

**“Castlereagh at the Congress of Vienna: Maintaining the Peace, Political Realism,
and the Encirclement of France.”**

by

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A Thesis Submitted in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in History

at

Liberty University

May 2014

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Introduction: Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna

In the early morning of September 21, 1809, Robert Stewart Castlereagh and George Canning traveled their separate ways to Lord Yarmouth's cottage on Putney Heath in England. They scheduled their rendezvous for 6 a.m. that morning; as such, they were up before the dawn and on their way, pistols and shot in tow. While thoroughly macabre, the fact that their shared mentor William Pitt had died within sight of the cottage in January of 1806 made it a fitting location for their duel that morning. Stewart's cousin Yarmouth went with him, humming snippets from a contemporary piece of music, Madame Angelica Catalani's latest performance. They met with Canning and his second, Charles Ellis, at the cottage. Stepping aside from their principals, Yarmouth and Ellis made one final attempt at mediation between the two statesmen. Ellis stated that the matter that Canning concealed had been on the command of the King and that Canning himself had disliked the necessary deceit of Stewart; however, this equivocation did not placate Stewarts wounded pride.¹ While Castlereagh had fought a duel before in his youth in Ireland, Canning had never fired a shot in his life. As the appointed time approached, the men readied their pistols and took their marks. They both walked ten paces and, then turned:

From April to October in 1805 the War of the Fifth Coalition waged across Europe with Britain, Austria, and its allies fighting against the empire of Napoleon.²

¹ Edward Cooke, Downing Street, To Charles Stewart, 21 September 1809, *Castlereagh Papers*, MIC570/16 [D3030/Q3].

Thomas Moore to Miss Godfrey, 30 August 1807, in *Memories, Journal and Correspondence of Thomas Moore*, edited and abridged from the first edition by the Right Hon. Lord Russel, MP (Longman: London, 1860), 69.

John Bew, *Castlereagh: A Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 261.

² While some authors specifically make reference to London, or English influence, this thesis will use the phrase "British". This is not to say that there was an absolute consensus between England and Scotland nor to undermine the agency and conflict in portions of Ireland. "British" highlights that increasing view of

While men died in Spain, Italy, and Germany, Castlereagh and Canning fought their duel of public and private honor on a sward of grass in England. That two heirs of Pitt came to such a row while the fate of Europe hung in the balance echoed the worst absurdities of classical tragedy, hubris, and vainglory in the midst of war. It also showed the personal nature of national and international politics. The flash of sword and roar of cannon decided the fate of Europe's wars, but the matters of peace rested on the individual qualities of statesmen. While Castlereagh fought a duel of private honor in Putney Heath and a war against Napoleon around Europe, his more important battle would take place five years later at Vienna. It was there that he fought against his peers to establish a lasting peace in Europe.

At the Congress of Vienna from September 1814 to June 1815, Stewart, the second Marquess of Londonderry and Viscount Castlereagh, succeeded in encircling France with a cordon of strong states that could better resist the possibility of future French military aggression. He conceived these goals with an eye towards European balance of power, strategically resettling European borders and placating allies when necessary. He guarded against the advances of France and Russia through the strengthening of the Low Countries, resettlement of Norway from Denmark to Sweden, the restructuring of a more resilient Italian Peninsula, and the division of Poland and Saxony along the convoluted borders between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Castlereagh, of course, held ideological leanings, but his principle purpose was neither the preservation of absolute monarchy or *ancien regime*, nor a more liberal sentiment for

statesmen in London that while they did have interests in their private holdings, there remained larger interests in the British Isles and the burgeoning Empire.

self-determination. His goal was to bring peace to Europe through strategic realism in the peacemaking process.

After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the victorious march of the Allied Coalition into Paris, the Great Powers faced the difficult position of restoring a shattered and weary Europe. Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and wayward France met at Vienna to discuss the fate of Europe and the resettlement of national borders. Due to his familiarity with continental diplomatic figures from his time in the War Department and Foreign Office, the British government sent Castlereagh. He had previously helped arrange and execute multiple coalitions arrayed against Napoleon, built Britain's army up to an unprecedented size, and worked closely with Sir Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, in his Peninsular Campaign. Outside of continental Europe, Castlereagh crushed an uprising in Ireland, led a secondary war against the United States, and helped bring about the end of the Atlantic Slave Trade. Rather from these triumphs, Castlereagh's fame springs from his exploits at the Congress of Vienna and the part he played in a peace settlement that directed the nature of European power politics for the next century. In the 'Long Century' of peace that followed, much of the criticism of Castlereagh came from the British public itself, who thought his conservatism made him subservient to foreign autocracy. After the apparent failure of the Concert of Europe³ in the Great War, popular British perception of Castlereagh as an arch-conservative spread abroad as disenchanted Europeans heaped criticism upon him and his Congressional peers.⁴

³ The Concert of Europe was another term for the Congress system that sprung from the Congress of Vienna. The term and conception of the Concert, an idea that the states of Europe acted together, lasted long after the Great Powers stopped meeting in Congresses.

⁴ Bew, XXVII-XXX.

While his balance of power goals at Vienna were a success, Castlereagh did not embrace the conservative ideology of his diplomatic peers; he instead sought European security. He disapproved of the Holy Alliance and the Troppau Protocol that drew Austria, Prussia, and Russia into an ever closer union. Still, his balance of power system did not fail in the midst of the widening ideological gap between Britain and the Continent. The Concert endured in some capacity through the revolts in Spain, Latin America, and Ottoman Greece, as well as through the European Revolutions of 1848. The Crimean War eventually shattered the general peace between the Great Powers. This breakdown in European peace does not shear Castlereagh of his success in surrounding France with military and diplomatic barriers succeeded long after the members of the Coalition had gone their separate ways. Rather, his goal was to achieve a peace in Europe—as long as he could—through the realistic checking of France and balancing of other Powers' interests.

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

The outbreak of the French Revolution caught most of the states of Europe by surprise. While there had been contests in Europe between the rights of the aristocracy and the monarchy, the attack on the Bastille and the seizure of the royal family were a different sort of event altogether. The Revolution was not just an uprising by peasants upset with the temporary disruption of their rights or a mob of the hungry; the ideological origins of the French Revolution were the tenants of humanism and liberalism brandishing teeth. However, Prussia and Austria took to the field to aggrandize their interests and prestige. While figures in Britain were concerned with the disorder and conflict, they did not take military action until Revolutionary seizure of the Low

Countries. France achieved mixed success with the mass conscriptions of men and material via the *levee en masse*, but they failed to make deep inroads across the Rhine into Germany. The rise and exploits of the young Corsican general Napoleon Bonaparte in Northern Italy drastically changed the nature of the conflict, as did his further victories for the French republic.⁵

While Napoleon won renown for invading Italy, Egypt, and Germany, his most resounding successes were the war he waged against his own people, his seizure of the throne as Emperor in December 1804, his fashioning of a proto-police state, and the power he wielded over Europe at the expense of his subjects. In the following decade, several different coalitions of Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia led by William Pitt or Castlereagh contended against Napoleon. Though these were valiant efforts, they often failed due to an inability of the Allies to bring concerted military forces to bear against Napoleon, the inconstancy of the Allies, and the economic difficulty in financing the wars. The First Coalition began in 1792 when Prussia joined Austria, who was already at war with Revolutionary France. France suffered multiple invasions and an occupation of Toulon by Britain. The Coalition ended with the ceding of the Austrian Netherlands to France and Napoleon's victory in Northern Italy. Britain alone remained in conflict with France through 1797.

⁵ Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* / by Georges Lefebvre; Translated and with a Preface by R.R. Palmer (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-3. 49-72, 93-107, 183-189, 207-218.

Frank A. Kafker and James Michael Laux, *The French Revolution: Conflicting Interpretations* (New York: Random House, 1968), 1-56.

William Farr Church, *The Influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolution*, 2d ed. Problems in European Civilization (Lexington, Mass; D. C. Heath, 1973), 183-194.

Bailey Stone, *The Genesis of the French Revolution: A Global-Historical Interpretation* (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 196-235.

The Second Coalition, formed in 1799, traded Prussian soldiers for Russian. Both Russia and Austria both raised arms for conflict in Germany and Italy, while Napoleon returned from his exploits in Egypt. Although the coalition enjoyed some victories, it fell apart in 1802 when Russia left due to disagreements with Britain over Russian nautical privileges. Britain, Austria, and Russia dominated the Third Coalition in the conflict that broke out the following year. From 1803-1805, Britain stood under the constant threat of invasion. It was only after the battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 that Britain eliminated any threat of French troops crossing the Channel. On the Continent, things went poorly for the coalition as Napoleon performed a massive sweeping maneuver that caught an Austrian army by surprise. Napoleon followed up with his greatest success, the battle of Austerlitz, in which he defeated a combined Russo-Austrian force under the personal command of Tsar Alexander. Napoleon also used this time to set up the Confederacy of the Rhine as his own satellites in the former Holy Roman Empire.⁶

The Fourth Coalition, occurring from 1806-1807, was made of Prussian, Russian and British forces. Prussia joined the coalition in fear of Napoleon's growing influence in Central Germany and then massed its forces in Saxony. Napoleon crushed Prussia in a lightning campaigns and eventually wore Russia down in a series of clashes. Through these successes, Napoleon annexed huge swathes of Prussian territory and forced Russia into the Continental System to choke Britain of its European trade. The Fifth Coalition began in 1809, pitting Austria and Britain against France. Austria contended with France in Central Europe while Britain increased pressure on France in Spain through the Peninsular Campaign led by Arthur Wellesley. Britain suffered failure in the Walcheren Expedition, and Austrian forces suffered defeated at the hands of France at the battle of

⁶ Gates, 15-37, 49-82, 196-264.

Wargram. A significant amount of Austrian territory was transferred to strengthen France and its allies.

The final coalition included Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The fruit of Castlereagh's diplomatic skill, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and several of the smaller German states, marched with them. This coalition became possible after Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia to compel maintenance of the blockade of British goods. Military defeat and a long retreat from Moscow destroyed the most experienced members of Napoleon's armies, allowed Austria to disentangle itself from a forced alliance, and prompted nationalist sentiment against Napoleon all over Europe. The defining battle of the campaign was the Battle of Leipzig, the largest battle in European history before the Great War. Napoleon was defeated, and he fought a rearguard action until his eventual abdication after the Allies took Paris.⁷

The Congress of Vienna did not suddenly spring out of the diplomatic ether after the defeat of Napoleon; it appeared organically through military and diplomatic necessity. Castlereagh's initial mission to the Continent was to use seized colonial possessions to secure Belgium from French military control and influence and consolidate an Alliance that would endure after the defeat of Napoleon.⁸ The Treaty of Chaumont was the first step towards the Congress of Vienna. At Chaumont, Castlereagh said,

My own impression is, as it has always been, that whilst anything of an army remains to him [Napoleon] will not easily submit to sign such a peace as the Allies require; and I am induced to believe he will put his main resistance upon Antwerp, 1st, as the point of most pride as well as power, and, 2ndly, as that

⁷ Ibid., 100-141.

⁸ Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe* (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 1931), 192-195.

Memorandum of Cabinet, December, 26th, 1813 from Charles K. Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815* (London: G. Bell and sons ltd. 1921), 123-126.

interest in support of which he expects the continental Powers will be least disposed to continue the war.⁹

Their successes or failures aside, the other coalitions up to this point were limited in scope. The defeat of Napoleon, while a lofty goal for a coalition, was only a part of the Treaty of Chaumont. The purpose of the Treaty was to bind Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia together beyond the defeat of Napoleon. For the present war, each Power provided 150,000 men or comparable subsidies, but the longer plans of the Quadruple Alliance remained for twenty years and guaranteed each of the signatories' security against France with a compulsory force of 60,000 soldiers.¹⁰ This alliance was a sword set against France, but one of Castlereagh's goals was to make the drawing of this blade unnecessary.

Initial attempts at settlement among the Great Powers at Paris failed due to the patriotic fervor of the French people, the distracting decadence of the city, and the intemperate boasts of Tsar Alexander. An example of this lack of circumspection by Alexander was his unilateral decision to settle Napoleon Bonaparte on the Island of Elba with his honors intact. A second attempt to settle matters in London also failed when Alexander alienated the Prince Regent and much of Parliament. The settlement moved to the secondary cultural center of Europe, Vienna. The home of the ancient Hapsburg Monarchy, Vienna made sense as an appropriate site for deliberation. The Allies eventually formalized their monopoly on the deliberation of the proceedings by keeping all territorial distribution decisions unto themselves, but also sought the support of France and Spain. Smaller states that sent representatives to Vienna waited on the sidelines as

⁹ Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 3, 1814: B.D. 163; March 4, 1814: *F.O. Continent*, 3. from Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 227.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 227.

the larger states determined their fates. While the operations of the large states kept the smaller states of Europe from enjoying the fruits of sovereignty, it allowed the resolution of larger settlements concerns.¹¹

Talleyrand attempted to disrupt proceedings by appealing to a European wide participation in the Congress, but his appeal only gave rise to the Committee of Eight and a Special Committee of five German powers. The former was a lightning rod, a show that the Congress had greater European legitimacy than the domination of Great Powers in the proceedings allowed. It was this group, not the Committee of Four, that called for hostilities against Napoleon in the Hundred Days.¹² The latter Committee rose to the task of drafting a constitution for a German Federation, though the Committee did suffer due to initial animosity between Prussia and Austria, as well as similar relations between smaller states like Wuttenburg and Bavaria.¹³

While some of Castlereagh's contemporaries attributed his actions at the Congress of Vienna to a desire to reinforce conservative ideological goals or personal pretensions of continental prestige, this interpretation ignores his strategic goals at the Congress.¹⁴ Following the upheavals of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, Castlereagh succeeded in surrounding France with states that could better resist French military aggression. While he built up the Low Countries and Piedmont-Sardinia, he carefully rearranged the borders of lesser Italian states, Norway, Poland, and Saxony. Castlereagh

¹¹ Charles K. Webster, *The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963), 79-88. It was this seizure of authority that marked the full recognition of the "Great Powers" as states fundamentally different from smaller European states.

¹² *Ibid.*, 95, 155.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 84, 148-149.

¹⁴ Many of Castlereagh's contemporaries and successors made such an accusation. For a particularly useful source on the motivations of Castlereagh and a fuller context of his academic and diplomatic background, see John Bew's *Castlereagh: A Life*.

held ideological presumptions, but his principle purpose was to bring peace to Europe by focusing on diplomatic and strategic realities.

Difficulty With Sources

While Castlereagh has left behind many documents through the materials arranged by his brother or the official communiqués, reports, and instructions from the War Department, Foreign Office, and Parliament, there are significant gaps in the sources. Castlereagh provided materials for his colleagues in the Netherlands, Italy, London, Vienna, and Moscow. He meticulously preserved his notes during the Congress itself from outside misuse. Prince Metternich's spy service was in full force at Vienna, and so Castlereagh often destroyed his documents, kept things under lock and key, and used his own staff brought from England in lieu of compromised local staff at Vienna. While there is access to some of his materials, a good deal of the scholarship on Vienna relies on what Castlereagh planned before the Congress, what he said about it afterwards, and his private communications with peers around Europe. While it would of course be better to have Castlereagh's notes from the Congress as the proceedings occurred, it is possible to put together his views on balance of power and settlement from other sources.

The principle primary sources of Castlereagh are the collections from the Foreign Office, the *Castlereagh Papers*, and *The Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh* put together by his younger brother Charles William Vane. These sources are in no way exhaustive of the political culture of Europe, of Britain, or of Castlereagh himself, but they serve as an excellent framework to introduce the researcher to Castlereagh's policies for peace in Europe.¹⁵

¹⁵ Enno Kraehe wisely pointed out the limited usefulness of a paper on the Congress and larger European diplomacy that does not use all the diplomatic sources available. For the limited scope of this work

Chapter One

The Historiography of the Congress of Vienna

The Congress of Vienna has long been of importance to historians and statesmen as a guiding star of diplomatic communication or a warning on the dangers of an aggrandizing peace. Three authors stand out as particularly influential in the diplomatic historiography of Castlereagh. Charles Webster, Harold Temperley, and Henry Kissinger all wrote on the diplomatic goals of Castlereagh at Vienna. While their works set the pace for all future discussions of Castlereagh's diplomacy, they are not without omissions or faults. While Webster and Temperley wrote between the First World War and the end of the Second, the continued attempts at balance of power during the Cold War influenced Kissinger's *A World Restored*. Kissinger's work grappled with balance of power issues, but Edward Guilick, Harold Nicolson, and Paul Schroeder further pursued the topic of the Congress and Castlereagh's policy for peacemaking, but they often failed to grasp the vision of their predecessors or fully address the nature of the diplomats at the Congress—their education, ideology, and goals. While Gulick, Nicolson, and Schroeder wrote during the Cold War, and their writings do reflect that background, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with another trend in historical research.

By the 1990s, the growing popularity of social history and a move a more nuanced form of biography took the academic and the general reader into the mind of the statesmen at Vienna—Castlereagh not the least. David King pursued a detailed history of the decadence of the Congress, and Adam Zamoyski made the first great move to the popular political account of the Congress of Vienna. While King's work suffered from

however, more particular sources and research were used with Castlereagh as the object and not as a diplomatic coincidental.

flippancy about diplomatic affairs, and the issue of Polish nationalism stunts Zamoy's work, both succeed in moving Castlereagh from the sole province of diplomatic historians and statesmen to the attention of the general reading public. John Bew's recent biography made use of a firm understanding of European ideology, diplomatic realism, and Castlereagh's background to paint a full picture of Castlereagh's diplomatic and personal motivations—culminating with the diplomatic realism and popular historical approach of his predecessors. In spite of several excellent texts, many historians disregard details on Castlereagh's approach to nationalism and his general ideology. Castlereagh's legacy from the Congress of Vienna is undoubtedly complex, but a clear understanding of the diplomatic background in which he labored and his own internal struggles are necessary context to understand his realistic goals at the Vienna peace settlement.

The three most important authors on Castlereagh's diplomatic history are Charles Webster, Harold Temperley, and Henry Kissinger. Webster and Temperley share an academic and professional background in interwar England, while Kissinger was an academic and statesman of a singularly different nature. Webster and Temperley wrote several books on the diplomacy of Britain, which involved Castlereagh, but their own fears and concerns of interwar Europe had some influence on their work. Instead of the prosecution of the war against Napoleon, both men spent a great deal more time discussing the efforts for achieving and maintaining peace. Webster wrote several books on the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh, but the most important works were his short texts on the bureaucratic structure of the Congress, *The Congress of Vienna*, and a pair of books on Castlereagh's foreign policy from 1813-1822.¹⁶ The former covers the

¹⁶ Webster, *The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*.

motivations of diplomats and the exchanges of territories, but the primary purpose of the text demonstrates the organization of the Congress. It did not just jump into the minds of the creators *ex nihilo*; it was a thoroughly organic process amongst the Great Powers. The structures of power and the diplomatic representation at the Congress changed with the movements against an enthroned Napoleon, the early fears over territorial settlements, and the pretensions of states and statesmen. His other two works, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812-1815* and *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, were the fruit of his desire to gain a clearer understanding of the Congress System in Europe and what role Britain's foreign policy played in its formation and maintenance.¹⁷ While the nature of international diplomacy and economics meant that Britain remained in contact with the Continent in the remainder of the 19th century, Webster believed that the connection between the common problems of Europe and Britain were closest at the close of the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁸ In regards to Castlereagh, Webster broke down his actions into two parts: the personal factors and changes in diplomacy that made the last great coalition possible, and Castlereagh's key role in the peace settlement.

Webster's colleague in 19th century British diplomacy, Harold Temperley had a rather different appraisal of the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh, and the effects and significance of the Congress System.¹⁹ *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827* only briefly focuses on Castlereagh, but it was an important addition in the historiography of

¹⁷ Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822* (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 1925), v.

Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*.

¹⁸ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, vii.

¹⁹ The academic adversity of Webster in Canning is stuff of legend. Their rows may have something to do with their different backgrounds during World War II. Temperley served in the Foreign Office while Webster served in the War Department, curiously paralleling the careers of their subjects Canning and Castlereagh.

Castlereagh and the Congress.²⁰ Temperley was one of the first historians to offer criticism of Castlereagh's actions at the Congress and his reactions to the Holy Alliance without attributing it to starch conservatism. He treats the success of the Quadruple Alliance over Napoleon as their shining moment, a gilded accomplishment that tarnished in the suppression of liberal European ideology and the ideological division between the Allies.²¹ The seeds of the Allies' failure were in how the different Powers looked at the fulfillment of treaties and a disagreement on the purpose of the Quadruple Alliance.²² In spite of Castlereagh's disapproval of the suppression in Germany brought on by the Carlsbad Resolutions, he stood aside and did not press the issue. While Prince Clemens von Metternich desired a period of static peace, Castlereagh's goal was a continuance of the Congress System.²³ Without the danger of France, the Great Powers were able to go their own way on issues, and the discontent in British public opinion limited Castlereagh's diplomatic freedom.

The fact that Webster and Temperley disagree on the nature of Castlereagh and Canning's role at the Congress and larger European diplomacy is not particularly troubling. How different the men were in temperament and method of policy in spite of their similar backgrounds always attracts scholarly attention. Two things are sadly lacking from Webster and Temperley's works: they do not make a clear connection between the private nature of individual statesmen and the larger political goals. Both Webster and Temperley provide details and analyses of Castlereagh's life and diplomatic

²⁰ Harold William Vazeille Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827; England, the Neo-Holy Alliance and the New World* (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 1925).

²¹ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

²² *Ibid.*, 4-5. The constant tension of Tsar Alexander's desire for autocratic rule and the trappings of liberal ideology were a constant source of diplomatic and political angst. Temperley asserts that the revolutions of the 1820's and his frustration with Poland ended this dichotomy.

²³ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

background, but they never make a clear connection between the events of his life and his later policies. Castlereagh's tumultuous introduction into Irish politics, his early trip to Spa, and his service in the War Department and Foreign Office tempered his appraisal of the destruction and disorder of European warfare. While the dates and data are present for Webster and Temperley, they never draw the private man and his public policies to the point of reconciliation.

The Great War tempered Webster's and Temperley's perspectives on the Congress, but the end of World War II and the rumblings of the Cold War influenced Henry Kissinger's *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822*, first published in 1954. While his topic was the peace settlement, his own pressing interest in the uneasy *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union colors his work. This preoccupation is clearly seen in his discussion of inherent obstacles between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. Their inability to accept each other's political, social, or ideological framework as valid bars them from successful diplomatic discussions. They are unable to deal with particulars because of the assumption that the universals that either side supports are a ruse for self-aggrandizement.²⁴ More pressing is Kissinger's discussion of Castlereagh's goal to construct a balance of forces in the Continent and Metternich's goal to buttress this equilibrium with enduring legitimacy.²⁵ While Castlereagh looked to reduce France, Metternich wished to use Russia as a long-term check on French power.²⁶ In spite of these different goals, both men walked a tightrope between their aspirations and either

²⁴ Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*, Sentry Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

Ibid., 1-4.

²⁵ Ibid., 6.

²⁶ Ibid., 60.

creating a power vacuum in Western Europe or a Russian hegemony in Central Europe. According to Kissinger, the issue of justice, of a state's own conception of its role and historical identity, limited the settlement of a lasting peace. Metternich and Castlereagh were able to overrule these issues for Austria and Britain, to achieve a lasting peace at the Congress of Vienna. Rather than cater only to the interests of their own states and then appeal to a balance, both statesmen willingly limited their nations for a larger goal.²⁷ Kissinger's multiple parallels of the Cold War and the Congress of Vienna do not damage his scholarship, but they do undermine something in his overall argument. While Kissinger looked at the personalities and temperament of Castlereagh and Metternich, his work comes across as a species of structuralism. Kissinger did not assert that Castlereagh's social background and economic concerns bound him in his policy making, but he could not break free from a rigid need for a balance of power in Europe. It seems that Kissinger saw a balance of power—with Austria at its center—as the only possible, advantageous diplomatic option. It was possible, indeed sought after by most of his peers in Britain, that Castlereagh would support a removal of Britain from the affairs of Europe; however Castlereagh did not see this option as tenable. Castlereagh achieved Britain's immediate territorial concern for Hanover and the Low Countries at the Treaty of Paris. He had no need to get involved in lengthy and expensive obligations in Vienna. What he saw during his actions against Napoleon, the building of the last coalition, and the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont was an intrinsic connection between British interests and peace on the Continent. The goal of Castlereagh was not balance of power for its own sake, but a pursuit of British interest as well as European peace.

²⁷ Ibid., 145-147.

Castlereagh and the Balance of Power

In order to understand the politics of Europe following the defeat of Napoleon and the nature of the arguments at the Congress of Vienna, one must have a basic understanding of the European states system and the nature of the Great Powers.²⁸ The *ancien regime* in Europe was a collection of various dynastic rulers, long-term landed aristocrats, later merchant and administrative aristocrats, and various bureaucratic officials. The *ancien regime* embraced a large array of political forms ranging from liberal constitutional monarchies to conservative autocracies—and yet, they shared the cultural touchstones of manners, blood ties, a Christian background of one form or another, and a reverence for the classical Mediterranean empires.²⁹ Out of the ever shifting conflicts in Europe formed five relatively comparable Great Powers: Great Britain with its burgeoning, far-flung economic empire; France with its historic desire for military and cultural hegemony on the Continent; Austria with its ancient prestige at the heart of its vast holdings spread throughout Europe; Russia as the rising player on the field with Asiatic, Levantine, and European interests; and Prussia with its recent rise to Great Power status due to the military expertise of Frederick the Great.³⁰ States of all sizes and makeup filled Europe, but these five states surpassed all the rest. Other statesmen had proposed vast international coalitions and alliances—even William Pitt pursued this goal in his own fashion—but Castlereagh was the one who made it possible with his emphasis on concerted action, international guarantee, and his realistic

²⁸ For the sake of convenience in this work, the term “nation” and “state” describes a specific geographic region in which some governing body claims a monopoly on the use of force. Any allusion to the forces of nationalism and self determination are due the vagaries of language unless otherwise stated.

²⁹ Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power; a Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1955), 10-11.

³⁰ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 1987), xvii.

settlement at Vienna. It would take the closed nature of the Congress to make the demarcation of Great Power official, but the turmoil of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars served as a crucible to turn the Powers into the prime movers of authority and policy on the Continent.³¹

Between the Great Powers and the European state system there was no invisible hand of moving about states, but rather deliberate actions of rulers and statesmen in response to a preponderance of power. Europe was not a self-correcting power system, but it did tend to abhor hegemony. The size of the Great Powers, the existence of sections of territory within Europe and abroad that could easily change hands, and the long history of the governing dynasties encouraged the predatory system in which the Great Powers fought, but it did not drive them to push one another into oblivion. Some early coalitions formed to seize territory, but some came about due to fear of the Hapsburgs or France creating a hegemonic power in Europe, the material realities of conquest, and a shared background amongst the Great Powers.³² The Great Powers actively resisted any change that would build a hegemonic state that could threaten their own sovereignty. Balance of power was not an eternal peace—it was balance through constant conflict. Warfare was a constant in the 300 years before the French Revolution due to the Great Powers' need for security, against their peers. Beneath this conflict was a desire for security and a need to limit the rise of a hegemonic power, which doomed Europe to near perpetual warfare. It would take the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire to change that.

Castlereagh's early tutelage under William Pitt and the military support of Arthur Wellesley were of the utmost importance to his understanding of balance of power issues.

³¹ While it may be regarded as anachronistic to call Britain, Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia the Great Powers before the Congress, this will be the term used for the sake of brevity.

³² Gulick, 30-35.

Kissinger wrote on the balance of power, but other authors pursued it in order to focus more intently on specific issues in maintaining equilibrium between states. Some pursued a limited view on particular issues—with mixed results—while others enriched the field with broad studies that placed the actions of Castlereagh in a broader context. Edward Gulick's *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, published in 1955, deals with misconceptions and realities of the European states' approach to diplomacy and war. Driven by what he saw as a lack of an overall synthesis in the field, he discusses balance of power as a theory in thought and practice in the European state system, with the Congress of Vienna as a singular case study. He argues that European statesmen perceived of a special European system that self-corrected for the rise of hegemonic forces. His treatment of Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna focuses on the idea of a reactionary treaty, one that would serve to entrap later French aggression. This diplomatic trap would serve to redress the potential homogeneity nearly achieved by Napoleonic France and set up the framework to resist renewed campaigns by either France or Russia in Central Europe.³³

Gulick does make some excellent points about the nature of international guarantee, but he ignores the reality of European statecraft. While there had been various coalitions in European history against a rising power, the norm in European warfare was a short-term military alliance that created a preponderance of power for the exploitation of a neighbor. Coalitions were usually predatory, not defensive—which may seem to be a minor point, but Castlereagh's efforts at Vienna are only possible with a correct understanding of this issue. If the natural inclination towards states is self-correcting, Castlereagh was merely a political actor giving shape to an intrinsic diplomatic

³³ Ibid., 134-135.

undercurrent—but if the norm of European diplomacy was conflict and exploitation, then his actions in forming the Treaty of Chaumont to guard against France, his attempts to pro-actively invest power in other states, and his attempts to forge a lasting peace are all the more impressive. Gulick touches on some interesting ideas, but fails to grasp the nature of the diplomatic system that Castlereagh and his peers worked in.³⁴

If Gulick's attempt at a minute study led him to error, Paul Schroeder's *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* succeeded admirably due to the inclusiveness of its content and scope. Rather than the issue of balance of power at Vienna itself, Schroeder approaches the failures of the old balance of power system during the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, and shows the development of equilibrium in Europe based on comparable hegemony and underpinned by international law.³⁵ It was not the French, Atlantic, Industrial, and Napoleonic Revolutions that had the greatest influence on Europe, but the diplomatic revolution. Ideas and theories of government, not the horrors of war, changed European political thought from raw and boundless self-aggrandizement to a tempered deferral of personal state goals for a larger European good.³⁶ Schroeder sets the wars against Napoleon in the proper context of predatory state interests, but draws special attention to the Third Coalition. For Schroeder, the Coalition kept together by Castlereagh was the turning point for Austria and Prussia. Their defeats, reversals, and betrayals had taught them that the formation and success of an international

³⁴ For a fuller understanding of the methods, problems, and personalities that bind and separate states and coalitions while waging war and seeking peace see Harold Nicolson's *The Congress of Vienna: a Study in Allied Unity* focuses on. He argued that the organization of states into an alliance or coalition rests on a shared good placed above separate goals; after achieving the principal goal the priorities of the separate states often reassert themselves. Rather than a desire for an international benefit, states often assert national benefits based on their efforts in securing victory or armistice.

³⁵ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*, Oxford History of Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, viii.

alliance was difficult in the current European diplomatic system. It also failed to provide security. Both Powers, still driven by self interest, began to recognize the need for a new system or tenor for diplomatic relations in Europe.

The primary difference between the policies of the 18th and 19th centuries is that the latter relied on the deferral of unbridled ambition and a basis of diplomacy on law, legitimacy, and trust over temporary exploitation. While other authors might say that the new generation of statesmen after the death of Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand did not fear the destruction brought about by the Napoleonic Wars as their predecessors did, Schroeder asserts that the principle error was a failure in maintaining the new political system.³⁷ Schroeder's work has little time to discuss the personal politics of Castlereagh at the Congress, but he does touch on a fundamental truth of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: their destruction and upheaval was so disastrous as to prompt a desire in Castlereagh to set aside unbridled British wealth, power, and influence on the Continent to pursue that end. In the discussion of the events at Vienna, the transformation in European politics was well underway. It would take Castlereagh's settlement and plan to guard against France to make it a reality.

Popular History of Castlereagh and Congress

The end of the Cold War and the movement of academia to other aspects of social history brought out a renewed interest in the classic biography, as well as in the period piece meant for a larger audience. While the former reconciled the individual with his academic, economic, religious, and ideological surroundings, the latter ignited an interest towards a larger audience. The introduction of Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna into popular nonfiction is surprising at first glance, but the upheaval and turmoil of the

³⁷ Ibid., 582-586.

period and the personal nature of the conflict and negotiations lend themselves well to a stirring narrative. This new perspective is the fruit of a renewed interest in social history, as well as an attempt to make diplomacy approachable to the general public. The works of David King, Adam Zamoyski, and John Bew are three recent entries in the popular history of the Congress and Castlereagh.³⁸

As an example, David King's *Vienna: 1814* focuses on the revels, dances, and dalliances of the princes and statesmen at Vienna.³⁹ King's approach of laying out the figures of the Congress as compelling characters with their own personal idiosyncrasies, flaws, and strengths allows him to focus on some of the lesser individuals who took part, such as Dorothee de Talleyrand Perigord.⁴⁰ His focus on the pageantry, torrid affairs, and social distraction of the Congress creates the image that events at the Congress were petty. He describes borders and souls parceled out at the swish of a pen, but does not establish the real fear among the different Powers and their willingness to go to war. The conflict over territory and prestige was a game, but their function in maintaining peace and seeking state self interest. King's desire to focus on the material and social culture is commendable, but he has failed the reader if the Congress is seen as silly as opposed to how deadly earnest it was. King points out Castlereagh's goal to build an "iron ring" around France while undermining its importance or seriousness of that goal by focusing on aristocratic minutia.⁴¹ In his coverage of the Holy Alliance, King says that Castlereagh was comfortable with the new "general European police." King also says that the

³⁸ Bew and Zamoyski's work deal with nationalism and ideology at the Congress as explained further below.

³⁹ David King, *Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna*, 1st ed. (New York: Harmony Books, 2008).

When describing the book to a peer, the phrase, "the Downton Abbey of European politics" came up.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 40-42.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 150-151.

revolutions in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Naples made the “Great Powers” declare that they would not recognize revolutionary movements or settlements and would resist them by force. Both of these statements are misleading because Britain, France, and Austria all had differing opinions on recognition of revolutionary forces. King creates the false image of unanimous, concerted reaction in Europe where none existed. In the rush for greater public interest and coverage of social history, it is important not to slip into error.

The historiography of the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh are a rich field that has transformed between the scholarship during Great War and current historic and literary trends. The telescoped political analysis of the interwar period gave way to studies that attempted to uncover trends or transformative processes in politics. World War II and the Cold War prompted a further desire in some political historians to provide a response to the Marxist narrative of European politics based on the broader issues of the early modern period. In spite of this new focus, historians kept returning to the Congress of Vienna due to its place as a nexus of modern European history. The rise of greater interest in social history and a widening audience for public history has brought an innovative change. The background of political figures, the details of their lives while conducting diplomacy, and the social context in which they worked are synthesized with earlier writers who focused on high politics and sweeping diplomatic transformation.

Castlereagh and Nationalism at the Congress

While there have been several books that dealt with nationalist movements around the time of the Congress of Vienna, some authors still tend to focus on the image of the Great Powers running rough-shod over national interest. It is true that Webster took this route, but Hannah Strauss expertly deals with the nationalist ideas circulating Vienna

during the Congress in *The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland*. Works that continue to make an appeal to abjured nationalism at the Congress come across as rather niche in focus. A recent example of this trend was Adam Zamoyski's *The Rites of Peace*. While it principally dealt with the military defeat of Napoleon and the arranging of the coalition against him, Zamoyski points out that the plans of the Allies while fighting Napoleon in the field were temporary measures, plans to reflect the discourse in London or Vienna. Instead of reassessing the necessity of their decisions, the Allies carried on with their established plans and policies. Zamoyski's discussion of the redrawing of borders is an interesting discussion that leaves some confusion on where he stands on the pragmatism or justice of the settlement. While he does assert that the Congress' overall settlement supported the goals of the *ancien regime*, he does not condemn them for pursuing their own ends. Throughout his work, Zamoyski is rather critical of most of the proceedings regarding Poland. Harold Nicolson and David King also have passing remarks about the cavalier attitude of the Congress towards the lesser states of Europe.

With some issues in the historiography of a subject, it is possible to make a brief note and move on. The issue of nationalism and ideology at the Congress of Vienna are integral to the understanding of the Congress and Castlereagh's goals. Castlereagh and the rest of the Congress did not ignore the possibility of nationalism, nor did they as a body desire to impede it in all its forms. Castlereagh weighed the benefits of nationalism against its intemperance and fragility, siding with order and some form of control by the *ancien regime* on the Continent. This is not a tangential issue for the scholarship of Castlereagh. It ties into how he viewed the settlement of Europe. If he abjured

nationalism for reasons other than a natural inclination towards aristocracy, then it is more likely that strategic concerns pushed him onward. The statesmen at Vienna did not dismiss nationalism out of hand, but rather they addressed its benefits and dangers for their own personal goals and the general peace of Europe. Castlereagh in particular showed ideological flexibility in how he dealt with these issues. While he might make use of nationalist sentiment, his underlying goal was always the preservation of peace in Europe.

The issue of German nationalism at the end of the Napoleonic Wars split through the sharp difference in opinion between the two largest German states, Prussia and Austria. While figures in Prussia hoped to use German nationalism to further their own ends, Austria saw the movement as a possible danger. German nationalism might strengthen the solidarity of the German states, but it would also erode the cohesiveness of the multi-ethnic Hapsburg holdings. Castlereagh had freedom at Vienna, but his actions towards German nationalism—and its effects on the government's budget—had to appear before Parliament. While the Tories willingly incorporated Saxony into Prussia and the Whigs preferred to preserve it, neither group had a clear idea of the larger issues of the settlement. No matter the response of Parliament, Castlereagh saw his own goals for balance of power as solid and able to stand against the opposition.⁴² In spite of his eventual acquiescence of Saxon territory, Castlereagh did remark that “if the incorporation of the whole of Saxony into the Prussian monarchy is necessary to assure the welfare of Europe, I would not condemn the measure from either the political or moral point of view, though I feel some regret at the idea of seeing such an ancient family

⁴² Hannah Alice Straus, *The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland*, Columbia University Faculty of Political Science Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 72.

so profoundly injured.”⁴³ His response to the settlement of Saxony and German nationalism became less friendly as tensions increased between the Great Powers over the settlement of Poland and Saxony. On his return to England, he expressed his new distrust of German nationalism by stating that “public feeling, not merely the people of Germany, but of all other countries, would have been wounded by so great and complete a sacrifice of an ancient family.”⁴⁴ For Castlereagh, Germany nationalism only became an issue after it threatened to bolster Prussia and threaten the balance of power in Central Europe. Regardless of larger diplomatic and strategic concerns, any talk of unifying the states of Germany touched on the interest of Britain due to the holdings of House Hanover. For Castlereagh, the issue of Hanover was “a point of honor, and a point of honor to this country.”⁴⁵ The Prince Regent shared this opinion, showing indifference to the loss of territories to Hanover.

Britain’s interest in German nationalism was a non-issue in spite of the royal connection to Hanover, but Austrian and Prussian interests bound up with the idea of a German nation. Two of Castlereagh’s goals at the Congress of Vienna were the strengthening of Prussia in northern Europe in order to serve as a physical buffer against France in the German states, as well as the strengthening of Austria to block French military incursions into Italy and diplomatic forays into the German states. The historiography of the liberation of Germany and contest between Austria and Prussia for the hearts and minds of the German Confederation is too large to discuss here.⁴⁶ While

⁴³ Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington, 24, October, 1814, Castlereagh, *Memoirs and Correspondence*, vol. 10, 173.

⁴⁴ Castlereagh, *Memoirs and Correspondence*, I, 51, 181.

⁴⁵ Duke of Wellington, *Supplementary Dispatches*, edited by his son, London, vol. 9, Dec. 23, 1814 Liverpool to Castlereagh from Straus, 41.

⁴⁶ On top of all of these issues comes the sharp divide among diplomatic historians who look at the Congress as a larger event with interlocking diplomatic pieces and those who attribute near god-like powers

both of these states had their own interests and goals, Castlereagh had a great deal of diplomatic wiggle room at the Congress. There are those who lay the control of the Congress System at the feet of Metternich—and rightly so—but the Congress System was only possible because Castlereagh saw its value at Chaumont and pursued it with vigor.

Castlereagh's response to nationalism in Italy suffered complications by Joachim Murat sitting on the throne of Naples and Britain's earlier use of nationalism as a sword against Napoleon. While Napoleon had covered himself in glory in his early campaigns in northern Italy, the death knells of his empire prompted the rise of a muted nationalist sentiment. His brother-in-law Murat was a man of great ambition, who considered uniting Italy under his rule. Eugene Beauharnais, the viceroy of Italy, considered doing the same. While the passions of these men could be seen as traditional dynastic desires under the guise of a populist movement, the actions of British and Austrian commanders on the ground introduced further difficulties. Austrian commanders Marshall Bellegarde and General Nugent promised freedom from foreign oppression and called for national independence. More embarrassing for Castlereagh at the later Congress were the pro-Italian declarations of Lord William Bentinck, the commander of Britain's forces in Italy. Bentinck was inconsistent in his support, also promising Genoa freedom as a separate republic.⁴⁷ While this sentiment was useful while the Allies were in contest against

of persuasion and foresight to Prince Metternich. While Metternich was likely the most profound and important statesmen of his age, his successes or failures have more to do with the political landscape around him and the acceptance of his peers than any ability to direct a continent wide zeitgeist of European conservatism. See James Scheehan's *German History 1770-1866*, the Enno Kraehe's *Metternich's German Policy*, and Timothy Saxon's *The Question of Organizing the German Federal Army 1813-1819*.

⁴⁷ T. C. Hansard and Great Britain. Parliament. "The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, from Which Last-Mentioned Epoch It Is Continued Downwards in the Work

Napoleon, it quickly became a liability and an obstacle after conflict ceased. To Castlereagh, the support of Italian nationalism had been “excusable” because “we were justified in running all risks,” but he quickly asserted that a continuation of this policy was inadvisable.⁴⁸ As with the issue of the settlement in Saxony, Parliament held strong opinions—and little information—on the settlement in Italy. The Whigs supported the nationalist movement in Italy and criticized Austrian power in that region.⁴⁹ While the Whigs spoke irreconcilably of freedom for Genoa and nationalism in Italy, the Tories supported the strengthening of Sardinia. Though nationalism was useful, Castlereagh focused instead on the needs for balance of power in Europe and sacrificed the desires of the people of Italy for Austrian compensation and a stronger Piedmont-Sardinia.

The issue of nationalism in Poland is muddled by its history of division and the fears of the other Great Powers over Russian influence in Central Europe. The Whigs supported a separate Polish state, a bold and ambitious goal given its partitions.⁵⁰ Castlereagh saw the appeals of Tsar Alexander as a shameless power grab covered by fair sentiment.⁵¹ His eventual support of a Polish state was an attempt to make a buffer limiting the ambitions of Russia in Central Europe. While the issue of nationalism did not take hold and dictate the policies of the Great Powers at Vienna, the movement did play a factor in the propaganda at the Congress. Castlereagh supported and abjured the sentiment of nationalism in his turn, not due to wavering ideology, but due to a realist desire to maintain peace in Europe.

The Ideology of Castlereagh

Entitled "Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.," (London: Printed by T.C. Hansard, 1812), 390-391, 729-730.

⁴⁸ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 9, May, 1814, Castlereagh, *Memoirs and Correspondence*, vol 10, 18.

⁴⁹ Hansard and Great Britain. *Parliament*. 730-735.

⁵⁰ Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. 9, 342-344, Oct. 14, 1814, London.

⁵¹ Hansard and Great Britain. *Parliament*. XXIV, 554.

As with nationalism, the other flaw laid against Castlereagh is a charge of over-conservatism and ideological rigidity. While some of Castlereagh's contemporaries and successors asserted that he reinforced European conservatism and tied Britain to despotic Powers, this view either relies on the mischaracterization of his goals or on a misunderstanding of European ideological trends. Percy Shelley compared Castlereagh to the gruesome figure of death in *The Masque of Anarchy* and George Byron called Castlereagh an "intellectual eunuch" who combined despotism with foolishness.⁵² The criticisms against Castlereagh do draw attention to his failure in publishing his political thoughts or of passing them on to a successor, but it does not necessarily imply that he did not approach his international politics with a great deal of forethought and experience. In the most sweeping terms, European conservatism rests on the necessity or sanctity of the rights of the monarchy and the *ancien regime*. While some states looked to utilitarian benefits of a central authority under the monarch and nobility, others focused more on the supposed providential nature of the aristocracy—their legitimacy as ordained by God. European liberalism was a mixture of greater control by the aristocracy over the monarchy (a push back against absolutism) with greater receptiveness to popular opinion. It was rare for any European state to seek out local involvement in decision making. Even the extreme Committee of Public Safety and the political parties of the French Revolution feared the disorder of over-participation by the wrong sort in statecraft.⁵³ There is a logical fallacy in the work of some popular historians that equate Castlereagh's goals at the Congress with either liberal or conservative goals. Castlereagh did have forays into liberal ideology, and later allied with Tories in Parliament, but his goals in foreign policy

⁵² Bew, XXVIII-XXIX.

⁵³ For a full and detailed account of the Committee of Public Safety's opinions on the populace, please see *The Twelve Who Ruled* by R.R. Palmer.

were pragmatic in nature. There is little evidence to suggest that Castlereagh's international policy was directed by what he thought would support conservative or liberal ideology. He did not go to war to make Europe safe for constitutional monarchies nor did he expect himself to redirect the currents of internal politics in Europe.

Most authors, no matter their attention to detail, gloss over Castlereagh's background and ideology. The most recent entry in the scholarship, John Bew's *Castlereagh*, circumvents this trap and instead discusses Robert Stewart as a man of his time with a full discussion of his familial, ideological, and governmental background. Bew fully covers Castlereagh's life in Ireland and his early actions against Napoleon with Pitt to demonstrate his social, ethnic, and ideological context. Rather than focus on the international upheaval of the period or the political exchanges between the Great Powers, Bew's focus allows the reader to ignore the arguments of absolute political ideologies and long-term military concerns. Instead, he brings the chaos and *ad hoc* nature of the Napoleonic conflict and diplomacy to life.

Bew spends an inordinate amount of time in his book covering Castlereagh's actions and goals during his time of political power in Ireland.⁵⁴ Rather than a colorful beginning, this material on Castlereagh in Ireland serves to counter those who assert that Castlereagh was a pure reactionary. At Vienna, his desire for a swift settlement—to the exclusion of the lesser powers—was not a conservative power-grab to bolster the ailing ranks of the *ancien regime*. Castlereagh objected to the threat of military dominance in Europe; as such, he had to tread the delicate balance between limiting the possible resurgence of French power and the current control of so much territory by Russia.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Bew, XXII-XXVII.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 367-377.

Where his book shines is how it puts all of the actions of Castlereagh in context. Castlereagh's education, family stresses, ideological pragmatism, struggles with Parliament, and battles over the Act of Union and the future of Ireland all play a part in his policy. Bew's exhaustive research into the life of Castlereagh avoids the hasty labels of Conservative or Reactionary. While the letters and official government documents from the Congress would give an indication as to what Castlereagh planned for settled Europe, the inclusion of an ideological background gives the historian a fuller understanding of his plans and purposes. Even though men can break free of their social conditioning, Castlereagh's background undoubtedly affected the realism of his diplomatic approach and his plan for the neutralization of future French aggression.

Castlereagh's Congressional Legacy

The historiography of the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh are rich fields that span more than a century. However, there do seem to be some fundamental issues that limit the effectiveness of some of the works. Most historians have no clear definition of what they mean when discussing institutions and events, fail to fully address the effects of the issues in a larger European and world context, and entertain unreasonable expectations of Castlereagh and his peers.

While Webster and Schroeder are careful with their use of terms in this historiography, others are less exact. There is a whiggish propensity to treat the various coalitions formed by Pitt and Castlereagh against the Revolution and Napoleon as false starts for the inevitable Sixth Coalition. Whether willing or otherwise, authors present the coalitions as failed attempts to build the Europe of 1815 rather than separate political unions that were based around the goals of politicians, economic concerns, and the

success or failures of armies in the field. There is a similar propensity for authors to treat the Sixth Coalition and the Quadruple Alliance as if they were the same thing. The former was a large collection of greater and lesser European states arrayed against Napoleonic France, while the latter was a concerted plan by Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia designed to oppose Napoleon, secure peace, and to endure after the end of hostilities. To treat these two alliances as one is to give unwarranted legitimacy to the Quadruple Alliance's decisions at the Congress of Vienna and subsequent Congresses. The Congresses themselves are problematic in the historiography, as there is a propensity to discuss the Congress System and Concert of Europe interchangeably. The former ended in the 1820s, while the latter was an idea appealed to in Europe up until the Great War.⁵⁶

Webster, Temperley, Schroeder, and Kissinger all take time to pull back from the specifics of their research and assert the overall importance of what they are discussing. Many of their latter-day peers, however, avoid addressing the larger questions raised by the Congress and the peace in Europe. Zamoyski focuses on the fate of Poland, King is interested with the pageantry and personal factors, and John Bew's work is remarkably thorough but limited to Castlereagh. These types of social and personal studies are useful to the field and attract new historians, but this meticulousness could be channeled in other ways. Zamoyski, King, and Bew could take their detailed, yet riveting manner of research and direct it to what figures thought of the Congress System, balance of power, and the intersection of foreign diplomacy with local politics. The trend of displaying Castlereagh and Canning as opposing figures lingers. While the heirs of Pitt did disagree

⁵⁶ There are arguments as to whether the Concert was an active component in European diplomacy. It was an idea that the Great Powers used in official and unofficial communications.

on how to preserve Britain, their underlying goals were similar. Both sought the defeat of Napoleon, limit the power and reach of the Holy Alliance, free Latin America from European influence, and obtain *reapproachment* with the United States. These issues strained the relationship between the two men, but it is unreasonable to cast them as opposing forces. For all of their differences, they moved within the same social circles, had similar upbringings, and the same entertained general political philosophy.

Most of the texts written on the Congress of Vienna in the last few decades have been kinder to Castlereagh than his contemporaries. No longer seen as a villain who sold out the liberals of Europe to dally with monarchs, he was a statesman who tempered his ideals with realism and a firm belief in utilitarianism in international power politics. Castlereagh's goals at Vienna to encircle France and neutralize its aggression as well as win a lasting peace were not some ephemeral plan born to protect his peers' social privilege or to solely advance Britain's interests. Castlereagh pursued both Britain's national interest and Europe's ultimate good by the pursuit of peace—a lasting peace that was made possible by his ideological background, strategic and diplomatic experiences, tireless effort, and willingness to make difficult and sometimes repellent choices at the settlement in Vienna.

Chapter Two

Castlereagh before the Congress

While men's goals and desires are not the sole result of their upbringing—their early education, political leanings, and public actions undoubtedly matter. Regardless of the future arrayed for Castlereagh, his background affected his later political and diplomatic policies. Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, was born the 18th of June, 1769, to a respected and ambitious Scots-Irish family.⁵⁷ He was the second son of Robert Stewart and Lady Sarah Stewart, whose first child had died that same year as Castlereagh's birth. His mother, the Lady Sarah, followed her first child Alexander into the grave in July 1770. Castlereagh's father, Lord Londonderry, threw himself into his political career in Dublin, and his son received a warm upbringing at their home, Mount Stewart. As a child, Castlereagh was clever, quick, and healthy.⁵⁸ His youthful exuberance was full of an active social life among his Irish peers, but he did have some missteps in dealing with the fairer sex. At one point, Castlereagh dueled with a member of the local gentry to defend his conduct with a young woman under the gentryman's charge. More salacious was the claim that he had pursued, won, and gotten a child on a young serving maid named Nelly Stool. The truth is unknown, but the Stewarts did give her a cottage and financial support of 100 pounds a year—and Castlereagh would call on her whenever he was nearby. In spite of these issues, at the age of 16, Castlereagh stayed in London for his first introduction to public society. By 1785, he took part in political life and attended meetings at the House of Commons.

⁵⁷ Bew, 7-11.

⁵⁸ Bew, 16.

The fortunes of the Stewarts improved during Castlereagh's childhood after his father entered into an advantageous second marriage in 1775. He achieved the position of Privy Councilor in Ireland in 1795 and became Earl of Londonderry in 1789. It was after his father's ascension to Earl of Londonderry that Robert achieved the courtesy title of Viscount Castlereagh. These changes increased the family's involvement in the Irish peerage and exposed Castlereagh to the writings of the English Enlightenment and Ulster Irish Whigs and patriots. This familiarity played an important role in his later push for the Act of Union.⁵⁹ The early years of Castlereagh's life took place in a background of political upheaval. Under various English monarchs, Ireland suffered a systematic loss of land to English peers and the division of large family holdings due to inheritance laws designed to divide Irish holdings into ever-smaller plots. The dominance of the Parliament in Ireland was due in part to the policy excluding Catholics from holding office. While Castlereagh had a pleasant childhood, the confluence of economic, social, political, and religious conflict between English, Irish, Anglican Irish, and Catholic Irish influenced his early political trials.⁶⁰

Castlereagh's political life began in earnest after his return from Cambridge. This return coincided with a push by his father to reassert the family's interests against an Irish political rival, Lord Downshire, in the Irish Parliament, and his ascendancy to peerage as the Lord of Londonderry in 1789. In spite of his vigorous support of his father and his own campaigning, Castlereagh was ambivalent about a life in politics in Ireland with its "petty provincial politics" and the rudeness of its court compared to "English knowledge,

⁵⁹ Bew, 26-28.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 15-56.

and more enlightened knowledge.”⁶¹ His ascendancy to the House coincided with that of Arthur Wellesley, a man whose fortune intertwined with Castlereagh’s.⁶² He sat in Parliament for ten years, during which time Ireland enjoyed comparably greater freedom than it had from the direct influence of England. This freedom was in part due to the harsh criticism of Henry Grattan, a political firebrand, whose call for a separate Parliamentary rule for Ireland continually undermined the goals of the English Parliament.⁶³ Castlereagh succeeded in finding a balance between those in the Irish Parliament who called for greater freedom, and his own connections and interests in the English Parliament. In particular, he maintained a relationship with William Pitt’s administration.⁶⁴

In his time in Parliament, Castlereagh defied easy polarization by contemporaries and historians alike. His background in Irish liberalism, contacts with the realism of Pitt, and own musings on the role of government stumped those who would ascribe him a simple political label. He disapproved of the spread of Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man* because it “alter’d the people of Ireland”, supported Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in spite of some inconsistencies between Burke’s sentiments and those of Irish Whigs, and initially celebrated the fall of the Bastille.⁶⁵ In a trip to Spa in the Netherlands, Castlereagh saw the Revolution firsthand. In a letter to his grandfather, Castlereagh laid out what he saw as the three principle goals of a government: protect

⁶¹ Earl Amden to Castlereagh, 16 October 1790, *Castlereagh Papers*, D303/F/5.

⁶² Wellesley went on to become the Duke of Wellington, the most famous English general in the Napoleonic Wars.

⁶³ Henry Grattan was a member of the Irish House of Commons that campaigned for legislative freedom for the Irish Parliament. He opposed the Act of Union, but served as a member after the unification.

⁶⁴ Bew, 38-41.

William Pitt “The Younger” served as a Prime Minister from 1783 to 1801. He also served as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. He was instrumental in the early conflicts against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. He opposed what he saw as partisan politics in Parliament.

⁶⁵ Castlereagh to Viscount Bayham, 10 January, 1792, *Castlereagh Papers*, D303/Q/2.

personal liberty, protect personal property, and keep taxes within reasonable levels. He found the French government wanting the first two areas. Apart from his time at Spa, Castlereagh also traveled to Paris. After observing the National Assembly in session, he said that the Revolution had “done much to approve and much to condemn,” and that “an essential change was necessary for the happiness and dignity of a great people, long in a state of degradation.”⁶⁶

However, Castlereagh’s subsequent discomfort with Revolutionary France affected his relationship with those in Ireland who supported an independence movement to separate them from Britain. In his first speech delivered in February 1791, he insisted that the admission of Ireland into trade with the Far East or India should be based on “not a spirit of local partiality, but as a member of the British Empire.” While Castlereagh’s commitment to the idea of a separate Ireland endured until the later revolt, he was already weighing the benefits of working within the British Empire against the possible dangers of trying to leave it. While Castlereagh desired greater freedom for Ireland, his time on the Continent had soured him to those who postulated a similar revolution in Ireland or an international alliance with France.⁶⁷ His discomfiture was not over the revolution of the French people against the *ancien regime*, for which he had criticism, but over its disrupting effects on society and mistreatment of the individual.

Castlereagh’s break with his independence-minded, Irish colleagues began with the arrest of a Charles Hamilton Teelings, a former acquaintance of the family who had

⁶⁶ Robert Stewart to Earl Camden, London, 1 September, 1791 from Bew, 47.

Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 6.

⁶⁷ C. J. Bartlett, *Castlereagh* (London, Melbourne etc; Macmillan, 1966), 9-11.

Charles Teelings had been family friends with the Stewarts. Castlereagh rode alongside Teelings and his son pleasantly, only to have the man arrested when they reached their destination. No matter Castlereagh’s intent, this type of behavior is one reason for his reputation as cold and distant.

been in contact with the French government about the possibility of a French invasion.⁶⁸ Castlereagh's arrest of Teelings was only one of many as the threat of collaborators with the feared French invasion gave way to increased government reaction. Castlereagh shared a public role in these arrests, and as time went on, the popularity of Castlereagh and his family in Ireland sank to an all-time low as peers who had hoped for greater autonomy looked on the family with fear and distrust. He took up a residence in Dublin Castle, the seat of British power in Ireland, and sought to maintain peace and limit those who might have helped France. Contrary to the popular belief of his contemporaries, Castlereagh was not able to wield sinister powers from within Dublin Castle, spurring betrayal and treachery among the independence-minded. In fact, he was unprepared for the confluence of external and internal threats. As Castlereagh heard that ships from Toulon were moving to lead an invasion into Ireland, the country stirred in discontent that would end in revolt in 1789. In response to the French invasion, Castlereagh led a group of militia—though awkwardly arranged—around the coast of Ireland, traipsing around the countryside without certainty of where the French might land.⁶⁹

While this invasion came to naught, the confluence of Castlereagh's support of British interests over Irish and the "repelling" of French forces set the tone for three defining characteristics of his career: his harsh legacy at home, his struggle for the Act of Union, and a steadfast fight against the military dangers of the French Revolution.⁷⁰ The arrests of so many revolutionaries, his seat of power at the traditionally reviled Dublin

⁶⁸ Bew, XXI-XXX, 109-124.

⁶⁹ Bartlett, 15.

For a better understanding of Castlereagh's day to day issues during the revolt in Ireland and threat of French invasion, see the first volume of *The Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh* arranged by his brother in 1848.

⁷⁰ While the absence of French forces in Ireland seems more like a bad omen from *Waiting for Godot*, the threat of the invasion and rising in Ireland was one of the more dangerous moments for Britain in the war.

Castle, and his military maneuvers against the French invasion earned Castlereagh the hatred of many peers in Ireland. Castlereagh's earnest affection for Ireland and his fears over Ireland's fate if it separated from Britain tempered his actions. He did not sell out his peers in Ireland who supported a separate Parliament for the praise of his allies in London, instead he chose the economic connections and tranquility that Britain could provide in the long term over what he had seen of French anarchy in Spa and Paris.⁷¹ Aside from the economic benefit to Ireland, Castlereagh feared what ruin a war between Britain and France fought in Ireland would do to his native land. If Castlereagh had a private political philosophy, it was more in tune with classical liberalism as opposed to Tory-monarchism.⁷² His goal was peace and he had a profound respect for the mixed system of government in Britain that checked mob rule and tyranny while also supporting means for more direct governmental control and the trappings of popular participation. Regardless of his ideals, Castlereagh's pragmatism towards the conflict with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France overcame what more ephemeral desires he may have had for policy.

While Castlereagh's efforts kept returning him to the familial and governmental duties in Ireland, his heart and interests pulled him back to London. Castlereagh had grown up in Ireland and achieved political success there, but his preferences lay in London politics, especially with William Pitt. Encouraged by his grandfather Lord Camden, Castlereagh attended several of Pitt's debates at Westminster during his time at Cambridge between 1787 and 1788.⁷³ Castlereagh did not always approve of the Pittites

⁷¹ Bew, 4-5.

⁷² Castlereagh did eventually entertain a long alliance with Tory interests, but his personal writings seem do not support a deep internalizing of their ideology.

⁷³ Bartlett, 9.

in Ireland itself. In particular, he held the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, the Earl Westmorland, in scant regard.⁷⁴ Convinced of his role as an impediment to reform, Castlereagh was clear that he “shall not lament his [Westmorland’s] departure.”⁷⁵ Castlereagh received a good deal of advice from Lord Camden and William Pitt to help him navigate between the conflicting loyalties to his peers around the country and the control of Britain in the Castle at Dublin, but he still suffered from a strained relationship with many of his peers.⁷⁶ After having worked together, Pitt pressed Castlereagh into the position of Secretary of State for War as part of a plan to hurriedly make up two allies that Pitt had just lost in Parliament. This new office served Castlereagh in the short term, making up for his electoral defeat in the County Down, but in the long term, it also served a greater purpose. His position kept him in contact with Pitt during the peace memorandum that Pitt drew up with Russia in 1805.⁷⁷ Pitt’s plan later served as a map to Castlereagh for the settlement of Europe. When Castlereagh came to the Foreign Office, he continued this close working relationship and assisted in the drafted peace settlement of 1805.⁷⁸

Castlereagh’s policies were born of his own experiences and political philosophy, but Pitt’s policies on strategic reaction to French aggression and future settlement of

Castlereagh’s grandfather Lord Camden was a supporter of William Pitt and instrumental in maintaining the connections between Castlereagh and Pitt.

Bew, 18, 35-36.

⁷⁴ John Fane, the 10th Earl of Westmorland was a supporter of Pitt. He served as Lord Privy Seal, Joint Postmaster General, and later Master of the Horse. In spite of any disapproval Castlereagh had, he later became a Knight of the Garter, a high honor.

⁷⁵ Castlereagh to Earl Camden, Dublin, 26 January 1793, Castlereagh Papers, D303/Q/2.

⁷⁶ Bartlett, 10-11

Bew, 38-39.

⁷⁷ Bartlett, 50-51.

Harold William Vazeille Temperley and Lillian Margery Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902); or, Documents, Old and New* (Cambridge Eng; University Press, 1938), 10-21.

⁷⁸ Bartlett, 106.

Europe affected Castlereagh's later goals at the Congress. Pitt's international policy focused on some form of coalition against unrestrained France that involved a system of guarantees and legitimacy within international law. Two prime examples of Pitt's policies include a letter he assisted in writing to M.F. Chauvelin in December 1792 and a memorandum he wrote to Tsar Alexander in January 1805.⁷⁹ The letter to Chauvelin spoke about concern over the call of the Convention in France to "encourage disorder and revolt in all countries, even in those which are neutral."⁸⁰ While the extreme discomfiture of the British government of a foreign power advocating their overthrow was bad enough, more contentious was the irreconcilability of proposed French policy and its military actions. While French leaders abjured the annexation of territory in November 1792, they launched an attack upon the capital of Antwerp, Scheldt. The British government found the continued promise of the Revolutionary government to respect, "the independence and rights of England and her allies" coupled with a demonstrated intent to "maintain these open and injurious aggressions" against the holdings of those same states untenable.

This confusing foreign policy indicated a larger fault with the French government, the false conception that they had the right to set aside the treaties and rights between the nations of Europe.⁸¹ France's abjuring Britain's role in the Low Countries while calling their own seizure a form of justice was galling. While Pitt might have been uncomfortable with the radical nature of the Revolution towards monarchy, the chief criticism of the statesmen was never on Revolutionary ideology, it was its execution of its

⁷⁹ While the letter comes from the hand of Lord Grenville, Lilliam Penson and Harold Temperley hold the letter to be the fruit of both men. Chauvelin was the acting head of the French Convention, at least for the purposes of international communication. Tsar Alexander was Emperor of Russia, but was also later King of Poland, and Grand duke of Finland and Lithuania. While his youth was marked with promises of reform, he later years were profoundly reactionary and despotic under the cloak of mysticism.

⁸⁰ *The case against the French Revolution and the Dispatch of 31, December, 1792*, quoted from Temperley and Penson. 4.

⁸¹ *The case against the French Revolution and the Dispatch of 31, December, 1792*, quoted from Ibid., 6.

ideology in a diplomatic framework. Instead of condemning Chauvelin in the lessening of his monarch, Pitt's criticisms were over the fomentation of rebellion and French expansion into the Low Countries. There was a distinction between intervention "for the purpose of establishing any form of Gov[ernment] in France," and "a concert between other Gov[ernment]s to provide for their own security at a time when political interests are endangered both by the intrigues of France in the interior of other countries, and by their views of conquest and aggrandizement."⁸² Pitt's focus on the strategic realities was important for Britain's foreign policy, but it also had a great influence on Castlereagh's eventual views.

In January 1805, Pitt wrote a memorandum to Tsar Alexander after lengthy discussions with Ambassador Prince Adam Czartoryski.⁸³ The memorandum laid out three objects that a concert between their countries might achieve. They could free the sections of Europe that had fallen under French power since the Revolution, build a barrier against future French aggression, and establish a peace based on conventions and guarantees for mutual protection and security. Pitt sought a system that guaranteed the rights of all states, not that undermined local sovereignty.⁸⁴ The chief military concerns of the memorandum were the "Evacuation of the North Germany and Italy, the Re-establishment of the Independence of the United Provinces, and of Switzerland, the

⁸² *The case against the French Revolution and the Dispatch of 31, December, 1792*, quoted from *Ibid.*, 9.

⁸³ Adam Czartoryski was a member of Polish nobility and the sometime friend and confidant of Tsar Alexander. He served as a diplomat for the Tsar and was a constant source of confidence and indecision on the matter on what the Tsar would do with Poland.

⁸⁴ W. Alison Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe; a Study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823, as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace* (New York: H. Fertig, 1966), 38-40, 144. *The case against the French Revolution and the Dispatch of 31, December, 1792*, quoted from Temperley and Penson, 3-8.

Restoration of the Dominions of the King of Sardinia, and the security of Naples.”⁸⁵

Coupled with these goals, a more encompassing plan limited future French aggression and secured a longer peace in Europe. Castlereagh would imitate much of these policies, especially the settlement of the United Provinces and northern Italy.

Pitt then divided the dominated states of Europe into two groups—those who could stand on their own against France after restoration, and those countries whose occupation had destroyed local autonomy and lacked the inherent strength to resist France. While Pitt eagerly advocated for the independence of the former (the United Provinces, Switzerland, extended Sardinia, Tuscany, and Modena), he saw the weakness of the latter (Genoa, the Austrian Netherlands, and much of traditional Austrian Italy that fell under France) as a danger to Europe. Pitt discussed the parceling out of much of Italy, but his primary concern was the enlargement of Sardinia, the United Provinces, and of Prussia. Bolstered Sardinia would serve as a bulwark in Italy, the enlarged United Provinces would be a less tempting target for France, and strengthened Prussia would protect the Rhine and the Low Countries. Pitt did temper his generous offer of territory to Prussia with a provision that it would be limited to secure the support of Austria and Russia. While Pitt had an eye towards larger European concerns, he continued to work within the existing diplomatic and strategic system.

Some authors would set up a conflict between Castlereagh and Canning for the title of Pitt’s political heir, but Castlereagh clearly inherited—and helped form—Pitt’s plans for peace in Europe. In the midst of 1813, while Castlereagh was building the last coalition to fight Napoleonic France, Castlereagh wrote, “The main features we are

⁸⁵ *Pitt’s Memorandum on the Deliverance and Security of Europe, 19 January, 1805*, quoted from Temperley and Penson, 18.

agreed upon—to keep France in order, we require great masses—that Prussia, Austria, and Russia ought to be as great and powerful as they have ever been—and that the inferior States must be summoned to assist, or pay the forfeit of resistance.” To demonstrate what his plan for peace would look like, Castlereagh alluded to the memorandum written by Pitt to Tsar Alexander in 1805, writing,

As an outline to reason from, I send you, as a private communication, a despatch on which the confederacy in 1805 was founded; the Emperor of Russia probably has not this interesting document at headquarters: (interesting it is to my recollection, as I remember having more than one conversation with Mr. Pitt on the details, before he wrote it) some of the suggestions may now be inapplicable, but it is so masterly an outline for the restoration of Europe.⁸⁶

Years later, in the midst of the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh again alluded to Pitt’s memorandum in a letter to the Duke of Wellington, stating, “I am always led to revert to with considerable favor to a policy which Mr. Pitt, in the year 1806 [sic], had strongly at the heart, which was to tempt Prussia to put herself forward on the left bank of the Rhine, more in military contact with France.”⁸⁷ The memorandum of Pitt was a plan for restructuring Europe to maintain peace, not for solely furthering Britain’s self interest or Pitt’s personal ideology—and Castlereagh worked with him on putting it together. Castlereagh was a staunch admirer of Pitt from his earliest introductions to Parliamentary debates. While Castlereagh’s background tempered his life and political fortunes in Ireland, Pitt’s political realism greatly influenced Castlereagh’s later opinions on checking Napoleonic ambitions and the necessity of limiting France. The threat of France as a direct military force and indirect supporter of economic or social disruption trumped

⁸⁶ Castlereagh to Cathart, 8, April, 1813 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 356.

⁸⁷ Castlereagh to Wellington, 1, October, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 196. In the original letter Castlereagh misremembers the date of the memorandum. He meant 1805.

personal opinions on French revolutionary ideology. French bayonets and cannons were a more pressing fear than any number of maypoles and tricolor ribbons.

Castlereagh's interaction with Pitt was not limited to absorbing his tutor's thoughts on combating France. The two worked together closely in trying to bind Ireland and Britain. The first issue they had to address was the anger in Ireland over representation and sovereignty. The dissatisfaction of Ireland on the eve of the rebellion took no one by surprise. Pitt had long been aware of discontentment in Ireland over the limited political participation of most Catholics due to the Ascendancy, and the political and economic domination of Ireland by a minority of Protestant landowners and clergy. While the Ascendancy spanned over a century, the recent upheaval in Ireland made it look weak and ineffectual to Protestants in Ireland and British statesmen who hoped to maintain authority. The waning social domination also looked assailable to those in Ireland who wanted to some form of home rule. Taking advantage of the waning confidence of the Ascendancy, Pitt moved forward with the Union.⁸⁸ Castlereagh, on the other hand, had extended firsthand experience with the ever-worsening political malaise. He knew that the Ascendancy could not stand forever and pondered several solutions, the Union among them.⁸⁹ The Union would solve Castlereagh's fears of French domination as well as his discomfiture with the treatment of the Irish. The British Parliament had feared domination of Irish Parliament by Catholics over Protestants if there was a union between the two kingdoms, but if Catholics gained franchise and government office within a single, unified British kingdom, then they would be a minority and no danger. Of course, Castlereagh hoped for the Union and the recognition of Irish Catholics.

⁸⁸ John Holland Rose, *William Pitt and the Great War* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 409.

⁸⁹ Bartlett, 15.

In spite of this hope, the Emancipation could not move forward due to a lack of support in London and the disapproval of local Protestant elites in Ireland. The Union itself was quickly pushed forward with Castlereagh's insistence that delay would only cause greater unrest.⁹⁰ In spite of unrest around Dublin, the recompense for lost Parliamentary seats and the paying off of members of the peerage moved the Act of Union forward. While the Union succeeded, the movement of Catholics into political life would have to wait until 1829. The introduction of Catholics into Parliament, the Catholic Emancipation that Castlereagh and Pitt supported, failed due to King George III's belief that the participation of the Catholics would undermine his coronation oath.

Castlereagh and Pitt's relationship was not some passing political alliance made for the sake of convenience. Pitt's influence directed Castlereagh's most important policies. On one hand, Castlereagh's personal and ideological connection pulled him towards the Irish Whigs; on the other, he rejected the Irish Rebellion due fear of French dominance and destruction in case of a war between France and Britain on Irish soil. Pitt and Castlereagh worked together to push through the Act of Union, merging Ireland into the larger state. Though the plans for Emancipation failed, Pitt's eased some of Castlereagh's concerns over the fate of Ireland. Castlereagh and Pitt's shared policies towards France and plans for a settlement of Europe became the benchmark of Castlereagh's goals for the defeat of France and the restructuring of the European state system. Castlereagh's steadfast distrust of the strategic goals of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France were due to his own personal experiences with the disorders of the Revolution and close discussions with Pitt. Their shared plan for a settlement of Europe

⁹⁰Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 1, 442-443.

and an encirclement of France was a policy that Castlereagh would carry from London to Vienna.

While Castlereagh would be involved in military ventures all over Europe during his time in the War and Foreign Offices, his disastrous ordering of the Walcheren Expedition is what prompted his duel with Canning. In 1797, in the midst of the French occupied Low Countries lay the river Scheldt and the island Walcheren. Housing a royal armory, Walcheren served as an ideal setting-out point from which to attack London.⁹¹ The temporary success of Austria's fighting in the field and the erroneous information on the disposition of the town meant that the attack went ahead.⁹² The force that Castlereagh sent to the Netherlands was larger than that serving in the Peninsular campaign, but the attack failed miserably. The troops landed and captured the island of Walcheren, only to take ill from the swamp surrounding the island. More than 4,000 of the 20,000 men sent died or returned injured from the attack and ill-managed siege. Walcheren, along with other failures that fell under Castlereagh's purview at the War Department, broiled in public and Parliamentary discontent. George Canning had been making moves against Castlereagh, but dissembled support. While there are accounts (reiterated at the duel) that Canning wanted to inform Castlereagh as to the precariousness of his position, but he was unable to.⁹³ Regardless, when Canning's support of Castlereagh ceased with the news of the disaster at Walcheren, Castlereagh assumed that his one-time colleague was a "perfidious enemy" who had betrayed him.

⁹¹ Bew, 249-250.

⁹² Ibid., 250-251.

Schroeder, 565-366.

⁹³ Bew, 258-261.

Setting aside all of the failed coalitions and reversals of combat that the Allied Powers went through against France from 1789-1815, one singularly important outcome arose from the conflicts: the fear that another force like the French Revolution and the Napoleon Wars might wreak terrible destruction on Europe. The Great Powers—diplomats and sovereigns alike—had gone through such a ruinous cycle of recurring war and peace that the leaders of that generation had a firm intent to form a lasting peace. The Great Powers were not just continuing their early games of balance and quest for aggrandizement; the conflict they had witnessed with its death toll, loss of property, and disorder of society on such a drastic scale taught them that while wrangling and disagreements may go on, the rules needed to change.

After the defeat of Napoleon, all of Europe was in jubilation. The Great Powers had at last made peace in Europe, but issues of peace were not at rest. The territorial and political confusion was especially acute for the Central European powers of Austria and Prussia. Both the armies and diplomats of Austria had worn themselves out with constant toil. It had lost its holdings in Italy, mislaid swathes of land in the German States, entered financial ruin, and suffered many blows to prestige in its military defeats. With peace established, Austria's monarch Emperor Francis and his preeminent statesman Prince Clemens von Metternich hoped that they would secure lands taken from Austria and find some succor against the rising power of Russia and Prussia.⁹⁴ Prussia weathered the storm of the Revolution due to geography and fickle political dealings with Napoleon. Though Prussia moved close to Russia near the end of the conflict, it suffered a partition by Napoleon as penance for its duplicity. King Frederick William III of Prussia and

⁹⁴Arthur James May, *The Age of Metternich, 1814-1848* (New York: H. Holt and company, 1933), 7. King, 17-20. Schroeder, 527

diplomat Prince Karl August von Hardenburg hoped to find some form of compensation from the Congress of Vienna. They eyed the Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Saxony, and other sections of Northern Germany that they could bring under their sway.⁹⁵

Castlereagh had been in close contact with Metternich in the last days of Napoleon, but Metternich's final separation from Bonaparte came at a time that he thought most beneficial to Austrian interests. While Metternich was exceedingly clever in the manner and timing of his reapproachment with the Allies, he was not the key figure holding the group together.

Russia fared comparably well in the Napoleonic Wars, using the lull of combat after the first phase in 1793 to round off portions of Poland.⁹⁶ After the rout of Napoleon in 1812, Russian forces pushed on through the German States and liberated them from French control. The image, true or feigned, that Tsar Alexander defeated Napoleon and rescued Europe vastly increased his prestige and power. Trappings of high purpose and mysticism followed Alexander across the fields of Germany and only increased during the Peace of Paris. Alexander represented the interests of Russia at the Congress of Vienna while pursuing the contradictory roles of liberator in Central Europe and expander of Russian influence.⁹⁷ In the last days of the war against Napoleon, Castlereagh's opinion of Alexander improved, though at the Congress Castlereagh would quickly grow to distrust Alexander's motivations.⁹⁸

⁹⁵King, 6-9.

May, 9.

⁹⁶ This is of course not to underplay the destruction of Napoleon's invasion.

⁹⁷King, 25-27

May, 9-12

Gulick, 187-189

⁹⁸ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 3, March, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 163.

Britain accrued benefits and disadvantages from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Under Pitt and Castlereagh, Britain snatched up colonies of France, Denmark, the Knights of Malta, and other territories in the midst of the wars. Unlike the other Powers, the island fastness of Britain did not come under direct assault due to the diligence of the British navy. However, Britain incurred a massive war debt in keeping its navy afloat, subsidizing its continental allies, and it continued to fight on a second front with the United States in the War of 1812. All of the Great Powers answered to their aristocracy and military on some level. Britain had the singular problem of a vocal press and an active Parliament. The opinions of the voting populace, small though it may have been, affected the choices the British government made and how they approved Congressional decisions. This discontent would be especially true of the later treatment of Genoa, Saxony, Norway, and Poland. Castlereagh, while battling a disagreeable Parliament, endeavored to maintain peace in Europe, secure their trading empire abroad, and set up a system that would deal with the rising pretensions of Tsar Alexander.⁹⁹ One of the lynchpins in Castlereagh's play would be the fate of France.

France was defeated, but unconquered. The loss of men, material, and goods from France during the Revolution was unprecedented. Equally unprecedented was how many lands the other Great Powers let it keep. Holdings that France had won along its natural frontiers remained, Britain returned several colonies that it had seized, and France was not required to suffer any ignominious blow to prestige.¹⁰⁰ The paintings and art that been looted from Germany, Italy, and Holland were left in *La Louvre* because of their beauty

⁹⁹Gulick, 197.

May, 9
King, 3-4.

W. P. Cresson, *Diplomatic Portraits* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1923), 97.

¹⁰⁰ The colonies returned including Guadalupe, Martinique, Reunion, and Mauritius.

when arrayed together. France would indeed occupy the thoughts of many, especially Britain, in their fears of a returned hegemony, but this concern did not intrinsically engender international discourtesy or mistreatment. Instead, France benefitted by earning a surprising amount of respect. The treatment toward France after its defeat is one of the best examples of the fundamental change in European politics in the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand protected the dignity and power of his country at the Congress, attempting to bring Britain into its good graces and set up spheres of influence in the German States.¹⁰¹

While the Congress at Vienna settled more issues than the just territorial settlement of Italy, Germany, Poland, and the Low Countries, these issues were of singular importance to Castlereagh. It did not lie in his power to hold back the tides of the world and force peace on Europe. The Great Powers were war weary, but if Castlereagh was to turn this respite into a lasting peace, he would have to build bastions of power in Europe to curb the predatory interests of figures like ambitious Napoleon or messianic Alexander. After the Peace of Paris, the threat of French forces in Holland had been resolved, but Castlereagh took further steps to remove the danger of future enemies seizing the Low Countries with ease.

¹⁰¹Cresson, 140-143.

Schroeder, 529-530.

Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna, a Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822* (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 137, 141.

Chapter Three

The Congress of Vienna

The Settlement of the Netherlands

In retrospect, the settlement of the Netherlands may seem to be the least of Castlereagh's successes. In his negotiations with the House of Orange and the consolidation of the Netherlands, he had relatively little disruption from the other Great Powers.¹⁰² However, the settlement of the Netherlands is of great importance in what it shows about Castlereagh's approach to Britain's strategic concerns. The Dutch Republic held a connection with Britain since the arrival of William of Orange in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Edmund Burke in 1791 said that "Holland might justly be considered a necessary part of this country as Kent."¹⁰³ It was the invasion of this strategic region that prompted Pitt's support of military action against France. The Netherlands, and the Low Countries in total, had long been the fighting ground between French, Prussian, Hapsburg, and British interests. The Prussian invasion of the Dutch Republic in September 1787 and the occupation of the region by French Revolutionary forces in 1795 highlighted the precariousness of this region and the necessity of bolstering in against outside threats. While Britain did pursue a policy to tie the Netherlands to Britain through a dynastic union, Castlereagh was interested in how it affected his plans for Britain's

¹⁰² The House of Orange was a dynasty that took its name from the princely dynasty that derived its name from the medieval principality of Orange, in old Provence, France. They had been vassals to the Holy Roman Emperors, but passed to Spain in 1544. The rebellion against Spain in 1568 gave rise to the practice of the Prince monopolizing the office of stadtholder.

¹⁰³ Quoted in T. C. W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars*, Origins of Modern Wars (New York: Longman, 1986), 47.

immediate security and for a stronger Northern Germany that could resist French aggression.¹⁰⁴

In the midst of the last coalition arrayed against Napoleon, Holland—the economic center of northern Europe—was central to Britain’s security. The high level of urbanization, sheltered harbors, and the short distance from London made its separation from France a necessity for Britain.¹⁰⁵ When a revolt supported by Castlereagh broke out in Holland on November 15, 1813, Castlereagh sent a diplomat, an improvised military force, and 100,000 pounds to support British interests in the region and to help enthrone Prince William VI of Orange in the ancient republic. Hoping to strengthen the connection between the Netherlands and Britain, a dynastic union between Charlotte the Princess of Wales and the Hereditary Prince William II, the son of the new king of the Netherlands, seemed politically advantageous. Castlereagh was personally involved in some of these interactions, gaining a private audience with the Hereditary Prince in January 1814.¹⁰⁶ This plan failed due to natural frictions between the couple and the possible interference of the Russian Grand Duchess Catharine who hoped to win the hand for a Russian Grand Duke and thus strengthen Russian interests in the region.¹⁰⁷ These difficulties aside, Castlereagh was insistent on the strengthening of the Netherlands in spite of possible slights to the personal honor of Princess Charlotte. The British government did its utmost to maintain positive relations between the two countries, offering the Prince of Orange the command of a Hanoverian regiment. Four months later Castlereagh reasserted that the first objective was to “provide effectually against the systemic views of France to

¹⁰⁴ T. C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802*, Modern Wars (New York: New York: Martin's Press, 1996), 24-25.

¹⁰⁵ Refer back to the harbors assaulted in the Walcheren Expedition.

¹⁰⁶ Castlereagh to the Prince Regent, Castlereagh and Londonderry. Vo. 9, 150-152.

¹⁰⁷ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 299. Catharine was the sister of Tsar Alexander and accompanied him on several diplomatic exchanges.

possess herself of the Low Countries and the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.”¹⁰⁸

His strengthening of the Netherlands proceeded through three different goals. He secured the recognition of protection by the other Great Powers, garnered territory for the new state, and pushed for a series of fortresses along the border between the Netherlands and France.

Francis of Austria willingly gave up his holdings in the Low Countries, aware that he could not effectively control and govern them in a manner to his liking. With that, Castlereagh was able to secure the support of the Great Powers for the freedom of the Netherlands.¹⁰⁹ With that guarantee, Castlereagh could focus on the internal strength of the country. While some in the British government had considered taking lands that were ancestrally French and giving them to a larger state in the Netherlands, Castlereagh realized that “if you take part of old France and add it to Belgium, all France will, as a point of honour, be anxious to regain it.”¹¹⁰ Instead, Castlereagh endeavored to combine the Austrian Netherlands with the Dutch Republic to create a larger, more resilient state. Peers of Castlereagh suggested the Act of Union that he earlier pushed forward with Pitt be the guiding document for reconciling the two territories. The liberal constitution that the Prince of Orange signed and the guarantees he enjoyed abroad made the borrowing of the Act of Union unnecessary.

For Castlereagh, another territorial tool for strengthening the Netherlands was the restoration of colonies seized during the war. While some of the larger issues were mute due to the agreement at the Treaty of Paris that if the Netherlands were strong enough to resist attack it would get back many of its seized colonies, the restoration of particular

¹⁰⁸ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 3, March, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 163.

¹⁰⁹ Castlereagh to Clancarty, 14 March, 1814, Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 354-356.

¹¹⁰ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24, August, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 370-371.

colonies remained in question. Britain kept the wealthy Dutch East Indies, but returned the West Indian Isles. The settlement of the West Indian islands and Guiana was more difficult. British merchants had been heavily investing in the region. Before Castlereagh arrived there had been a plan to pay Sweden 1,000,000 pounds for renouncing the island of Guadeloupe due to French refusal to part with it in the peace settlement. In recompense for the re-establishment of the Netherlands and its union with Belgium, Holland would pay the price to Sweden. With Castlereagh's involvement in this settlement, he pushed his policies over the discomfort of some in the Netherlands and came to a rather fair settlement. Britain kept the settlements on Guiana and allowed the Dutch to trade with them. In compensation, Britain would pay 1,000,000 pounds to Sweden, pay off half of the Russian debt in Holland (3,000,000 pounds), and pay 2,000,000 pounds for the Cape. Looking at the deal closely, Holland was only getting 2,000,000 new pounds for the settlement. They did not benefit from the other 4,000,000 taking into account the debt Russia already owed them and the new Swedish debt foisted on them. Their windfall of 2,000,000 would not go to their coffers however, but would instead go to build fortresses and fortifications between France and the Netherlands.¹¹¹

Castlereagh fought hard for a series of fortresses between the Netherlands and France. There was no distress on the part of the other Great Powers, but instead internal antagonism in Britain towards the idea that Britain paid for the war against Napoleon and that it would have to pay for the peace as well.¹¹² This economic reluctance was the main reason why Castlereagh hid the cost of the fortifications in the Netherlands under the blanket of a colonial settlement. Castlereagh supported the building of the fortifications,

¹¹¹ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 303-305.

¹¹² Bathurst to Castlereagh, 25, August, 1815, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 371-372.

but this did not translate into a “blank-check” for the safety of all the territories of the Low Countries. As time went on, Castlereagh grew wary of entangling guarantees on the continent. He said later that the guarantee on the Low Countries was “an engagement fundamental and inseparable from our policy,” while the guarantee of forts against France was “incidental and auxiliary, a mere question of expediency, of means to an end.”¹¹³ The purpose of the forts was not to serve as an eternal inroad of British power into the continent; it was to guard the Netherlands against France.

The establishment of a monarchy in the Low Countries with the help of Castlereagh and its expansion could be viewed as a conservative move on the part of Castlereagh, a goal to reinforce the monarchies of Europe. It is true that Castlereagh played a role in re-establishing the House of Orange, but the assumption of a conservative motive relies on a false premise: that the reestablishment of the House of Orange was the underlying goal of Castlereagh’s actions. If Castlereagh only wanted to reestablish Orange, he would have no need to strengthen it with territory from the Austrian Netherlands, would not have tied it with such a loose constitution, nor would he have invested so much effort in providing it with the means to better resist France. Castlereagh fought for more territory for the Netherlands, but did not manage to provide it with all he had hoped.¹¹⁴ The constitution binding the Prince of Orange was not empowering, it was similar to that of the King of England. Castlereagh could have fought for a more conservative model, similar to the rest of the monarchic states on the continent, with greater power invested in the Prince. He did not pursue this goal, however; instead, he built a more liberal state to better placate the Prince’s new subjects.

¹¹³ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 4, September, 1815, in *Ibid.*, vol. 8, 375-376.

¹¹⁴ Castlereagh to Wellington, 1, October, 1814, in *Ibid.*, vol. 8, 195-196.

Some still argue that Castlereagh could have been building a state like Britain, exporting constitutional monarchism. This argument flies in the face of his settlements in the rest of Europe and his opinions on the precariousness of the Prince in his new country.¹¹⁵

The establishment of the fortresses along the border between France and Denmark does not make sense if his goals were politically conservative. The fortresses arose with great expense and diplomatic horse-trading. These fortresses were not a series minute Bastilles to bolster the Prince in a hostile state, they were bulwarks against renewed French aggression. In a letter to Wellington, Castlereagh lamented the lack of land given to the new Netherlands state, noting that “some modification may be effected, but the great question for them, as well as for us, is to weight what is the best security for peace, and for keeping the Low Countries out of the hands of France.”¹¹⁶ Castlereagh’s policy in the Netherlands did not rest on ideological goals, but on a need to build it up against France.

The Settlement of Italy

Castlereagh had a larger goal of peace and security in Europe, but the convoluted dynastic and diplomatic webs that covered the Italian peninsula proved to be stumbling blocks. The settlement of Italy following the defeat of Napoleon was complicated because it involved the settlement of three different questions in one region: the issue of Marshal Joachim Murat as king of Naples and how his removal affected plans for Bourbon resumption in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the restitution of the Papal States, and the fate of Italian settlements in northern Italy in the strengthening of Sardinia

¹¹⁵ Castlereagh to Wellington, 1, October, 1814, in *Ibid.*, vol. 8, 195-196.

¹¹⁶ Castlereagh to Wellington, 1, October, 1814, in *Ibid.*, vol. 8, 195-196.

and Austria.¹¹⁷ Murat was a destabilizing factor on the peninsula, and Castlereagh needed to remove him from power before he could achieve a lasting peace. In regards to the Papal States, the peace of Europe was not contingent on strengthening its borders. Its preservation and restitution was important for the purposes of guarantees and reliance on international law. French swift inroads into Europe had been possible in large part because of the political fragmentation of northern Italy. Genoa had been a comparably neutral state in the conflict between France and the Allied Powers, and it had hoped to maintain its sovereignty upon the cessation of hostilities. However, the need for a secure and strong buffer state in northern Italy to offset French influence involved merging Genoa into the Kingdom of Sardinia.¹¹⁸ This issue is a microcosm of the rest of the territorial issues in the Congress of Vienna, how Castlereagh dealt with the dispersion of territories and peoples to guarantee security against general warfare in Europe.

The participation of the Italian peninsula in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars centered on the strategic importance of Italy, its history of dynastic division, and its military geographic dispersion. As a military and diplomatic lever, southern Italy served as a barrier for British interests in the Levant against dedicated French incursion, while northern Italy served as a potential route to Austria filled with states of mixed suzerainty to the Hapsburgs. The peninsula had been the seat of contest between Hapsburgs, Valois, and Bourbon, and the conquest of the region would serve as a crucial morale multiplier out of synch with its strategic value. While Napoleon had resounding success in northern Italy with the accruing of massive indemnities and the movement of artwork back to

¹¹⁷ Joachim Murat was a cavalry officer who served under Napoleon. Having worked with Napoleon in the preservation of the National Convention, the Italian campaign and the Russian Campaign, he moved up to Grand Duke of Berg and King of Naples. He was a brother-in-law of Napoleon through Caroline Bonaparte.

¹¹⁸ Nicolson, 185-187.

France, southern Italy was a highly contested region. The politics in Naples were often confused, Napoleon's response to the Holy See constantly shifted, and Sicily became a staging ground for British naval power in the Mediterranean.¹¹⁹

The first inroads into Italy occurred with the peaceful annexation of Savoy and the more brutal conquest of Nice. Both of these incursions were at the expense of the House of Savoy.¹²⁰ While the destruction of Rome and the defeat of Austrian forces in Italy were ripe targets for French forces, they demurred and refocused on German and Dutch territories. The most glorious victories in Italy would later fall to Napoleon.¹²¹ Diplomatically, Italy served as a staging ground for Napoleon's politics and further harassment of the Savoys. In December 1801 and January 1802, in the midst of peace proceedings, Napoleon took control of the Cisalpine Republic and renamed it the Italian Republic with himself as president. During the seizure of other states and the resettlement of territories, Napoleon annexed the heart of the Savoy holdings, Piedmont. The mistreatment of the King of Sardinia (House Savoy) was one of the reasons for Tsar Alexander's renewing conflict with Napoleon. It was not that Alexander held a deep and abiding love for Sardinia, but Napoleon had rebuffed his attempts at mediation to the great embarrassment of Alexander's personal prestige.¹²² Napoleon's restructuring of the Italian states in the midst of peace proceedings is indicative of how fundamentally flawed

¹¹⁹ Castlereagh's peer William Bentinck in Sicily drew attention to the disorder in Sicily in several letters to Castlereagh, but he always tempered these criticisms with the recognition that Sicily *could* preserve itself with proper care of its military and alliances without the aid of Britain.

Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 213-233, 322-325.

¹²⁰ The House of Savoy rose to ducal status by the Holy Roman Empire in the 15th century. They usually maintained a policy of neutrality between the France and Austria. After the battle of Utrecht in 1713 dukedom raised to a king of Sicily. While the Savoy's swapped this holding for Sardinia, they had a rich history of kingship in Italy.

To clarify, the House of Savoy is a family that lived in the region Savoy. For the remainder, the term will refer to the family and not the region unless explicitly stated.

¹²¹ Schroeder, 111-112.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 237-239, 245, 266-267, 380-381.

the early attempts at peace in Europe were after a failed coalition. While some Powers sought to limit the damage done to them if defeated, most went a step further and considered how the peace would affect the next, inevitable war. Napoleon went a step further and deliberately divided his holdings and vassal states in Italy into strategic and military districts for the raising of men and capital for the next war.¹²³ For Napoleon, the peace settlement itself was a tool for winning men and resources for the war immediately to follow. Castlereagh's peace at Vienna did look towards the strategic necessity of men and material, but it did so in the hope of maintaining peace, not of wringing the maximum benefit.

In the midst of the Napoleonic Wars, Castlereagh had been privy to detailed accounts of Sicily, but his greater interest was in reclaiming Naples from Napoleon's control.¹²⁴ While he was more than willing for a local response in Naples to rise up and restore Ferdinand II, he thought it "should be in fact a restoration rather than an election."¹²⁵ A plan for a new constitution tempered the proposal for the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples. Later, William Bentinck tempered this view, saying,

My object was to secure, if possible, to this great population [Sicilian] the attainment of their blessings which have been placed within their reach, and which is of the subject of universal desire. Their incapacity to seize this desired liberty arises from their misfortune, and not their fault, from the nature of the active and debasing tyranny under which they have lived.¹²⁶

¹²³ It is true that Napoleon did this in the German states and other conquered territories, but it was more blatantly illegal and contrary to his promises and treaties in Italy.

¹²⁴ Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 213-233.

¹²⁵ Castlereagh to Bentinck September, 26, 1812 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 275-276.

¹²⁶ Bentinck to Castlereagh February, 5, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, 238-239.

While historians have noted Bentinck's species of idealism, letters back and forth between Bentinck and Castlereagh suggest that there was some comparison in the sentiments of the men, if not their manner of statecraft.

While Castlereagh may have preferred restoration to the popular election of a monarch, his views on liberty and freedom (that he shared discussions on with William Bentinck) were sanguine for the future but wary of the dominance of another state.

Castlereagh's goal for Naples was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in Sicily, reunifying the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The establishment of Murat on the throne of Naples hindered this plan. Though Murat participated in Napoleon's ruinous campaign against Russia and fought in the French defeat at Leipzig, he survived the rout from Moscow—and so went on to plague Castlereagh in Italy. Sensing the changes of fortune as his master fled back into Germany and then France, Murat signed a peace agreement with Emperor Francis in exchange for 30,000 soldiers from Naples for use against his father-in-law.¹²⁷ With the ad hoc legitimization of Murat, the issue of southern Italy was the choice between of the brigand-turned-king and the restoration of the dubiously effective House of Bourbon. Both Castlereagh and Metternich were uncomfortable with the settlement towards Murat, but Castlereagh said,

[A]s Murat's support became less indispensable, one's repugnance to the arrangement in his favour increased. I still believe (however much I dislike it) that, even at the moment the Treaty was made, it was both wise and necessary. The only think that can make it palatable will be a liberal arrangement for the Sicilian family.¹²⁸

At this point in the peace process, Castlereagh's opinions of Murat seemed to spring from his disappointment over the Bourbons, and from Murat's habit of delaying peace talks to gain the maximum advantage.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Few historians have ever remarked on the irony of Napoleon's father-in-law (Francis) making an agreement with Napoleon's brother-in-law (Murat) to make war on Bonaparte. One can imagine a meeting of these might be exceedingly awkward.

Castlereagh to William Bentinck, January, 22, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 184-185.

¹²⁸ Castlereagh to William Bentinck January, 22, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 234-235

¹²⁹ Castlereagh to Aberdeen, October, 15, 1813, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 102-103.

Following Napoleon's abdication and exile to Elba, Castlereagh was in some difficulty as to how to proceed. He did not want the unpleasant task of dislodging Murat from Naples, yet having a former officer of Napoleon on a throne, especially one so near Elba, gave all of his peers cause for concern.¹³⁰ Metternich and Castlereagh originally quelled their disapproval of Murat in the name of strategic necessity. Austrian fears over the possibility of Murat stirring trouble near its holdings in Italy and anger in the House of Commons over the awarding of Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia caused them to reconsider the issue.¹³¹ Despite some public posturing, Castlereagh pursued the removal of Murat through British and international channels long before Murat's failure in the Hundred Days presented them with the perfect opportunity.¹³² Looking at Castlereagh's intent and goals in southern Italy, one sees him supporting the liberty of people of Sicily (seen through Bentinck's goals and sentiments on the ground in Italy), supporting the restoration of the Bourbons in Italy, and being wary of Murat's control and use of delaying tactics for diplomatic purposes.

Castlereagh's goals were the preservation and betterment of the people of southern Italy. While modern critics, and assuredly some of Castlereagh's peers, may have preferred an election of a monarch in Naples, an elected monarch would not command respect amongst his dynastic peers. Castlereagh's fears over Murat seem have been a mixture of distrust of Murat as a tool for Napoleon and his unnecessary extension of conflict to get the most benefit out of a peace agreement. Castlereagh's means were

Castlereagh of William Bentinck February, 15, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 262-263.

¹³⁰Wellington to Liverpool, 25, December 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 273.

Liverpool to Wellington, 11, January, 1815, in *Ibid.*, 288-290.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 25, February, 1815, in *Ibid.*, 307-308.

¹³¹King, 93.

¹³²Castlereagh to Wellington, 7, August, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 189.

Castlereagh to Liverpool, 8, December, 1814, in *Ibid.*, 261-263.

strategy and diplomacy, but his goal for Europe was peace. While the entire issue of Italian settlement would have to wait, Murat's defection to his master in the Hundred Days took the decision of unilateral British action out of Castlereagh's hands. The settlements of Murat's holdings in southern Italy did not end with the restoration of the Bourbons, it touched on Castlereagh's strategic concerns for the rest of Italy.

The issue of the Papal States at the Congress is a small matter, but it is indicative of the difficulties Castlereagh had in settling strategic borders in Europe with so many conflicting needs. The French Revolution devastated the Church within France itself. Rich church holdings were dissolved by the state and traditional clergy privileges were set aside. In the Papal States themselves, cities and territories under the authority of the pope fell into the hands of Revolutionary France or Napoleon. Comtat Venaissin and Avignon were annexed in 1791 as well as the Legations put into part of the Cisalpine Republic. Revolutionary France invaded the Papal States proper in 1798 and declared a Roman Republic. Pope Pius VI died in exile in France. Napoleon did not attack the trappings of the papacy, but he did annex the remainder the Papal States' territory to France. Napoleon's relationship with the papacy rested on his intemperate desire for control and his desire to use religion as a bulwark of his rule. Napoleon may have annexed and invaded papal lands, but he reintroduced reforms and restitution to the Church in France under his proto-police state.¹³³ After the push of Napoleon back to France, Castlereagh received letters from the Papacy detailing their loyalty and the trials

¹³³ Napoleon was not above using the Papacy for bolstering his regime in more ostentatiously. Napoleon had himself crowned by the pope in an echo of the Charlemagne—though he laid the crown on his own head to demonstrate that he was the wellspring of his own authority. Napoleon also had a plan to make his son King of Rome as the seat of a combined Franco-Austrian empire as he inherited French and Austrian territory from his parents.

they had undergone for the resistance against Napoleonic domination.¹³⁴ While Castlereagh might have wanted to recompense the Papal States, he surrendered to the needs of balance of power concerns for Austria and the raw aggrandizement of Murat. While the needs of the papacy could be set aside for larger concerns, the holdings of Austria were paramount in Castlereagh's plans for Italian security.

The issue of Austria in Italy also troubled Castlereagh. At the Congress, Austria recouped its holdings in Lombardy and Venetia. While there had initially been hopes in the local populace for a respite from war and taxation, the necessity of raising levies against Napoleon in the Hundred Days and the slow administration of the Hapsburgs meant that this goodwill evaporated in fairly short order. Castlereagh was aware of the inefficiencies and discontent in the Austrian holdings, but he did not meddle.¹³⁵ The territory of Austria in northern Italy needed to be filled out, and Murat delayed and connived to gain more territory at the expense of the Papacy. While Murat's defection would make Castlereagh's desire to reinforce the Papal States easier, the issues with the Papacy demonstrate Castlereagh's limited options due to strategic concerns. Before his fall, Murat was a necessary tool for the defeat of Napoleon and pacification of the peninsula. Austrian territories, while of middling importance to Hapsburg's long-term interests, were strategically necessary to secure their interests against France in Italy.

While Austria would have some holdings in northern Italy and a restored Bourbon monarchy would govern in the south, Castlereagh did not think this would be enough to preserve Italy from the possibility of future French aggression in northern Italy. The

¹³⁴ Poynter to Castlereagh, 30, April, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 530-533.
Hippisley to Castlereagh, 5, May, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 10, 11-12.

¹³⁵ Duke of Capriola to the Hereditary Prince of Naples, 22, March, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 380-381.
Bentinck to Castlereagh, 27, March, 1814, in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 400-401.

Kingdom of Sardinia had been strong enough to join the First Coalition against the French Republic in 1792, but Napoleon thoroughly defeated it in 1796. Castlereagh originally considered keeping Genoa a free city, though he long knew that any lasting settlement in Italy required a restoration of the Kingdom of Sardinia.¹³⁶ While the House of Savoy held decent holdings in the Piedmont and in the island of Sardinia, it quickly suffered defeat by initial French incursions into the region. If Sardinia was going to be stronger, the city of Genoa was the likeliest target. Genoa had surrendered to Castlereagh's peer William Bentinck, but only at the promise that it retain its ancient freedoms.¹³⁷ Castlereagh entertained the idea of a free Genoa and he quickly saw that Sardinia's need for expansion for the security of Italy against France meant the sacrifice of Genoa.¹³⁸ This decision met with disapproval in Britain, but Castlereagh supported it in the Congress and called the Savoys back to their ancestral home in Piedmont from their refuge in Sardinia.¹³⁹ While Sardinia had been able to assist in driving France out of Italy after Napoleon's retreat, it could not effectively serve as a counter to French goals on the peninsula.¹⁴⁰ Sardinia would have to be enlarged to block easy French access, to serve as a buffer between France and Austria, and to maintain peace in the region. At the Congress, the promises of Bentinck to Genoa were reneged, but their sacrifice bolstered the power of Sardinia.

Castlereagh's overall goal in Italy was the reformation of the peninsula to resist French military aggression. He pursued this goal through the wooing and eventual

¹³⁶ Castlereagh to Liverpool, May, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 10, 10-11. Schroeder, 509-511.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 285, 494.

¹³⁸ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 341-342.

¹³⁹ Castlereagh to Bentinck, 26, April, 1814 in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 508. Schroeder, 162-163.

¹⁴⁰ Castlereagh to Bentinck, 7, May, 1814, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 181-182.

removal of Murat from the Kingdom of Naples, the attempt to reinstate the Bourbons as kings of both Sicily and Naples, the extension of Austrian territories into portions of northern Italy, and the consolidation of Sardinia with the city-state of Genoa to serve as a buffer against France. With the rout of Napoleon from Russia and his defeat at Leipzig, Castlereagh desired for the war to come to an end as soon as possible. While he had often made use of Sicily as a platform for military action against France in the Mediterranean, the defection of Murat was an opportunity that he could not pass up. Castlereagh's discontent grew as Murat failed to bring concerted action against his father-in-law and stalled for greater territorial concessions. Castlereagh wanted peace and security in southern Italy for the good of Europe and for Britain's territorial interests, but planned with Metternich for some possible removal of Murat should the opportunity arise. Castlereagh was willing to forego his plan for the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples if it meant a secure peace under Murat. On the other hand, Castlereagh's willingness to collude with Metternich for the long-term security of southern Italy demonstrated his deliberate goal to make a lasting peace in Europe. His attempts to put the Bourbon's on the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would not have been a territorial extension of direct French power, but would have secured the region from the Bourbons of France; they would be unlikely to make war on a cadet house.

The extension of Austrian lands into the Mediterranean and the absorption of Genoa were not blind aggrandizement. There was traditional Austrian authority in some of the regions it gained control over, and this plan would carry some form of continuity after twenty years of war. More importantly, the expansion into northern Italy would serve as a buffer against France. The traditional holdings of the House of Savoy were

Piedmont and the island of Sardinia. While this ancestry was enough to make a minor power, it could not repeal French incursions for any amount of time. The history of Sardinia as a local ruling power, unlike Austria, made it a natural center for the sentiments of the Italian aristocracy. Bringing Sardinia's power in line with its prestige, it would require the city of Genoa. While Castlereagh balked at the betrayal of Genoa, he saw the safety of Italy, the cordoning off France, and the peace of Europe as trumping all other concerns.

The Settlement of Poland and Saxony

The borders of Central Europe were of great importance to Castlereagh in his quest for peace. Prussia had to be strengthened against the threat of renewed French aggression and the crossing of the Rhine—the German states bulwark—had to be garrisoned on both banks. At the close of the Napoleonic Wars Russian forces overran Germany and Prussian forces eyed their neighbors with greed. Castlereagh needed to build up barricades against France, but he also needed to balance this goal against interests in Central Europe. For his lasting peace to work, Castlereagh needed to bring his Russia, Austrian, and Prussian allies to an equitable peace, limit Russian hegemony in Central Europe, and protect Prussia's neighbors from annexation. The settlements of Poland and Saxony were one issue due to the territorial concerns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and their expectations and needs for security after the Napoleonic Wars. When Napoleon cast his eye upon the Holy Roman Empire, it was a hopelessly decentralized system of more than 300 states. Francis of Austria turned down the position of Holy Roman Emperor, despite the empire's earlier prestige, for fear that it might act as an impediment to Austria's dealings with outside powers and lesser states within the Holy

Roman Empire. While Napoleon had mixed contact with some of the states in Germany, his relationship with Saxony was more cordial, at least as far as diplomatic expediency was concerned. Saxony served as the site where the defeated Russia, Prussia, and other lesser states paid homage to Napoleon after one of his glorious victories in Central Europe.¹⁴¹

In 1808, Napoleon established the recently elevated king of Saxony, Frederick Augustus I, as the Grand Duke of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.¹⁴² In proper gratitude, Frederick fought on the side of Napoleon against Austria in 1809. In 1813, Frederick received Metternich, who entreated him to turn on Napoleon, but Frederick held true for a time.¹⁴³ However, on the eve of the Battle of Leipzig, Frederick abandoned Napoleon and tried to defect to the Allies, causing the remnants of the *Rheinbund* state to collapse around him.¹⁴⁴ Austria and Prussia prevented Frederick's defection and held him interned at Schloss Friedrichsfelde.¹⁴⁵

The issue of Saxony's settlement made many in the Congress diplomatically uncomfortable. While Frederick was indeed a king, the Great Powers entertained the possibility of dethroning him and giving portions of his lands to Prussia to accommodate them for their losses in land and souls against Napoleon.¹⁴⁶ While the Kingdom of Denmark lost its subsidiary state Norway, the seizure of Saxony marked the dissolution of a Frederick's house in Europe from a position of power. It is one thing to take away land from a dynasty, it is quite another to dissolve its holdings altogether. However, the Powers had different expectations in regards to Saxony. Castlereagh originally thought

¹⁴¹Nicolson, 7.

¹⁴² Napoleon had also raised Frederick to his position of king from elector.

¹⁴³Nicolson, 279.

¹⁴⁴Nicolson, 479.

¹⁴⁵ Nicolson, 279.

¹⁴⁶ Schroeder, 527.

that the goals of Prussia were more modest in nature and that its territorial ambitions were limited. As he traveled with Tsar Alexander to the conquest of Paris, his understanding of Russian—and by extension, Prussian—ambitions in Central Europe grew.¹⁴⁷ Prussia desired to see itself compensated and strengthened in Northern Germany, and it had calculated its due down to the last farmstead. Alexander hoped to strengthen a loyal Prussian protégé. Metternich feared that giving Saxony to Prussia would increase Austria's borders with Prussia to a financially damaging degree, would sully Austria's reputation as a protector of smaller German states, and would unbalance the relationship between Austria and Prussia to a fatal degree.¹⁴⁸

While Metternich changed his opinions on the awarding of Saxony's territory for hopes of concessions on the settlement of Poland, he saw the necessity for creating a strong state to offset the possible machinations of France to be of paramount importance.¹⁴⁹ Aptly enough, France's interests were to keep Saxony separate from Prussia so that it might be able to influence the lesser German states along its own border. Despite this self-serving goal, Talleyrand was outspoken about the impropriety of the Congress deposing a monarch who "governed his subjects for forty years like a father, serving as an example of the virtues both of a man and of a prince."¹⁵⁰ The mixed support and opposition to this settlement in Parliament complicated Castlereagh's options. Not only the British aristocracy, but the public was also uncomfortable with the idea of unjustly removing a monarch, and Samuel Whitebread, a Member of Parliament, called

¹⁴⁷ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 201, 225-226.

Castlereagh to Liverpool, 14, January, 1814 in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 144-145.

¹⁴⁸ Nicolson, 151-152.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 156-157.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 157.

the idea a treacherous partition, an act done in accordance with Bonaparte.¹⁵¹ At Vienna itself, Castlereagh mulled over the possibility of the Allies having replaced Napoleon's use of arbitrary power for that of Alexander.¹⁵² While the issue of Saxony was complicated in and of itself, it was intertwined with how the Congress dealt with the partitioned Republic of Poland.

Castlereagh's thoughts on Polish nationalism and self-determination notwithstanding, he had two main goals for Poland. He wanted to settle the border in Europe in such an equitable fashion so as to preserve peace, and he wanted to limit the dangers of Russian hegemony or Austrian insecurity in Central Europe. The long history of Polish partition and disintegration as an independent state posed a number of obstacles for Castlereagh. The Kingdom of Poland was partitioned in 1772 by a supposedly hesitant Maria Theresa in Austria, an insatiable Frederick of Prussia, and an opportunistic Tsarina Catherine the Great.¹⁵³ Despite the loss of land and political prestige, Poland interacted with other European powers from 1788 to 1791.¹⁵⁴ In 1793, there was a second partition in which Russia gorged itself on eastern Poland, Prussia obtained a Polish corridor that linked the territories of Brandenburg and Silesia, and Austria went without benefit. This event increased the standing of Russia and Prussia, limited the benefit of Austria's prize in the first partition, and forced Austria to tread carefully. It feared that Russia or Prussia would seize its holdings in Poland, a fear that limited the effectiveness of its response to the French Revolution.¹⁵⁵ In 1795, Russia, Austria, and Prussia divided

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 183-184.

Liverpool to Castlereagh, 18, November, 1814, from Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 235-236.

¹⁵² Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon & the Congress of Vienna*, 1st U.S. ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 333-335.

¹⁵³ Schroeder, 17-19.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 74-84.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 122-124.

Poland for a third time; again, Russia gained the most out of this situation. This benefit was less due to the territory it took from Poland and more to the increase in power caused by the continued rivalry and infighting between Austria and Prussia over Germany.¹⁵⁶

While Austria feared the loss of its Polish territories, Poland itself did not fare well throughout the tumults of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon attempted to rouse a rebellion in Poland during his campaign in the German states, but with little success. Following the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon set up the Duchy of Warsaw and offered it to Frederick of Saxony.¹⁵⁷ After the defeat of Napoleon, no Power earnestly expected Poland to become its own separate kingdom with its 1772 borders, but each Power would discuss some change—whether it would serve to compensate Prussia for its losses or serve as buffer state between Russia and the rest of Europe. Russia claimed the Duchy of Warsaw by right of occupation, as compensation for its wartime efforts, and because Warsaw's inclusion under Russian control would better gratify the Poles. While no one can doubt that conquest is a legitimate argument in statecraft, especially with the 200,000 Russians in the German states, the argument over compensation is particularly demonstrative.

Russia took part in a continuation of balance of power politics and aggrandizement through its seizure of the duchy. However, one has to take into account what Alexander himself said on the matter.¹⁵⁸ He promised his friend Adam Jerzy Czatoryski, an exiled Pole, that he would rebuild Poland. Given the air of mysticism and self-importance with which Alexander surrounded himself, it is likely that the tsar

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 144-147.

Kennedy, xxii-xxiii.

¹⁵⁷ Schroeder, 322-323.

Napoleon offered the Duchy to Alexander. The Tsar declined due to fear of how the other powers would respond and possible heightened discontent amongst the Poles.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 524.

actively held two irreconcilable goals—that he would both govern the Poles and free them. He would be both conqueror and savior. Though Alexander made promises to his friend, he also had several meetings with Castlereagh on the issues of Poland and Saxony. The tsar did plan to build a Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but Castlereagh questioned whether this entity would be the “erection of a part of Poland into a Kingdom merged in the Crown of Russia, [or] the restoration of the whole or greater part of it into a distinct and independent state.” He also went on to point out the disruptive nature of a new Polish state to the holdings of Austria and Prussia, the abhorrence of this policy in the rest of Europe, and the burden it would lay on his own people.¹⁵⁹ Castlereagh appealed to Metternich and Hardenberg check the Alexander’s goals, but met with little support while the issue of the Saxony settlement was in doubt.¹⁶⁰ Confronted with Alexander’s stubborn responses to Poland and Prussia’s interests in Saxony, Castlereagh began to discuss the possibility of military action against Russian and Prussia for the preservation of balance of power.¹⁶¹ Castlereagh’s goals at the Congress were not to win a silent summer for his people, but rather to forge a lasting peace. His consideration of going to war with Russia does not undermine his goal of peace in Europe. Castlereagh did not seek after a single summer of quiet before war erupted once more; he sought a lasting peace in Europe. If he had to go to war with former allies and enemies alike to achieve this peace then he was willing to do so. His enlistment of the France in this secret pact was not a reversal of his long-term goal of encircling France. He made use of France in the short-term while continuing to pursue its long-term neutralization as a predatory power on the continent.

¹⁵⁹ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 2, October, 1814, from Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*. 197-199.

¹⁶⁰ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 9, October, 1814, from Ibid, 201-203.

¹⁶¹ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 21, November, 1814, from Ibid, 240-241.

The fate of the Polish Duchy of Warsaw mingled with the fate of Saxony. Metternich could be convinced that Prussia deserved compensation for its losses with lands from Saxony, or that Russia warranted rewarded for its help in the defeat of Napoleon. However, both halves of the plan were untenable if introduced together due to the strategic strain that it would put on Austria.¹⁶² If Russia and Prussia both realized their prospective goals, the border they shared with Austria would be over 500 miles, necessitating higher border security than that required to face a lesser power. According to this plan, Russian territory would end 175 miles from Vienna.¹⁶³

Castlereagh viewed the issue in terms of diplomatic relationships rather than mere borders. He hoped for a system that set a diplomatically noncommittal Britain in the camp of a Austria and Prussia that were against the possible growth of France and Russia. If Prussia was building better relations with Russia and alienating Austria, then his second plan involved a power block of Britain, France, and Austria against Russia and Prussia.¹⁶⁴ Castlereagh's fears of a Russian hegemony in Europe were extreme enough that he pursued a secret agreement with Talleyrand and Metternich in case the tsar would not make concessions in Poland and Saxony. This secret treaty came out during the Hundred Days, enraging the tsar, but also revealing to him the lengths that his compatriots would go for the Central European settlement. When Castlereagh continued to press forward in his attempt to temper Alexander's goals in Poland, he received a letter back from Alexander that stated that the creation of a separate Polish Kingdom would act as a check to Russian power. Castlereagh pointed out that while a new Poland might be legally distinct from Russia, its systematic domination by Russia would serve as an

¹⁶² Gulick, 200-201.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 202-203.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 205-209.

inroad to European politics and a stepping stone for possible military action in Central Europe.¹⁶⁵

Up to this point, the discussion of Castlereagh's policies at Vienna have primarily focused on the threat of France to the tranquility of Europe. The settlements in the Netherlands and in Italy endeavored to strengthen them against France. The greater freedom that Castlereagh gave Prussia in territorial claims over Russia reflects his hope that a stronger Prussia could better contest France. Castlereagh's settlement of Denmark (discussed later) endeavored to recompense different states in Europe who sided against Napoleon and weaken Denmark, who served as a long-term tool of France. Castlereagh's insistence on contesting Alexander's proposal seems to be in earnest. However, according to a discussion Castlereagh had with a lesser French diplomat,

Any attempt on the part of France to make such a collateral point as that of Saxony a question of war, in subversion of the more important object of opposing a barrier to Russia, must, in all probability, not only destroy the relations with England, but lead to immediate hostilities.¹⁶⁶

This possible alliance with France and Austria does not undermine Castlereagh's long term plans for peace in Europe; it merely demonstrates the lengths he would go to secure some form of lasting peace that avoided a continental hegemony.¹⁶⁷ France was still no less of a danger to the peace of Europe; its power could threaten Alexander to force terms.¹⁶⁸

The threat of war between the Powers passed with their galvanization in the Hundred Days, the recognition of how close they came to war, the renewed war

¹⁶⁵ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 14, October, 1814, from Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 206-210.

¹⁶⁶ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24, October, 1814, from Ibid, 212-215.

¹⁶⁷ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 350-351.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 342-375.

Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5, December, 1814, from Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 251-255.

weariness on the part of the statesmen, and the diplomatic prestige of Arthur Wellesley who traveled to Vienna to take up Castlereagh's policies while Castlereagh traveled to London to present himself to Parliament.¹⁶⁹ In the end, Prussia received two fifths of Saxony with a population of about 850,000 subjects as well as the fortress of Elbe. In exchange, Austria received Tyrol and Salzburg as well as promises for concessions in northern Italy and Illyria.¹⁷⁰ Frederick of Saxony kept a portion of his realm, specifically some historically and strategically relevant settlements. The settlement was much less than the initial claim for all of Saxony, but more than Castlereagh had hoped for. However, Castlereagh's stubbornness in face of Prussian desire bore fruit.¹⁷¹ In Poland, Prussia kept the province of Posen, and Austria gained the province of Galicia. The capital of Krakow and the surrounding area became a free city. The remainder of the duchy integrated into the Kingdom of Poland under Alexander.

While prince Czartoryski, Alexander's Polish confidant, wrote the *Principles of the Constitution of the Polish Kingdom*, that outlined the kingdom's independence, he did so with the clear understanding that the constitution was not inherent to the Polish people, but rather a boon granted by Alexander.¹⁷² The partitioning of Poland and Saxony on its head looks like a classic balance of power exchange of territory, and the aggrandizement and desire for relative gains did play a part. However, the arguments Prussia made was not that it had taken land from its neighbors by right of conquest, but that it had suffered long against Napoleon and deserved compensation for the general security of Europe. This claim was not just posturing on the part of Prussia. Talleyrand, Castlereagh, and

¹⁶⁹ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 329.

¹⁷⁰ Nicolson, 179-181

¹⁷¹ Castlereagh to Liverpool, 18, December, 1814, from Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 260-261.

¹⁷² Nicolson, 179-180

Metternich disliked the choice of location and the distasteful treatment of Frederick of Saxony, but they all saw the need for a strong Prussia to offset power in Northern Germany.

Russia did gain large sections of Poland—not as direct annexation, but under the guise of the Kingdom of Poland. While one could argue that Alexander intended to seize Poland all along, his own words, and those of Czartoryski, protest that he had good intentions. While the seizure of Saxony and Polish lands might have been distasteful, the end goal was the improved security of Europe. A weakened Prussia could not offset France or Russia, and the existence of the Polish Kingdom—even if it was under Russian control—eased the tensions between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in that area.

If Castlereagh had a failure at the Congress of Vienna it was the negation of Poland and Saxony. The desires of Alexander thwarted his plans for a separate Poland as the king of Saxony lost a good deal of territory to Prussia. However, these local reversals did not cause irreparable damage for Castlereagh's interests in a check on French military expansion. While Saxony suffered, Prussia increased to a size that could resist France. While some could argue that Russia's inroads into Poland created the means for it to infiltrate every continental court, it also made Russia more receptive to the needs of Austria and Prussia. The territorial strength of Russia and its ability to draw back politically and militarily into its own vastness failed to work with its connections to Poland, binding it fast to Central Europe. Russia was the dominant eastern power at the close of the Congress, but the economic and social upheaval it was undergoing did not dissipate. The continued threat of unrest from Poland or the infiltration of Austrian or Prussian interests turned the territory into a liability rather than a benefit. While

Castlereagh might lament his actions in the settlement of Poland and Saxony, the buffer state of Prussia grew stronger, and Russia's direct interaction in Western Europe increased.

The Settlement of Denmark

The treatment of Denmark by Castlereagh and his peers at the Congress was in response to territorial needs and concerns, but the troubled relationship between Denmark and Britain undoubtedly effected what diplomatic options were available to Castlereagh. The opinions and prejudices of his peers in Britain and Denmark bound Castlereagh, but his goal was a settlement in Europe that could ensure a lasting peace. Before the Revolution, Russian interests in the region depended on maintaining a status quo of conflict between Denmark and Sweden. Britain, on the other hand, focused on keeping French authority out of the region.¹⁷³ If Britain supported Sweden, it indirectly followed that it was opposed to Denmark's interests. After the fall of Holland to French occupation, Denmark benefitted from the absence of its traditional trading rival. While Danish ships did benefit France, the insistence of some in Denmark's court to contest Britain's illegal searches and seizures was what caused real strife between the two nations. The division between the two nations increased when the British sixth-rate frigate *Nemesis* stopped a convoy of Danish vessels guarded by the Danish ship the *Freya*. Such an affront to national honor prompted Denmark to call on Russia's aid for some form of action against Britain. Russia used this appeal as an excuse to call Denmark into a League of Armed Neutrality. Some have argued that the true purpose of the League was to serve as a check to British and Austrian interests and to serve as a conduit for further Russian influence in Central Europe to counter a Franco-Austrian peace.

¹⁷³ Schroeder, 44-45.

Regardless, the British were opposed to the League as a slight to their international prerogative and war with France. In response, Britain led a naval force and laid waste to much of the Danish fleet to teach Denmark, and Russia by proxy, a lesson.¹⁷⁴ Britain's relationship with Denmark became further complicate with the siege of Copenhagen in 1807.

The Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 secured a peace between Russia and France and meant that there were fewer avenues through which Britain could attack France. Castlereagh was aware of this difficulty and originally considered action in South America and the Middle East. Eventually, he decided on an attack on Denmark to weaken French power in Northern Europe and to deprive France of a Danish power as a possible weapon against Britain.¹⁷⁵ Napoleon had been eyeing the Danish fleet to supplement France's failures in the blue-water war with Britain. Fearing that Napoleon would bring Denmark under his control, Castlereagh sent an expedition asking the Danes to join the British alliance and surrender its fleet. When they refused the overture, Castlereagh sent British forces to occupy the Danish island of Zealand, bombard Copenhagen, and destroy the Danish fleet.¹⁷⁶

The actions of Sweden, Denmark's neighbor, intrinsically tied with Denmark's fate in the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh's need to negotiate for peace in Europe. While the clash between Britain and France drew Denmark into danger between them, Sweden drew closer to Russia's sphere of influence. In 1811, interactions between Sweden and Russia took the form of Russia guaranteeing support for a Swedish invasion

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 219-221.

¹⁷⁵ Castlereagh to the Duke of Portland and Portland to Castlereagh, both 21, December, 1807, Castlereagh Papers.

¹⁷⁶ Schroeder, 327.
Bew, 255.

of Danish Norway, and the use of Sweden as a diplomatic lifeline between the estranged Russia and Britain.¹⁷⁷ While the use of Denmark as an indirect channel of communication was useful, Castlereagh disliked it. Castlereagh's preference for direct communication would bear fruit at Vienna and the later Congresses.¹⁷⁸ Sweden served a similar position as proxy for Britain's interests in 1813 when they joined an Anglo-Swedish Alliance to fight on the continent and take Norway from Denmark. While this policy may have seemed necessary to combat French control of Denmark, Castlereagh never cared for it.¹⁷⁹ During the Napoleonic Wars, the Scandinavian states of Denmark and Sweden fell inbetween the clashes of Britain, France, and Russia. Denmark fared poorly; the loss of its shipping and its fleet, the bombing of Copenhagen, the loss of several islands, and the constant threats to Norway sapped them of resources. Sweden, on the other hand, benefitted from the patronage of Britain and Russia in turn. The connection of Denmark to France and the more active relationship of Britain and Russia with Sweden would play a part in their treatment in the later settlement.

Castlereagh's goal to use Sweden as a tool against Napoleon was not always successful. This mixed success was in part due to the confusion of the northern campaign, but also due in large part to Jean Bernadotte's (Charles XIV of Sweden) desire to preserve his own troops for later use against Denmark.¹⁸⁰ Born Jean Bernadotte in France, this military officer became a Marshall of the Empire under Napoleon. He had held off the British at Walcheren (interestingly enough, Castlereagh never held this against him) and was later offered the Swedish crown. Bernadotte's desire in the peace

¹⁷⁷ Schroeder, 430-431.

¹⁷⁸ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, 94-95.

¹⁷⁹ Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 294-295, 325-331, 344-347, 376-377, 382-385. Schroeder, 459.

¹⁸⁰ Castlereagh to Cathart, 22, January, 1813, in Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, vol. 8, 312-314.

settlement rested on an agreement from 1812. If Sweden would join its forces with the last coalition, it would receive reimbursement for territories it had lost to Russia earlier in the Napoleonic War. This promise, along with an inability to pry Denmark away from France while also courting Sweden, limited Castlereagh's options. The long-term connection between France and Denmark made any concessions towards Denmark unpopular with the British public.¹⁸¹ Public opinion aside, there was a fear in Britain that France would continue to wield great power in the Danish court even if Napoleon's troops were removed from garrisoned locations.¹⁸²

While the Congress agreed to honor the promise made to Sweden and offer Norway as recompense, the Norwegians had their own ideas. Norway had been under the Danish crown for 500 years, and it did not relish the idea of transference to Sweden. In response to the Congresses ruling, in May 1814, Norway proclaimed its independence and crowned Prince Christian of Denmark its king. While Castlereagh was loath to take arms against Norway for this sentiment, he agreed to the Congress's enforcement of the decision.¹⁸³ To add further injury, Denmark never saw the lands of Northern Germany, Swedish Pomerania, and the island of Rugen promised in recompense for the seizure of Norway. Prussia, eager to expand territories lost in the wars and settlements of Napoleon, coveted and received Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rugen.¹⁸⁴

The settlement of Denmark and the reorientation of Norway to Sweden seem to have little to do with Castlereagh's goals for balance of power in Europe. The

¹⁸¹ Zamoyski, 101-103.

Bew, 315.

¹⁸² Thorton to Castlereagh, 18, February, 1813, in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 331.

Thorton to Castlereagh, 19, March, 1813, in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 344-347.

Charles Stewart to Castlereagh, 6, June, 1813, in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 22-23.

¹⁸³ Castlereagh to Thorton, 7, March, 1814, in Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 8, 314-315.

¹⁸⁴ Schroeder, 562.

recompense of Sweden for the loss of Finland was necessary, however, to allow Russia to keep its territories in the Northern Europe. The reorientation of Norway served four main purposes. It kept Russia content with its seizure of Finland, which would be important in the arguments that Castlereagh had for the preservation of Poland and Saxony. The use of Denmark as a later tool for French aggression lessened with the loss of Norway, while at the same time rewarding Bernadotte for his actions against Napoleon. Lastly, the removal of Denmark's non-continental Norway effectively increased its connection to the German Confederation, the alliance of German states that existed for the preservation of their individual sovereignty.¹⁸⁵

Those who might suggest that Castlereagh had dominating conservative motivations at the Congress ignore his support of the removal of Norway from Denmark. The crown of Denmark had ruled Norway for more than 500 years, and its removal was a clear break with European dynastic conservatism. He also ignored the call of the Scandinavian peoples for some form of self-determination. While he lamented the necessity of foisting the Swedes—unwanted—on the people of Norway, he supported the move due to the diplomatic needs of Europe and the Congress.

Castlereagh had succeeded in bolstering the Netherlands and Piedmont-Sardinia against France, had made peace with Russia and Prussia in the settlement of Saxony and Poland, and had entrenched Austria in a supportive position in Italy. These goals were not due to blind reactionary motive, but were based on a realistic need to check French military aggression. Castlereagh's goals were underlined with realism, but his legacy as a

¹⁸⁵ There is no document suggesting that this was an intention, but removal of Norway from Denmark centralized the responsibility of the Bund.

continentally-inclined reactionary endured as Britain drifted closer—against his will—to the Holy Alliance.

During the Congress Castlereagh set aside his ideals in exchange for realism and a belief in utilitarianism in international power politics. At the Netherlands Castlereagh built a stronger state that could better resist France by expanding it into neighboring territories and paying for fortresses between the two countries borders from Britain's coffers. In Italy Castlereagh deposed Murat, revitalized a Bourbon cadet-house in the Two Sicilies, bolstered a stronger kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, and tied Hapsburg interests into the region. In Poland and Saxony Castlereagh walked a tightrope between a need to make a lasting peace between the Powers and a need to avoid Russia achieving hegemony in Central Europe and the strategic ruin of Austria. In Denmark he was forced to act against the values of both European Liberalism and Conservatism in pursuit of a territorial settlement that would pay off the allies who had assisted in the downfall of Napoleon. Castlereagh's diplomatic conflicts with his peers in Vienna were heated, but the true test of his settlement was the actions of the Great Powers in the decades that followed.

Chapter Four

Castlereagh, the Holy Alliance, and Congressional Legacy

While Castlereagh had fought a duel before in his youth in Ireland, Canning never fired a shot in his life. As the appointed time, approached the men readied their pistols and took their marks. They both walked ten paces, turned, and Castlereagh and Canning shot at one another. Both men missed their first shot. Castlereagh was not satisfied with this outcome, and on the exchange of a second volley hit Canning in his thigh. He helped carry Canning into the nearby house and bound up his wound. While both men went on to deal with high policy, war, and intrigue, their duel sticks out as a singularly demonstrative event. There are historians who have attempted to paint the lives of Castlereagh and Canning as a great conflict between opposing ideologies. In truth, however, the men shared the same fundamental goals of peace in Europe and prosperity for Britain. Castlereagh's real legacy was not the preservation of Britain's internal liberalism, or the checking of the Holy Alliance's conservatism, but the preservation of peace in Europe and the maintenance of Britain's national interest through the system he had arranged at the Congress of Vienna.

The Holy Alliance was the child of Alexander's fears and insecurities after the Napoleonic Wars. The Holy Alliance was to be a union between all of the monarchs of Europe in a Christian accord against the forces of revolution, Jacobinism, and democracy. Aside from these lofty goals, Alexander also desired some form of guarantee for his newly seized territories in Poland. Metternich was eager for Austria to make use of the arrangement in spite of his personal feelings towards the Alliance, and Prussia was already under the influence of Russia due to strategic and personal factors. Castlereagh,

on the other hand had two main difficulties in the support of the Holy Alliance. The House of Hanover sat on the throne that had passed to them through the Glorious Revolution. It would be politically absurd for a monarch who sat due to revolution to sign a document protecting a monarch from revolution in any form.¹⁸⁶ While this diplomatic approval would be politically awkward, more pressing was the incompatibility of Alexander's autocratic dream for Europe with Britain's constitutional monarchy. Even more absurd was the fact that King George IV of England lacked the authority to accept the proposal sent to him by Alexander. While the Holy Alliance was an irritant to Castlereagh and Canning alike, the real ideological conflict between British liberalism and continental conservatism came with the Troppau Protocol. The Holy Alliance established the Protocol in response to the revolutions in Spain, Portugal, and Naples in 1820-1822. Russia, Austria, and Prussia formed the Protocol without the approval of Britain and France due to their disagreements on how to address revolutions and the role of the Quadruple Alliance in governing Europe. It stated that the Holy Alliance would have the responsibility of guaranteeing borders and squelching revolutions throughout Europe.¹⁸⁷

The Troppau Protocol came out of a meeting of some of the Great Powers who met at Troppau in 1822. It was primarily concerned with the revolutions in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and in the Spanish Americas. Alexander, moving away from his somewhat liberal policies in 1815, wanted the Holy Alliance to have teeth and be responsible for putting down revolutions through the military means of the Great Powers.¹⁸⁸ Britain protested against such a plan, stating that it would make them "the armed guardians of all

¹⁸⁶ Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, 382-385.

¹⁸⁷ Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*. 285, 288, 295.

¹⁸⁸ Gulick, 294.

thrones.”¹⁸⁹ Castlereagh disliked the Protocol for three reasons: the precariousness of a world empires that might require the Alliance to suppress a revolution at a future date, Britain’s historical dislike of the standing army that would be required for such a venture, and Britain’s natural liberal tendencies. France did not support the Troppau Protocol, either—something that was due to its attempt to improve relations with Britain, as well as to its own more liberal political culture. Metternich made a particularly interesting provision in the Protocol, stating that a monarch could call for outside assistance from the other members of the Holy Alliance if their rights or sovereignty were threatened.¹⁹⁰ This addendum would play off quite well for Austria in the Revolution of 1848. While the Troppau Protocol transformed the Holy Alliance into an active organization, it also widened the ideological gap between liberal Britain and France and their autocratic neighbors. Despite this gap, and a disagreement over the use of military force within Europe itself, the Great Powers did not enter into general war. The Concert of Europe endured the idiosyncrasies of its adherents.

While the Troppau Protocol gave teeth to the Holy Alliance, it did not suppress revolutions and maintain the peace by itself. The Austrians dealt with the revolution of Naples with audible support from the Holy Alliance.¹⁹¹ Against its pro-orthodox designs, Russia did not support the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹² France intervened on its own, without the prompting of the Holy Alliance, moving into Spain and giving it a resurgence of national and military prestige at little cost.¹⁹³ The Polignac

¹⁸⁹ May, 22.

¹⁹⁰ Schroeder, 610-611.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 608-611

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 616.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 626-627.

Memorandum ruled out military involvement by Britain and France.¹⁹⁴ The continued number and severity of revolutions in Europe and the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, Germany, Italy, and in colonial possessions continued. These revolutions elicited ever more severe responses from the Great Powers, but the Concert of Europe allowed general peace to endure. The peace between the Great Powers ended when Britain and France made war on Russia for its designs on the Straits in the Crimean War.

The argument is that Castlereagh succeeded in surrounding France with strong states to resist French aggression. While it is readily apparent that he was instrumental in building the larger states, how does one measure the success of his efforts? The Netherlands, a traditional war ground in Europe, was free from invasion until the Great War a hundred years later. Italy did not suffer invasion from France, but Sardinia did accept the assistance of Napoleon III in the removal of Austrians from settlements in northern Italy. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden slipped into relative unimportance in the larger affairs of Europe. In the decades after the Congress of Vienna, French soldiers returned to Italy and Spain, would travel across the Atlantic, and would finally fight beneath the walls of Sevastopol. Yet, none of these conflicts were for the purpose of conquest. Though the restored Bourbons and Napoleon III fought and schemed to push French prestige around the world and to use their influence for greater power in Europe, the end goal of their ventures was not to seize estates, goods, and material for an ever greater war on Europe, but rather for discreet diplomatic goals. Castlereagh's desire to surround France tied with the "guarantee," the international recognition of borders and the rights of states. It is clear that Castlereagh surrounded France with stronger states, but what is not clear is if these new states were guarded by a bayonet in hand or by the lines

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 634-635.

on a map. Castlereagh's reputation among his peers did not celebrate the lasting general peace that he gave Britain for decades but instead abjured him for entangling Britain in continental conflict.

Castlereagh was a man of his times. He was not a Prince Metternich who led the post-Conference Europe about with relative ease, he was not Tsar Alexander with a holy mission of import. He of course had his own personal ideologies and opinions. He acted foolishly on an international stage in the attack at Walcheren and even more absurdly in his private duel with Canning. In spite of these faults, his long-term goals were not overawed by emotion and ideology but were the fruit of his experiences. The revolt in Ireland and what he had seen in France and Spa, led Castlereagh to distrust what he saw as the intemperate and disruptive nature of the Revolution. He advocated sorties into Napoleonic France and brought the Allies together in the last coalition. While the Treaty of Paris succeeded in securing Britain's immediate territorial concerns, Castlereagh took the negotiations to Vienna with the intent of securing a lasting peace in Europe and a bulwark against French aggression. He supported the strengthening of the Netherlands and Piedmont-Sardinia; reestablished stable dynasties in Italy; and resettled Saxony, Poland, and Denmark to secure a peace with the other Great Powers. While he made decisions that glossed over the needs and desires of voiceless peoples in disputed territories, his goal was never the reestablishment of autocratic control, but the security of Europe and a lasting peace. Castlereagh's endeavors at Vienna and his attention to political realism secured a peace for Europe that lasted until the Crimean War and tempered the upheaval of the continent until the Great War.

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