a. World-straddling alliances
      b. Missiles
   6. Social
      a. American population
      b. Four great world religions
      c. Spread of constitutional arrangements and political ideas

C. WHAT’S NEW ABOUT TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GLOBALIZATION? (301-03)
   1. Network Effects
      a. Joseph Stiglitz: Spillover Effects
   2. Thickness
   3. Quickness
   4. Direct Public Participation
      a. Democratization
      b. Pluralization

Study Questions

1. Dimensions of Globalization  What is meant by “geoconomics”?  Why does globalization not imply universality?  Identify its three chief dimensions.  What is happening with the pace of environmental change?  What are some of the features of political globalization?  (299-301)
2. **What's New** Identify **four effects** of contemporary globalization that reveal it to be “farther, faster, cheaper and deeper,” according to Thomas Friedman [cf. the Olympics: faster, higher, stronger]. (301-03)

3. **Political Reactions to Globalization** How do different societies accommodate change? What is some of the evidence of increasing inequality between people in the richest countries and people in the poorest? [In *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (1998), David S. Landes, a Harvard economic historian, maintained that the income difference between Switzerland and Madagascar is about 400:1]. What have been some of the effects of the market forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution? What is meant by “useful inefficiencies”? (303-05)

3. **The Concept of Interdependence** How do statesmen and analysts differ in their use of political words? As an analytic word, what is **interdependence**? What are some sources of interdependence? Why did the collapse of the Soviet bring relief in the West rather than cause anxiety? Why did the cost of bread rise in the 1970s? What happened when the United States decided in 1973 to stop exporting soybeans to Japan? Why is the distribution of benefits a “zero-sum game”? Why does the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs become blurred? Why does classical balance of power theory not fit economic interdependence very well? (305-08)

4. **Costs of Interdependence** Distinguish between short-term **sensitivity** and long-term **vulnerability**. Identify three factors involved by vulnerability. What was behind the error in Lester Brown’s prediction that the United States would be dependent on imports of 10 of the basic 13 industrial raw materials by 1985? (308-10)

5. **Symmetry of Interdependence** When the United States became dependent on imported Japanese capital to balance its federal budget in the 1980s, did this give Japan either a political or a trade advantage? How can manipulation of **asymmetries** be a source of power in the politics of interdependence? What is **linkage**? How do international institutions sometimes set the rules for **trade-offs**? Even though Canada is more dependent on the United States than vice versa, what accounts for its ability to prevail in a number of disputes between them? What is the effect of pacts such as NAFTA? (310-13)

6. **Leadership in the World Economy** Why did hegemony over the international economy shift from Great Britain to the United States? What crisis occurred due to the American unwillingness to live up to its new responsibilities? What are some of the key institutions of the post-WWII international economic regime? How do the ideas of realism and complex interdependence describe the US/China relationship? (313-19)

7. **The Politics of Oil** What were the characteristics of the international oil regime in 1960? What is OPEC? What are some explanations for the changes in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf? What changes were evident as a result of the Arab oil embargo of 1973? Describe three explanations of the changes in the international oil regime. What are the particulars of each? Why was the oil weapon not more effective? (319-23)

8. **Oil as a Power Resource** How did the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 modify American foreign policy? How did reciprocity of independence affect the use of oil as a weapon? One factor is that Saudi Arabia was deeply worried about the Soviet Union, just as it is deeply worried about Iran today. What are some non-OPEC oil sources? What are some unconventional sources of oil? (323-25)

**Review**
CHAPTER NINE: THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS

Study Questions

1. **Power and the Information Revolution**  Why have governments always worried about the flow and control of information?  How did Gutenberg’s invention of movable type change the world?  What is the key characteristic of the information revolution, which is sometimes called the **Third Industrial Revolution**?  What changes were wrought by the first two industrial revolutions?  What is meant by the **management of scale**?  Why does productivity growth lag?  What were the political effects of mass communication and broadcasting?  How and why have they changed?  How is Internet lessening the control of governments over their agendas?  (329-33)

2. **A New World Politics?**  Does the information revolution tend to equalize power among nations?  According to realists, what trends aid the already large and powerful?  What are “network effects”?  GPS and navigation systems are widely available but information systems also create vulnerabilities.  A revolution in military affairs also strengthens already powerful countries?  Why are most information shapers democracies?  Why are closed systems more costly?  What conclusions does the author draw about the information revolution?  How, according to Peter Drucker and the Tofflers, is the information revolution bringing an end to the hierarchical bureaucratic organizations (cyber-feudalism) that typified the industrial revolution and the Westphalian state system?  The term “cybernetics” -- which was introduced by the scientist and philosopher, Norbert Wiener, in the 1940s -- is derived from the Greek root kubernetes [pilot or steersman], as governor is derived from the Latin equivalent.  (333-37)

3. **Sovereignty and Control**  What are the implications of the communications revolution for national identity, loyalty, and sovereignty?  What changed as a result of medieval trade fairs (e.g., Scarborough Fair)?

NOTE: Serfs who escaped to live and work in the medieval free cities won their freedom after a year and a day: “Stadtluft macht frei” [city airs makes (one) free].  Hitler’s concentration camps changed the slogan to “Arbeit macht frei” [work makes one free].  The **lex mercatoria** [merchant or market law] was developed as a private set of rules, complete with courts, for conducting business.  In The Mystery of Capital, the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto examines the development of property protections on the American frontier and commends the American model for land reform in Third World areas.
The ideas of complex interdependence and transnational actors are not at all new. Cf. Adda B. Bozeman on the origins of the Hanseatic League in *Politics and Culture in International History* (1960):

“The objective and subjective factors that had distinguished the Western European approach to peace and unity in religious, political, and intellectual matters, and had given rise, in consequence, to the permanent establishment of the three great concerts or "virtues" of the Church, the Empire, and the University of Paris, and the *ad hoc* assembling of all European interests at Constance were operative also in the field of Europe's economic life where they called forth a remarkable movement toward federalism among the rising groups of townsmen and merchants.”

“This impulse toward corporate unity was particularly strong north of the Alps, where the absence of a protective secular international order was felt more keenly than in Italy. Here, in the midst of political confusion, where travelling merchants had long been in the habit of carrying their special merchant law with them, and where cities had evolved their own law in protection of their special peace, certain German towns recorded what may be the most suggestive chapter in the annals of inter-European constitutionalism when they formed the *transterritorial* League of Hanseatic cities.”

“The North European scene in which the German merchants operated before the twelfth century . . . presented greater hazards and greater opportunities for adventurous action than the southern region. East of the river Elbe spread the vast territorial expanse of rural, pagan Slavdom. Here the pioneering merchants are known to have conducted a border trade as early as the ninth century A.D. This penetration, later supported by organized campaigns of colonization and Christianization, brought the entering Germans into contact with local rulers under whose protection they proceeded to found and build numerous towns. Lübeck, renowned in later centuries as the leader of the Hanseatic League, was the first of these settlements that pointed, chainlike, toward the magnetic market of Novgorod. From the eastern ports of the "new" Germany the companies pushed to the farthest Baltic coast, gained economic control over the Baltic Sea, and established a direct route between these northern waters and the Black Sea by traveling on the Oder or the Vistula to Cracow, and thence on the Pruth or Dniester to their southern ports of destination.”

“The recognition granted the Germans abroad coincided with the constitutional status that the trading companies had evolved for themselves, for all Germans who were natives of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were actually organized at this time as *universitas communium mercatorum*. This first all-German *universitas*, the predecessor of the Hanseatic League, united the merchants of over thirty towns, from Cologne and Utrecht in the west to Reval in the east, and had
its headquarters on the island of Gotland, then known as the axis and most celebrated market of Europe.” (505-06)

How does the transition from the medieval to the modern political world illustrate the resistance, slowness, or lag of political institutions in responding to change? Identify some of “the growing list of problems that are difficult to control within sovereign borders.” How do competing sovereignties affect border control, national security, and human rights? How have human rights issues effectively modified the UN rule against intervention? How do cross-cutting identities (like “cross-cutting cleavages”) and cosmopolitan identities complicate the existing mix of loyalties? How have diaspora communities (exiles, such as the Iraqis in America who voted in the 2005 election) used Internet to stay politically involved with their home country? What are “flash movements?” How does Arab Spring demonstrate the transformative power of the Internet? What is James Rosenau’s “fragmegration?” (338-43)

4. The Information Revolution and Complex Interdependence What is meant by the “paradox of plenty?” What does the author mean when he writes: “Now credibility is the crucial resource,” and “Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility?” What are the implications of a shift from broadcasting to narrowcasting? (343-45)

5. What are transnational actors? How do they add to the blurring of foreign and domestic politics even within the bureaucracy? What economic interests in America were not unhappy that OPEC raised oil prices? What is one of the distinguishing characteristics if complex interdependence? Give some examples of NGOs. (346-52)

6. Transnational Terrorism and the “War on Terror” How does Daniel Gilbert view the psychology of terrorism? How does the death toll from terrorism compare with that from drug cartels and paramilitaries (which may also be considered terrorist organizations)? How does an organization like al-Qaeda threaten American democracy? What is the most effective way of combating transnational terrorism? (352-56)

7. Conclusions Four likely future effects of the information revolution. (356-57)

Review

Gutenberg’s movable type key characteristic of the information revolution
characteristics of the three industrial revolutions management of scale
productivity growth lag totalitarianism (closed systems) and mass communication
Peter Drucker Alvin and Heidi Toffler
centralizing and decentralizing effects of computing power medieval trade fairs
Hanseatic League cross-cutting identities diaspora [dispersion] communities
NGOs terrorism and states paradox of plenty
competitive credibility narrowcasting terrorism
al-Qaeda conclusions about the information revolution

CHAPTER TEN: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT IN THE FUTURE?

Outline

A. ALTERNATIVE VISIONS (360-65)
   1. Self-Help Realm
   2. Arnold Toynbee: Nation-State vs. Fission
3. **Large Territorial State** as the Post-Westphalian Norm

4. **Five Alternatives**
   a. World Federalism
   b. Functionalism
   c. Regionalism: Jean Monnet, Schumann Plan, Treaty of Rome (EU)
   d. Ecologism: Richard Falk
   e. Cyberfeudalism: Peter Drucker, the Tofflers, Esther Dyson
      (1) Crosscutting Communities
      (2) Terrorists
      (3) Thomas Hobbes

5. **Sovereign States Have Not Become Obsolete**
   a. **Political Goals**: Physical Security, Economic Well-Being, Communal Identity

6. **Changing Context**
   a. Divisiveness: Religious and Nationalistic Cleavages
   b. **Economic Integration** vs. **Political Fragmentation**

7. **Communications and Diplomacy**
   a. CNN
   b. Synchronization

8. **“Narrowcasting” of Information**

**B. THE END OF HISTORY OR THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?** (365-67)

1. **Francis Fukuyama**’s End of History
   a. Deep Ideological Cleavages
   b. Success of Liberal Capitalism
   c. Post-Cold War Return of History

2. **Samuel P. Huntington**’s Clash of Civilizations
   a. Toynbee’s Civilizations

3. Critique

4. Nationalism

5. **East vs. West Europe**

6. Explanations
   a. Role of Economic Growth
   b. Democratic Processes
   c. Regional Institutions

7. Persistence of National Identity
   a. French and Germans
   b. Immigration
   c. Failure to Assimilate Immigrants
   d. Xenophobes

**C. TECHNOLOGY AND THE DIFFUSION OF POWER** (367-69)

1. **Diffusion of Power**
   a. Erosion of Control
   b. Trends

2. Consequences
   a. Islands of Democratic Peace vs. a New Feudalism

3. Benign Vision: NGOs

4. MNCs

5. Confusion of Identity

6. Protectionism

**D. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION** (369-71)

1. Malign Vision
   a. WMDs
   b. Proliferation

2. Nuclear Club

3. **Cold War Obstacles to Nuclear Proliferation**
a. Cold War Alliance Structure
b. Superpower Cooperation
   (1) Nuclear Suppliers Group
c. Treaties and Institutions
   (1) India Cheated

4. Collapse of Soviet Alliance Guarantees

E. TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECURITY: TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
   (372-75)
1. Definition of Terrorism
2. George W. Bush and Just War Doctrine
   a. Wars of national liberation
   b. State war crimes
3. Transnational Terrorism Analogized with the Piracy of an Earlier Era
   a. Vulnerability of modern systems
   b. enhanced appreciation of the role of states
4. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
   a. Fissile materials
   b. Biological Agents
   c. Transnational Terrorism
   d. Aum Shinrikyo
5. Netwars: Attacks on Information Systems
6. Inadequacy of Deterrence
   a. State Terrorism
   b. Panama’s Manuel Noriega
7. The Great Fear (La Grande Peur, 1789)
   a. Use by terrorism by revolutionary France, anarchists, Germany, Russia
8. Difficulty in Organizing Trustworthy Cells [Lenin was the master organizer]
   a. Proliferation of jihadist websites

F. CYBERWARFARE (375-76)
1. Critical Infrastructure
   a. Vulnerability of electric power grids [including to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks]
2. Diffusion of Power from Central Governments to Individuals [a good argument for returning to federalism and decentralization]
   a. Examples of cyber-attacks: Philippines, Estonia, Georgia, Iran
   b. Stuxnet is one of an ensemble of computer viruses attacking the Iranian nuclear program

G. PANDEMICS (376-77)
1. Spanish Flu, 1918-1920
   a. Perhaps a quarter of the world’s population was infected; perhaps 50-120 million died
2. HIV: Death toll is more than 25 million
3. Exotic (Imported) Diseases: West Nile, H1N1, Tuberculosis

H. CLIMATE CHANGE (377-81)
1. Carbon Emissions: A Negative Externality
   a. The issue of anthropogenic causes is still controversial within and between different parts of the scientific community
2. Effects of Climate Change
3. Ways of Reducing Carbon Emissions
4. Free-Rider Problem

I. A NEW WORLD ORDER? (382-83): Global Governance
1. Order
   a. Realists
   b. Liberals
   c. Constructivists
2. Conspiracy Theories
3. Lack of Definition

J. FUTURE CONFIGURATIONS OF POWER (383-86)
1. Rapid Power Transitions
2. Multipolarity
3. Unipolar Hegemony
   a. Tripolar Economic Power
4. Transnational Relations
5. Three Economic Blocs: Europe, Asia, North America
6. Multilevel Interdependence
7. No American Hegemony

K. THE PRISON OF OLD CONCEPTS (386-88)
1. Sui Generis [Self-Generating] System
2. Realist View
   a. Erosion of Classical Conception
3. Liberal View
5. Unforeseen Rise of Bipolarity
6. Issue of Self-Determination

L. THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID WORLD ORDER (388-90)
1. Human Rights
   a. Sanctions against South Africa
   b. Helsinki Accords
2. Armed Multilateral Intervention
4. What Realists and Liberals Must Recognize

M. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE (391-92)
1. Change
   a. Thucydides
   b. Kant
2. Thinking about Different Ideal Types

Study Questions

1. Why did Arnold Toynbee believe that the nation-state and the split atom could not coexist on the same planet? Identify five alternative futures. What do people want from their political institutions? How is the context of world politics changing? What is meant by “narrowcasting”? (316-20)

2. Compare and contrast the theories of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington. What are some of the criticisms? How does the author account for the virtual absence of intrastate conflict in Europe? Is nationalism dead in Europe? (320-23)

3. What third vision of the future does the author offer? Compare the benign with the malign vision? How is transnational investment [Mead’s millennial capitalism] helping to confuse identities? What were the chief obstacles to nuclear proliferation during the Cold War? Why is deterrence inadequate to protect from terrorist threats? What then is required? (323-27)

4. What is the nature of terrorism? How does it compare with piracy in an earlier era? How important is the role of states, including failed states? The combination of great fear and sophisticated technology makes for greater vulnerability and the “privatization of war.” (327-30)

5. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure should be evident when considering cyber-warfare, pandemics, and climate change. Warfare over scarce resources is a distinct prospect. What is the free rider problem?
At a time of rapid power transitions following the Cold War, what future scenarios are usually invoked? In “The Prison of Old Concepts,” what does the author find salvageable? What does he mean by a “hybrid world order”? Why must we understand both the realist and the liberal views of world politics? (337-46)

Review

Arnold Toynbee: large territorial state and the five alternatives
Richard Falk: what people want from their political institutions
Samuel P. Huntington: East vs. West Europe
benign vs. malign visions
terrorism
pandemics
Darfur conflict
free rider problem
problem of self-determination

Marshall McLuhan: diffusion of power
Francis Fukuyama: Cold War obstacles to nuclear proliferation
jihadist websites
climate change
ways of reducing carbon emissions
rapid power transitions
multipolarity
negative externalities