An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in Uniting the Intelligence Community

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Abstract

September 11, 2001 marks the date of the largest attack on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II. This event not only changed the lives of individuals who suffered intense loss but changed the course of American history in several ways. This paper focuses specifically on the changes in the intelligence community since the attacks. The attacks that 9/11 presented flaws in the system created demonstrating weakness as a direct result of the immense destruction that occurred.

The thesis of this paper is to analyze, assess, and draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the creation of the Director of National Intelligence position in the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act, 2004. To assess that effectiveness, an overview of the Intelligence Community will be examined along with the relationship that exists between the DNI and other agencies, decisions that were made by incumbents, and an analysis of the security environments for the United States. The analysis demonstrates that the DNI does not necessarily help solve any problems, but creates another layer of bureaucracy.
An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in Uniting the Intelligence Community

Prior to 1940, the U.S. had two military branches with which to engage in war but did not have any type of intelligence organization. The main reason being for the lack of intelligence existing prior to this time period, despite the fact that the U.S. was founded in 1776 with the signing of the Declaration of Independence, is because the U.S. had too small an interest in international relations to need anything more than a minimum military organization. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was founded in 1908 by Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte. The FBI was to be an investigative force of the Department of Justice. Today, its main intelligence interest is in domestic rather than international.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Coordinator of Information (COI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) on the brink of World War II, led by William Donovan. These organizations acted as counterpart to the British intelligence agency that has its root in history hundreds of years before any national intelligence community in the U.S. existed. During the war the OSS had little impact on contributing to the Allied forces in winning, although it acted as a foundation for foreign intelligence in regards to espionage and counterintelligence operations. The military and OSS had a difficult interaction because of lack of trust between the two government bodies. As a result the

2. Ibid.
Joint Chief of Staff decided that the best way to unify both of the intelligence areas to create a better way to share information. While the OSS was incorporated under this structure, tension still existed between the two because of similar functions. This trend exists to this day as evident in the somewhat strained relationship between the Department of Defense and CIA.\(^3\)

The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, signed by President Truman after World War II ended, marks the beginning of the new era for intelligence in the U.S. and is responsible for creating the intelligence community.\(^4\) As a result, the intelligence community developed under a very similar structure for more than 50 years in the midst of some of the greatest threats to the U.S. including the Cold War, a series of surrogate wars, and battles fought in latter half of the 20\(^{th}\) century against the Soviet Union.

With WWII fresh in Truman’s mind, he signed the NSA of 1947, which created several new concepts, offices, institutions and ideas into law regarding how the U.S. would operate in future international dealings. Truman also reorganized several ideas of foreign policy and military structure, as many of these branches overlap in when dealing with international relations. Specifically in regard to intelligence, the act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was a base for non-military intelligence for the government.\(^5\)

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3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.
The NSA also gave a legal foundation for the intelligence community by creating the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who oversaw the national intelligence for the U.S.\(^6\) Truman made several innovative decisions in the NSA of 1947 in regards to the DCI. For example, the DCI did not have military power such as controlling or directing troops for intelligence affairs. Additionally the CIA only had foreign power rather than national. The FBI would be domestic in nature; this distinction still exists to this day. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) later became an agency that dealt specifically with intelligence and the military in a different way than CIA would.\(^7\)

In regard to the legislators and the DCI, there would be knowledge for those with the proper clearance and positions in Congress and the executive branch, while they would not explicitly mention what was done covertly. Mainly, these are the acts that are listed under espionage, covert action and analysis that could be detrimental to national security if revealed.\(^8\) Truman was essential in the process of creating the intelligence community, knowing that there was a significant and prominent need for the type of work in the U.S. while it was not explicitly enumerated in the constitution as a branch of government per say.

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The NSA of 1947 also notably established military organizations such as the National Security Council which included the Secretary of Defense who oversaw the newly created Department of Defense. The Department of Defense came out of merging the War Department and Navy Department along with the Air Force, which was established around the same time. While the Army Corps was essential in WWII, a need began to be more evident as planes and then, cutting edge technology, began to emerge over the 20th century.\(^9\)

There have been several events that have shaped the intelligence community since its official creation in 1947, such as several wars, failures, covert actions and attacks. These include, but are not limited to, the following incidents: Korean War (1950), Coup in Iran (1953), the Guatemala Coup (1954), the Missile Gap (1959-1961), the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba (1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1964-1975), the Antiballistic missiles treaty and SALT I Accord (1972), intelligence investigations and hearings after the Vietnam War, Iranian revolution (1979), the Iran-Contra crisis during Reagan’s administration, the fall of the Soviet Union (1989-1991), the Ames spy scandal revealed (1994) and Hannssen spy case (2001).\(^{10}\) While all of these have affected intelligence operations and national security, the attacks on 9/11 remain to this day the biggest game changer in terms of legislation to manage intelligence and prevent attacks.

\(^9\) “National Security Act of 1947.”

\(^{10}\) Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 20-25.
September 11, 2001, was the largest attack on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II. In brief, on 9/11 nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists led by Osama Bin Laden hijacked four domestic American planes. Two planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City and both of the towers collapsed and burned to the ground. The third plane flew into the Pentagon, the home of the Department of Defense in Arlington, VA. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania when passengers took charge of the plane and brought it to the ground before it could fly into the Pentagon or White House. Collectively, almost 3,000 innocent American citizens lost their life on that tragic day.¹¹

Several complicated and obvious questions arose from the stunned American people. The U.S. was clearly unprepared and caught off guard for this attack, yet how could they have been? Was not intelligence so carefully crafted and manufactured to eliminate or catch the enemy prior to such events from occurring? Is this the first of several attacks? Are we at war? These questions along with several of others were on the forefront of everyone’s mind minutes, hours, days, months and years after the attack as the U.S. began to unpack a much bigger problem than they previously had on their hands. Brigadier General Russell Howard, USA (Ret) explained the threat that appeared on 9/11 was unlike any other type of terrorism the American people had faced before, “terrorism’s previous incarnations, were not nearly as organized, deadly, or personal as the attacks inflicted on New York City and Washington, D.C., or on that remote

Pennsylvania field."\textsuperscript{12} He describes these attacks as a “new terrorism” where the tactics are ancient in nature that reaches across any borders with an ideological motivation that is explicitly religious in Islamic extremism organized by Bin Laden under the terrorist organization, al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{13} Al Qaeda’s motivation was to kill several thousand people to achieve their goals. The actual hijackers on 9/11 for each flight are listed in the image below. The attacks from al-Qaeda were carefully planned and crafted. Each of these hijackers was trained on American soil and lived here, infiltrating society before actually attacking the U.S. in such a horrific way. There were several signs that pointed to fact that they were terrorists based upon intelligence gathering that was done after identifying their identities after the attack. In hindsight, the question arises, why didn’t intelligence pick-up on any of these men prior to the attacks?

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13. Ibid.
The hijackers responsible for the 9/11 tragedy

After the attacks on 9/11 it became apparent that while the attacks were grand in scheme it potentially could have been prevented if the different intelligence agencies had shared information. The intelligence failure was seen by because of a “failure to connect the dots.” An immediate reaction to this was the removal of legal barriers to create sharing information amongst intelligence organizations and law enforcement, which came to fruition in October 26, 2001 by the USA Patriot Act.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.
As the U.S. began the recovery process, beginning at the burning buildings, policy leaders created “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States” in November 2002 also commonly referred to as the “9/11 Commission.” Located in section 604 of Public Law 107-306 the purpose of the 9/11 Commission is to investigate each of the details involved from the actual day of 9/11, an analysis of the enemy, and what future problems exist and persist. 22 July 2004, the 9/11 Commission was officially released for the public, available free of charge. This nearly 500 page report detailed circumstances surrounding 9/11, the terrorist attacks, foundations for terrorism and counter-terrorism, emergency responders, and wartime. Additionally, several recommendations and mandates are included to change legislation to be guarded against the future attacks. The report was created as a bipartisan effort on a committee that consisted of 10 congressmen, 5 democrats and 5 republicans. In the preface of the report, signed by Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the chair, and vice chair, respectively, it states:

In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate. We have sought to be independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan…our aim has not been to assign individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify the lessons learned. 18

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.
During this time of research, al-Qaeda continued to act and the U.S. engaged in war. A failure that occurred during this time which, was not as big as 9/11, but still held as much weight, was the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate’s (NIE) report on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program. In 2002, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet wrote a statement regarding the controversy about the seemingly inaccurate data reported in the NIE. The controversy, in brief, was that the NIE was the best intelligence report gathered at the time was consistent and accurate from the data and reports in existence for several years. He wrote in a press release, “We have no doubt, however, that the NIE was the most reasonable, well-grounded, and objective assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs that was possible at the time it was produced.” Tenet essentially argues that given the intelligence at the time, the conclusions were the most accurate and conclusive. However, the intelligence was inaccurate. Along with this and other intelligence concerning 9/11, are reasons advanced for why the intelligence community was presumably in desperate need for reform.

Located in the 9/11 Commission is also a report specifically regarding recommendations on how to make the intelligence community stronger by changing the existing structure with a better and more effective organization under the chapter, “How


21. Ibid.
to Do it? A Different Way of Organizing the Government?” In a profound statement, the writers of this document recognize a structural problem accounting for many of the events of 9/11: “Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to. The United States have resources and the people. The government should combine them more effectively, achieving unity of effort.”

The Commission identified six problems and recommendations they believed would aid in solving the holes and inconsistencies in the intelligence structure. These include (1) unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorist across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center; (2) unifying the intelligence community with a New Intelligence Director; (3) unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries; (4) unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and (5) strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders. Within these recommendations are several underlying ideas foundational concerning intelligence failures that existed prior to 9/11. While the past cannot be changed, the future can be written to make amends for mistakes, quite literally through laws and a change of structures, as well as learning and recognizing faults and getting to the core of the problems.


23. Ibid.
Of the aforementioned recommendations, the underlying suggestion is that unification amongst the intelligence community is necessary in order to proactively engage the future rather than react to the attacks defensively by being caught completely off guard. In addition to the overarching ideas presented specific observations were included in the 9/11 Commission. These include the idea that the CIA is centralized while the FBI engages more with the department of Justice; the Department of Defense (DOD) is very large and unified under different commands; the new Department of Homeland security has a combination of resources for transportation security; the State Department is the leader in the government in regards to international policy; and at the White House, the National Security Council (NSC) is combined by a “parallel advisory structure,” the Homeland Security Council. All of these recommendations lead up to the following ideas of why the 9/11 Commission makes a recommendation that the Director of Central Intelligence should share responsibilities with a newly created Director of National Intelligence.

Between 2001 and 2004 when the 9/11 Commission was released, the intelligence community was in a desperate position. After failed intelligence in the NIE, a sense in Washington and nationwide was for some quick action to change the intelligence community. Since the problems, inconsistencies, and failures were identified, it was now time to do something about it which came to fruition in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, enacted 17 December by the 108th Congress.

24. Ibid.
This Act used the recommendations put forth in the 9/11 Commission to change the structure of the intelligence community in the most drastic fashion since its initial creation in 1947.

The statues in the IRTPA begin with the purpose of the law in its entirety which reads, “(An Act) to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government and for other purposes.” 25 The IRTPA contains more than 200 pages of law for reform the intelligence community. While each detail has significance, the purpose of this analysis will focus specifically on the law that was established in Title I, Reform of the Intelligence Community, Subtitle A, Establishment of Director of National Intelligence.

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26. Ibid.
The IRTPA of 2004 reflects the investigations of the 9/11 Commission and the law the two documents cannot be discussed apart from each other as the IRTPA is the direct by-product of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.\textsuperscript{27} Within this Act, there are nine subtitles. One of the major faults that had been recognized in the intelligence community was a lack of unity and sharing of intelligence between agencies. Several agencies collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence but rarely shared the intelligence with the other agencies who had been either working on the same type of intelligence or could be beneficial in putting together missing pieces of information that, in essence could have prevented tragedies such as 9/11.

The 9/11 Commission recognized an overwhelming predicament in regard to the lack of unity and information sharing that could possibly prevent attacks. As a result, the question of the DCI and its position could not be ignored because he was the principal advisor to the president on intelligence issues and the head of the intelligence community and director of CIA. The 9/11 Commission lists the various structures of the intelligence community including to whom the DCI was directly responsible for other than overseeing CIA in general.\textsuperscript{28} This includes the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, the Community Management Staff, the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, the National Intelligence Council, and other community

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\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
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Additional, it lists the national intelligence agencies including the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and other reconnaissance programs. Lastly it includes the departmental intelligence agencies which include the Defense Intelligence Agency; Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines Intelligence; Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence; Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions of the FBI; Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy; Directorate of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence of the Department of Homeland Security.\(^{29}\)

The list recognizes how overwhelming the structures and intricacies were prior to 9/11. However, it is not a matter of quantity but quality of intelligence from each. Each organization plays a specific role in the intelligence community while some of the roles consequently overlap as well. But at the end of the day, 9/11 and the NIE 2002 report of Weapons of Mass Destruction still happened. This cannot be ignored. The 9/11 Commission recognizes six problems that were apparent before 9/11 and now to be changed. These include structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work because each agency has its own collection discipline rather than focus on sharing; a lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide; divided management of national intelligence capabilities between each of the agencies and Department of

\(^{29}\) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 407-410.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.
Defense, which makes the DCI less influential; weak capacity to set priorities and more resources, too many jobs for the DCI including running the CIA, manage the loose confederation of agencies, and to be the chief analyst to the President as his principal intelligence adviser; and too complex infrastructure in the intelligence community and too secret in the internal community and external for intelligence and matters that the DCI oversees.  

The 9/11 Commission recognizes that the DCI was being held responsible for the “community performance” without any actual authority to carry out those duties such as the power of the budget for the intelligence community, the ability to make decisions regarding the hiring and firing of senior officials, and the capability to make and execute expectations and positions in regards to the structure of the intelligence community and individual personnel. As a result, the DCI was put in the extremely difficult position of attempting to play several roles that no one office should be responsible for given the inability to do anything about it. Each of those previously mentioned powers rests in Congress and other organizations. Therefore, the 9/11 Commission recommends a new position to be created that would replace the DCI’s responsibility as a separate entity. Today it is called the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) but in the suggestion it was called the National Intelligence Director. The two main responsibilities that the 9/11 Commission recommends for this position is to (1) oversee national intelligence centers

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it. In order to understand the intricacies of this new organization, the chart below explains the relationships that were being proposed in the 9/11 Commission. Historically, the idea of the Director of National Intelligence was first discussed in 1955 by Congress when they recognized that the DCI was in need of a deputy that had a different position in overseeing the other areas of intelligence, not solely CIA. However, consistently there had been no significant changes to the intelligence community until the trigger of 9/11


34. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 32.
As displayed in this organizational chart, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has cabinet level access and is incorporated into the executive branch which signifies the importance of this role is to the U.S. intelligence. Additionally, the IRTPA makes a note between the roles of the DCI and DNI in controlling “national intelligence” which incorporates foreign, domestic, and homeland security in the domestic intelligence.\textsuperscript{35} The DNI is not directly connected to any organization like the DCI, but rather is independent. It began with a staff of approximately 1600 people in order to accomplish the given tasks. However it has grown in size significantly since its creation and moved buildings to accommodate the growth. In general, the intelligence community has grown from 75,000 personnel to 100,000 personnel exclusive of any contractors that work for the government.\textsuperscript{36} This can both be seen as positive and negative depending upon the perspective.

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The chart shows the ODNI’s relationship in the Intelligence Community and its structure.\(^{37}\)

The DNI is responsible for the Intelligence Community, acts as the head of the intelligence community as a whole, answers to the President on all matters, and is in charge of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The NIP specifically runs the budget for America’s Intelligence Community and acts as the head for the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council for Intelligence Matters related to national security.\(^{38}\) It is also in charge of the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America.

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America (NIS), which enumerates different objectives; the 100 and 500 Day Plans for Integration and Collaboration, a document which serves as plan for how to act in the intelligence world for collection, analysis and other important fields; and Missions Managers, which act as intelligence experts for the hardest intelligence arenas and players in the U.S. including Iran, North Korea and other hard to reach areas. 39

Located in the IRTPA there are specific enumerated jobs that the ODNI has to do by law which are listed below:

- Ensure that timely and objective national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; and the Congress;
- Establish objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence;
- Ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the Intelligence Community;
- Develop and ensure the execution of an annual budget for the National Intelligence program (NIP) based on budget proposals provided by IC component organizations;
- Oversee coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security services of foreign governments and international organizations;

• Ensure the most accurate analysis of intelligence is derived from all sources to support national security needs;
• Develop personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint operations and to facilitate staffing of community management functions;
• Oversee the development and implementation of a program management plan for acquisition of major systems, doing so jointly with the Secretary of Defense for DoD programs, that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program milestone criteria.  

For accountability’s sake, the ODNI is held to a high standard regarding how they are able to operate. Especially since they are responsible for such important items on collection and intelligence on terrorism, proliferation, chemical warfare, biological warfare, information and infrastructure attack, narcotic trafficking through the various means of Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence, Human-source Intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence and Geospatial Intelligence. The different bodies that oversee the ODNI include the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI),

41. Ibid.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), and other Committees in Congress.\textsuperscript{42}

After the IRTPA was signed in December of 2004, in February of 2005 President Bush nominated the Ambassador John Negroponte of Iraq to be in the inaugural Director of National Intelligence position as well as Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF as the first Principal Deputy. Hayden also had extensive background in intelligence as the director of the National Security Agency (NSA).\textsuperscript{43} They were both sworn in on April 22, 2005 and began their position the next day figuring out what exactly the position entailed in its entirety since it was newly created. The aforementioned position descriptions are a result of the work of these men who were trying to figure out their next moves in office from the list of responsibilities discussed in the IRTPA.

These men were leading the way in this new era of intelligence in many ways, learning lessons and experiencing failures while trying to understand what exactly their responsibilities entailed and the authority of each of their decisions. Negroponte said in an interview at the Defense Intelligence Agency about the intelligence process, “My own view of intelligence is that there is no silver bullet…intelligence is a resource. It is a tool in our toolkit and one that we neglect at our own peril.”\textsuperscript{44} Negroponte had discovered that intelligence has many facets and is a dynamic entity in both theory and practice.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} Lowenthal, \textit{Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy}, 30.

Quickly succeeding Negroponte were John M. (Mike) McConnell, Vice Admiral, USN Ret. who served as the Director of National Security Agency prior to his civilian career as the DNI. McConnell served has the DNI from February 2007 to January 2009. He was only under President Obama for a few days before he retired from the position. McConnell said that when he was undertaking the grandiose task of trying to combine the intelligence community what he saw that the biggest area he saw was necessary to have a unified front amongst the different intelligence organizations that make up the intelligence community. He said in the same interview at the DIA, “The thing I felt most strongly about was what I practiced when I was on the inside [of the IC] and what I learned in my business: the power of collaboration…once a community or an institution really starts to work in a collaborative way, it's really incredible what is achieve.”

McConnell also made a similar statement in 2008 which said:

[W]e have focused [on] the DNI’s role as the integrator of the community. We seek to create efficiencies and improved effectiveness in shared services like security clearances, information-sharing, information technology, and communications, but still promote an environment where the elements of the community serve their departmental responsibilities. This integration model of governance across the departments is still being defined because, quite frankly, we are in new territory for U.S. intelligence, something that has never been tried before, balanced with the need to have strong departmental intelligence elements in each department.

45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
He recognized that as the DNI’s office is the figure head for the intelligence community, their task was big in nature but the main aspect of it was to have a fluid integration and unity that was previously lacking because of communication problems. With the DNI at the top of the position, they can strongly encourage this integration by being a point person in this process. Several events, wars, and natural disasters have taken place that demonstrate that it is not just one intelligence organization, but rather a combination of intelligence community efforts to successfully bring the best quality analysis, aid, and intelligence. The best example of this is 9/11. In an analysis conducted by Richard A. Best Jr., a National Defense Specialist, on the success of the DNI after its creation for five years, in which he states:

To the extent that the government is able to address new threats or opportunities, it is expected to require a capability of utilizing disparate agency capabilities on short notice and for limited periods without permanently changing statutory provisions for “authority, direction, and control.” In many ways intelligence agencies are arguably among the most agile agencies in the federal government and should be more amenable to these conditions than is the case with other departments.  

Dennis C. Blair, Adm., USN Ret., served as the DNI from January 29, 2009 to May 28, 2010 prior to the incumbent James R. Clapper, Lt. Gen., USAF Ret. Blair had a positive reaction to how the ODNI was making progress in the intelligence community for the field and its operations. He claimed that the main areas of improvement from failures leading to 9/11 were information sharing, technical and cultural barriers in the intelligence community, lack of diversity of the existing intelligence community. Blair

said that there were legitimate examples of the success of the DNI position in various projects including identifying the existence of the Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Qum amongst several other successful items in intelligence such as the ODNI Rapid Technology Transition Initiative.\textsuperscript{49}

The ODNI also created a joint duty program which created sharing between different organizations including the Department of Homeland Security, A-Space and the Library of National Intelligence. This helped in encryption and emailing with information sharing, enhancing the unity and communication in the intelligence community. Additionally the ODNI contributes to the President’s Daily Brief which they’ve now ensured includes intelligence from all spectrums in the intelligence community with a high standards and analytics in addition to other initiatives such as the Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA).\textsuperscript{50}

While these are positive assessments of the success of the DNI, there are also negative inputs into how well this position is actually accomplishing the task it was initially intended for. The first reaction to this position is the idea that there have been several DNI’s since the position was created nearly 7 years ago. The media argued in 2010 upon the resignation of DNI Blair the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board was investigated to see the value in the DNI’s position and determine if it was doing what it was intended to accomplish. Some of these conclusions state that the actual description of

\textsuperscript{49.} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50.} Ibid.
what the DNI position in the IRTPA was neither conclusive nor understandable in its intentions. As a result they said that the DNI should downsize by using other intelligence agencies to do the same functions it was doing. They believed that they overlapped too much to be successful. Instead of being a filter to the top, it was continuously working on the same things instead of sharing the intelligence.\textsuperscript{51}

Additionally criticism has come from a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which found that the ODNI and Intelligence Community do not have an adequate computer databases by having different information on several areas. This caused a lot of problems in communication. As a result, while it is not officially operating, the intelligence community is in the process of creating a database in order to solve this problem.

In summary: the Intelligence reform was launched in 2001. The ODNI has created a timeline to highlight the key reforms.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
This timeline demonstrates that the Intelligence Community has been moving forward in many directions in the past few years, trying to do something different than prior to 9/11. With that being said, there are several factors that play into the effectiveness of the ODNI and the DNI itself. The ODNI was originally designed to combat the intelligence failures of disunity and lack of communication that was credited to several intelligence failures. Additionally, the DNI was to serve as the head of the Intelligence Community, creating a better system of communication with the President.

The ODNI has to a degree accomplished the given tasks in name, but not necessarily in functionality.

Prior to 9/11 the DCI was accomplishing the tasks of the current DNI. However, the responsibility was given without the full budgetary control to successfully act in the way necessary to have sufficient integration and communication. In the desperation of the aftermath of 9/11, Congress had the pressure to act and needed to do something. This is evidence by the amount of legislations, investigation, and reforms. The 9/11 Commission was an accurate analysis and representation of the intelligence community situation surrounding 9/11. The lack of quality intelligence was shocking when looking back on the events and details.

Thus, quick reforms and creations resulted such as in the Patriot Act and creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Regarding the ODNI, was it first really necessary to create? The argument could go in either direction given the circumstances. Something needed to change and this was Congress idea in changing the intelligence community. In reality, instead of rushing and creating a new office with new responsibilities that overlap with the then DCI may have not the most beneficial move. Intelligence by nature is difficult to comprehend and there is disconnect between policy makers and the intelligence community. Since it is due to the very nature of each entity, this will constantly be a struggle to find the best solutions that will discovered through trial and error. However, this should not be an excuse for failures. With the amount of resources that exist, being a good steward and using the resources with thoughtfulness based upon reality can accomplish the given task. Prior to the creation of the ODNI, a
reform that would have been similarly effective without the amount of overlap and people who work in the ODNI currently adding to bigger government limiting effectiveness, could have been simply creating new deputy positions for the DCI. These deputies would have responsibility for the problems existing.

In hindsight, the ODNI has done what the DCI deputies could have done but through an extreme increase in personnel accompanied by confusion of what the position was created for in the first place. Additionally, the DNI does not have as much control of the purse strings in the budget that would be necessary to really make a change. In order to be maximally effective responsibility and resources would have to change.

Despite the negative representation of the effectiveness of the ODNI’s existence, the ODNI has accomplished several positive tasks in uniting the Intelligence Community. In a figurative sense, the structure makes more sense in who answers to whom for accountability in the government. Yet the problem still exists at how big the intelligence community has gotten with overlap and lack of sharing. The DNI acts more as a figurehead of unity, rather than an actuality of unity. This is a result of the fact that the ODNI has to continuously grow bigger with more personnel to accomplish the exact same tasks as the other intelligence communities. Bigger government and personnel do not qualify as quality and act as a safeguard against failure. Therefore, several of the same problems exist and persist before its creation.

In conclusion, the DNI has united the intelligence community to a degree. It has been effective in some ways by encouraging unity through a variety of internal programs and information sharing. Its beginnings have been shaky without lucid direction from its
inception on its responsibility, lack of resources and responsibility, and personnel growth that overlaps the intelligence community, and the amount of DNI’s to hold the position since it began. Time and quality reforms in action will tell if these problems can be figured out in the future to be optimally effective in the intelligence community.
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