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Pinochet's Plebiscite and the Catholics: The Dual Role of the Chilean Church

By **STEPHEN R. BOWERS**

For decades the Catholic church and the Chilean military embraced common concerns. Each was an advocate of stability, law and order, social harmony, and an opponent of radical political movements. Their occupation of such extensive common political, economic, and social ground made them natural allies. However, as the church, fearing the stronger attraction of both the Protestant faith and Marxist-Leninist ideology among the country's working class, could no longer confine itself to this limited role and became more politically and socially active, the two allies became opponents.¹ By 1975, the Catholic church was in the forefront of opposition to Chile's military government and was becoming the focal point for opposition activities. Yet, as Chile prepared for its plebiscite in 1988, the relationship between the regime and the church experienced yet another transformation from that of distinct adversaries to one of uneasy members of a common system, each struggling to define the limits of their mutual authority over different aspects of Chilean society. In the volatile period preceding the plebiscite, the junta became increasingly sensitive to clerical intrusions into the political sphere while the church leadership, more cautious than in the earlier part of the decade and forced into the dual role of both advocate and adversary, endeavored to avoid secular manipulation, excessive political activism, and the internal dissension that could jeopardize the church's institutional framework and inhibit the role that it might play after the 5 October plebiscite.

By 1986 the military regime was becoming increasingly cautious in dealing with the nation's most important social institution. Its overall goal was to utilize the Catholic church as an instrument of regime authority or, failing that, to contain church opposition to Pinochet's policies. In several important respects, the junta was

successful in manipulating the church in such a way as to draw clerical support from an essentially reluctant church leadership. The best example of the regime's skillful handling of the religious community was the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1987. Yet, in other instances, the government faced severe criticism from numerous church leaders and treated the church as an opponent, thus intensifying its image as an oppressive regime bent on consistent violation of human rights. At its rhetorical worst, the government resorted to accusations such as that of Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez who suggested early in 1988 that the church represented one of the three greatest obstacles to peace in the country.²

As the process of Chile's democratization has proceeded, the relationship between the junta and the church has become particularly significant as an indication of the ability of the regime to work with non-governmental power centers in guiding national development along a democratic path. The increasingly violent context of Chilean politics in 1987 and 1988 has served as a reminder of the difficulties of resolving the junta's troubled relationship with the society that it must govern both today and, should it win the plebiscite, in the future. It is the purpose of this article to examine the nature of the relationship between the regime and the church during this critical period and to evaluate how each institution has dealt with the strains that have become typical of Chilean politics. That evaluation may be useful in making projections about the future of Chilean society in the era after the plebiscite.

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

One of the most striking indications of the intense strains within Chilean society has been an increasing pattern of violence as the country has moved cautiously toward democratization. Most frequently associated with the recent wave

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of terror has been the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), a small group originally believed to have only 1,000 to 2,000 hardcore members and long associated with attacks against electrical, telephone, and transportation systems, foreign-owned banks and mining companies, the U.S. Embassy, and pro-junta newspapers. By 1986, FPMR activities had expanded to include not only kidnappings, but also the attempt on Augusto Pinochet's life in September.³ In November 1987, a series of terrorist actions against National Electric Power, Inc., apparently the work of the FPMR, left a vast region from Copiapo to Temuco without electricity while simultaneous attacks against the Santiago bus system resulted in the burning of three buses.⁴ In March 1988, the Chilean attorney general Ambrosio Rodriguez warned that there would be an increase in terrorist attacks as the date of the plebiscite approached. These undertakings, he explained, were part of a political strategy aimed at inducing a so-called drug effect that would prevent people from being fully responsive to political events during that sensitive period. By the spring, violence intensified as terrorists disabled the Pacifico Steel Enterprise railroad by planting bombs along the railway line, thus causing panic among the residents of the Coquimbo region. Strikes against Santiago's electrical system became routine, with the result that vast industrial sectors of the city were often without power. Even radio stations served as convenient targets of terrorist actions. Although FPMR is given credit for most of these incidents, there were rumors of involvement by the Peruvian terrorist organization Shining Path. As a result, the Carabineros director general Rodolfo Stange was compelled to issue a public statement in June 1988, in an effort to reduce popular fears of such foreign intervention. According to Stange, the violent attacks on a Carabineros barracks in May, seen by some as a Shining Path action, was the work of domestic "extremists," probably the FPMR, who had promptly fled when the Chilean military came to the aid of the Carabineros.⁵ Nevertheless, Chilean authorities insisted that there was considerable foreign support for local terrorists and Ad Hoc Military Prosecutor Fernando Torres suggested in February 1988 that out of a group of over 100 cases he had tried, "at least 30 to 40 percent have been trained in Cuba or the USSR. They have confessed to this and it is no secret."⁶

The turbulence of this era was characterized not only by an increase in domestic violence but also by a continuation and, in some cases, an

intensification of international criticism of the military regime. As a result of the barrage of hostile pronouncements about the government, junta representatives have long been embroiled in bitter debates with numerous governments and international organizations, disputes likely to inhibit the operation of the government should the regime prevail in the plebiscite. The U.S. Department of State has been a leading critic of junta policies, including the plebiscite that served as the cornerstone of Pinochet's process for transition to civilian rule. The official response to the State Department's negative assessment of the plebiscite was offered by Admiral Jose Toribio Merino who, in a statement in December 1987, suggested that it is U.S., not Chilean elections, that are open to criticism because of the low turnout in U.S. presidential elections and the inconvenient hours during which a person may vote.⁷ The United Nations added its voice to the chorus of international critics of Pinochet's regime in March 1988, with a resolution condemning the junta for human rights violations. Chile's ambassador to the United Nations responded to the resolution by denouncing it as interference in Chilean internal affairs and suggesting that it was motivated by "political interests" rather than a concern for human rights and that the resolution was "invalid from the beginning because it was drafted by such an untrustworthy government—that of Mexico."⁸ Finally, in July 1988, the European Parliament issued a unanimous resolution calling upon all Chilean democratic parties to reject Pinochet in the 5 October plebiscite. The spokesman for the Chilean Foreign Ministry promptly denounced the decision as "grotesque" and labeled members of the Parliament "ignorant" and suffering from a "distorted view of Chilean reality."⁹

THE CHURCH AS AN ADVOCATE

The regime's difficulties with international organizations and foreign governments have been matched by severe strains in its relationship with the church since 1975. Harassment of church workers and even the deaths of foreign priests in police searches of Santiago's slums were indications of open and bitter official hostility toward the church. This attitude was dramatically reflected in actions against church organizations such as the Vicariate of Solidarity—the Catholic church's human rights office. Pinochet himself described this organization as "more communistic than the communists." Apparently in retaliation for the Vicariate's accusations of hu-

man rights violations, numerous anonymous attacks were directed against church buildings, clergy, and lay workers. In addition, church workers were often the targets of bombings, threats, kidnappings, and beatings.¹⁰

Yet, in spite of the extremely harsh church-regime relationship that developed since 1975, the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1987 demonstrated Pinochet's ability to back away from overt and sometimes violent confrontations with the church and to utilize that organization, indirectly at least, as an advocate of his policies. While there were papal gestures that supported the opposition, the pope gave significant indications of support for the regime. The pope's critical gestures fell into four categories: meetings with opposition leaders, demands for greater popular participation in politics, a call for an assertive church, and recognition of the Vicariate of Solidarity for its "devotion on behalf of human rights." Yet, these indications of support for Pinochet's opponents were balanced by a series of actions clearly supportive of the regime. One of the most important symbolic moves during the papal visit was the pope's appearance on the presidential balcony with Pinochet and his family and his prayers that were offered with the general and his family. In addition, the pope echoed at least some of Pinochet's anticommunist sentiments before an audience of bishops and priests with his denunciation of "foreign influences" that are attempting to "subjugate or distort the national will." Finally, after listening to shanty town delegates at a mass rally, the pope cautioned grassroots church organizations to avoid taking direct political positions. As the visit ended there was general recognition that it had made the split within the church a matter of public attention while the attendant disturbances did more harm to the image of opposition groups than to that of the government. The words of comfort that the pope gave to the government had greater impact in promoting more cautious church behavior than those remarks that might have supported the opposition.¹¹

THE SUPPRESSION OF LIBERAL TENDENCIES

The relationship between the ecclesiastical leadership and the Vicariate of Solidarity has demonstrated the shift in church policy in recent years. The activities of this organization exemplify the attitude of the more liberal element of the church leadership toward the military regime. The Vicariate has championed the cause of human rights by criticizing official abuses and

by offering aid—food, shelter, clothing, and legal support—to victims of abuse. At the same time, it has defended the poor and preached its own brand of liberation theology, which stresses the need for Catholics to become involved in movements for social justice. A few Vicariate associates, such as former member Ignacio Gutierrez, have even advocated the desirability of revolution, thus prompting the Chilean interior minister's 1988 charge that the Vicariate is a "counterintelligence organization at the service

The suppression of liberal tendencies within the church—something which was facilitated by the church hierarchy—was accompanied by governmental pressures against elements of the church media.

of the opposition" and dedicated to providing moral and logistical support for terrorism.¹²

However, by 1986 the Vicariate faced a more cautious church leadership that seemed inclined to return to a more "pastoral" mission. The demand by Bishop Antonio Moreno, vicar of the northern zone of Santiago since 1986, that priests not participate in any form of protest against the government is typical of the position taken by many of the more recently appointed church leaders. When a group of lay people went to Bishop Moreno to describe a brutal search and seizure raid in their neighborhood, the bishop responded that the soldiers and the police were "only doing their duty and obeying the laws." This cautious attitude undoubtedly reflected a concern about the alienation of traditional Catholics who have played such an important role in supporting the church and making it possible for church structures to serve those in need of assistance. It is, of course, important to note that the Catholic church is not a monolithic body either at the popular or at the elite level. Disagreements over fundamental political questions exist at every level of the organization and thus mandate caution on the part of ecclesiastical leaders who are concerned about the institutional solidity of the church.

The suppression of liberal tendencies within the church—something which was facilitated by the church hierarchy—was accompanied by governmental pressures against elements of the church media. One of the most important media reflections of liberal tendencies within the

church is the monthly political journal *Analisis*, published by the Academy of Christian Humanism. The Academy, founded in 1975, is a church organization that supports the research of numerous social scientists suppressed by the junta. While *Analisis* continues to serve as a reminder of the residual vestiges of a free press in Chile, it has been the target of numerous attacks by government officials stung by its critical commentary. With the approach of the plebiscite, authorities became increasingly sensitive to critical reportage. In June 1988, Valparaiso Naval Prosecutor Miguel Angel Munoz used the military justice code to take legal action against the journal for its publication of an article dealing with the Chilean arms trade, arresting both the deputy director of the magazine and the author of the offending article. *Analisis* director, Juan Pablo Cardenas, was already serving a limited jail sentence for having "offended" President Pinochet.¹³ The campaign against the Catholic media has also been directed against Radio La Voz de la Costa, a Catholic radio station that broadcasts educational programs to peasants and other rural residents. In February 1988, sponsors of the radio station were asked to cancel their contracts with the station unless they wanted to face reprisals. This request was evidently made on behalf of the ultra-rightist terrorist group "Chilean Anticommunist Action" (ACHA) and was coupled with a death threat sent by letter to the priest who runs the station. In March, the shop of one of the radio station's sponsors was bombed in retaliation for its continued support for La Voz de la Costa. Chilean human rights attorneys claim that ACHA is closely linked with Chile's security services. These actions should be viewed not simply as attacks on the church, but rather as part of what Jaime Moreno Laval, president of the Santiago Journalists Association, describes as a concerted campaign of threats and pressure against journalists as the date for the plebiscite approaches.¹⁴

Authorities have, however, needed more than the mere silencing of critical elements within the church-supported media. On the eve of the plebiscite, authorities enjoyed at least some success in drawing expressions of support from clerical figures. Given the importance of the plebiscite as an element of Pinochet's policies, the regime has been eager to solicit support from prominent church figures, thus in advance strengthening the position of the junta should it be successful in the plebiscite. An important measure of such support came in July 1988 when the Episcopal

Conference president, Msgr. Carlos Gonzales, generally seen as sympathetic to liberal church elements, met with the director of Chile's Voting Service to review measures being taken in preparation for the plebiscite. Following the meeting, Gonzales declared that he was favorably impressed by the long lists of registered voters, the computer equipment, and the supplies of paper for printing secret ballots and felt that they were clear evidence that the electoral process was well organized and secure against any form of fraud. The director of the Voting Service, Juan Ignacio Garcia, in turn, expressed the government's deep satisfaction with his observation that "the fact that a church authority expressed his support for the system is satisfying" and is "a positive message to all Chileans."¹⁵

An important reason for the change in the church's recent pronouncements—in addition to some of the papal pronouncements in the 1987 visit—is the changing composition of ruling ecclesiastical bodies, entities that were once dominated by regime critics but are now balanced between liberals and conservatives. The evenness of the split within the church leadership is reflected in the almost even liberal-conservative division within the twenty-nine member Bishop's Council. Although Juan Francisco Cardinal Fresno Larrain, archbishop of Santiago since 1983, was a theological conservative and an enthusiastic supporter of the military regime, he and the Bishop's Council have sometimes taken positions that advocate the causes espoused by Chile's opposition. For example, in 1986 the bishops joined in the call for a general strike against the government by unions and professional groups. Cardinal Fresno has been equally outspoken in his demands for changes in the Pinochet constitution and for a transition from military to civilian rule. Yet, the council cannot be regarded as a captive of the liberal faction of the leadership. The proposal that Cardinal Fresno made in 1985 for a national accord is based on a formula that would favor the nation's center-right political groups at the expense of the left, something that pleases the government far more than the activists among the poor and the working class who see the left as their champion. The tendency of the council to fluctuate between the postures of advocate and adversary illustrates the desire of the clerical leadership to occupy a more balanced position.¹⁶

Late in 1986, Cardinal Fresno's criticism of the government was softened even more by actions that many see, at best, as supportive of a

restrained church role or, at worst, as an effort to ally the church with Pinochet. This shift away from overt antigovernmental activism became most apparent following the imposition of a state of siege after the attempt on Pinochet's life on 7 September 1986. Indicative of this less critical posture was Cardinal Fresno's decision to proceed with the traditional "Te Deum" celebration in Santiago's cathedral on 18 September, Chile's independence day. Even though a large sector of the clergy and laity called for a suspension of the celebration because of regime attacks against the church, Cardinal Fresno summoned the Santiago clergy to announce that the church's mission was "transcendent" and that two-hundred-year-old traditions such as the "Te Deum" should not be broken in response to passing political controversies. This ceremony, which was attended by General Pinochet and several junta members, was denounced by the Chilean liberation theologian, Ronaldo Munoz, who described it as the shepherds marching "into the plaza arm in arm with the wolves that are scattering and destroying the flock."¹⁷ Realistically, it must be recognized that these actions have not constituted a "sell-out" on the part of the church leadership, but are, rather, important steps toward facilitation of a constructive church role in Chile after the plebiscite, regardless of the outcome.

THE CHURCH AS AN ADVERSARY

Yet, with the approach of the plebiscite and in spite of these conciliatory gestures, the church did not abandon its adversarial role and expressed critical views on fundamental political questions. One of the most important of these was the moral validity of the plebiscite itself. In spite of some praise for the electoral machinery, in June 1988 the Episcopal Conference released a statement of its concern that certain other more essential conditions should be met for the plebiscite to be considered morally valid. The first condition was that the opposition must be given more access to the media, especially the national television channel. Most independent observers agreed with the suggestion that the fifteen minutes of television time allocated for both opposition and pro-regime groups each evening, an arrangement that did not even begin until September, would not be sufficient or fair in view of the government's formal domination of the television broadcast system. It was also important, the statement continued, that the states of exception, with the limits they imposed

upon political liberties, be lifted so there could be free and open debate. Furthermore, according to the conference, government officials and members of the armed forces who were responsible for management of the electoral machinery should not simultaneously be active supporters of a specific plebiscite option. Finally, the "aggressive, disqualifying, and exclusionary language" associated with public discussion of the plebiscite should be eliminated in order to maintain the air of calm deliberation required for an orderly and peaceful plebiscite. In this context, one is reminded of the numerous statements—such as that by Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez in March 1988—that "political anarchy, social disorder, and insecurity" would follow a plebiscite vote rejecting the government candidate. Further and even more explicit distrust of the plebiscite process was expressed by Carlos Camus, Bishop of Linares and a former secretary general of the Episcopal Conference, who, when asked about General Pinochet's statement that he would "overwhelm" the opposition in the plebiscite, asked, "What is he going to overwhelm them with, I wonder? Will it be with votes or with machineguns?"¹⁸

An equally fundamental issue upon which church leaders also made direct critical comments was General Pinochet's political future. In January 1988, Msgr. Raul Silva Henriquez, Santiago's retired archbishop who presently holds the office of cardinal, observed that Pinochet did not want to relinquish his office and, in all probability, would prefer to die as a dictator. According to Cardinal Silva, Pinochet's days are numbered because he will not be allowed to remain in office and if, upon being defeated in the plebiscite, he leaves Chile he will be killed. This was evidently a sensitive point within Pinochet's inner political circle and, according to some reports, in the event of a defeat, the general would not leave the country but rather take refuge on Robinson Crusoe Island, a remote Chilean possession in the Pacific. Following Msgr. Silva's comments, the Chilean Foreign Ministry filed a formal complaint with the Vatican against the Cardinal and denounced his remarks as "not conducive to national harmony," while Sergio Onofre Jarpa, president of the pro-Pinochet National Renewal party, described them as "incredible." Cardinal Silva had already demonstrated his disdain for Pinochet by refusing to send Christmas greetings to the general, instead sending formal Christmas messages to the relatives of five young communists who had disappeared in September 1987. ACHA has

claimed credit for abducting the five. In February 1988, ACHA threatened to kill Cardinal Silva because of his public statements about human rights violations in Chile.¹⁹

The growing number of disappearances among the ranks of those expressing opposition to the junta was yet another issue about which the church was increasingly outspoken. In April 1988, the Vicariate issued a statement in which it declared that the worst cases of human rights violations in Chile were the increased campaign

ployed against those who criticized the junta's abuses.²¹

Yet, it is clear that while the church was willing to oppose the regime on issues that have moral implications, particularly the human rights abuses cited above, it does not seek political power for itself. Although it has emerged as the most important nongovernmental institution since 1973, it shows no desire to assume the role of a "shadow government" or an auxiliary state apparatus. It is sometimes an adversary but never an aspirant for political authority. The determination of clerical leaders to avoid direct involvement in secular matters was reflected in the Episcopal Conference's June 1988 declaration of neutrality in the plebiscite. In addition, when Bolivian groups requested clerical mediation in the Bolivian-Chilean sea-outlet issue in May 1988, the church leadership was quick to deny any authority to engage in such an action, once again stressing that the Catholic church has no aspirations for direct political authority, especially on questions that lack profound, direct moral implications.²²

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of political kidnappings and the arrest and torture of people in secret detention centers run by the National Intelligence Center (CNI). The Santiago Archbishop's Office charged that the methods employed and the timing of events supported fears that the repressive tactics of the early Pinochet years were being revived as the country neared the date of the plebiscite. Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno and his close advisors stressed that the Catholic church could not remain indifferent to such events and that finding the missing should be one of the highest public priorities.²⁰

The church's pursuit of a restrained adversarial role was not without its costs for those leaders associated with public statements of opposition to regime policies and practices. In May 1988, four priests who signed a document which asserted that General Pinochet and the military regime were "morally disqualified" to rule Chile and called upon Pinochet to resign were arrested by a Santiago military prosecutor. Episcopal Conference president Carlos Gonzales, widely viewed as a supporter of the more liberal line, was the target of bitter personal attacks in a seventeen-page publication signed by Chilean Catholic Action, an organization of pro-Pinochet Catholics. Death threats, such as that made by ACHA against Cardinal Silva, were another frequent consequence of the leadership's adversarial functions. Even petty vandalism—such as the assault with red paint on the home and automobile of the executive direct of the Vicariate of Solidarity in October 1987—was em-

THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Over the years, the ecclesiastical leadership seems to have arrived at a consensus with regard to the limits to political activism. A key point of that consensus is that prophetic statements by themselves are not likely to bring about a fundamental change in the regime. As Brian H. Smith has observed, the institutional resources of the Catholic church were more important than its moral voice in alleviating the effects of repressive government, meaning that its role as an advocate of acceptance of the regime could bring important benefits to its parishioners. Accordingly, by avoiding elite-level confrontations with the regime, the church has been able to focus on providing important services, such as communications networks and legal and economic assistance, to those who have been victims of repression. Thus, the role of the church has been enlarged rather than diminished under the military regime, and the Catholic leadership has drawn closer to an understanding with regard to the limits of the clerical political activism characteristic of its adversarial role. When newly appointed Bishop Jorge Medina went to Pinochet to reaffirm his loyalty to the regime, he was making a dramatic statement of the self-imposed limits that now apply to the church's role in politics. Yet, that loyalty does not imply subservience or a willingness on the part of the

church to allow its leadership to be undermined.²³

This understanding is clearly the result of a realistic evaluation of the church's mission by the ecclesiastical hierarchy—especially the Vatican leadership, which has recently appointed conservative bishops who are more supportive of the government—rather than a consequence of direct military pressure against the church. The exercise of restraint by both the church and the junta, which generally refrained from direct threats to the core interests of the Catholic church, is a tribute to the political wisdom of both the Chilean military figures who act as political leaders and the ecclesiastical figures who enjoy political prominence. When Bishop Medina made his journey to Pinochet, he was rewarded for his expression of support by a ceremony in which the dictator presented him with a pectoral cross made of lapis lazuli. After all, military authorities can accept a church that engages in an active pastoral mission but refrains from direct plays for secular authority even if it does venture into the political sphere when it sees a moral issue at stake. Yet, the church's political role remains modest and restrained, thus protecting its ecclesiastical structure and allowing the church to serve its parishioners—including those who have been victims of the regime's repression.

CONCLUSIONS

Policies of the Catholic church in the period just prior to the plebiscite were not a sell-out, but rather an effort to facilitate a transition to democratic government and avoid the violence that might be associated with a left-wing overthrow of the Pinochet government. The church has played a dual role in that sometimes it has been an advocate of regime policies while on other occasions it has been a critic. On balance, clerical leaders are most concerned about pursuit of a policy that allows maximum attention to the needs of parishioners while also directing attention to political controversies when crucial moral questions are at issue.

A crucial factor stimulating adoption of this approach is that, by 1987 and 1988, the core interests of the church were not being threatened by the junta. The worst excesses of earlier years had stopped and, while they occurred on an occasional basis, direct physical threats and harassment were not a dominant part of regime tactics for dealing with the church. The achievement of better relations with the church supports the view that Pinochet is one of the region's

most adroit politicians and his skill in dealing with the church in this period is a tribute to his political acumen. In spite of serious disputes between the government and the church, Pinochet was able to maintain contacts with the church leadership. At the same time, while Pinochet was critical of the activities of the Vicariate as well as of activist priests who attempted to mobilize the opposition, the junta did not endeavor to destroy the church leadership or intrude directly into the management of the church.

A less perceptive government might have concentrated on attempting to undermine the church by attacking its bases of economic or financial support. There is no indication today of a serious official effort to undermine the church in such a fashion. In short, the Chilean government may have been in the hands of the military, but the responsible officers recognized the fundamentals of Chilean history with the prominent role assigned to the church and did not brutally defy tradition. By pursuing a more restrained policy toward the church, Pinochet was able to maintain the appearance of a loyal, practicing Catholic whose main desire was that the church give more attention to pastoral concerns than to political issues. He did not challenge the special position of the church as a common element in Chilean life and an integral part of the nation's Hispanic heritage. Such an approach was not only a critical element of regime policy prior to the plebiscite but crucial to Pinochet's prospects for governing with any measure of success in the event of a "yes" vote in October. For the Catholic church, maintenance of a qualified truce with the government was essential to the leadership's hopes of performing both a pastoral and a humanitarian mission in the years following the plebiscite.

NOTES

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5. FBIS-LAT-88-048, 11 March 1988, p. 26, FBIS-LAT-88-095, 17 May 1988, p. 11, and FBIS-LAT-88-111, 9 June 1988, p. 36.

6. *Fortin Mapocho*, 9 February 1988, p. 12.

7. FBIS-LAT-87-244, 21 December 1987, p. 26.

8. FBIS-LAT-88-048, 11 March 1988, p. 25.

9. FBIS-LAT-88-131, 8 July 1988, p. 24.

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11. *Southern Cone Report*, 16 April 1987, pp. 1–2.
12. FBIS-LAT-88-007, 12 January 1988, p. 25.
13. FBIS-LAT-88-111, 9 June 1988, p. 36.
14. *Fortin Mapocho*, 24 March 1988, p. 8.
15. FBIS-LAT-88-128, 5 July 1988, p. 26–27.
16. *Southern Cone Report*, 16 April 1987, pp. 1–2.
17. *Latinamerica Press*, 30 October 1986, pp. 5–6.
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21. FBIS-LAT-87-195, 8 October 1987, p. 27, FBIS-LAT-88-026, 9 February 1988, p. 32, and FBIS-LAT-88-101, 25 May 1988, p. 25.
22. FBIS-LAT-88-092, 12 May 1988, p. 28, and FBIS-LAT-88-094, 16 May 1988, p. 39.
23. Smith, pp. 293–297.