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SUICIDE KILLING OF HUMAN LIFE AS A HUMAN RIGHT

The Continuing Devolution of Assisted Suicide Law in the United Kingdom

Prof. William Wagner, Prof. John Kane, and Stephen P. Kallman†

INTRODUCTION

Throughout its remarkable history, Great Britain’s culture and law safeguarded the dignity of human life by refusing to recognize a “right” to suicide. Indeed, contemporary British statutes make it a serious crime even to assist in the commission of a suicide killing. Recent parliamentary proposals and a court decision, however, deliberately abandoned these deeply-rooted cultural, historical, and legal traditions. Most recently, in an

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1. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2 (Eng.) [hereinafter Suicide Act].


exercise of raw judicial power, five Law Lords made British history by
declaring into existence a human right to kill human life via suicide.4
Prosecutorial guidelines promulgated pursuant to this court decision by the
Department of Public Prosecutor (DPP), likewise abandoned the deeply-
rooted inalienable standard. These guidelines provide prosecutors with
factors they may use to justify a refusal to prosecute someone who assists in
the killing of another human being via suicide. The trend continued with
the formation of a Commission on Death and Dying, which was charged
with studying how the United Kingdom should employ assisted suicide
policy.5
In this article, we analyze the devolution of Britain’s assisted suicide
policy. We begin by reviewing current U.K. statutory law prohibiting
assisted suicide. We then review recent pro-suicide parliamentary proposals
and subsequent court action recognizing suicide as a human right. We also
analyze the DPP guidelines and other relevant contemporary government
actions concerning assisted suicide in the United Kingdom. This critical
review reveals a disquieting jurisprudential shift, accompanied by a
deteriorating respect for the value of human life. Finally, we review the
implications that accompany such a shift in worldviews and how it affects a
nation. In the end, we conclude that viewing the value of human life

4. Id. at 366, 390. Keeping the debate in the global spotlight, two particular doctors,
each known as Dr. Death, publicly pandered their human life termination position
throughout the world. Australian physician Dr. Philip Nitschke founded a right to die
organization and campaigned to legalize euthanasia. Most recently, he brought suicide
workshops to the United Kingdom, where he panders his suicide kits. ‘Dr. Death’ Brings First
Suicide Workshop to UK, THE TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2009, 7:11 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/5276368/Dr-Death-brings-first-
suicide-workshop-to-UK.html. The American Dr. Death, Jack Kevorkian, served eight years
on a murder conviction. Kathleen Gray, Kevorkian Paroled: “I’m Not Going to Do It Again,”
immediately began campaigning for laws authorising assisted suicide. Associated Press,
Kevorkian Released After 8 Years, WASH. POST, June 2, 2007 at A2, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/01/
AR2007060100179.html. Prior to his recent death, Kevorkian further advocated for human
experimentation on individuals committing suicide, as well as for the experimentation on
handicapped infants and incompetent elderly individuals. Jack Kevorkian, The Last
Fearsome Taboo: Medical Aspects of Planned Death, 7 MED. & L. 1, 8-9 (1988). Nitschke,
Kevorkian, and the five Law Lords view the world through a very different lens from those
who oppose this lethal conduct.

5. The Aim of the Commission, COMMISSION ON ASSISTED DYING (Aug. 17, 2010, 3:02
AM), http://commissiononassisteddying.co.uk/the-aim-of-the-commission.
through the lens of human-centred, morally-relative legal positivism presents grave implications for the citizens of Great Britain.

PART I.

U.K. LAW ON ASSISTED SUICIDE

Current statutory law prohibiting assisted killing reflects an objective moral standard present in Great Britain’s divine, natural, and common-law traditions. Pro-suicide proposals and court decisions, on the other hand, divorce and discard any moral reference point in the law and replace it with a human-centred, morally-relative approach to lawmaking.6

When formulating law concerning suicide killing, these two jurisprudential worldviews collide. Like other nations, the Parliament and the judiciary in the United Kingdom face a choice. On the one hand, they may look to the objective moral standard revealed in divine or natural law as the benchmark and promulgate provisions reflecting that standard. Alternatively, they may use subjective, morally-relative legal positivism to create law apart from any objective moral standard of right or wrong.

A. The History and Tradition in Britain of Protecting the Sanctity of Human Life

For most of British history, the idea that God endows all human beings with sacred, inalienable rights—including the right to life—was self-evident.7 British citizens, through the law, have historically acknowledged and respected the God-given, and hence, inviolable dignity of every human

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6. Fundamentally, two jurisprudential views of the world exist. The first view sees God as the source of law and rights, while the latter makes man the measure of all things. Thus, one can embrace either that law is something God reveals for us to discover or that it is something we create solely by our own reasoning—apart from any divine revelation. Dan Crone, Assisted Suicide and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: A Philosophical Examination of the Majority Opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 399, 422 (1997). See also Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Limits, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 259, 260 (2005); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 667-69 (1997). For further jurisprudential worldview discussion, see WILLIAM WAGNER, The Jurisprudential Battle over the Character of a Nation, in JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY, (Suri Ratnapala & Gabriel Moens eds., LexisNexis Butterworths 2d ed. 2011).

7. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
This history acknowledges that one of the fundamental roles of a moral government is to protect human life. Thus, in Britain, we traditionally find divine or natural-law prohibitions on suicide and later see such traditions embodied in British common and statutory law. As we have noted elsewhere:

It is no coincidence that Western cultures uniformly discourage—if not condemn—suicide and those who assist in it. These cultures based their ethical and legal systems on the Judeo-Christian tradition, which teaches that taking human life...
is fundamentally wrong. . . . 14 Because God creates human life, only He can authorize the taking of it—and nowhere in His

Cultural History of Suicide, in SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 4 (Normal L. Farberow ed., Univ. Park Press 1975); and JACQUES CHORON, SUICIDE 13-14 (Scribner 1972)).

Hellenistic culture also may have influenced some later Jewish writers to relax their approbation of the act (e.g., in special circumstances, such as avoiding capture in battle), but Rabbinic and Talmudic writings after the Jewish exile included prohibitions on suicide and maintained funeral sanctions. Id. at 10-11 (citing BATTIN, supra note 13, at 32; see also Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 187). Roman law forbade suicide and, at least under limited circumstances, forfeited the violator’s personal and real property to the state, so it could not pass to the offender’s heirs. Crone, supra note 13, at 16 (citing FARBEROW, supra note 13, at 6); see also Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 192-94, 199-200 (highlighting that Roman law criminalized assisting in suicide, “mercy killing” was deemed murder, and forfeiture occurred only in limited circumstances).

Early Christian culture eventually came to influence Roman law with the conversion of the Emperor Constantine. Crone, supra note 13, at 17. Christian doctrine, as most famously expounded by Augustine and Aquinas, clearly forbade suicide, which, at the very least, implicitly prohibited assistance in suicide. Id. at 17-22; see also Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 194-95, 197. Because of the dominant influence Christianity had on Western legal systems, the Judaic and Roman legal penalties for suicide persisted in Western cultures for many centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 741. See generally HAROLD J BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (Harvard Univ. Press 1983); Crone, supra note 13, at 16.

Luther, Calvin, and the majority of influential Reformation Christian scholars continued the Christian condemnation of suicide, although there were a few Christian writers in the seventeenth century who questioned the extent to which suicide should be punished as a culpable act. Crone, supra note 13, at 22-24. Despite these debates, the law in Western countries continued to prohibit suicide. Id.

14. See, e.g., Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. In this regard, God reveals in His Word that the life He creates has worth, value, and significance. He declares His creation of human life good: “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.” Genesis 1:26, 27 (NIV); “God saw all that he had made, and it was very good.” Genesis 1:31 (NIV). Moreover, God intimately communicates that He has a plan and purpose for each life He creates: “For I know the plans I have for you,’ declares the LORD . . . .” Jeremiah 29:11 (NIV); “For we are God’s handiwork, created in Christ Jesus to do good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do.” Ephesians 2:10 (NIV); “For you created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother’s womb. . . . Your eyes saw my unformed body; all the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be.” Psalm 139:13, 16 (NIV); “For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through him and for him.” Colossians 1:16 (NIV); “[E]very one who is called by my name, whom I created for my glory, whom I formed and made.” Isaiah 43:7 (NIV); “The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth . . . . From one man he made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands.” Acts 17:24, 26 (NIV); “[M]y only aim is to finish the race and complete the task the Lord Jesus has
Word does He authorize suicide or assisting someone to commit suicide.\textsuperscript{15} God’s inviolable standard is expressed in His command: “Thou shalt not kill.”\textsuperscript{16}

Historically, the United Kingdom never recognized a “right” to suicide—or assistance in committing suicide by physicians or others.\textsuperscript{17} On the contrary, the common law generally viewed suicide as self-murder.\textsuperscript{18} As with murder, assisting or attempting suicide were also criminal acts at common law.\textsuperscript{19} British common law continued the Judaic and Roman traditions of ignominious burial\textsuperscript{20} and adopted a more expanded version of
given me—the task of testifying to the good news of God’s grace.” Acts 20:24 (NIV) (relating the words of Paul, just prior to facing humanly unbearable adversity).

\textsuperscript{15} See Genesis 1:27, 5:1-2, 6:7; Job 27:8; Isaiah 42:5; John 3:36; Revelation 22:19.

\textsuperscript{16} Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17; see also Genesis 9:6 (NIV) (indicating that humans are not to be killed because “in the image of God has God made mankind”). Although the duty of those created to reverently respect the commands of the Creator is self-evident, it becomes especially compelling when one reads the commandment not to kill \textit{in pari materia} with the First Commandment, “I am the Lord your God . . . . You shall have no other gods before me.” Exodus 20:2-3 (NIV); Deuteronomy 5:6-7 (NIV), and the greatest commandment, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.” Matthew 22:37 (NIV).

\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Suicide Act, supra note 1; Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 A.C. 345.

\textsuperscript{18} Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, [1823] Russ. & Ry. 523, 168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711 (“[F]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”).

\textsuperscript{19} Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, [1823] Russ. & Ry. 523, 168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295); see also Shih, supra note 12, at 1274. Interestingly, if the assister provided the assistance prior to the suicide act and was not present at the time of the act, then the assister escaped prosecution. This is because at common law an accessory before the fact could not be prosecuted until the government prosecuted and convicted the principal felon (here the person committing felonious suicide). Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [6], 1 A.C at 379 (citing R v. Russel, [1832] 1 Moody 356, 168 Eng. Rep. 1302; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)). To rectify this problem Parliament enacted the Accessories and Abettors Act of 1861. Section 1 of the Act made clear that such an assister could be “indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if he were a principal felon.” Id. at [7], 1 A.C. at 379-80 (citing Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 98, § 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter \textit{Abettors Act}]; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)). Although a provision of the Homicide Act of 1957 later mitigated to manslaughter certain factual circumstances involving a suicide pact, those assisting suicide generally still faced murder charges. Id. at [8], 1 A.C. at 380 (citing Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 4 (Eng.) [hereinafter \textit{Homicide Act}]).

\textsuperscript{20} Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (1985) [hereinafter Marzen I].
the Roman penalty of forfeiting the personality of one who committed suicide, although it discontinued the escheat of realty.21

Whether by common law, statute, or both, the American colonies also generally condemned suicide and essentially continued England’s legal sanctions.22

When natural-law theory dominated Western legal philosophy,23 judges, lawyers, and scholars recognized God’s existence and referred to His natural law as a source of human rights.24 These judges, lawyers, and legal scholars widely agreed that the common law was an expression of natural or divine law.25 The highest courts of Western nations cited the writings of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel—three of Europe’s greatest natural-law scholars.26


24. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 404-07; Miller, supra note 10, at 217; see e.g., Romans 1:19-29; Romans 2:14-15. For a lucid discussion of divine law as natural law, see David VanDrunen, A Biblical Case for Natural Law (Acton Inst. 2008) (referencing Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, 1a 2ae Q. 91, art.2; John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans (John Owen trans., William B. Eerdman Publ’g Co. 1947); Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans 148-51 (William B. Eerdman Publ’g Co. 1996); A. Andrew Das, Paul, the Law, and the Covenant 180-82 (Hendrickson Publishers 2001)).


26. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 407. David Hume prominently opposed the notion that suicide should be prohibited as a violation of natural law, arguing that we regularly “violate” natural law and that is not necessarily negative. See Marzen I, supra note 20, at 35-36. Hume’s argument was cast, however, mostly in terms of the physical laws of nature and was based on his assertion that human life had no special sanctity or importance. See id. at 36 (“The life of a man is of no greater importance than that of an oyster.”). Hume cannot,
Additionally, Blackstone, whose *Commentaries on the Laws of England* was once the “bible” for lawyers and judges, characterized suicide as “self-murder” and “among the highest crimes.” Thus, the divine law, natural law, English common law, and Britain’s statutory law traditions all historically embody an inviolable, objective standard that killing a human being by suicide is wrong.

**B. Contemporary British Statutory Law: The 1961 Suicide Act**

Reflecting the inviolable, objective standard, the United Kingdom enacted statutory law prohibiting assisted suicide. As originally promulgated, the United Kingdom’s Suicide Act 1961 (“Suicide Act”), provided that “[a] person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment . . . .”

On its face, the Suicide Act broadly covered all aspects of assisted suicide. To be sure, like many other governments, the United Kingdom, in the Suicide Act, dropped criminal sanctions for the person attempting suicide.

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31. *Suicide Act*, *supra* note 1, § 1. In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, many governments abolished the penalties for suicide by statutory or constitutional
It is important to note, however, that neither the United Kingdom nor these other governments did so because they believed suicide was acceptable.32 Thus, after the United Kingdom statutorily decriminalized suicide, judicial opinions in the House of Lords described the change as a way to promote life.33

The provisions of the Suicide Act acknowledged that legitimizing assisted suicide inherently threatens the most vulnerable among us. Similarly, in judicial opinions, the House of Lords historically recognized such risks.34 Undeniably, many people in the final stages of life cannot communicate effectively. Whilst they may have once indicated a preference to avoid end-of-life suffering, no-one knows whether, at the time they cannot communicate, they still desire to extinguish their lives unnaturally.

Additionally, Britain’s statutory proscriptions against assisted suicide reflect the notion that government-authorized suicide creates a frightening duty to die. Judicial opinions in the House of Lords also historically recognized that the elderly might choose suicide, “not from a desire to die

provisions. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 67-68. How governments treated those who assisted in suicides is unclear due to a lack of reporting and codification of case law and legislation. Id. at 70-76 (concluding that in the nineteenth century many governments prohibited assisted suicide). From a drafting perspective, the wording of the Suicide Act 1961 creates an interesting point of criminal law. This is because “the offence of aiding and abetting the suicide of another under section 2(1) Suicide Act 1961 is unique in that the critical act—suicide—is not itself unlawful, unlike any other aiding and abetting offence.” Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [49], 1 A.C. at 393 (quoting Keir Starmer, Decision on Prosecution – The Death By Suicide of Daniel James, The Crown Prosecution Service (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james/).

32. Rather, governments came to view the penalties as inappropriate either because they imposed unjustifiable hardship on the victims’ families or because the act was deemed a manifestation of mental illness, and thus not punishable. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 67-100; Marzen II, supra note 21, at 264-65; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 774.

33. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [106], 1 A.C. at 847-48 (“There were good reasons for wishing to decriminalise the act [suicide] itself. The removal of the fear of prosecution and of the stigma was likely to make it easier to deter those who were planning or attempting suicide. Broadly speaking, it was a measure in favour of saving life . . . .”). Ironically, in Purdy, Lord Brown turns this underlying policy designed to protect life on its head by using it to legitimise assisting suicide. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [82], 1 A.C. at 403-04 (“[T]he assistance criminalised by section 2(1) is assistance which those lawfully intent on suicide may require so as to enable them to fulfil their chosen end.”).

34. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [28], 1 A.C. at 822 (“The Government can see no basis for permitting assisted suicide. Such a change would be open to abuse and put the lives of the weak and vulnerable at risk.”) (quoting the Government Response accepting the recommendation of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics).
or a willingness to stop living, but from a desire to stop being a burden to others.”

C. Pro-Suicide Statutory Proposals: Advocates Unsuccessfully Attempt to Legalize Assisted Suicide Killings in the United Kingdom

Consistent with Britain’s cultural heritage and legal traditions, Parliament repeatedly defeated endeavours to undercut the protections provided in the Suicide Act. To be sure, several members of Parliament relentlessly sought to shift the political paradigm. Lord Joffe, whose self-proclaimed life mission is to promote dying, led the attack. In 2002 and 2003, Lord Joffe tried unsuccessfully to legalize assisted suicide by proposing the Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill—later known as the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill. Parliament again rejected the pro-suicide proposal in both 2005 and 2006.

The situation involving British pro-suicide advocate Debbie Purdy prompted another attempt to pass pro-suicide legislation. Diagnosed with a terminal disease, Purdy wanted to kill herself after the illness progressed to a certain stage. She stated that she could not accomplish the act without assistance. When the time came, she wanted her husband to assist in her suicide killing by helping her travel to another country where suicide was

35. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [29], 1 A.C. at 823 (“We are also concerned that vulnerable people—the elderly, lonely, sick or distressed—would feel pressure, whether real or imagined, to request early death.”) (quoting a report by the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics).


37. Id.

38. Id.


42. Id.
legal. While Purdy’s situation gained the limelight, Parliament debated the Coroners and Justice Bill. Consistent with the cultural heritage and legal traditions of the United Kingdom, members of Parliament originally introduced the Coroners and Justice Bill to strengthen British anti-assisted suicide law. The provisions included in the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009 clarified that Britain’s proscription against assisting suicide: 1) extended to those who do not know the person who wants to die, and 2) applied to assisters of attempted suicides regardless of whether an attempted suicide or suicide occurs.

Pro-suicide proponents in Parliament, however, attempted to use the Coroners and Justice Bill as a vehicle to legalize assisted suicide. Using Debbie Purdy’s situation as justification, pro-suicide proponents proposed various amendments. One amendment, intended to authorize assisted killing of British citizens in Purdy’s situation, counter-intuitively indicated that

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\text{an individual . . . is not to be treated as capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another adult . . . if . . . the act is done solely or principally for the purpose of enabling or assisting [another adult] to travel to a country or territory in which assisted dying is lawful . . . .}
\]

This proposed amendment would have codified the government-sanctioned killing of human life under prescribed conditions.

Thus, an individual in the United Kingdom could put another human being on a train, sending that person to another country to be killed. The proposed amendment cloaked the individual assisting in the killing with

\[\text{Id.} \]

\[\text{Id.} \]

43. Id.


45. Coroners Bill, supra note 30, § 46(1A).

46. Id. § 46(1B).

47. See, e.g., Coroners Amendment, supra note 2.

48. Id.

49. Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. The act reads, in relevant part:

(1) An act by an individual (“D”) is not to be treated as capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another adult (“T”) if—(a) the act is done solely or principally for the purpose of enabling or assisting T to travel to a country or territory in which assisted dying is lawful . . . .
complete immunity. Again, counter-intuitively, the proposed law continued to protect human life as long as the train did not leave the United Kingdom.

Another amendment proposed putting doctors, serving as coroners, in the position of authorizing the killing of a human being.50 Upon “certification from a coroner,” the amendment would have allowed an individual to assist another in committing suicide if the person wishing to die was “suffering from a confirmed, incurable and disabling illness which prevents him from carrying through his own wish to bring his life to a close.”51

The pro-suicide proposal aggressively challenged long-established ethical elements of medical practice in the United Kingdom. The British Medical Association and other respected health care organizations nonetheless continued to affirm the moral proscription against assisted suicide as the very foundation of medical ethics.52 The Hippocratic Oath, written during the fifth to fourth centuries B.C., declares, “I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.”53 Such a standard is consistent with God’s revealed, inviolable standard reflected in the common law and other historical and legal traditions of the United Kingdom.54 Indeed, assisted suicide is entirely irreconcilable with a doctor’s calling to heal.55 Astonishingly, the pro-suicide proposals before Parliament failed to provide any ethical standards of implementation or enforcement mechanisms for compliance by physicians. Not surprisingly, therefore, no data-collection requirements that might provide some accountability even existed. Furthermore, despite vague, subjective requirements concerning the physical and mental state of the patient, no definitional safeguards

50 Id.
51 Id.
54. The creation of the Hippocratic Oath in ancient Greek culture has been foundational in Western medical ethics, and it remains centrally relevant in contemporary medical practice. See, e.g., C. Everett Koop, Introduction, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1996).
55. Id. at 2.
existed to protect vulnerable or elderly patients. Moreover, no duty to discuss other treatment options or palliative care alternatives for pain management existed anywhere in the proposed statutory scheme.

Thus, with virtually no protection for the most vulnerable of British citizens, the proposed pro-suicide amendments to the Coroners and Justice Bill expressly authorized individuals, in prescribed circumstances, to assist in the suicide killing of a human being. Consistent with and informed by the deeply-rooted first principles reflected in Britain’s legal history and tradition, a majority of those voting on the pro-suicide provisions voted against them.

D. The Purdy Decision: Surrendering Sovereignty and Conscience?

Not long after Parliament rejected pro-suicide amendments to the Coroners and Justice Bill, a court case initiated by Debbie Purdy came before five Law Lords. Although the Suicide Act broadly covered all aspects of assisted suicide, Purdy raised the issue as to whether an individual could assist someone to travel to another country where assisted suicide is legal and expect to escape prosecution. Among other things, Purdy contended that the assisted suicide prohibition in the Suicide Act constituted an interference with her privacy rights under Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“European Convention”). Thus, Purdy asserted that she possessed a human right, grounded in privacy, to decide to

56. Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. The language of the proposed amendment is as follows:
Notwithstanding sections 49 to 51, no offence shall have been committed if assistance is given to a person to commit suicide who is suffering from a confirmed, incurable and disabling illness which prevents him from carrying through his own wish to bring his life to a close, if the person has received certification from a coroner who has investigated the circumstances, and satisfied himself that it is indeed the free and settled wish of the person that he brings his life to a close.


58. See, e.g., Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [18-25, 90-93], 1 A.C. at 382-85, 405-06.

59. Id. at [28], 1 A.C. at 386. The European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “European Convention”) in paragraph 1 of Article 8 provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” See also id. at [29], 1 A.C. at 386.
kill herself, and that the statutory proscription against assisting suicide infringed this right.60

To understand fully the context of Purdy, one must review what happened beforehand. Prior to Purdy came Pretty v. DPP,61 which involved a woman who also desired to kill herself with the assistance of her husband.62 When Pretty reached the House of Lords, the court confirmed that no right to commit suicide existed in the United Kingdom:

while the 1961 Act abrogated the rule of law whereby it was a crime for a person to commit . . . suicide, it conferred no right on anyone to do so. . . . The policy of the law remained firmly adverse to suicide . . . .

Moreover, on the issue raised by Mrs. Pretty, the Law Lords held that Article 8 pertained to protecting personal autonomy while the individual was alive, but did not confer a right to decide to commit suicide.64

The Pretty case was then heard by the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), now styled as Pretty v. United Kingdom.65 Turning a blind eye to the cultural and legal traditions of Great Britain, the ECHR reached a very different conclusion from the British court. The ECHR concluded that exercising a choice to kill human life via suicide constituted a human right

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60. Id. at [28-31], 1 A.C. at 386-87. She also contended that because the Government failed to provide an offense-specific prosecution policy for assisted suicide, such interference violated Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention, which requires interference with a right to be "in accordance with the law." Id.; see also Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2. In this regard, Purdy contended that without such guidance she lacked enough information to make a decision—so as to be able to challenge a government authority if it arbitrarily interferes with rights safeguarded by the Convention. Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [28-31], 1 A.C. at 386-87. The European Convention in paragraph 2 of Article 8 provides: "There shall be no interference by a public authority with the existence of this right except such as is in accordance with the law . . . ." Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2.


62. Id. at [29], 1 A.C. at 809; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [71], 1 A.C. at 400.


64. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [61], 1 A.C. at 835; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [32], 1 A.C. at 387.

under Article 8(1). The ECHR also held that the Suicide Act interfered with this right.

With the dichotomy of the Pretty decisions serving as the prologue, Purdy began its journey through the British courts. The Court of Appeal faced the issue of whether, under Article 8(1) of the European Convention, Purdy possessed a human right to decide to kill herself. Before deciding the issues, the Court of Appeal had to first determine whether to follow the British court precedent or the ECHR precedent. The Court of Appeal applied the former, confirming that Article 8(1) of the European Convention conferred no right to commit suicide. Purdy appealed the decision to the House of Lords.

The five Law Lords began by relying upon the ECHR’s analysis in Pretty to resolve the issues raised by Purdy, rather than standing by their previous precedent in Pretty v. DPP. In so doing, the Law Lords discarded the deeply-rooted British cultural and legal traditions protecting human life against suicide killings. In its place, the Law Lords adopted the ECHR’s construction of Article 8(1) of the European Convention holding that the decision to kill human life via suicide was a human right. Thus, each Law Lord concluded that Purdy possessed a human right under the European Convention to decide to kill herself. After the Law Lords held that Purdy had that human right, it further concluded that the assisted suicide prohibition in the Suicide Act constituted an interference with that right. Because the Government failed to provide an offense-specific prosecution policy for assisted suicide, the Law Lords further found that such interference violated Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention.

66. Id. at 37.

67. Id. at 37-40. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) disagreed with the British Court, asserting: “The Court is not prepared to exclude that this constitutes an interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed under Article 8(1) of the Convention.” Id. at 37. Given that a right existed, the Court then proceeded to evaluate whether this interference conformed to the requirements of Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention. Id. at 37-40. The Court concluded the interference in this instance was justified. Id. at 39.

68. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [32], 1 A.C. at 387. The Court of Appeal decision is reported at [2009] EWCA (Civ) 92 (Eng.).


70. Id.

71. Id. at [29], 1 A.C. at 386. Article 8, paragraph 1 of the European Convention provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 1.
because the Government’s interference with the right was not “in accordance with the law.”

How could the five Law Lords in Purdy so inconsistently interpret existing pro-life law given the deeply-rooted first principles reflected in its nation’s legal history and tradition? The answer lies in understanding the lens through which they view the world. The Law Lords and other assisted suicide proponents reject the moral absolute of an inviolable standard. In its place, they employ a human-centred, subjective, morally-relative worldview of legal positivism. When the five Law Lords deemed the killing of human life via suicide a human right, they did more than defer to the ECHR. They shifted a nation’s jurisprudential worldview. Before Purdy, British jurisprudence saw a moral absolute in the innate, positive value of vulnerable human life. Judges and lawmakers therefore viewed such life as worthy of governmental protection and proscribed conduct associated with assisted suicide killing. The five Law Lords in Purdy, instead, chose to view the matter through the subjective lens of morally-relative legal positivism, which enabled them to create law without looking to any moral standard of right or wrong. Viewed through the subjective lens of moral relativism, deciding to kill human life via suicide devolves into a matter of personal autonomy or convenience. Thus, the value of a particular human life in the United Kingdom now varies with the circumstances.

To completely comprehend the significance of this jurisprudential shift, it is helpful to analyze the mechanics of the court’s analytical process. Under traditional notions of the rule of law, government can prohibit conduct. The Court held that without such guidance, individuals like Mrs. Purdy lacked enough information with which to make a decision—so as to be able to challenge a Government authority if it arbitrarily interfered with rights safeguarded by the European Convention.

72. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [30-31, 40-56], 1 A.C. at 386-87, 390-96. The Court held that without such guidance, individuals like Mrs. Purdy lacked enough information with which to make a decision—so as to be able to challenge a Government authority if it arbitrarily interfered with rights safeguarded by the European Convention. Id. The European Convention, Article 8, paragraph 2 provides: “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the existence of this right except such as is in accordance with the law . . . .” Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2); see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [29], 1 A.C. at 386.

73. See Wagner, supra note 6.

74. Herbert W. Titus, The Bible & American Law, 2 LIBERTY U. L. Rev. 305, 311 (2008). Titus’ descriptive analysis of this principle is a good example of the unalienable worldview:

Let us now look at the thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. We can all certainly agree that verse four addresses the role of the civil ruler as a minister of God. In the Greek, he is a deacon of God, he is a servant of God. Notice carefully that verse four authorizes the civil ruler to wield the sword against wrong doing. Now, that is a very important first principle: The civil ruler has authority over conduct. Blackstone reflects this view in his definition of
value at all stages, the United Kingdom enacted laws prohibiting a person from assisting in the commission of a suicide killing. Using the evolving human-centered, morally-relative approach of legal positivism, the Law Lords took this prohibited conduct and judicially re-characterized it as an essential liberty interest cloaked with the status of a “human right”—i.e., a privacy right of personal autonomy to make end-of-life choices. It was no accident that the newly-created human right completely contradicted the inalienable, inviolable standard.\(^{75}\)

E. Purdy’s Progeny—Public Prosecution Guidelines

In response to the Law Lords’s discussion in Purdy criticizing the lack of an offense-specific prosecution policy, Britain’s Director of Public Prosecution (“Director”) drafted policy guidelines in conformance with the Law Lords’ decision declaring assisted suicide a human right.\(^{76}\) Unfortunately, the new guidelines create more than a little uncertainty in the law. The guidelines begin by ostensibly suggesting that Purdy did nothing to change assisted suicide law in the United Kingdom:

The case of Purdy did not change the law: only Parliament can change the law on encouraging or assisting suicide.

This policy does not in any way “decriminalize” the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide. Nothing in this policy can be taken to amount to an assurance that a person will be immune from prosecution if he or she does an act that encourages or assists the suicide or the attempted suicide of another person.\(^{77}\)

Nevertheless, the guidelines provide that whether someone who assisted in suicide will be prosecuted is left to the discretion of the prosecutor:

[t]his was recognised by the House of Lords in the Purdy case where Lord Hope stated that: “[i]t has long been recognised that a prosecution does not follow automatically whenever an offence

\(^{75}\) For a deeper discussion of the jurisprudential mechanics involved, see Wagner, supra note 6.

\(^{76}\) Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Feb. 2010), http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html.

\(^{77}\) Id. at paras. 5-6.
is believed to have been committed” . . . He went on to endorse the approach adopted by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney General in 1951, when he stated in the House of Commons that: “[i]t has never been the rule . . . that criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution.”

Accordingly, where there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution, prosecutors must go on to consider whether a prosecution is required in the public interest.78

Thus, the once inviolable standard, deeply rooted in the nation’s legal traditions and reflected in its statutory law, is no more. Instead, the value of any particular British human life rests in the hands of individual government prosecutors. In deciding not to protect human life against an assisted suicide killing, prosecutors now may arbitrarily rely upon ambiguous provisions in the guidelines to refuse to prosecute. Under the guideline’s factors:

[a] prosecution is less likely to be required if:
1. the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide;
2. the suspect was wholly motivated by compassion;
3. the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within the definition of the offence, were of only minor encouragement or assistance;
4. the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from taking the course of action which resulted in his or her suicide;
5. the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to commit suicide;
6. the suspect reported the victim’s suicide to the police and fully assisted them in their enquiries into the circumstances of the suicide or the attempt and his or her part in providing encouragement or assistance.79

These factors create colossal excuses allowing for assisted suicide without fear of prosecution. Attempts to disprove these factors become problematic because, in the words of Dr. Peter Saunders, “[a]nyone who takes part in an

78. Id. at paras. 36-37.
79. Id. at para. 45.
assisted suicide is going to claim they were acting out of compassion. The only witness who really knows will be dead.”

The Director’s assisted suicide guidelines became effective in February of 2010. Thereafter, prosecutors did not file charges in twenty assisted suicides committed during 2010. According to the Director, many of the cases involved family members assisting in the suicide. The disturbing irony is that this increase in assisted suicides took place while assisted suicide was still illegal in Britain.

As the public debate on assisted suicide continues, it makes sense to review the national implications that accompany such a jurisprudential shift. In the next section, therefore, we address the implications of turning down the road of morally-relative legal positivism.

PART II.

TURNING DOWN A DANGEROUS ROAD WITH DARK CONSEQUENCES

Suicide-killing proponents insist that the United Kingdom turn off the path of self-evident inalienable truth—embodied in its deeply-rooted natural, common, and positive law traditions—onto a path of legal positivism. Humankind has travelled down this immorally-relative road before with tragic consequences. Before the United Kingdom proceeds past a point of no return regarding its suicide-killing policy, we might consider whether the consequences are worth the supposed convenience.

Policy positions permitting assistance in suicide killings proceed from a mistaken premise that, in certain conditions, human life no longer has positive value or purpose. That presupposition has incalculably grave implications for every citizen in the United Kingdom. When government policy relegates the value of life to an immorally-relative individual choice, no benchmark exists against which to measure right from wrong or good


82. Id.

83. Id.

84. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422; see also McConnell, supra note 6, at 667-69.
from evil. If no moral reference point exists for those governing in the United Kingdom, then nothing prevents taking human life in other ways, or for other people in different situations. History reveals terrible costs associated with such an approach. Once liberated from objective, moral standards by subjective relativism, the individual is completely subject to the will of any stronger individual or group; for no moral standard exists to prevent the imposition of that stronger subject’s “morality.” Thus, instead of leading from the alleged “oppression of tradition” to the freedom it promises, the morally-relative legal positivist path leads to totalitarian tyranny.86

Many scholars document that although present proposals protecting suicide proceed down this dangerous road, these proposals were not the first steps taken down the perilous path.87 During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, eugenics movements advocated for the elimination of “less valuable” human beings.88 Germany subsequently legalized voluntary euthanasia.89 Thereafter, the Nazis killed hundreds of thousands of the mentally ill—all prior to the unspeakable tragedy of the Holocaust.90 The push to make assisted suicide, or “mercy killing,” a normal and “compassionate” procedure was happening as early as the 1920s in Germany.91 This approach transformed the role of a physician from that of purely a healer to both healer and killer.92 The end result was Auschwitz and places like it. Dr. Jay Lifton conducted extensive research and interviews of the Nazi doctors who committed these mass killings.93 Lifton established that the first step enabling the Nazis’ mass killings was the removal of the barrier between healing and killing:94 “Medicalization of killing—the

86. See Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Limits, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 259, 270-71, 274 (2005). That it may be a tyranny of the majority is no comfort, for today’s majority may become tomorrow’s minority. See Arkes, supra note 85, at 31.
88. Id. at 6. Thirty American states passed sterilization laws embraced by both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Id.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 7.
92. Id. at 4-5.
93. Id. at 6-12.
94. Id. at 14.
imagery of killing in the name of healing—was crucial to that terrible step. At the heart of the Nazi enterprise, then, is the destruction of the boundary between healing and killing.95

The question must be asked, how could doctors reconcile the killing of people with their vow to uphold the Hippocratic Oath? When Dr. Fritz Klein was asked this question, he answered, “Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is a gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind.”96 Because of his morally-relative worldview, Dr. Klein reached the deluded conclusion that he was upholding the Hippocratic Oath and serving mankind by slaughtering thousands of Jews.

The perverted idea that killing a patient is compassionate and therapeutic first gained traction from the work of two German professors, Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche.97 In 1920, they published their work entitled “The Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life.”98 This work postulated that some people are unworthy of life. Those unworthy of life included not only the incurably ill, but also many mentally ill and deformed children.99 They stressed the therapeutic goal of destroying an unworthy life and described it as “purely a healing treatment” and a “healing work.”100 Hoche insisted the policy was compassionate and consistent with medical ethics.101 He wrote that putting people to death “is not to be equated with other types of killing . . . but [is] an allowable, useful act.”102

Hoche further justified the killing policy by deeming the mentally and physically ill a tremendous burden for society to bear.103 He concluded: “single less valuable members have to be abandoned and pushed out.”104 Dr. Lifton exposed Hoche’s “striking note of medical hubris in insisting that ‘the physician has no doubt about the hundred-percent certainty of correct selection’ and ‘proven scientific criteria’ to establish the ‘impossibility of

95. Id.
96. Id. at 15-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 46-47.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
improvement of a mentally dead person."105 In other words, these doctors thought so highly of their knowledge and skill that they could be certain a “mentally dead” person will never recover. According to their morally-relative standard, therefore, no problem existed with destroying that life.

The supposed compassionate killing of mentally or physically “unworthy lives” eventually evolved into a justification for the slaughter of thousands of Jews, likewise deemed “unworthy.”106 And so we learn from history where the path of killing as an accepted medical treatment leads. Hoche’s and Binding’s justifications validating “compassionate” killing of a patient are eerily similar to contemporary justifications for assisted suicide.

In the 1940s, euthanasia proponents like Dr. Foster Kennedy advocated, on eugenics grounds, compulsory euthanasia for retarded children.107 By the 1970s, euthanasia proponents evolved their position to easing the “burden” of caring for the elderly, and then to easing suffering,108 and now to “liberty of choice.”

A more recent example of the consequences of legalizing assisted suicide is found in the Netherlands. There, “safeguards” in the pro-suicide Dutch law failed to protect Dutch citizens. Evidence revealed that thousands were killed, including many unreported assisted suicides, that many failed to follow established guidelines for voluntariness or consultation, and that many lives were extinguished without consent.109 Where did travelling

105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422.
107. Foley & Hendin, supra note 87, at 6-7.
108. Id. at 8. Remarkably, no suffering requirement exists in the pro-suicide proponents’ proposals that were before Parliament. See Coroners Amendment, supra note 2, at n.2. Nor do these proposals require anyone to advise the patient of palliative care and hospice options. Id.
109. Foley & Hendin, supra note 87, at 10. Doctors consistently violated unenforceable legal restraints on “abuses” of the new “right.” At one point in time, sixty percent of Dutch assisted-suicide cases went unreported. Id. Most of the unreported cases involved physicians failing to follow established guidelines for voluntariness or consultation. Id. at 10-11. Worse, in several thousand cases, physicians ended patients’ lives without the patients’ consent. Id. at 104. Twenty-five percent of physicians terminated one or more lives without a request. Id. at 104-05. In a 1995 study, forty percent of the more than 6,000 cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death involved no explicit request from the patient. Id. at 105; see also Zbigniew Zylicz, Palliative Care and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Observations of a Dutch Physician, in Foley & Hendin, supra note 87, at 122-43. Each major Dutch measure enacted to control and regulate physician-assisted suicide—including informed consent, consultation, and reporting—failed, was modified, or was violated. Foley & Hendin, supra note 87, at 103 (citing Carlos F. Gomez, Regulating Death: Euthanasia and the Case of
down the path of euthanasia take the Netherlands? A Dutch healthcare facility concedes it euthanized newborn infants, and a physician who killed the disabled babies unapologetically asserts his conduct is proper.110 Thus, society continues to slouch toward Gomorrah—and at an increasingly faster pace as it replaces God’s inviolable, moral standard with a morally-relative, individual convenience.111

What can policymakers in the United Kingdom learn from the experience of its Western neighbours? One thing is that which United Kingdom pro-suicide proponents present as a limited right to assisted suicide will “likely, in effect, [lead to] a much broader licence.”112 The most recent proponent and activist for legalizing assisted suicide in the United Kingdom is Lord Falconer.113 Leading a supposedly unbiased Commission on Death and Dying, Falconer’s commission is studying if and how assisted suicide policy should be implemented in the United Kingdom.114 The commission is made up of twelve members, most of whom favor legalized assisted suicide.115 Nine of the twelve members already work in the field and support assisted suicide.116 The remaining three on the commission are not known to oppose assisted suicide.117 The chair of the commission, Lord

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113. The Aim of the Commission, supra note 5.

114. Id.


116. Id.

117. Id.
Falconer, is a long-time proponent of assisted suicide, campaigning to legalize assisted suicide in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{118} Far from balanced, Lord Falconer is using this commission as a vehicle to drive the pro-assisted suicide policy in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{119} How far down the terrible path we have trod.

CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of its existence, the United Kingdom’s divine and natural law traditions embodied God’s sacred standard. That standard requires us not to assist in the killing of human life He created. Discerning the truth of this ancient, inviolable benchmark, the common and statutory law of Britain reflected its moral reference point and prohibited assisted suicide. In the name of progress, \textit{Purdy} and its pro-suicide progeny reject the inviolable standard underlying current statutory proscriptions against assisted killing. Instead, \textit{Purdy} and its progeny take the United Kingdom down the morally-relative road of legal positivism. The grave implications for a nation that accompany such a choice are historically clear and profoundly frightening. C.S. Lewis noted,

“We all want progress. But progress means getting nearer to the place where you want to be. And if you have taken a wrong turning, then to go forward does not get you any nearer. If we are on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; and in that case the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive man.”\textsuperscript{120}

Only by turning around and walking back to the right road will the United Kingdom ever again find the inherent value of human life worthy of government protection.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{120} C.S. Lewis, \textit{Mere Christianity} 28 (HarperCollins ed. 2001).