

MAKING SENSE OF ETHNOCENTRISM:
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS & NATIONAL CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

by

Travis J. Benson

Liberty University

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

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ABSTRACT

Varying internal and external stimulants naturally oscillate the creation of objective intelligence analysis; however, the most egregious offender to accuracy and completeness is the natural human mental process. No element of intelligence analysis is more formidable than the cognitive process that houses specific deviations, known as biases, as it yields inaccuracies and alters what is believed to be a rational response to a complex analytical problem. The phenomenon of ethnocentrism is consistently identified as an analytical limitation of intelligence professionals, derived from cognitive bias. Ultimately, ethnocentrism manifests an analyst's perception of information directly through the lens of culturally dependent heuristics and cognitive patterns accumulated over a lifetime. The application of the Six-Dimensions of National Culture (6-D model), put forth in 1980 by Geert Hofstede, was selected to alter this pattern via an exploratory qualitative multi-case study involving Imperial Japan (Pearl Harbor), the Soviet Union (Cuban Missile Crisis), and al-Qaeda before September 11, 2001. With the application of the 6-D model, in concert with the Data-Frame Theory, as presented by Moore and Hoffman, this dissertation attempts to amplify the human capacity to make sense of ethnocentrism by expanding analytical frames and, as a result, help analysts produce and disseminate more holistic intelligence.

Research results identified significant divergence between the created cultural disposition and the US intelligence perspective, specifically throughout the IDV, MAS, and IVR cultural dimensions. This study highlights the implications of ethnocentrism within the intelligence paradigm and identifies the necessity to employ cultural condition frameworks when attempting to produce accurate and comprehensive intelligence.

Keywords: Intelligence Analysis, Ethnocentrism, Sensemaking, Data-Frame Theory, Cognitive Bias, Comprehensive Analysis, Six-Dimensions of National Culture, Information Synthesis

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Dedication

To: Ashley, Nathanael, and Daphne.

You are, and will forever be, my principal purpose.

The Lord has bestowed upon me a precious gift: you!

Acknowledgments

Throughout my Ph.D. journey, I have relied on exceptional individuals for motivation, philosophical discussions, humor, subject matter expertise, doses of reality, late-night brainstorming sessions, and general advice. This manuscript owes its existence to their encouragement, for which I am eternally grateful.

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reinvigorated my motivation and encouraged me without even knowing it. Special thanks to my sisters, Lorien and Heather—you know, because.

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List of Abbreviations

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)

Area of Responsibility (AOR)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

Committee for State Security (KGB)

Communication Intelligence (COMINT)

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

Data-Frame Theory (D/F Theory)

Department of Defense (DOD)

Diversity, Equity & Inclusion (DE&I)

Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX)

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)

English Standard Version—Bible (ESV)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Federal Security Service—Russia (FSB)

Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate (F3EAD)

Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activity (FORMICA)

For Official Use Only (FOUO)

Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR)

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)

Global War on Terror (GWOT)

Great Power Competition (GPC)

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

Individualism v. Collectivism (IDV)

Indulgence v. Restraint (IVR)

Indications and Warnings (I&W)

Infrared Imagery (IR)

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR)

Long-term v. Short-term Orientation (LTO)

Masculinity v. Femininity (MAS)

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)

National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

National Security Agency (NSA)

National Security Council (NSC)

National Security Strategies (NSS)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)

Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs)

People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)

Power Distance (PDI)

Presidents Daily Brief (PDB)

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)

Prisoner of War (POW)

Processing and Exploitation (P&E)

Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party (RSDWP)

Sensitive Compartmental Information (SCI)

Russian Communist Party—Former Bolshevik Party (RCP)

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Situational Awareness Theory (SA)

Soviet Union—New Economic Policy (NEP)

Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIIEs)

Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats Analysis (SWOT)

Six Dimensions of National Culture—Hofstede's (6-D model)

Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)

Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

United Kingdom (UK)

United States Ship (USS)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

World War I (WWI)

World War II (WWII)

The more we learn about the world, and the deeper our learning, the more conscious, specific, and articulate will be our knowledge of what we do not know.
—Karl Popper

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Overview

The human experience is a curious endeavor; one facet of this illustrious adventure is the desire to understand how the mind works. We accomplish this through studying cognitive science, which explains the underlying processes of perception, decision-making, and learning (Bottemanne et al., 2022). The mind is undoubtedly a complex and sophisticated system of interconnected networks that receive and process data from internal and external environments, which begs the obvious and logical question of how these informational inputs are interpreted. Moreover, what perceptions and decisions are made based on the individual's synthesis of these data points? Finally, what is the reactionary response to cognitive ambiguity when a series of data points holds levels of uncertainty, distortion, or atomistic properties?

The human reasoning process is a critical element in intelligence analysis, and unfortunately, “understanding this process is hindered by the lack of conscious awareness of the workings of our own minds” (Heuer, 2019, p. 1). On the surface, Richard Heuer (2019), a consensus initiator of intelligence psychology research, builds a narrative of pessimism. He explains that “many functions associated with perception, memory, and information processing are conducted before and independently of any conscious direction...weaknesses, and biases inherent in human thinking processes” (Heuer, 2019, p. 1). However, optimism remains, as Heuer and a plethora of intelligence scholars such as Betts (2007), Kent (1949, 1994b), Davis (2008), Freedman (1981), Andrew (2018), Odom (2003), Jervis (2009), Johnson (1996), Johnston (2005), and several others, as well as the memoirs of former directors of central

intelligence (DCIs), all agree, the same “weakness and biases” can be ameliorated by the deliberate application of analytical tools and techniques. This research embodies the latter form of idealism by creating a novel analytical instrument designed to assist intelligence professionals in comprehending the perilous bias of ethnocentrism.

The remaining eight sections will introduce fundamental cognitive biases, including ethnocentrism, its impacts on intelligence analysis, and the overall rationale behind the study. Through robust problem and purpose statements and associated research questions, the reader will build a holistic understanding of ethnocentrism's intricacies within the constructs of intelligence analysis, the associated key terms, and this study's methodology to make sense of it all.

Ethnocentrism in Intelligence Contextualized

During the Cold War, the American scholar and pioneering intelligence analyst Sherman Kent, founding father of US intelligence analysis, “lamented that the US intelligence community lacked professional literature” (Bruce & George, 2008, p. 1). Kent articulated, “As long as this discipline lacks a literature, its method, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine, and even its fundamental theory runs the risk of never reaching full maturity” (Kent, 1994b, pp. 14–15). His commitment to the intelligence tradecraft underscores the vital role of the profession in shaping and contributing to American national security. This dedication also highlights its influence on the policies that govern the functions of national security. Today, there is an overabundance of general writings of varying quality, on intelligence typically exploiting and manipulating intelligence failures while enjoying the benefit of hindsight. More legitimate works personify

Kent's request for an academic approach and proficient progress in developing and defining the complex principles of professional intelligence analysis.

With the influx of literature and evolving frameworks, dilution of the same intelligence subjects, words, and concepts began to emerge. However, the consensus from the intelligence community was founded through the work of Michael Warner (2002), who, after synthesizing previous attempts to define intelligence, concluded that “intelligence is a secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities” (Warner, 2002, pp. 15–22). Concurrently, the former Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Douglas MacEachin (2006), is famously quoted, “Intelligence is a profession of cognition” (MacEachin, 2006, p. 117), specifically “monitoring important countries, trends, people, events, and other phenomena” (Bruce & George, 2008, p. 1).

These generalizations of the intelligence profession divide intelligence analysis into two different but not mutually exclusive categories: (1) tools and techniques and (2) cognitive processes (Johnston, 2005). Rob Johnston (2005), within his ethnographic study *Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community*, merges these two categories when defining intelligence analysis as “the application of individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret socio-cultural context” (Johnston, 2005, p. 4). Johnston’s definition understands that “seeking to provide a definition of the essential nature of intelligence by listing all activities associated with the term falsely assumes that the essential nature of a single entity must include all relationships of association between that entity and other entities or concepts into a single taxonomic class” (Whitesmith, 2020, p. 24).

However, one obvious truth spanning multiple definitions of intelligence is that intelligence requires human action and the pursuit of information (Johnston, 2005; Kent, 1949; Lowenthal, 2012; Warner, 2002). Therefore, knowledge, justification, belief, deduction, and formal logic—a linear progression of reasoning that establishes validity—are all critical components of intelligence analysis. Unfortunately, these psychological variables are cognitive faculties with great epistemic complexity, which is fallible and prone to error (Whitesmith, 2020). Meaning that intellectual error is both ordinary, inevitable, and absolute, signifying that incontrovertible truth is an elusive goal (Whitesmith, 2020).

Cognitive biases are errors in logic or other cognitive operations created by information processing/synthesis practices designed by the brain for the purpose of decision-making. Furthermore, cognitive biases influence how we develop belief systems and determine behavioral patterns. Additionally, cognitive biases impact the prominent phases of psychological synthesis: (1) the principles of initial conceptualization surrounding thoughts, sentiments, hypotheses, and inferences and (2) the modification of the same components during the refinement of information.

Well-established precedence has been set surrounding the influence of cognitive biases during the process of psychological synthesis (or analysis), specifically, heuristics that are employed when making judgments under uncertainty: (1) representativeness—judging the probability of an event, (2) assessing the plausibility of a particular development, and (3) adjustment from the anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further examples are the human belief system and how the human mind formulates constructs regarding the character of other people (Hendrick et al., 1973) and the judgment of causal empirical relationships outlined

by Chapman and Chapman (1967). From an intelligence perspective, according to Betts (1978), cognitive bias holds the heaviest impact on analytical judgment, as all the aforementioned cognitive components are mechanisms critical to the judgment process.

Ethnocentrism Defined

Ethnocentrism, “projecting one’s cognition and norms onto others,” is one of the challenging biases plaguing the intelligence community (Johnston, 2005). Fundamentally, ethnocentrism is a cognitive obstacle that impacts analysts’ perceptions and inhibits holistic perspectives (Witlin, 2008). Ethnocentrism encompasses significant similarities to mirror-imaging, described as “imposing personal perspectives on incomplete data, undermining objectivity” (Witlin, 2008, p. 89). These two biases are frequently used interchangeably throughout intelligence literature. However, they do have a minor divergence. Where mirror-imaging focuses on the analyst’s projected perception, ethnocentric constructs are based on cultural *scotoma* or blindness. As Shelton articulates, “Scotoma indicates that an individual who fails to see facts or is blind to alternatives observes only limited possibilities as a result of a sensory locking out of information from the environment” (Shelton, 2011, p. 637). From a cultural perspective, this blindness is typically due to cultural unfamiliarity and unawareness; and produces an element of being imprisoned inside one’s own culture (Snyder, 1977, pp. 8–9).

Additionally, the mind usually accepts only what it wants to believe and holds on to its version of reality (Tice & Quick, 1997, p. 17). This cultural blindness is catastrophic in intelligence analysis as cultural variables are critical components of holistic intelligence reporting. For example, an analyst from the US who reads and synthesizes an intelligence product about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) versus a Russian intelligence professional

viewing the same piece of intelligence in Moscow will deduce significantly different judgments. These opposing conclusions are based on multiple cultural factors (attributing principles of ethnocentrism), the total sum of ideas, conditional behaviors, historical patterns of thought, and national strategic objectives (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012). The ethnocentric bias limits the US analyst's attempt to view the intelligence as the Russian analyst does. Conversely, the Russian analyst interprets the same data from a Russian perspective. Both scenarios lead to inaccurate assessment and, ultimately, dangerous decision making. By making sense of ethnocentrism through building acculturation through applied national cultural dimensions, the enormous divergence between the US and Russian analysts should narrow.

Ethnocentrism's Influence on Intelligence

December 1941, an early morning attack on US sovereignty against military and civilian assets at Pearl Harbor exemplified the inadequacy and disorganization of American intelligence (R. Z. George, 2020). Furthermore, the void between valuable information regarding national security and the president's ear was vast and presented extreme vulnerabilities during wartime. Thus, the idea of a 'central' agency was born, with the primary objective of reporting to the president rather than the military services or the secretary of state (R. Z. George, 2020). From an organizational perspective, by way of the National Security Act of 1947, the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD) and CIA was an attempt to bridge the intelligence gap and empower the national security enterprise. However, intelligence was still vulnerable to cultural assumptions and political motivations (A. M. Lewis, 1976).

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, intelligence was inundated with the misapplication of cultural variables, conscious prejudice, racism, or intentional insensitivity to

differing cultures (Andrew, 2018). However, most intelligence errors during this period that produced geopolitical and militaristic campaigns were also founded on the unavoidable cognitive trap of ethnocentrism (Pipes, 1995). The strong influence of psychological properties transcends generations, continuously hindering the intelligence professional (Jervis, 2017). Analysts typically face multiple demands while experiencing substantive uncertainty, including reaching accurate, timely, and holistic estimates, coordinating assessments with colleagues, satisfying organizational norms, and conveying judgments to decision-makers (Davis, 2008, p. 157). The phenomenon of ethnocentrism being conspicuously absent from finalized intelligence considerations is highly impactful in shaping comprehensive intelligence. This absence suggests that ethnocentrism operates subtly in the background, adversely affecting end products without immediate recognition.

Impacts of Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is the “consequence of a combination of cognitive and cultural biases resulting from a lifetime of enculturation, culturally bound heuristics, and missing, or inadequate, information” (Johnston, 2005, p. 75). Where ethnocentrism functions on a conscious level, it remains a phenomenon that is difficult to “recognize in oneself and equally difficult to counteract” (Johnston, 2005, pp. 75–76). A primary example of this is captured through the lens of an intelligence professional perceiving foreigners—both friends and adversaries of the US—as thinking the same way as Americans. The detriment of this line of deduction has been attributed to analytical error found in examples such as the Attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (Benedict, 1946), the Chinese Intervention in Korea in November 1950 (Walton, 2012), the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 (Zegart, 2012); the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (Pape, 2005) and Russia’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War in September 2015

(Borshchevskaya, 2022; Nalbandov, 2016).

A constant throughout these examples was the analysts' success in producing the adversaries' capabilities. However, through the lens of ethnocentrism, intelligence produced a series of unexpected or unanticipated misjudgments of the adversaries' intentions. The factual inaccuracies found within the analysis from inane or absent information, specifically from a cultural perspective, surrounding these historical events, resulted in inadequate hypotheses, judgments, and strategic policies. After an exhaustive review of the literature surrounding the presence of ethnocentrism in the intelligence process, there is an excess of recognition; however, there are limited or no feasible recommendations to make sense of the issue. Typically, the haphazard solution consists of the analyst leveraging contrarian techniques such as red teaming, devil's advocate, Team A/Team B, high-impact/low-impact probability analysis, and "what if?" analysis and scenarios. This study is designed to move past assumptions/predetermined values and establish a concrete process for intelligence analysts to make sense of ethnocentrism.

Situation to Self

The current generation of intelligence professionals, including myself, who carried the torch from a post-Cold War America through the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to the current strategic objectives surrounding the Great Power Competition (GPC), is responsible for expanding the analytical toolkit. First, however, we must proceed with caution and find guidance from the observations outlined by Richard Betts (2007) and Robert Jervis (1976), who state, "In focusing on failures, critics often lose sight of the system's many successes" (Betts, 2007, p. 2). Therefore, a critical piece of expanding the analytical toolkit must include looking beyond the latest intelligence issue or failure. Instead, the researcher should look to "the longer span of

history,” which will build a more holistic perspective “to solve deeply rooted problems” (Betts, 2007, p. 3; Jervis, 1976). Consequently, any condemnation must be realistic, and future philosophies or designs for improving analytical methods must be conscious of the intended positive change and the possibilities of negative repercussions at the expense of an already successful process (Betts, 2007, p. 18).

These warnings from revered intelligence scholars set the tone and scope of this study. With those principles established, I looked at the long-term issues within the intelligence discipline that have been dismissed as subservient to the broader strategic picture. By leveraging the core definition of intelligence, “a secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities” (Warner, 2002, pp. 15–22), in concert with a continuous ailment facing the intelligence professional, unconscious biases and psychological roadblocks, the core themes, problems, questions, and scope of this study was created. It would have been easy to focus on technological advancement, the politicization of intelligence at the policy level, the organizational structure of the intelligence community, capabilities, and legality of covert/ clandestine operations, the overabundance of information without well-established resources, retrospective analysis of intelligence failures, or other top-level examples of perennial issues surrounding the intelligence community (Odom, 2003). However, as an enlisted intelligence specialist and now a commissioned information warfare officer, I have witnessed firsthand how the underappreciation of cognitive processes can produce negative impacts, particularly due to ethnocentric bias.

When the synthesis of information is not holistic, it can lead to insalubrious intelligence, resulting in a high cost, including faulty policy, poor decision making, or the most severe scenario—loss of life. This influenced a narrowing of scope and the steering away from the

“easy” topics found in current reviews and literature that do not necessarily add value to the progression of the intelligence process. This study pushes back on the established norm surrounding intelligence literature by not shining a light on the intelligence community’s apparent shortcomings/failures or the more title-catching snafus of the intelligence community. Instead, this research focuses on the need for the intelligence professional to think critically about and make sense of cognitive biases like ethnocentrism. Unfortunately, a topic like this is an unappreciated facet of the intelligence process, but its impact is no less substantial than the more famous and desired literary topics. However, the detrimental effects of decades of appealing versus necessary intelligence analysis work should start being reversed by fact-based solutions and well-crafted arguments measuring the scope of ethnocentrism’s dangers and impacts as they are manifested throughout the intelligence process.

Problem Statement

Heuer, a plankholder in foundational analysis literature, considers cognitive bias a “commonly understood phenomenon associated with intelligence analysis” (Heuer, 2019, p. 131). Moreover, biases are considered major contributing factors to historically consequential and pertinent intelligence gaps and are continuously identified in analytical lessons learned (Lowenthal, 2019). These gaps in intelligence, formed by cognitive biases, are considered root causes surrounding significant loss of life. Examples of this can be found in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the outbreak of the Korean War, the overwhelming use of force in the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan, the Yom Kippur War, the invasion of Iraq and search for WMD, South American drug cartel incursions, the entirety of the GWOT, and most recently Russian aggression throughout the Middle East and eastern Europe. Cognitive bias is not limited to these examples, as it is found throughout most intelligence analyses. Without a

more stringent method to make sense of cognitive biases, its impacts will continue to plague the intelligence community and, in turn, manufacture poor decision making.

Cognitive biases are intricate and diverse, encompassing various aspects such as perception, the estimation of probabilities, perception of causality, and the evaluation of evidence. In essence, cognitive biases can manifest in a wide array of cognitive processes, making them complex phenomena. These themes can be found in the following:

- Anchoring and Adjustment Bias: resulting from decision-makers over-relying on a preexisting anchor or initial estimation when making evaluations (Morvan & Jenkins, 2017).
- Conservatism Bias: where people believe prior evidence more than new evidence or information that has emerged (Huq et al., 1988).
- Consistency: Conclusions drawn from a small body of consistent data engender more confidence than ones drawn from a larger body of less consistent data.
- Contrast Bias: which involves making an evaluation based on the standard of the preceding information (S. Shapiro & Spence, 2005).
- Empathy Gap: where people in one state fail to understand people in another state (Sayette et al., 2008).
- Ethnocentrism: Where people do not understand or recognize cultural and cognitive differences, typically applying their own culture to every scenario (Johnston, 2005).
- Expectation Bias: We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive. More (unambiguous) information is needed to recognize an unexpected phenomenon.

- Rationality: events are seen as part of an orderly, causal pattern. Randomness, accident, and error tend to be rejected as explanations for observed events.
- Representative Bias: the tendency of people to judge the degree of relationship between two things based on their similarity to each other (stereotyping) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

This study's primary focus is ethnocentric bias and making sense of its constructs. Johnston describes ethnocentric bias as a "heavy link to American psychological limitations" (Johnston, 2005, p. 75), including false consensus effect, organizational bias, and general American exceptionalism—cultural identity (Jervis, 1976, 2017). In anthropology, ethnocentrism is the tendency to judge the customs of other societies by the standards of one's culture (Moles et al., 1977). According to Johnston, "This includes projecting one's cognition and norms onto others" (Johnston, 2005, p. 76). This study will adopt the latter, as this research will answer how to make sense of and bring awareness to the act of projecting personal values into information synthesis. Moles et al. (1977) identify a character flaw where Johnston's interpretation of ethnocentrism is more aligned with the unconscious cognitive action of intelligence professionals.

The danger of ethnocentricity in the analysis process is that the analyst typically does not recognize that essential details are missing or, more noteworthy, that their worldview and problem-solving formulas impede the process of identifying information that contradicts or refutes their assumptions, hypotheses, or general deductions. From an intelligence perspective, ethnocentrism presents a misunderstood cultural void, as analysts perceive information directly through the lens of "culturally dependent heuristics and cognitive patterns accumulated through a lifetime" (Johnston, 2005, p. 84). When ethnocentrism is annotated within the subject matter,

“mitigation” techniques include a simplistic explanation that “managers must train analysts to recognize it when it intrudes on their work” (Lowenthal, 2012, p. 129), or analysts have to try and “see the world as adversaries do” (Walton, 2012, p. 95). These lackluster and antiquated techniques house two significant problems.

First, ethnocentrism is a natural bias that cannot be mitigated (Moore & Hoffman, 2011). An exhaustive and systematic literature survey determines that analytical prejudice is certain; institutional intelligence practices are essential and create vulnerability; conjecture guarantees a margin of miscalculation in intelligence estimation (Bruce & George, 2008). However, this study is predicated on the belief that making sense of ethnocentrism, recognizing its many complexities, and amplifying the analytical techniques to identify ethnocentric judgments can significantly minimize its appearance in disseminated intelligence. Second, the reviewed literature does not articulate or identify any specific practice, training aid, or model presented to intelligence professionals regarding the recognition [or mitigation] of ethnocentrism from its continuous intrusion. Quality research surrounding intelligence analysis regularly advises intelligence professionals to be cautious of ethnocentrism but presents limited actionable solutions. Consequently, attempts to reject or reduce bias and strengthen the objectivity of intelligence professionals are typically unfruitful due to the lack of a researched framework and of tested modeling.

Purpose Statement

The study pursues a contemporary qualitative method design that will include interpretive or materializing frameworks of examination and analytical techniques that may be inferential/deductive or generalizations found within inductive reasoning. Both approaches will

determine patterns or themes from intrinsic values from any given phenomenon (Creswell & Creswell, 2019). Furthermore, this qualitative multi-case study will “illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (Yin, 2018, p. 14). This qualitative multi-case study also calls for a detailed description of the setting or individual actions, followed by investigating and questioning the data for fundamental concepts and issues. Due to this, data gathering for the proposed research will begin with a complete historical account of each case:

1. Imperial Japan—Attack on Pearl Harbor, December 1941
2. Soviet Union—Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962
3. Islamic Extremism—al-Qaeda, pre-September 2001

The summaries will be followed by describing the complexities associated with the movements, decisions, intentions, corresponding human elements, and final actions of the decision-makers. Finally, utilizing multiple sources of evidence, including documentation, archival records, publicly available discourse (of decision-makers), and macro-level identifiers of geographical, cultural, historical, and political normalities (or abnormalities) (typically not considered by intelligence analysis methodologies), a convergence of evidence will produce quality conclusions and shape the cases into a complete chronicle.

After the case study descriptions and associated conclusions, the documents and archival records will be reexamined through a new analytical lens. This process is an analytical review with the application of dichotomous variables found in the Six-Dimensions of National Culture (6-D model), presented in 1980 by Geert Hofstede (2010). Hofstede’s earliest model presented four dimensions of national culture, determined initially for 53 countries and regions of the

world: power distance (PDI), individualism v. collectivism (IDV), masculinity v. femininity (MAS), and uncertainty avoidance (UAI). A subsequent publication expanded his model of national culture dimensions with two additional categorizations: long-term v. short-term orientation (LTO) and, most recently, indulgence v. restraint (IVR) (Hofstede et al., 2010). Collectively and by comparing varying subjects, the 6-D model produces a comprehensive cultural disposition profile. The functionality of Hofstede's 6-D model dimensions is to provide procedural application of "overarching cultural patterns or dimensions which influence people's behavior in significant ways" (Arasaratnam, 2011, p. 45), thus quantifying an aspect of national culture that can be measured relative to other national philosophies and doctrines (Inkeles & Levinson, 1963). Furthermore, Hofstede specifically focused on dimensions based on correlations between extremes, as the two measurable attributes present the coefficient of correlation that expresses the relationship's strength (Hofstede, 2011).

The 6-D model has been applied throughout various research environments to recognize and analyze the influence of culture in multifaceted spheres of activity (Callegari et al., 2020). These areas of study include, but are not limited to, the national culture's influence on the interpretation of and response to strategic issues, also known as crisis interpretation (Schneider & De Meyer, 1991), and behavioral finance paradigms coordinating national psychology, economics, and anthropology (Ricciardi, V., & Simon, 2000). Based on its proven success within varying research paradigms, the 6-D model best fits the goals and objectives of this study. This secondary analytical review should identify ethnocentric bias within the intelligence process and the decisions based on that intelligence, thus developing a future state methodology. Ultimately, the results of this analytical review should increase awareness of ethnocentric tendencies

throughout the intelligence community while also providing a path for intelligence professionals to build a more accurate, timely, and holistic intelligence assessment.

Most in the intelligence community would identify contrarian techniques to mitigate ethnocentrism, one example being devil's advocate—the practice in which arguments are mustered for and against; more broadly, devil's advocate is a way to challenge the consensus or conventional wisdom (Walton, 2012). However, a majority of studies indicate that “trying to think like them” resulted in applying the logic of one's own culture and experience, which immediately voids any understanding of the actions of adversaries (R. Z. George & Bruce, 2008).

Instead of thinking like the adversary, this study measures the application of predetermined anthropological and cultural variables rarely considered in the analysis process. After the comprehensive analytical review applying the 6-D Model, the cross-case synthesis for all three (3) case studies should identify if different intelligence outcomes would have occurred if the analytical frame had included national cultural dimensions. As the culture of friend and adversary remains a vital component of intelligence analysis, this study should produce a new analytical methodology to expand the analytical toolkit while preserving well-established analytical techniques.

Significance of Study

Intelligence, in its purest form, “is a secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities” (Warner, 2002, pp. 15–22), thus making the intelligence apparatus a critical piece of national security and of national strategy policy formation. Fundamentally, this definition encompasses strategic and actionable intelligence, a process outlined by the US Joint

Forces Command designed to influence an adversary's cognition or behavior (The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2020). Both facets (strategic and actionable) of the intelligence discipline hold a peripheral lens or an objective of influencing specific outcomes from an external perspective.

Augmented or distorted intelligence is expensive and dangerous, as it can degrade national policy and security objectives. More importantly, the same flawed intelligence can yield intelligence errors. These errors have been proven to create critical vulnerabilities and negatively influence strategic and tactical decision making. Ethnocentrism and its associated dangers, is one facet of cognitive bias, which is heavily linked to the distortion of intelligence products. By leveraging the three (3) case studies, specifically chosen because of their inherent association with ethnocentrism and flawed intelligence, this study intends to make sense of ethnocentrism and provide a solution to the dangers it creates.

Research Questions

The research questions formulated for this study pose five intricate yet clear inquiries:

RQ1. How can Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model be applied to information synthesis (which becomes intelligence)?

RQ2. Leveraging Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, what are the cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects (i.e., Imperial Japan, Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda)?

RQ3. Continuing to adopt Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, what was the US Intelligence Community's perception and American sentiment of the case study subjects?

RQ4. What variations or differing results, compared to the original ethnocentric analytical deductions, judgments, and decision-making of the case study event, emerge when

applying accurate cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects?

RQ5. How can the cultural dimensions of the 6-D model, designed by Geert Hofstede (2010), elaborate basic analytical judgments while simultaneously identifying and making sense of ethnocentrism?

Definition of Key Terms

Acculturation—is a process in which the ethnic consumers move along a theoretical continuum from low acculturation, where they maintain the cultural values of their country of origin, to high acculturation on the other extreme, where the ethnic consumers have adopted the cultural values of the host culture (Gbadamosi, 2012).

Cognitive Bias—a “systematic error in thinking” that occurs throughout information processing and interpretation that can affect decision making (Grant et al., 2020). Cognitive bias remains one major cause of analytical pathologies (J. R. Cooper, 2012; Johnston, 2005; Moore, 2011). Additionally, cognitive biases are systematic and frequent deviations from standard processing (Caverni et al., 1990).

Collectivism—is “a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 106). Within the political domain, contemporary collectivism is founded on Marxism and critical theory principles, leading to moralistic loftiness and analytical vagueness and confusion (Sowell, 1999, p. 70). This means that all the means of production are concentrated in the hands of the government, and the individual would be totally and inescapably dependent on the political authority for their very existence (Ebeling, 2004).

Ethnocentrism—is a phenomenon where individuals “project one’s cognition and norms onto others” (Johnston, 2005). Fundamentally, ethnocentrism is a cognitive obstacle that impacts analysts’ perceptions and inhibits holistic perspectives (Witlin, 2008). This definition diverges from the typical anthropological understanding of ethnocentrism, which defines it as individuals identifying their culture as superior and tending to judge alternative customs of other societies through a lens of inferiority. (Moles et al., 1977). This study further defines ethnocentrism as being culturally blind or unaware, which causes a projection of personal perspectives on to the information being analyzed.

Femininity—identifies cultural characteristics typically associated with the gender roles of women, including modesty, tenderness, and concern for life quality (Dabić et al., 2015).

Heuristics—a mental technique allowing an individual to condense a multifaceted problem to a more concise progression of events—ultimately, a method of abridged reasoning and thinking. Heuristics, in this view, can be thought of as deviations from rational or normative decision processes (Elstein & Schwarz, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Individualism—is a society in which the “ties between individuals are loose – everybody is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family only” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 91). Individualism is a dominant force in Western societies, “not only in practice but also considered a superior form of mental software” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 112). Within the political domain, individualism is predicated on practices embodying ideals of the individual, persistent values of community, a specific but agreed-upon rule of law, and the virtue of the individual mind (Kelly et al., 1991).

Indulgence—is the relatively unrestricted gratification of an individual’s dreams and emotions, such as appreciating vitality and harboring a pleasurable life experience (Callegari et al., 2020).

Information Synthesis—Vital in developing coherent intelligence, information synthesis is the “process of analyzing and evaluating information from various sources, making connections between the information found, and combining the recently acquired information with prior knowledge to create something new” (Lundstrom et al., 2015, p. 61).

Intelligence—*holds three interconnected proprieties*: (1) is a secret state or group activity to understand or influence foreign or domestic entities (Johnston, 2005). Two (2) is the collection of raw data, which transposes into information that is then analyzed for dissemination to civilian or military decision-makers (R. Z. George, 2020). Finally, (3) is a finished product where all information has been accurately analyzed and evaluated to meet specific objectives or relative significance to a predetermined strategic, operational, or tactical requirement (R. Z. George, 2020; Lowenthal, 2012).

Long-term orientation—stands for the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards—in particular, perseverance and thrift (Hofstede, 2001)

Masculinity—identifies cultural characteristics typically associated with the gender roles of men, who are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas cultural femininity values consist of modesty, tenderness, and concern with the quality of life (Dabić et al., 2015).

Power Distance—is a dimension that measures “the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 54–55).

Restraint—is a dimension focusing more on concealing gratification and encouraging regulation of an individual’s demeanor (Callegari et al., 2020).

Short-term orientation—fosters virtues related to the past and present—in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of “face,” and fulfillment of social obligations (Hofstede, 2001, p. 359).

Uncertainty Avoidance—is a byproduct of power distance and is predicated on how society feels about ambiguity or unknown situations (Hofstede, 2011; March & Cyert, 1963).

Summary

Many scholars believe holistic analytical methodologies incorporate five factors: accuracy, expertise, access, reliability, and objectivity (R. Z. George, 2020). Undeniably, ethnocentrism and other cognitive biases can significantly impact all five factors. Ethnocentrism is constantly recognized as a continuous, systematic constraint of intelligence professionals. The bias created by ethnocentrism throughout the analytical process produces an environment where the analyst typically does not recognize essential details are missing or that their worldview and problem-solving formulas impede the development of identifying information that contradicts or refutes their worldview, assumptions, hypothesis, or general deductions. Ethnocentrism manifests an analyst’s perception of information directly through the lens of culturally dependent heuristics and cognitive patterns accumulated through a lifetime (Johnston, 2005).

This qualitative multi-case study identifies the crossroads where intelligence and ethnocentrism exist and then supplies the intelligence professional with an academic roadmap to recognizing and making sense of ethnocentrism. Through the first three research questions, this study asked if specific cultural dimensions leveraged within the 6-D model, can be applied to information synthesis, and if the 6-D model can identify the cultural disposition of three separate societies and the associated US perception. Additionally, through cross-case synthesis, the fourth and fifth research questions mandate results asking what variations or differing results, compared to the original ethnocentric analytical deductions, judgments, and decision-making in the case study event, emerge when applying accurate cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects, and how can the cultural dimensions of the 6-D model, designed by Geert Hofstede (2010), elaborate basic analytical judgments while simultaneously identifying and making sense of ethnocentrism? Ultimately, a structure of amendatory properties will be built throughout the analytical process, aiming to establish a resolve against ethnocentrism. The main goal of this study is not only to emphasize the impact of ethnocentrism in the realm of intelligence analysis but stress the essential need for incorporating cultural context frameworks to ensure the production of accurate and comprehensive intelligence.

“It is the duty of every man, as far as his ability extends, to detect and expose delusion and error.”

—Thomas Paine

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

The following literature review is sundered into seven (7) sections with corresponding subsections. First, this study is founded on the principles surrounding situational awareness theory (SA) and its three (3) basic levels: perception of environmental elements, comprehension of current situations, and projection of future status (Mavor & Pew, 1998, p. 174). Ultimately, the components of SA lead to the study’s primary theoretical framework, the Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking (D/F Theory). A full review of the D/F Theory, as described by Klein et al. (2007), categorizes the theory’s fundamentals and identifies why this theory best fits the study’s objectives and scope. The subsequent section of this literature review defines the gathering literature process and articulates the core ideas essential to the literature search strategy. Additionally, this section is designed to convey how this literature review illuminates the current state of knowledge about the varying interconnected research topics—simultaneously crafting holistic arguments designed to show the reader how the established knowledge rationally leads to a problem and/or research questions requiring original research (Machi & McEvoy, 2016).

The succeeding section compiles facts and logical arguments that evolve linearly throughout the research. The reader will discover the foundation of intelligence analysis, the elements of human thought when presented with data, information, and intelligence, with a heavy emphasis on critical thinking, inductive and deductive reasoning principles, and the presence of cognitive bias within those processes. The concentration of literature surrounding

ethnocentrism is discussed at length, and the reader will be exposed to how ethnocentrism is rarely referenced or incorporated with other significant cognitive biases. The following subsection explores the core points of ethnocentrism and places its parameters within the intelligence apparatus. Within this subsection, the reader will encounter three critical concepts central to this study: (1) ethnocentrism's dangers to intelligence fundamentals, (2) the varying definitions of ethnocentrism (anthropology versus intelligence), and (3) how intelligence organizations leverage specific techniques to "mitigate" ethnocentrism from the analysis (the core principle of this study is to make sense of, not mitigate ethnocentrism).

The literature review defends an argument for the selected variables, Hofstede's (2010) national cultural dimensions found within the 6-D Model. The fundamentals of these variables are explained, and their applicability is assessed and discussed. These variables are the primary tool of the research design in the attempt to make sense of ethnocentrism within intelligence analysis. Finally, the context of the individual case studies (Pearl Harbor 1941, Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, and the Global War on Terror 2001) is examined and discussed. Capturing particular geopolitical conflicts of varying periods was of high importance. Where each case study is rich in historical components, the primary focus is the contemporaneous strategic assumptions that were not challenged and the intelligence errors that manifested from ethnocentrism.

Within a post-September 11, 2001, society, the intelligence community is inundated with scholarly works, magazines, generic articles, essays, professional development writings, and organizational publications, articulating the nuances of intelligence policy, procedures, reform, techniques, best practices, and critiques. Due to this saturation, and in keeping with the scope of this study, it is prudent to concentrate primarily on literature articulating the cognitive elements

intelligence professionals regularly face and the corresponding phenomenon of ethnocentrism (Johnston, 2005). Specifically, how intelligence professionals should make sense of and reimagine approaches to ethnocentrism and its destructive properties, the archetypal literature surrounding the intelligence discipline, and its plethora of subsets add significant and critical context to this study; however, the following literature review benefits from a disciplined focus.

Where appropriate, literature encompassing technical fundamentals, applicable historical world events with intelligence significance, and commonly discussed methodologies and intelligence tradecrafts are leveraged to build holistic understanding. Furthermore, a considerable amount of scholarly work is dedicated to theoretical intelligence and its practicality within the national security enterprise; this is not overlooked or discarded but included for explanatory or descriptive purposes only. Finally, this research finds considerable value in recognizing how intelligence fits within the global, political, budgetary, and military/defense domains. This review applies these factors when required; however, its fundamental objective remains centered around literature discussing and synthesizing the presence of ethnocentrism within the exploitation and analytical process conducted by intelligence professionals.

Theoretical Framework

The Situational Awareness Theory (SA) proposed by Endsley (1995) significantly contributed to this study's initial creation, scope, and design. The core fundamentals of SA encompass the "perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future" (Endsley, 1995, p. 36). Undoubtedly, SA is a core tenet for successful intelligence analysis as intelligence is a product manifested out of focused collection and processing of information


concerning the environment that is dictated by proficiencies/incompetencies and intentions of specific actors to identify adversarial/friendly pressures and offer holistic judgments and assessment for decision-makers to exploit varying avenues of approach. Several examinations of the human cognitive approach in low-tempo tactical planning “have demonstrated how decision biases and poor situation awareness contribute to poor planning” (Mavor & Pew, 1998, p. 175). Throughout these studies, the awareness examples consisted of “uncertain assumptions, awareness of enemy activities, ability to focus awareness on important factors, and active seeking of confirming/disconfirming evidence” (Mavor & Pew, 1998, p. 175). From an intelligence perspective, these awareness characteristics are critical to understanding the efficacy and efficiency of analyzing information and creating an accurate, common operating picture for novice and expert decision-makers to leverage.

Situational Awareness Theory

Situational Awareness Theory provides the framework of the necessary cognitive constructs that support human decision making and cognizance (Endsley et al., 2003). Additionally, SA permits holistic interpretation and builds an “understanding of information in the context of a larger concept called *situation*, which is an abstract state of affairs related to specific applications” (Gaeta et al., 2021, p. 6586). Therefore, when attempting to make sense of ethnocentrism, leveraging SA is climacteric, as it consists of three levels dedicated to supporting (1) the perception of environmental elements (Endsley, 1995), (2) Current situation comprehension, referring to the impact of data and cues concerning desired goals and objectives (Gaeta et al., 2021), (3) the future projection of the situation (Endsley, 1995). Below are the hierarchical phases that encompass each of the primary components, also represented in Figure 1 (Endsley et al., 2003):

1. Level 1 Situation Awareness: This is identifying the key elements or “events” that, in combination, define the situation. This level tags integral aspects of the situation semantically for higher levels of abstraction in subsequent processing.
2. Level 2 Situation Awareness: This combines level 1 events into a comprehensive, holistic, and tactical pattern. This level defines the current status in operationally relevant terms supporting rapid decision making and action.
3. Level 3 Situation Awareness: This is the projection of the current situation into the future to predict the evolution of the tactical situation. This level supports short-term planning and option evaluation when time permits.

The SA levels are predicated on continuous repetition, with the intention of reaching complete comprehension. The constant search for new data and the new data fusing with previous understandings develops more recognition, combining data-driven and goal-driven information processing (Endsley et al., 2003; Gaeta et al., 2021). This compounding effect emphasizes the importance of having predetermined goals and objectives and allows the expansion of analytical frames when new data emerges. As one can deduce, based on the design and function, SA is highly applicable not just in the realm of military operations and intelligence but also in any dynamically changing environment (power generation, petrochemical, nuclear, command and control, medicine, aviation, and education). Due to its high applicability, this study draws on the requirements of SA to make sense of ethnocentrism within intelligence analysis. Furthermore, as SA requires frame elaboration and encourages making sense of the information available within any given environment, this study uses the D/F Theory proposed by Klein et al. (2007), which captures the parameters set by SA.

Figure 1*Theoretical Model of Situation Awareness*

Note. Adapted from “Designing for Situation Awareness: An Approach to Use-Centered Design,” by M.R. Endsley, B. Bolte, & D.G. Jones (2003).

Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking

The D/F Theory explores frame analysis, specifically, how new data can influence the elaboration of an existing frame or how data can produce a re-framing based on specific criteria (Klein et al., 2007). At a basic level, the term “frame” throughout this study parallels Cantril’s (1941) depiction of “frame of reference,” which has a traditional meaning that generalizes a point of view that directs interpretations and perspective (Cantril, 1941, p. 20). When individuals

put stimuli into frameworks, this enables them “to comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and predict” (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 51). With this in mind, there is an understanding that intelligence professionals continuously leverage cognitive frameworks to synthesize collected information and make sense of multifaceted, ever-evolving situations throughout multiple information-dense environments. This, mixed with the necessary cognitive hegemony, remains a critical component of quality intelligence analysis (Heuer, 2019; Kent, 1949). Therefore, this study leveraging the D/F Theory as an overarching framework while introducing new variables to analytical thinking and intelligence estimates appears to be highly advantageous.

The D/F Theory “describes the relationship between data, or signals of events, cognitive frames, or explanatory structures that account for the data and guide the search for more data. The main assertion of this theory is that sensemaking is the process of fitting data into a frame and fitting a frame around the data” (Klein et al., 2007, p. 115). Klein, Phillips, Rall, and Peluso (2007) predicate their findings on the originally described sensemaking process by Karl Weick (1995). He stated, “sensemaking is the process of providing structure to the unknown and requires the agent to place individual stimuli or data into a framework. Once the data is coherently structured, decision-making can proceed” (Weick, 1995, p. 5). Throughout the analytical process, there are numerous points where decision-making takes place. Within each decision, there is a starting point that consists of sensemaking. According to Klein (2007), “recognition of a situation or a problem, which is understood in terms of some sort of framework or story” (Klein et al., 2007, pp. 117–118). The determination of an “initial understanding (referred to as a “frame”) is a necessary first step in making sense of things” (Moore & Hoffman, 2011, p. 155). The frame results as “one—often tacitly—asks, ‘What is going on in this

situation?’ A frame is necessary because it specifies what counts as data” (Moore & Hoffman, 2011, p. 147).


A frame is a structure for accounting for the data and guiding the search for more data, where the data is the interpreted signals of events (Klein et al., 2007). Frames aid in integrating incoming data with other components in the environment or scenario and with past pertinent understanding. The development of a frame that manifests specific shapes and organizational structures to incoming data contains cues and anchors within a given scenario easily recognized by the individual. Significant differences in frame development can be seen based on the individual’s varying degrees of proficiency and experience within a given field. With more expertise comes a more sophisticated construction consisting of multiple fragments of frames to depict complex scenarios. As the primary purpose of this research is transformational, this framework holds valuable contextual properties that can amplify the integrated complexity of the intelligence analysis process. Furthermore, the D/F Theory meets the needs of this study, specifically the themes of elaborating on existing data based on new findings.

The affinity connecting data and frame is symbiotic: the specified frame represents the applicable data, and advent data compels the frame to be adjusted. Individuals typically construct a frame with minimal data points (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). This limitation is a fundamental construct of human capacity, as humans can only simultaneously manage four objects in working memory (G. A. Miller, 1956). Thus, larger frames consisting of complex data points exceed working memory capacity and, at times, can hinder the coherence of a frame. Developing smaller frames chronologically and identifying a specific narrative is more digestible for the human mind and builds a more holistic picture. However, as the D/F Theory is evolutionary, the

cycle between data and the frame or frames continuously repeats until all unexplained data is congruent (D. Hudson & Singh, 2017). When prevailing components no longer fit within a frame throughout the cycle, the D/F Theory presents options to resolve the incongruity: frame elaboration, questioning, and comparison (D. Hudson & Singh, 2017).

Figure 2

Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking (Recreated)



Note. Adapted by the author from “Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking as a Best Model for Intelligence,” by D. T. Moore, & R. R. Hoffman, *American Intelligence Journal*, (2011).

Elaboration: Following the awareness of data through the construction and specified design of an initial frame, the data-frame model motivates the possibilities of “alternative reasoning paths” (Moore & Hoffman, 2011, p. 147). According to Klein and Moon (2006), this leads to elaborating or forming an alternative frame—referred to as re-framing (Klein & Moon, 2006). Fundamentally, elaborating on the frame is essential in seeking more detail. There is

always the likelihood that a frame is insufficient, or that expansion is required. The foundation of this research intends to implement new data in the form of cultural dimensions throughout the analysis process, thus elaborating and re-framing interpretations to extend human (intelligence professionals) capacity to create more holistic and accurate intelligence products or assessments.

Questioning/Comparing: Examining or challenging the frame occurs when “anomalous data is encountered that is inconsistent with the frame. Both the data and the frame need to be re-evaluated, and the process restarts” (D. Hudson & Singh, 2017, p. 169). Usually, questioning can promote new frame development and facilitate frame elaboration. However, this can also lead to overlapping data where the same data point can fit in multiple frames. At this juncture of frame development, the frames must be compared, and the individual would select the frame that best fits the data.

Furthermore, such a comparison of this nature can “lead to further data searching or rejection of one of the frames” (D. Hudson & Singh, 2017, p. 169). The overarching goal is to construct the most dominant frame or frames, enabling the incorporation and presentation of all essential data within the appropriate frameworks. Furthermore, the act of comparing frames possesses a distinct quality relevant to decision-making, serving as a test for the current frame to ensure and showcase its validity, with a crucial emphasis on fostering understanding (Moore & Hoffman, 2011).

Literature Search Strategy

The following literature review is intentionally designed with a thematic approach. This method facilitates a more organized structure of critical concepts, issues, and rational/persuasive arguments (Creswell & Creswell, 2019). In addition, reasoned discussions of logically justified

evidence produced by the thematic approach presents exhaustive conclusions leading to well-crafted arguments (Machi & McEvoy, 2016). Finally, this approach is highly justified for collection efforts as this qualitative study is predicated on overlapping complex themes. Identifying outstanding gaps in, and demonstrating the need for extending current research can clarify those overlaps and provide a more articulate overview of the relevant literature.

The study takes a linear theme-based approach, capturing a holistic narrative while articulating the importance of timeframe, methods, and the current state of knowledge expressed by subject matter experts. Chronological and methodological approaches were also considered; however, continuously shifting among periods and emphasizing the frameworks of previous researchers demonstrated an unnecessary element of confusion. The linear themes selected directly correlate with the previously established topic components from the overview section (critical thinking, cognitive bias, ethnocentrism, and dangers of ethnocentrism in intelligence). More importantly, the approach outlining the fundamental question of the proposed research amplifies the human capacity to make sense of ethnocentrism in intelligence analysis, with a presumable measurable focus on Hofstede's (2010) national cultural dimensions as a central tenet.

This study identifies that intelligence literature can be categorized into four comprehensive literary mediums: (1) academic/professional journals – including publications from government agencies; (2) books published by academic institutions that champion scholarship and research fundamentals; (3) training materials and professional essays produced by the intelligence community in the form of shared best practices, learning technology guides, professional development programs, standard operating publications, and qualification

curriculum publications, (4) open-source literature, including newspapers, online content, and oral presentations. All mediums are leveraged in this review. Most of the materials supporting this review are shared between the physical and online domains. The initial review began with basic literature within intelligence-related books and the accompanying bibliographies. These books were authored by Betts (1978, 2007), Davies (2004), Davis (2008), Fingar (2011), George (2020), Grabo (2004), Heuer (2019), Janis (1972), Jervis (1976, 2009, 2017), Johnston (2005), Kahneman (2011; 2009), Lowenthal (2019), and Walton (2012), who are considered required reading for intelligence professionals. Upon completion, the Liberty University Library's books, articles, audio/visual, journals, and dissertation databases provided further insight as a cross-reference to the references/bibliographies mentioned above.

Additional searches through the Journal of Strategic Intelligence, Intelligence, and National Security Archives, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Journal, Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, in conjunction with sociology, economic, communication, intelligence history, policy analysis, legal, and cross-cultural psychology journals, Central Intelligence Agency archives, National Intelligence University, Naval Postgraduate School, Liberty University Library, and online pay-wall/subscription-protected publishers were leveraged. The searches conducted, but not limited to, consisted of terms such as *intelligence AND ethnocentrism*, *mirror-imaging*, *intelligence analysis AND cognitive deduction*, *situational logic*, *AND intelligence community*, *cultural bias AND national intelligence*, *perceptions of intelligence professionals*, *cognitive bias AND critical thinking*, and *situational awareness*. For the case studies and D/F Theory, all major topics and keywords were searched through every possible medium. The search parameters presented multiple authors and scholars working in fields

unrelated to national intelligence, with an authoritative understanding of the topic, which expanded the literary foundation for this review. Finally, searches for comparable antecedent or supplemental research were conducted with more material and references found and utilized.

Another consideration when focusing on the US intelligence apparatus is the sensitive nature of classified or declassified materials. There is a minimal presence of designated “unclassified” material within this study. Unclassified material is considered a security classification assigned to official information that does not warrant the assignment of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret (or SCI) markings but is not publicly releasable without authorization (Bagley, 1993). Combining multiple unclassified or available controlled unclassified information (CUI) to produce a finished product could be considered sensitive or classified depending on the integration of the unclassified sources. This literature review attempts to maintain a high vigilance surrounding derivative classification, incorporation, paraphrasing, or restating.

Related Literature: Intelligence

Intelligence: Historical Context

Intelligence fundamentals and practices have a solid historical presence in American history. It ranges from espionage “rings” throughout the Revolutionary War, aerial reconnaissance via gas-filled balloons during the American Civil War, and the first uses of signal intelligence shifting President Woodrow Wilson’s motivations surrounding World War I involvement (K. A. Clements, 1987; Gunz & Keegan, 2004; Tiedemann & Rose, 2007). Before World War II, intelligence tradecraft with organizational and government backing consisted primarily of overt actions, and covert operations were condemned (Andrew, 2021). This is most

notably captured in the famous quote of President Herbert Hoover's Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, who stated, "Gentlemen do not read other people's mail" (Stimson & McGeorge, 1948, p. 188), a response to focused cryptological objectives. This statement referred to the administration's motives behind closing the Cipher Bureau (US Cryptology Service), also called the Black Chamber (Paxson & Yardley, 1931). The composition of US intelligence components in the pre-World War II era consisted of inadequate resourcing, provincial and inaccurate production, faulty dissemination systems, inter-service competitions, and the severe scarcity of quality training, expectations, and professional development (Deininger & Wohlstetter, 1963).

From an institutional perspective, there was little to no coordination between federal agencies, including a strained relationship between the US Army and the US Navy. This resulted in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, which ultimately catalyzed the governmental overhaul of US intelligence efforts (Dahl, 2013a). In 1946, by way of a presidential directive, the National Intelligence Authority, comprised of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, became a complete entity in conjunction with the White House Chief of Staff (Andrew, 2018). Recognizing the necessity for enhanced coordination and expansion of intelligence practices, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, hailed as a crucial piece of Cold War legislation (Andrew, 2018). The reorganizational objective of national security led to a significant augmentation of the entire power structure in Washington, D.C.

The reform included the Armed Forces' unification under a single Department of Defense (DoD) to coordinate the Air Force, Army, and Navy. It established a single Secretary of Defense while also amplifying the National Security Council (NSC) and formally founding the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (P. Johnson, 1997; McCullough, 1992). The CIA was a critical

component in the future of the US intelligence enterprise, specifically effective espionage, covert action, and analysis (Walton, 2012). In addition, the national paradigm shift approving conventional intelligence organizations and their contributions to the policy domain solidified the need to coordinate intelligence activities of several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security (Dorn & Andrew, 1997; R. Z. George, 2017).

Throughout the evolution of institutional intelligence organizations and the greater emphasis on the NSC to drive the intelligence process, the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), a process that systematically determines intelligence requirements, resources, collection, and management functions, was created (R. Z. George, 2020; Lowenthal, 2012). However, analysts' skills, methods, and analytical prowess remained largely undefined (Betts, 2007).

Additionally, classified environments and confidential performance are two contributing components limiting research and hindering outside academic literature pertaining to intelligence analysis. These limiting factors contribute to the intelligence community's opacity, and lead to misinformation and speculation. Unfortunately, this leads to assumptions by those outside the intelligence community. As a result, negative connotations, intelligence failure, and lack of oversight have become topics in most literature. From an analysis perspective, this is detrimental as the discipline yearns for further study and academic exploration. Due to the minimal research surrounding the act of analysis, the field has essentially been black-boxed and inaccurately configured as a natural skill or method (Stowell & Welch, 2012).

Furthermore, due to the lack of analytical structure, Aldrich and Kasuku (2012) identify that American intelligence has been widely perceived to have underperformed, so much so that

retired practitioners and seasoned academic commentators believe the intelligence machine to be in trouble (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012). Richard Betts, who remains an ardent pessimist and is considered the leader of skeptics and anti-meliorists, articulates that this analytical problem is due to unrealistic expectations from the consumer of intelligence. He believes reform in the analytical realm is impossible until policymakers cease manifesting personal narratives based on intelligence estimates (Betts, 2007; Moore, 2011). A similar perspective, but from a different approach, is presented by Amy Zegart, who believes analytical paralysis is attributed to institutional arteriosclerosis, which impedes the natural evolution of any profession (Zegart, 2007). Greg Treverton (2011), author of *Intelligence for an Age of Terror*, is also cognizant throughout his work that analytical constructs need to be allowed to evolve from the stagnant structural methodology of the Cold War era to meet modern-day necessities. Finally, the “doyen of intelligence experts,” Robert Jervis, who along with Johnston is the most considerable influence on the direction of this study, argues that if analysts had only deployed suitable political science methods, they would at least have avoided some of their more lamentable recent errors (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012; Jervis, 2009).

These authors examine the causes and effects of the analytical processes within the strategic intelligence apparatus and have collectively identified a need for reform and progression. The predominant questions surrounding analytical capability and practice among intelligence professionals persistently emerge. First, is there a necessity for a new breed of intelligence officer possessing heightened deductive prowess? Second, is the ongoing emphasis on strategic intelligence for policy suitable for the 21st century (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012)? This study focuses on the latter question; however, its primary intent is to enhance the existing intelligence professional’s repertoire of tactics when analyzing and synthesizing information.

Thus countering the clamor for new analysts and allowing innovative concepts to amplify the current cohort of patriotic servants.

Intelligence: Process & Cycle Fundamentals


Intelligence, as previously defined in Chapter One, is a highly complex and interconnected process of three major components: (1) *Purpose* – understanding or influence on foreign data and information, (2) *Techniques* – collection and analysis, and (3) *Organizational & Reasoning* – meeting predetermined strategic, operational, or tactical objectives (see: *Intelligence definition in Chapter One*). This study understands that all interconnected parts are equal and necessary to the intelligence process; however, its primary focus is the intricacy and criticality of analysis. Intelligence analysis “consists largely of tasks such as identifying problems, generating and evaluating hypotheses and ideas, identifying and assessing open source and classified information, recognizing patterns in large sets of data, judging the probability of events, aggregating information, and providing results, chiefly in the form of judgments, forecasts, and insights to policymakers” (Straus et al., 2011, p. 128). To aid intelligence professionals in these tasks, fundamental techniques and philosophies are widely accepted as paramount throughout the intelligence community. Arguably, the parent theory described by Sherman Kent in 1949 and again in 1966 has progressed into today’s intelligence cycle. Undoubtedly, the intelligence cycle has grown and matured as the intelligence community continuously adapts to post-World War II missions/wars and the emergence of new technologies and budgetary transitions, political influence, and operational demand in a global environment (Kent, 1949, 1994b). Since the intelligence cycle’s inception, many augmentations have accentuated specific attributes of the cycle. There is debate amongst intelligence scholars surrounding the cycle’s sequential process not providing iterations between steps or other limitations of the intelligence cycle; however,

they all agree that analysis represents a cog in the machine of any recapitulation or redesign.

Notwithstanding the scholarly debate on specific nuances surrounding the cycle, the intelligence cycle is a highly referenced analytical construct taught and used at the foundational level of all intelligence analysis. Its progression typically, regardless of “tweaking,” encompasses six essential components, also referred to as phases: (1) planning and direction, (2) collection, (3) processing and exploitation, (4) analysis and production, (5) dissemination and integration, and (6) evaluation and feedback (Fingar, 2011; Lowenthal, 2012). The typical diagram of the intelligence cycle found in Figure 3 demonstrates, through linear progression, how analysts see the intelligence process (Bruce & George, 2008).

Figure 3

Intelligence Process (Cycle)



Note. Created by the personal experience of the author. (Benson, 2023).

The intelligence cycle starts with the **planning** and **direction** phase, in which the consumers for the intelligence product—policymakers in the case of national security intelligence—communicate intelligence priorities and requirements surrounding a respective problem, subject, or precise target (Phythian, 2013). Identifying requirements means “defining those policy issues or areas to which intelligence is expected to make a contribution, as well as decisions about

which of these issues has priority over others” (Lowenthal, 2012, p. 57). Once the consumer identifies comprehensive requirements and the intelligence professional identifies the available capabilities to reach the predetermined objectives, the second phase of the cycle, **collection**, is initiated. Typically, the collection phase begins by retrieving and accessing the raw data. This collection effort encapsulates a recorded truth from a single point in time. These collected data points are essential to the finished intelligence product as they are irrefutable and cannot be contested.

Contemporary intelligence collection draws on a wide range of sources, usually categorized into various intelligence disciplines, also referred to as “INTs.” There are five main collection categories of INTs with associated subset intelligence disciplines (R. Z. George, 2020; Odom, 2003). The following list is not exhaustive.

- Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is a collection discipline identified by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) as information about any object—natural or man-made—that can be observed or referenced to the Earth and has national security implications. It is a visual representation through imagery intelligence (IMINT)—representation of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means—and other geospatial information and elements (i.e., weather). Imagery can be derived from visual photography, optical systems (electro-optical), infrared imagery (IR), radar sensors, multispectral or hyperspectral imagery, and light detection and ranging (LiDAR) (Lowenthal, 2012; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 2020).
- Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is a discipline that falls under the responsibility of the National Security Agency (NSA). SIGINT is derived from “signals intercepts

comprising, however, transmitted—either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), or foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT)” (Phythian, 2013).

- Human intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence gathered by employing interpersonal contact, a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (Department of the Army, 2006). The collection includes the clandestine acquisition of photography, documents, and other material (DOMEX); overt collection by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts; debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who travel abroad—foreign military intelligence collection activity (FORMICA); and official contacts with foreign governments (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022).
- Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is a highly “technical and scientific intelligence discipline designed to capture and measure the basic properties and mechanisms of an object or activity” (National MASINT Office, 2021). These characteristics allow the object or activity to be detected, identified, or characterized whenever encountered (National MASINT Office, 2021).
- Open-source intelligence (OSINT), according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), is intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated promptly to an appropriate audience to address a specific intelligence requirement (Williams & Blum, 2018).

The US collection approaches, and systems are usually designed to be flexible which allows for quick technological insertion and reprogramming to adapt to shifting emitter environments (Campbell & Hayden, 1992). Understanding that collection methods are continuously evolving

due to technological advancements, it is important to note that definitions of INTs are rarely updated. There are slight modifications through lessons learned and “new practices;” however, most INT descriptions and techniques are based on late 20th century government and military manuals.

Collected data points are not considered information, nor are they finalized intelligence. Data collected by technical means (IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT) is not viable or synthesized. It usually appears to be complex digital signals or codes. Therefore, a conversion procedure must transform raw data into processed data. This action occurs in the intelligence cycle’s **processing** and **exploitation** phase. Processing is the pre-analytical phase determining which data points will be deemed relevant to the consumer’s intelligence requirements. The processed data then transitions into a ready-to-use form (images, intercepts, or narratives) that is prepared for exploitation. Through exploitation (translation, decryption, and interpretation), the layering of these data streams creates information which is considered the bedrock of intelligence (Lowenthal, 2019).

Within the **analysis** and **production** phase, the raw data (observations and measurements) has been collected, and information (organized data that has been classified, indexed, and/or placed in context) has been exploited. However, gaining knowledge (analyzed and understood information) is still necessary to form intelligence (E. Waltz, 1998, 2003). Fingar (2011) identifies that phase four (4) of the intelligence cycle is where intelligence professionals convert data into insight (information) and do what is required to provide helpful input to decision-makers, thus producing quality intelligence. Analysis and production provide this imperative step, as it is a process of evaluating information for “reliability, validity, and

relevance; integrating and analyzing it; and converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which includes assessments of events and implications of the information collected” (Johnston, 2005, p. 46).

The analysis process is considered a critical choke point of gathered information, and even for the most skilled intelligence practitioner, Johnston’s definition, as stated above, remains a highly complex and difficult undertaking, depending on any given scenario. There is agreement among the subject matter experts, as the literature dictates that considerations entertained by the intelligence analyst should hold the two coordinated themes of relevance and plausibility (R. Z. George, 2020). However, minimal research on the “analyzing it” portion of the analysis and production definition creates ambiguity and subjectivity (Straus et al., 2011). Due to this uncertainty, how the intelligence professional analyzes information in phase four (4) of the intelligence cycle is covered in the following sections in greater detail.

The completed intelligence product, post-analysis, is **disseminated** and **integrated** through a largely standardized process as the intelligence moves from producer to consumer (Lowenthal, 2019). Typical products include multi-source reports, bulletins, timely intelligence or status reports (SPOT), threat assessments, tactical/operational/strategic briefings, and position papers or extended studies. High-profile examples include the Presidents Daily Brief (PDB), National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the DIA/J2 executive highlights, and combatant commander update briefings. The dissemination process is a necessary and undervalued segment of the intelligence cycle.

A challenge facing the intelligence community is the consumer willfully distorting analysis to satisfy their immediate demands through politicization, specifically framed questions,

direct pressure, and/or cherry-picking (Treverton, 2008). These actions within the dissemination process can produce disillusionment and dysfunction between intelligence officials and consumers/policymakers (Heymann, 1985; Rovner, 2015). Most descriptions of the dissemination and integration phase do not include the complexities of intelligence consumption. It is important to note that cognitive biases, such as ethnocentrism, within the analysis process can significantly influence intelligence products and exacerbate poor consumption practices by policy/decision-makers. Additionally, the policy/decision-maker's ethnocentric biases compound the already existing biases within the analyzed intelligence.

Finally, the **evaluation** and **feedback** phase communicates lessons learned throughout the cycle. This phase goes beyond the typical dialogue between intelligence producer and consumer, where the feedback baseline consists of "which areas need continuing or increased emphasis" (Lowenthal, 2012, p. 67). Where those inputs are highly beneficial, further value is found from the evaluation and feedback within the intelligence community itself. Since the creation of the intelligence community in the wake of Pearl Harbor, the demands for centralization to remedy fragmentation have evolved beyond the organizational structures and into the analysis sector (Betts, 2007). The centralization improved efficiency by "reducing redundancy and waywardness among organizations...it is those inefficient qualities that foster diverse views and challenges to any single orthodoxy" (Betts, 2007, p. 148). Many in the intelligence community understand that a balance is needed between centralization and decentralization. A fundamental realization occurred in the post-September 11, 2001, intelligence community reforms: "to deal with complexity and the unforeseen, the system should be decentralized to give operators or analysts latitude in thinking and problem-solving. At the same time, the tight coupling requires centralization to ensure prompt and coordinated response"

(Rovner & Long, 2006, p. 627). Better mechanisms for coordination among organizations while also allowing freedom for intelligence professionals to conduct analysis are imperative to building objective and holistic intelligence. Furthermore, this balanced approach towards evaluation and feedback harbors a comprehensive method in identifying the required parameters and reinforces if all cycle phases leverage all the resources, capabilities, and analytical techniques within the intelligence community.

Where all six (6) phases of the intelligence cycle are necessary, this study holds significant focus on phase three (3), **processing** and **exploitation**, in conjunction with a heavier emphasis on phase four (4), **analysis** and **production**. However, due to the scope of the research questions, both phases are necessary components of this review. Therefore, the following section articulates the nuances, complexities, and challenges of the actual analysis of information as conducted by intelligence professionals.

Intelligence: Analysis & Cognitive Bias

The analytical community is extremely robust and houses many different designators, subjects, technical experts, research topics, and orators. The job of individual analysts can range from global coverage down to raw data analysis of 1s and 0s. Ultimately, regardless of scope or level of priority, the primary objective of intelligence, since biblical times,¹ “has been to reduce uncertainty about the aspirations, intentions, capabilities, and actions of adversaries, political rivals, and sometimes, partners and allies” (Fingar, 2011, p. 6). These objective parameters provide a more holistic understanding of the issues and drivers that shape events. Unfortunately, as described throughout the section on dissemination, intelligence does not always offer the

¹ See: Holy Bible - English Standard Version, (Numbers 13:2-30)

assurance of quality decision-making, nor will it automatically design virtuous policy; however, the probability improves exponentially. This increase in probability is centered around the notion that analysts are considered the “critical links between the collectors and policymakers” (R. Z. George, 2020, p. 93). However, success is only found if accurate, timely, reliable, and objective intelligence analysis is provided to decision-makers. Quality intelligence evaluates, integrates, and interprets information to build threat and vulnerability assessments. These assessments, backed by high-value sources, decrease ambiguity and discover new tactical, operational, or strategic approaches, which gives the policy or decision-maker the upper hand.

Fundamental analysis, however, is mandatory for most intelligence professionals to be proficient at any analytical job. Analysts must continuously pursue five (5) foundational components: truth, credibility, defensibility, transparency, and accountability (A. Barnett et al., 2021). The analysis itself can be broken into different but compounding aspects, including, but not limited to, hypothesis exploration, information search, information validation, stance analysis, information synthesis, sensitivity analysis, specialist collaboration, and information critiquing (Zelik et al., 2007). Ultimately, one essential function of intelligence analysis includes identifying trend analysis, which is information that can be analyzed “over time to establish increasing or decreasing trends in a foreign actor’s military programs, economic development, or political stability” (R. Z. George, 2020, p. 90). Fingar (2011) concludes that “providing insight on trends, the political calculus of particular foreign leaders or the way problems are perceived by people outside of the US is often more helpful to decision-makers than is the presentation of additional facts or speculation about worst-case possibilities” (p. 36). A more granular definition of trend analysis, outside the perspective of intelligence, is visualizing applicable data points through a comparative lens to procure a judgment on future events. However, when the analyst

identifies these trends, it is advantageous to articulate varying and sometimes conflicting assumptions, as it will prompt decision-makers to think critically and reevaluate their initial judgments.

Analysis at its core is central to intelligence, and what George (2020) and Fingar (2011) identify is considered fundamental analytical practice. Where this is a valuable portion of the analysis, an additional dimension unique to intelligence analysis is analytic rigor. Analytic rigor can be categorized into five (5) components, best outlined by (A. Barnett et al., 2021):

- **logical:** observing principles of sound reasoning and avoiding fallacies
- **objective:** being free from the influence of values, desires, interests, or belief systems
- **thorough:** tackling analytic work with completeness and attention to detail
- **stringent:** observing relevant rules, guidelines, principles, or policies
- **acute:** noticing and addressing relevant issues and subtleties.

Another rudimentary analytical concept is pattern recognition, a more scientific discipline that aims to classify objects into several categories or classes (Theodoridis & Koutroumbas, 2006). A good example of pattern recognition found in intelligence analysis is modeling terrorism incidents to uncover the patterns of their timing, location, or method. Finally, a third basic analytical function is relationship identification, link analysis, model building, and networking organizational structures (Clark, 2004). Ultimately, these elementary functions are foundational skillsets that every analyst should possess. Unfortunately, these critical elements are at times underused or neglected due to the plethora of analytical tasks throughout the intelligence community that are outside the scope of pure analysis.

Every analyst should be well versed in the politics, economics, strategic weapon systems,

procedures, and military programs found in friendly and adversarial countries and regions is critical to success. The reasoning behind this is not the necessity for analytical insight but the identification of critical questions that policy and decision-makers will have in the future (Walton, 2008). The criticality of question-answering within intelligence analysis cannot be overstated. Every analyst's job involves answering questions. At any given moment, hundreds of intelligence customers are simultaneously working on hundreds of issues and are "levying an unrelenting stream of requirements on the Intelligence Community" (Fingar, 2011, p. 46). Analysts who inundate themselves with topics and current events are better suited to answer questions and provide holistic judgment, presenting a more accurate articulation of confidence.

Analytical confidence is the "assigning of probabilities to significant events as well as judging the quality of those estimates before their accuracy can be known" (J. A. Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2018, p. 1070). A critical component of intelligence analysis is analytic confidence, as extreme skepticism is deeply ingrained in the mindset of intelligence professionals, and is prevalent throughout the national security community. Recognition of the inherent limitations in the intelligence-gathering process, the complexity of geopolitical events, and the ever-evolving nature of threats demands a constant awareness of uncertainty. The subjectivity associated with vagueness further complicates the analytical landscape, thus analytical confidence ensures that decision-makers are equipped with a nuanced understanding (Jervis, 1997). Typically, these confidence levels, to mitigate ambiguity, are standardized across the intelligence community. The US Defense Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council's guidelines instruct analysts to leverage probability estimates through qualitative language corresponding to an empirical scale of zero percent (0%) and one hundred percent (100%) (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). Zero percent (0%) qualitatively represents—very unlikely, highly

improbable, or remote, and one hundred percent (100%) represents—very likely, highly probable, or nearly certain. These guidelines “define confidence with respect to attributes such as quality and quantity of available information, potential for deception, gaps in knowledge, and strength of relevant inferences” (J. A. Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2018, p. 1071). Quality tradecraft, discussed in later sections, helps the analyst arrive at accurate confidence assessments; however, a more fundamental practice that allows analysts to provide information on context, patterns, and trends is critical thinking.

Intelligence professionals are typically associated with the title of critical thinker (T. J. Smith, 2008). Where this is an accurate statement, it only holds partial truth. According to Dörner & Funke (2017), critical thinkers are realistic and objective and ground their work in complex data and verified facts rather than hearsay (Dörner & Funke, 2017). Additionally, critical thinkers are open to change (Aboukinane et al., 2013) and motivated by a sense of purpose (Mejía et al., 2019). Other conclusions specify that critical thinkers appreciate the importance of investigating the premise of the problem itself before working toward a solution (Aldave et al., 2019). The title of adventurer is also granted to critical thinkers as they are willing to venture into uncharted territories of thought and cognitive ambiguity to gradually make sense of unstructured phenomena (Dörner & Funke, 2017). These attributes are highly applicable to the intelligence professional; however, the purest critical thinking model results in unbiased thought (Jervis, 2017). Unfortunately, it is understood that cognitive bias is an ongoing issue within intelligence analysis. Therefore, intelligence professionals can indeed be called critical thinkers, but with the caveat that their assessments and judgments must be reviewed for any dissonance manifested by biases. This truth begs the question, if the intelligence professional is a critical thinker, why is cognitive bias still an active component disrupting holistic assessment

and judgment? The remainder of this section examines where cognitive bias (including ethnocentrism) and critical thinking converge and identifies how cognitive bias impacts intelligence analysis.

The core concept of critical thinking “is improving the quality of reasoning through greater conscious attention to the process of thinking” (Hendrickson, 2008, p. 679). From an intelligence professional perspective, critical thinking can be considered the intentional application of “rigorous analytic procedure to relevant analyst problems for reliable analytic products” (Hendrickson, 2008, p. 680). However, limitations of human cognition are inevitable, resulting in cognitive biases. These biases are considered errors in logic or other mental operations created by information-processing practices designed by the brain for decision-making (Heuer, 2019). Furthermore, cognitive biases influence how we develop belief systems and determine behavioral patterns. Additionally, cognitive biases impact the prominent phases of psychological synthesis: (1) the principles of initial conceptualization surrounding thoughts, sentiments, hypotheses, and inferences and (2) the modification of the same components during the refinement of information.

The influence of cognitive biases holds a well-established precedence during the process of psychological synthesis (or analysis), specifically, heuristics that are employed when making judgments under uncertainty: (1) representativeness—judging the probability of an event, (2) assessing the plausibility of a particular development, and (3) adjustment from the anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further examples consist of the human belief system and how the human mind formulates models regarding the character of other people (Hendrick et al., 1973) and the judgment of causational empirical relationships outlined by Chapman and Chapman

(1967). From an intelligence perspective, according to Betts (1978), cognitive bias causes the heaviest impact on analytical judgment, as all the aforementioned cognitive components are mechanisms critical to the judgment process (Betts, 1978). The body of research surrounding cognitive psychology and decision-making regarding intelligence analysis is “based on the premise that these cognitive limitations [fundamental limitations in human mental processes] cause people to employ various simplifying strategies and rules of thumb to ease the burden of mentally processing information to make judgments and decisions” (Heuer, 2019, p. 111). These cognitive shortcuts are leveraged to make sense of multifaceted or vague scenarios. However, the simplifications intended to help the mental process are a critical component of defective decision-making known as cognitive biases.

The Intersection of Ethnocentrism and Intelligence

As listed and defined in Chapter One, there are varying and well-understood cognitive biases, including contrast bias, expectation bias, representative bias, rationality, empathy gap, anchoring, and ethnocentrism. According to Heuer (2019), these cognitive biases are usually identifiable within four elements of intelligence analysis: (1) evaluation of evidence, (2) perception of cause and effect, (3) probability estimation, and (4) evaluation of intelligence reporting (Heuer, 2019). Where ethnocentrism holds a predominantly perception-based meaning, as it is the “failure to understand that others perceive their national interests differently from the way we perceive those interests” (Heuer, 2019, p. 70), it can significantly influence all four elements. Within the critical step of evidence evaluation, the impact surrounding the absence of evidence, which makes the analyst question reliability, fosters an environment for ethnocentrism to be present. Evidence gaps or lack of consistency within the evidence influences the analyst to apply their perception, incorporating cultural and cognitive differences (Johnston, 2005).

The perception of cause and effect is a necessary tool for intelligence analysts to use when describing how historical events can impact the future. However, pattern recognition is mandatory for this type of analysis, which breeds an analytical setting conducive to ethnocentric bias. When assessing cause and effect, most analysts assume that the actions of groups, individuals, or governments are motivated by comprehensive planning and/or direction. Jervis (1976) states, “Most people are slow to perceive accidents, unintended consequences, coincidences, and small causes leading to large effects. Instead, coordinated actions, plans, and conspiracies are seen” (Jervis, 1976, p. 320). From an ethnocentric perspective, the analyst underappreciates or overestimates due to the centralized design of their cultural constructs. According to Heuer (2019), “the extent to which other countries are pursuing coherent, rational, goal-maximizing policies, because this makes for more coherent, logical, rational explanations” (Heuer, 2019, p. 131). In turn, the impact of analysts not understanding or recognizing cultural and cognitive differences within cause and effect can produce faulty judgments of prospective events, specifically a miscalculation of unintended consequences from decisions with differing motives in mind.

Both ethnocentrism and anchoring, sharing similar properties, are highly prevalent cognitive biases within the estimation of probabilities. As previously discussed, probability expressions are designed to eradicate ambiguity and make intelligence reporting more digestible to the customer via specific verbiage aligned to an empirical percentage. However, this practice remains highly subjective and harbors possibilities for ethnocentrism and anchoring, which both “pose a serious challenge to rational accounts of human cognition” (Lieder et al., 2017, p. 323). Anchoring within intelligence is considered an over-reliance on an initial qualitative estimation (Morvan & Jenkins, 2017) or prevention of analytical reassessment from the analyst’s earlier

assessment (R. Z. George, 2020). Similarly, ethnocentrism builds an intellectual gap surrounding the cultural and cognitive actions of groups, individuals, or governments, which creates initial presumptions about how a foreign actor would behave based on how the analyst would react in the same situation (R. Z. George, 2020). Maintaining cognitive rigidity can hinder the analytical process, thus not allowing one's earlier judgment to shift based on the presented evidence and unconsciously avoiding other analytical possibilities. (Schweitzer, 1979).

The evaluation of intelligence reporting can manifest ethnocentrism and hindsight biases. The foundation of the act, to evaluate something, is vulnerable to the properties of hindsight. Still, other biases can be found when the analyst overestimates the accuracy and validity of their past judgments and assessments (Heuer, 2019). Specifically, ethnocentrism and confirmation bias tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgments (Kappes et al., 2020). Furthermore, the evaluation of reporting is continuously met with solid objections throughout the intelligence community (Keegan, 2002). As ethnocentrism usually manifests from a lack of cultural understanding of a subject or region, this organizational approach is dangerous and only helpful to the continuation of misunderstandings surrounding the subjects of intelligence collection. The opposition to quality evaluation is found at the organizational and analytical levels, as admitting mistakes is typically met with discipline and is viewed as an analytical weakness (National Research Council, 2011).

Ethnocentrism and the Intelligence Analyst

Aldrich and Kasuku summarize the most accurate summation of ethnocentrism and its effects on intelligence analysis with a simple question: "Why do we think like Americans when we think about intelligence" (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012, p. 1016)? The answer remains highly

complex; however, scholarly work referencing ethnocentrism agrees that the national strategic culture manifests related intelligence cultures. According to Al-Rodhan, “strategic culture is essentially an attempt to integrate cultural considerations, cumulative historical memory and their influences in the analysis of states’ security policies and international relations” (Al-Rodhan, 2015). Identifying the parallels between strong strategic culture and ethnocentrism is not irregular. Jack Snyder initially presented the early explorations of the corresponding phenomena in 1977. During the Cold War era, Snyder deemed it prudent to build a framework that explained Moscow’s thought process regarding nuclear weapons. Snyder suggested, “we might consider how the total sum of ideas, conditioned behaviors, and historical patterns of thought affected a national strategic community” (Snyder, 1977, p. 8). Aldrich and Kasuku identify that the implication of Snyder’s work culminated with a progressed understanding that a “nation’s sense of its own politico-military experience over time was important” (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012, p. 1014). More importantly, “strategic culture also conjured up the dangers of ethnocentrism—a feeling of ‘group centrality and superiority’ that contributed to a lack of intellectual challenge and could potentially result in imprisonment inside one’s own culture” (Snyder, 1977, pp. 8–9). Grabo, the preferred name of reference regarding indications and warnings (I&W) principles, coincides with Snyder when she attributes intelligence failures—individually and collectively—to the inability to examine evidence realistically and draw conclusions outside the intelligence professional’s perceptions (Grabo, 2004).

Ken Booth (1979) questioned Snyder’s (1977) position in a detailed study where he attributed strategic culture and ethnocentrism concepts to the constructs of “groupthink” with its cerebral propensities towards organizational or bureaucratic concurrence (Booth, 1979, p. 104). Booth argued, with support from Irving Janis’s classic statement of groupthink, that “while

ethnocentrism does not automatically lead to groupthink, it increases the likelihood that groupthink will occur, with the desire for consensus overriding realistic appraisals of alternative ideas and courses of action” (Booth, 1990; Janis, 1972, pp. 3–4). With the assertion that “ethnocentrism and groupthink work in tandem to produce stereotyped images” the result is what Aldrich and Kasuku (2012) identify as collective judgments that are self-confirming and therefore riskier than would otherwise be the case (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012; Booth, 1979, p. 107). Snyder’s (1977) and Booth’s (1979) findings expanded the literature on cognitive and psychological perception theories throughout the intelligence community. Specifically, both authors focused on results concerning human perception, cognitive heuristics, mental and institutional paradigms, and satisficing (the tendency to opt for quick, seemingly adequate solutions rather than search exhaustively for utility-maximizing answers) (Simon, 1955; T. J. Smith, 2008). Furthermore, Snyder (1977) and Booth (1979) produced a complex methodological debate regarding strategic culture, behavioral patterns, and national historical experience, raising further questions. For example, how far does culture intertwine in the context of a strategy (Gray, 1999)?

In 1976, Anthony Marc Lewis, an academic who led a CIA program focused on foreign interactions, leveraged case studies focusing on the Vietnam War to argue that “hidden cultural assumptions crippled the CIA’s ability to perform its advisory functions” (A. M. Lewis, 1976, p. 45). Lewis’s study motivated a demand for “cultural understanding” to ameliorate intelligence judgment and enhance strategic thinking (Bozeman, 1988). A leader in expanding the relevant literature was Adda Bozeman, a professor of international relations, who argued that the security realm was susceptible to the concepts of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior derived from common experiences, accepted narratives, and historical traditions (Bozeman,

1960). These realizations launched multiple literary studies into ethnocentrism and intelligence analysis, most famously Rob Johnston's work, which uncoincidentally is the influence behind this study. Johnston's focus on ethnocentrism argues that ethnocentrism is a "phenomenon that operates on a conscious level, but it is difficult to recognize in oneself and equally difficult to counteract" (Johnston, 2005, p. 75). In concert with Bozeman (1960), Johnston advances the scholarship on heuristic bias, pattern bias, and projective identification within the analytical constructs of the intelligence community (Johnston, 2005).

Where identified, cultural awareness and what Booth called the fundamental cognitive orientation of one's worldview is sporadically challenged in the existing literature via academic anthropologists, intelligence scholars, and foreign policy authors. Ultimately, the literature parallels Bonthous's position that cultural constructs can significantly influence intelligence, intelligence institutions and their evolution in a globalized world, and what performance society expects from its intelligence apparatus (Bonthous, 1994). Furthermore, there is agreement that national security policy should reflect cultural constructs; however, "it has not yet had much impact in the realm of national intelligence communities" (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 33). Culture is rarely deployed in this sense in the intelligence community literature or in its training documents that are designed to make sense of ethnocentrism. This failure is well documented throughout the literature.

Current Approach to Intelligence Analysis and Ethnocentrism

There are many implemented structured analytical techniques designed with the understanding that expert judgment and intuition share the problem of biases in assessments, leading to decision-making problems (Spellman, 2011). These analytical methods are intended to

aid the intelligence professional in overcoming and/or limiting cognitive biases and the premature confirmations found in groupthink. Some structured techniques are rudimentary and are taught in the most basic intelligence courses and training. This includes the analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH), where an analyst creates a matrix with rows for individual data and columns for alternative hypotheses (Heuer, 2019; Walton, 2012). In its most basic form, ACH addresses biases by “directing an analyst’s attention at the full sets of data and hypotheses and requiring an explicit tally of data consistent with each hypothesis” (National Research Council, 2011). A smaller-scale technique that uses four cells of a matrix is the analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) matrices. This approach highlights the four key components inherent in its structure, giving precedence to the considerations and supporting information related to a particular focus to enhance awareness of the subject and challenge assumptions. Similarly, SWOT can expose risky blind spots about an organization's internal weaknesses and serious external threats (Walton, 2012). More complex structured techniques include network and link analysis charts, spotlight matrices, and decision/hypothesis trees; however, specific analytical methods designed to “help mitigate bias and mindset that may influence analysis” (Directorate for Analysis, 2009) include Red Team, Devil’s Advocacy, and Team A/Team B.

To “mitigate” cognitive biases such as ethnocentrism, anchoring, and confirmation bias, the intelligence community uses Red Team—a group of alternative or oppositional analysts challenging institutional orthodoxy (Zenko, 2015). According to Caffrey (2000), red teams have been juxtaposed against blue teams in war gaming for decades within the US military domain and the intelligence community (Caffrey, 2000). Red teaming methodology throughout the intelligence community is a substantial expansion on the usual analytical approach to attempt to

discover or reconsider a wide variety of alternative threats and to deter the natural phenomenon of assuming foreign leaders, individuals, or organizations will behave rationally (Jervis, 1976; Moran, 2021). Red teaming is predicated on alternative ways of thinking. To best fit the red team objective, finding individuals who can represent the adversary from a cultural perspective while also being sympathetic to the adversary's goals is practically impossible (Johnston, 2005).

Furthermore, a plethora of cognitive biases would emerge if these uniquely qualified individuals were utilized, as their cultural identities and cultural allegiances would manifest misunderstood and complex results (Cushman, 1996; Lucy, 1992; Shweder, 1991). The likely alternative is to find intelligence professionals with the proper credentials, thus limiting the field of participants with similar ethnic or regional properties. However, ethnicity "is not the same as sharing culture or identity. Not all ethnic groups in the US are isolated and self-perpetuating" (Johnston, 2005, p. 83). For first-generation intelligence professionals, acculturation is an immediate response to being immersed into a new culture, and they are quick to assimilate into the broader community (Levinson & Ember, 1997). Second- and third-generation intelligence professionals display enculturation "by learning the language, attending the schools, assimilating local and national values, and establishing ties to a diverse community outside of their own ethnic enclave" (Johnston, 2005, p. 83; Levinson & Ember, 1997). Where these individuals might have more insight than their counterparts from a cultural perspective, their cognitive filters have been altered by their current region and culture. Within both scenarios, regarding the possible pool of participants on the red team, cultural reference points are interfered with and are unsuitable substitutes for cultural knowledge and understanding. Red teaming has its uses and is an analytical tool that can introduce new or different stimuli missing from the original analysis; however, it can fail to build a holistic cultural picture and accurately replicate the mindset and

intended methods of the adversary.

Devil's advocacy originated centuries ago as an analytical tool used by the Roman Catholic Church, where the *Advocatus Diaboli*—with the formal title of Promotor Fide, i.e., Promoter of the Faith—“fulfilled the distinct purpose of challenging the purported virtues and miracles of nominees for sainthood” (Claver, 2020, p. 90). In contemporary usage, the term Devil's Advocacy applies to the process of dissent or contrary positions, usually leveraged for the sake of argument and attempting to provide seedbeds for new ideas (Gardner, 1990). From an intelligence perspective, Devil's Advocacy is a popular tool within the established contrarian techniques to mitigate groupthink and other cognitive biases. Heuer and Pherson (2010) define Devil's Advocacy as a challenge to a firmly held view or consensus by building the best case for an alternative explanation (Heuer & Pherson, 2010). By intelligence professionals and organizations using Devil's Advocacy, there is a “check on a dominant mindset that can develop over time among even the best analysts who have followed an issue and formed a strong consensus that there is only one way of looking at their issue” (Directorate for Analysis, 2009, p. 17). The contrarian position presented by Devil's Advocacy provides an opportunity for contradictory evidence to be considered, which can alter the outcome of the initial or long-term assessments (Coulthart, 2016). Furthermore, when Devil's Advocacy remains within the appropriate constructs founded in the scientific domain of critical thinking methods, it remains highly applicable. Within the intended scenario, to build a holistic decision-making process, Devil's Advocacy is considered a valuable analytical tool (Claver, 2020).

However, there is criticism for the concept of Devil's Advocacy, specifically that the dissenting view is presented by a team or individual explicitly tasked to do so (Mitchell, 2006;

Stack, 1997). This criticism is predicated on behavioral science. Charlan J. Nemeth (2018) examines dissent, where Devil's Advocacy is efficient for decision-making and needed to inspire divergent thinking; Nemeth identifies it is only practical when authentic and desired by the majority. According to Nemeth (2018), "When someone truly believes something different than you do, it has a stimulating quality for your own thinking. When you're roleplaying, you can't argue with the person who's pretending" (Nemeth, 2018; Schlitz, 2018, p. 2). Ultimately, Devil's Advocacy within the intelligence community should be used to test validity by proving the analysis is self-consistent through contrarian challenges. However, like Red Team concepts, Devil's Advocacy presents two significant issues when "mitigating" ethnocentrism. First, the population picked to deliver the contrarian theories is not of the same mindset, cultural understanding, or behavioral state as the adversary. Therefore, they would not present holistic or accurate contrary positions. Second, Devil's Advocacy can elicit emotions that hinder dialogue and create anger. Disagreement or dissent can build a divisive and contentious environment, where the facts are no longer the priority, but instead, individual or organizational ego takes precedence. This type of emotional underpinning is not uncommon amongst intelligence professionals, specifically those who are subject matter experts and who rarely receive opposition to their intelligence assessments.

A closely related technique, sometimes confused with the objectives of Devil's Advocacy, is Team A/Team B—"the use of separate analytic teams that contrast two (or more) strongly held views or competing hypotheses" (Directorate for Analysis, 2009, p. 19). Team A/Team B can be set up in two distinct ways. First, professional analysts design controlled arguments amongst each other and "hone their skills and findings in the *dissoi logoi* of argumentative give-and-take" (Mitchell, 2006, p. 145). Second, outsiders take the role of Team B

and are given access to the same evidence and intelligence as the analysts. They provide a conflicting argument for the initial assessment.

A famous Team A/Team B operation was the competitive exercise in 1976 to review intelligence on the Soviet Union's weapons systems capabilities and strategic doctrine (Lowenthal, 2012, p. 150). Team B in this scenario was made up of academics, aspiring politicians, and statesmen tasked to assess the intelligence analysis of the CIA and DIA regarding the Soviet Union's strategic military objectives. Team A and Team B came to drastically different conclusions regarding the Soviet Union military threat. Team A remained consistent with the original assessments found within the NIEs, whereas Team B argued that the NIEs "substantially misperceived the motivations behind Soviet strategic programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate their intensity, scope, and implicit threat" (United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1991). The use of "soft" evidence derived from perceptions regarding Soviet intentions (unproven assumptions by Team B) was introduced to counteract the "hard" evidence that built Team A's initial conclusions (Pipes et al., 1984). However, it has since been understood that the considerable variation in assessment between Team A and Team B was not as evidence-based or constructive as it initially appeared. Team B was filled with military hard-liners and highly hawkish individuals of Soviet activity who held predetermined ideological perspectives of Soviet military intentions and lacked cultural understanding outside of the typical national narrative of the Cold War era (Turner, 1985, p. 251). These ethnocentric characteristics contributed to the failure of the 1976 competitive analysis exercise and are evident throughout other high-profile attempts of Team A/Team B, including the 1994 Rwandan genocide reports, the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report on ballistic missile threat, and the 2003 Iraq prewar intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The characteristics of ethnocentrism found in Red Team and Devil's Advocate are also present within Team A/Team B, including the population of analysts among the teams who hold the preconceived cultural understanding and learned behaviors that impact psychological constructs and critical thinking pathways. Moreover, naturally, the process of argumentation, as found within Team A/Team B, consists of theoretical horizons that affect objectivity, including speech act theory, informal logic, and rhetoric (Govier, 1992; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992). Another impact on impartiality is when both Team A and Team B initiate "argumentation with the reciprocally shared assumption that the other will adhere to certain basic premises governing the exchange, with the idea that such an approach can maximize chances that the argument will leave both parties enriched by a better understanding of the issue at hand" (Mitchell, 2006, p. 146). Unfortunately, this example convincingly conveys that both Team A and Team B can manipulate the process of argumentation. Thus, conversely adhering to Shulsky and Schmitt's description of how functional competitive intelligence exercises should "attempt to imitate" the "free marketplace of ideas," where pure argumentation can "expose the invalidity of positions the evidence doesn't support while providing a greater chance that new, unconventional ideas will receive a serious hearing" (Shulsky & Schmitt, 1993, p. 80). Where Team A/Team B can be a promising approach to problem-solving and producing a complete intelligence assessment, significant strides must be taken to address the root causes of bias including ethnocentrism found throughout the Team A/Team B process.

Limited solutions are presented in the literature outside the three intelligence techniques of Red Team, Devil's Advocate, and Team A/Team B. However, where these analytical tools are indeed critical to quality analysis, there remains a disconnect in understanding or recognizing an analytical solution to the problem in the cognitive realm, specifically the phenomenon of

ethnocentrism (Johnston, 2005). Instead, leaders in the intelligence domain are instructed to concentrate on the appropriateness and adjustability of concepts but with little instruction on what processes to implement (Butterfield, 1993; Heuer, 2019). This study aims to design a structure where intelligence professionals can implement controls throughout their analysis and counter cognitive and cultural biases.

Additionally, the theory of mitigation is the antithesis of this study, yet it remains a constant goal throughout the intelligence community literature. This study aligns more with the theories of David Moore (2011), who articulates that mitigation of ethnocentrism is folly, but amplifying the human capacity for sensemaking and awareness is a better approach to understanding ethnocentrism (Moore et al., 2021). Moore's position originates from the works of Daniel Kahneman (2011) and Gary Klein (2009), who believe that exploring skill-based and heuristic-based intuitive judgments can affect forecasting (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). This contrasts with Betts (1978), Jervis (1997), and other skeptics who believe that potential improvements to the intelligence process are limited (Moore, 2011). This study is rooted in the camp of meliorism, or those who feel intelligence processes can be improved. Believing that applying "well-informed, mindful expertise, as developed in the present work, can bring positive and substantive value to the fulfillment of the IC's obligations" (Moore, 2011, p. 3). However, ethnocentrism remains a deficiency without a solution (Heuer, 2019; Johnston, 2005). It is reframing through re-conceptualization via implementing new variables (national cultural dimensions) and then critically examining what intelligence practitioners do and why it is possible to remedy the centuries-old intelligence obstacle of ethnocentrism.

Related Literature: Historical Context of Ethnocentrism

The term historical context encompasses any political, social, cultural, or economic setting for a specific topic at any given period. Understanding detailed elements surrounding historical events can foster a more comprehensive narrative structure while simultaneously giving meaning to the greater global picture. This study intends to approach specific historical topics to identify the uniqueness of the traditionally categorized who, what, where, why, and how. Furthermore, the case studies presented focus on the embeddedness of cultural and strategic unfamiliarity of those same topics. The primary purpose of using historical context is to use difficult situations to find specific ways of thinking about the subject matter and identify alternate paths for future analysis. Through context, the analyst can visualize the collected evidence, identify the risks with the benefit of hindsight, and qualify all indicators. Ultimately, lessons from history can adjust synthesis, which builds more holistic analysis and allows for better decision-making.

The chosen case study topics (the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001) have much larger narratives than those depicted in this study. Countless books, articles, movies, and government documents have been published/produced based on the wide scope of these events. This study has consciously collected the most relevant points of these historical events concerning intelligence and ethnocentric tendencies. The ethnocentric bias created by the cultural ineptitude of American intelligence and decision-makers is identified, and the study concludes that the impact of ethnocentrism leads to catastrophic ends for each topic in its own right. The detailed description of each case study's historical context also identifies that ethnocentrism was responsible for the intelligence gaps that contributed to global events that shaped future policy decisions.

Case Studies: Ethnocentrism Affecting Analysis and Decision-Making

This study offers three topics from the last eight decades. These events were drawn from a longer list of possibilities; however, these three historical events best capture the geopolitical climate of the period, the shift in national security objectives, and the variety of intelligence disciplines leveraged, given the technological and cultural limitations of the period. The first topic is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Significant cultural differences presented blind prejudices that clouded American warfighters when attempting to predict Japanese behaviors (Benedict, 1946). The second topic is the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. At the height of the Cold War, cognitive distortions on the part of analysts and decision-makers, attributed to ethnocentrism, created false concepts of Soviet intentions, strategy, and global movement (Walton, 2012). The third case study topic is the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which focuses on al-Qaeda's radical fundamentalism. The attack on the US on September 11, 2001, was only a stepping-off point for the ethnocentric phenomenon that influenced the intelligence and governmental spheres. The asymmetric warfare associated with the GWOT created complex environments where Western morals, ideals, and philosophies were challenged, and American vulnerabilities were exploited.

Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941

The Japanese offensive against the island of Oahu in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, stands as one of the most significant national tragedies or traumas in US intelligence history (Phillip H. J. Davies, 2002). From an intelligence perspective, the US was not unaware of Japanese aggression or capabilities; in fact, the US expected war (Vogel, 2012). However, the Japanese Empire was a formidable opponent, and their unknown habits, cultural constructs, and deep devotion to order and sovereign hierarchy did not exist in American understanding. These

characteristics were critical components of Japanese success at Pearl Harbor and were absent in US intelligence assessment. Throughout historical texts and Pearl Harbor references, the intelligence apparatus's indications and warnings (I&W) element is usually found to be at fault. Still, the strategic analysis and disseminated conclusion about the Japanese leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor should be the focal point of review.

Roberta Wohlstetter's 1962 analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor, in conjunction with Ruth Benedict's literary masterpiece synthesizing and discussing Japanese culture, identifies how the US considered the unfamiliar intelligence elements improbable (Benedict, 1946; Wohlstetter, 1962). Meaning that the US intelligence apparatus of the 1940s was so inundated with the "obvious" Japanese actions, predicated on European tactics and procedures, that they neglected the possibility of differing strategies centered around Japanese culture and intentions (Deiningner & Wohlstetter, 1963). Additionally, the concept of belief was a motivating factor in the lead-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. At its foundation, beliefs are a powerful motivator in producing specific behaviors, and based on American intelligence, FDR held a belief that:

The United States should enter the war as soon as possible; Germany, not Japan, was the main enemy; the United States was so much stronger than Japan that the latter would dare not attack; economic sanctions against Japan might not force that country to comply with American demands; Japan was likely to attack the Philippines (an American possession) in the belief that the United States would otherwise use it as a base to interdict Japanese attacks on British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies; but Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor. (Jervis, 2017, p. 24)

The US did not understand the motivations of the Japanese at a cultural and societal level, nor

did American intelligence provide a holistic picture of Japanese intentions and possibilities. As a result, American intelligence was blind to the perspective of the majority of Japanese leaders who “thought the stakes for the US were not sufficiently high to justify an all-out effort and that the Americans would instead fight a limited war, and, being unable to prevail at that level of violence, would agree to a settlement that would give Japan control of East Asia” (Jervis, 2017, pp. 194–195). By not understanding the kind of war Imperial Japan was willing to wage, the US stayed complacent, and American intelligence echoed ethnocentric elements.

Due to the insufficient due diligence of intelligence analysis and American leadership, the Japanese assault achieved complete tactical and strategic surprise. At 7:55 AM on Sunday, December 7, the first wave of Japanese planes attacked, and roughly an hour later, the second wave hit Pearl Harbor. The Japanese sustained minimal losses as most deployed aircraft returned safely to the carriers, and the entire Japanese naval force escaped without a loss (P. Johnson, 1997). From a short-term tactical perspective, the attack on Pearl Harbor was detrimental to the Pacific Fleet and operational integrity moving forward. Half of America’s military airpower was destroyed in the Pacific theater, and “the attacks put out of action eight battleships, three destroyers, and three cruisers, and destroyed the battleships *Oklahoma* and *Arizona*: 2,323 US servicemen were killed” (P. Johnson, 1997, p. 779). Moreover, American opinion of the war shifted throughout the days following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and what was a short-term tactical detriment became a motivating long-term advantage.

The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor represent the misconception or error of intelligence synthesis and decisions based upon ethnocentric principles. According to Douglas Porch and James Wirtz, “It seemed inconceivable to the US planners in 1941 that the Japanese would be so

foolish to attack a power whose resources so exceeded those of Japan, thus virtually guaranteeing defeat” (Porch & Wirtz, 2007; Witlin, 2008, p. 89). Ultimately, the failure of the US strategic analysts and planners was their inability to “think beyond their own cultural experiences and reasoning” (Witlin, 2008, p. 89). This led to decision-makers in Washington and Hawaii “not understand[ing] the viewpoint of decision-makers in Tokyo” (Walton, 2012, p. 95). The presence of ethnocentrism produced an inhibiting line of thinking that repressed the possibility of a Japanese attack while simultaneously diminishing the strategic value of the adversary.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

The analysis of intelligence in 1962, centered around the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons to Cuba, possessed a specific perception of, and misunderstanding of risk. Essential factors of analysis: strategic motives, calculations, and intentions were all subjected to ethnocentrism, thus framing a false projection of the situation and exacerbating already heightened tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. The framing of intelligence estimations in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis is a textbook example of the ethnocentrism phenomenon. Raymond Garthoff (1998) identified the mis-assessment of Soviet intentions by American intelligence professionals as a failure of “estimative empathy” (Garthoff, 1998, p. 46). The Cuban Missile Crisis is also a manifestation of numerous “cognitive distortions on the part of analysts, including mirror-imaging, the rational actor model, and being too wedded to the status quo” (Walton, 2012, p. 146; Zegart, 2012). Ultimately, the ethnocentric barriers represented throughout the intelligence estimations are projected through the context of assumption and the application of American risk profiles or risk tolerance—this skewed analysis presented unrealistic Soviet movements and intentions.

Ultimately, “the US assessed Soviet intentions taking into account only the risks and costs—the ‘downside’—of deploying strategic weapons into Cuba, and failed to consider the potential benefits that such a deployment would have for Khrushchev, as well as the reasons he might have for believing that such a move would be successful” (Renshon, 2009, p. 316). The misestimation produced an irregularity of historical precedence, as every action of each superpower moved the human race to a “nuclear precipice” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 1). President Kennedy summarized the ethnocentric conclusions when describing how US decision-makers and intelligence analysts did not expect Khrushchev “would put missiles in Cuba because it would have seemed an imprudent action for him to take” (Dallek, 2003; Kilpatrick, 1962, p. 1). This reinforces the consensus narrative that intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union in 1962 only projected the cultural elements of American strategy. Analysts leveraged their framing of the situation based on American goals, objectives, and cultural understanding.

Renshon (2009) describes how an excessive amount of research from “almost every conceivable vantage point” has been conducted on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Renshon, 2009, p. 317). These topics range from the bureaucratic process that influenced decision-making (Allison & Zelikow, 1999), the political psychology of the US and the Soviet Union during the 1960s, and the contributing factors that led to the crisis (Garthoff, 1988; Marfleet, 2000), and the status of international law, nuclear proliferation, and decision-making based on crisis psychology (Trachtenberg, 1985; Welch, 1989). Renshon (2009) also includes the importance of memoirs (Hilsman, 1996; R. Kennedy, 1999) and the literary determination to identify and implement lessons learned centered around the components that created the crisis (J.G. Blight & Welch, 1995). However, “significantly less effort has been devoted to understanding both why the Soviet Union deployed missiles in Cuba, and why (and how) the US failed to anticipate the

deployment” (Renshon, 2009, p. 318). This study is designed to fill this literary gap and provide a reframing of the crisis based on the 1962 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 80-62 and National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 85-2-62. These intelligence estimates raised the possibility that Caribbean states (including Cuba), friendly to communist controls, could house missiles, submarines, and aircraft from the Soviet Union, to establish a hostile military presence (US Intelligence Board, 1962). Furthermore, NIE 85-2-62, released in August 1962, presented the possibility that the Soviet Union was dedicated to safeguarding and intensifying the regime of Fidel Alejandro Castro, prime minister (1959-1976) and future president (1976-2008) of Cuba. Again, the intelligence estimates deemed it unlikely that the Soviet Union military and national leadership would acquire such heavy risk (Kent, 1994). The estimated Soviet strategy in Cuba and possible tactical movements of naval and nuclear assets were deemed implausible due to the analysts' ethnocentric conditioning and the scenario's unprecedented nature (Walton, 2012).

Islamic Extremism (al-Qaeda) in the 1990s–2000s

Throughout the past few decades, the plague of terrorism has mandated a rescripting of national strategy and intelligence doctrine. The reasoning is simple: acts of terrorism hold an impact the fundamental global paradigms of economics, affecting trade patterns, market stability, and investment climates; political science, by altering diplomatic relations, fostering security-centric policies, and influencing governance structures; and sociology, as it instigates shifts in societal perceptions, norms, and the dynamics of multicultural interactions. Additionally, terrorism fuels a pervasive sense of human fear, shaping public discourse and individual behaviors in response to perceived threats, causing catastrophic imbalance in societies. Sandler (2014) states, “Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or

subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims” (Sandler, 2014, p. 257). Based on this definition, it is easy to determine why terrorism has such an incredible impact on the global equilibrium.

The September 11, 2001, attacks on New York, Pennsylvania, and Arlington, Virginia, scarred the American landscape and would define the next two decades of American and global history. The belligerent actions of September 11, perpetrated by al-Qaeda, put the Western world on a collision course with states harboring terrorism, including Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Iraq, thus beginning the GWOT. In the early years of GWOT, American and allied forces faced unconventional and asymmetrical tactics used by international terror organizations. These techniques were not foreign to the conventional warfighter; however, they were considered unusual, considering most of the active military population participated in the Gulf War (1990-91), the Bosnian/Croatian War (1992-95), Intervention in Haiti (1994-95) and Kosovo War (1998-99), which consisted of state-on-state actors (Andrew, 2018; P. Johnson, 1997).

Adaptation to asymmetric warfare, presented by the terrorist challenge, was considered slow, methodical, and at times disastrous—costing the lives of American and allied forces. From an intelligence perspective, a shift in analytical thinking was required, which presented a significant challenge for the post-Cold War intelligence professional. Critical assumptions were levied without a well-crafted and functioning framework, identifying that terrorist organizations shared the same analytical reference points. It was assumed that groups such as al-Qaeda thought similarly to the Western world from an ethical and values perspective (R. Z. George, 2020). The bombings of US embassies in Africa, the radical martyr attack on the USS *Cole*, and the

September 11, 2001, attacks resulted from this ethnocentric void, in conjunction with the political system devaluing international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as a threat. Ultimately, the national intelligence apparatus actively incorporated Western values into the synthesis of intelligence data, placing a considerable emphasis on the promotion and propagation of these values. This intentional integration aimed to shape the narrative and direction of the synthesized information, underscoring the significance attributed to Western perspectives within the broader intelligence framework.

The American over-reliance on technical intelligence during the period significantly contributed to this issue. An example of this is best captured through the context of collection capabilities and their associated limitations. This means SIGINT and IMINT intelligence hold constraints, specifically how they capture a single moment in time with limited cultural or pattern context. Moreover, with heavy reliance on technological superiority, the greater picture of transnational issues, especially terrorism, became more challenging, and the growing or flourishing conditions of influence within failed states were not identified. Furthermore, the exploitation of Western vulnerabilities, specifically cultural constructs, was not incorporated in the original threat assessments of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Suicide terrorism was a phenomenon that struck fear and disbelief into the hearts of the global community, specifically in the West, where the tactic was viewed as exceptionally brutal and culturally incomprehensible. These Salafi-jihad suicide missions and attacks, whose success is dependent on the death of their perpetrator, “are one of the most lethal tactics employed by terrorist and insurgent groups ... they have demonstrated great potential to create turbulence in international affairs” (Gambetta, 2005; Moghadam, 2009, p. 46). Throughout the 1990s and early

2000s, the actions of al-Qaeda against US assets across Africa, the Middle East, and on September 11, 2001, consisted of suicide operations that became “the signature mode of attack – [and] have highlighted how this tactic can lead to considerable losses of human life and physical infrastructure while influencing the course of global events” (Moghadam, 2009, p. 46).

By 2003, suicide terrorism accounted for 48% of all terrorist-related fatalities, “making the average suicide terrorist attack twelve times deadlier than other forms of terrorism – even if the immense losses of September 11, 2001, are not counted” (Pape, 2005, p. 6). These figures, combined with the psychological dissonance experienced by Americans and allied forces regarding a willing human being executing these deadly attacks, were overwhelming intelligence gaps manifested by ethnocentric principles. The concept of terrorism, particularly against a soft target, is shocking enough to most liberal audiences; however, as witnessed throughout the GWOT, radical martyrdom did not just encompass military-aged males but also women and children. These acts of brutality were unfathomable to the Western understanding, and “the use of female attackers exacerbates the already potent psychological effect of suicide terrorism” (Von Knop, 2007, p. 398). Within Chapter 6, the difference between suicide bombers and radical martyrs is discussed at length, and through that analysis, there is a diametrically opposing cultural void creating an ethnocentric event.

In the post-September 11 environment, the intelligence community and analysts recognized that there were fatal misconceptions regarding al-Qaeda’s mission, objectives, and ideological motivations. As seen throughout the DoD and strategic planning, “Americans [continued] to ascribe to other countries [and terror organizations] the best of our own values: tolerance, equal opportunity, the rule of law, freedoms of speech and religion, and separation of

church and state” (Crumpton & Melia, 2016, p. A13). This was a dangerous precedent as these ethnocentric lines of thinking undermined the ability to produce a realistic narrative of Islamic extremist paradigms and their threat to national security.

Related Literature: Six Dimensions of National Culture

This study applies Geert Hofstede’s (2010) cultural dimensions on three (3) comparative case studies to make sense of ethnocentrism in an analytical capacity. This attempts to answer RQ1 and identify if the original analytical frames could have been expanded based on applying cultural themes that were not initially considered. This study believes the Six Dimensions of National Culture (6-D model), presented in 1980 by Geert Hofstede, best fits the established analytical paradigms and overall objectives of the study. When applied, the 6-D model aims to identify fundamental cultural domains and to represent the independent variables tested within the study.

The intricacies of the 6-D model amplify the manifestations of cultural aspects in a comprehensive manner that encapsulates factors well suited for investigative pursuits. This is due to the 6-D model’s ability to heighten focus on a national culture’s influence surrounding the interpretation of and response to strategic issues (Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). Furthermore, the 6-D model can provide critical insight into behavioral paradigms and the coordination of national psychology, economics, and anthropology (Ricciardi, V., & Simon, 2000). As ethnocentrism is the absence of understanding cultural differences, it was critical to select a model, such as the 6-D model, that is centered around awareness of how culture influences the ethical expectations within a society “leads to a deeper understanding of other societies and respect for differences” (R. L. Sims, 2009, p. 40). Conversely, Jackson argues that “comparing

national cultures based on a limited number of values or other dimensions is uninteresting. Using Hofstede's cultural dimensions as independent variables is not only unimaginative but a poor reflection of reality" (T. Jackson, 2020, p. 4). However, the 6-D model has been used throughout various research environments, including the technology industry, financial sector, cross-cultural psychology research, migration research, healthcare/clinical studies, international management, and cross-cultural communication.

Throughout these varying areas of research, the 6-D model is leveraged to recognize and analyze the influence of culture in multifaceted spheres of activity (Callegari et al., 2020). Shi and Wang agree that Hofstede's research has been a major influence on understanding the national culture within societies while concurrently being a topic for many researchers in many fields (Shi & Wang, 2010). However, past research surrounding intelligence analysis has not combined the 6-D model with analytical techniques, nor is there formal research strictly measuring anthropological aspects to collect information for intelligence. This study is designed to change that statistic.

National Cultural Dimensions Model

Culture is a complex term, and its definition can vary widely depending on the lens through which the term is viewed. The multifaceted properties of the term culture can be discerned by considering differences in knowledge, perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. At its core, culture originates from the Latin word *cultura* derived from *colere*, meaning "to cultivate." It commonly denotes patterns of anthropological movement and the representational structures that imbue such movement with truth, significance, and importance. At a more granular level, cultural differences vary and can dictate specific behaviors, philosophical

understanding, and value systems.

Mirroring this concept through a differing lens, anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) defined culture as a “system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz, 1973, p. 89). Foundationally, these characteristics can be traced back to Aristotelian concepts captured in *Politics*, where Aristotle emphasizes the importance of the political community as the source and sustainer of the typical human life (Aristotle, n.d.). Furthermore, Aristotle identifies political life and moral virtues as not the highest need for man but the contemplation of truth (Aristotle, n.d.). Within cultural concepts, there is an overabundance of truth when looking at the constructs of natural human connectivity. The continuous search for communitive truth remains a critical piece of humanity and a stimulant for man to find reason (Hardon, 2001). These rudimentary aspects of culture are common in the studies of sociology and anthropology. Progression in these fields has allowed the definition of culture to be predicated on the definer’s lens, which can present new challenges; however, a majority of definitions describing culture continuously revert back to values, symbols, rituals, or practices. This study concurs that values are often viewed as central tenets of a society's culture (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961), “representing that which is explicitly or implicitly desirable to a group of individuals” (Rotondo Fernandez et al., 1997, p. 44). According to Rokeach (1973), values are a complex set of global beliefs that dictate actions and judgment across situations; he further describes values as a series of learned cognitive constructs manifested from exposure to specific cultural conditions (Rokeach, 1973).

This study concurs with the Aristotelian perspective, articulating the constant search for

human truth. However, connectivity is a primary motivator for culture while recognizing that specific values can be both a byproduct of, and simultaneously produce cultural conditions.

Furthermore, this study agrees with and applies Hofstede's considerations of what culture means and the dimensions that he uses to explain/measure specific national behaviors and beliefs:

(1) The training or refining of the mind; civilization; (2) the unwritten rules of the social game, or more formally, the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another – this meaning corresponds to the use of the term culture in anthropology. (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 6)

Hofstede's definition coincides with the functionalistic approach, a doctrine rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul while also having antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a "calculating machine" (Guirdham, 2005). Hofstede's culture concept subscribes to "an approach that seeks patterns and lawfulness to predict behavior" (Knudsen & Loloma Frohold, 2009, p. 106). The collective programming paradigm Hofstede articulates is a critical component of this study, as it suggests people's behavior is determined by their culture, which is learned—so to say, put in the head of the individuals—mainly in childhood and stabilized through institutions reinforcing the societal norms (Hofstede, 2001; Knudsen & Loloma Frohold, 2009). Ultimately, the 6-D model is instrumental in furthering an understanding of cross-cultural perspectives and practice, revealing that members of different societies hold divergent values concerning the nature of organizations and the interpersonal relationships within them (Rotondo Fernandez et al., 1997).

The desire to capture the differing cultural components between nations began before (1963) Hofstede, as early 20th-century anthropologists, including Ruth Benedict (1887-1948),

“developed the conviction that all societies, modern or traditional, face the same basic problems; only the answers differ” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 29). By the 1950s, two Americans, the sociologist Alex Inkeles and the psychologist Daniel Levinson, expanded on the original anthropological convictions of Boas (1929) and Malinowski (1944/1990), by publishing literature on the concepts surrounding national culture, identifying “common basic problems worldwide, with consequences for the functioning of societies, of groups within those societies, and of individuals within those groups: (1) relation to authority, (2) conception to self - the relationship between individual and society – and the individual’s concept of masculinity and femininity, (3) ways of dealing with conflicts, including the control of aggression and the expression of feelings” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 30; Inkeles & Levinson, 1963). The 6-D model shares an ancestry with the principles of Inkeles and Levinson (1963), and through that original design, Hofstede expanded the concept of national culture.

Two decades after Inkeles and Levinson (1963), based on survey data about the values of people in more than 50 countries, a large study was conducted by Geert Hofstede, creator of the 6-D model. By leveraging his access to employee survey data at International Business Machines (IBM), a large multinational computing corporation, Hofstede focused on characteristics of national culture that can be measured relative to other national cultures. Additionally, Hofstede was able to categorize four (later six) primary problem areas “empirically found in the IBM data representing *dimensions of cultures*” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 31).

- Power distance index (PDI): “the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 61).

- Individualism v. collectivism (IDV): “the degree to which individuals are supposed to look after themselves or remain integrated into groups” (Hofstede, 2001, pp. xix–xx).
- Masculinity v. femininity (MAS): “refers to the distribution of emotional roles between the genders” (Hofstede, 2001, pp. xix–xx).
- Uncertainty avoidance (UAI): “the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations” (Hofstede, 2001, pp. xix–xx).
- Long- v. short-term orientation (LTO): “refers to the extent to which a culture programs its members to accept delayed gratification of their material, social, and emotional needs” (Hofstede, 2001, pp. xix–xx).
- Indulgence v. restraint (IVR), added in 2010: An indulgent society values the satisfaction of human needs and desires; a restrained society sees the value in curbing one’s desires and withholding pleasures to align more with societal norms (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 281).

The functionality of Hofstede’s dimensions provides procedural application of “overarching cultural patterns or dimensions which influence people’s behavior in significant ways” (Arasaratnam, 2011, p. 45). This provides an aspect of a national culture that can be measured relative to other national philosophies and doctrines (Inkeles & Levinson, 1963). Furthermore, Hofstede specifically focused on dimensions based on correlations between extremes, as the two measurable attributes present the coefficient of correlation that expresses the relationship’s strength (Hofstede, 2011).

Power Distance Index

PDI scores identify dependence relationships in a country. There is considerable dependence on authority figures in large-power-distance countries, such as Malaysia, Guatemala, Philippines, Russia, Arab Countries, Venezuela, Bangladesh, and China. Interestingly, there is a polarizing pattern where some in large-power-distance countries prefer such dependency, while others reject the dependency notion, formulating a psychological construct of counter-dependency. Typically, power distribution is “explained from the behavior of the more powerful members, the leaders, rather than those led” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 75). However, the PDI examines and is based on the value system of the less powerful members (Hofstede et al., 2010). Fundamental understandings associated with PDI, regarding small-power-distance versus large-power-distance, can best be described with a focus on large-power-distance countries where “people read relatively few newspapers, and they rarely discuss politics: political disagreements soon deteriorate into violence” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 77).

Furthermore, countries with large-power-distance ratings are also more corrupt and show a high correlation with increased income inequality and taxation favoring the wealthy (Raghunathan, 2010). According to Hofstede, in the small-power-distance situation, subordinates, superiors, or in the case of the state—citizens and government consider each other as existentially equal (Hofstede & Bond, 1984). Specifically, within a small-power-distance society, the use of power should be subject to laws and the judgment between good and evil (Gladwin & Hofstede, 1981).

More common associations with PDI consist of the following concepts:

- **Low Power Difference:** Pluralistic government based on the outcome of majority vote; much discussion but little violence in domestic politics; all should have equal rights; power, status, and wealth do not need to go together; prevailing religions and philosophical systems stress equality; desire for decentralization; leaders are not necessarily superior; and the use of force reveals the failure of power (Hofstede et al., 2010).
- **High Power Distance:** Military, autocratic, or oligarchic government based on co-optation; high inequality; superiors are viewed as superior; desire for centralization; little discussion but frequent violence in domestic politics; the powerful have privileges; status consistency: power brings status and wealth; prevailing religious and philosophies stress stratification and hierarchy; use of force is the essence of power (Hofstede et al., 2010).

As of 2010, countries such as Malaysia, Slovakia, Guatemala, Panama, Russia, Romania, Arab states, Venezuela, Mexico, Bangladesh, and China scored high within the PDI index.

Conversely, lower power distance values were collected from Austria, Israel, Denmark, New Zealand, Scandinavia, Germany, Costa Rica, Australia, the US, and Ireland. Mid-range examples included Canada, Japan, Spain, Iran, South Korea, Uruguay, Poland, Italy, France, Brazil, and Peru.

Where the above characterization of PDI examples help identify states with cultures of varying PDI, there is also theoretical reasoning associated with PDI. One example is language origin and its link to the national cultural aptitude for power distance. European nations with native Romantic native languages (France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) scored medium-high

values on the PDI. In contrast, countries of Germanic origin (Denmark, England, Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Austria) scored low on PDI. Hofstede (2010) attributes this phenomenon to cultural elements dating back to the Roman Empire, where Romanic language speaking countries value their history of Roman rule and a single power center. Political systems comprised of local lords historically separated countries that spoke Germanic languages during the same period. Interestingly, regardless of the unprecedented increase in worldwide communication, components of PDI remained concurrent with historical and present-day elements.

Individualism v. Collectivism

Individualism versus collectivism (IDV) describes individualism and collectivism as opposite poles of the same dimension. Within the 6-D model, the cultural dimension of collectivism versus individualism ranges from an empirical score of almost zero, indicating a collective culture, to nearly 100, indicating an individualistic culture (Hofstede et al., 2010; R. L. Sims, 2009). This study identifies individualism as “a society in which the ties between individuals are loose – everybody is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family only” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 92). Societies with higher IDV usually embrace competition over cooperation, identify with “I” over “We,” and prefer to adopt universalism versus exclusionism. On the other hand, collectivism is understood as “a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 92). Ultimately, cultures are classified as collective when the interests of the group outweigh the interests of the individual (R. L. Sims, 2009). In contrast, a person’s identity is based only on

the individual in individualist cultures.

Some characteristics encompass the general differences between the behaviors valued within both cultural conditions. A collective culture values compliance, progressive or unrealistic harmony, interdependence, the duty to organizations or government, relational connectivity, and shame. The behaviors valued within an individualist culture consist of self-interest and preservation, assertiveness, conflict acceptance, independence, individual rights, rationality, and responsibility (R. L. Sims, 2009). Countries with high IDV scores, meaning more individualist, including Australia, the US, Great Britain, Canada, and New Zealand (which coincidentally make up the classification caveat of REL TO USA, FVEY), tend to be wealthier and maintain small power distance values than collectivist countries. Based on governing documents, most high-scoring IDV countries also champion the previously discussed values of independence, individual rights, and personal responsibility. According to Hofstede, individualism is a dominant force in Western societies, “not only in practice but also considered a superior form of mental software” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 112). Conversely, Latin America, West Africa, and Southeast Asia regions and countries such as Pakistan, South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, China, and Serbia hold a weaker sentiment toward individualism. This manifests the greater role of a dominating State, completely immersed in the economic, political, and values system.

A more in-depth example of IDV complexity can be found in the US–Russian comparison (IDV scores of 91 and 39, respectively). The Russian cultural system is based on two fundamental truths. First, Russian foreign policy continues to be shaped by what Nikolai Berdyaev, a Russian religious and political philosopher, described as “within the Russian soul, East and West are in a continuous state of conflict” (Berdyaev, 1948, p. 1). This assessment

remains foundational and highly applicable from the Cold War to the present day, especially with the current Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. The continuous narrative surrounding Russian political culture and policy is that Vladimir Putin is the alpha and omega of Russian politics or, as Nalbandov (2016) identifies, the current Russian president is an institution of his own (Nalbandov, 2016). The political desires of Vladimir Putin only exacerbate the collectivist values within Russian culture and limit the individualistic characteristics of the Russian people.

The second fundamental truth is the Russian conceptualization and realization of exceptionalism and how the Russian interpretation significantly differs from American exceptionalism. This difference is difficult for Western policymakers to discern. Most modern-day elected officials and associated policy writers cannot sufficiently define American exceptionalism nor understand how Russian exceptionalism differs. American historian Richard Hofstadter observed, “It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one” (Hofstadter, 1989, p. 242). This principle resonated through doctrine designed and scripted during the American Founding and forms the premise that human beings possess natural rights that the state cannot give or withhold, thus placing individualism as a cornerstone of societal principles. In practice, American exceptionalism was found in daily life through egalitarianism, community life, philanthropy, religiosity, and industriousness, all culminating in the uniquely American quality of civic culture and individualism (Murray, 2013).

Conversely, exceptionalism in the Russian political context is inextricably linked to the three main forces that drive Russia’s progress: its religious views, the ethnic composition of the nations that fill its vast territory, and its ideological visions (Nalbandov, 2016). Similarly, Van

Herpen centralizes Russian exceptionalism in three more specific components: “the Russian Orthodoxy (depicted as the symbiosis of the church and state), pan-Slavism (manifested in racism and anti-Semitism), and the communist ideology” (Van Herpen, 2014, p. 32). Even in the nineteenth century, the fundamental differences between Russian and American exceptionalism were present, as Alexis de Tocqueville described the conflict of identities:

The American fights against natural obstacles; the Russian is at grips with men. The former combats the wilderness and barbarism; the latter, civilization with all its arms. America’s conquests are made with the plowshare, Russia’s with the sword. To attain their aims, the former relies on personal interest and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of individuals. The latter in a sense concentrates the whole power of society in one man. One has freedom as the principal means of action; the other has servitude. Their point of departure is different and their paths diverse; nevertheless, each seems called by some secret desire of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world. (Tocqueville, 1835/2000, p. 413)

These conflicting exceptionalisms present an important and distinct contradiction between individualism and collectivism within the international arena. In turn, they parallel an unwritten intention to attain global ascendancy and dominate the world’s cultural conditions.

Masculinity v. Femininity

The terms masculinity and femininity refer to cultural tendencies and “categorizations of groups and not individuals’ biological designations as male and female” (Zahedi et al., 2006, p. 89). Maccoby’s explanation identifies that “one can be more or less feminine. One cannot be more or less female” (Maccoby, 1988, p. 762). Within this scope, masculinity and femininity are

considered more cultural constructs and are considered behavioral practices, consisting of what people within specific environments “do,” not what they “are” (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Typically, masculinity is defined as a position in which social gender roles are explicitly connected to men. However, in this study, the focus is cultural masculinity, which is a societal behavior encompassing cultural values of assertiveness, toughness, and a focus on material success within the lens of familial connection, religious constructs, and legacy culture. Similarly, femininity through the same lens of familial connection, religious constructs, and legacy culture is typically associated with female attributes of modesty, tenderness, and concern for life quality. It is critical to reiterate that masculinity and femininity are considered a societal concept in this study, not a dimension of biological association (Dabić et al., 2015).

The MAS index values were calculated in a way similar to IDV. The range consisted of the most feminine countries at zero and the most masculine countries at 100. States such as Slovakia, Japan, Hungary, Venezuela, and Italy were measured highest on the MAS index versus Norway, Sweden, and Latvia, holding single-digit returns. The US, Australia, Great Britain, Germany, China, and Argentina ranged within the mid-60s to low 50s, identifying factor scores balancing masculine assertiveness and feminine quality of life attributes (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 143). Attitudes towards the poor, immigrants (assimilation versus integration), and handling international conflict (trying to resolve by fighting versus compromise) are other factors measured when calculating a country’s score within Hofstede’s model. From a classification perspective, Hofstede summarizes these masculine and feminine complexities down to masculine cultures striving for a performance society and feminine societies seeking a welfare-type society (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Hofstede identifies that the MAS index has been the most controversial of the dimensions as the terms masculinity and femininity hold very “taboo” connotations, which ironically is a strong manifestation of cultural values. Unfortunately, the MAS terminology elicits an emotional response in the academic and anthropological community, which turns the focus away from measurable cultural attributes and pivots to the political correctness of women’s and men’s societal roles. However, Hofstede articulated that the MAS dimension is not predicated on gender roles within the broader society but on the characteristics of the society as a whole. Hofstede presents differences that explain the framework and scope of MAS. For example, assertiveness, competitiveness, ambition, and decisiveness are examples of the masculine principles of a society. On the other hand, a feminine society embraces intuition, consensus, coalition-based politics, and negotiation instead of resolution via strength and power projection, and rewards are based on equality.

A promising approach to further understanding cultural masculinity and femininity is through the lens of religion, specifically a focus on the Christian Bible. From this vantage point, one can contextualize how cultural masculinity and femininity are central to faith while also providing a framework recognizable to those attempting to identify the applicable differences between masculine and feminine societies. Christianity’s understanding of God’s intended design for masculinity and femininity is expressed throughout Biblical passages. Still, it is projected more predominately in Genesis with the core callings of Adam (responsibility and leadership) and Eve (an indispensable companion of strength and compassion). From the Christian perspective, there is a constant struggle between “tough masculine elements” where God justifies more aggressive behaviors among mankind and those elements of a feminine nature. A masculine concept is found in 1 Samuel, where Samuel said to Saul, “Now go and

strike Amalek and devote to destruction all that they have. Do not spare them but kill both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey” (ESV, 2001, 1 Samuel 15:3).

This devotion to destruction, also found in Deuteronomy 20:16-17, sets an extreme but masculine tone of how a society should be devoted to God while simultaneously leading with an iron fist when attempting to stop the spread of paganism. Where the concepts of these verses would be considered genocidal in today’s culture, the attributes of assertiveness, corrective action, assimilation, the projection of power, and support for strength are all masculine.

In contrast, “tender feminine elements” promote a loving God who demands men act in a caring behavior towards fellow humans (Hofstede et al., 2010). Examples of this were written by the Apostle Peter, who states, “Finally, all of you, have unity of mind, sympathy, brotherly love, a tender heart, and a humble mind” (ESV, 2001, 1 Peter 3:8). Feminine values can also be found throughout Isaiah, which states, “They will neither hunger nor thirst nor will the desert heat or the sun beat down on them. He who has compassion on them will guide them and lead them beside springs of water” (ESV, 2001, Isaiah 49:10). Also, “Shout for joy, you heavens; rejoice, you earth; burst into song, you mountains! For the LORD comforts his people and will have compassion on his afflicted ones” (ESV, 2001, Isaiah 49:13). Throughout these verses, there are consistent themes of cultural uniqueness and how a society can be identified based on masculine or feminine behaviors and belief structures.

Uncertainty Avoidance

The foundational makeup of UAI is a by-product of power distance and is predicated on how society feels about ambiguous or unknown situations. Moreover, UAI measures the lengths individuals within a society (specifically those that score highly for uncertainty avoidance) will

go to make life as predictable or controllable as possible. James G. March, an American organizational sociologist, identified uncertainty avoidance as an unavoidable construct within human life, and interpreting how individuals accept avoidance is an ever-evolving science (March & Cyert, 1963). Such ambiguity can generate unendurable anxiety, thus producing a measurable level of apprehension. According to Hofstede, “every human society has developed ways to alleviate this anxiety” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 189), and these attempts can be encapsulated within three differing domains: technology, law, and religion (Hofstede, 2011). Through a compounding design, technological advancement mitigates natural uncertainties, laws and rules are written to prevent the uncertain behaviors of others, and religion mitigates the unknown elements of the soul and eternal future. These are components of cultural identity developed to control feelings of uncertainty.

Uncertainty Avoidance is measured in the same fashion as PDI, IDV, and MAS, with index values ranging from zero for a country with the weakest uncertainty avoidance to 100 for the strongest. This means that for those scoring in the index’s weak (low) sections, uncertainty is a standard feature of life, and each day is accepted as it comes. Conversely, those strong (high) on the index see the uncertainty inherent in life as a continuous threat that must be fought. For example, states such as Greece, Portugal, Russia, Guatemala, Belgium, Poland, and Japan held a high index value (ranging from 112-92). In comparison, the lower values (ranging from 48-23) housed Canada, the US, India, the Philippines, Great Britain, China, Vietnam, Sweden, and a significant outlier, Singapore, with a value of eight (8) (Hofstede et al., 2010).

It is important to note that UAI is not synonymous with risk, as people in high-scoring countries will engage in high-risk behaviors because it eliminates or decreases uncertainty.

Specific characteristics are associated with strong (high) or weak (low) UAI regarding citizen and state relationships. Strong-UAI countries tend to hold more conservative values even within their more progressive parties, exercise more attention to detail, devalue creativity and innovation, and believe in the necessity for law and order (Triandis, 2004). This produces a “high value on law and regulations in organizations, institutions, and relationships” (Giebels et al., 2017, p. 94). Additionally, these controls produce the desired behavior predictability and a conforming societal effect based on norms, rules, and procedures (Doney et al., 1998).

Conversely, weak-UAI countries are more open to a liberal mentality, where attitudes toward the youth and progressive policies are more favorable than unfavorable. Furthermore, weak UAI societies operate with less sense of urgency but are open to change or innovation. The acceptance of ambiguity, found in weak UAI countries, generates a society that is more reliant on informal interactions rather than formalized rules, and individuals are “permitted to follow their own beliefs rather than group norms and take risks” (Mahajan & Min Toh, 2017, p. 115). From a political perspective, low UA represents a weak situation whereby political skill is more associated with interpersonal citizenship behaviors (Ferris et al., 2007).

Both high and low UAI attributes hold varying detriments. For example, strong UAI can harbor and breed more extremist minorities within the political landscape (Hofstede et al., 2010). On the other hand, weak UAI can progress to extreme idea pathogens that advance under the banner of inclusion (political correctness, social constructivism, postmodernism, culture of perpetual offense and victimhood, identity politics, cultural and moral relativism) but result in endangering the natural freedoms of society at large (Saad, 2020).

Long-Term v. Short-Term Orientation

The fifth dimension, initially referenced as Confucian Dynamism (Hofstede & Bond, 1984), now organized as Long-term orientation versus short-term normative orientation or LTO, is defined as “long-term orientation is the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards – in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present – in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of “face,” and fulfilling social obligations” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 359). Ultimately, LTO refers to a societal focus on the past and present versus the future (Gil et al., 2019, p. 1167). Societies within the short-term orientation paradigm prioritize goals and objectives based on current situations. People within these societies “prefer to sustain current social hierarchy, value tradition, and emphasize the fulfillment of social obligations” (Gil et al., 2019, p. 1167). Those who measure higher on long-term orientation throughout the index are more ardent champions of planning for the future and implementing more strategically conscious objectives in society (Ardichvili & Kuchinke, 2002). Additionally, these societies or individuals are highly pragmatic and willing to adapt for the sake of the long-term cause.

Economics and political culture were the driving forces behind the addition of this dimension. Typically, throughout a long-term oriented nation (South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, China, Ukraine, Germany, and Russia—scored the highest), there is an emphasis on persistence, relationships are ordered by status, family pragmatism, and personal adaptability is essential. From a cognitive perspective, synthetic thinking is dominant, priority is given to common sense, heavy importance is placed on profits 10-20 years in the future, and most importantly, good or evil depends on the given circumstances. Conversely, short-term oriented nations (Egypt, Columbia, Iran, Zimbabwe, Jordan, Australia, Ireland, Peru, and the US—scored low) place

emphasis on quick results, leisure time is essential, there is an extreme focus on the “bottom line,” and this year’s profits (differing from the 10-year outlook of long-term orientation). Finally, from a philosophical perspective, short-term-oriented societies are concerned with possessing the truth, a need for cognitive consistency, analytical thinking, and, most importantly, there are universal guidelines about what is good and evil (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Indulgence v. Restraint

Indulgence versus restraint, or IVR, is the newest addition to Hofstede’s dimensions and is identified as the weakest dimension as it has not gone through the rigors of academic testing (Hofstede et al., 2010). This dimension’s foundational makeup is predicated on the anthropological study of loose and tight societies. Significant parallels exist between these dimensions, but they also hold respectable distinctions. In loose societies, there is a level of acceptance of deviant or abnormal behaviors, whereas tight societies maintain strong values of group organization, formality, permanence, durability, and solidarity (Pelto, 1968). However, what defines IVR is the mutually correlated and robust association of three key terms: happiness, life control, and leisure.

Similar to the other dimensions, IVR is a value system based on two poles. On the high end (highest score is 100), society perceives that one can do as one pleases, accumulate and disburse financial gain, and partake in leisurely activities with friends or alone. Nations with a high IVR score permit or foster relatively unrestricted gratification of an individual’s dreams and emotions, such as appreciating vitality and harboring a pleasurable life experience. Societies with higher indulgence “tend to enjoy life and have fun, favor individual happiness and well-being, consider leisure time more important than hard work, and enjoy greater personal freedom to

savor the here-and-now” (Gil et al., 2019, p. 1167). At the opposite pole, societal norms articulate that spending money, enjoying leisurely activities, and partaking in indulgent behavior is wrong and a drain on society. In a society with a low IVR score, there is more focus on concealing gratification and encouraging regulation of an individual’s demeanor. Furthermore, there is a hyper-intensive need for individuals within these societies to acquire specific skills, pass tests, focus on advancement, and to rarely celebrate daily life (Gil et al., 2019). Therefore, it is prudent that citizens of a low IVR society accept the standard of maintaining order and the seriousness surrounding concepts of restrictiveness.

From an index perspective, Latin American and South American countries score the highest in the indulgence factors, with Nigeria, Sweden, New Zealand, and Ghana having similarly high values. Finding equilibrium between IVR poles but leaning more towards the indulgence domain houses Canada, the US, Great Britain, Austria, Brazil, Finland, and Malaysia. Countries that score in the restraint position include Russia, China, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Egypt, and Pakistan. In more indulgent societies, it is not uncommon to see a higher percentage of happy people, individuals more active in sports, freedom of speech is viewed as necessary, sexual relationships are more laissez-faire, and gender roles are loosely prescribed. The restrained societies are on the opposite end of the indulgent spectrum, and include a low percentage of obese people, fundamental sexual norms, and a higher number of police officers per 100,000 population. Also, censoring expression and a predetermined value system is a national decision instead of an individual one. Ultimately, there is a sense of optimism throughout the indulgent society, and pessimism is a more prominent mindset in a restrictive society.

Summary

Ethnocentrism within intelligence analysis remains a critical vulnerability without a specific technique to help analysts identify and make sense of its dangers. Johnston (2005) helped define ethnocentrism from an intelligence analysis perspective but also challenged the intelligence community to “develop tools and techniques to combat analytic ethnocentrism” (Johnston, 2005, p. 84). Furthermore, Johnston (2005) believed that using “cultural diversity as a strategy to combat ethnocentrism” is a recommended starting point (Johnston, 2005, p. 84). However, the call for research on combating ethnocentrism through educating analysts on cultural components is made by only a few researchers. Additionally, there is literature explaining the presence of ethnocentrism in the intelligence apparatus, but it typically fails to identify viable or practical solutions. This study’s principle objective is to meet the challenge of Johnston (2005) while also being cognizant of the warnings presented by Betts (1978) and Jervis (2009), who state that further research within the field of intelligence should not restructure the established system, but only add tools and techniques to the analyst’s repertoire. This study intends to honor that warning and add an analytical tool to the already elaborate toolkit leveraged by analysts regularly.

The application of Hofstede’s (2010) 6-D model to intelligence, channeled through the SA framework and D/F Theory constructs, has never been tested. The specific case studies, usually referenced as intelligence failures, provide an eight-decade-long sample size of intelligence affected by ethnocentrism. Despite globalization, social maturation, and technological advancement, ethnocentrism has transcended generations and remains a vulnerability over 80 years later. This study is designed to capture the vulnerability of ethnocentrism, construct a framework in which analysts can apply cultural dimensions, and

successfully identify and make sense of ethnocentrism within their analysis. Although there is limited literature supporting the efforts of this study, the leaders in intelligence research have laid the groundwork for building solutions to the timeless problem of ethnocentrism.

“Nothing has such power to broaden the mind as the ability to investigate systematically and truly all that comes under thy observation in life.”

—*Marcus Aurelius*

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

Overview

This qualitative multi-case study explores new avenues of approach for making sense of ethnocentrism, a cognitive bias within intelligence analysis. Ultimately, this chapter outlines the strategy chosen to investigate the contemporary phenomenon of ethnocentrism. It also explores how real-life context is integrated into the study. (Robson, 1993). This chapter comprehensively describes the study’s research methods, goals, objectives, and questions. Chapter Three is divided into (11) sections: (1) design, (2) the research questions, (3) setting, (4) participants, (5) procedures, (6) the researcher’s role, (7) data collection, (8) data analysis, (9) trustworthiness, (10) ethical considerations. Chapter Three concludes with a (11) summary that captures the most critical elements of the research strategies, methods, approaches, techniques, and procedures.

Design

This study’s foundation is based on qualitative multi-case study research methods. The study discovers “something new and interesting by working through a research topic” (Swedberg, 2020, p. 17). The phenomenon or topic being addressed, ethnocentrism within intelligence analysis, is explored through previously articulated and published experiences and perceptions encompassing specific understandings and markers related to the phenomenon. In contrast to quantitative methods, this dissertation focuses on the delivery of themes collected from previously authored books, articles, documentation, training manuals, and other forms of published literature. The qualitative approach was selected due to the highly qualitative source

materials, with minimal association with quantitative precedence.

An exploratory approach was selected [over descriptive and explanatory] for the following reasons. First, there is a unanimous consensus in the literature that ethnocentrism is present within intelligence analysis. Second, there are no significant models to help intelligence analysts make sense of, or recognize ethnocentrism. This centuries-old issue is a significant hole in intelligence research and impacts the intelligence community. This study itself is designed to fill the gap and present options for future research. Third, this study is the first of its kind to use a preexisting model (Hofstede's 6-D model) to answer the ethnocentric ailment of the intelligence community. As noted in Chapter 2, Hofstede's 6-D model has been leveraged throughout various research environments, including the technology industry, financial sector, cross-cultural psychology research, migration research, healthcare/clinical studies, international management, and cross-cultural communication. The intelligence community is not part of that distinguished list of highly studied areas. The 6-D model paired with intelligence research also presents another first, as the 6-D model has not been applied to previous intelligence analysis research.

As for the selection of exploratory research, the reasoning is simple. Exploratory principles are founded in the preliminary, and this study is the first of its kind. Exploration case studies provide insight and inception to initial research describing hypotheticals. With that understanding, this study is enacting the original use of Hofstede's 6-D model to make sense of ethnocentrism in intelligence analysis. Therefore, by definition, this study is mandated to use exploratory methods over descriptive or explanatory.

This study's design was selected after carefully considering varying qualitative methods, including ethnography, phenomenology, and case study. Ultimately, exploratory and

retrospective principles were selected for this qualitative multi-case study, as it is critical to extensively explore ethnocentrism in intelligence analysis using multiple timeframes, perspectives, and data sources (Yin, 2018). The case study design ensures that all possible exploration approaches were available to meet the study's objectives. There was also a conscious decision to identify case study topics with more than one data source, as Smith (2018) identifies that more credible case studies tend to leverage multiple data sources. The plethora of information surrounding the key terms related to this study, such as intelligence, ethnocentrism, cognitive bias, cultural patterns, and sensemaking, in conjunction with the three chosen events: Pearl Harbor 1941, Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, and Islamic extremism leading up to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the 2000s, can best be categorized and thematically placed within the case study format. According to Yazan (2015), the advantages of using a case study design include the generous quantity of data and information that can be organized and compiled while simultaneously aiding the researcher in describing the expansive complexity of a phenomenon (in this case, ethnocentrism and developing the cultural disposition of each case subject and the US intelligence perspective).

Other designs with more meticulous methods proved to be more of a challenge to this study and limited the possibility of holistic results. Due to the intricacies associated with exploring and describing ethnocentrism in intelligence analysis and using the Hofstede 6-D model to identify a path to sensemaking, the case study research design was deemed the most appropriate. Furthermore, exploratory and retrospective principles are desirable to set this study up as a prelude to more prolonged, more intensive research on ethnocentrism in intelligence analysis, developing cultural dispositions, and determining the US perspective of any respective case study subjects. Additionally, in contrast to other design types, exploratory principles allow

the interconnection of the 6-D model with historical events where ethnocentrism was present in the intelligence analysis. Exploratory and retrospective methods captured the in-depth qualitative perceptions and accurately/effectively communicated results to the reader while not eliminating any critical distinctions.

From a process and analytical technique perspective, this study leverages thematic analysis to organize and categorize the data. Thematic analysis was chosen due to the importance of pattern recognition and the attention to detail this study requires (V. Braun & Clarke, 2006). Through thematic analysis, this study examines documents (previously published accounts of the events) and archival records (redacted or declassified intelligence products correlating to the gathered documents). The study identified patterns in these materials, which were then systematically coded using inductive coding techniques. This process helped in developing themes that correlated with cultural dimensions, dispositions, and specific perspectives of the case study subjects. In culmination, this process provided the opportunity to construct a comprehensive narrative of the research (V. Braun & Clarke, 2006). This process is discussed in greater detail in this chapter's Measurement and Data Collection section.

Research Questions

RQ1. How can Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model be applied to information synthesis (which becomes intelligence)?

RQ2. Leveraging Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, what are the cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects (i.e., Imperial Japan, Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda)?

RQ3. Continuing to adopt Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, what was the US Intelligence Community's perception and American sentiment of the case study subjects?

RQ4. What variations or differing results, compared to the original ethnocentric analytical deductions, judgments, and decision-making of the case study event, emerge when applying accurate cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects?

RQ5. How can the cultural dimensions of the 6-D model, designed by Geert Hofstede (2010), elaborate on basic analytical judgments while simultaneously identifying and making sense of ethnocentrism?

Measurement & Procedures


This study is designed to conform to traditional case study methodology, wherein multiple data sources were utilized to identify categorical and thematic manifestations through documented historical accounts and archival records of the events (Yin, 2018). Measurement and assessment were conducted through a categorical approach, specifically applying a low to high nominal scale corresponding to the cultural dimension's parameters, resulting in a comparison of findings to build a comprehensive narrative. The researcher used the broad constellation of meanings and analytical frames surrounding the case study concept and correlated indicators from the data associated with the fixed themes represented in the individual cultural dimensions. The researcher measured the data for qualitative classification (using a low or high score—relating to the 6-D model scoring system), producing original results.

Each cultural dimension encompasses a predetermined calibrated spectrum with proportionate polarization of critical themes and categories (*see*: Figure 4 below). These categories were leveraged to build a cultural disposition profile of each case study subject and a cultural disposition perspective of the US intelligence community regarding the case study subject. The process resulted in a comparison against each other, identifying variations and

differences.

Figure 4

Thematic Analysis Approach with the 6-D Model



Note. Created by the author, information is adapted from multiple sources. (Benson, 2023)

Procedurally, three examinations were conducted and demonstrated. First, the researcher determined the case study subject's (Imperial Japan, Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda) cultural disposition profile within the 6-D model framework. These results were determined by the outlined measuring techniques using a low or high score—relating to the 6-D model scoring system (specific concepts of each case study subject were reviewed and categorized, resulting in a 6-D model scoring). *Note:* the results of the first examination (RQ2) are separate from the 6-D model application to the intelligence community perspective.

Second, examining concepts within the data using a low or high score—relating to the 6-D model scoring system—created a cultural disposition profile of the intelligence community's general perspective of the case study subjects. This was based on reviewing the raw intelligence,

historical US perspective, the original analytical deductions and judgments, and decision-making results for each case study event. The disposition profile of the case study subject is a critical component of the study, as it identifies a starting point for the comparison procedures. Moreover, it determines an informational baseline that establishes the research benchmark to track the future progress of the study and increases validity throughout the qualitative comparison and deduction phases. The accuracy of this second examination is essential to creating the practical historical context baseline and providing a framework for researcher accountability. Again, by using the same nominal scale from the first examination, keeping all scoring consistent across examinations, the researcher identified the appropriate 6-D qualitative classifications to create a cultural disposition profile of the intelligence community's general perspective of the case study subjects. Once compiled and analyzed, the researcher can determine if the intelligence community perspective of the case study subject was either consistent, inconsistent, or non-existent in comparison to the results of the first examination. Establishing this frame-expanding element creates a comprehensive baseline while simultaneously allowing the researcher to stay on course and create a successful study.

The third examination compared the results from the first and second examinations. The comparison identifies variations between the accurate cultural disposition profile of the case study subject against the cultural perspectives and understandings of the original US intelligence community's analytical deductions, judgments, and decision-making. Throughout the comparison, any differences that emerged were annotated and discussed. Additionally, the third examination produced the evidence needed to identify if applying the 6-D model can impact the elaboration of basic analytical judgments while simultaneously identifying and making sense of ethnocentrism.

Expanding the intelligence analysis toolkit is the primary objective of this study, which places the intelligence professional as the target audience. Ultimately, the critical thinking framework of the intelligence analyst, referenced in chapter two, is the primary environment in which this study should produce the most impact. This study appreciates that the intuition of the intelligence analyst is not a default mode of cognition (Dhami & Careless, 2019); however, the study values the relationship between critical thinking and problem-solving and its associated cognitive biases. Therefore, adding a sensemaking tool to the analytical toolkit by reframing evidence and reevaluating critical thinking patterns can fuel analysts' problem-solving dimensions and increase efficiency, consistency, and validity (Paul & Elder, 2022).

The setting of this study is not a physical location. Instead, the study explores a new approach to making sense of ethnocentric components within intelligence analysis by applying cultural dimensions. The result of this study should expand analytical theory, provide well-crafted dependent variables for future academic research, and amplify the analyst's objectives of "telling key truths, rendering key judgments, and explaining the evidentiary basis" (Herbert, 2006, p. 668). Therefore, the study is theoretical and designed for the intended reader to be an academic and general intelligence practitioner.

Participants

This study is theoretical, indicating that the data and evidence pool were extracted from published documents and archival records. No interviews or participant observations were used in this qualitative multi-case study. Therefore, the only active participant in the study is the researcher. In an attempt to negate the reporting bias associated with using only documentation and archival records, there are strong controls within the research questions. Additionally, the study's focus allows for only the most pertinent information to be used (Yin, 2018). A

prioritization of materials by their unmistakable centrality to the study's questions occurred, demanding more time spent on data fundamental to the study than the superfluous materials that can challenge validity. This negation of bias technique is critical to the study's success and reinforces the need for distinct categorization, quality control, and transparency of sources.

This study is the first of its kind, and ensuring an unbiased approach is extremely important. This understanding caused the decision not to use interviews or participant observations and relied on the stability and unobtrusiveness of documentation and the specificity of archival records. Further research on ethnocentric impacts within intelligence analysis of descriptive and explanatory designs should incorporate direct observations, quantifiable interviews of intelligence professionals, and qualitative synthesis of intelligence operations where the 6-D model is utilized.

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was confirmed before any data was accumulated and synthesized. The researcher provided all the mandated documents, including the research proposal, to the IRB. The primary objective of submission is a successful IRB review. IRB approval and any other substantiating documentation identifying permission to execute are attached to the study's appendix.

The Researcher's Role

Qualitative research can be considered interpretive research; therefore, the researcher's inquiry, collection, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination approaches are critical research elements. The researcher is the main organizer and critical stakeholder of all study mechanisms (Rogers, 2018). With these modes of responsibility comes an assortment of strategic, ethical, and personal issues injected into the qualitative research process (L. F. Locke et al., 2013). It is essential for the researcher to "explicitly identify reflexively their biases, values, and personal

backgrounds, such as gender, history, culture, and socioeconomic status that shape their interpretations formed during a study” (Creswell & Creswell, 2019, p. 183). As stated in Chapter 1, I am an intelligence professional of 14-plus years and remain hyper-aware of the connections between me as the researcher and the data collected, data synthesis, and overall study objectives. Gravitating towards specific themes or purposefully looking for evidence to support specific outcomes, advantageous or uncomplimentary to progressing the analytical toolkit, were not implemented as these actions would jeopardize the integrity of the study. The absence of surveys and participants also enabled the researcher to process the collection and analysis of data with the desired objectivity and study standards.

The function of the researcher in the design of the case study is centered on accumulating, managing, and analyzing considerable amounts of data from various sources. First, the researcher collected all appropriate documents and archival records for the data collection. Then, for the data analysis procedures, the researcher conducted the examinations, categorization, synthesis, and qualitative analysis, including the manual step-by-step coding of data and the triangulation of the themes from the documentation and archival record data sources.

Data Collection

In most research, using multiple sources to seek convergence and corroboration is an advantageous practice, and it is highly applicable to a case study design (Pal, 2005; Yin, 2018). Due to this study collecting only documentation and archival records, without interviews, it is crucial to indicate the specific procedures used to collect all pertinent data. Where leveraging only documentation and archival records is a good approach for exploratory research, articulating precise collection and analysis techniques is mandatory. Additionally, collecting

documents and archival records is an authentic strategy in qualitative research because the data these mediums provide offer an alternative to the more intrusive and reactive forms of data collection, such as interviews and observations (Bowen, 2009).

Documentation

Document analysis is prominent in this study, as it was the preferred data collection method involving qualitative content analysis from published works and documents. Bowen defines document analysis as “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents, both printed and electronic (computer-based and internet transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). Furthermore, document analysis differs from other analytical methods, as document analysis requires that data be explored and scrutinized while simultaneously being “interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge” (Bowen, 2009, p. 27; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Therefore, document analysis was fundamental in exploring this study’s parameters and allowing the researcher to make sound and logical deductions.

This qualitative multi-case study did not review the prior literature incorporated in Chapter 2. Granted, there are referenced studies within Chapter 2 that are excellent data sources; however, this study did not rely on previously authored descriptions and interpretations of data to manifest results. Instead, raw data was extracted, and the document analysis yielded “excerpts, quotations, or entire passages from records, correspondence, official reports - that are then organized into major themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content analysis” (Labuschagne, 2003, p. 101). The collection method was strictly designed to collect only the thematic data from documents and synthesize that data for results without the interference of the document's general purpose.

The types of documents that were collected include but are not limited to formal studies (example: *Analytical Culture in US Intelligence Community* by Dr. Rob Johnston), academically published books (example: *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* by Ruth Benedict), Department of Defense evaluations related to ethnocentrism and intelligence analysis, administrative documents (including intelligence community proposals and internal records), reports of events, personal documents of key decision-makers and intelligence professionals (diaries, memoirs, and notes).

Documentation collected in this fashion can produce critical qualitative information that can be coded and thematically associated with the case study topic. It was the responsibility of the researcher to identify the document type, the publisher or owner of the document (self or institutionally published or government agency-owned), the date of publication, why the document was written, and the overall objective of the document as described by the author and title. Additionally, the researcher conducted a document analysis of the information disseminated by the document, described why and how the document held valuable information, and how that information was thematically positioned.

Archival Records

This study used archival records to identify pertinent data and evidence in conjunction with documentation. As the original purpose of archival records is typically generated for reporting or research purposes, the use of archival records can provide “a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility” (Eisner, 1991, p. 110). This study's most common source of archival records was public records from governmental agencies. This included declassified national intelligence estimates, relevant intelligence assessments of specific scenarios and periods, and

documented lessons learned from military and civilian agencies within the national security apparatus. This study intends to use only the unclassified and publicly available (without FOIA request) archival records. The reasoning for this is described in greater detail in the ethics section below.

Archival records as a source of evidence are critical to the research design. These intelligence estimates, maintained by individual intelligence agencies, produced the raw data needed to run the 6-D model correctly and identify valid results based on real-world intelligence. All intelligence estimates available within the unclassified mediums that pertain to this study's research events were examined. Furthermore, the archival records produced greater insight into the behavioral patterns of the intelligence professionals of the case studies' periods, the analytical tools used by those intelligence professionals, and the risk tolerance of the intelligence customers or decision-makers. Archival records identified the situational awareness of the intelligence community as a whole, additionally, the records identified the intelligence communities' ability to reframe evidence if varying controls like the 6-D model were introduced. From a collection perspective, using archival records also allows the researcher to see essential areas that have not been considered or help identify patterns and relationships that were not previously determined.

Data Analysis

This study's thematic analysis includes identifying patterns, systematically coding, deriving themes that correlate with cultural dimensions, and placing themes within the 6-D model low to a high-scoring system (V. Braun & Clarke, 2006). Finally, through analysis and qualitative synthesis, a summary of the themes produced a comprehensive narrative in

concurrency with the research questions.

The core concept of this study is to incorporate all elements of the 6-D model, including power distance (PDI), individualism v. collectivism (IDV), masculinity v. femininity (MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UAI, long-term v. short-term orientation (LTO), and indulgence v. restraint (IVR). The parameters of each dimension were represented and accounted for within the data analysis process. Each dimension was separated into specific predetermined categories and general concepts to be identified within the documents and archival records. While not exclusive, each of the following was considered when constructing the cultural disposition of the case study subject and developing the US intelligence perception of the case study subject:

- **PDI:** Inequality within a society or organization; how superiors within a society are viewed; centralization or decentralization
- **IDV:** Universalism or exclusionism; identification with “I” or “We”; competition or cooperation
- **MAS:** Familial values; behavior patterns; legacy cultural conditions; religious impact
- **UAI:** Attention to detail; compounding environmental factors; creativity and innovation
- **LTO:** Pragmatism and expansionism; humility; overall mission objectives
- **IVR:** Ethical code; anxiety levels; concept of choice


Additional themes and categories were considered during the progression of research as long as they abided by the definitions of each cultural dimension articulated in Chapter 1.

From a coding perspective, open and selective coding was utilized to generate themes in concert with the 6-D model (as seen above). Before coding occurred, the researcher obtained intimate knowledge of the information extracted from the documents and archival records.

Through this familiarization, the researcher observed meanings and patterns that manifested from the data. Based on these observations, with the study's objective at the forefront, initial open coding took place for each cultural dimension individually. Each original theme stated above was tested and categorized, corresponding to the 6-D model and the associated low and high scores. Figure 4 identifies generic terms, themes, and associations that were also considered as the baseline of understanding regarding how the researcher identified each cultural dimension throughout the coding process. Further review of the applicable events, similarities, and unique sequences within the data will determine if a theme reorganization is necessary.

Figure 5

Data Analysis Structural Diagram



Note. Created by author—visual interpretation of the intended design plan. (Benson, 2023).

As Figure 5 depicts, each cultural dimension was explored separately, concluding in a specific narrative comparing how that dimension was measured throughout the three (3) case studies. This approach was repeated for each cultural dimension, producing independent results that distinctively created their narrative. At this point, the categorized data was implanted in the D-F theory constructs. Plausibility, possibility, inconsistencies, and anomalies were questioned, and the data frames were reframed or elaborated. Examining the individual cultural dimension narratives (as shown in Figure 5), a comparative and comprehensive narrative was crafted with synthesized data at a level that summarizes relationships, patterns, themes, and their relation to the research questions (*see* Chapter 7). This summary constitutes the research findings.

Trustworthiness

The researcher holds the burden of ensuring a trustworthy and ethical research process. This is an honorable and esteemed responsibility going back generations. In qualitative research, the sentiment of trustworthiness is of even greater importance as the qualitative method is founded on subjective principles and individualistic experiences are not categorized through numerical ranges as in quantitative research (Tufford & Newman, 2012). This subjectivity presents the ultimate challenge for qualitative researchers. The following section will address, define, and describe this study’s approach regarding the components of trustworthiness: credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability (Anney, 2014; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Credibility

Credibility depends on many factors; this study exhibited credibility through “rigorous

techniques and methods for gathering high-quality data that are carefully analyzed, with attention to issues of validity, reliability, and triangulation” (Patton, 1999, p. 1190). The required accuracy regarding researcher interpretations were demonstrated through the rigorous qualitative document and archival record analysis (Tobin & Begley, 2004), with overlapping open, axial, and selective coding steps (as depicted in Figure 4). Additionally, the results and construction of the narrative must convey an unwavering truth, as credibility is founded through the principles of confidence, specifically surrounding the research process and narration (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Triangulation was used to enhance credibility, a practice where two or more data sources are used, in conjunction with researcher reasoning and logic, to ensure valid concepts are being represented (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

Triangulation was accomplished throughout the data collection phase by using corroborating and conflicting documentation, archival records from varying intelligence professionals of the period, and researcher observations. The justification for using numerous data sources is informed by the belief that recognizing patterns and habits across various sources can improve the confidence and trust that the themes observed by the researcher are legitimate areas of study. The credibility of the researcher is also a vital component of this study. My experience, philosophical belief in the subject matter, and admiration for “naturalistic inquiry, qualitative methods, inductive analysis, purposeful sampling, and holistic thinking” (Patton, 1999, p. 1190) are considered controls and assets to the study.

Dependability and Confirmability

Dependability and confirmability are comparable to the quantitative philosophy of authenticity, ultimately identifying the value of consistency throughout the data and the results of

the data analysis (Anney, 2014). Conceptualizing and implementing controls that personify a qualitative study's dependability and confirmability is essential to guarantee that the results and narrative determinations remain valid. As this study is exploratory, keeping it grounded and possessing dependable and confirmable qualities is extremely important. Moreover, dependability and confirmability provide the groundwork for the next generation of scholars to describe and explain future findings. Without dependable and confirmable research parameters, the study is susceptible to high scrutiny. While scrutiny itself is valuable for enhancing research quality, the absence of proper parameters could tarnish the work as a whole, diminishing its potential value for future research. This study is intended to conduct exhaustive research, as it is critical to dependability and confirmability. The literature on all three case study events is extensive as they are significant historical moments for the US. However, the available intelligence analysis and raw data is limited. Moreover, it is even more uncommon to see ethnocentric constructs identified throughout the intelligence analysis or retrospective literature written about the three historical occurrences. Therefore, the outcomes are considered exhaustive due to utilizing documents identifying the ethnocentric problem, which archival records corroborated.

Both dependability and confirmability were managed through the requirement of great detail, specifically surrounding the context, process, setting, and analysis conducted throughout the study (Stahl & King, 2020). Throughout every procedure of the study, the researcher articulated and captured sufficient details so future researchers can reproduce the study or have the option to examine and assess the study's objectivity. In addition, the dependability and confirmability were enhanced by supplying in-depth details and comprehensive descriptions of the analysis and study. Through extensive sourcing and narrative, this study articulates how

conclusions and interpretations manifested from the data to demonstrate confirmability. Finally, throughout the study, records were kept on how the study was conducted and the sequential history of the decisions made by the researcher for quality audit trail purposes (Wolf, 2003). Through well-captured sourcing, a recreation of the study is achievable.

Transferability

The study's data collection, analysis, and decision-making were transparent by carefully conforming to the planned design. In conducting an exploratory study, the intention is for future researchers to continue the topic's journey, building on the foundation originating through exploring a new theory or phenomenon. This makes transferability extremely important and highly relevant to this study. The premise of this study's design mandates that the findings and results hold applicability and understandability for future studies (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To ensure transferability, the researcher ensured well-sourced context and detailed descriptions, also called "thick" descriptions—an attempt to reconstruct the symbolic meaning or recounting of a specific activity within a defined context (Geertz, 1973). This includes the where, how, and why of data collection and analysis.

Ethical Considerations

Within this study, there are two forms of ethical considerations: the management of documents and archival records collected and the ethical nature of caretaking the sensitive topic of national intelligence. Both elements are beholden to the constructs of ethical intentions and virtuous action. These terms are best described by Thomas Aquinas, who defined virtue as a quality or "habit of the soul"; the individual who is continuously virtuous remains routinely right (Schall, 1997). Aquinas took to this methodology of 'reason' because he discerned that ethics

were something natural to human nature, and he equated virtue and ethics as possessions that make the person good (Aquinas, 1271/2007). With that understanding, the researcher of this study has only good and quality intentions for both the physical safekeeping of data and the sensitive topics that arise from the intelligence domain.

A storage component was enforced throughout the study, meaning all paper-based documentation and archival records were locked, and electronic files were password-protected and restricted from outside users. As stated in the literature search strategy in Chapter 2, serious considerations must be taken when focusing on the US intelligence apparatus—specifically surrounding the sensitive nature of classified or declassified materials. This study had minimal designated “unclassified” material; however, declassified National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) were used specifically for the Cuban Missile Crisis and post-September 11, 2001. Unclassified material is still considered a security classification assigned to official information that does not warrant the assignment of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret (or SCI) markings but is not publicly releasable without authorization (Bagley, 1993). In addition, combining multiple unclassified or available controlled unclassified information (CUI) to produce a finished product could be considered sensitive or classified depending on the integration of the unclassified sources. Therefore, this study maintained a high vigilance surrounding derivative classification, incorporation, paraphrasing, or restating of declassified or already released unclassified materials.

Summary

This chapter explained the approach, design, and collection/analysis rationale for exploring new avenues for making sense of ethnocentrism, a cognitive bias within intelligence

analysis. During this complex qualitative multi-case study, documents and archival records were the core mediums from which data was extracted. After gaining IRB approval, the collection of relevant documentation and archival records was researched and leveraged for the researcher to make sound and logical deductions. Finally, this chapter identifies that the researcher used specific patterns and predetermined thematic analysis while allowing additional thematic components (within the 6-D dimension definitions) to extend the holistic nature of this research.

The data analysis section provides clear guidelines on how each cultural dimension was explored separately, concluding in a specific narrative comparing how that respective dimension was measured throughout the three case studies. Three case studies were discussed to best answer the RQs, including the Attack on Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Islamic extremism focusing on al-Qaeda. Ultimately, the research culminates in a comparative and comprehensive narrative crafted with synthesized findings that identify relationships, patterns, themes, and their relation to making sense of ethnocentrism in intelligence analysis.

The sub-context of trustworthiness is critical for every research study. The factors of credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability were prioritized throughout this study, and specific controls of each concept were incorporated to protect the study's validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The use of triangulation was leveraged throughout the data collection and analysis phases to solidify credibility. Audit trails and detailed descriptions of the research process ensure the study's dependability, confirmability, and transferability. From an ethical perspective, this study identifies two ethical concerns. The first is the physical management of collected and analyzed data, and the second is safeguarding intelligence within the unclassified domain. Both hold significant weight on the outcome and longevity of this study, and the

previously described mitigation techniques were employed throughout the study.

This study introduces a new way of thinking about ethnocentrism within intelligence analysis. It explores the possibility of reframing analysis by identifying national cultural dimensions. As a new concept, relying on traditional research design and methods, the objective is to test preexisting intelligence data points and retrospectively implement an additional thought process that can redefine, judge plausibility, detect inconsistencies, and, most importantly, sharpen analytical distinctions and fill gaps in intelligence analysis.

The hope of the world is that wisdom can arrest conflict between brothers, I believe that war is the deadly harvest of arrogant and unreasoning minds.

—President Dwight D. Eisenhower

CHAPTER FOUR: SENSEMAKING IN THE PACIFIC—1941

Overview

The following three chapters will encompass the findings of this dissertation, based on the scope and methodology outlined in chapters one through three. Each of the subsequent chapters will follow a similar structure, beginning with the historical context of the case study subject and then identifying the qualitative representation to determine the cultural disposition of each case study subject. In this chapter, Imperial Japan is the subject. Each cultural dimension of the 6-D model will guide the chapter outline, and each of the predetermined themes associated with the individual dimensions of the 6-D model will be examined with Imperial Japan as the primary focus. Additional or new themes will also be examined as they are presented in the literature. The US perspective will also be analyzed for comparison purposes, specifically leveraging literature that accurately explains the American understanding and perception of Imperial Japan and how the intelligence apparatus also viewed the pre-war Japanese. It is important to note,

In 1941, a better description of the US intelligence establishment would have been intelligence fiefdoms. The State Department received reports from its missions abroad. The War and Navy Departments had attachés with the responsibility of reporting on military intelligence. Small cryptographic units in both departments worked on foreign government ciphers. The attorney general and FBI director received reporting from their corresponding field offices—the senior US attorneys in the various states and the FBI divisions. Treasury received information from the Secret Service and Customs. However,

none of those offices was obliged to provide raw intelligence or analysis to the White House. And each jealously held their “intelligence” and prevented the other parts of the government from even knowing what types of collection they were undertaking. (Seeger, 2023, p. 48)

The literature surrounding the American perception of Imperial Japan, in conjunction with 1940s US intelligence, will be evaluated through the framework of predetermined qualitative themes that define each element of the 6-D model parameters. Finally, a comparison will be conducted identifying the difference between how Imperial Japan would score within the 6-D model and how the limited US intelligence community, mostly comprised of State Department memorandums and unsophisticated SIGINT, perceived Imperial Japan within the 6-D model constructs.

Imperial Japan Philosophy & Expansionism

Meiji Restoration: Confucianism to Empiricism

The Japanese counter to European expansionism and American trade demands ended a two-century-long foreign policy, sustained by the Tokugawa Shōguns, setting conditions of seclusion and isolationism, generally known as *Sakoku*, meaning ‘closed country’ (Tolstoguzov, 2018). The transition away from isolationism is attributed to Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the US Navy, who arrived south of Yokohama with a fleet of four American sloops and the latest steam-powered ships on July 8, 1853 (Perry, 1968). An expedition that was heavily endorsed by the Fillmore administration (National Archives, 1854). Ultimately, by the threat of force against the Japanese, the US government was determined to reach three main objectives: (1) ensure the rights of American whalers, (2) strategically develop coaling ports throughout the coasts of

Imperial Japan, and (3) begin bilateral trade. Through the Treaty of Kanagawa (National Archives, 1854), a plethora of unfavorable agreements, and violations of long-standing national foreign policy and cultural understandings were enacted. The Harris Treaty was signed four years later, in 1858, which expanded the basis of the Treaty of Kanagawa and further amplified the diplomatic privileges of the US in Imperial Japan while increasing Western economic penetration throughout the island nation (Iokibe & Minohara, 2017).

The emperor of Imperial Japan, Emperor Kōmei, refused to accept these treaties because, although he appreciated the well-calculated manner in which they were presented, he realized how they were a complete manipulation to make Imperial Japan an open country (Kitahara, 1986). At the same time, the Shōgun, Tokugawa Iemochi, the power-holding force in 19th century Imperial Japan, who feared Western supremacy, continued to sign similar treaties known as the “Ansei treaties,” with European nations, including Holland, Russia, Great Britain, and France. The identity of Imperial Japan was in flux, and the Japanese Emperor demanded that the Shōgun “refuse these new demands, and shoo the foreigners out of his country, as befitting his job description as the barbarian-suppressing supreme general” (J. Clements, 2022, p. 10). However, the Shōgun viewed these isolationist sentiments as archaic and founded on darker historical components when “early samurai had fought decades of frontier wars against Imperial Japan’s indigenous people in the north” (J. Clements, 2022, p. 10). Later generations would denigrate these polarizing treaties as “unequal treaties.” This designation was not unwarranted as the agreements mirrored imperial pacts usually forged between Western signatories and underdeveloped colonies. Additionally, the treaties included provisions of extraterritoriality and the denial of Japanese-controlled tariff rates (Auslin, 2004).

Within the solitary confines of Kyōto, where American influence had not yet penetrated

traditional culture, the emperor labeled the Shōgun incompetent, and a shift in diplomatic and political culture propagated throughout Imperial Japan. Two differing political regimes began to create divisive ideas, beliefs, and values, thus altering ordinary Japanese culture and the patterns of cooperating with the foreign world (Auslin, 2004; Iriye, 1997). In the wake of Imperial Japan being viewed as a failed state by foreign powers and the political culture's shift away from the centuries-old neo-Confucianist heritage institutionalized in Tokugawa Japan, there was a violent coup d'état. The powerful faction against the Shōgun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu who was elevated to Shōgun in 1866, led by samurai loyal to the emperor, forced the Shōgun to tender his resignation and relinquish power and status in 1867 (Wynn, 2020). The slogan of *Sonno joi*, advocating for the "restoration of the emperor and expel the Barbarians," gained prominence throughout the island nation (Benedict, 1946, p. 76). Simultaneously, there emerged a widespread desire for the reinstatement of the traditional 10th-century golden age, predating the dual rule of Shōgun and Emperor, which permeated societal paradigms. During this political transition, Emperor Kōmei became ill and died. The Crown Prince, Mutsuhito, ascended to the Chrysanthemum Throne and proclaimed the restoration of imperial rule in January 1868 (Griffis, 2004). The emperor assumed the name Meiji, defined as the "enlightened rule," and the *Meiji Restoration* began (Arisaka, 2014).

The Meiji Restoration, in its infancy, is understood to be an era of eliminating foreign individuals from Imperial Japan and, more importantly, the shift away from the "Confucian models of thought and behavior cultivated since the time of the Tokugawa shogunate" (Katsuhito, 2016, p. 12). As the newest generation of Meiji intellectuals were born, not beholden to the narrow and strict subject-centered educational perennialism historically dictated by government authority, their academic curiosity and progressivism peaked; however, the

influence of Confucian ethics continued to guide their way of thinking. Yamaji Aizan (1864-1917) explained:

I have given up the teachings of Confucianism, but I cannot possibly forget the sweetness with which Confucianism unifies the Way of humanity with that of heaven and grounds the feelings of the righteous in what is unchangeable (Tokutomi & Yamaji, 1971, p. 392).

While these intellectual insights represented a departure from Japan's efforts to modernize, the fusion of Confucianism with modern ideals introduced a novel line of thinking. Despite the inevitable challenges to the prevailing new thought, this synthesis propelled Imperial Japan towards a self-defined societal construct uniquely its own. In contrast to classical Western philosophy, founded in Greek influence, where there was a systematic process of deductive methods leveraged to organize knowledge through original principles (Russell, 1945), Imperial Japan subscribed to an inductive method that took its “lead from empirical facts and relied mainly on experiment and verification for its conclusions” (Katsuhito, 2016, p. 13). Within the early period of the Meiji Restoration, empirical philosophy in tandem with Western cultural perspective manifested fundamental shifts throughout Japanese society and altered their learning and thinking (Katsuhito, 2016).

The new philosophical approach of empiricism impacted all levels of Japanese life—social, political, economic, technological, cultural, and aesthetic (M. Jansen, 1965; Samson, 1989). The rapid modernization was also evident amongst the smallest choices of Japanese society, including “clothing (kimono or dress/suit), eating utensils (chopsticks or silverware), whether to eat beef (a new custom), where to sit (a mat on the floor or a chair) entertainment (traditional or Western-style) and other daily practices all became markers of this cultural transformation” (Arisaka, 2014, p. 4). Throughout the Meiji era, promoting individual self-

consciousness generated a continuous, and sometimes conflicting, oscillation between *wakon yosai*, or “Eastern spirit of Japan and Western science” implementation (Theodore de Bary et al., 2005). Japanese intellectuals and political decision-makers wished to combine the “best elements of both to form a unique, modern yet non-Western culture of Japan” (Arisaka, 2014, p. 5). Meiji thinkers succeeded in the attempted balance, as they concurred that unique elements of Japanese culture were universal with empirical, philosophical expressions. It was found that the combination of Western philosophical models consisting of rational thinking and traditional Japanese values should not be viewed as in competition but as in a relationship. This thought process and framework was inspired by Inoue Tetsujirō’s Buddhist expression of “harmonious interrelation,” and Inoue Enryō enhanced this perspective by stating the following metaphor: “water-in-wave and wave-in-water indicate the reason why truth and all things are inseparable from each other, just as there are no waves without water and no water without waves” (Enryō, 1987, p. 370). This equilibrium was felt throughout all aspects of Japanese life, including political systems, the reconsidering of spirituality, critical thinking, and artistic concepts (Heisig et al., 2011).

Japanese Imperialism: Spheres of Influence

In concert with the new philosophical application, the Meiji generation’s foreign-policy objectives were to emphasize the Emperor and Imperial Japan as a great power capable of ensuring Japanese security and independence. These objectives underpinned the domestic reforms that signaled the sovereign’s strength. According to Paine (2017), the list of reforms is impressive:

In 1869, a year after the new government was formed, it overturned the internal distribution of power by eliminating the feudal domains that had long fragmented Japan.

It then turned from the top of the social pyramid to the bottom. In 1872, it made elementary education compulsory in recognition that modernization depended on an educated citizenry. In 1882, it turned to financial and legal institutions: it founded the Bank of Japan and promulgated a Westernized criminal code. In 1885, it began reforming political institutions by creating a Cabinet subordinate to a prime minister. In 1886, it founded Tokyo Imperial University to become the center of higher Westernized learning. In 1887, it instituted a modern civil service examination system. In 1889, it promulgated a Constitution, and in 1890, it convened the first Diet, reorganized the judicial system, and introduced a westernized code of civil procedure. (Paine, 2017, p. 8)

The efforts of Meiji Japan were primarily reactionary to the unequal treaties, absolute infringement by European and American states, and the colonial-type discrimination imposed on the Japanese race. The foundation for Imperial Japan to become equal in the eyes of Western powers began with its domestic reforms, starting with the Charter Oath of 1868 that promised to “strengthen imperial rule by uniting society behind economic development, governing through a new public assembly, allowing all classes to pursue legitimate aspirations, discarding obsolete customs, and, most critically, seeking knowledge worldwide” (Paine, 2017, p. 5).

With state-building the primary focus of Meiji Japan, the next logical point in national progression and prestige-building was developing a modern and respectable military focusing on a formidable navy and a logistically capable army (Koga, 2020). Similar to other movements within Meiji Japan, the military build-up was centered around a slogan, *fukoku kyōhei*, meaning “enrich the state, strengthen the army” (Jacob, 2016). Imperial Japan exercised care when designing its military, attempting to adopt successful models from other states. These models included the military philosophy and leadership used by Prussia, logistics methods used by the

United States, naval platforms and fleet design used by the British, the maritime doctrine articulated by US Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (Paine, 2017, p. 9), and the manpower/infantry precepts used by the Germany army (Evans & Peattie, 1997; Presseisen, 1965). With these elements together, Imperial Japan believed it could reach its desire to become a “floating fortress” able to “exercise power in all directions” (Harries & Harries, 1991, p. 43).

Philosophical and economic expansion was also a domestic ambition of Meiji Japan; however, those concepts were directly linked to territorial growth and influence throughout Asia, and became a priority foreign affairs of the Japanese Empire. By 1894, domestic ambition and foreign policy collided, and Imperial Japan initiated the First Sino–Japanese War. Japanese historians argue that Imperial Japan’s 1894-95 war against the Qing dynasty “marked the rupture in time, inaugurating a ‘Fifty-Year War’ that lasted until 1945” (Barclay, 2021, p. 1). This “Forever War” of nearly fifty years was a series of strategic diplomatic maneuvers that alternated “peacetime” (constitutionalism) and “wartime” (militarism), periods that collectively identify Japan’s continuum of expansion through limited wars in Korea, mainland China, Taiwan, Russia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands (Barclay, 2021, pp. 1–2). Culturally, the Sino–Japanese War in 1894-95 was a turning point in the Japanese citizenry's belief that Imperial Japan was a national entity, later considered the “Great Japanese Empire” (Hiyama, 2001, pp. 26–31). Additionally, military service, due to the conscription ordinance of 1873, was traditionally viewed as a “blood tax” in Imperial Japan; however, from the beginning of the Sino–Japanese War to the end of WWII, national survival was perceived to be directly linked to soldiering, the emperor's success, and the expansion of Imperial Japan’s geography/sphere of influence (Hiyama, 2001, pp. 40–42).

By 1894, the slogan "wealth and strength" was seen as accomplished. During this time,

the gaps between Imperial Japan and its Asian counterparts widened significantly, setting them apart in terms of prosperity and power. With (1) the political domain stable, (2) consistency in the structure of laws and tax revenue, (3) manufacturing and textile industries booming, (4) external nations' new perception of Imperial Japan as a civilized nation-state, and (5) the restructuring of treaties with European nation-states created an opportunity for, and made imperialism easier to pursue (Beasley, 1991). As a result of early Meiji Malthusian expansionist ambition, territorial enlargement on the Northern Island of Hokkaido (Xu Lu, 2019), the Japanese annexation of the Ryukyu Islands (Yoon, 2019), and the attempted occupation of Taiwan (Masaru, 2005) were appropriate next steps. With its adeptness in swiftly executing military operations and taking control of territories by leveraging existing local conflicts, Imperial Japan believed it had now established itself with a seasoned army and a capable navy.

With this understanding, and under the guise of “protecting Japanese nationals in Korea,” Imperial Japan went to war with China in the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–5 (Paine, 2017, p. 15). The justification for war came from the Japanese believing the Chinese intrusions were violating Korean sovereignty; however, ultimately, the Japanese objective was to destabilize the “regional balance of power,” which came at “Chinese and Russian expense” (Paine, 2017, p. 15). The Sino–Japanese war was “a milestone in the progress of Japanese militarism” (D. H. James, 2010, p. 132), and the Japanese success contained Russian expansion throughout Korea, specifically forcing Russia to delay the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Treaty of Shimoneseki was signed in 1895, and China agreed to honor Korean independence while also forfeiting the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands (Paine, 2003).

In the wake of the Sino–Japanese war, Russia and China agreed to the Trans-Siberian Railway to cross between territories, specifically the region of Manchuria. However, within this

infrastructure agreement, there was a drafted clause “providing for a Russo-Chinese Military Alliance directed at Japan” (D. H. James, 2010, p. 133). This type of infrastructure agreement was not an uncommon foreign affairs tactic in this period; as the Tokyo magazine *Taiyō* observed in July 1899, “the means of extending one’s territory without the use of troops...is railway policy” (Beasley, 1991, p. 74). By 1902, post-Boxer Rebellion in China, the Russian sphere of influence expanded through “diplomatic, civil, military, and commercial affairs” (D. H. James, 2010, p. 135). These Russian tactics in the Asian mainland inadvertently aided Japanese ambitions in Korea and provided an opportunity for a propaganda campaign that swayed the Japanese public that their sphere of influence was necessary to preserve Asian culture and combat Russian influence. By the time the Russo–Japanese War broke out in 1904, after years of increased hostilities between Russia and Imperial Japan in and around Korea, “Japan had provided on average a little over 60% of Korean imports and taken about 80% of exports” (Beasley, 1991, p. 75). After multiple Russo–Japanese disputes concerning Manchuria and Korea and a Japanese–British military alliance, in “early February 1904, Japanese land and sea forces launched attacks on Russian positions in southern Manchuria, using Korea as a staging area” (Beasley, 1991, p. 78). The Russo–Japanese War was considered the prelude to territorial expansion, as Imperial Japan gained control over Sakhalin and Southern Manchuria. However, the most significant outcome was the Japanese victory over Russia, which firmly established a prevailing global perception of Japanese strength and influence. With Japan defeating Russia, a major world nation-state, the objectives of Imperial Japan had conclusively been achieved. Imperial Japan had built an empire that would rival European powers by westernizing Japanese society, defeating Chinese and Russian influence in the region, and remaining a continuously expanding sovereign.

After the Russo–Japanese War, Korea became a de facto Japanese province. Ultimately, post-1905, control of foreign relations and administration of Korea was given to the resident-general under the Japanese emperor (McKenzie, 2009, p. 89). In an appeal to the US, Korea declared, “the so-called treaty of protectorate recently concluded between Korea and Imperial Japan was extorted at the point of a sword and under duress and therefore is null and void” (McKenzie, 2009, p. 100). The US recognized Korean independence; however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was compelled to take the stance that if the “Koreans could not maintain the treaty, other nations could not be expected to do for them what they could not do for themselves” (McKenzie, 2009, p. 101). Additionally, FDR understood the power dynamic between Russia and Imperial Japan within the region, and in the Russo–Japanese relationship, “the president personally favored Japan” (Morris, 2001, p. 311). As a result, in August of 1910, the Japan–Korea treaty took full effect, and Korea was annexed and placed under Japanese control (Gilliland, 1920). It is argued at this point in the early 1900s, in the wake of Japanese expansion being championed in some international circles and not being challenged by other prominent nation-states, that Imperial Japan developed an appetite for future foreign expansion which eventually led to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific theater of war in WWII.

Imperial Japanese Expansionism: Taishō Era & Shōwa Era

Upon the death of Emperor Meiji in July 1912, the Taishō era began. As a result, Imperial Japan was emboldened to explore further territorial expansion. The reason was unprecedented economic growth and Imperial Japan being an archipelago of limited resources, which made reliance on British, French, and American trade of rubber, wood-pulp, cotton, scrap-iron, and oil critical to maintain such substantial growth (D. H. James, 2010). Concurrently, diverging political transformations were underway, characterized by Emperor Taishō's perceived

weaker rule compared to his predecessor. Consequently, both parliament and the military saw an increase in their power. Japanese political systems saw that “the main task confronting Imperial Japan’s leaders changed from building a great power to corking the domestic unrest arising from industrialization and urbanization – another factor contributing to party cabinets” (Paine, 2017, p. 89). Correspondingly, electoral participation became more prominent, and new political parties with conflicting ideologies were created. However, despite the shifting political landscape, the previous expansionist policy to project the strength of the sovereign remained. The theory of Japanese expansion of the period is best defined by Young (2010), who identifies the Japanese thought “that the territory of a weak neighbor was liable to be used as cover by a strong enemy; this naturally leads to absorption of the dangerous territory, until the borders of the strong Powers are coterminous” (Young, 2010, p. 21). Because of this sentiment, Imperial Japan increased infantry and naval investment. As a result, the Japanese army expanded, and its navy became the world’s third most powerful maritime presence, measured by the Japanese influence that spanned thousands of miles across the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, and the Mediterranean (Young, 2010).

Due to Imperial Japan’s Anglo–Japanese Alliance and its economic and military strength, the Allied Powers of the Great War (World War I) hoped Imperial Japan would honor its commitment to the British. Amidst these developments, Germany’s presence in the area, characterized by its establishment of colonies and naval bases in the region leading up to WWI, was also a significant factor. One of the most significant territories was Kiaochau (present-day Qingdao), which Germany acquired through lease agreements with China in the late 19th century. This strategic foothold provided Germany with access to vital trade routes and naval resources in the Pacific. Additionally, Germany aimed to expand its influence in East Asia

through economic investments and diplomatic maneuvers. The Japanese wished for the German navy not to disturb the peace of the Far East. They provided an ultimatum to the German warships, for them to leave Chinese waters, and for Kiaochau leased territory to be turned over to Imperial Japan (Young, 2010, p. 71). With the German navy ignoring the ultimatum, Imperial Japan formally declared war, claiming German hostilities drove the decision; however, there are still no records of German aggression.

Imperial Japan's siding with the Powers catalyzed Japanese and Pacific expansionism (Barclay, 2021; Dahl, 2013a; Paine, 2017). By the end of WWI, Imperial Japan owned the previously occupied German territories across the coast of China and multiple Micronesian Islands in the Pacific. The Japanese advancement in WWI effectively spread their sphere of influence in strategic locations throughout China and the Pacific, providing them with increased economic privilege (Beasley, 1991). Separately, the Kiaochau and various German-held islands (Mariana, Palau, Caroline, and Marshall) held minimal value, “but when linked in the public mind with a colony in Taiwan and commercial expansion into southern China, they served to stimulate a growth of interest in the whole 'south seas' (nanyō), including south-east Asia” (Beasley, 1991, p. 116).

At this point, due to militarization and expedited expansionism, formal American–Japanese relations became slightly strained. Also, the Japanese–American relations declined partially due to the Governor of California supporting a bill in the California legislature declaring that aliens (i.e., Orientals) were “ineligible to citizenship” and could not own land in California (K. A. Clements, 1987, p. 138). Although this reaction was a double standard, “the Japanese denied all foreigners the right to own land in Japan ... they bitterly resented this pointed discrimination against Orientals in the United States” (K. A. Clements, 1987, p. 138). While

Japanese Americans were becoming “targets of racial discrimination and mob violence,” the American stance on Imperial Japan’s influence in China and Southeast Asia was a growing concern (K. A. Clements, 1987, p. 138). The Japanese saw these immigration laws as an attack on the sovereign, and by 1924, racial discrimination in the US was propagandized nationwide, building poor sentiment and perception of the US.

Domestically, in the early 1900s, Imperial Japan was beginning to experience the warring of political and economic factions fueled by greed and nationalistic ideologies, typically represented in the military, banking, industrial, and statecraft sectors. Because of this, in 1918, physical confrontations broke out across the country. These “Rice Riots” were strikes against the rising cost of living, and the market-manipulated price of food (specifically rice prices that increased by 300% between 1915 and 1918) (D. H. James, 2010, p. 161). Domestic issues and international agreements also affected the new Emperor Hirohito Shōwa Tenno (Shōwa era), who immediately faced the rise of nationalism and external obligations, such as Imperial Japan being responsible for “Peace in the Orient” post-WWI (D. H. James, 2010, p. 165). The nationalist militarism movement in Imperial Japan that held heavy political influence by the early 1930s was described as ultra-nationalist and fascist (Maruyama, 1963). The “men of spirit” were idolized by the Japanese public as nationalist heroes (Beasley, 1991, p. 177). These were the prominent individuals who, in the 1860s, helped eliminate the Tokugawa (Beasley, 1991, p. 177). The same tactics used to install Meiji—assassination, terrorism, and coups d’état—were used by civilian extremist groups and young military officers in the 1920s, on multiple occasions (Shillony, 1973). By 1936, the Prime Minister, Inukai Tsuyoshi, had been murdered, and two failed coups d’état had taken place in Tokyo. Nationalism gripped Japanese society and drove an aggressive campaign to control Imperial Japan's political, industrial, and cultural makeup until

1945, spearheaded by military leaders in prominent political positions.

The common ground between the Japanese government and the nationalist movement was foreign policy. Both believed in the evil of Marxism and that only through “Japanese assistance” could the countries of Asia [China and India] overturn the villainous British and Russian empires (Beasley, 1991, p. 178). Additional accelerant to expansionist policy was found through correspondence between Japanese settlers in treaty ports and leaseholds from Chinese mainland cities of Wuhan to Shandong, who “energetically petitioned Japanese politicians for protection from protestors, strikers, and Nationalist soldiers (Barclay, 2021, p. 18; Morton, 1980). Japanese intentions were conclusively self-serving as expanding Japanese sovereignty in the name of “safeguarding Asian interests and ideologies” would conveniently solve its population increase problem and supply Imperial Japan with “great areas [Korea, Manchuria, and French Indochina] adequate to support a population of at least two hundred and forty or fifty million” (Wilson, 1969, pp. 64–87). By 1931, it was a central belief that,

Japan, acting through the army, was destined to save the world from Marxism and other corrupting ideologies. This would require a series of wars, first against Russia, then against Britain, finally against the United States, in which Japan would stand as the champion of Asia and the embodiment of Confucian righteousness. (Beasley, 1991, p. 182)

Japanese expansionism was justified in Tokyo and began on the Asian mainland, specifically Manchuria. Justified by the Japanese theory that the “self-protection of Asians and for the coexistence and co-prosperity of China and Japan” was founded on Japanese control over Manchuria, Imperial Japan began its invasion (Beasley, 1991, p. 118). At this juncture, the US relationship with Imperial Japan had become more of a rivalry than an international partnership.

The perception of Japan as a rival by the US was predicated on Japan's perceived political hegemony in Asia and the strained relationship within the Anglo-Japanese alliance, thereby shaping America's view of Japan's hegemonic actions. It was understood by the British Foreign Office and the US that Imperial Japan stood “little chance of industrial survival unless she could obtain control over the resources of China,” making China a Japanese “vassal state” (Foreign Office, 1921). Neither Britain nor the US wanted to contribute to the alteration of Chinese sovereignty; thus, Britain and the US became dedicated to the defense and rehabilitation of China.

The London Naval Treaty of April 1930 was a tipping point between the Japanese military and Tokyo, as the Japanese government agreed to terms that further limited naval arms beyond the concessions of the 5:5:3 battleship ratio drafted in the 1921 Washington Naval Conference (Nomura, 1935). The military “began to consider more seriously how they could bypass civilian policymakers, when, as they saw it, national interests were at stake” (Beasley, 1991, p. 190). The inadequacy and power struggle between Japanese leaders and military institutions was building, and the Kwantung Army (Japanese occupying force in Manchuria) understood they could disregard the Japanese cabinet with impunity (Beasley, 1991, p. 198). Throughout the early and mid-1930s, Japanese influence spread throughout Manchuria, and Chinese nationalists fought a persistent guerilla campaign against the Japanese with minor success (Paine, 2017). These aggressive tactics caused a continuous escalation in the Sino–Japanese competition for dominance throughout Asia. Additionally, the Japanese exploited the vulnerabilities presented by the anarchy in China (the Chinese civil war between the nationalists and communists) and the Soviet Union’s attempts to export Communism to Asia. Imperial Japan seized these opportunities to meet territorial expansion objectives throughout the resource-rich

region of Manchuria.

In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, which was the first official exchange of gunfire in the Second Sino–Japanese War, China’s feuding factions of nationalists and communists realized ideological differences were pale in comparison to the inevitable hostile aggressions of the Japanese empire (Paine, 2017). By August, Japanese territorial expansion was being met with higher-than-anticipated resolve by the Chinese, and the initial projection of using five army divisions quickly evaporated. Despite the Japanese predictions of taking Shanghai within a month being inaccurate, the Chinese Communist–Nationalist alliance, supported by Russia, persisted in exerting unexpected and unprecedented pressure on Japanese logistics, manpower, and strategic outlooks, albeit losing ground. By the end of 1937, “Japan had suffered 100,000 casualties, doubled the number of divisions deployed in China to twenty-one, and committed 600,000 men” (Barnhart, 1987, p. 91). Throughout the Second Sino–Japanese War, the gradually increasing demand for forces impacted the Japanese population and the country’s military capabilities. Ultimately, by 1939 Imperial Japan had 34 divisions in China, totaling 1.1 million men, and “by 1941, fifty-one divisions, and still the Chinese refused to capitulate” (Liu, 1956, p. 205).

Regardless of the Chinese efforts, after the fall of Shanghai in the summer of 1937, and due to overwhelming Japanese force, “provincial capitals fell like dominoes: Baoding (Zhili) on 24 September, Shijiazhuang (Hebei) on 10 October, Taiyuan (Shanxi) on 9 November, Hangzhou (Zhejiang) on 24 December, and Jinan (Shandong) on 26 December” (Paine, 2017, p. 125). From this point forward, the war became devastating for civilians and military members on both sides, as massive atrocities were enacted by the Japanese and Chinese. First were the war crimes committed by the Japanese during the Nanjing Massacre (also referred to as the Rape of

Nanjing) that exacerbated Sino–Japanese hatred. Making the issue worse for current-day scholarship is the continued conflicting interpretations of the event through historical and governmental discourse (Kushner, 2007). Chinese history textbooks unanimously use words and photos to spell out Japanese brutality (Crawford & Foster, 2007). Conversely, Imperial Japan identifies historical events and war crimes in text with less strict methods to explain the narrative (Gu, 2022).

According to Western sources, Japanese troops entered the Chinese capital of Nanjing on 13 December 1937. During the initial days of occupation, they conducted mass killings of Prisoners of War (POW) and civilians, raped thousands of residents, and participated in violent acts of looting and vandalism. While the figures remain unclear, the scale of the atrocities and barbaric methods of execution were undeniable (Brook, 1999). Reasonable estimates consist of 200,000 POW and civilian deaths, and the conservative figure of individuals who were raped during the massacre is calculated with a minimum figure of 20,000 (higher estimates range to 80,000) (Brook, 1999; Vance, 2006, pp. 279–281). These atrocities would significantly impact international relations between Imperial Japan and the US, and the massacre would later be a catalyst for the escalation of hostilities between the two great powers leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Further atrocities were committed by the Chinese in June 1938, when Chinese Nationalists ordered “the breach of Yellow River dikes at Huayuankou, Henan, near the key railway junction at Zhengzhou,” inundating 70,000 square kilometers (Lary, 2010, p. 61). This act was one of the most devastating of the second Sino–Japanese War, as roughly 900,000 people died, and almost 3.9 million became refugees (Drea, 2009, p. 201; Lary & MacKinnon, 2001, p. 112). Japan continued to advance along the Chinese coast and throughout mainland China. By the fall of 1938, the Japanese were “in possession of all of north China and the Yangzi

River valley, the most prosperous and developed parts of the country” (Paine, 2017, p. 127). The Japanese advance was relentless throughout China and driven by an expanding policy objective, “wherever Japanese troops took territory, they set up new puppet governments,” which eventually led to Imperial Japan announcing in November 1938 the “formation of a New Asian Order encompassing Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and China” (Paine, 2017, p. 136). This new order was intended to “put the old order in Asia on death ground, attracting the attention of all the colonial powers as well as the United States, which had strong vested interests in the international legal and institutional status quo” (Paine, 2017, p. 136).

Technically, by 1938, the Second Sino–Japanese War was considered complete due to the Japanese acquiring all the critical centers of production and population; however, the Chinese never formally surrendered. The Chinese continued to fight, albeit on a lower scale; it was enough to mandate a continued Japanese presence of roughly 1.1 million Japanese soldiers. The Japanese presence is argued to be a critical variable to consider, as the occupying Japanese force could not be deployed to the southern island chains and Indochina during the Pacific theater campaigns, resulting in less effective Japanese forces fighting the Allied forces in WWII.

Imperial Japan’s penetration of southeast Asia was much more strategic than the expansion into Manchuria, as European states divided and colonized most of Asia’s southern regions. Thus, the Japanese expansion into southeast Asia can be considered the catalyst that set the stage for war in the Pacific. Ultimately, the Southeast Asian region appealed to the Japanese for the “acquisition of raw materials and the development of export markets” (Beasley, 1991, p. 120). However, in the Japanese attempt to “relieve the pressure of population” (Record, 2010, p. 40) by spreading the sphere of influence into Indochina, they coincidentally underestimated the compounding complexity of “diplomatic, political, and military miscalculations that led the

country to war when peace might have been possible” (Kato, 1946, p. 40). Due to the increase of Japanese militarization of the South Pacific, specifically naval air stations and fuel depots “by late 1940, it is fair to say that the naval high commands in both Washington and Tokyo assumed that a collision between the United States and Japan was unavoidable in the next several years” (Peattie, 1984, p. 202). Culturally, at this juncture, the Japanese decision to war against the US resulted from “offended honor, fatalism, racial arrogance, cultural incomprehension, economic desperation, and strategic miscalculation” (Record, 2010, p. 40). These realizations hardened US policy towards Imperial Japan, and decades of ethnocentric errors were exacerbated as the Japanese were now viewed as entirely adversarial.

Throughout 1940 and 1941, critical moments shaped the events that lead to the Japanese declaration of war at Pearl Harbor. The Tripartite Pact, Imperial Japan’s “entry into a military alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy” (Record, 2010, p. 40), “shook the foundations of global politics...and constituted a major turning point in foreign policy, and hinted at a further estrangement between Japan and the United States of America” (Yellen, 2016, p. 556). Imperial Japan’s intentions for the Pact were considered two-fold, aimed at struggling foreign and diplomatic relations. First, the Pact would serve as a “trump card” against the US as “Japanese leaders sought to scare the USA away from a confrontation that might lead to a two-ocean war” (Iriye, 1987, p. 113; Nish, 2002, pp. 139–141; Yellen, 2016, p. 556). Second, the alliance was “intended to counter the growing Soviet threat in East Asia, or to help Japan settle the China Incident, the undeclared Sino–Japanese war that had been raging nonstop since 1937” (Barnhart, 1987, pp. 139–140).

Due to the Axis alliance, the relationship between the US and Britain grew more robust, and the US perception of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union significantly shifted US policy

towards Imperial Japan. FDR began to aid China in more strategic ways that would influence Japanese expansion, specifically through Lend-Lease assistance, which bolstered Chinese resistance against Imperial Japan. Additionally, the Roosevelt administration enacted three critical policy initiatives, argued to be events that piqued US-Japanese tensions. First, “the administration’s decisions to freeze Japanese assets in the United States” (Record, 2010, p. 41). Second was the reinforcement of the Philippines, an island chain considered the gateway to oil-rich Dutch East Indies and tin- and rubber-rich British Malaya, which had fallen into the Japanese sphere of influence by 1940 (Marshall, 1995, p. 134). The access to “oil and critical raw materials would reduce the economic dependence [of Japan] on the United States,” which was perceived in the US as a sure path to war (Record, 2010, p. 41).

Finally, through the power of sanctions and embargos, the US engaged in economic warfare with Imperial Japan and began to limit Imperial Japan’s imported oil. Leading up to the embargo, 90% of Imperial Japan’s oil was imported, and 75-80% was from the US (E. S. Miller, 2007). Unfortunately, the Dutch East Indies was also an oil producer that could partially meet the needs of Imperial Japan’s military and domestic consumption; however, the US Navy and the Philippines were obstructing access to the desirable and necessary natural resources and materials (Anderson Jr., 1975). US public opinion favored the economic sanctions on Imperial Japan, as most Americans supported the cease of sale for all critical war-type materials, most notably oil and aviation gasoline (Utley, 1976).

The US sanctions and embargoes were intended to be economic tools for a defensive position for the US that also weakened Imperial Japan. However, the lack of cultural understanding, on behalf of the US, presented a pathway to catastrophic entanglements. Where the US was observing the adversary and expecting reactionary results that would be typical from

a Western country—i.e., further diplomatic and geopolitical talks, the Japanese held a cultural lens of significant difference. Imperial Japan saw the US actions as an act of war and an encroachment on the Japanese and Asian sphere of influence, similar to the Tokugawa Shōguns in 1868, the Chinese influence in Korea in 1894, the Russian control in Manchuria in 1904, and the Chinese communists and nationalists bastardizing Asian purity in 1937. For Imperial Japan, “war with the United States was not chosen. The decision for war was rather forced by the desire to avoid the terrible alternative of losing status or abandoning national objectives” (Wohlstetter, 1962, p. 353). The Japanese perspective mandated a proportional response to the deliberate attack on the Japanese people, culture, and sovereignty.

Imperial Japan aimed to achieve oil and resource independence from the US by seizing the Dutch East Indies and much of Southeast Asia. However, they were aware that this action would likely prompt the Roosevelt administration to take preemptive measures. Furthermore, the Japanese assumed that the American public was not inclined towards war, given the absence of US military involvement in Germany. The US decision to allow Japan to initiate the conflict, seen as a strategic opportunity at the time, was ultimately a significant misjudgment of Japanese capabilities and intentions. This perspective is succinctly summarized in the post-war testimony of US Secretary of State Henry Stimson: If you know your enemy is going to strike you, it is usually not wise to wait until he gets the jump on you by taking the initiative...in spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there would remain no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors. (Current, 1953; *Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 11*, 1945)

Due to the Roosevelt strategy and maximized tensions between the US and Imperial Japan, on December 7th, 1941, a day that will forever live in infamy, the Japanese declared war on the US by launching a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Cultural Disposition Profiles

Power Distance Profile: Imperial Japan & US Perspective

The industrialization and emergence of a national market from 1885 to 1940 significantly affected the concept of equality throughout Imperial Japan, specifically within the labor structures and among rural peasants (Bassino, 2006). The level of income distribution among households throughout the various prefectures also had a significant role in exacerbating the rise of personal inequality leading up to 1941 (Minami, 1995). However, where lower socioeconomic impacts were being felt, there remained a strong correlation between income and stature, which indicates a normalization of income inequality based on the ranking structure of societal constructs (Bassino, 2006). From an ethno-racial equality perspective, Imperial Japan claimed they were not conquerors but unifiers from 1885-1945, “protecting Asia from the Western menace ... and under imperial slogans such as “Do-so Do-shu (Same Origin, Same Race), the Japanese government granted all colonial subjects Japanese citizenship status regardless of their class, ethno-racial origin, religion, language, age and or/gender” (Shin, 2010, p. 332).

However, by the 1920s, Japanese bias against colonial subjects gave rise to negative sentiments and racial divisions across the empire. Additionally, the ongoing Second Sino–Japanese War in China and the Pacific War with the US caused a “labor vacuum created by the military draft of Japanese males, the government forcefully conscripted colonial subjects and forced them to work in mines, factories, and other manual labor sites in Japan like slaves, for they had neither salary nor freedom to leave” (Shin, 2010, p. 332).

These findings identify Imperial Japan's conscious decision not to reduce societal inequality. The exact opposite took place, as Imperial Japan took extra steps to intensify ethno-racial inequality during wartime, which, in coordination with the prolonged income inequality, designates Imperial Japan as high scoring on the PDI regarding their acceptance of inequality within society.

The next theme within the PDI constructs is the concept of superiors within a society and how they are viewed. Imperial Japan's monarchy represents over a thousand years of tradition and is different from Western conception of absolute monarchy, explicitly surrounding the notion of divine association. There is a misunderstood divergence between the "claim of absolute monarchs to be chosen by god" and the Japanese Emperor, who is considered to be "a living god" (Bertolini, 2018, p. 643). This historical concept continued throughout the Meiji restoration as the Emperor's political powers remained intact, and the constitutional implementation placed a reemphasis on the Emperor as "the source of the sovereign power, sacred, and inviolable" (Bertolini, 2018, p. 650). Throughout Imperial Japan's post-Meiji constitution, the ethnic and spiritual ties and loyalty between the Emperor and the people endured.

Since the teachings of Confucius in Imperial Japan, loyalty is considered one of the most revered virtues in the Japanese moral code. According to Nakano, "with the decline of the Shōgunate and the disintegration of the feudal organization precipitated by the invasion of western nations, it [loyalty] became so blended with the awakened national consciousness and the patriotic spirit, that, in the mind of the Japanese, loyalty to the emperor is hardly distinguished from patriotism" (Nakano, 1923, p. 32). Additionally, the social mechanism of hierarchy is directly linked to order within the Japanese culture, and Imperial Japan's

“confidence in hierarchy is basic to her whole notion of man’s relation to his fellow man and of man’s relation to the State” (Benedict, 1946, p. 43). Accepting the hierarchy and the inequalities associated is not only a Japanese behavior that is “as natural to them as breathing” it is also a “rule of their organized life” (Benedict, 1946, p. 47). The ruling constitution until 1945 relied on this acceptance and continued loyalty to the social structure, which eventually “created a class of autocrats standing between the sovereign and the people” (Nakano, 1923, p. 37). Because of this, the clamor from the Japanese people for political liberty was silenced, and the constitution manifested into a claim of Japanese independence as a nation.

The second theme of PDI surrounds how society views its superiors and their affiliated social and political structures. For this theme, a high score is correlated with superiors who are considered superior beings, whereas, in the low-scoring paradigm, superiors are not regarded as extraordinary and are easily replaced (Hofstede et al., 2010). Additionally, within the low-scoring constructs, hierarchies are accepted for the sake of order. The caveat of hierarchies regarding the position of a superior in a society introduced a secondary level of complexity, as the role of the Emperor in Imperial Japan is uncharacteristically unique. Uncoincidentally, due to the parameters in which the Japanese emperor existed in Imperial Japan, it naturally produced a high score on the PDI. Conversely, Imperial Japan’s acceptance of a hierarchy structure for the sake of order presents a moderate to low score on the PDI. However, based on the predominance of Japanese institutions of the period functioning for and by the grace of the emperor, a high score is warranted regarding the second PDI theme.

The third theme of the PDI is centered around a society's desire for centralization or decentralization, the latter producing a low score on the PDI. It is understood that Imperial

Japan's central government was primarily a facilitation of the emperor's rule; the state was also unique in the fact that Imperial Japan was "controlled not by a ruling class, at least not a ruling class in the classic Marxian sense, but by bureaucrats...it [Japan] was a bureaucracy, in the true sense of the word, rule by state officials" (Fulcher, 1988, p. 229). Meiji Japan's bureaucratization was a means to control political power and policy while simultaneously providing the people of Japan the ability to democratize the state by awakening the Japanese political consciousness through establishing the practice of voting for a representative parliament (M. B. Jansen, 2000). However, the Japanese constitution was considered superficial: "The vote was given to only one percent of the adult population, while both ministers and commanders of the armed forces were made individually responsible to the emperor, not the parliament" (Fulcher, 1988, p. 235). Additionally, the bureaucrats were servants of the emperor, who was "the center of the constitutional web," but the power was owned by the oligarchs and military leaders (Beasley, 1981; Fulcher, 1988, p. 235; Halliday, 1975, p. 35). These findings identify the minimality of democratically elected power in combination with emperor rule, which exacerbates Imperial Japan's higher scoring within the PDI constructs.

Japanese expansionism is an additional quality of measurement regarding how centralized the Japanese government became post-Meiji, but more importantly, post-WWI. The original intent of the Meiji Constitution was for Imperial Japan to build a society and military that could compete with the Western powers. The deviation of expansionism became a moderately emphasized national policy but was not yet considered critical. After WWI, this concept amplified, and without societal dissent, there was a centralized bureaucratic consistency across all domestic and foreign policy-making—continue to expand the Japanese modernized industrial state while embracing militarism (Peattie, 1975, 1984). Additional evidence of

Imperial Japan's increase in centralization is found in the state's attempt to create institutions of growth. Many economists articulate that centralization stagnates growth, whereas decentralization increases economic and societal development (Stockman, 2014), and pre-war Imperial Japan was/is considered an anomaly. Imperial Japan created a complex ownership web of material factories, financial institutions, and communication infrastructure, ultimately controlled by the state (G. C. Allen, 1972). Insiders and state officials owned most industries, and in contradiction to basic economics, Imperial Japan saw exponential growth, population increase, and a minor rise in the Japanese middle class.

Based on the findings, Imperial Japan produced a healthy facade through an elected parliament and a Western-leaning constitution; however, with a national deity at the center of government and the significant influence of military and political leaders, Imperial Japan generated a high score on the PDI. Interestingly, the findings articulate a divergence between the established governmental constructs and the Japanese population, as the people of Imperial Japan welcomed the emperor's rule but preferred a decentralized form of government. Within the lens of this study, the structures of pre-1945 dictate the cultural disposition as high. Still, it is understood that the Japanese culture would score neither low nor high but moderate if analyzing just societal models.

Early American philosophies that evolved out of European sentiments, specifically surrounding religious and political theories, helped craft the American doctrine of equality, officially expressed in the Declaration of Independence, "All men are created equal..." and the Virginia Declaration of Rights, "All men are by nature created equally free and independent..." (Boles, 2017, pp. 68–70). The concept of equality was and remains a cornerstone of the

American condition, and as Tocqueville (1835/2000) observed, equality is the “fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived...[equality] is a providential fact, and its principle characteristic is universal, it is enduring...all men serve its development” (Tocqueville, 1835/2000, p. 6). European thinkers such as Hobbes (1651/2011) and Locke (1689/1764) are considered the main contributors to the US national movement in the late 1700s that was predicated on the fact that men in their natural state were free and equal (Hobbes, 2011; Locke, 1689/1764; T. V. Smith, 1927). Throughout history, America has incurred many blemishes, deep-rooted intolerances, and injustices. Still, equality remained a protagonist in the national landscape and, more importantly, a beacon of hope spanning generation after generation. There is a belief among the American institutions and her people that equality is a pinnacle achievement that can be amplified and continuously perfected.

The strong attachment and esteem America holds for equality can present a psychological and cultural barrier when comparing national dimensions (Jervis, 2017). In the case of the Japanese Empire, the American interpretation of Japanese equality was highly complex. From a political and leadership perspective, the American understanding of the equality of the Japanese people centered around militarism endorsing imperial structure and its figurehead, Emperor Hirohito. He was considered the political and social leader of Imperial Japan, but the emphasis on imperial dominance built a great misconception which led many historians to conclude that “American opinion was bitterly anti-emperor and opposed any accommodation of the hated Japanese monarch” (Bernstein, 1975; Brands, 2005, p. 432). Where there is some debate the domestic opinion in America was more malleable and less monolithic, American policy and intelligence analysis “reflected dominant trends from the domestic discussion,” and both influential systems were victim to the “rhetorical tendencies of American propaganda and the

broader moral and ideological mobilization of the US public” (Brands, 2005, p. 433). However, the constant vigilance and emphasis on the Japanese figurehead produced a narrow lens, an inaccurate American perspective, and a flawed analytical line (Dahl, 2013a; Walton, 2012). It can be deduced that this ethnocentric perspective is derived from the Japanese: “reliance upon order and hierarchy versus our [American] faith in freedom and equality are poles apart, and it is hard for us to give hierarchy its just due as a possible social mechanism” (Benedict, 1946, p. 43).

In the case of the Japanese, from the American perspective, there was a belief that the Japanese were inherently inferior. However, in most Japanese American interactions in communities across the country, the immigrated Japanese were characterized as people of “pride, strong moral convictions, and community cohesiveness” (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 1997, p. 38). These characteristics were met with prejudice and anti-Japanese sentiment; however, they were considered qualities familiar to American aspirations and values. Collectively, the American people observed a similarity in Japanese ethics and nationalism to that of the Puritan work ethic and community virtues (Inouye & Elliott, 1967, pp. 36–37). However, racial segregation by law was still widespread, and “racial discrimination by custom and practice was found everywhere” (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 1997, p. 44). The Japanese personified a high level of equality amongst themselves, which skewed the reality of rampant inequality in the Japanese homeland, which “had been for centuries the rule of their organized life” (Benedict, 1946, p. 47). The equality projected by the immigrated Japanese to the US painted a false narrative for the American people and intelligence apparatus compared to the high levels of inequality throughout the Japanese sphere of influence in Asia. The irony is that the immigrated Japanese were exhibiting a desired American low-scoring PDI cultural value, and American assumptions, built off a small sample of

immigrants, were being projected on all Japanese across the globe.

While American policy and intelligence regarding Japanese activity and geopolitical presence in the Pacific, was plagued by miscalculations of Japanese military capabilities and intentions, US intelligence and policy also held significant misinterpretations of cultural perspectives (Benedict, 1946; Dahl, 2013b). The American intelligence disposition profile based primarily on State and War Department memorandums would consist of the following: (1) inequality was not considered acceptable within Japanese culture from an American perspective – resulting in a low-scoring PDI disposition; (2) the American perspective did not fully understand the divinity of the Japanese emperor; however, there was an understanding of the emperor's importance and criticality to the Japanese people—resulting in a high scoring PDI disposition; (3) Americans before Pearl Harbor were highly critical of Japanese militarism and expansionism, which resulted in high prejudice and severe racial disparity (Smith, 2007). Additionally, the centralized government of the Japanese did not escape American lawmakers and diplomats' notice (Current, 1953). American intelligence was familiar with the excessive power of the Japanese Emperor, specifically, his role as the sovereign of the state and commander in chief of the Japanese imperial forces; however, where intelligence was lacking was that the interconnectivity of the Japanese centralized state where military control, state-owned big business, and the ultranationalist movement headed by the war minister General Hideki Tojo were undervalued entirely. A prime example of this can be found in FDR's longhand notes to Churchill and King George VI, stating, "I'm a bit worried over the Japanese situation ... the Emperor is for peace, I think, but the Jingoese are trying to force his hand" (Roosevelt, 1950, pp. 1223–1224).

Throughout all three themes that make up the PDI—(1) inequality, (2) how society views superiors, and (3) centralization versus decentralization—Imperial Japan acquired a high rating in each. It is therefore deduced that Imperial Japan would have an overall high score in the PDI with minor deviations of a medium-high score. In comparison, the American perspective would have aggregated the Japanese cultural disposition in the lead-up to WWII slightly differently, with a low score on the PDI for inequality but with similarly high scores on the remaining two themes of how society views superiors and centralization versus decentralization.

Individualism v. Collectivism: Imperial Japan & US Perspective

By political structure alone, it can be deduced that the Japanese, in the lead-up to WWII, were similar to their current scoring of the present, with a middle-range scoring leaning closer to a collectivist society. Within Japanese society, the concept of collectivism can be translated into *zentaishugi*, which recognizes the direct link of collectivism to a dictatorial political system that can be defined by ultra-nationalism, Nazism, militarism, and specific facets of socialism (Itoh, 1991). Where this Japanese terminology examines the more extreme parameters of collectivism, the Japanese typically migrate away from using *zentaishugi* as a descriptive platform for their system. Instead, Japanese scholars have adopted phrases such as *Aidagarashugi* “relationalism” (Kumon, 1982), *Kanjinshugi* “contextualism” (Hamaguchi, 1982), and *shuhdanshugi* or “groupism” (Itoh, 1991). All of these descriptive structures identify various attributes of collectivism, and where individualism is undoubtedly present within Japanese culture at lower levels of society, as it was a national cornerstone of the Meiji restoration, collectivist goals are highly sought after. One of which is the first IDV theme—universalism, which is the classifying of others as individuals, scored against the societal application of exclusionism, which identifies others as in or out of a group, and more importantly, the associated characteristic of loyalty of

the individual within the group or collaborative settings (Enke et al., 2022).

Ultimately, through Imperial Japan's conviction to persevere beyond Western colonization and the successful movement of "catching up and surpassing the West," the Japanese society accepted a constitution that codified many individualist beliefs and values but also included a mandatory collectivist state that invested all sovereignty in the emperor (Samuels, 2007, p. 15). Further into the 1900's post-Russo-Japanese War, the domestic groupism or collectivist structures began to splinter. Global economic crashes helped amplify the have and have-not centrifugal forces throughout Imperial Japan. Where most of the industrial sector had the means to weather the depression, the agricultural sector (a majority of the Japanese population) suffered. It was only natural that citizens in a collectivist society would then look to their government and the constitutional system; however, these institutions proved inadequate and revealed an overabundance of weaknesses in political and Taishō leadership (M. B. Jansen, 2000, pp. 519–575). The lack of action concerned military leaders, and to maintain Japanese strategic military objectives, to preserve the collectivist state with a rising population, and to counteract the resource deficiencies, the military deemed it incumbent upon themselves to gain control of Imperial Japan's economy. This included expanding heavy industries to meet the continued military-industrial enterprise and taking "control of society as a whole in order to enforce mobilization of all of Imperial Japan's people when it became necessary" (Hunter-Chester, 2019, p. 213). Imperial Japan's national economy and its society were now linked to the total war theory and Imperial Japan's defense strategy (Drea, 2009, p. 138). The new design "posited Imperial Japan fighting against a coalition, likely composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China" (Drea, 2009, p. 140). With new international adversaries, a weak political establishment, and the growing narrative that Imperial Japan must "protect Japanese

interests and residents” (Hunter-Chester, 2019, p. 214), the Imperial military's commonplace dimension of in-group collectivism quickly progressed into Japanese society.

By the 1930s, when Imperial Japan was pivoting from domestic predicaments to international calamities, military “generals and admirals became more powerful political actors” (Hunter-Chester, 2019, p. 215; M. B. Jansen, 2000, pp. 590–591). Militarism in Imperial Japan was embraced, as institutional and national collectivism abided by the strong cultural norm—“the preference for harmony in decision-making bodies” (Eisenstadt, 1996, p. 320). Imperial Japan openly welcomed an economic and political approach dependent on grouping entities, people, and industries, as they believed operating out of a centralized structure was more advantageous than private endeavor (Paine, 2017). This is represented in *shudan ishiki*, the Japanese group consciousness, where the Japanese people increased their adherence to the social codes and group values and continued the long tradition of being “primarily group-oriented and giving more priority to group harmony than to individuals” (R. J. Davies & Ikeno, 2002, p. 195). These sentiments identify a secondary theme within IDV—a society that identifies more with “I” is higher on the IDV scale, whereas societies that identify as “We” are considered collectivist societies, generating a lower score. Imperial Japan, in this case, is the latter.

Throughout the Shōwa era, Japanese success was measured by group achievement and directly linked to military action (Paine, 2017; Record, 2010). From an IDV perspective, this indicates a society where the interests of the group prevail over the interests of the individuals (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 74). It can be argued that the Japanese approach of unification through the group is a deeply rooted cultural condition that can be traced back to Confucius's teachings and virtues found in the samurai (Benedict, 1946, p. 137; Hofstede & Harris-Bond, 1988). Due to

this, by the late 1930s and early 1940s, the “we” based sentiment in Japanese culture was highly evident as the military, political, industrial, financial, and agricultural sectors were at odds with each other, all frequently focused on strength through a cohesive group.

Additionally, the concept of unquestioned loyalty is a significant variable in the workings of the Japanese group, as there is a cultural understanding that “the loyalty a man of honor owes to his superior and to his fellows of his own class” was an unwavering obligation (Benedict, 1946, p. 137). This type of loyalty produces more cooperative behavior; in contrast, individualists embrace more competitive behaviors (Bjonstad & Ulleberg, 2017). The Japanese “have always been inventive in devising ways of avoiding direct competition ... this minimizing of direct competition goes all through Japanese life” (Benedict, 1946, pp. 154–155). This contrasts the American categorical imperative of “making good in competition with one’s fellows” (Benedict, 1946, p. 155). Many would argue that the American socioeconomic system is founded and coordinated through robust antitrust law and institutions designed to promote interdependent markets and amplify free competition (Kurz, 2015; C. Shapiro, 2019).

Competition in America is not only encouraged through Adam Smith’s (1776/1991) classic works but remains a cornerstone of the favored American attributes of equality, liberty, natural order, and justice. Conversely, the Japanese hierarchy system “with all its detailed rules of class minimizes direct competition” (Benedict, 1946, p. 155). Additional characteristics such as etiquette, honor, and proper courtesies are sharp cultural distinctions that build a less competitive environment. Where these attributes are not necessarily collectivist, the virtues associated with these critical Japanese characteristics manifest amenability and a shared set of values—and when a differing group who does not share those values approaches, the original

group becomes even more hermetic (Sole, 2017).

Based on these findings, three key IDV themes were identified: (1) societal application of universalism versus exclusionism; (2) a society that identifies with “I” or “We;” (3) a society embracing competition over cooperation. Throughout all three themes, Imperial Japan produced strong collectivist sentiments, thus scoring low on IDV in all three categories, making up a low IDV score overall. It is important to note that independence is a vital attribute of Japanese culture; it was a critical motivation behind the Meiji Restoration and used as a pretext to justify the expansionist agenda. However, this type of individualism is more of a nationalist property and was implemented out of fear of the growing threat of colonialism. The cultural condition of collectivism, which has been “overwhelmingly more representative in societies throughout history,” was openly embraced in Imperial Japan through familial obligation, political policies, national behaviors, and deeply embedded values (Benedict, 1946; Bongioanni, 2022, p. 65).

American individualism is a unique conglomerate of social philosophies predicated on free will, natural law, opportunity, democratic trust, and human behavior (Carey, 2004; Kelly et al., 1991; Rommen, 1998). Herbert Hoover (2016) identifies American individualism as a differing construct from any other type of individualism, as it is a spirituality predicated on equality of opportunity that embraces principles:

That while we build our society upon the attainment of the individual, we shall safeguard to every individual an equality of opportunity to take that position in the community to which his intelligence, character, ability, and ambition entitle him; that we keep the social solution free from frozen strata of classes; that we shall stimulate effort of each individual to achievement; that through an enlarging sense of responsibility and understanding, we

shall assist him to his attainment; while he, in turn, must stand up to the emery wheel of competition. (Hoover & Nash, 2016, pp. 7–8)

Hoover's acknowledgment of American individualism encapsulates the accumulation of concepts that make up the American interpretation of individualism. At its foundation, we find the Western philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, who reinforced the idea of individual autonomy and the pursuit of happiness through self-determination and reliance on the inner force of human free will (Irwin, 1992). This philosophical underpinning laid the groundwork for the development of American individualism as a core cultural value. Aurelius Augustine, later known as St. Augustine of Hippo, and Thomas Aquinas (now known as St. Thomas) built on these theories by taking a theological approach and identifying that only through God and foundational truths can an individual find happiness and motivation to act freely (Hill, 2016).

These philosophical realities sparked a renaissance of political and human thought, with the writings of Hobbes and Locke notably influencing American individualism. The seventeenth century witnessed a profound shift in the debate on governance, as the diminishing "rule" of kings coincided with the rise of democracy. During this period, various facets of political theory, including classical liberalism in its infancy, took on multiple forms, such as republicanism, constitutionalism, and early forms of liberalism (Stein, 1993). The last remnants of the "old ways" were encapsulated by Thomas Hobbes, best known for his seminal work *Leviathan*, penned in the aftermath of King Charles I of England's execution. Hobbes' overarching thesis presented a viewpoint contrary to Aristotle's philosophy, which emphasized human reason and the immortality of the soul—an Enlightenment ideal still considered antiquated by many. However, this line of thinking began the transfer of priorities, opening the door to thinkers who

valued reason, science, religious tolerance, and, most importantly, natural rights—life, liberty, and property (Lloyd, 2012). Throughout *Two Treatises of Government*, John Locke agrees with Hobbes in regard to the viciousness of the “state of nature,” necessitating what Hobbes describes as a “social contract” to guarantee harmony and order (J. Locke, 1689/1764). However, as a child of post-civil war England, Locke believed the supreme authority of government should reside in the stable hands of an elected legislature, similar to the English Parliament (Uzgalis, 2019). This contradiction to Hobbes identified Locke as a progressive thinker who supported individual freedom and believed in irrevocable natural rights that exist in the state of nature. This would present significant impacts of a negative nature on the power of a king (and future perspectives of an emperor). It proposed limiting their absolute power and only endorsing their ability to protect the natural rights of their subjects. Furthermore, the newfound individual freedom surrounding the foundation of this theoretical thought (found within *Two Treatises of Government*) influenced not only the conceptualizing and drafting of the Declaration of Independence and the founding of American principles by Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Samuel Adams, and other Founding Fathers, but the face of American democracy as we see it today (Asadi, 2015).

Within American thought, individualism also encompasses freedom of action and moral responsibility. As evident in Hoover’s articulations, these two philosophical issues resonate not only within societal paradigms but also extend beyond the confines of human consciousness to the metaphysical realm. They inform and shape human understanding while illustrating the depth of the soul’s conscience (Hill, 2016). The thesis of free will is made up of these two concepts, the idea that humans can have choice and control in actions via the freedom to choose specific behaviors. In other words, self-determination produces the causality of all actions (McLeod,

2023). Through spectacular oratory and literary dialogue during the American Founding, these characteristics were encapsulated through constitutional decree, and the US was the first sovereign union to transform and bring to balance a governing doctrine based on the ideology of individual liberty (Murray, 2013a).

Given the context, it is apparent that individualism is a coveted and necessary cornerstone of American cultural and political thought and a societal construct that defines the American people. Terms such as constitution, democratically elected legislature, and republicanism are fixed pieces of the American identity. Additionally, some would argue that these terms could be directly correlated to the natural phenomenon of American exceptionalism (Kelly et al., 1991; Murray, 2013). Because of this devotion to free thought and republican political institutions, the American perception of Imperial Japan post-1890s was discriminatory of cultural conditions but politically favorable (K. A. Clements, 1987). This was due to Imperial Japan promulgating a constitution in 1890, assembling an elected Diet (similar to a parliament or legislature—not bicameral), reorganizing the rule of law through a more comprehensive judicial system, and introducing a Westernized code of civil procedure (Paine, 2017, p. 8). However, this misinterpretation was primarily motivated by the use of European political system terminology and the lack of realistic evaluation of the complex situational composition of the Orient from a foreign affairs perspective (Schroeder, 1958).

Americans believed that regardless of the Japanese expansionism and belligerent violence in China, culturally, Imperial Japan stood for “universal principles, subscribed to by all peaceful men the world over” (Schroeder, 1958, p. 170). From an American diplomatic perspective, Imperial Japan was believed to be in the wrong militarily; however, through robust commercial

relations, it was recognized that Imperial Japan valued equal opportunity and self-preservation (Hornbeck, 1942). By 1938, concern surrounding Japanese actions in China caused significant shifts in policy—specific embargos would be placed on Imperial Japan. More importantly, the US State Department “quickly received the cooperation of American business groups and civilians,” resulting in an American “moral embargo” on Japanese goods and services (Adams, 1971, p. 80). Although the hostilities between the two nations were escalating and the populations were sensing that combative exchange was inevitable, the American government and US citizens were under the impression that the currency manipulation, property rights infringement, military action, industrial management, and inconsistent raw material exchange throughout Imperial Japan were not inherently linked (Adams, 1971). There was a perception that continued beyond 1940, even after the sanctions, that Imperial Japan was an adversarial entity, but was still adhering to the principles of independent commercial opportunity. This misconception of Japanese political culture was an egregious miscalculation by American diplomats and intelligence professionals.

Imperial Japan’s signing of the Tripartite Pact in an attempt to isolate the US and persuade America not to interfere in the Pacific increased the American defensive position; however, the American perception from an IDV perspective did not shift. Where not as clearly defined through the intelligence, diplomatic transmissions, and memorandums from the State Department (which were one and the same in the 1940s), it can be deduced that the three themes of IDV regarding the American perception of Imperial Japan would be scored as high indicating Americans thought Imperial Japan championed more of an individualism societal construct versus collectivism. This can be attributed to two fundamental issues: the lack of clarity on the political systems of the East and the cultural mindset or ethnocentrism of the 1940s American.

As previously stated, American individualism is an identity marker beyond typical cultural characteristics. It would have been incredibly difficult for Americans to disassociate and understand how such a vast cultural difference could exist, even though Imperial Japan operated under a Western-style constitution, held an elected legislature, championed competition within their free market, and convincingly abided by commercial opportunity. The inability to make that logical leap led to ethnocentric conditions, resulting in differing results from Imperial Japan's IDV cultural disposition as a collectivist society.

Masculinity v. Femininity: Imperial Japan & US Perspective

Familial values, behavioral patterns, legacy cultural conditions, and the impact of religion will be the primary focus to capture an accurate scoring of MAS. A heavier emphasis will be placed on the religious aspect, as "issues related to the masculinity-femininity dimension are central to any religion" (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 175). In Imperial Japan, two ideologies heavily impacted culture. First was the practiced religion/concepts of Shintōism, and secondly was the ancestral application of Confucianism. Where these two ideologies have contrasting values from a MAS perspective, both are considerably different from the predominant American religions and traditions of Christianity typically captured in Catholic and Protestant houses of worship or the predominant Jewish communities worshiping in the synagogue (Hout & Fischer, 2001). It is important to note that MAS is not scored based on the religion itself, but on the characteristics it implants into the society from a cultural standpoint.

Hofstede (2010) ensures the delineation and identifies that "masculine cultures worship a tough God or gods who justify tough behavior towards fellow humans; feminine cultures worship a tender God or gods who demand caring behavior toward fellow humans" (Hofstede et

al., 2010, p. 176). Additionally, there is a further level of complexity in depicting MAS correctly. In the case of Imperial Japan, a more modern example is that current-day “Buddhism in masculine Japan is very different from Buddhism in feminine Thailand” (R. Cooper & Cooper, 1982, p. 97; Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 176). Multiple components of religion and ancestral ideology must be identified to calculate MAS accurately, hence the usage of Shintōism in conjunction with Confucianism and other ideological Japanese components.

Shintōism within the Japanese structure can be challenging to understand as there is a difference between the religion Shintō and the government-sanctioned State Shintō. Where the implementation and practices are less of a focus within this study, the values and characteristics of Shintō are the primary concentration; however, both will be discussed. By the end of the Russo–Japanese War (1905), State Shintō “became a supra-religious national ritual system under the Imperial Constitution, which was ostensibly compatible with freedom of religion, but in actuality dominated the religions of Shintō and Buddhism. The doctrine of State Shintō was formulated definitively with the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education that adopted State Shinto as its ideological foundation” (Susumu & Murphy, 2009, p. 95). By the Shōwa era (1930s) the Japanese state expanded State Shintō which increased religious tensions throughout Imperial Japan. In the final period, “the period of fascist state religion” lasting from the invasion of Chinese Manchuria and bombing of Pearl Harbor through the end of WWII (1945) “State Shintō found a secure place as the state religion and the government tightened control over the various religions as they were mobilized for the war effort” (Susumu & Murphy, 2009, p. 95). Where some scholars argue State Shintō was not always allied with the “militarist, expansionist, and totalitarian ideologues ... and Shrine Shintō was not consistently treated well by the state,” (Michiaki, 2011; Sakamoto, 1993 as cited in Susumu & Murphy, 2009, p. 97) the foundational

principles of State Shintō were a coherent system of practices and religious ideas centered around *Kami*, “the word rendered as ‘god’ means literally ‘head,’ i.e., pinnacle of the hierarchy” (Benedict, 1946, p. 127). The Japanese state ultimately created a bastardized version of Shintō to reinforce the continuous obedience to the emperor and amplify governmental control in all cultural and religious activities throughout Imperial Japan.

The Western perspective of State Shintō, often referred to as neo-Shintoism in the 1930s and 40s, was considered a practice that “glorified the emperor and traditional Japanese virtues to the exclusion of Western influences, which were perceived as greedy, individualistic, bourgeois, and assertive” and implemented a series of “false ideals of the Japanese family-state and self-sacrifice in service of the nation, which was given a missionary interpretation and was thought by their ultranationalist proponents to be applicable in the modern world” (US State Department, 1994, p. 4).

Shintō (“the way of the gods”)—not to be confused with State Shintō, is considered a critical element in the Japanese culture (Naokazu, 1966). It provides a resounding absolute that affords the Japanese a unique distinctiveness and individuality from other cultures and religious practices across the globe. On the surface, Shintō is typically associated with characteristics that include “nature worship and taboos against *kegare* (impurities), but it has no system of doctrine; it exists in diverse forms as a folk belief but at the same time possesses certain features of organized religion” (Toshio, 1981, p. 1). Ultimately, from the outside viewer, Shintō is an intricate variable in Imperial Japan’s ancient mythology, including emperor worship, and can be considered the “indigenous religion of Japan, continuing in an unbroken line from prehistoric times down to the present” (Toshio, 1981, p. 1). From a cultural perspective, in conjunction with

the concomitant suppression of Buddhism and Confucianism during post-Meiji constitutionalism, “there have always been Shintō -like beliefs and customs (*shinkō*) ... an interpretation frequently found in studies of Japanese culture and intellectual history” (Toshio, 1981, pp. 1–2).

Religions like Shintō or Christianity encompass extensive historical narratives that can only be fully explored in comprehensive, lengthy publications and religious texts. Shintō encompasses an immense space of numberless *kami* that can be categorized as ancestral deities, human deities, and natural deities, creating a complex divine genealogy, with each deity having differences in quality and strength (Naokazu, 1966, pp. 49–50). Shintō’s fundamental concepts are so interwoven into Japanese culture that they are an interdependent body of thinking. This includes the beliefs of purity, harmony, family respect, and subordination of the individual before the group (Cartwright, 2017). Additionally, Shintō fosters a cultural mindset characterized by profound reverence for nature, expressed optimistically, and its influence on familial values, as well as the ongoing observance and dedication to ancestors (Littleton, 2002). Prayers and offerings asking for the *kami*’s help are considered a divine interaction; however, differing from Western religions, within Shintō, no previous commitment or traditional conditioning is necessary for those who visit the temples and shrines of the *kami* (Reader, 2008). These fundamental characteristics captured throughout the Shintō religion can be categorized as primarily feminine paradigms concerning the scope of the MAS-scoring architecture. However, the application and ideological reasoning behind the implementation of the Shintō practices, from a cultural behavior standpoint, will not necessarily diminish the feminine characteristics, but other cultural concepts such as Confucianism and *Giri* will change how the end state of the custom is established (Minamoto, 1969, p. 41, as cited in Murase, 1982).

Confucian traditions have been “transmitted and transformed over nearly two and half millennia,” its dominant cultural sphere has shaped the Asian centers of gravity, specifically China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia (Lee, 2017, p. 1). Confucianism acted and, in some ways, continues to “function as a main resource for cultural building, that is, for the education, formation, and cultivation of self and society” (Lee, 2017, p. 1). By the fourth century, Confucianism became accepted by the Japanese nobility, and by 1868 (Meiji restoration), Confucianism was considered a fundamental humanistic tradition within Japanese society (Nori-hisa, 1979, p. 16). From a cultural perspective, Confucian thought in Imperial Japan consisted of multiple trends. First was the consideration that Confucianism “enhanced the ethical, metaphysical, and moral aspects ... often centering on the concept of reverence or seriousness” (Marleen, 1996, p. 65). Second, Confucianism was the premise to “seek the Way through new ways of study of poetry, prose, ritual, and music” (Marleen, 1996; Minamoto, 1979, pp. 231–307). Third was the “movement toward exploring principles in the objective world” and placing “stress upon the moral rather than the intellectual aspect of man’s nature, and his emphasis on deeds rather than words” (Minamoto, 1979, pp. 388–397). Ultimately, where Confucianism at times calls for harsh punishment as a deterrent to chaos, competition, and violent behaviors, Kongzi (Confucius) believed that the only way to reach a thriving and harmonious society included a substantial investment in education and implemented controls that would help individuals follow the path of moral self-cultivation (Ivanhoe, 2000; Slote, 2016; Van Norden, 2007).

Moral self-cultivation, among other components of Confucianism, can be directly linked to high-scoring characteristics of the MAS cultural dimension. The nature of moral self-cultivation lies within the internal development of “moral motivation, the desire actually to do

what moral injunctions and principles tell us we ought to do” (Slote, 2016, p. 192). More simply, moral self-cultivation demands personal accountability and a “process that an individual can take charge of and accomplish largely through his or her own efforts” (Slote, 2016, p. 195). There is a belief in Confucianism that people can “fundamentally transform or shape themselves on moral terms, and Kongzi speaks of rituals or rites as helpful in effecting moral self-transformation” (Slote, 2016, p. 196). A more modern example of this thought would be the benefits of participating in athletics and the social science research proving that engaging in athletic competition can relocate energy and alter human capacity at a psychological and physiological level (Farrey, 2008; Wooden & Jamison, 2005). Again, we see the divergence between masculinity and femininity from an implementation perspective. Morality can correlate strongly to a low MAS score (femininity) (Hofstede et al., 2010). However, within particular cultural constructs, the execution of moral self-cultivation, specifically in Imperial Japan, shifts the feminine principle of moral self-cultivation to a masculine characteristic. Through solid demand for personal responsibility, the societal mandate of righteous persistence, continuous independent activity, accepting objective and unemotional results, and personifying individual strength that is then mandated in a familial way is highly consistent with high-scoring MAS characteristics.

Outside Confucianism and Shintō, a majority of Japanese believed in *Giri*, which includes a “heterogeneous list of obligations ranging from gratitude for an old kindness to the duty of revenge” (Benedict, 1946, p. 133). The debts associated with *Giri* are “regarded as having to be repaid with mathematical equivalence to the favor received, and there are time limits” (Benedict, 1946, p. 116). Ultimately, *Giri* is an instilled cultural characteristic that dictates patterns of behavior and the societal attitude toward moral duty and social obligation (R. J. Davies & Ikeno, 2002). *Giri* can be further understood as a “constellation of meanings” (R. J.

Davies & Ikeno, 2002, p. 95) that include “(1) moral principles or duty, (2) rules one has to obey in social relationships, and (3) behavior one is obliged to follow, or that must be done against one’s will” (Matsumura, 1988, p. 653). To reach *Giri*, the individual must be willing to communicate internally and externally honestly and directly. This means the core principles of *Giri* present a strong level of assertiveness to reach the desired harmony, and where the result (harmony) is a feminine characteristic, the approach to achieve the goal (decisiveness/assertiveness) is considered highly masculine.

Japanese Shintō and Confucian ethics, in conjunction with traditional ideologies, have encouraged masculine programming in Japanese society. From a gender role perspective, "males were taught to be strong and tough and encouraged to have control and dominance over children and women" (Yoko & Emiko, 1999, p. 136). However, Japanese women “were taught to be reserved, subservient and obey their husbands in their marriages and act similarly to their male children in their old age” (Yoko & Emiko, 1999, p. 136). These categorizations directly correlate to Holstead’s (2010) depiction of the mental programming found in a masculine society. Furthermore, within Imperial Japan, the emotional gender roles are distinct, “men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 140). Additional components critical for Imperial Japan to receive a high MAS score (masculine) include; Imperial Japan from a societal perspective preferred facts over emotions; the Japanese held admiration for strength—which is found in both Confucianism and traditional Japanese ideologies, and most importantly, the constructs of Shintō within a Confucian framework presents a highly masculine focus (Hofstede, 2011; Tokutomi & Yamaji, 1971).

In 1930s and 40s America, Shintō was considered a strange religion and nothing more than a simplistic form of thought (Benedict, 1946). Speculation surrounded the Japanese practice due to its unfamiliar categories of religious identity, and Shintō did “not fit neatly into our Western historical or *wissenschaftliche* [scientific] methods” (Kitagawa, 1988, p. 321). In defense of the ethnocentric Westerner, Shintō in the prewar era was a vastly established “not religion” state-funded church of 110,000 shrines (Benedict, 1946, pp. 87–88). Shintō fell within the national jurisdiction as statesmen appreciated the Shintō practices, which demanded proper respect for national symbols. Although Imperial Japan constitutionally decreed freedom of worship to the individual, Shintō was required of all citizens. Also, adding to the Western inability to associate, prefectural priests would “perform ceremonies for the people rather than conducting worship by the people, and there was, in State Shintō, nothing paralleling our [Western] familiar church-going” (Benedict, 1946, p. 88).

The consistent viewpoint within the American analytic framework, as evident in State Department correspondences with the US embassy in Tokyo and in limited intelligence assessments concerning the Pacific region and Japanese capabilities and intentions, portrayed a perception of Japan as possessing a significantly more feminine MAS score than was accurate. This perspective suggested an overly feminine characterization from an MAS standpoint within American thought. America believed Imperial Japan depended on imported materials and held a highly emotional foreign policy based on their actions in China (Benedict, 1946). More importantly, America had a complacent and smug mentality surrounding the Japanese and completely disregarded any Japanese assertiveness as a possibility. A prime example can be found in the American embassy in Tokyo believing they had,

considerable insight into Japanese psychology, noting at one point, when assessing the chances of a conflict [in 1941] between Japan and the United States, that National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic. (Walton, 2012, p. 90)

Intelligence also negated the masculine characteristic of Japanese assertiveness when key strategic indications and warnings of hostile action were ignored (Wohlstetter, 1962), specifically the telegram sent by Joseph Grew, the American ambassador to Tokyo, in late January 1941, a year before the attack at Pearl Harbor (Dahl, 2013b, 2013a). According to the *Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings*, he [Ambassador Grew] “reported that the Peruvian Minister to Japan had heard a report that seemed ‘fantastic,’ that should trouble break out between Japan and the United States, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor ‘using all of their military equipment (Dahl, 2013b; *Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 11, 5421-5422, 1945*). Where there is scholarly doubt surrounding this event because the report originated close to the same time Admiral Yamamoto’s original plan for the attack was manifested (Betts, 1982, p. 45), the issue remains that America quickly “discounted the report” based on a flawed analytical line that held ethnocentric (feminine) inaccuracies and judgments (Walton, 2012).

Japanese devotion was not considered a threat to a plethora of decision-makers within the US government and military before 1941. On the tactical level, the American commanders in Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel and US Army General Walter Short, were questioned about the possibility or prospect of Japanese aggression and an attack on Pearl Harbor, and they are famously quoted for continuously saying there is “none, absolutely none” (Goldstein et al., 1991, p. 401). On a national level, there was a significant amount of complacency surrounding the

Japanese intentions and capability towards America; some of that was ignorance perpetrated by the American disdain, which resulted in heavy discrimination and racism against the Japanese. However, evidence of ethnocentric characteristics was highly relevant, as Americans did not understand the Japanese devotion to the “Asian Cause,” which was the grounds for expansionism, and the Japanese need for the increase of commodities and materials was a motivating factor that eluded the US government. Wohlstetter articulated that “the only signal that could and did spell ‘hostile action’ to them [US government and military alike] was the bombing itself” (Wohlstetter, 1962, p. 68).

Conversely, General Douglas MacArthur, through his memoir *Reminiscences*, articulated a compelling narrative regarding his visit to Imperial Japan in the early 1900s with his father (Medal of Honor recipient in the Civil War and US Governor-General of the Philippines), who had been sent to “measure the strength of the Japanese Army and its methods of warfare” (MacArthur, 1964, p. 30). MacArthur’s initial perception of Japanese culture was optimistic: “I was deeply impressed by and filled with admiration for the thrift, courtesy, and friendliness of the ordinary citizen,” MacArthur later wrote: “They seemed to have discovered the dignity of labor, the fact that a man is happier and more contented when constructing than when merely idling away time” (Parr, 2020, para. 16). However, after being present in meetings with senior military leaders and visiting military camps, MacArthur reports in his memoir, “I met all the great Japanese commanders: Oyama, Kuroki, Nogi, and the brilliant Admiral Heihachiro Togo – those grim, taciturn, aloof men of iron character and unshakeable purpose. It was here that I first encountered the boldness and courage of the Nipponese soldier. His almost fanatical belief in and reverence for his Emperor impressed me indelibly” (MacArthur, 1964, p. 31; Parr, 2020). Based on observation alone, MacArthur deduced that “the haughty, feudalistic samurai who were

their leaders, were, through their victories, planting the seed of eventual Japanese conquest of the East. Having conquered Korea and Formosa [Taiwan], it was more than evident that they would eventually strike for control of the Pacific and domination of the Far East” (MacArthur, 1964, p. 31). MacArthur believed that the “vast, complex area, restless under the boot of European domination, might well be the arena of future world struggle” (MacArthur, 1964, p. 31). MacArthur had a deep appreciation for the Japanese culture and the Far East in general; however, based on his memoirs and correspondence with Washington when he was Commander of the US Army Forces in the Far East in 1941, MacArthur identified Japanese assertiveness and endlessly expressed concern of Imperial Japan’s aggressive and unyielding (two strong masculine characteristics) desire for Pacific domination throughout his tenure in the Philippines. However, while intelligence and decision-makers of the indications and warning apparatus were aware of the “long-standing and deep-seated antagonism between Japan and America,” they ignored cultural indicators, and viable warnings that Imperial Japan would most certainly war with America (US State Department, 1994, p. 6).

The Japanese behaviors surrounding neo-Shintōism, militarism, and territorial expansion produced a US perception that Imperial Japan was capable of war. However, without proper collection or line of sight into Japanese culture from a MAS perspective, the Japanese environment was analyzed with false characteristics mostly due to various levels of ethnocentrism, discrimination, and, more importantly, inaccurately complex and ambiguous cultural information (Jervis, 2017, p. 120). Conversely, MacArthur is a good example of how the analytical line can be augmented when individuals inundate themselves with a cultural experience. General MacArthur concluded a very different assessment of Japanese capabilities and intentions than that of the limited intelligence community in the 1940s because of his

physical presence and first-hand observation of the Japanese military and the surrounding Japanese sphere of influence in Asia and the Pacific.

Uncertainty Avoidance: Imperial Japan & US Perspective

Previously examined components of the Japanese culture, such as the strict hierarchal power structure that clearly defines the roles of every citizen, Shintōism through a formality-conscious Confucius framework, and the continuous planning and organizational shifts to curb the unknown (Meiji restoration and Shōwa era reconstruction), also contribute to a predominantly high UAI score. UAI characteristics associated with societies high in uncertainty avoidance “emphasize rules, laws, and codes of conduct to better ensure a stable and orderly life” (Yamamura et al., 2003, p. 9), all of which can be found in parallel with previous findings. Additionally, the Japanese in the 1930s and 40s (through to the present day) had a formidable cultural structure of controls through expansive rituals and ceremonies. These activities included (and include) school ceremonies, weddings, funerals, social events, and even the do’s and do nots of how people should behave, recorded in etiquette books in great detail (Maris Landis, 2018).

The Japanese maintain a cultural practice (present in Imperial Japan) of meticulously reviewing their actions at a deliberate pace, which enhances their focus on details and helps in managing ambiguity. This is a substantial deviation from American culture, where instant gratification can diminish quality, whereas in Imperial Japan, being both effective and efficient (but not at the risk of squandering success) are championed characteristics. The Japanese attention to detail is considered a cultural and personal mandate that the Japanese “strive to eliminate all uncertainties” (Katz, 1998; Maris Landis, 2018). According to both Katz (1998) and

Maris Landis (2018), when it pertains to UAI, the Japanese attempt to eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty results in how they conducted themselves in everyday life—with great attention to detail, strong work ethic, and quality familial practices at all levels of society. In contrast to some countries where a high UAI score might be perceived as indicative of societal weakness, in Imperial Japan, a high UAI was regarded as a strength. This belief stemmed from the notion prevalent among the Japanese of the 1930s (and persists today) that a risk which cannot be comprehended and controlled is unacceptable. (Katz, 1998).

Compounding environmental factors and political history, in conjunction with previous findings, play a critical role in shifting the Japanese culture to a higher UAI scoring. The geography of Japan is unforgiving, and life in the archipelago is not peaceful due to the ongoing environmental events of earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, and volcanic eruptions (Heimbürger, 2018). The Japanese live in constant fear and anxiety. For example, in 1923, the Great Kanto Earthquake produced a 40-foot-high tsunami that swept away thousands of people and devastating fires that swept through Yokohama and Tokyo, resulting in a death toll of 140,000, “including 44,000 who had sought refuge near Tokyo’s Sumida River in the first few hours, only to be immolated by a freak pillar of fire known as a ‘dragon twist’” (Hammer, 2011). Other wide-ranging earthquakes impacted Imperial Japan in 1933 and 1940, killing 3,000 plus Japanese; significant floods and landslides took place in 1936 and 1938, claiming over 1,000 lives; large-scale typhoons destroyed major city-states in 1928 and 1934; and the 1934 Hakodate city fire claimed 2,100 or more, Japanese (Heimbürger, 2018). Consistent exposure to disaster risk has dramatically impacted the Japanese culture from a UAI perspective. Imperial Japan had and continues to have a hyper-focus on *zeijakusei*, which translates to vulnerability or fragile and weak character when “referring to the level of predictable consequences of a phenomenon in

society” (Heimbürger, 2018, p. 4). Additionally, the Japanese attempt to understand and control the environmental uncertainty through *saigai risuku* (disaster risk) in an effort to minimize the human and material consequences associated with their “archipelago of natural disasters” (Heimbürger, 2018, pp. 4–5).

Creativity can be considered an additional component of UAI. The correlation between creativity and UAI is relatively standard. A higher creative acumen of society produces an inverse (or lower) UAI score. Whereas, if a society is less innovative or creative as a collective whole—not individually—the UAI score would be higher, indicating more hesitation within societal constructs and a desire to establish controls. Societal creativity, differing from individual creativity, is considered a component of collective national thinking that “involves searching for meaningful new connections by generating many unusual, original, and varied possibilities, as well as details that expand or enrich possibilities” (Treffinger, 2008, p. 2). Japanese creativity is considered to be hindered due to national etiquette and a strong ambition to avoid failure (Benedict, 1946, p. 157). Additional psychoanalytic categories that curb societal creative stimuli include sacrifice, dignity, and, most importantly, humility or *Kenkyo*, which are critical components to the traditional collectivistic endeavors and maintaining harmony throughout prewar Japanese society (Dalsky & Su, 2020). In Imperial Japan, praise from an outside source was usually met with a humble and, at times, self-denigrating response because exercising individuality or extraordinary ability would constitute exclusion from the community (Matsumoto & Saint-Jacques, 2003).

Fundamentally, this cultural condition is rooted in the mandated societal cooperation surrounding agricultural elements such as harvesting rice. For example, during periods of excess

harvest, there was a cultural and collectivist expectation that any production beyond the normal distribution would be shared with community members who did not produce the necessary allotment of grain or rice (Hara, 2013). A violation of this rule would negate support from community members and families, leading to exclusion from community events, also called *mura-hachibu* (Dalsky, 2011; Dalsky & Su, 2020; Hara, 2013). This community attribute can also be identified throughout the educational environment, where expressing opinions or seeking attention is considered a failure, and those individuals would have been neglected or bullied for their differences (Dalsky & Su, 2020). The adverse reactions of the community heavily influence Japanese behavior and stagnate societal creativity. The continuous emphasis on avoiding failure within the Japanese culture contributes to the fear of losing community, and excessive second guessing of character through stringent self-reflection produces a magnitude of mental reservation that mandates a positive perception of those around them (Fry & Ghosh, 1980).

Conversely, the US and Western cultural condition mandates that individuals heavily emphasize their success, especially if those successes were a product of one's abilities and efforts (Chen et al., 2009; Miller & Ross, 1975). Innovation and creativity have been cornerstone cultural attributes throughout America's existence, and "American success resulted from its openness to new ideas and the creativeness of its people" (Florida, 2004, para. 2). American creativity can be directly linked to entrepreneurship, natural market competition, economic and human capital, and, most importantly, it provides the foundational principles of critical thinking and problem-solving (E. Meyer, 2014).

These findings identify Imperial Japan scoring high in all the themes and subcategories of UAI, which produces an overall high-scoring cultural disposition for Imperial Japan. Hofstede

(2010) also concludes that the Axis powers from WWII would undoubtedly score high in the UAI as fascism, nationalism, and racism “find their most fertile ground in cultures with strong uncertainty avoidance plus pronounced masculine values” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 225). Fear and the control of ambiguity are heavy components of Japanese UAI scoring. These attributes were used as justification for Pacific domination, and through forced cultural assimilation on colonized and annexed lands of Asia, Imperial Japan demanded the acceptance of Japanese cultural elements, thus providing a blanket of control and compliance that would curb ambiguity (Song, 2018). The deep-rooted fear of Western colonialism and geographic impacts drove Imperial Japan to become the colonizer and the aggressor that they were dedicated to keeping at bay.

The US perspective of prewar Imperial Japan’s UAI characteristics is minimal; only through conjecture and deductive thinking could a logical consensus be reached as literary synthesis was nominal. From a US UAI perspective, Japanese expansionism was the primary narrative and concern. The US analytical line regarding Japanese UAI can be linked to that specific disposition, where lacking specific characteristics, the overall themes associated with expansionism are qualifiable. Ultimately, the US perception of Imperial Japan from a UAI perspective can be considered on par with the actual Japanese UAI disposition. The US intelligence and national sentiment surrounding the Japanese was that they were fearless warriors of the Pacific, they exhibited calculated control as their conquests had meaning and strategic objectives, and from an external viewpoint, military and governmental control was abundant (Dahl, 2013a). These understandings would have indicated to analysts and the general US public that Imperial Japan would score high on UAI, as the Japanese did not execute movement throughout the Pacific without motive, intention, and planning. Japanese control and well-

designed progress would have indicated the desire to avoid uncertainty and, in turn, influence and project a correct US perception.

Long-Term v. Short-Term Orientation: Imperial Japan & US Perspective

Japanese development of the Meiji era until WWII can be attributed to multiple cultural characteristics, including persistence, pragmatism, perseverance, and a desire for national stability. Moreover, combining these characteristics with a heavily collectivist society typically results in long-term thinking, producing a national identity that would easily subscribe to some aspects of Confucian philosophy, such as filial piety and paternalism (Hofstede & Harris-Bond, 1988; Mooij, 2013). All of these have been identified in the previous cultural dimensions; however, a direct connection between high LTO and the practice of expansionism was found (Hofstede, 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010). Additional factors of a high-scoring LTO society include good and evil being viewed as relative, humility, and the necessity of learning from other countries and adapting those teachings to the perceiving culture's societal constructs (Hofstede et al., 2010; Rotondo Fernandez et al., 1997). All of these attributes can be directly linked to the cultural makeup of a long-term oriented society, whereas fundamentalism is encouraged, traditions are considered sacrosanct, and good and evil are considered absolute, are characteristics of a society with a low LTO score or short-term orientation (Callegari et al., 2020; Hofstede & Harris-Bond, 1988). Based on these preliminary findings, Imperial Japan can be considered a long-term-oriented society.

The most significant key identifier of prewar Imperial Japan's high-scoring LTO is the pragmatic approach during the Meiji era and the continuation of nation-building through expansionism. One of its three founders of pragmatism as a philosophy, F.C.S. Schiller

(2007/1907), who referred to himself as a disciple of Protagoras (a dialogue of Plato), shared the philosophical commitment that “one opinion can be better than another, though it cannot be truer” (Russell, 1945, p. 77). Ultimately, pragmatism or *instrumentalism* is an action-oriented philosophy that studies the connection between action and truth and is more applicable to prewar Imperial Japan through the lens of practice and theory (Dewey, 1929; W. James, 1907/2003; Peirce, 1992). Japanese and East Asian cultures warmed to pragmatism because it challenged the dominant European models that were abruptly imposing traditional Western ideals on Asian culture during the colonization period (Mooij, 2013; Shusterman, 2004). During the Japanese shift to constitutional governance and industrialization, the practical evolution to pragmatism became an essential aspect of their culture (Auslin, 2004; Russell, 1945, p. 34). They adapted to other cultures in such a way “that Westerners were fooled and thought the Japanese were Westernizing” (Mooij, 2013, p. 85), when in actuality, Imperial Japan was exercising exploitation of Western cultural understanding regarding the perception of truth. Meaning that Western logic was considered linear and founded by an axiom summarized in a statement of opposites: *if A is true, B, which is the opposite of A, must be false*. According to Mooij (2013), Eastern logic does not have such an axiom, “if A is true, its opposite B may also be true, and together they produce a wisdom that is superior to either A or B” (Mooij, 2013, p. 85). With this understanding, it is clear that the principles of the Meiji Restoration were fundamentally pragmatic at every level.

With pragmatism comes a transformational sentiment, and in prewar Imperial Japan, where foundational Japanese principles were changing rapidly, it is only natural that traditional methods evolved according to situational needs during any process (Katsuhito, 2016; Taatila & Raij, 2012). Fundamentally, this approach of pragmatism outlines a high LTO score from a

characteristics perspective, including the Japanese demand for society to learn from other countries, societal traditions (not religious or familial) were not considered sacrosanct, and truth or situational approach is maneuverable (Hofstede et al., 2010; Yamamura et al., 2003). With the high score correlated to pragmatism, and the high scores from military expansionism and the link to humility as a high-scoring cultural attribute, Imperial Japan's cultural disposition is considered high, identifying them as long-term-oriented.

The US perspective was not challenging to discern, as similarly to UAI, there was limited literature regarding the principles of the US thought process surrounding Japanese LTO. However, two key themes correlate to the US perception of LTO throughout State Department memorandums and intelligence collection attempts. First, Japanese expansionism throughout Asia and the Pacific was at the forefront of all US policymaker's minds, intelligence professionals, and American society (A. Harris, 2019). This would indicate that the US perception was high scoring and viewed Imperial Japan as a long-term-oriented nation. However, the second theme counters the high LTO scoring, as the US perception also included a high recognition in the way Imperial Japan held tradition in such high esteem and regarded the Japanese individual as a person of steadiness and pride in their country—not looking to other countries for teachable qualities/improvements. All of these characteristics are aligned with a low LTO score, but more importantly to this study, this US perception is predicated on the evaluation of the Japanese individual, not the Japanese society at large. However, this realization emphasizes the hypothesis that cultural dimensions were not applied throughout the State Department, intelligence community, or the American people, nor was a differentiator applied between the Japanese citizen and Imperial Japan as a national culture.

The enduring hostility between Imperial Japan and the US, where both viewed each other as military threats and trade competitors, caused US intelligence collectors and diplomats to overlook crucial factors. Consequently, Imperial Japan received a high-scoring LTO disposition (US State Department, 1994, p. 6). Where the inaccuracy lies is through narrow focus and ethnocentric sentiments. First, cultural pragmatism was not included or discussed at the highest levels of the US government. Second, what was initially thought to be long-term-oriented characteristics (traditions are sacrosanct, fundamentalism, and the fostering societal virtues related to the past and present) observed at the individual level were low-scoring LTO characteristics. However, the primary focus of Imperial Japanese actions from the US perspective was the direct attack on Western influence in the region, indicating long-term-orientation objectives. Conversely, in Imperial Japan, the pursuit of Asianism—a foreign policy ideology embraced by the expansionist, militarist, and conservative factions of Japanese society (Aydin, 2008, pp. 1–2)—highlighted a distinctive emphasis on LTO, diverging from the perspective of the US. Despite this difference, both Japan and the US achieved similar high scores in their respective assessments.

Indulgence v. Restraint: Imperial Japan & US Perspective

As previously discussed, the Japanese ethical code has historically demanded extreme fortitude and unwavering dedication to fostering harmonious familial dynamics. This enduring tradition continues to shape the values and behaviors of contemporary Japanese society, emphasizing the importance of familial cohesion and collective well-being. The Japanese commitment to their community values and national identity (directly linked to the emperor) is also considered a spiritual and necessary obligation. On the surface, a strong ethical code and dedication principles represent a restrained society. Conversely, high-scoring characteristics

consist of high emotions, optimism, and impulses are encouraged (Hofstede et al., 2010), all of which are exhibited in Japanese culture, but “they must not intrude upon the serious affairs of life” (Benedict, 1946, p. 177). The Japanese “do not condemn self-gratification...they consider physical pleasures good and worthy of cultivation ... they are sought and valued” (Benedict, 1946, p. 177); however, there is a mandatory time and place for those emotional human connections.

Hofstede (2010) identifies that a restrained society also exhibits higher anxiety levels, which Benedict (1946) reinforces when she articulates that the Japanese purposefully practice keeping tensions high. Additionally, regarding human pleasures, the Japanese “make life hard for themselves by cultivating physical pleasures and then setting up a code in which these pleasures are the very things which must not be indulged as a serious way of life” (Benedict, 1946, p. 178). This resistance to temptations holds a direct correlation to restrained characteristics; although the Japanese practiced self-restraint as a consciously held virtue, which is a low scoring variable on the IVR scale, the pre-war Japanese also “cultivated pleasures of the flesh like fine arts, and then, when they are fully savored, they sacrifice them to duty” (Benedict, 1946, p. 178). The strength to purposefully make life complicated was an admired virtue in Imperial Japan, and the strict moral discipline directly reflects the societal fortitude of the prewar period. The Japanese have no pity or sympathy for those suffering to execute the “proper performance of his duty” (Benedict, 1946, p. 193).

In contrast, the American populace craves solutions, and they believe that sacrifice must be met with recognition, as virtuous acts are admired and celebrated (Sophn, 1987). It is clear that Western cultures, even in the 1930s-40s, valued free gratification of basic and natural human

desires and, in turn, held an optimistic outlook on the world; however, it can be argued that where the Japanese manifested stringent codes surrounding these same characteristics, when they participated in them, there was more happiness and fulfillment (Benedict, 1934). Amplifying this psychological component throughout the culture builds a standard of national self-discipline that negates the option of choice (Eisenstadt, 1996), whereas, in the US, the individual can choose to attain a specific goal based on ambition, not social demand (Murray, 2013). The American can accept a Stoic regime to become the most affluent player in a sport or render all relaxations unimportant to be the best musician, but these are considered techniques to the Japanese. In Imperial Japan, self-discipline and restrained psychology are taught similarly to arithmetic or science (Benedict, 1946; Eisenstadt, 1996).

The US perspective of Japanese IVR, similarly to LTO, is rarely discussed in memorandums and intelligence. There is an overarching sentiment throughout the documentation and literature of the period that labeled Imperial Japan as highly indulgent but strictly built on the concept of military expansionism (Dahl, 2013; Deininger & Wohlstetter, 1963; Miller, 2007). If considering the anticipation of the future as a critical failure, which, according to Fingar (2011), should not be the primary goal of strategic analysis, then the focus for US analysts in the 1930s should have been on understanding essential cultural motivators and developments, and how these factors interact with probable outcomes. The emphasis was not on any of the particular characteristics of IVR, and the continuous pivot to the indulgent desires of Japanese military and government leaders' expansion efforts blinded American collectors from other critical components that could have built a more comprehensive narrative in 1941.

It can be argued that Manifest Destiny, the belief that it was the duty of American

frontiersmen to settle the continent and prosper (Pratt, 1927), contributed to the indulgent analytical line; however, Manifest Destiny during the period was still viewed as essential and positive (Tierney, 2016), where the Japanese expansion was a collectivist encroachment on human rights and military domination (Paine, 2017). Ultimately, the US held a dysmorphic perception that Imperial Japan was highly indulgent, where the characteristics of Japanese culture were the opposite (Benedict, 1946). Imperial Japan's restraint demonstrates their collective appreciation and seriousness regarding preferred restrictiveness, self-discipline, and, most importantly, a harmonious balance between emotional human desires and performance of duty.

Cumulative Cultural Disposition Profile: Summary of Findings

Several discrepancies were identified when comparing Imperial Japan's cultural disposition based on the 6-D model and the US perception of Imperial Japan's cultural conditions. Imperial Japan should be considered moderately high within PDI due to the hierarchical government and societal structure. The American perception was accurately attributed to this particular dimension, as Japanese centralism persuaded most US observational components.

Table 1. Imperial Japan Analysis & US Perspective of Subject

Cultural Dimensions	Imperial Japan Disposition	US Intelligence Perspective
PDI	Moderately High	Moderately High
IDV	Collectivist	Individualism
MAS	Extremely Masculine	Moderately Feminine
UAI	High	High
LTO	Long-term Oriented	Long-term Oriented
IVR	Moderately High Restraint	Indulgent Society

The first divergent perception was found with IDV, as the Japanese disposition is highly

collectivist; the American understanding, based on the observation of Japanese Americans who were assimilating to American culture, skewed the American perception of Imperial Japan culture, and they attributed IDV characteristics as low. These concepts included recognizing Japanese American commercial trade, familial practices, and a Western-style constitution.

Throughout the analysis of MAS themes of familial values, behavior patterns, legacy cultural conditions, and impact of religion, Imperial Japan exhibited a predominantly masculine disposition, yet the American perception only registered the more feminine characteristics of the Japanese Americans. Consequently, the analysis of Imperial Japan did not incorporate masculine concepts, thus highlighting the nuance needed when assessing cultural characteristics and identities. An additional contrast between disposition and perception can be found within the themes of UAI. Ultimately, Imperial Japan scored predominantly high within UAI, identifying the Japanese culture as holding disdain for ambiguity. In contrast, it can be concluded that the American perception was that the Japanese embraced ambiguity, thus presenting an inaccurately low UAI score. The US intelligence and American sentiment surrounding Japanese cultural LTO disposition correlated correctly, as Imperial Japan is extremely long-term oriented. Finally, within the IVR dimension, there was a misinterpretation on behalf of the American collectors, as they viewed the Japanese as a moderately indulgent society when the Japanese culture was identifiable as highly restrained.

Freethinkers are those who are willing to use their minds without prejudice and without fearing to understand things that clash with their own customs, privileges, or beliefs. This state of mind is not common, but it is essential for critical thinking.

—Leo Tolstoy

CHAPTER FIVE: COLD WAR DYNAMICS—1962

Overview

In the wake of Pearl Harbor and the National Security Act of 1947, the intelligence community had formed an analytical identity and was a much more formidable force for collection, information synthesis, and intelligence production. The federal government provided a legal precedent for the actions and practices of the intelligence community by the 1960s, which was advantageous as it signaled the US resolve for intelligence matters. Creating a permanent and highly functional intelligence apparatus signaled to the global community that the US was altering the previous practice of reducing intelligence in peacetime and it was bolstering a functioning structure of strategic superiority. Following the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, alongside other organizational changes, the importance of national intelligence grew exponentially. (Lowenthal, 2019). With each intelligence success and failure, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, the intelligence community would further evolve and make corrective actions based on lessons learned and new best practices (George & Rishikof, 2017).

Concurrently, by the late 1950s, the Soviet Union, who took the lead in the space race by launching the *Sputnik* satellite and was increasing its nuclear arsenal at an exponential rate, was evening the strategic balance, all while building an intelligence environment to rival the US (Walton, 2012). The competition over nuclear domination was undoubtedly the face of the Cold War, but the intelligence, espionage, and counterintelligence process from both the US and the

Soviet Union fueled the underpinnings of an almost five-decade geopolitical tension that nearly resulted in global annihilation (Gaddis, 2018). The concept of credibility and cultural understanding fed the American and Soviet Union calculus regarding decision-making in the critical moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War in general (Press, 2005). This chapter intends to identify if those cultural conditions were interpreted correctly or if there were discrepancies by comparing the Soviet Union disposition to the American perception.

The following chapter will follow a similar structure to Chapter four, beginning with the historical context of the case study subject and then identifying the qualitative representation to determine the cultural disposition of the case study subject. In this chapter, the Soviet Union is the subject. Each cultural dimension of the 6-D model will guide the chapter outline, and the predetermined themes associated with the individual dimensions of the 6-D model will be examined with the Soviet Union and Marxist ideology as the primary focus and their impact on the Soviet Union's actions. Additional or new themes will also be examined as they are presented in the literature. The US perspective will be analyzed for comparison purposes, specifically leveraging literature that accurately explains the American understanding and perception of Soviet culture and how the intelligence apparatus viewed the Soviet Union, specifically concentrating on the intelligence leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Rise of the Soviet

Implications of Unrest, Hunger, & Revolutionary Ambition

Imperial Russia, at the end of the 19th century, was continuing the royal lineage of the Romanov Dynasty. What began with Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov in 1613, ended in execution and bloodshed with the last Romanov, Nicholas II (Torke, 2009). By 1900, the three-

century-long reign of the Romanovs was responsible for producing an empire that encompassed one-sixth of the world's surface area, making it one of the largest empires in world history.

Through land accumulation came exponential economic and societal prestige on the global stage, which strongly reinforced the Russian demand for “a divinely anointed absolute monarch at the top and a system of legally defined social estates (sosloviia = Stande), headed by the nobility defining its social hierarchy” (Zelnik, 2009, p. 234). Across the colossal Russian landscape, there were over 140 nationalities and countless languages, cultures, customs, and ideologies. The Romanovs held great power through geopolitical influence, monetary holdings beyond computation, and leveraged power projection through military might.

Tsarism in Russia in the early 1900s consisted of two specific social and cultural components: “(1) rapid territorial expansion and industrialization along with (2) a well-articulated conception of Russian citizenship rooted in age-old Orthodox Christian tradition” (Anisin, 2013, p. 648). The expansionism of Nicholas II was specific and consisted of industry and railroads. In 1860, Russia had 1,000 miles of railway, and by 1916, it had expanded to 40,000 miles (Goldsmith, 1961). Industrialization expansion was carried out with a heavy concentration on steel, iron, textile, communication, and coal (Owen, 1985). As for religion, Nicholas II and his court were firmly convinced that their dedicated belief in Orthodox Christianity would save the Russian people and all of humanity, which would anoint Russia as the Third Rome (Anisin, 2013). This belief structure produced a geopolitical destiny for Russia, as the reference to Rome did not mean a physical place but a concept of historical, legal, theological, and mystical importance (M. Johnson, 2004, p. 51; Nalbandov, 2016). However, the Russian autocracy was beginning to feel the pressure of the people. This societal discomfort was due to the ramifications of expedited industrialization working congruently with quality of life

degradation, food scarcity, and the Russian people's waning belief in the Tsar as the "Father of the People" and the direct descendent of God himself.

In the first two decades of the 20th century, poverty, famine, and rural unrest produced a perfect storm of political and economic calamity that forced cataclysmic conflicts between the Russian autocratic institution and the powerful crosscurrents of revolutionary opposition (B. R. Miller, 2013). The rapid breakdown of traditional behavior patterns of the Russian people significantly impacted three hundred years of Russian equilibrium, and the driving forces behind the emerging political identities would shape the future of Russia for the next hundred years. According to Geifman (2005), "grievous economic conditions and complex relations among and within the newly emerging social groups during the initial phases of the country's industrialization indeed seemed to validate the radical socialists' claim that exploitation, competition and the alienation of individuals – those odious features of capitalism – would disappear only after the overthrow of the old regime" (Geifman, 2005, p. 15). In conjunction with Nicholas II's perceived incompetencies and his ignorance of the long-prophesied and increasing possibility of Russia's lower classes (*nizy*) fully revolting, these conditions were the foundational building blocks of the Russian Revolution (Galai, 1973; Reynolds, 2011).

It is also argued that the aggressive expansionism of Asian policies that led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 was evidence used for significant criticism of the autocratic regime's dereliction to the Russian people (Jacob, 2016; Peeling, 2021). Additionally, with the domestic absence of troops and naval support that was usually "relied upon by the regime to quell the domestic protest," civil unrest amplified and, at times, turned to violence (Esthus, 1981; Peeling, 2021, p. 3). Zelnik (2009) identifies that the Russo-Japanese War and its "glaringly unsuccessful

conduct and the resulting national humiliation served to raise the level of political unrest in almost every layer of society and within every political grouping, pushing Russian political dialogue several degrees to the left” (Zelnik, 2009, p. 249). All the economic, political, and civil variables combined created a dangerous situation for the Romanov dynasty, and the traditional government was under immense pressure from all factions of the Russian people.

With an unprepared agriculturally driven peasant society being concentrated and forced to shift from farming to factory, an arena for radical activity was created that opened the door to Marxist and more radical populist perspectives (B. R. Miller, 2013; Zelnik, 2009). Structural causes motivating the clamor for reform can be easily identified through the problems regarding land, the peasantry, ethnic friction, a rapidly growing urban proletariat, and a similarly growing educated middle class (Bushkovitch, 2011). It was commonplace to see violent and non-violent political polarization throughout St. Petersburg during this period; however, “the contentiousness of autocracy’s enemies now grew apace, as even the moderates waited impatiently for the moment that would advance their cause” (Zelnik, 2009, p. 250). By 1904, during the Russo–Japanese War and an increased potential for conflict due to prolonged tariff disagreements with Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Germany, the left-leaning revolution “parties” narratives became more appealing to laborers, which, in turn, intensified their popularity.

These “parties” consisted of varying ideologies with diverging solutions to the same problem— “seeking to overthrow the existing system– and here came some monumental disagreements– replace it either *temporarily*, with a liberal-democratic, constitutional polity and market economy (a ‘bourgeois phase’), or *permanently*, with a socialist order (in any case a clearly non-capitalist socio-economic system)” (Zelnik, 2009, p. 246). These “parties” included

the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), and rival factions, the Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party (RSDWP), and the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks (Thatcher, 2009). It is important to note that "party" is continuously placed in quotations because of its immense difference from the traditional Western political understanding of political parties. In Russia, these "parties" would not have national elective office ambitions; instead, these entities were underground organizations with specific motives and correlating ideologies.

In February 1905, the first steps to the installation of a communist state over a decade later would take place outside the Winter Palace of Nicolas II at the Narva Gate in the southwestern part of St. Petersburg (Gapon, 1906). A procession, largely made up of over one hundred thousand Orthodox Christian Russians led by a young priest, Gregory Gapon, who was not a revolutionary, but an advocate for the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers. The procession was littered with religious symbols; groups sang patriotic songs and chanted "God save the Tsar." Father Gapon aimed to coordinate a peaceful procession to express the desire for worker-centered corrections such as higher wages, civil rights, and more hospitable working conditions (Gapon, 1906).

The other portions of the procession approaching the Palace from four different directions were groups of workers and political idealists waving red flags and pictures of Karl Marx (Askew, 1952). This population of the demonstration also demanded that a liberal political program be enacted (Hosking, 2001; Zelnik, 2009). This desired reform would "include a constitution and free elections based on direct, universal manhood suffrage" (Zelnik, 2009, p. 251). Unfortunately, the colliding processions quickly became an indiscriminate massacre when Russian troops sent warning shots into the trees, where young children had postured for good

viewing and then an onslaught as shots were fired into the crowd creating an extended period of chaos (Anisin, 2013). The reaction was violent, with countless dead in the streets of St. Petersburg. This extraordinarily complex event, viewed as monarch brutality, radically changed Russia's political culture and society (Bushkovitch, 2011). The aftermath of "Bloody Sunday" was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and at its center was a Russian Marxist, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Vladimir Lenin (Esther, 1979).

The catastrophic events of Bloody Sunday impacted all of Russia's regions and the empire's nationalities, giving way to absolute anarchy with over 2.5 million workers, civil servants, students, peasants, liberal intelligentsia, national minorities, and clergy joining the anti-government movement (Bushkovitch, 2011; Hosking, 2001). Massive production loss, taxes, inflation, and continuous violence through assassination and terrorism increased the call for rebellion throughout Russia, Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and the Caucasus. Initially, there were countless warring factions throughout Russian cities and rural provinces, which played well into the regime's attempts at de-escalation. The liberal-dominated professional unions were ideologically opposed to the revolutionary parties; however, where independently divergent, each union held distinct but complementary roles in the revolutionary process (S. A. Smith, 1984). Eventually, 14 of these professional unions allied themselves. They reemerged as the Union of Unions dedicated to enhancing liberal-socialist cooperation and championing a legislative proposal to the Tsar that mandated Western European models of workers' rights, the legal standing of these rights, and an eight-hour workday (Rosenberg, 1996).

Moreover, the Union of Unions liberal movements supported constitutional reform and a representative legislature. However, more radical reverberations of reform were taking

precedence as the other revolutionary “parties” dedicated to Marxist and socialist thought gained more support from the masses, as Marxism’s hollow promises of the abolishment of eternal truth, and its economic falsities appeal to the laboring and starving (Bushkovitch, 2011; Engels & Marx, 1848). While representatives from the leftist “parties” who would later become leading personalities of the Soviet Union, Leon Trotsky, Vladimir Lenin, and Joseph Stalin, held significant authority in the future, with Lenin abroad in 1905 due to sectarian arguments between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Trotsky returned to Russia from European exile in February and began to organize the fractured left-wing “parties” (Hosking, 2001; Rubenstein, 2011; Thatcher, 2005).

Trotsky’s return was a turning point in Russian aggression towards the monarch, but it was precisely, as Trotsky states, “he first advanced the theory of ‘permanent revolution’ – a doctrine that was to be associated with him until his death and beyond” (Thatcher, 2005, p. 241; Trotsky, 1908). More importantly, Trotsky became an invaluable leader of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies as an orator and journalist, giving Trotsky access to provide organization for workers and coordinate their efforts and actions (Thatcher, 2005). By September 1905, the individual strikes across Russia became a general strike against the monarch, and the establishment of a democratic republic was demanded (Rubenstein, 2011). The coordination of the Soviets produced a massive force that the Tsar could not ignore. In Saint Petersburg alone, the Soviet had nearly 560 delegates, each representing approximately 500 workers (Hosking, 2001; Thatcher, 2005; Zelnik, 2009). The general strike impacted every facet of production and communication throughout the empire, and the Russian economy began to collapse.

Roughly two months after the general strikes began, at the urging of Sergei Witte and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Nicolas II issued a Manifesto containing a vague promise to, grant an elected legislative body (elected not directly or equally, however, but at least on the basis of near-universal male suffrage) as well as civil and religious liberties and – for the first time in Russian history – the right to organize unions and political parties. (Engelstein, 2017; Zelnik, 2009, p. 255)

The Bolsheviks and Leon Trotsky used this opportunity to exercise their abilities of persuasion to continue the revolution and overthrow the Tsar. However, the moderates, liberals, Constitutional Democrats, and Mensheviks initially believed they had achieved their desired results with the Tsar's implementation of the Duma—an elected assembly with legislative function—and the Trotsky insurrection failed (Rubenstein, 2011).

Ultimately, the Manifesto “broke the back of the revolution – factories resumed work, parties held conventions” (Engelstein, 2017, p. 14). However, the violence surrounding the 1905 Revolution did not abate, and the Russian empire remained fractured, with hundreds of revolutionary factions predicated on varying and conflicting objectives. The power struggle in Russia became a multifaceted crossroads. Trotsky was the moving force behind the worker Soviet, while Lenin, who was in Europe, was puppet master of the more radical Bolsheviks who were also in Soviets across Russia. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Democrats (known as the Kadets) viewed the Duma as progress towards a constitutional monarch akin to the British model, and finally Nicholas II (Owen, 1985; Rubenstein, 2011).

The Marxist ambition post-1905 was challenged regularly, not only because the Tsar still exercised unquestioned authority, but because “capitalism was relatively undeveloped in Russia,

and the country had yet to experience a bourgeois revolution...[additionally] the Russian middle class was weak and indecisive” (Rubenstein, 2011, p. 48). However, Trotsky believed that the lack of a middle class and Russia’s lack of capital would make revolution inevitable. Eventually, his alignment with radical leftist ideology and outspoken dialogue renouncing the monarch’s violent and antisemitic atrocities against the Russian people got him arrested. Ultimately, the 1905 revolution was considered over, and the death toll exceeded 15,000 Russians, but the next decade would see continuous uprisings due to unjust racial targeting and religious brutality at the hands of the state (Khiterer, 2015). The increased violence and poor standard of living that continued post-1905 fed into the influential Marxist aspirations of Trotsky and Lenin; while both were absent from Russia, the influence of their philosophy grew exponentially during the next decade, and the specter of Communism evoked by Marx found its home in Europe’s eastern border (Engelstein, 2017; Zelnik, 2009).

By 1907, from a societal standpoint, the first two Dumas were deemed incompetent, as the pessimists significantly outvoiced the optimists. Additionally, the governing body was perceived to be incapable of producing quality legislation due to procedural issues and unclear lines of authority. However, the Third Duma (1907-1912) reached its statutory five-year term (the previous two lasted less than 100 days—each), and giant legislative strides were made through army reforms, peasant issues, and the three-stage legislative revision process was implemented. Before the Fourth Duma convened in 1912, a critical flashpoint in the Russian shift to revolution transpired in the gold mines in Siberia. The “echo of Bloody Sunday,” known as the Lena Goldfields Massacre, where striking workers assembled to protest and arrest their leadership, were met by Russian troops who opened fire, leaving 200 dead and over 100 wounded (Engelstein, 2017; Zelnik, 2009). The massacre triggered an explosion of strikes and

demonstrations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, which fed into the Bolsheviks exploitation of events and amplified their power within the labor unions (Engelstein, 2017; Melancon, 2006). From that point forward, the Bolsheviks projected and instituted heavy influence over the political sphere, and, more importantly, they began to experience success in their competition with the Mensheviks and establishing footholds in crucial industries. These strategic moves propelled a shift in the election results of the Fourth Duma, and the Bolsheviks won a majority of the seats held by labor (Bonnell, 1983; Hosking, 1973).

Fall of the Tsarist Autocracy: Russian Cultural & Political Revolution

The commencement of WWI became a flashpoint in Russian history that revealed the true deficiencies of Nicholas II's regime. A display of nationwide conformity accompanied Russia's declaration to enter WWI in defense of the Slavic Serbs (Orlovsky, 2009). In the summer of 1914, the Duma and the Zemstva communicated holistic consent as a representative legislative body for Russia to execute aggressive tactical strategies against the German-Ottoman alliance. As a reaction to the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's military buildup and initial conscription were considered well-organized and peaceful. Outside of military manpower, the initial Russian strategy did not account for naval activity, as Germany had complete maritime control of the Baltic Sea, and the Ottoman presence in the Black Sea was overwhelming (Ambrose & King Chair, 1970). This put Russia at a significant disadvantage and disconnected Russia from foreign trade, markets, and supplies (Lieven, 1952). These effects immediately impacted Russian society; combined with ineffective economic policies, soaring inflation, and continuous domestic strikes causing logistical and military obstructions, the Russian people were emboldened by their abhorrence for the autocratic power (Jensen & Nichols, 2017; Orlovsky, 2009).

The population increase, which doubled within Russia between 1860 and 1914, was also a significant contributing factor to the rural discontent and clamor for revolution by the start of WWI (Orlovsky, 2009; Zelnik, 2009). The increased need for resources and productivity in an economic system that disincentivized gains to the people created overwhelming hardships (Wade, 2017). These conditions crippled economic function, and the Russian people believed their welfare was of no concern to the sitting political regime (Lieven, 1952). The war effort only drew further on the limited resources, and scarcity became a new normal for the Russian people; this exacerbated an already unstable society and was a precursor for the surge in industrial strikes and popular demonstrations. Additionally, it was within this period that Lenin began to push the Bolsheviks to a more radical and uncompromising stance (Brooks & Chernyavskiy, 2007). In conjunction with the national response towards the calamity surrounding national defense in WWI, the lack of resources for the Russian populace is continuously argued to be the central motivation for the coming revolution in 1917 and its outcome—the end of the autocracy in Russia (Orlovsky, 2009).

The Russian shortcomings of WWI did not just include weakness in the command staff and the lack of industrial necessities such as weaponry (machine guns, artillery shells, or torpedoes) at the front; it was the moral of the Russian soldier. Granted, this could have been attributed to what a horrified British military attaché, General Alfred Knox, observed: “Unarmed [Russian] men had to be sent into the trenches to wait till their comrades were killed or wounded and their rifles became available” (Knox, 1921, p. 270). However, the more predominant variable was captured by the minister of war, General A. A. Polivanov, who reported to the Council of Ministers on July 16, 1915, that “the soldiers are without a doubt exhausted by the continued defeats and retreats. Their confidence in final victory and in their leadership are

undermined, ever more threatening signs of impending demoralization are evident” (Kowalski, 1997, p. 20; Wade, 2017). Furthermore, similar to the tactics leveraged by the Russians during Napoleon’s march across Europe in 1812, the high military command ordered a “scorched-earth” policy as the Russian military retreated (Josephson, 2023). Domestically, due to wartime losses, imperial authorities issued a strict position on “Military Censorship,” which was intended to “prevent the proclamation or dissemination of information that could harm the military interests of the state” (Stockdale, 2016, p. 39). The imperial regime abused this policy, and the punishment was severe for any vocalization or publication in disagreement with the state.

By 1917, the Great War brought together “over 14 and a half million men, nearly 90% of them peasants, to the army. Between August 1914 and the end of 1916, this huge number of men were drafted into the biggest—and by far, army of WWI” (N. Werth, 2017, p. 49). However, due to poor leadership, failed domestic economic policies, and calamitous wartime policy decisions, over 5 million men were considered casualties of war—2.1 million war prisoners and 3 million dead, wounded, or seriously ill (N. Werth, 2017; Wildman, 1980). These were sons, husbands, brothers, and fathers of the lower and middle class, and their absence was felt across society, and Russian culture shifted significantly as a result. What was once a national outcry of support for a justified war was now viewed as the country’s absolute demise (Jensen & Nichols, 2017).

The censorship, antisemitism, overreaching authoritative rule, economic collapse, and most influential—the government’s handling of the war effort—was a holistic defeat of the monarch. All of which led to pervasive discontent throughout all segments of society (Wade, 2017). At this juncture, liberal and conservative political circles agreed that rash and forceful fundamental changes in the political system were mandatory, similar to the demands from 1905.

The first attempts were through the Duma, but Nicolas II viewed these legislative attempts as a threat to his authority and suspended the Duma. With millions of refugees from the western regions, escaping the horrors of war, converging into Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and Moscow, the winter 1916-17 fuel shortages, and the rampant starvation of women and children, tensions in the cities escalated to new heights (Hasegawa, 2018). These cultural and societal conditions were only further amplified by pure human desperation (Hasegawa, 2018). By February 1917, the conditions of the Russian state, most notably the industrial workers had so radicalized society that waves of strikes exploded across the country. Russia was in full revolt, and the revolutionary parties capitalized on the chaos.

Later, on February 23, 1917, the women of Russia organized a massive International Women's Day demonstration, demanding "bread" for themselves and their children. The movement made its way through Petrograd, which enticed the textile, metalwork, and industrial factory workers to participate in the demonstration; this also provided the revolutionary underground (Bolsheviks and others) an opportunity to continue the demonstrations from December and January (Orlovsky, 2009). The military was called in and ordered to suppress the movement; however, troops became participants alongside the mobilized peasants, scholars, middle class, politicians, and revolutionaries. Municipalities and government buildings were overrun, and every facet of Tsarist authority was frayed (Brooks & Chernyavskiy, 2007). By nightfall, Petrograd was paralyzed, and five days later, imperial authority in the capital was non-existent (N. Werth, 2017). After three centuries of rule, the Romanov dynasty vanished, and for the sake of tranquility, Nicolas II abdicated the throne for himself and his son (Orlovsky, 2009). The Tsarist state was ultimately undermined by the destabilization of the social order, mass population displacement, and continuous external and internal war that strained the economy and

society (Gatrell, 2015). The autocracy's long-held political and economic ambitions evaporated, and the Russian collectivist culture began to emerge (Gatrell, 2015).

Revolutionary Culture: Bolsheviks & Leninism

The central element to emerge out of the February Revolution was the Provisional Government, which was founded on “democratic principles and goals, which envisioned a revolutionary transformation on liberal principles, with appropriate guarantees of civil rights and more autonomy for minorities” (Orlovsky, 2009, p. 277). With the intention of rule and reform in every sphere of society, the Provisional Government focused heavily on drafting legislation on self-government, judicial reform, educational enhancements, labor relations, corporate law, and the separation of Church and state. However, within weeks, the Provisional Government had not addressed the most pressing issues plaguing the Russian people, specifically food shortages, industrial production, land reform, labor laws, and the Russian involvement in WWI (Kerensky, 1932). These political realities became the steppingstones of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who initially dominated the Petrograd apparatus and were openly critical of, and rejected the bourgeois Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks favored revolutionary Soviet control and held an obsessive belief in the continuation of revolution. Lenin's *April Thesis* coincided with the Bolshevik clamor for revolution, as it promised peace, bread, land, and a workers' government (Frankel, 1969; Wade, 2017). Most importantly, what made Lenin's role decisive in the Bolshevik movement was his demand for eliminating dual power within the Provisional Government and a complete transition of “all power to the Soviets” (Orlovsky, 2009). Lenin's oratory prowess and powerful ideological drive for utopianism, which is best captured in *State and Revolution*, identified Lenin as a political realist, a pragmatist, and a strategist who encapsulated organization and political astuteness (Barfield, 1971).

After a summer of Russian conservatives failing to eliminate the Bolsheviks from the Provisional Government and General Kornilov, commander of the Russian army, failing at a coup attempt in Petrograd to destroy the Bolshevik presence, the Bolshevik power amongst the workers and soldiers was significantly strengthened. Through the October Revolution of 1917, at the behest of Lenin demanding the party seize power in the name of the working class through immediate armed uprising, the Bolsheviks gained control of Petrograd, and the Provisional Government was eliminated. Lenin's intense vision of transforming Russia by reshaping its consciousness and making the proletariat a true universal class had become a reality (Wade, 2017).

The next three years produced a cultural shift in Russia; from 1918-1921, the Russian Civil War tore Russia apart geopolitically and culturally (Engelstein, 2017). Against the sitting Bolshevik power, the White Army consisted of highly varying political and philosophical entities. Predominantly, the White Army comprised monarchists, militarists, and foreign nationals who did not want to see a socialist state in Europe (Orlovsky, 2009). The Bolsheviks, known as the Red Army, were facing resistance throughout all of Russia as Poland and the Baltic States revolted against Bolshevik control, Finland claimed their independence, Lower Volga was under the leadership of Socialist Revolutionaries, anti-Bolshevik assemblies were created throughout western and central Russia in addition to Petrograd, and in both Trans-Baikalia and Manchuria, monarchists loyal to Nicholas II established their own governments (Mawdsley, 2009).

However, the Bolsheviks continued to leverage society's emotions for support by incorporating images and metaphors of the monarch's failures in their rhetoric and propaganda

(Engelstein, 2017). The continuous onslaught of harsh materials perpetrating extreme combat between good (Bolshevik philosophy) and evil (Romanov dynasty) rallied the peasantry and workers to the Bolshevik cause (Steinberg & Khrustalëv, 1995). In the summer of 1918, Lenin, realizing the threat of the living royals, who were imprisoned in Siberia, and with the White Army gaining ground with the possibility of liberation, Lenin gave the order for the radical anarchists and extreme Bolsheviks of the Urals to execute the Romanov Family. Within the Bolshevik regime, the political assassination of Nicholas, Alexandria, his wife, and their four young children was a necessary cleansing for Soviet Russia and a purge (*chistka*) mandated by certain moral understanding (Orlovsky, 2009).

At this juncture in Russian history, the once powerful nation was considered by the global community to be in a state of complete chaos. Imperial Japan began encroaching on Russian territory, and the Allied Forces began questioning Russian sustainability on the Eastern Front (Carr, 1985). This chaos also gave Germany hope that the new regime in Russia would provide them a respite on the Eastern Front, and further tactical focus could be deployed against the British, French, and the US on the western Front (Trani & Davis, 2017). In this case, both sides were correct, and in keeping with their promises and with the nefarious undermining of the German war machine, which was in league with Lenin, the Bolsheviks rendered peace via the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference between Russia and the Central Powers (Brest-Litovsk. Peace Conference 1917-1918, 1918). The allied forces were concerned by the actions of the new Russian government, and the West had to decide between strategic necessity (needing Russia in the fight on the Eastern Front) and wanting to stop the spread of communism (J. W. Long, 1982).

The Allied Forces ambitiously attempted to capture both objectives, with England, France, and the US sending troops to Russia to support the anti-Bolshevik forces and to restore the Eastern Front against Germany (Orlovsky, 2009). It is argued that the lack of trust between Russia and the US was rooted in the actions of the Allied Forces, Woodrow Wilson, and the Western support for the anti-communist White Army in 1918-1920 (Trani, 1976; Trani & Davis, 2017). The Soviets resented the intervention, and the Leninists never forgot that the US was a critical component in the attempt to stop the communist revolution in Russia (Trani, 1976). The Russian suspicions of the West are highly correlated to the tactics used by the Allied Forces in the Russian Civil War, and they directly impacted Russian–American relations throughout the next seventy years (Unterberger, 1987).

In the wake of the Red Army victory, the Bolsheviks gained complete authority over the Russian state (Carr, 1985; Orlovsky, 2009; Trani, 1976). Conflicting literary narratives capture the years following Bolshevik control. Some arguments are made that through massive famine and economic collapse due to an incredibly hostile World War and Civil War; there was a profound cultural achievement in building socialism at such a massive scale (Husband, 2009). The Leninist principles of a dictatorial proletariat were welcomed by an aggressive mandate by the Russian people, and their collectivist virtue founded in classical Russian culture welcomed such a change in state governance (Kengor, 2020). However, other arguments detail a more divergent narrative that was purposefully articulated by Communist propaganda, as senior Bolsheviks knew that corruption was rampant throughout the new system of government and the idealism that was fought for in the Russian Civil War had been supplanted by greed (Brovkin, 1998). Undeniably, the 1921-1929 Bolsheviks perused the most elaborate experimental phase of Russian communism, which began with the New Economic Policy (NEP) (Husband, 2009). Its

primary objectives were to establish a grass-roots economy and generate investment capital for industrialization, transition to socialism, and predominantly advance equitable social and economic order (Gregory, 2017). However, the Bolshevik control over Russia was illusory at best, and there was a realization in Moscow that in order for successful implementation of NEP (Gregory, 2017), the Bolshevik movement needed to transition from a revolutionary cadre into a ruling institution; this transition was accomplished (Carr, 1985); however, it was decided that it was best achieved through increased repression and centralization despite popular discontent (Husband, 2009).

Historians argue that the NEP was undoubtedly the march towards socialism, but it was considered a purer period of socialism with a human face, displaying cultural diversity and private enterprise (Husband, 2009). Viewed through a cultural lens, the brief period of the 1920s in Russia, lasting only eight years, was hailed as a Golden Age. This was attributed to the notable achievements in economics and politics, mirroring the advancements witnessed in Berlin and Vienna. (Cohen, 1980). Under Lenin, Russian cinema, theater, and art were in an ever-expanding and experimental state; however, the terms of cultural discourse “precluded production of explicitly anti-Soviet, apolitical, and individually oriented works” (Brovkin, 1998, p. 1; Kenez, 1985; Pipes, 2011, pp. 282–387). A majority of the anti-Communist sentiment was raised by the bourgeois who were accustomed to the pre-Bolshevik experience, which only emboldened the Bolsheviks to produce new cultural practices that purposefully clashed with the traditional culture of classical Russia. According to Brovkin (1998) and Kenez (1985), the outcomes of the intentional cultural purging resulted in a mixture of misunderstandings, misappropriations, distortion, and adaptation of the required behavior norms.

From a production perspective, however, the Bolsheviks required the bourgeois and had to tread lightly on their desired suppression (Orlovsky, 2009). In conflict with the outright loathing the Bolsheviks felt towards the bourgeois in post-Civil War Russia, early Leninism demanded cooperation with specialists such as technical intelligentsia, engineers, state factory leaders, and agency professionals (Bailes, 1978). One of Lenin's challenges with the Bolshevik leadership was crafting an unpopular fundamental argument that there was a mandatory need for the enlistment of bourgeois specialists if a revival of the economy was to be obtained (Lenin, 1958, vols. 36: 158-159, 179). Lenin warned that failure to learn from this segment of the bourgeois would prevent the necessary large-scale production and foundations of socialism (Lenin, 1958, vol. 36: 311). Regardless of the predominant position of the bourgeoisie as instruments of production to facilitate socialism, as stated by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*, there was mutual hatred shared amongst Lenin and the Bolsheviks regarding the general role of the bourgeois, specifically in Russia, where the bourgeois was too timid and underdeveloped to prepare the social and economic ground for socialism (Ball, 1990; Harding, 2009).

The 1920s were marked by numerous contradictions. While political debate regarding the tenets of Soviet socialism, which aimed to bolster Stalin's future position, was actively promoted, there was also an encouragement of party openness. This juxtaposition highlights the complexities of the era. Additional contradiction can be observed through the simultaneous push for "creativity in artistic expression combined with the tightening of ideological controls" (Brovkin, 1998, p. 2). Moreover, the NEP advocated for individual agricultural markets, yet it also supported the centralization of industry to maintain the planned Leninist economy. These conflicting dynamics underscore the intricate nature of the period. The strain between the old intelligentsia and the Bolshevik upstarts (determined to destroy cultural autonomy) was a point

of criticality in NEP Russia regarding contradictory positions (Fitzpatrick, 1992). Throughout the 1920s, the non-Communist intelligentsia that operated in government offices, banks, and educational institutions did “not hide their indifference, if not hostility, to Communism and the interpreted Communist claims, as well as the social, political, and cultural reality” (Brovkin, 1998, p. 16); however, this population of professors, engineers, military tacticians, and students were necessary for the unqualified and unprepared Bolsheviks propelled into positions of government and industrial leadership (Fitzpatrick, 1992). Eventually, the Russian ideology, culture, behavioral norms, and cultural practices merged with the political paradigms of the Communist Party, and the revolutionary visions of classical Russian values and world views personified in Lenin’s just utopia would eventually manifest into a dictatorial regime (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Stites, 1991).

The 1920s became a political culture crossroads that would pin the libertarian revolutionary ideals of equality of the proletariat, the enhancement of community, and proletarian morality against the experimental impulse and authoritarian elements of the Bolshevik portrayal of the same ideals, thus giving way to the 1930s’ bureaucratic centralism and eventually, Stalinism (Faulkner, 2017; Stites, 1991). Both sides were considered practicing Marxists (Koenker, 2013) and favored socialism over capitalism, as the populist mentality was a protest against modernity associated with the elevation of manufacturing and commerce, social injustice practiced by autocracy, and the evils of Western materialism (Naimark, 1983). However, it is argued that Marxism-Leninism is a complete bastardization of Marxism, as the idea that the state could “build socialism” would be considered absurd by Marx and Engels (Harding, 2009; A. G. Meyer, 1957).

It is understood that Marxism cannot be created by implementing intentional or preconceived conditions (Engels & Marx, 1848; Harding, 2009; A. G. Meyer, 1957), only through class struggle and the natural evolution from established capitalism, which is then replaced by socialism after the capitalist mode of production has exhausted all possibilities (Brovkin, 1998; Harding, 2009). These discrepancies in philosophy and implementation are critical markers of the Bolshevik political culture, which eventually manifests the 1930 deviation from the intent to better the lives of Russian workers. Differing from classical Marxism (Engels & Marx, 1848; Kengor, 2020; Marx, 1992/1867), the Bolshevik ideology became an exercise in the loyalty of the proletarian consciousness and demand of obedience from the masses to the political elite, a typical result as the Marxist foundation is a contradiction to natural law (Hayek, 1944; Koyzis, 2019; Rommen, 1998).

Soviet Union Executive Power: Stalinism

Five years removed from the Russian Revolution, which was founded on the principles of eliminating the nation-state and gaining proletariat control, the transition from Russia to the official Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or “Soviet Union” was created (Hanson, 2014; Reiman, 2016). Instead of an individual utopian community, the Soviet Union emerged as a vast nation that “forced millions of people into a federation initially made up of Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Transcaucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia” (Davis, 2022). Lenin believed the independence of the Soviet Union republics was essential, but federation control over culture, industry, and language was essential to maintaining the desired communist state (Husband, 2009). Additionally, under the NEP, the Bolshevik movement was expanding exponentially, and its economic promises continuously appealed to the younger, more radical, and more revolutionary populations (Siegelbaum, 2009). This recruitment provided

Stalin with “the necessary machinery for launching his revolution from above” (Brovkin, 1998, p. 191; Fitzpatrick, 1986). The Bolshevik Party was renamed the Russian Communist Party (RCP) and developed into an administrative juggernaut by the late 1920s, and the party doctrine had integrated into the public values, views, and cultural practices across the entirety of the Soviet Union.

In the wake of Lenin’s death in January 1924, the ardent follower of Leninism, Joseph Stalin, a power-seeking Bolshevik, emerged as the leader of the Russian Communist Party, regardless of Lenin’s disapproval (Todd, 2016). After complex political maneuvering and competition for power between Communist Party leaders of Moscow and Petrograd, including Stalin, Leon Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, Stalin emerged as the dominant leader of the Soviet Union, and by 1927, Stalin had complete control over the party (Lampert, 1992). Stalin ended the NEP, which he viewed as a retreat from orthodox Marxism, and implemented an element of cultural fear that gripped the Soviet Union (Bauman, 2004; Todd, 2016). Stalin refocused the state’s objectives in contrast to Lenin by implementing controls including the obedience of the population and executing the Soviet Union Five-Year Plan—a policy to initiate instant and expansive industrialization across the Soviet Union (Bauman, 2004). This action was an attempt by Stalin to end the ill-conceived programs revolted against by the proletariat and the experimentation phase of NEP (Husband, 2009). Ultimately, radical industrialization through dictatorial decree was the future of the USSR, based on the opposition principles of the Bolsheviks in 1917.

Between 1929 and 1941, there is one fundamental truth: the Soviet Union went through an accelerated cultural transition. Depending on the viewpoint presented, whether it's the

Marxist-Leninist narrative depicting the era as the Soviet enlightenment of socialist construction—highlighting the enthusiastic efforts of the Soviet people in building massive factories, developing national infrastructure, and transforming rural areas into collective farms for mass production, all while embracing the principles outlined in the Stalin Constitution of 1936—or the acknowledgment of the escalating imperialist threat from European powers, which prompted the Soviet Union's industrialization to ensure the nation's survival and uphold the socialist ideology it represented (Siegelbaum, 2009). Conversely, Western scholarship understands the rule of Stalin as correlated with totalitarianism and dictatorship of the Communist Party. This narrative is not without basis, as Stalin's demonic repressiveness, and terror reached every corner of the Soviet Union (Butler, 2006). Any individual who posed a threat to Stalin's authority, labeled *Trotskyites* and counter-revolutionaries, would fall victim to Stalin's Instruments of Terror: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), later known as the Committee for State Security (KGB), secret police used to arrest and dispose of all political rivals through notorious "show trials;" or to end the lives of millions of Soviet citizens, high ranking military officers, intelligentsia, laborers, clergy, journalists, artists, and political activists through immediate execution without trial (Solzhenitsyn, 1973/1997).

Moreover, the NKVD were the shepherds of the vast system of GULAG prisons, and for four decades, they had the authority to arrest, interrogate, convict, transport to, and imprison any Soviet Union citizen in the labor camps that dotted the outer reaches of the Soviet Union (Siegelbaum, 2009; Solzhenitsyn, 1973/1997). According to Nalbandov (2016), identity attributes such as ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status were also contributing variables to persecution, as were cultural conditions and behaviors, and the justification for arrest, imprisonment, and death was that every aspect of life was directly linked to political affiliation

and loyalty to Stalin's regime. By 1939, the Soviets witnessed their leadership allow the extermination of over 1.3 million Soviets (Siegelbaum, 2009); however, by the end of Stalin's regime, his name would be in the company of Hitler and Mao as one of the deadliest dictators in modern history. Where the estimations are difficult to gather accurately, Stalin was roughly responsible for at least 6 million murders and an additional estimated 14 million deaths caused by forced labor, violent extradition, bloody massacres, famine, and captivity in concentration/labor camps (Applebaum, 2004; Naimark, 2011).

The Great Terror is a common designation for the massive purges of human life throughout the Soviet Union in the 1930s. It also indicates the "sweeping or even total fear among the Soviet population" (Conquest, 1973; Thurston, 1986, p. 213; Ulam, 1973). The system of terror Stalin instilled throughout the Soviet Union can be argued as an act to keep the population in check and ensure their loyalty, which correlates to countless political violence studies (Walter, 1969); however, throughout numerous memoir accounts and data points, before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there is evidence that the Stalin Purges created a cultural phenomenon of fear reaching multiple generations, manifesting cultural amalgamation, and a strong motivation to comply with a categorical group versus embracing any individuality (Getty, 2002; Kengor, 2017; Nalbandov, 2016). The systematic physical tortures, Bolshevik glorification of plebeian defiance, false charges against millions of citizens in the name of the higher good, and mass executions that were all centrally directed and planned, according to Oleg V. Khlevniuk (2021), the leading Russian expert on the terror, still impacts the modern Russian psychology (LeVine, 2008; Siegelbaum, 2009). It can be argued that since the social engineering of the Stalin era still has an immeasurably large impact on today's geopolitical climate, it was

operating during the cultural disposition of the 1960s Soviet Union (Applebaum, 2013; Hofstede, 2001; Lampert & Rittersporn, 1992; LeVine, 2008; Lo, 2015).

Domestically, the Soviet Union was in chaos during Stalin's 1930's rule, and the Soviet population was experiencing the extreme aspirations of dictatorship under Marxist philosophies, and the people's everyday life was fear and uncertainty (Thurston, 1986). From a foreign relations perspective, the Soviet Union was always afraid of the fascist threat rising from Nazi Germany and the power of Imperial Japan rising throughout the Chinese and Mongolian Republics, but similarly the expansion and the spread of political philosophy (in this case communism) remained a fundamental principle of the Soviet Union. To meet these two objectives, Stalin knew Hitler aggression against Poland, a desire, which was shared by the Soviet Union, and Stalin leveraged that position (Kulski, 1978; Smith, 2007). Through the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Treaty in 1939, a Boundary of Friendship defined the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the Soviets acquired nearly half of Poland's territory and one-third of its population (Smith, 2007). The additional territory included three Baltic republics, the Romanian province of Bessarabia, and the entirety of Finland; however, Finland resisted territorial aggression throughout the eastern corridor, resulting in the Winter War (1939-40). The Winter war was quickly won by the Red Army, not because of skill or superior firepower, but greater troop numbers (Siegelbaum, 2009).

Regardless of the treaty, Stalin remained fearful of Germany, and his next set of policies showed evidence of his psychological preparation for war and demand for Soviet patriotism (Fitzpatrick, 1989). Laws demanding an extended working day and draconian penalties for even minor labor infractions were implemented to increase production, as Stalin demanded a massive

buildup of defense industries. The shift to extra-territorial war meant increased government controls, concentration of power, and further centralization of the economy, adding to the long-term effects of Stalin's policies on political and sociocultural conditions (Fitzpatrick, 1989). Ultimately, Stalin believed Mother Russia had transformed into the Socialist Fatherland, and its preservation was at stake as the Germans and Japanese continued to advance (Fitzpatrick, 1989; Kohn, 1952; Siegelbaum, 2009).

World War II: The Eastern Front

German behavior in the Second World War, while devastating to a majority of Europe and specific religious populations such as Judaism, the German war machine also wreaked havoc on the Soviet communist system, with dire political consequences, but more importantly, the war was catastrophic for the Soviet people (Roberts, 2007). From June 1941, when the Germans broke their alliance and invaded the Soviet Union, to Imperial Japan's surrender in 1945, over 70,000 Soviet cities, towns, and villages were decimated, including over 6 million homes, and close to 300,000 farms, factories, schools, libraries, and hospitals (Voznesenky, 1948, pp. 126–133). In post-Soviet literature, the casualty numbers have significantly increased, starting at 7 million war-related deaths, where the generally accepted figure is now 25 million, two-thirds of them civilians (Erickson, 1994; Roberts, 2007). The German invasion of the Soviet Union was brutal and violent, as German ordinance and Soviet tactics laid waste to a geographic area larger than the country of France. Due to Soviet weakness, within four months, 1.5 million Soviet troops were dead, and the German army had besieged and starved the city of Leningrad, and was only miles away from Moscow (Fuller, 2009; A. Reid, 2011).

Nazi Germany's ambitions quickly altered, as they sustained heavy losses from the Red Army counter-offensive attacks outside Moscow, which pushed the Germans back an additional 40-50 miles (Roberts, 2007). Additionally, Hitler's objectives had changed to prioritize the oil and natural resource-rich area of the Southern Front, consisting of the Black Sea, Kyiv, Odesa, Rostov, and Stalingrad. The change altered troop numbers in the North, stretching the Eastern Front and mandating that Hitler accept a long war of attrition, thus marking the first strategically critical defeat for the Germans (Allen & Muratoff, 1944). The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, also benefitted the Soviet war efforts. With the US declaring war on Germany's ally in the Pacific theater and Hitler's declaration of war on America on December 11, 1941, the US became an active participant in the European theater and set in motion the American-British-Soviet coalition (Roberts, 2007).

By April 1945, the Soviet army encircled Berlin, and a few days later, Adolf Hitler committed suicide, ending the war in Europe. Stalin then honored his pledge to the Americans and joined the Pacific war in Manchuria, and by September 1945, Soviet representatives witnessed the Japanese surrender on the deck of the American battleship *Missouri* (Stillwell, 2015). The Soviets understood that their victory was due to the alliance coalition expanding the war to multiple fronts, and that German intelligence undermined its own effort (Ratcliff, 2008). A prime example can be found in the Allied forces penetration into German and Japanese signal intelligence (SIGINT) (Ratcliff, 2008), but also in the German intelligence that estimated the Red Army only held 200 divisions; however, by August 1941, 360 divisions had been identified by German forces (Fuller, 2009). Additional German estimates misrepresented the Soviet tank count, naval capabilities, and the scale at which the Soviet economy and factories could produce wartime necessities (Fuller, 2009). Nazi racist ideology also contributed to the miscalculation of

the Soviet resolve and perseverance to protect the sovereignty of the Soviet Union (Roberts, 2007). Hitler believed that Germans could push from Poland to the Urals in three months due to the Soviet disposition of societal fragility produced by communist ideologies and practices (Norman, 1973).

The extreme centralization and authoritarianism streamlined the mobilization of millions of troops, resources, and every able-bodied laborer (against their will—absenteeism was declared a felony; and factories, railways, and waterways were under martial law). Over 16% of the population was eventually drafted to maintain the necessary numbers to slow the German advance, and at its height, the Red Army had 11.2 million people under arms (Fuller, 2009). This conscription destroyed the workforce, and Stalin was forced to release “prisoners” from the GULAG, which provided an influx of 1.1 million people to support society, the military, labor, and agricultural communities. (Applebaum, 2004; Fuller, 2009).

Women also played a critical role within the Soviet Union, similar to the US and Britain, as they became the dominating demographic of the rural labor force in the absence of men, machines, and draft animals (horses, mules, and cows). Women were 82% of the rural labor force by 1944 (Schuster, 1971) and 70% of the industrial labor force within the population centers by the end of 1941 (Fuller, 2009). Culturally, WWII devastated the Soviet Union, the roles and responsibilities of specific demographics shifted, and the conscription and death toll of Soviet men and young boys ravaged the familial and community dynamic (Fitzpatrick, 1986; Fuller, 2009). Economically, one-third of the nation’s wealth had been depleted, putting more pressure on the national business lines to produce (Fitzpatrick, 1986; Fuller, 2009). However, the Soviet Union had gained global prestige, and Stalin was in a unique situation as the strongest

power in Europe, which would bolster the Soviet claim of socialism's superiority over capitalism (Reiman, 2016). This opportunity would be one of the main factors shaping the collision course between the two remaining superpowers and dictate the next 46 years of US–Soviet relations (Nijman, 1992).

World War Two significantly altered the global landscape, compelling countries worldwide to recognize the interconnected nature of the modern age. The war manifested many policy, doctrinal, and cultural shifts in addition to creating magnificent examples of national heroism; simple names such as Dunkirk, Pearl Harbor, Midway, Guadalcanal, Kursk, Monte Cassino, Coral Sea, Normandy, Eindhoven, Leyte Gulf, Bastogne, Iwo Jima, Haguenau, and Okinawa symbolize the valor and selflessness exhibited by both Allied and Axis military members, and what victory and defeat meant for each theater of war. However, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where Imperial Japan and the world learned the meaning of “complete and utter destruction,” would alter the course of contemporary human history (Bernstein, 1975; McCullough, 1992; Walker, 2005). The scorched earth and flaming sky of the Japanese mainland in August 1945 ended WWII but shaped the second half of the 20th century, during which the globe lived in constant wonder if a clash of the two superpowers would destroy all human life.

Origins of Mistrust: Soviet and American Relations—Cold War

The Potsdam conference is considered one of the fractures between the Soviet Union and the West, setting the stage for the Cold War (Jervis, 1976; Neiberg, 2015). Postwar intentions were becoming increasingly divergent among the Allies, as the West feared Stalin's ambition of communist domination throughout Europe, and Stalin believed the Western Allies took the Red

Army and Soviet citizens' sacrifices for granted, and that the Soviet Union was a pawn in a larger geopolitical chess match (Naimark, 2021). Undeniably, the Soviet Union sustained the most casualties at 14% of the prewar population, compared to the US, with 416,800 deaths in battle and 1,700 civilian deaths (Neiberg, 2015). Ultimately, the governance and administration of Germany and Poland became the most pressing areas of contention between the three allies. When geographic lines were finally agreed upon, further divergence of diplomacy occurred over recognition of government type, which eventually became substantial indicators of mistrust between the West and the Soviet Union (McCullough, 1992; Neiberg, 2015). The Potsdam Conference concluded with the three allies optimistic about European governance and the ongoing Pacific war; however, the West feared the domination of Soviet communism over Europe, which amplified tensions. Additionally, Stalin viewed the Western policies of post-war management as depriving the Soviet Union of its rightful position as the victor in Eastern Europe (Fuller, 2009; Naimark, 2021; Neiberg, 2015).

Leveraging a proactive strategy, Stalin quickly mobilized and sent communist leaders to the many states and territories that the Red Army had liberated from Nazi Germany along the western front of the Soviet Union. This line of Eastern European nations would act as Stalin's geographic barrier between the capitalist nations of Western Europe and the Soviet-controlled Eastern bloc (Paterson, 1986). This line of demarcation was a growing concern for the West, and in 1946, the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his *Iron Curtain* speech at Westminster College, highlighting the existing polarization between the West and the Soviet Union's expansionist policies (Larres, 2018). Stalin referred to the speech as a direct attack on himself and the Soviet Union, and he was appalled by the speech (Khrushchev, 1970, p. 361). Conversely, in the West, the speech was considered a plea for peace, not conflict (Harriman,

1987). For the Kremlin, the *Iron Curtain* imagery was seized on and was considered the “decisive opening shot of the Cold War” (Larres, 2018, p. 87).

In reactionary form, Stalin began to purge domestically, explicitly focusing on newly acquired citizens. He orchestrated the establishment of communist governments in Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, and Stalin deported or arrested millions of ethnic nationals who were allegedly collaborating with Nazis and resisting Soviet control (Fuller, 2009). An additional 1.5 million non-Russian citizens from Crimea, Caucasus, Bulgaria, and Armenia, mostly of Muslim descent, were labeled as Nazi sympathizers, resulting in immediate displacement to labor camps or execution (Russia File, 2011). Additional purging of cultural figures occurred throughout the Soviet Union until Stalin died in 1953, as they were considered a danger that would dismantle Soviet society. This attack on the populace was considered a xenophobic campaign to purify Soviet intellectual life of all Western concepts and, more importantly, bourgeois influence (Fuller, 2009). Behind the Iron Curtain, Soviet culture was decimated, and any deviation from conformity to the party line in art, music, cinema, religion, political debate, celebration, or education was met with savage treatment, imprisonment, or death (Fuller, 2009).

Major geopolitical and economic events occurred throughout the following two decades post-WWII. However, culturally, the Soviet Union had minor advancements that would not produce a differing cultural disposition (Hofstede et al., 2010). The Iron Curtain insulated the Soviet society, and the Truman Doctrine (1947) pledged aid to governments threatened by communist subversion. The Marshall Plan (1947), provided to nations with democratically elected governments, economic aid in the billions, and the first mutual security and military

alliance was created —the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Hitchcock, 2019; McCullough, 1992; Robertson, 2003). In response to the economic support and the creation of NATO, the communist governments of Eastern Europe formalized an alliance through the 1955 Warsaw Pact, but ultimately, the dividing line separating East and West was stagnant for the following decades, most notably in East and West Germany (Będźmirowski, 2007).

From a domestic production perspective, the Soviet Union leadership understood that the fear and expense of Stalin's tactics were paralyzing any development of the country. Under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, the de-Stalinization process took place, dismantling the Stalinist system of repression and secrecy to an extent (Freeze, 2009). By the late 1950s, the tensions of the Soviet Union populace had eased thanks to the cautious liberation known as the *Cultural Thaw*, which opened more opportunities to previously closed spheres of culture and intellectual life. Khrushchev's objective was clear; he wanted to distance the Soviet Union from Stalin's crimes against humanity and amplify Soviet successes. By the late 1950s, the Khrushchev economy was in a continuous upward trend of growth in the industrial and agricultural sectors (Hitchcock, 2019). These reforms and Soviet restoration actions were short-lived, and where the domestic life of the Soviet citizen was improving, the Soviet Union's relationship with the global community was worsening, regardless of the peace advances made between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev (Smith, 2013). The failure in diplomacy was due to the void created by the competing ideological viewpoints of the two superpowers in conjunction with the ongoing global military-industrial complex (Santis, 1976; Smith, 2013).

The valid reasoning for the Cold War conflict can be identified through Soviet and American behavior and the parallels or similarities shared between the two superpowers (Jervis,

2017; Zelikow & Rice, 2019). Most of the literature identifies the intensification of the nuclear arsenal or the proxy wars that devastated the globe for the next 70 years (some are still ongoing in Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine). However, where these events add color, the fundamental antagonism is evident in four specific cultural identities. First, both superpowers projected a form of universalism, where the Soviet Union held an expectation that Marxism, which was not particularly Russian, should be shared and implemented in every corner of the globe. In contrast, the Americans held a similar sentiment of their founding principles being exported worldwide, which would add validity to their creation instituted by ideas (Jervis, 2017). Second, both the US and the Soviet Union believed they were the pinnacle of progress and modernism. This manifested global change and other nations conformed to either US or USSR philosophical, political, and cultural standards (Hitchcock, 2019; Plungian, 2022). Third, per Waltz (1959) and Jervis (2017), the international politics of both superpowers were directly linked to their respective ideologies. Their domestic systems and values profoundly influenced foreign policy, and to maintain the global power balance, democracy (for the US) or communism (for the Soviet Union) must become the universally accepted form of government throughout the world (Jervis, 2017). Finally, both nations emerged as the result of a revolution, seeking political transformation and equality for the people (Higgs, 2012; Nalbandov, 2016). The concept of change was ingrained in the foundational makeup of the US and the Soviet Union; therefore, the ambition to seek major change or remake what is considered incomplete is deeply rooted in both cultures (Jervis, 2017; Sestanovich, 2005). These four similarities are regarded as fundamental beliefs and behaviors of the respective superpowers. The resolution to the sustained stalemate, perceived as an inherent threat to the other's security, arises when one side allows for a shift in cultural ideals and domestic strategies (Hitchens, 2006; Jervis, 2001; Payne, 2011).

The Cold War produced a corrosive global environment, and the constant ebb and flow of democracy versus communism being mandated worldwide significantly impacted Europe, the Korean peninsula, and most of Southeast Asia. Dueling agencies such as the CIA, GRU, FBI, and KGB, which were not directly comparable during the Cold War, were finding their analytical footholds and exploiting information at unprecedented rates. Unfortunately, not all information and intelligence was viable, accurate, or practical (Lowenthal, 2019). The first and primary focus of intelligence matters centered around the global advancement of political ideologies and the diplomatic movement of key leaders. The second was understanding the capabilities of strategic nuclear weapons (Betts, 1978). Principles of intelligence collection by the US and Soviet Union were in constant parallel regarding progression, influence, and creation of more accurate analytical and technical instruments of early warning, espionage, and deception (Fingar, 2011; Walton, 2008). However, US and Soviet Union intelligence had a significant void in incorporating cultural dispositions, counterintelligence best practices, and the PMESII-PT structure (operational variables of every action including political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) (Moore, 2011; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007; Shelton, 2011).

In 1962, the threat of American and Soviet strategic weapons, in conjunction with their symmetries of identity, produced what could have been a globe-ending event on the island of Cuba, 90 miles south of Florida's coast. Leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the CIA had published multiple National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) about Castro's communist regime in Cuba, the close ties the Cuban government had with the Soviet Bloc, the Soviet commitment to and activities in spreading communism throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and how all those variables were a

threat to US national security (Zegart, 2012). Where these assessments were accurate as general strategic assumptions, the American intelligence that stated Khrushchev would be unwilling to risk establishing a base in Cuba was plagued with cognitive distortions, including ethnocentrism, mirror-imaging, the rational actor model, and being too wedded to the status quo (Betts, 2007; R. Z. George, 2020; Johnston, 2005; Walton, 2012; Zegart, 2012). Additional NIE language (NIE 85-62) states that Khrushchev would certainly not intervene directly with its own forces in Cuba if Castro's regime was overthrown by internal or external forces (Zegart, 2012). Ten weeks later, Khrushchev decided to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba, and the island was supporting a massive number of Soviet troops (Soviet archive materials indicate an increase from 350 to 4,000 during 1962) by August 1962. By September, the intelligence produced in (SNIE 85-3-62) via SIGINT and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources indicated a massive arms buildup in Cuba, approximating 70 ships worth of weaponry and construction equipment. However, the intelligence still concluded that the Soviet policy of not intervening in Cuba remained fundamentally unaltered (Walton, 2012; Zegart, 2012). Ultimately, from an indications and warnings (I&W) perspective, American intelligence successfully detected and warned President Kennedy about missile movement to the Caribbean. However, holistically, signals were missed, and Khrushchev's intentions of communist expansionism, political ideology – in this case, relationships with Cuba, and the Soviet Union's trend of power projection through nuclear gambit were not captured.

Cultural Disposition Profiles

Hofstede (1981; 2001; 2010) has indicated that cultural disposition rarely changes from generation to generation, as cultural fundamentals are learned through familial and community experiences (Dabić et al., 2015). Additionally, Hofstede's original results from the 1980s

incorporated both Soviet and Russian perspectives, which would identify the desired results for the Soviet Union's cultural disposition of the 1960s. Using the Hofstede results, the following sections will leverage those scores as guidance but consider specific qualitative components to ensure accuracy.

Power Distance Profile: Soviet Union & US Perspective

The first theme of PDI is centered around inequality; the high-scoring theme is associated with a society that accepts inequalities, whereas a low-scoring society attempts to reduce inequalities. In the 1960s, it was argued that inequalities, specifically income inequalities, were exasperated by socialism, and democratization would lead to a stronger stance against inequalities. Theoretically, this sentiment is true, depending on the economic conditions of the varying socialist economies and policies, inequality could be better or worse within a socialist regime in comparison to a democratic society (Henderson et al., 2005)—in the case of the Soviet Union, price control and centralization manipulated market equilibrium and exacerbated inequalities, not necessarily making it a desired cultural condition but a reality of communist rule (Hayek, 1944; Pesci, 2013; Pogge, 2007). Ironically, the motive behind the government's seizure of agricultural products and the collectivization of farms that led to rationing, shortages, and limited production quantities was instilled to eliminate inequalities (Courtois, 1997; Henderson et al., 2005). While the ideology statistically did not persistently eliminate inequalities, in the Soviet Union, income inequality was relatively on par with the industrialized countries of the West (Piketty et al., 2017). The intention of the Soviets, spanning from 1905 to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, was to produce a utopian society of equality; however, where the Soviet Union partially controlled income inequality, it was lacking

in racial, gender, and educational equalities. This result strongly contradicted the political objectives of the communist expansion narrative.

It is undeniable that the Soviet plan was to dominate the world with a blanket of communism, and the political doctrine continuously addressed the inclusivity and favorability of diversity, which in turn would create an auspicious image of socialism (Rosser, 1962). However, behind the Iron Curtain, racism, sexism, and education (mandated but controlled through state authority, as only the selected could rise in the social elevator) were prevalent and widespread (Miranda, 2023; Smolentseva, 2007). Zaslavsky (1980) also identifies the contradiction of the Soviet Union when stating, “The Original Marxist aim – the elimination of inequality, the eradication of all causes of man’s alienation, the creation of a classless society – had not been achieved. On the contrary, in the Soviet Union, there has emerged a system of entrenched economic and social inequality” (Zaslavsky, 1980, p. 383). This contradiction makes scoring complex. The state politicizes and articulates throughout its doctrine the concept of eliminating inequality, yet, the practice of accepting inequalities within Soviet culture was prevalent, which ultimately scores high within Hofstede’s constructs.

The second and third themes of PDI are centered around similar paradigms in the case of the Soviet Union: how superiors are viewed within a society and the desire for centralization (high PDI) or decentralization (low PDI). Within the Soviet Union, central planning of the economy, including agriculture, industry, religion, and education, in and of itself necessitates a high degree of centralized control where planned goals are transmitted to individual sectors of society in the form of direct orders by way of communist party leadership thus increasing or decreasing output in either physical or value terms (Perkins, 1963). Culturally, the Soviet Union

embraced the concept that production was determined by the planning authorities “largely irrespective of what the consumer desired” (Perkins, 1963, p. 71). These findings suggest a high PDI score for both themes as they are inherently linked in this case study, indicating an overall high PDI score. This finding is concurrent with Hofstede’s conclusions, with Russia scoring from the 80s and 90s—93/100, as the top-down approach was widely accepted (due to fear) within Soviet Union and post-Cold War Russian culture (Gladwin & Hofstede, 1981; Hofstede et al., 2010).

The American perspective was transfixed on the “evils of communism,” the McCarthyism phenomenon fueling fears of the Soviets, and the external movement of the Soviet Union was considered a grave threat to liberty and national security (Schrecker, 2004; J. E. Smith, 2013). This will be a common understanding throughout the US perspective for all six dimensions. The intelligence community also shared this sentiment, as seen through memos and correspondence, evidenced in the NIEs that were consumed by the status of communism expansion versus the accurate estimations and assessments of Soviet tactics, techniques, and procedures (CIA, 1962; Renshon, 2009; Walton, 2012). Ultimately, the American perspective of the PDI themes regarding the Soviet Union was predicated on a minor understanding of Stalinism and Marxism governance principles and the American baseline for both of those ideologies, which was then further reduced to the concepts of subjugation and authoritarianism (Foster, 2000)—this understanding, while limited, results in a high PDI score.

Individualism v. Collectivism: Soviet Union & US Perspective

The collectivist characteristics of foreign exclusionism (but welcoming expansionism), societal identification with “We” versus “I,” and embracing economic cooperation versus

competition within the Soviet Union from a cultural, political, and societal perspective have been well established. Additionally, Hofstede's (1981; 2011; 2010) works continuously support that Soviet culture score low in IDV comparisons. The whole-hearted acceptance of the Marxian dogma from an agricultural and industrial production perspective by Soviet society, by way of the Bolsheviks, Leninism, Stalinism, the NEP, and eventually post-WWII Soviet structures defined Soviet ideology and became a dominant factor in everyday Soviet life (Narkiewicz, 1966; Volin, 1937).

The Soviet collectivist thought process, in contrast to the American identity of democracy, individualism, voluntarism, and opposition to concentrated power “especially when wielded by the government,” was built around the proletariat, the centrality of class conflict, and the transformation from individuals to societies (Jervis, 2017, p. 170). Fundamentally, similarly to the American exceptionalism belief, “from its inception, the Soviet Union had claimed to be an experiment in socialism, a superior alternative to capitalism, for the entire world. If socialism was not superior to capitalism, its existence could not be justified” (Kotkin, 2001, p. 19; Leffler, 2007). With this ideological motivation and global superpower status, the Soviet Union's collectivist identity looked to mirror, rival, and surpass the US. With this ambition, the Soviet Union's culture shifted from implementing domestic behaviors of a “normal” state to an emboldened global ambition. It is understood that the Soviet leadership was continuously irritated by the “hypocrisy” of the US as the Western superpower “denied them the right to do things that the United States did routinely – for example, intervene in the Third World, establish bases all over the globe, and play a central role in the Middle East” (Jervis, 2017, p. 171; Khrushchev, 1970). This cultural shift significantly influenced the Soviet Union's approach from the 1940s to the end of the Cold War; instead of hindering American efforts to establish global

dominance, in a move that perplexed American policymakers, the Soviet Union established the right to behave in the same way (Hitchcock, 2019; Jervis, 2017).

The ethnocentric phenomenon present in the American intelligence surrounding the Soviet Union's actions in the Caribbean in 1962 is prevalent not in the estimates that identified the Soviet desire for communist expansionism but in not identifying "the paradoxes of Bolshevik behavior that their leaders have yearned to be treated as equals by the people they consider doomed" (Kissinger, 2007). Ultimately, the cultural characteristics of collectivism were considered in the American intelligence calculations; however, the Soviet desire to emulate the American behavior of expanding the capitalistic and democratic sphere of influence via military movement and foreign presence was not a consideration. Additionally, the American perception of collectivism was limited to the broader communist ideology; this presented an ethnocentric void in the analysis, as the Soviet identity was much more complex than basic Marxism (Grabo, 2004; Jervis, 1976; Walton, 2012). For example, the Soviet identity was considered to be the result of a top-down organization, which was not necessarily an absorbed cultural condition of the entire population; however, American propaganda and intelligence labeled this type of organizational structure as a comprehensive condition of all Soviets, which was argued to be an additional reason (alongside usual communist isolationism and paranoia practices) of what drove Soviet leadership to extinguish their citizens freedom to interact with any outsiders (Jervis, 2017; A. G. Long, 2008; Watry, 2019). Another example is the process leveraged by the Soviet Union when they projected the collectivist ideology onto the world versus that of the American way. According to Jervis (2017), Soviet identity "pivoted not on what Soviet society was, but what it could be, and, relatedly, on what it should lead the world to be" (Jervis, 2017, p. 173). Alternatively, where American exceptionalism and its ambitions of forward-thinking were

present during the Cold War, American perception, considerably idealized, was based on a view of what American society actually was (Carey, 2004; Jervis, 2017, p. 173; Murray, 2013). The differing approaches benefited the US, as its sense of self was minimally altered from the Cold War, whereas the Soviet Union eventually collapsed (Hanson, 2014; Jervis, 2001). From an intelligence perspective, these competing approaches in national image eluded intelligence professionals and resulted in an ethnocentric result in the finished analysis.

The cultural characteristics and themes of IDV from a Soviet perspective are undeniably low, meaning the Soviet Union was highly collectivist (Koenker, 2013). The US perception of the Soviet Union can also be considered low-scoring, identifying a collectivist perception within IDV. However, nuance is a significant variable regarding cultural conditions, and where the Soviet Union's approach to expanding communism differed from the US design to spread capitalism, an understanding of the collectivist variations and definitions would be beneficial in this scenario. Additionally, it is essential to note that studying collectivist societies is a critical component of the intelligence profession and international relations (R. Z. George, 2020; Zegart, 2012). Understanding how cultural conditions, such as collectivism, will influence decision-making is significant in both fields (Jervis, 2017). Identifying the simplistic 6-D score of an entity or adversary is just the beginning of the process of sensemaking and its application to ethnocentrism. However, identifying additional components, such as the practice of due diligence, understanding the uses of 6-D scoring, and applying all accurate and timely information, is a best practice in building holistic intelligence.

Masculinity v. Femininity: Soviet Union & US Perspective

Similar to Imperial Japan in Chapter 4, capturing an accurate scoring of MAS includes focusing on familial values, behavioral patterns, legacy cultural conditions, and the impact of religion. The latter condition for the Soviet Union is highly complex, as the communist regime, starting under Lenin and continuing until the Soviet collapse, was at constant war with organized religion and its cultural byproducts. As seen in Japanese Shintōism in conjunction with Confucianism, religious principles tend to impact all the MAS characteristics; as was the case with the Soviet Union and its predominantly Eastern Orthodox population (Hofstede & Harris-Bond, 1988).

Russian traditions, morality, and community concepts are deeply rooted in the Russian Orthodox Church. The minority religions throughout the vast Soviet geography, including Judaism, Islam (Sunni and Shia Muslims), Catholics, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, also impact cultural configuration and present MAS behavioral components to Russian traditions, morality, and community (Shternshis, 2017). The values and behavioral patterns that were central to the Orthodox Church's message at times remained steadfast throughout the Soviet regime; however, as seen with government-sanctioned State Shintō, the Soviet influence quickly impacted the religious language of traditional morality, and it was corrupted and depreciated into a political rhetoric of solidarity and patriotism (Agadjanian, 2017). Historical representation of Soviet-controlled religion during a time when the Soviets attempted to deconstruct organized religion makes accurate research complicated; however, using Hofstede's scoring in conjunction with carefully selected literary accounts, a correct account of Soviet MAS is obtainable.

Organized religion and Marxism hold a complex and opposing relationship.

Fundamentally, Marxism is an aggressor against organized religion as its fundamental doctrine consists of militant atheism, “which does not concede to any religion the right to exist, thus two faiths [Communism and Orthodox Christianity] became opposed to each other” (Embree, 1935; Timasheff, 1941, p. 20). This delineation is best captured by the American Catholic Monsignor Fulton Sheen, who, on instruction from Pope Pius XI, dove into an extensive study of Karl Marx, Lenin, communism, Stalin, and the Bolsheviks to expose their fallacies when speaking to the public (Reeves, 2002; Sheen, 1948). With Monsignor Sheen’s extensive language aptitude, he exhumed a telling quotation from obscure and untranslated tidbits of Marx: “Communism begins where atheism begins” (Sheen, 1954, p. 138). Sheen added,

In order to understand the Communists’ idea of truth, we have to substitute a philosophy of Communism for God; in other words, the ultimate origin of truth is their Party, which falls heir to the philosophy of Marx and Lenin. (Sheen, 1954, p. 61).

Ultimately, the Soviet war against the Church culminated in a single choice for the citizenry—brotherhood in Christ or comradeship in anti-Christ, there was no alternative (Kengor, 2017; Sheen, 1948).

The Bolshevik leadership, motivated by the Marxist ideology, initiated and initiated a continuing conflict throughout the Soviet Union through religious persecution, expulsion, and extermination (Froese, 2004; Walters, 1986). The Marxist conception in the Soviet Union was that the upper class continued and maintained religion only because it was another tool of oppression exploiting the proletariat (Timasheff, 1941, 1955). This position manifested in the dispossessing of the Church, and all property was transitioned to the trustees of the Church; i.e.,

the Soviet government. Additional changes included reducing clergy numbers and presence within the Church and their presence and influence in unions (keeping them in meager poverty status) (Walters, 1986). Harsher standards of living were placed on the priests and ministers, as they were not provided ration cards, the government deprived their children and families of education in secondary schools and universities, and under the rule of Stalin, a majority were executed or sent to the GULAG (Timasheff, 1941). The communist plan consisted of completely destroying the Church's influence, specifically targeting the younger generation to break the attachment to organized religion from the beginning of life. Timasheff (1941) and Walters (1986) identify that teaching religion was eventually prohibited in public and private schools, making them secular, and only the natural and social processes of Communism were allowed to be taught. The Bolshevik contempt for God resulted in an arresting change in Soviet society, which continued under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The anti-religion movement that was exacerbated under Lenin and Stalin became a systematic campaign that eliminated belief structures globally through other communist and authoritarian countries such as China, Eastern Bloc nation-states, North Korea, Vietnam, and most important to this case study, Cuba (Kengor, 2020).

By the 1960s, there was a negative affinity between the Orthodox moral didactic and the Soviet ethos (Agadjanian, 2017). Under Soviet rule,

Churches had to refrain from any polemics about the official materialist philosophy; they had acknowledged publicly that the Soviet government had never persecuted them (contrary to fact, of course); and they had to endorse the foreign policy of the Soviet

government and to assert every opportunity that it was the only peace-loving government while the Western powers were preparing a new World War. (Timasheff, 1955, p. 330)

For the sake of self-preservation, false proclamations from the Soviet clergy were continuously made with the undertones that under Communism, the Churches were finally free. However, the effectiveness of these Soviet Union endeavors to devalue and undermine the religious ties and inclinations of the citizens was met with opposition (D. Powell, 1967). The repressive actions against the Church and its officials, in combination with the anti-religious pro-atheist propaganda aimed at weakening the latitude and importance of religion in the Soviet Union, was perceived as an “agent preaching a repugnant doctrine and intent on undermining and destroying one’s intimate and precious beliefs” (D. Powell, 1967, p. 380).

The repulsiveness of the anti-religious movement is critical in deciphering an accurate MAS score, as the religious convictions of the Russian Orthodox Church consist of human dignity, freedom, and rights (Gaskill, 2022). Embedded in the liturgical texts from the Orthodox Church are values commensurate with Russian traditional values. A legacy cultural condition evident throughout Russian history is that the human being is bearing the image of God, and the individual should not exult in this lofty dignity, for it is not his achievement but a gift from God (Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, n.d.). Hofstede identifies this cultural trait as Russians talking modestly about themselves, and when meeting strangers, they somewhat understate their personal achievements, contributions, or capacities. These sentiments can also be directly correlated to a collectivist mindset; however, within the MAS domain, these attributes are a low-scoring, feminine characteristic (Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Rotondo Fernandez et al., 1997).

From a familial values perspective, the Russian nuclear family is ordinary and a desired establishment, and the family dynamic was of the highest importance to individuals in the Soviet Union (Siegelbaum, 2009; Siegmunt, 2016). Under Soviet socialism, there were critiques of the conventional family and encouragement of more egalitarian sexual and social relationships (Kaminsky, 2011). Marx and Engels believed that the extinction of the nuclear family and patrilineal systems would amplify gender equality and strengthen individual rights (Engels & Marx, 1848; Engels, 1847, 1884; Kengor, 2020). The Soviet Union leveraged Marx and Engels' theorizing and reasoned that socialism would protect women and children where the male figure once held that responsibility, and the family under socialism was expected to wither away (W. Z. Goldman, 1993; Kaminsky, 2011). The results were similar to the Soviet Union's entire fate; the socialist attack on marriage became a sign of chaos, disruption, and dislocation as the Soviet citizenry's social attitudes were hardly compatible with socialist ideals (W. Z. Goldman, 1993). By the 1960s, the Soviet state realized the failure of Bolshevik thought and implementation of Marx and Engels' delusions that family members could be completely independent of each other, and post-Stalin, the Soviet Union adopted the more conservative and modernized version of family and marriage (Freeze, 2009).

The role of women in the Soviet Union was continuously in flux due to the communist experiment being in a constant state of trial and error (Schuster, 1971). Regarding gender equality and the role of a woman in the Soviet Union, some imprudent literary personalities state that the Soviet communist regime was seeking to empower women and increase their gender equality, and since the collapse of communism, "a significant amount of progress towards gender equality, has eroded" (Evason, 2017, para. 6) This sentiment is curious: a regime that murdered millions of women and children for not conforming to an ideological narrative is considered a

champion of gender equality? On the surface, Lenin stressed complete “equality with men in law and practice, in family, in the state, and in society” (Schuster, 1971, p. 261); in actuality, the communist ideology established a system where women were used as the “beasts of burden in strenuous occupations from coal mining and foundry work to street sweeping and digging ditches. Men were appointed [by government and communist leadership] as foremen over women simply because they were men” (Field, 1968; S. E. Reid, 1998; Schuster, 1971, p. 266). Many statistics show an increase of workforce labor for women throughout the Soviet rule, which empowers the false narratives that communism was good for women; however, the labor women were allowed to partake in failed to hold equal representation and was categorized as jobs at the bottom of the pyramid, such as unmechanized jobs, animal husbandry, and unskilled manual labor where pay was low to non-existent (Buckley, 1981; S. E. Reid, 1998). On top of the poor positions within the workforce, women under communism were still mandated to keep the household in order with tasks that included cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, queuing for food [socialism rationing due to famine and state-controlled production], and raising children (Buckley, 1981). These were promised to be eliminated through social services initiated by communism and, in turn, a female liberation from domestic enslavement or household bondage (Lenin, 1977/1934). Ultimately, the promise of a gender utopia was a fallacy of communist ideology as the Soviet economy continued to sacrifice the citizen’s needs to the interests of the state, which was typically allocated to heavy industry and defense policy, not gender equality (Kengor, 2017; Nove, 1982; S. E. Reid, 1998).

The cultural condition of women in Soviet society is one of caretaker and sacrifice, as the women usually worked two jobs, one in hard labor and the other at home (Buckley, 1981; Schuster, 1971). Rarely were the gender hierarchies challenged in the way communist leaders

promised, and aggression towards the nuclear family was met with *Obshchestvennitsa* or housewife-activist, a movement “both symptomatic of, and contributed to, the reaffirmation of gender and class hierarchies” (Reid, 1998, p. 154). The movement was evident throughout the heavy industry sector and the wives of Red Army commanders where “Obshchestvennitsa consolidated wives of the higher-ranking managers, professionals, and bureaucrats as a distinct social force” (Reid, 1998, p. 154). This particular social echelon held the belief that husbands' incomes should be sufficient due to free market pricing, which, in turn, afforded women within this group greater flexibility in their roles and decisions (Neary, 1999). Additionally, although typically ignored in most texts examining the social, economic, and political history of the Soviet Union, these empowered women's groups were dedicated to promoting cultural behaviors. These behaviors were drawn from moral values and traditional Orthodox virtues associated with middle-class femininity, as well as emphasizing the importance of cleanliness in both the work environment and home, thereby linking it to cultural expectations at various levels. (Buckley, 1996; Neary, 1999). The *Obshchestvennitsa* is one part of many of the deep-rooted femininity characteristics of the Russian culture, and it identifies a predominantly feminine characteristic within the 6-D model.

Overall, the Soviet Union held a low MAS score, which is in concert with Hofstede's scoring from the 1980s and 90s of 36/100, whereas the US is 62/100, and for comparison purposes, Imperial Japan would have held a mid-90/100 score (Gladwin & Hofstede, 1981; Hofstede et al., 2010). Ultimately, the Soviet citizenry's sustained desire to combat attempted changes to traditional values and virtues was a heavy indicator of more feminine characteristics, particularly among women. This distinction is important not to be confused with the general population's demand for socialism. The socialist ideology was still desired, but with

modifications that would not uproot their most prized values and virtues. Most importantly, the dominating narrative across the multiple themes contributing to a low MAS score consisted of the Soviet/Russian concept that love and devotion, specifically from the mother, to the family is of monumental importance, and this love would outweigh work, politics, and the threat of autocratic or totalitarian genocide (Buck, 2012; S. E. Reid, 1998).

The American perspective regarding the scope of MAS and the Soviet Union is challenging, as masculinity and femininity were rarely referenced. However, the foundation of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Bolsheviks was established on the back of revolutionaries. In WWII, the Allied Powers witnessed extraordinary human loss on the side of the Soviets, and yet the Soviets, through dedication and numbers, continued to gain ground, which was considered a culturally masculine trait (Fitzpatrick, 1989). The perception of the communist Russians was that they were muscular, tough, and disciplined, and came from a party that was suffused with imagery of strength and masculinity (Weitz, 1996). It was understood in Europe and America that the true Bolshevik required the right amount of masculinity (Meyers, 2006, p. 140), “Too much, and a man became unreliable and undisciplined. Too little, and a man became an effeminate and ineffectual revolutionary” (Kirschenbaum, 2017, p. 77). Additionally, the US perception, based on culturally unaware hatred of communism/anti-democratic rhetoric from the Kremlin, discerned that communist cultural norms must have been produced and maintained in aggressively masculine environments, as leaders like Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev were overly ambitious in the ideological, political, economic and military sectors of international relations (Library of Congress, 2023).

The American understanding of Orthodox virtues, Russian political culture, and familial values was minimal, which although, they have been easy to understand as each theme of MAS is in close parallel to the US relationship with religious virtues, political party control, and its economic impacts, and similar familial values (Vanneman & Cannon, 1987). The building blocks of the American MAS perception were predicated on the communist ideology and study of Bolshevik behaviors, void of the deep-rooted cultural identity of the Soviet citizen. This created an ethnocentric vacuum identifying falsities as fact and, in turn, perceiving the Soviet Union as a highly masculine society.

Uncertainty Avoidance: Soviet Union & US Perspective

A critical theme supporting an accurate representation of UAI is the society's desire to curb ambiguity and apply a conscious effort to practice every task and object with heightened attention to detail. An elevated prowess for mitigating ambiguity, which is seen throughout Soviet culture, is best captured in the Soviet Atomic Program. At the end of WWII, August 6, 1945, the US projected nuclear strength when the Enola Gay, a B-29 Superfortress bomber, named after the mother of the pilot, traveled to Imperial Japan, and at eight in the morning Hiroshima-time, deployed a 10,000-pound uranium-235 bomb nicknamed Little Boy. The bomb exploded over the city and created the first and deadliest atomic bombing in history (Pellegrino, 2015). Three days later, the US dropped a second atomic weapon, a plutonium-239 bomb named Fat Man, on the port city of Nagasaki, ending the war in the Pacific theater (Johnson, 1997). These catastrophic events were the beginning of the US emergence as a global superpower, but also set the Soviet Union on a more aggressive path to mastering nuclear physics, thus leading to the Cold War. The Soviet attention to detail is on full display through the lens of their ambitious scientific and technological advancements over the next 40 years.

Before the byproducts of the Manhattan Project were deployed on mainland Japan, Soviet academics were engrossed in the practical use of nuclear energy and began to discover its limits and potential capabilities. By 1942, six weeks after the launch of the Manhattan Project, the Soviet Union established the unique Atomic Nucleus Laboratory at the USSR Academy of Science with the objective of creating and producing a uranium bomb (Goncharov & Ryabev, 2001). After the creation and successful testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb, the concept of nuclear energy and its successes were linked to Soviet national identity. The Soviet achievement in science, technology, industry, and policy was the,

result of an unprecedented effort on the part of the State to concentrate all intellectual, material, and spiritual resources for the sake of solving a problem of vital importance to the country. It became a turning point in world history; no longer did a single country have a monopoly on nuclear weapons (Goncharov & Ryabev, 2001, p. 92).

With this new control and a high-scoring UAI cultural disposition, the Soviet Union continued progressing toward strategic balance with the US (Holloway, 1996). Although there was escalation, with the creation of thermonuclear weapons, third-world interventions/proxy wars, and ideological expansionism, the arms race produced new technologies, new laboratory and industrial equipment, new inventions and innovations in physics and design, new methods of computing, theory, and experiment, and a new environment of efficiency and effectiveness surrounded by the complexities of atomic research and production (Goncharov & Ryabev, 2001; Jervis, 2001, 2017).

Compounding environmental factors and previous findings are critical in shifting the Soviet Union culture to a higher UAI scoring. The Soviet Union's geography and the associated

natural disaster impacts created a demanding and unforgiving environment. The Soviet Union was the world's preeminent land power, exceeding 170 degrees of longitude stretching almost halfway around the globe's surface (Kaplan, 2013). However, the severe cold that griped the Soviet landscape (and the current Russian environment) produced cultural components only seen in the East European Plain, Ural Mountains, Siberia, and the Arctic Circle (Dodds & Nuttall, 2019; Østhagen, 2016). As a frame of reference, the northernmost point of the US lies at the 49th parallel (the border with Canada), and a great majority of the Soviet Union lay north of the 50th parallel; this identifies that the Soviet population inhabited a colder climate than most Canadians (Emmerson, 2010; Hønneland, 2020; Kaplan, 2013). Soviet geography was fundamentally more rugged and inhospitable for most Soviet subjects, which holds the key to Soviet character and their cultural instincts. The severe cold and draught, increasing the frequency of famine and food shortages, developed in the Soviets "a capacity for suffering, a certain communalism, even a willingness to sacrifice the individual for the common good" (Longworth, 2005, pp. 15–16). Longworth (2005) further articulates that the high north latitudes required "interdependence between farmers, as well as frenetic, strenuous effort, long hours in the field, and mobilization of children" due to the compressed timeframe in which crops must be reaped and sown (Longworth, 2005, pp. 15–16). Kaplan (2013) also identifies that low surplus because of the cold "encouraged the elites of the merging state to control wide areas, killing the incentive of farmers to work harder without compulsion, and contributing to a violent tendency in daily life" (Kaplan, 2013, p. 158). These considerations provide deeper insight into the historical and geographical personality of the Soviet Union and current-day Russians. To brave the natural elements of the Arctic freeze and be a productive asset to a communal society took meticulous planning and control, both of which are high-scoring attributes of UAI.

The UAI score of the Soviet Union consistently ranks high across all the analyzed themes. Both the emphasis on attention to detail and the influence of various environmental factors contributed to this high score. Creativity, the final theme, is also considered high scoring as previous findings indicated expansive suppression throughout the Soviet Union on all creative avenues, thus hindering generations of Soviets, and now Russians, that did not flex creative attributes. These findings align with Hofstede's later assessment of Russia in the 1980s and 1990s, where the country scored 95 out of 100 in UAI, significantly higher than the US score of 46 out of 100. This high score suggests that the Soviets, and subsequently Russians, were averse to ambiguous situations, leading to the establishment of one of the world's most intricate bureaucracies (Gladwin & Hofstede, 1981; Hofstede et al., 2010).

The US perspective, specifically from the intelligence community, was lacking regarding UAI. This omission directly resulted from the intelligence professionals and policy analysts not making a conscientious and imaginative effort to see the problem or situation from the other side's point of view (Grabo, 2004). The language within NIE 85-62 identifies the concerns of control exhibited by the communist regime within Cuba, but the analysis does not point to the Soviet Union's cultural desire to mitigate ambiguity and take control of the ideological expansionism the Soviet regime was implementing on Cuba (CIA, 1962). The intelligence states, "The USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces ... the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba" (CIA, 1962, pp. 3-4). This was a lack of perception based on subjective judgments of how the Soviet Union ought to behave rather than objective assessments based on how it was behaving based on cultural conditions and ideological decree (Grabo, 2004, p. 47). Ultimately, the US assumed a

moderate/low UAI score, similar to the US score of 46/100, applied to the Soviet actions in Cuba, which resulted in an ethnocentric misinterpretation and critical analytical misjudgment.

Long-Term v. Short-Term Orientation: Soviet Union & US Perspective

The Soviet ideology and cultural conditions captured in previous findings clearly articulate a highly pragmatic mindset, thus identifying a high score within the LTO constructs. This is best identified in the autocratic shift to Bolshevik socialism. The practical evolution to pragmatism became an essential cultural necessity, as the adaptation to a new ideology was mandated to survive (Orlovsky, 2009; Zelnik, 2009). It is understood that pragmatism's central concerns are not based on absolutes but that institutions, practices, and even truth itself would vary according to time and place (Dewey, 1989; Engerman, 2006). A contemporary similarity of a hazardous nature would be post-modernism and its acceptance of a continuously fluctuating truth only designed to meet the needs of the current emotional state and compete with natural law and traditional values (Budziszewski, 2009; Rommen, 1998; Saad, 2020). Dewey (1928) identified this type of pragmatism within the Soviet culture when stating, "The revolution was a great success, while Communism was a frost" (Dewey, 1928, p. 221). This means that if the focus is on Soviet Russia's cultural transformation versus the Communist ideology, the Soviet approach to replacing individualism with collectivism, establishing connections between learning and labor, and continuing social experimentation was highly pragmatic (Dewey, 1989; Engerman, 2006, p. 43). However, Stalinism and the Cold War trumped the cultural pragmatism and progress of change, ignoring Soviet needs, and the intuitions of change became governmental mandate versus societal choice.

Space exploration is argued to be an additional element of Soviet pragmatism, as their policy objectives dictated to remain ahead of the opposing global superpower. Soviet society embraced the expenditure of human capital, economic investment, and hopes of scientific prestige as their nation, under communist ideology, was leading the world in universal exploration (Brinkley, 2019). It was understood that the US-Soviet space policy was another component of leverage used by both nations in Cold War strategic positioning (Stares, 1985); however, culturally, in the Soviet Union and the US, many argue that while governments claimed the space race was motivated to prove scientific prowess and superiority and a good deal of competition, others stressed the greater human achievement of space exploration and that the “conflicts and misunderstandings between the superpowers were of an earthly nature” Shreve, 2003, p. 68).

In the earlier years, the space race magnified the pragmatic and humanistic side of the superpower leaders; despite the Cold War tensions, the Bay of Pigs invasion, nuclear testing, the growing crisis behind the Iron Curtain, and war in Southeast Asia, space exploration was metamorphosing into a forum for dialogue and peace. From 1961-1963, before and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev maintained a “constant stream of exchange via congratulatory telegrams that followed the successful launch of a satellite probe or manned missions” (Shreve, 2003, p. 71). An example of this is found in Kennedy’s communique after Yuri Gagarin became the first human to achieve orbit; Kennedy wrote, “It is my sincere desire that in the continuing quest for knowledge of outer space, our nations can work together to obtain the greatest benefit to mankind” (Brinkley, 2019, p. 226; J. F. Kennedy, 1961, vol. 7). Within both societies these exchanges were a healthy reminder that peace amongst dueling ideologies can be achievable. Additionally, for the Soviet Union, Major Gagarin’s return to Earth

as a space pioneer fed the Soviet people's imagination, which was also inflamed by state media, and the Soviet people saw him as the living embodiment of Communist excellence (Brinkley, 2019). Culturally, this moment was a peak in Soviet history and is still a crowning accomplishment frequently referenced by Soviet scholars.

Unfortunately, some American and Soviet leaders were ardent believers that the space race was a surrogate war that would make the golden age of astronautics another frontier of ideological competition. In truth, both superpowers possessed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear payloads to any point on the planet, and many historians argue that the "civil" spaceflights of the 1960s were, in fact, paramilitary operations, and the secrecy surrounding the opposing space programs were considered to be critical for success (Stares, 1985; K. Werth, 2004). Additionally, the natural ebb and flow of which superpower had obtained the newest technological advances to reach the goal of landing a man on the moon quickly became an opportunity for each nation's intelligence communities to deploy collection assets and resources (Stares, 1985). However, with the success of the Apollo program, the notion of peaceful competition and cooperation between the two opposing global forces was often voiced on both sides (K. Werth, 2004).

Fundamentally, the Soviet approach of pragmatism deserves a high LTO score from a characteristics perspective, including the Soviet demand for society to migrate from a traditional ideology to another, societal traditions (excluding religious or familial) were not considered sacrosanct, and truth or situational approach is maneuverable (Hofstede et al., 2010). The high score, correlated with pragmatism, along with additional high scores attributed to ideological expansionism, reflects the Soviet Union's cultural disposition as being high, identifying them as

long-term-oriented. These findings align with Hofstede's later assessment of Russia in the 1980s and 1990s, where the country scored 81/100, identifying Russia as a long-term-oriented nation versus the US 26/100 being short-term-oriented.

Professor W.B. Ballis (1964) best summarizes the US perspective of the Soviet Union's long-term orientation in his lecture delivered at the Naval War College on October 5, 1964, when he stated, "The goal of the Soviet Union foreign policy is the extension of socialism, or what we call communism, throughout the world. This is related to the ideology of Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and Khrushchevism" (Ballis, 1964, p. 54). These sentiments were manifested over a decade of hearing Soviet leadership explain that the primary strategic objective of the Soviet Union was an all-out revolutionary offensive against the bourgeois and success of Soviet governance is predicated on global communism (Hoffman, 1987). However, US intelligence and general perspectives also understood the hypocrisy in the Soviet policy, as the official Soviet attitude toward foreigners was extremely hostile and suspicious (Chamberlin, 1956). These perceptions are based on the national objectives, not the cultural components of society; however, as stated previously, the US understanding of Soviet Union culture conflated with the communist ideology, creating voids in what were considered comprehensive understandings (Sherwin, 2020).

Indulgence v. Restraint: Soviet Union & US Perspective

The Soviet ethical code is directly linked to the collectivist-statutory law orientation, just as the US ethical structures are deeply rooted in democratic, competitive, investor-oriented-common law decisions (R. E. Barnett, 2016; Huskey, 1991; Murray, 2013). The latter represents moderate indulgence, whereas the former represents a more restrained society. Ultimately, in the

Soviet Union, citizens had to relinquish all their power, expertise, and capabilities to their professional careers or communal activities (Koenker, 2013), which would not serve themselves but serve their homeland (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006; Kengor, 2017). This sentiment aligned with Marx and Engles, who had “little positive to say of morality though a good case can be made that much of Marx’s writings were motivated by moral indignation” (De George, 1964, p. 206), the moral and ethical structures of Russian culture were in direct competition as Soviet Union morals and ethical codes were of high importance and defined as “the totality of principles or norms (rules) of men’s conduct, regulating their relations to one another as well as to society, to a certain class, to the state, country, family, and so on and supported by personal convictions, traditions, education, and the force of public opinion either of a certain class or of a society as a whole” (De George, 1964, p. 206; Siskin, 1963).

Further contradiction to the Marxist ideology of the Soviet people was their ethical code, which, while deeply rooted in generational practice, was predicated on historical materialism and navigated the social consciousness (Golubev, 2020), and “the meanings of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ which were found to be determined by the material conditions of a given class of society and to develop according to the development of social relations”(De George, 1964, p. 207). Realistically, the restraint of the Soviets, in regard to traditional ethical and moral code, prevented them from “achieving the ideal communism as they paradoxically preserve morality in its traditional sense” (Chambre, 1967; R. T. De George, 1964, p. 215).

The Soviet state is considered to be among the most secretive states that ever existed (Koenker, 2013). Regardless of the socialist principles preaching transparency and freedom of information so all citizens trust their government, the Soviet Union embraced the practice of

secrecy and leveraged its incalculable influence against the Soviet people (Harrison, 2008). The practice began during the Revolution of 1917 when the Bolshevik organization was organized on conspiratorial lines with secret communications and decision-making processes (Orlovsky, 2009). It served them exceptionally well, and the habit of underground revolutionaries continued within their governance practices, and they began to rule by conspiracy (Goriaeva, 2002; Harrison, 2008). Initially, the secrecy was centered around the defense industry and the governmental decision-making process; however, by 1937, secrecy stretched to every facet of Soviet life, including economic statics, agriculture, education, NKVD actions, and the GULAG's concealment (Applebaum, 2004; Bone, 1999). The reaction from the Soviet citizenry was cynicism and pessimism, which is identified as the expected and ordinary sociological and cultural response (Alexander & Smith, 1993; Berezin, 1997; Harrison, 2008). These cultural and practical retorts to decades of synthetic and falsified information became a cultural condition, and the absence of knowledge regarding government action made trust by the Soviet people impossible (Siegelbaum, 1973; Simmel, 1906; Steenvoorden, 2015). Hofstede identifies these cultural attributes as a low-scoring indulgence, resulting in a restrained society indicator.

The US perception of Soviet IVR is rarely discussed in literature, memorandums, and intelligence of the period. The US viewpoint was again consumed with the ideological expansionism of the Soviet state (Fursenko & Naftali, 2006). The spread of communism was understood to be a gratifying and fundamental need for the Soviet government and its people (Kengor, 2017); however, the primary consideration is within the definition of restraint—relatively strong control. The US intelligence knew the raw power of the Soviet government and the environment the Soviet people allowed that government to create (Dahl, 2013a; Hilsman, 1996; Marfleet, 2000; Walton, 2012); however, the collectivist encroachment on foreign

sovereignty and the projected military domination was viewed more as an indulgence than restraint (Moore & Hoffman, 2011; Sherwin, 2020).

Cumulative Cultural Disposition Profile: Summary of Findings

Numerous discrepancies surfaced between the cultural disposition of the Soviet Union and the way US intelligence perceived it. In terms of PDI, the Soviet Union exhibited a high level of distance, indicating a significant hierarchical gap within their society. This was in line with the US perception, which also recognized a high degree of subjugation within the Soviet Union disposition. Within IDV, the Soviet cultural orientation leaned heavily towards collectivism, a trait that was accurately perceived by US intelligence. However, the MAS dimension marked the first noticeable discrepancy, as the Soviet Union was identified by certain characteristics, aligned more with feminine qualities, indicating a nurturing and cooperative approach. In contrast, the US intelligence and policymakers viewed Soviet Union culture as highly masculine, perceiving it as competitive and assertive.

Table 2. Soviet Union Analysis & US Perspective of Subject

Cultural Dimensions	Soviet Union Disposition	US Intelligence Perspective
PDI	Very High	High Subjugation
IDV	Collectivist	Collectivist
MAS	Feminine	Extremely Masculine
UAI	High	Low
LTO	Long-term Oriented	Long-term Oriented
IVR	High Restraint	Moderately Indulgent

Further discordance arose in the realm of UAI, where the Soviet Union consistently scored high in this dimension, indicating a strong aversion to ambiguity. This contrasted sharply with the US perception, which incorrectly assumed that ambiguity was embraced in Soviet Union society. In terms of LTO, US intelligence correctly identified the Soviet Union cultural

disposition as extremely long-term oriented. This strategic perspective aligned with the Soviet Union's deep-rooted focus on long-term goals, ability to adapt to meet a specific goal, and enduring societal values. Lastly, the IVR dimension revealed a misunderstanding on the part of US collectors, they inaccurately perceived the Soviet Union as a moderately indulgent society, whereas the reality was quite the opposite: Soviet culture was highly restrained due to subjugation and Marxist ideological enforcements which emphasized the necessity for self-discipline and strict control self-indulgent behaviors.

The undertaking is daunting. To stop the enemy, we must be right 100 percent of the time. To harm us, they only need to succeed once.

—President George W. Bush

CHAPTER SIX: ISLAMIC EXTREMISM—AL-QAEDA 2001

Overview

The following chapter will follow a similar structure to chapters 4 and 5, beginning with the historical and ideological context of the case study subject and then identifying the qualitative representation to determine the cultural disposition of the case study subject. In this chapter, Islamic extremism with emphasis on radical martyrdom is the subject. Each cultural dimension of the 6-D model will guide the chapter outline, and the predetermined themes associated with the individual dimensions of the 6-D model will be examined with Islamic radicalization and fundamentalist ideology as the primary focus. The US perspective will also be analyzed for comparison purposes, specifically leveraging literature that accurately explains the American understanding and perception of extremist culture and how the multifaceted and well-funded intelligence apparatus also viewed Islamic terrorism, specifically concentrating on al-Qaeda and the intelligence leading up to the September 11, 2001, attacks, and the various attacks on US and Coalition Forces throughout the world during the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

The findings of this chapter will identify not only the cultural disposition of Islamic extremists and their dedication to exploiting American vulnerabilities with unique tactics and techniques never before leveraged against a US warfighting force but also the Western approach to Islamic extremism (Director of National Intelligence, 2021; Harris, 2006; Kindsvater, 2006). The response to the global jihadi insurgency was hyper-focused on the geography where terror groups operated, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and North Africa (Ibrahim, 2017). Where

this research does not argue that a formidable offense provides an advantageous and strategic deterrence, it is believed that an additional cultural approach to the terrorism phenomenon should have also been leveraged.

Terrorism holds significant geographic realities, but for a majority of the GWOT, there was minimal consideration of the societal, cultural, and economic characteristics that marginalized entire population centers throughout the Middle East. This marginalization produced a vicious cycle of resentment and political disenfranchisement, leading young Muslim men, women, and children to identify with an irresistible fight against their Western oppressors (Armstrong, 2014). Further elements that drove the Muslim youth to a life of terror include “identity politics, the perceived erosion of traditional notions of masculinity, sexual frustration, alienation from family, problems with law enforcement, and religious illiteracy” (Ibrahim, 2017, p. 8). These characteristics will be discussed and scored within the 6-D model. Each distinguishing cultural condition will be categorized and evaluated, answering the ultimate research question: Can the 6-D model, when applied to information synthesis, build a more holistic analytical environment making sense of ethnocentrism, thus amplifying finalized intelligence and leading to better decision-making by policymakers?

Islamic Revivalist Movements: Foundation for Abhorrence & Exportation of Hate

Today’s radical Islamism presents perplexing contradictions and paradoxes. Its explicit goal appears to be the restoration of the Golden Age of the Islamic Caliphate, a notion laden with oddities. Most notably, it embodies a reactionary anti-modernism while paradoxically embracing certain aspects of modernity, including advanced weaponry and sophisticated propaganda techniques, especially through the Internet (Gurski, 2016). This juxtaposition becomes glaring

when considering the coexistence of seventh-century methods of punishment, such as corporal punishments, amputations, lashings, and stoning, all filmed on smartphones and disseminated on platforms like Twitter, often under the ominous presence of Kalashnikovs (Gurski, 2016; Werd, 2020). To comprehend this brand of reactionary Islam, it's imperative to delve into its historical roots and how it aligns with the broader context of Islam and its historical development. This comprehensive understanding is key to unraveling the ideology underpinning reactionary and violent Islam and the psychological factors that attract individuals to this ideology.

The Birth of Islam: The Golden Age

The narrative of Islam commences with the life of its prophet, Muhammad, who is thought to have existed between 570 and 632 A.D. within the harsh and often merciless milieu of the Arabian Desert. Despite the formidable challenges he faced, his accomplishments are particularly remarkable in light of the adversity he endured (Ramadan, 2008). Muhammad had a modest beginning, engaging in trade as a merchant. During his early adolescence, he journeyed alongside Banu Hashim trade caravans, traveling toward Syria and other bustling trading hubs (Jebara, 2021). This enabled him to accumulate a degree of wealth and social standing. He cultivated a remarkable reputation for honesty and integrity, earning the titles *al-Amin* (faithful) and *al-Sadiq* (truthful) in his twenties (Jebara, 2021; Ramadan, 2008). Consequently, he became a sought-after impartial arbitrator in trade disputes among rival merchants, establishing a robust network of connections and business relationships founded on trust and respect (Ibrahim, 2017). Muhammad emerged as a steadfast pillar of stability within his community, yet he became disillusioned with the prevailing lack of justice in his surroundings (Lings, 2006).

Through the power of prayer and being tormented by disillusionment, Muhammad found

refuge in the Message of God in the cave of Hira above Mecca. Muhammad had discovered His God, the singular true God, a deity of Justice who regarded all individuals as equal and of the same moral value, to be evaluated solely based on their individual qualities (Ibrahim, 2017). This God fashioned the weak and vulnerable just as He did the strong and influential, insisting they deserved equal protection. Women, children, the infirm, and the impoverished all deserved the same respect and dignity as the most esteemed members of society (Ibrahim, 2017; Ramadan, 2008). This was the birth of not only a theology or religion but “a moral foundation for a new kind of state—an Islamic state, in accordance to the Will of God” (Ibrahim, 2017, p. 27).

Through historical consensus, the Constitution of Medina unified the diverse tribes of Medina under a social contract, ensuring religious freedom, protection, and cooperation among Muslims and non-Muslims (Brown, 2017). Following years of conflict between Medina and Mecca, Muhammad’s call for justice and equality disrupted the existing power dynamics. His monotheistic message, which shared common ground with earlier Jewish and Christian beliefs, brought together disparate communities and interdependent tribes in Arabia, fostering the unity of the Muslim belief system (Chopra, 2010).

Emerging after the death of Prophet Muhammad, the early Muslim caliphates, also known as the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, were foundational institutions that shaped the Islamic empire significantly (Kennedy, 2015; McGraw Donner, 2012). The term “Golden Age” is often used to describe this period, highlighting the expansion of the Islamic empire alongside political stability and unity (Brown, 2017). However, this perception is misleading, as during the caliphates, the Islamic world was remarkably diverse, marked by internal conflicts and significant disagreements among its factions (Ibrahim, 2017; Jebara, 2021). Moreover, the Sassanids and Byzantines were determined to dismantle the nascent Muslim state. Consequently,

the four caliphs found themselves compelled to adhere to a consistent foreign policy, which left them with no option but to engage in warfare against both formidable adversaries.

The caliphates produced the primary sources of Islamic literature, such as the one true Qur'an (the biggest source of knowledge and guidance for Muslims) and the Hadith, a collection of the customs and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (Lings, 2006). The Hadith commands great reverence and is recognized as the primary source of strict laws and moral standards in Islam, following the holy Qur'an (Chopra, 2010). Each sacred text served as a window into the intricacies of the political decisions, social structures, and religious developments during the founding of Islam. Of note, certain Hadith texts contain content that a significant portion of the Muslim community challenges for its authenticity, including the controversial notion that male martyrs will enjoy the pleasure of seventy-two virgins in Paradise (Qazi, 2020).

The Islamic Golden Age saw the establishment of intellectual centers like the House of Wisdom in Baghdad, where scholars translated and preserved knowledge from diverse civilizations, including Mesopotamia, Ancient Rome, China, India, Persia, Egypt, Greece, and Byzantium (Al-Djazairi, 2018). During the same period, various scholars, artists, engineers, and traders in the Islamic world made substantial contributions to fields such as agriculture, arts, economics, law, literature, philosophy, sciences, and technology (Ṭabarī & Hillenbrand, 1989). The Islamic empire served as a melting pot of cultures, connecting people from different parts of the world. Islamic civilization's growth was closely linked to its vibrant merchant economy, with Muslim traders influencing trade routes across Africa, Asia, and Europe (Kennedy, 2015). Sufi missionaries also played a significant role in spreading Islam to regions such as Persia, Central Asia, North Africa, and parts of Eastern Africa and Asia (Kennedy, 2015). This period also

witnessed innovations like papermaking, which spread from China to the Islamic world and eventually to Europe, fostering the exchange of ideas and goods (Brown, 2017).

The Muslim Golden Age has been represented through a historiographical construct suggesting unprecedented stability, prosperity, and cultural achievements in the medieval Muslim world, roughly from the eighth to the thirteenth century. All of this has been through the subjective benchmarking and key characteristics of a Western perspective (Omer, 2021). However, this perspective has been criticized for imposing an anachronistic framework, overlooking diversity within Islamic civilizations, and relying on reworked official histories that neglect marginalized groups (Ballan, 2014). Additionally, individual scholarship has observed the material progress achieved during the Golden Age but often overlooks the simultaneous decline in Islamic spirituality and the political structure that led to disunity and schism. (Omer, 2021).

The Umayyad Caliphate (God's Sword) is often seen not as creators of a Muslim caliphate but rather as builders of an Arab empire (Ṭabarī & Hillenbrand, 1989; Kennedy, 2015). Muhammad's message of racial equality was widely disregarded, establishing Arab Muslims at the top of the social hierarchy (Ibrahim, 2017). Non-Arab Muslims were deemed inferior and, for much of this era, subjected to similar taxation as non-Muslims (Hawting, 2002; Kennedy, 2004). While non-Muslims generally received protections outlined by Muhammad, there were periods of severe repression against Jews, Christians, and particularly against Persian Zoroastrians (Ibrahim, 2017). In stark contrast to the Qur'an's teachings, Zoroastrian clergy were massacred, and their temples were demolished (Al-Djazairi, 2018; Ṭabarī & Hillenbrand, 1989).

The demise of the Islamic Golden Age, highlighted by the ransacking of Baghdad by the

Mongols in 1258, left an indelible mark on Islamic civilization (Brentjes, 1978). The loss was not merely material but also intellectual and cultural (Kennedy, 2004). The once vibrant city, the epicenter of knowledge and innovation, fell into disarray, and the ensuing diaspora of scholars and thinkers contributed to the transfer of knowledge westward, enriching regions like Spain and Constantinople, which, in turn, played a pivotal role in shaping the European Renaissance (Meserve, 2008). As intellectual vigor waned in the Islamic heartlands, rigid dogma, and conservatism took hold, stifling the spirit of inquiry that had once propelled the Islamic world to unparalleled heights (Kennedy, 2004; Meserve, 2008). The shift in focus from scientific progress to theological rigidity has reverberated through the centuries, impacting contemporary discourse within the Muslim world and posing challenges in reconciling faith with modernity (McGraw Donner, 2012).

The decline of the Abbasid Empire, plagued by internal strife, led to a shift from scientific innovation to conservative religious discourse, exemplified by figures like al-Ghazali (Ibrahim, 2017). This cultural shift echoes in modern times, where some parts of the Muslim world have regressed into a state reminiscent of Jahiliya, emphasizing the Prophet's name over his message (Juergensmeyer, 2017; Moghadam, 2006; Pape, 2005). Despite political and doctrinal schisms, Islam's core message endured. Moreover, the Sunni-Shi'a divide, rooted initially in political succession, later deepened due to religious and political factors, shaping the distinctive religious values of the two sects.

It can be argued that the Umayyad's self-designation as "deputies of God" and their rulers' indulgence in behaviors typical of traditional Mediterranean dynasties is a baseline for modern-day extremism rationales (Ibrahim, 2017; Venzke & Ibrahim, 2003). The narrative of the

dissolute Umayyad caliphs became a crucial point of contention for subsequent fundamentalists who argued that mainstream Islam lost its connection to the true faith during this era (Hawting, 2002). However, this argument overlooks the subsequent Abbasid dynasty, which harkened back to Muhammad's early messages of tolerance and inclusive policies fostering a flourishing of religious, cultural, and scientific advancements (Kennedy, 2015; McGraw Donner, 2012).

Despite the fallibility of the rulers, their reigns positioned Islam at the global forefront, not solely due to strict scriptural adherence, but because they welcomed scholars and ideas from diverse corners of the known world (Ibrahim, 2017). Like all empires, their decline was inevitable. The Mongol invasion, although the final blow, was merely the culmination of a decline that had set in as early as the 11th century (Al-Djazairi, 2018). The arrival of the Seljuk Turks from Central Asia had already eroded Umayyad control over present-day Iran and Iraq. The Crusades furthered the fragmented Muslim rule in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, as the military campaigns and conflicts of the Crusades, which occurred between the 11th and 13th centuries, resulted in significant disruptions and changes to the political landscape of the region (Phillips, 2010). Muslim rulers were forced to divert resources and attention to defend against Crusader invasions, leading to internal divisions and weakening of centralized authority. (Kennedy, 2004).

During the decline of many empires, negative intellectual currents often surfaced (Renima et al., 2016). When a society faces collapse, it is common to attribute the downfall to a perceived loss of divine protection. According to this belief, God withdraws support from those who deviate from the true faith. In this narrative, the Muslim empire's creation was attributed solely to God, and its fall was seen as a consequence of losing divine favor, disregarding the contributions of the early caliphs and external factors (Ibrahim, 2017). This line of thinking resurfaced in Wahhabism, emerging in 18th-century Saudi Arabia, which rejected the cultural and

intellectual achievements of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties (Blanchard, 2007). Instead, it aimed to return to the perceived truths and simplicity of the early caliphs, laying the foundation for modern violent Salafism and Islamic extremism.

Ideological Components: Principles of Salafi-Jihad

This case study's most prominent extremist movement and primary focus is the Salafi Islamic fundamentalism (*Salafi-Jihadi*) movements of al-Qaeda. Salafism can be considered a product of Sunni Islamic revivalist movements, typically based on populist intentions, that were developed and designed to bring empowerment to Muslims and provide them strength and a haven against Islam's enemies, both internal and external (Arosoaie, 2015; Haykel, 2016, p. 71; Styszynski, 2014). *Salaf*, or "ancient ones," refers to the companions of Prophet Muhammad; therefore, the ideology is rooted in Islam that was explicitly condoned by Muhammad and a liturgical comprehension of the constructs upheld by the Prophet's first three generations of Sunni followers (Olidort, 2015). In some variations of Salafism, there is a more literalist interpretation of the Qur'an and transcripts of the Hadith, which provide the followers self-serving liberties to be the armed struggle (*jihad*) and muscular branch of Islam. This interpretation makes them a minority in the history of Islam, but is a powerful ideological structure that can "tap into a deep vein of resentment, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement, specifically among the [young] Sunni Arabs" (Arosoaie, 2015; Haykel, 2016, p. 72). These more radical interpretations of Salafism hold a strict Muslim-only sentiment and are considered "suspect deviations, corrupted by non-Islamic influences, that dilute the authentic message of God" (Brown, 1996, p. 31; Pape, 2005) In contrast, other Sunni fundamentalist groups such as Sufism, hold a specific level of tolerance for non-Muslim activity, practice, and traditions which is viewed by Salafism as heretical (Al-Jibali, 1995).

Salafism is not necessarily monolithic or uniform across the Islamic sphere. While some interpretations may involve militancy, the primary aim of Salafism, in many cases, is the establishment of an Islamic state or Caliphate, prioritizing ancient authority over modern interpretations of Islam (Pape, 2005). The ideological parameters of Salafism encompass an array of movements, such as Wahhabism, that dictates the core curriculum of the state's public education system and focuses on "bringing Muslims back to a strict and literal imitation of the Islam of the Prophet and his companion, but discourages violence as a legitimate means for achieving this aim" (Blanchard, 2004; Esposito, 2002, pp. 105–107; Pape, 2005, p. 106). The founder of Wahhabism, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, firmly believed that Muslim society had regressed to a state reminiscent of pre-Islamic Arabia, often referred to as the *jahiliyya* or period of ignorance (Abu Khalil, 2004). He observed Muslims venerating saints and building tombs and shrines in homage to Prophet Muhammad and his companions in the most sacred cities of Islam, Mecca, and Medina. He deemed these practices "pagan superstitions and idolatry, which is the worse of sins in Islam ... denouncing these beliefs and practices as unwarranted innovations" (Esposito, 2005, p. 118). According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, these convictions and rituals "compromised the unity of God (Islam's radical or absolute monotheism) and the Islamic community, as [made] evident by the eruption of tribalism and tribal warfare that had returned to Arabia" (Esposito, 2005, p. 118). What intensified Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's condemnation of this violation of God's unity was that it occurred within the "Islamic heartland and homeland of the Prophet" (Esposito, 2005, p. 118). Al-Wahhab argued that these actions eroded the unity of the *umma* (community), contributing to the moral decline of Islamic society. He considered these practices deviations from the authentic path, and the foundation for his theology centered around returning all Muslims to the "true" path of Islam (Dillon, 2009).

The transformation of Wahhabism from a historical anomaly to becoming the most outspoken faction within Sunni Islam unfolded in three clear stages. First, there was the “revolutionary” phase between 1744 and 1818. During this period, Wahhabism positioned itself in opposition to the entire Muslim world by declaring all Muslims outside their sect as *takfir* or apostates, legitimizing jihad against them (Commins, 2006). Ultimately, al-Wahhab justified violence against those outside the *ummah* by referencing interpretations of the historical Caliphate, as noted by Allen (2006). Consequently, if individuals are considered apostates for rejecting Al-Wahhab’s reading of sacred texts, Wahhabism allows their execution.

The second phase, spanning from 1823 to 1891, marked a period of consolidation for Wahhabism (Dillon, 2009). During this time, it adopted a more conciliatory theological stance, likely influenced by the impracticality of engaging in active warfare against other schools of Islam. Despite this shift, Wahhabism continued to assert itself as the sole true religion (Al-Rasheed, 2002). Importantly, this phase saw the strategic alliance between Wahhabism and the House of Saud, initially formed for the convenience of expelling the Ottomans from the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Rasheed, 2002).

The third phase, spanning from 1902 to 1932, marked the mature stage of Wahhabism (Armstrong, 2014; Commins, 2006). During this period, Wahhabi authorities acknowledged the absolute temporal authority of the House of Saud as the “keepers of the Two Mosques” (Mecca and Medina), even though, at times, the House of Saud pursued policies that contradicted Wahhabi theology (Al-Rasheed, 2002; Ibrahim, 2017). At this juncture, the Wahhabis were distinguishing themselves from Sunni orthodoxy by adhering to the teachings of al-salaf al-Salih (the pious ancestors), identifying themselves as Salafists (Blanchard, 2007; Moussalli, 2009;

Olidort, 2015). They assert that all Muslims should emulate these pious ancestors, accusing the majority of Sunni Muslims living under the Ottoman caliphate, including the caliphate itself, of committing *bid'a* (innovation) and *kufur* (unbelief) because the political system was unfamiliar to the pious ancestors (Moussalli, 2009).

The Egyptian Brotherhood, founded in 1928, also declared their motivating principles rooted in Salafism. Despite a slight deviation in the 1950s and 60s, under the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, when militancy against apostate Islamic regimes was accepted, by the 1970s, the “official mission statement emphasized a goal to bring about its Salafi ideals through peaceful political change” (Pape, 2005, pp. 106–107; Ramadan, 1996, pp. 152–183). Qutb’s interpretation of Salafism would play a critical role in al-Qaeda’s fundamental belief structure and heavily influence al-Qaeda leadership.

Outside the al-Qaeda interpretation of Salafism are slight variations, including the Deobandist version of Salafism in Pakistan, which originated in India, and is foundational in the Taliban’s political approach to Islam. This version of Salafism veers towards political interference, which aligns with the al-Qaeda rendition, but contrasts with other adaptations that primarily amplify Islamic individuality, personal responsibility, and strict adherence to ancient text (Rashid, 2000, p. 88; Zaman, 2002, p. 11). Even with their noticeable differences, Haykel (2016) identifies that “these movements offer up a fantasy vision of renewed power and glory that claims to reproduce the early history of Muslims, roughly the period from the seventh to ninth centuries when the Islamic empires of Umayyads and the Abbasids reigned supreme over huge swathes of the globe” (Haykel, 2016, p. 72). These complexities and minor philosophical nuances are critical in understanding al-Qaeda leadership as they (Osama bin Laden and Ayman

al-Zawahiri) were not a product of a single Salafi movement (Pape, 2005).

Both highly influential militant Salafis had different Salafi experiences: “Osama bin Laden was educated in Wahhabi schools while growing up in Saudi Arabia, and al-Zawahiri joined the Muslim Brotherhood as a youth in Egypt” (Esposito, 2002, pp. 5, 18). However, both fully embraced the influential advocacy for a Muslim Holy War articulated by Sayyid Qutb and desired a return to the strict application of Shari’a (Brown, 1996; Nasir, 2003). Additionally, the influence of Qutb played a leading role in creating “a distinctively Islamist brand of antisemitism” (Andrew, 2018, p. 703) and insisted that martyrdom was a necessary part of Islamic Jihad. Qutb believed that from the birth of Islam, the inherently evil Jews had been fanatically determined to destroy it (Calvert, 2010; B. Morris, 2010). In Qutb’s essay *Our Fight with the Jews*, which was released within six years of the liberation of Auschwitz and reads like a piece of radical fiction, Qutb proclaimed Judaism as Islam’s worst enemies: “They mutilate the whole of history and falsify it ... From such creatures who kill, massacre and defame prophets, one can only expect the spilling of human blood and dirty means which would further their machinations and evil” (Andrew, 2018, p. 703; Tibi, 2010). Qutb’s disgust of the West was transfixed not only on Judaism but also on the seductive capacity of the American character, specifically the human values and the overwhelming lust for sensual pleasure (Tibi, 2010). Through Qutb’s barbarism towards Judaism, America, and the Western world, al-Qaeda found a purpose: to die a martyr in defiance of these global influences, considered the greatest ambition in life and would lead to paradise (Atwan, 2011).

In the al-Qaeda interpretation of Salafism influenced by Qutb, Shari’a law was a central goal and desired set of legal frameworks (Kamali, 2005); however, it was not the single form of

jurisprudence as martyrdom and radical ideals were constructs added to legal precedent and actions. Throughout Islamic history, *Shari'a* has been considered a part of Islamic law. However, the word means “the way to know God,” which is reminiscent of what Muhammad and his followers “believed they were trying to achieve in Medina: a way of getting to know God through implementing justice, equality, and freedom in human society” (Ibrahim, 2017, p. 105). The deviation from traditional *Shari'a* as identified in the al-Qaeda interpretation, is leveraged to combat a polluted world. The design, which was once outward-focused, now looks inwards to a “reactionary, almost inhuman, mindset” (Ibrahim, 2017; Rubin, 2007)

Within the al-Qaeda context, *Shari'a* principles are no longer associated with customary Islamic practice. Instead, it is a control mechanism for religious fundamentalists outside of traditional Islamic theological thought. The use of *Shari'a* by al-Qaeda justified violent action against Judaism, secular Muslim governments, and the West. Founded in the teachings of Qutb, *Shari'a* dehumanized the adversaries so extremist could view them as soulless, greedy, arrogant, barbarous, immoral, Godless, and depraved citizens of the world (Shultz, 2012). It was a cosmic struggle in which only Islamic militancy and armed revolution could save the Islamic state. Rooted in the inception of Islam, the defense of Muslim territories and the endeavor to eradicate opposing ideologies that challenged Islamic power structures eventually transformed into a worldwide offensive against “all enemies of Islam,” which culminated in coordinated and calculated terrorist attacks throughout the world (Allen, 2006; Dillon, 2009). As a result of the global terror campaign, the first two decades of the 21st century were defined by the conflict between the West and Islamism, resulting in worldwide militarism and the rise of prolific international terrorism (Moghadam, 2009; Styszynski, 2014; Venzke & Ibrahim, 2003)

Al-Qaeda: Radicalization & Belief Structure

Dissimilar to the previous case studies that analyzed prominent state actors with well-defined sovereign borders and ideological philosophies shared amongst their people, al-Qaeda operated as an elusive terrorist group in the expanding world system of globalization where they attempted to destabilize through a nihilistic agenda (Friedman, 2005, pp. 595–602; Rodrik, 2012). The al-Qaeda identity differs slightly from the predominant nationalist-separatist terror groups, characteristically known as ethno-nationalism terrorists (Post, 2005a). Typically, these groups fight to establish a new political order based on ethnic dominance or homogeneity within a specific state or geographic region (Post, 1984). Terrorist activity for nationalist-separatists outside their desired borders of influence is very uncommon, as their objectives are internal destabilization versus the radical Islamist terrorists trying to expel the secular modernizing West by offensive operations on foreign soil (Mustafa, 2021). Al-Qaeda operatives had a deep understanding of Western philosophy, values, and contemporary life, because of their broad world experience (Sageman, 2004). Their involvement with European and American education institutions (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), and most influential, the alliance of the CIA and Afghan insurgency in Peshawar, a city that overflowed with radicals, opportunists, soldiers, and intelligence officers, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, helped shape this unique perspective (Sedgwick, 2004, p. 804). Again, the geopolitical consequences of the Cold War and its proxy wars on outlying nations became apparent, according to the *9/11 Commission Report*, in an attempt to build Islamic resistance to Moscow's influence and defeat Soviet forces in Afghanistan, "young Muslims from around the world flocked to Afghanistan [motivated by US propaganda] to join as volunteers in what was seen as a 'holy war'-*jihad*- against an invader. The largest numbers came from the Middle East. Some

were Saudis, and among them was Osama bin Laden” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 55).

Within this community of religious foreign fighters, future leaders and operatives of al-Qaeda would emerge, bringing with them the ideological components of Saudi Wahhabism and, most notably, the more radical theories of Sayyid Qutb of the Egyptian Brotherhood (Rashid, 2000; Sageman, 2004). Through this collaboration, there was an understanding that the overall objective was not only to eliminate the Soviet oppression but to realign Afghanistan as a new Medina and create a place where Muslims can return and restore—by force if necessary—a pure Islamic order (Coll, 2004; Sedgwick, 2004). After 10 years of warfare, through the power of the mujahidin, heavily backed by intelligence agencies and military operatives of the US and Pakistan, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Over one million Afghans (eight percent of the country’s population) had been killed (L. Wright, 2002). However, the strength of irregular warfare, instilled through training by the US and Pakistan, in conjunction with the desire to promote insurrection, followed the Afghan Arabs home, and the Islamic revolution amplified as groups of extremists began to implement the learned strategy serving tactics throughout the Balkans, Chechnya, the Middle East, and Africa (Al-Zayyāt, 2004; Wright, 2002). What began as a defense against Soviet influence and communism became an Islamic civil war where Muslims were fighting Muslims for political and cultural control. Throughout Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, and Afghanistan, a campaign against tourism and Western culture resulted in attacks and bombings of theaters, bookstores, banks, and the open killings of Christians (Fisk, 2015; Wright, 2002).

The nature of al-Qaeda, rooted in religious and ideological principles, quickly became

highly political and adopted a worldview that all constituencies should practice and live traditional Islam. This further divided the Muslim world, as the extremist vision further exacerbated the broad differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims, a dispute over the rightful lineage of religious authority in the generations after the Prophet Muhammad (Armano, 2004). A similar theological divide is found in the disagreement between Catholics and Protestants regarding the religious authority of the Pope. Both Shia and Sunni Muslims believe in the necessity of Islamic movement toward the traditional philosophies in their personal lives and political and social governance; however, Shia do not accept a solely Sunni Islamic state as a legitimate Islamic representation, and vice versa (Arjomand, 1993). Al-Qaeda, as a Salafi-Jihad Sunni movement, made enemies of not only Zionists, Americans, and Western culture but also Shia Muslims. Influenced by Islamic fundamentalism, Sunni Muslims answered the call to continue warring against the Shia Muslim populations, primarily found in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Nigeria.

Organizationally, al-Qaeda had a hyper-focus on radicalization by practicing a shared belief and behavior system through a specific strategic culture that continues to adapt and adjust to government countermeasures while simultaneously searching for new targets and vulnerabilities (B. Hoffman, 2009; Johnson & Larsen, 2006). The ideational narrative produced by al-Qaeda consists of beliefs, values, and theological misinterpretations that knit the movement together via a collection of expressed characteristics, a rationale for violence, and a framework for action. These elements served a significant purpose in characterizing the fabricated hardships conceptualized by the radical ideology, but also manifested the solution and legitimized the usually violent means used to achieve the end state of destruction of secular Muslim governments and, ultimately, the West (Shultz, 2012). The use of force became highly

encouraged throughout Salafi-jihadists as they were beholden to Qutb's observation that once a regime was "characterized as *takfir* and its leaders labeled infidels (*kufi*), then armed violence was a legitimate way of obliterating it" (Shultz, 2012, p. 15). This philosophy evaded understanding in the US, as the study of strategic cultures had traditionally been confined to resourcefully structured state defense areas, rather than encompassing amorphous insurgents, terrorist groups, or other armed factions (Smith, 2008). Irregular tactics and procedures, backed by religious and ideological motivations, were new to the modern warfighting domain and provided opportunities for groups like al-Qaeda to "enhance their capabilities and more effectively pursue their objectives from the local to the global level" (Shultz, 2012, p. 2; Smith, 2008). Al-Qaeda's advances in this field challenged conventional thinking and caused significant geopolitical loss.

As al-Qaeda's presence grew in the 1990s, the conversation shifted from the "near enemies," which were considered Muslim territories occupied by "infidel" Muslim forces and apostate Muslim governments, to the "far enemies" that were polluting the international system for fellow Muslims of the caliphate. Sageman (2004) identifies that the al-Qaeda leadership that believed in the "long jihad" continuously argued that to purify the Muslim world, "the main danger for the worldwide Islamist movement was the United States, which was seen as moving in on Muslim lands such as the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. In *The Looming Tower: al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, Lawrence Wright (2007) identifies why a highly religious country such as Afghanistan and the organizations within would turn on men who were a recent ally:

In large part, it was because they saw America as the locus of Christian power. [...]

Christianity – especially the evangelizing American variety – and Islam were obviously

competitive faiths. Viewed through the eyes of men who were anchored in the seventh century, Christianity was not just a rival, it was the archenemy. To them the Crusades were a continual historical process that would never be resolved until the final victory of Islam. They bitterly perceived the contradiction embodied by Islam's long steady retreat from the gates of Vienna, where on September 11 – that now resonant date – in 1683, the king of Poland began the battle that turned back the farthest advance of Muslim armies. For the next three hundred years, Islam would be overshadowed by the growth of Western Christian societies. Yet Bin Laden and his Arab Afghans believed that, in Afghanistan, they had turned the tide and that Islam was again on the march ... consumerism, vice, and individuality, which the radical Islamists saw as the hallmarks of American culture, threatened to destroy Islam – even the idea of Islam – by blending it into a globalized, corporate, interdependent, secular, commercial world that was part of what these men meant when they said America.' But by defining modernity, progress, trade, consumption, and even pleasure as Western assaults on Islam, al-Qaeda thinkers left little on the table for themselves. (Wright, 2007, pp. 171–172)

America was “the ‘head of the snake’ that had to be killed... the priority had to be ... the far enemy” (Sageman, 2004, p. 44). By the mid-1990s, al-Qaeda unified around this realization and adopted the view that the US was the primary target (as articulated by the al-Qaeda Handbook-1677-T 1D). Allied with the Taliban for sanctuary and sovereign protection, Osama bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and their ideological collaborators used Afghanistan and began to strategize, design, and staff transnational movements, and plan terrorist attacks that would undermine global superpowers.

Martyrdom: Reasoning & Exploiting Ethnocentrism

Suicide terrorism was a phenomenon that struck fear and disbelief into the hearts of the global community, specifically in the West, where the tactic was viewed as exceptionally brutal and culturally incomprehensible. These Salafi-jihad suicide missions and attacks, whose success is dependent on the death of their perpetrator, “are one of the most lethal tactics employed by terrorist and insurgent groups ... they have demonstrated great potential to create turbulence in international affairs” (Gambetta, 2005; Moghadam, 2009, p. 46). Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the actions of al-Qaeda against US assets across Africa, the Middle East, and September 11, 2001, consisted of suicide operations that became “the signature mode of attack – [and] have highlighted how this tactic can lead to considerable losses of human life and physical infrastructure while influencing the course of global events” (Moghadam, 2009, p. 46). What was once isolated to particular regions of the world: Israel, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Soviet-controlled Chechnya, was now a clear and present danger to the global community. In 1994, there was an exponential rise in Salafi-jihad suicide missions, totaling 27 attacks worldwide, marking a staggering 91.5 percent increase since 1981. These figures climbed yearly until 2000 when the world witnessed 37 attacks—a global record; however, in the wake of September 11, 2001, the level of suicide attacks became unprecedented, as the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) worldwide incidents tracking system captured the following numbers: between 2000-2007, the number of attacks rose steadily each year, from 54 in 2001 to 71 in 2002, 81 in 2003, 104 in 2004, 348 in 2005, 353 in 2006, and 535 in 2007 (Moghadam, 2009; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023).

Many categorizations regarding the cause of suicide attacks in the post-9/11 environment were researched and discussed through news media, political analysis, academic literature, and

strategic military policy (Kydd & Walter, 2006; McMaster, 2020; Pape, 2003). These categories consisted of (1) a focus on the individual attacker (Berko, 2007, 2012; Lachkar, 2002); (2) prominence on the underlying factors of the dispatching group or terror organization (Bloom, 2005; Sprinzak, 2000); and (3) emphasis placed on the societal structures and the need to analyze each component separately to build a comprehensive picture (Moghadam, 2006, pp. 81–107). Overall, the sentiment of the varying lenses in which suicide terrorism was viewed concluded that suicide bombers rarely suffer from salient psychopathology, there is a solid commitment to the group cause and objectives, there is a continuous desire for revenge that led to a violent act to advance the political goals of the group, and there remains a consensus that the higher degree of lethality presents a more concrete rationale to the movement (Crenshaw, 1985; McCauley & Segal, 1987; Pape, 2005).

The West identifies suicide terrorism as Irrational based on religious indoctrination or societal predisposition attributed to deep poverty and marginalization. Other accounts believe the logic of suicide terrorism is based on three components; coercive power, mass support, and altruistic motive (Pape, 2005), all of which originate on strategic, social, and individual levels. Organizationally, it has been decided that suicide terrorism is leveraged to create a disproportionate amount of chaos and fear among its intended targets (Richburg, 2004). Additionally, suicide attacks amplify the morale of the group responsible, and there is minimal denial throughout the research that the operational benefits, such as cost efficiency and high precision, are desirable attributes of the suicide attack (Dolnik, 2003; Sprinzak, 2000).

These Westernized descriptions of suicide terrorism are built on a specific level of ethnocentrism, as political violence is typically perceived as illegitimate by Western society,

causing a naturally narrow-minded cognitive response. The presence of militant Islam in conjunction with suicide terrorism “presents profound and difficult challenges for Western political and legal systems” (Freamon, 2003, p. 300), so applying varying frameworks to understand the suicide terrorism phenomenon is welcomed. However, where these categories are fundamental in building an accurate profile, one element rarely discussed is the difference between the employment of suicide terrorism (Western perspective) and the act of radical martyrdom (Chowdhury, 2004; Moghadam, 2009). These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but this is not an accurate representation. The intelligence apparatus, political discourse, journalism, and academic literature attributed these violent acts as nothing more than a senseless suicide that instills fear and promotes a terror group’s objectives (Andrew, 2018; Walton, 2012). These elements are undoubtedly within the rationale, but the underpinning theological belief system attached to the radical martyr employing an act of violence was continuously outside American understanding and not a component of the analysis (Grabo, 2004; Moghadam, 2006; Pape, 2005).

Radical martyrdom is considered a deeply spiritual and purifying act central to jihad (Chowdhury, 2004). Furthermore, the violence associated is justified as the act is believed to be anointed by God, a powerful tool of ideological persuasion and an important distinction that the West frequently overlooks (Moran, 2021; Pape, 2005). In the post-9/11 environment, many scholars and policy analysts do not appreciate the difference between suicide attacks and radical martyrdom, which presents a significant ethnocentric gap in understanding (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; Schmitt & Mulligan, 2020; Zegart, 2007).

Herein lies the confusion: Radical martyrdom, through the extremist lens, deviates from

early Islamic, Judaism, and Christian martyrdom and is not considered radical. Individuals who acted through traditional martyrdom exhibited incredible courage in defense of faith. Examples of this are best captured in the historical context of Sumayyah and Yasir, the holy Maccabee martyrs, or Saint Stephen, who all demonstrated a psychological readiness to suffer and sacrifice one's life for a deeply moral or theological truth (Bélanger et al., 2014). These acts were selfless and did not involve violence outside of what was inflicted on them. In the case of radical martyrdom, truth and theological belief still apply to the constructs of purpose; however, there is an additional component surrounding the act of radical sacrifice—the destruction of others. To achieve total martyrdom with Salafi-jihad, a self-annihilatory act of violence, killing or destroying other humans or infrastructure, to progress a cause God demands is a mandatory function (Chowdhury, 2004; Edwards, 2019; Moghadam, 2006). Due to ethnocentric perceptions and Western values, the West sees this additional component as homicidal and void of virtue (Jervis, 2017). In most Western academic, political, and journalistic circles, the victims targeted for exhibiting behavior or secular activity inconsistent with the beliefs of the terrorists are considered martyrs. In contrast, the radical terrorist committing the violent attack in the name of God considers themselves martyrs (Edwards, 2019; Freamon, 2003; Moghadam, 2006). These significant differences remain a matter of perspective and ethnocentric understanding.

An additional contributing factor to the misunderstanding of radical martyrdom is founded in the principles of Islam. Foundationally, Islam is a monotheistic belief that identifies God as the master designer who put order and purpose into Creation, and He breathed the spirit of life into humans, making them the noblest of God's creatures (van der Krogt, 2015). According to Islam, God granted humans three gifts: intelligence to discern the actual from the fraudulent, a resolve that can help navigate choices between both, and the capability of

communication to glorify God and the Prophet Muhammad. Human life has great value throughout the central Islamic text, the Qur'an. Notably, one murder is equal to the killing of the whole of humanity, and suicide is considered murder (Surah al-Ma'ida 5:32; Surah an-Nisa 4:29-30). These core values of Islam identify pure fundamentals, which indicate an apparent misunderstanding, deviation, and uniqueness to contemporary Salafi-jihadist behavior and an argument against the rationale behind radical martyrdom. The departure from true Islamic belief is exacerbated further when women and children are used as the perpetrators of violent suicide attacks (occasionally willingly, usually unknowingly, or against their will) (Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2005; Von Knop, 2007). This unorthodox and intentional tactic created a significant unbalancing in the West, as it is considered unfathomable to use women and children in that violent fashion. Moreover, during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, a result of September 11, 2001, the intelligence apparatus did not account for the use of the vulnerable on the battlefield, nor did the analysis make sense of this cultural divide which led to the death of US troops and Muslims local to the attacks (Speckhard, 2008; Von Knop, 2007).

From a Western profile perspective, it is not uncommon to see attributable characteristics applied to radical martyrs, such as widespread anger over subordination, humiliation, and physical subjugation imposed by secular Muslim governments and the West; however, the act of radical martyrdom is more often aligned with a religious entitlement and obligation of lesser jihad, encouraging extreme Muslims to go to war and defend God and the Muslim way of life (Hudson, 1999). As Freamon (2003) describes through a legal lens, "Islam is not just a religion and a system of theological thought. It is also a system of jurisprudence, one that finds its primary sources in religious texts and uses those texts to create legal norms, obligations, prescriptions, and prohibitions for its adherents to live and govern themselves by" (Freamon,

2003, p. 302). This is uncommon in Western society as the concept of separation of church and state helps to clearly delineate the exchanges between religious and state institutions of religious and state relationships (Saiya, 2022); however, within the Arab world, Islam dictates and influences national policy and procedures (Robinson, 2021).

For the radical mind, the constructs of religion and policy being linked together presented the opportunity to manipulate political meaning, as found throughout al-Qaeda rhetoric (Gunz & Keegan, 2004; Hoffman, 2009; Von Knop, 2007). Furthermore, a system of legal authority backed by religious concepts provided an element of influential interpretation, explicitly targeting young and impressionable Sunni Muslims (Shelton, 2011). Ultimately, al-Qaeda believed that their interpretation to create a caliphate and defend the Muslim community was fundamental and an approved legal action sanctioned by religious demand (Andrew, 2018; Coll, 2004; Sedgwick, 2004). On the other side of the manifested conflict was the West, mainly America, which is evident throughout all the “statements, interviews, sermons, and books by Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders over the past decades” that portrayed the US “as a religiously motivated ‘Crusader’ on an aggressive mission to subdue, occupy, and transform Muslim societies” (Pape, 2005, p. 119). Both Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who were seen by their followers as almost mythic icons, believed it was their religious duty to acquire weaponry to produce mass destruction against the monstrous Jews and Crusaders that had threatened Islam for the last thousand years (Andrew, 2010, pp. 807–808).

September 11, 2001: Faulty Analytical Assumptions

The rise of Islamic extremism can be attributed to many global conditions, societal events, and cultural characteristics; however, the fundamentalism phenomenon of the early

2000s is attributed chiefly as a byproduct of the irrelevant backwater proxy battlefields between the Soviet Union and the US—most notably, Afghanistan and the mujahideen's defeat of the Soviets (Fergusson, 2010). Further exacerbating the foundation of radicalism in the 21st century was the presence of Western forces in Saudi Arabia throughout the Gulf War. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is home to Islam's holy sanctuaries and is considered a beacon for Arab heritage and tradition (Bodansky, 2002; Coll, 2004). The presence of the US during the liberation of Kuwait and deterrence of Saddam Hussein's hostile regime was initially welcomed throughout international circles, but not the Arab world. The American presence in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait held secondary ramifications, producing fury among the Salafi fundamentalists regarding the sustained cultural and militaristic sphere of influence America was imposing on sacred Saudi soil (Engel, 2012).

The established policy of the post-World War II agreements between the US and Saudi Arabia outlined a vital trade and defense relationship, but there was always Saudi reluctance to allow foreign troops admission, as it would disturb sacred Muslim sovereignty. However, the Gulf War presented many calculated risks. Cultural conditions and sacred considerations were deemed null as the Iraqi army positioned itself within striking distance of Saudi oil fields and showed themselves to be capable of invading the Saudi Kingdom (Moger, 2021). Where the Gulf War was considered a success from a global context, the Western involvement in Middle Eastern affairs emboldened the Salafi jihad fundamentalists, and militant terrorism against the US would amplify (Moghadam, 2008; Pape, 2005).

By 1992, after success in the Gulf War, the American public and the larger intelligence community shifted focus to the post-Cold War era in Europe, domestic policy, and economic

concerns. This is best captured in the Clinton–Bush presidential campaigns, where Middle Eastern affairs were considered a “small blip” on the radar screen (Clinton, 2004; Coll, 2004, p. 240). The imprudence and lack of diligence regarding the socioeconomic and cultural conditions of the Middle East inspired the Islamic fundamentalists to organize and expose the US as an out-of-touch superpower, imposing its will whenever it deemed necessary with no regard for the people it impacts (Rashid, 2000). There was an explosion of radical Islamic movements throughout the region predicated on hostility, resentment, and religious fanaticism, while the American public disregarded the region as unimportant to global affairs (Bruce, 2008; Walton, 2012). The American sentiment towards the Middle East was minimal regarding foreign policy and national security; however, American influence through commerce and governance was shifting the traditional Arab culture to a more Westernized style of political and economic administration (Dillon, 2009; M. Hudson, 2013). Disruption of American influence became the primary objective of the Islamic extremists. This attempt to advance disturbance efforts and destabilize Western stimulus predominantly meant organizing and building complex networks of facilitators, governors, militants, transporters, financiers, religious teachers, propagandists, weapons experts, bombers, and political insurgents (Abu Khalil, 2004; Al-Rasheed, 2002). These extremist networks, driven by religious ideology, a formidable force throughout human history, would soon demand change throughout the global geopolitical landscape and influence Western powers’ military, domestic, and foreign policies for the next three decades (Hudson, 2013).

Throughout the 1990s, the most radical of al-Qaeda’s fundamentalists were not considered significant national security threats to the US, regardless of operational martyrs’ successes against American assets domestically and internationally (Coll, 2004). In 1993, Osama bin Laden supported Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the chief planner of the 9/11 attacks, in his first

attempt at destroying one of the World Trade Center towers (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Mohammed Salameh was ultimately responsible for the bombing, which was supposed to be a martyr's death but resulted in a solo bombing in the parking garage, ripping through seven stories, killing six and injuring 1,000 people (Blumenthal, 1993). This act of violence marked al-Qaeda's ambition to bring the older tradition of Holy War to the shores of North America and exploit vulnerable American assets across the globe (Hoffman, 2017). In August of 1998, after Osama bin Laden openly declared war on the US (Andrew, 2018), coordinated attacks (10 minutes apart) of large-scale bombs in trucks driven by radical martyrs came close to demolishing the entirety of the US embassy in Nairobi and the embassy in Dar es Salaam (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, pp. 115–116). A similar synchronized attack would be repeated on a much larger scale three years later, on September 11, 2001.

United States intelligence at this juncture still did not understand nor appreciate the threat of al-Qaeda, as the reporting still positioned Osama bin Laden as a financier (Heuer, 2019). There was conflicting reporting throughout the Intelligence Community, as some agencies believed the motivation of al-Qaeda was to obtain nuclear material; other agencies downplayed the reach of al-Qaeda. In contrast, competing agencies established evidence of a powerful and competent worldwide organization of terror (Andrew, 2018). However, in January 2000, the last year of the Clinton administration, al-Qaeda failed in a suicide attack on the USS *The Sullivans* in Aden Harbor, Yemen, due to the explosives sinking the small craft. However, they soon succeeded in October when radical martyrs detonated a more stable explosive-filled boat next to the guided missile destroyer USS *Cole*. Seventeen US Navy Sailors were murdered and 40 were injured in Aden Harbor, Yemen. Osama bin Laden claimed the attack on the USS *Cole* as a great step in the World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders which declared: "The ruling to kill

the Americans and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it” (Andrew, 2018, p. 720; Coll, 2004).

American intelligence strategy shifted in the post-USS *Cole* bombing environment, but not enough to prevent more large-scale terrorist plots on the American homeland. President Clinton later wrote in his memoirs that “Bin Laden was poisoned by the conviction that he was in possession of the absolute truth and therefore free to play God by killing innocent people” (Andrew, 2018, p. 720; Clinton, 2004; Clinton, 2000). However, for the remainder of 2000 and into 2001, intelligence products intended for the highest levels of defense and government were disjointed and plagued with vagueness (George, 2020; Thomas, 2008). So much so, during the 2000 election, George Bush was quoted saying, “Well, I assume I will start seeing the good stuff when I become president” (Bush, 2010; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Unbeknownst to President-elect Bush, the intelligence he was receiving was the “good stuff” (Andrew, 2018, p. 723). This inept and unimaginative intelligence surrounding al-Qaeda’s resolve and operational ambition would eventually lead to September 11, 2001, resulting in the worst attack on US soil since Pearl Harbor and a direct act of war on the sovereignty of Western society.

On September 12th, 2001, the Intelligence Community, investigative bodies, and other facets of national security realized their “strategic failure to prioritize the religious motivations of the martyrdom missions which reached their climax on 9/11” (Andrew, 2018, p. 725). Osama bin Laden noted this ethnocentric gap in American understanding as he told a Pakistani interviewer in the aftermath of 9/11, “We love death. The US loves life. That is the big difference between us” (Stengel, 2001). The US intelligence was experiencing a deficiency due to the void between

foreign and domestic threats and glaring cognitive biases, which produced a severe underestimation of the enemy. The intelligence events leading up to September 11 echo the *Day of Infamy* from 60 years prior when Roosevelt and Churchill did not believe the Japanese capable of such a sophisticated and well-calculated attack on Western powers. The similarities regarding the systemic intelligence failure are strangely congruent between Pearl Harbor and September 11, and it can be categorized into three corresponding characteristics best captured in the *9/11 Commission Report*:

1. Collection degradation by the denial and deception framework leveraged by al-Qaeda. This means that every facet of the September 11 plot practiced superior operational security, as did the Japanese, who were also capable of masking themselves and acting with the element of surprise (Grabo, 2004). “In successfully denying intelligence collection against the plot – chiefly foiling needed HUMINT and SIGINT penetrations – the terrorist plotters left the analysts largely empty-handed” (Bruce, 2008, p. 200). As Fingar (2011) describes, detecting plans or preparations for a military strike against the US is critical but missing from analytical estimates leading up to 9/11.
2. Intelligence sharing amongst foreign and domestic intelligence agencies was non-existent, similar to the unshared information in the 1940s between the Department of State and national defense entities. Bureaucratic posturing led to poor sharing of information. As a result, each federal agency, according to the *9/11 Commission Report*, held individual pieces of a highly complex puzzle, and if they had been connected, there is substantial evidence that September 11 could have been identified and prevented (Andrew, 2018, pp. 726–730; National Commission on Terrorist

- Attacks, 2004).
3. Like the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the entire 9/11 operation was unimaginable and outside the realistic realm of possibilities according to the analytical posture. Cognitive dissonance and faulty assumptions were to blame, as analysts were not asking the right questions (Walton, 2012, p. 257). Throughout the summer of 2001, there were threats of terrorism, but the assumption was that all terrorist attacks would occur outside the US. Additionally, any airline hijacking would entail hostage-taking. Moreover, the analytical line did not articulate any possibility of mass suicide attacks (using hijacked planes or any other medium) against high-density office buildings in the US homeland (Bruce, 2008, p. 200). The intelligence analyst primarily uses creativity, deduction, and critical thinking when indications and warnings are unsatisfactory (Bruce, 2008; Fingar, 2011; Grabo, 2004). This practice helps define external possibilities, which drives quality collection requirements and results in more reliable analysis. Confirmation bias and ethnocentrism blocked these critical analytical tools and resulted in devastation.

As America stood unprepared and unaware, similar to 1941, on the morning of September 11, 2001, four US commercial airliners were seized and used as human-filled missiles, destroying well-calculated targets of world-renowned symbolism that personified democracy, capitalism, independent thought, and freedom. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, resulted in the loss of 3,000 lives with a majority of casualties being civilians and heroic first responders. This extreme violence catalyzed two types of varying negative and positive activities. September 11, 2001, had obvious negative impacts, including decades of geopolitical turmoil, war/death, islamophobia, political divide, civil liberty infringement, and trillions of

military spending (Pew Research, 2021). Conversely, it created a national unity that transformed the US public, built unprecedented global coordination to defend freedom and deter terrorism, and GWOT created collaboration among Western and Arab nations that did not previously exist. Furthermore, the GWOT era increased opportunity, education, and gender equality within previously closed-off countries in the Middle East and Africa. Finally, as a reactionary measure to September 11, the US government attempted to correct the systemic failures of the national security apparatus by creating the Department of Homeland Security and the critical post of Director of National Intelligence, which improved coordination among the various intelligence agencies (Bruce, 2008; Walton, 2012).

Cultural Disposition Profiles

Evaluating al-Qaeda regarding specific cultural themes associated with the 6-D construct proved highly complex and required a more nuanced approach compared to Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union. The key themes of PDI will consist of inequality within the organization, how superiors are viewed, and the group's desire for centralization or decentralization. Within the realm of IDV, two major themes will be evaluated for scoring: al-Qaeda's organizational culture trends towards universalism or exclusionism and how the organization identifies with "I" or "we." To identify an accurate portrayal of MAS, familial values and the impact of religion on the organization will be investigated and assessed. Additionally, al-Qaeda's concept of protection and the American approach to dehumanization will also be used to calculate an accurate MAS score. Analysis of UAI will capture the valuations of two themes, including the organization's attention to detail and innovation or creativity. The final two cultural dimensions will be examined and scored based on evidence identifying if al-Qaeda is more pragmatic versus expansionistic (LTO) and the extent to which the ethical code informs the group, capturing IVR.

Power Distance Profile: al-Qaeda & US Perspective

Al-Qaeda does not fall into a specific governance structure or organizational model like the previous two case studies. It is agreed that there are fascist principles ingrained in the organization's culture, but it also houses conspiratorial elements that lean toward the more populist methodologies. In conjunction with these elements of authoritative philosophy, al-Qaeda encompasses other organizational components that dictate a higher PDI score, including ethnonationalism, anarchism, and ethnically affiliated religious parameters (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). The multifaceted methodology and desired cultural design of al-Qaeda is structured as a network hierarchy, which is a prudent configuration when attempting to operate in secrecy.

The organization's structure is intentionally created to reach operational efficiency while keeping information flow undetectable (Moghadam, 2013; Shultz, 2012). Within an equal, unfettered social, familial, or business setting, information flow can be open and well-connected, making individuals feel incorporated and connected in all facets of the process. The illegal nature of terrorism prevents open information flow, and the network design is a reaction to that fact. A series of trade-offs between information flow and group security allows the structure to fluctuate based on different scenarios (Enders & Su, 2007). It is essential to note that al-Qaeda is not “a traditional hierarchical terrorist organization, with a pyramid-style organizational structure, and it does not exercise full command and control over its branches and franchises. But nor is its role limited to broad ideological influence” (Leah, 2011, p. 126). However, the disjointedness of communication and information flow can alienate lower-tiered members of an organization and produce a sentiment of separation from the upper echelons of decision-makers, resulting in a higher PDI score regarding inequality within the organization. On the contrary, Leah (2011) points out a critical component of cultural belonging through personal ties and shared ambition,

“Due to its dispersed structure, al Qaeda operates as a devolved network hierarchy, in which levels of command authority are not always clear; personal ties between militants carry weight and, at times, transcend the command structure between core, branch, and franchises” (Leah, 2011, p. 126). Thus, producing an increase in influence resulting in a low PDI score regarding inequality within the group structure.

Structural evolution is a natural phenomenon surrounding terror groups, specifically when the organization is being targeted; the group implements countermeasures that increase sustainability and delegate authority to militants and local commanders (Arquilla et al., 1999). Throughout the GWOT, terror networks remained invariant to American tactics implemented to measure and infiltrate the inner workings of the terrorist cell, leading to the exploitation of the organization. It was not uncommon for terror organizations to completely alter their structural identity and abandon their centralized components, evolving into a compartmented structure with individual cells of varying abilities operating independently (Enders & Su, 2007). Ultimately, the activity of the cells would circumnavigate back to the directorship of the local commanders, thus leading back to the upper decision-makers of the organization. However, this loosely organized methodology creates a nonhierarchical deployment of small terrorist subgroups where no one group’s attack is coordinated or monumental in scale. The sum of individual cells acting independently of each other creates a fatal environment of chaos and provides a level of security for the organization as it excludes commanders and leadership in the planning or information flow; therefore, they remain less vulnerable to link analysis coordination via communication chain structures (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011; Leah, 2011; Wright et al., 2017). This design gives significant power to the lower echelons and provides an environment of belonging and personal achievement, thus creating a moderately low score on the PDI.

Another component critical to measuring inequality within the al-Qaeda organization is the highly sophisticated insurgent propaganda campaign that targets young and impressionable Muslims. Al-Qaeda created a ubiquitous message of anti-Muslim oppression and global jihad that appeals to the disenfranchised adolescents needing adventure, recognition, and development (Venhaus, 2010). Recruits for al-Qaeda were searching for association with the organization and global brand and an ideological fulfillment found in heroic Islamic narratives. Through indoctrination and psychological recalibration, al-Qaeda convinced young Muslims that regardless of being outmatched by every government force they opposed via devastating munitions and more incredible human and technical resources, the execution of al-Qaeda operations was an ideological imperative desired by God (Rabasa et al., 2006). This sentiment held a powerful mobilizing effect and provided a sense of belonging, as the group was fighting an undefeatable entity, but collectively, victory was possibly achievable (Rabasa et al., 2006). To the socially isolated Sunni Muslim, the insurmountable odds in fighting against the West were of no consequence, as recruits socioeconomic and degraded circumstances drove their natural human reaction of desire, integration, and purpose (Benton & Avent, 2020; L. K. Johnson, 2015; Portacolone et al., 2020).

The application of belonging to a larger group and holding a communal further justified when evaluating the motive and individual logic of radical martyrs within al-Qaeda (Borum & Gelles, 2005; Chowdhury, 2004). Many extremists who adopted the radical martyrdom path were also indoctrinated through ideological, religious, and social constructivist components, and on a more fundamental level, they were escaping marginalization and subjugation (Bélanger et al., 2014). This is no different regarding the average al-Qaeda recruit as a group association, and their desire to belong was a motivating factor. However, through al-Qaeda, the radical martyr

was presented with an opportunity to operate with multiple individuals of like minds and reach a collective purpose in conjunction with serving a cause that survived beyond their death (Bloom, 2005; Moghadam, 2006; Pape, 2005) Within the mind of the radical martyr, there was a belief that in final judgment, their death would be viewed as beneficial and supported by the local society. This recognition and admiration from the community, which was expected, was highly desirable to individuals such as radical martyrs who were previously socially isolated, moderately educated, and politically marginalized before joining al-Qaeda. Finding that element of higher belonging among the community was essential for the radical martyr (Edwards, 2019; Moghadam, 2009).

Regional analysis is also essential when evaluating inequality in an organization composed of multiple foreign entities. Where al-Qaeda provided a sense of equality and fostered an inclusive culture of brotherhood, the Middle East remains the most unequal region in the world (Assouad, 2020). The World Inequality Lab collected and combined data from 15 countries within the region from 1990–2016. From an income perspective, 64% of the total regional income was held by the top 10% of income earners (the same statistic for Europe and the US is in the high 30s and low 40s) (Assouad, 2020). The more staggering figure is that the bottom 50% of the region's population received about 9% of the total income, less than most developing nations and well below the European and US figures. The income void between the haves and have-nots is enormous, and the preservation of such harmful policies is driven by geopolitical promiscuity and abundant corruption within political institutions (Abbott & Teti, 2017).

There is a strong argument that the inequality throughout the region is a cancer on social

cohesion and the well-being of Arab society. The literature and empirical evidence reviewing the terrorism phenomenon confirm that regional inequality can be considered a root cause of terrorism (Bandyopadhyay & Ijaz, 2021; Mohammad, 2005; Newman, 2006). Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) identify that more redundancy in the inequality life cycle can lead to general social dysfunction, distrust among citizens is continuously elevated, and human health is ignored and deteriorates. Conversely, in more equal societies, there are lower homicide rates, and children experience less violence, which is critical regarding the mental development component and general philosophy toward the value of human life (Mthuli Ncube & Anyanwu, 2014; Pape, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010; L. Wright, 2007). Not all scholarship found a direct correlation between inequality and terrorism; Piazza's (2006) study identifies that economic opportunity, food security, life expectancy, education, and wealth distribution were minuscule influences compared to cultural stratification, personal choice, and the establishment of sociopolitical institutions (Piazza, 2006). However, it can be argued that institutions are responsible for the policy creation that manifests the undesirable characteristics such as social unrest, political instability, and economic disparity (Bardach & Patashnik, 2019; Kugler, 2006; Weimer & Vining, 2017). These characteristics can exacerbate grievances within marginalized communities, potentially leading to radicalization and violence.

Inequality throughout the region generates an undesirable environment for anti-terrorism ambitions, as the relationship between economic and social inequality is a factor contributing to political violence and the activation of terrorism (Lichback, 1989). Within the PDI constructs, this would place al-Qaeda, and most of the Middle East, higher on the index than most. However, at a micro level, within the group, there is less inequality, explicitly surrounding the decentralization of the organization when there is a need for the subgroup or individual cell

design. This perception of low inequality among group members within a typical hierarchy structure still holds a level of divergence from bottom to top; however, the sense of belonging and purpose accentuates the cultural connection to the group that built an awareness, albeit a manipulation, of equality.

Additional components of PDI consist of how the organization views the superior and their preferred level of centralization. These two components within al-Qaeda are inherently linked. The leadership demonstrated the continuous ability to evolve and adapt to the shifting political movements and trends, specifically regarding local governments, regional trends, international community policies, and terror mitigation techniques (Wright et al., 2017). Under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda had many successes, the USS *Cole* and September 11 attacks are masterpieces in the eyes of radicals. However, his status as the leader of Muslim fundamentalism was created during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Ross, 2015). His quick response in declaring jihad against the Soviet Union while the CIA propagated him as a star asset in the Holy Wars against world communism created a celebrity status amongst Muslim fighters. By expelling the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the mujahideen acquired a recognizable amount of money and organizational abilities. Coupled with their proficiency in articulating the desired ideological narrative, this environment provided the fertile ground in which figures like Osama bin Laden could ascend to borderline mythical status (Andrew, 2018). His illustrated anger at the US throughout the late 1980s and 1990s fed into his notoriety as an ally became adversary, and his group of fighters became estranged from Muslim governments, specifically Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, who turned to the US for military support versus the Afghan Mujaheddin (Bodansky, 1999).

Osama bin Laden's strategic stewardship of al-Qaeda consisted of building an army of devout fundamentalists to create a global jihad. This culminated in thousands of radical groups joining the al-Qaeda umbrella and organizing into a hierarchical network structure. Of course, caveats to the structure were present when operational necessity was required, but fundamentally, al-Qaeda was a network of power and decision-making (Lowenthal, 2012; Rabasa et al., 2006). As incoming groups joined the al-Qaeda cause, their organizations naturally shifted their focus to align with al-Qaeda's objectives. Destabilizing the near enemy (Muslim governments) was once the primary and original strategy for most of the individual cells that joined al-Qaeda. After assimilation into the al-Qaeda fold, their goals changed to destroying the far enemy (the US). There were many motivations for this shift, such as stability, money, weapons, logistical support, expertise, and training; however, the most significant driver was to be led by Osama bin Laden (Byman & Williams, 2015). To al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups, Osama bin Laden was more than a core leader or symbolic figure; he was a spiritual entity, the essence of a self-radicalized vanguard, and an ideological prophet (Schmitt, 2011). This perception of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's organizational network structure correlates to Hofstede's (2010) articulated principles of high-scoring PDI characteristics.

The American perspective of terrorism and religious extremism before the bombings at the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam was limited. There were counterterror groups within the FBI and small teams within the federal intelligence agencies; however, there was no communication or collaboration amongst the agencies (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Wright, 2007). This continued into the post-September 11, 2001, environment. The security challenges presented by al-Qaeda were ill-defined and not comprehensive as there was limited understanding of the organization's mission, capabilities, or objectives (near enemies

versus far enemies). This was exacerbated by the US intelligence community being handicapped by self-imposed internal barriers and bureaucratic stove-piping (Harris, 2006). The analytical line recognized the widespread insurgencies growing within immediate geographical regions, but intelligence failed to articulate core capabilities, differing ideologies, and desired targets of destabilization (Dahl, 2013; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Furthermore, cultural considerations were not deemed relevant or addressed within the intelligence produced by the CIA (Zegart, 2007). Notably, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on terrorism, including aspects such as terrorist intentions, culture, or leadership, were absent from publication between 1995 and September 11, 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004).

From a PDI perspective, the sentiment and understanding of al-Qaeda, while immensely inadequate, was focused on al-Qaeda's operational aptitude and growing technical sophistication versus the cultural conditions of individuals within the group (Tenet, 2001). There were indeed warnings within the sporadic intelligence that could have possibly led to further collection and strategic questioning (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 255), but intelligence content was chiefly based on general-level threat reporting (Dahl, 2013, p. 144). Recognition within the Presidents Daily Briefing (PDB) on August 6 that "clandestine, foreign government and media reports indicate Bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US" is a prime example of the overall generalities decision-makers were provided regarding intelligence on terrorism. Broad intelligence analysis of this caliber remained uncorroborated and unactionable until 2001 (Dahl, 2013a; Harris, 2006). It can be argued that a closer evaluation of al-Qaeda's cultural composition and articulated strategic objectives would have provided the evidence required, but that did not take place (Rovner et al., 2006). According to Richard Clarke, the US national security and counterterrorism czar from 1998-2003, the FBI New York field

office was one of the only organizations within the intelligence community umbrella conducting in-depth analysis at the tactical and practical levels (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 214; Wright, 2007).

Ultimately, the US understanding of al-Qaeda, regarding inequality within the organization, how superiors are viewed within the group, and the group's desire for centralization or decentralization can be captured as follows: Self-organized terrorism from an organizational perspective was considered flat, informal, and a highly complex networking apparatus of interdependent individuals (Harris, 2006; Leah, 2011). The leadership component is consistent with the foundational al-Qaeda condition, as US intelligence understood Osama bin Laden to be a symbolic figurehead primarily used to recruit a specific ideology and raise funds from state and non-state actors (Balz et al., 2002). The role of Osama bin Laden was usually not underplayed by US intelligence as he posed a significant threat to national security interests. There is produced intelligence that articulated the severity, significance, and sheer power of the threat posed by a leader of a religious element who called for war against secularism and the death of Western civilization (Doran, 2002; Harlow & Tenet, 2007). Finally, the command-and-control constructs of al-Qaeda were understood to be more decentralized without any one individual in a place of complete power as the components of decision-making varied between the majlis al shura (consultation council—who decided on operations) or the military committee that considered and approved military matters throughout the organization. Another level of complexity is added when the franchise structure of jihadi groups in various countries acted under the al-Qaeda umbrella but independent of higher leadership, most notably Egypt (led by Ayman al-Zawahiri), Sudan, Yemen, Albania, Lebanon, the Philippines, the Kashmiri region of India and the Chechnyan region of Russia (Dahl, 2013a; Harris, 2006; Smith, 2002). Facilitation and

financier cells within Africa, Germany, the UK, Canada, and the US also added to the expansive landscape of interconnected but disassociated decision-making.

The US perception would conclude that within the PDI constructs, the analytical line would be consistent with the cultural disposition with a high PDI score and several nuances throughout specific themes. Most notably, the discrepancy between how the individual is a product of society (in this case, high inequality) versus the characteristics of the same individual within the group (moderate to low inequality). Further discrepancies can be found in the network structure al-Qaeda was creating, and the US intelligence identifying the same structure as highly decentralized and fractured individualist acting with limited command and control. Overall, the al-Qaeda PDI score would be calculated within a moderately high range, and the US perception would calculate a similar score; however, identifying the differences amongst the PDI themes would be critical when attempting to produce accurate intelligence.

Individualism v. Collectivism: al-Qaeda & US Perspective

There are many layers to al-Qaeda regarding complexities within their belief systems and behaviors when viewed through Hofstede's (2010) 6-D framework, specifically IDV. Each cultural characteristic can contradict another when attempting to categorize generally. On the surface, al-Qaeda is an excellent example of a collectivist organization, as it values and emphasizes the interests of the group over the interests of individuals when those interests conflict (Diener et al., 1995; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004); moreover, al-Qaeda is known to pontificate and legitimize practices that benefit the group at the expense of the individual (Braun & Genkin, 2014; Schwartz, 1994).

Within IDV constructs, collectivist characteristics can be identified in the way al-Qaeda

built a justification framework convincing its fighters that violence was a palatable act because the group should be “elevated as the primary actor” and the member should embrace both the “tug of expectations and a sense of responsibility for the group” (Braun & Genkin, 2014, p. 1264). Additionally, in regard to radical martyrdom, Wagner (1995) identifies that dedicated people in a group are consistently willing “to make sacrifices for the sake of the group’s well-being,” which strongly correlates with a low-scoring IDV—collectivist mentality and matches the organizational expectation of al-Qaeda (Harris, 2006; Hofstede, 2001; Wagner, 1995, p. 162). Would-be martyrs in collectivist cultures parallel this finding, believing that a deliberate death in the name of their nation or organization is held in high regard (Hafez, 2006).

Further evaluation of al-Qaeda, regarding exclusionism and the adoption of “We” over “I” mentality, can be identified within the belief system and sanctuary that Salafism provides to Muslims. As seen within the PDI disposition, inequality is rampant throughout the region, and to further exacerbate societal uneasiness is the reality of uncertainty. Salafi jihadism delivered to individuals, a feeling of corrective realignment at junctures in life that were highly ambiguous. For disenfranchised Muslims, Salafi jihadism came with violent assurances and inevitabilities, but it also provided a promised utopia designed by the divine (Maher, 2016). The understanding, based on memoirs, interrogations, interviews, and the last will-and-testament of al-Qaeda members, is that no action was done for the individual self but only to fuel the progression and acclaim of the organization and the underlying ideology of Salafism (Coll, 2004; Pape, 2005; Rabasa et al., 2006). Most members of al-Qaeda were discharging their duties not for individual gratification (as seen later in IVR) but for the larger whole and dedication to Allah. The collectivist atmosphere became the objective and motivation for the group (Maher, 2016; Moghadam, 2008).

The US analytical perspective clearly understood the upper-echelon power structure, as the Western conventional military framework is designed similarly with a centralized approach and clear authority and decision-making relationships. However, al-Qaeda's continuing ability to evolve and change its approach in the spheres of risk-taking, target selection (hard and soft), geographic variability, and evading counterterrorism measures (Clarke, 2017; Harris, 2006) created a faulty analytical line (Fingar, 2011; George, 2020). For decades, the intelligence community had a broad focus on monitoring multiple countries simultaneously, with particular attention to the activities of the Soviet Union. However, with the rise of international terrorism, the focus shifted from nation-states to non-state actors, principally al-Qaeda. (Fingar, 2011; Lowenthal, 2012). Although the focus shifted and priorities were realigned, the common analytical perceptions and the framework in which data and information were synthesized remained similar to that of nation-state analysis. This created an ethnocentric void and an inaccurate estimation of al-Qaeda's operational capabilities.

Quality intelligence analysis would have questioned its own assumptions and looked for alternative explanations that would alleviate excessive conformity; however, the constraints of Western cultural perception manifested a faulty analytical estimation that militant operations, decision-making, and organizational evolution, as exhibited by al-Qaeda, was an impossible task in a highly collective environment. Due to learned experiences and conducting nation-state analysis for decades (Jervis, 2017; Kindsvater, 2006), it was unfathomable for analysts to imagine a collective and bureaucratic system filled with inefficient procedures and decision-making complexities could operate at the speed al-Qaeda was demonstrating (Rovner & Long, 2006; Stamatovic et al., 2016). This led to a higher analytical emphasis on the individual terrorists and the leadership, negating the importance of the collective whole (National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Rovner & Long, 2006). It also identified that the US intelligence was using the wrong lens to analyze al-Qaeda's organizational structure. The US focus on individual action and leadership mixed with the disbelief a collective organization could reduce efficiency and effectiveness, negated the reality of al-Qaeda's operational networks, and as Powell (1990) identifies, opposed to bureaucratic routines and hierarchical commands, networks are built on horizontal patterns of communication which can expedite action and efficiency (Powell, 1990). US intelligence was not blind to the integrated nature of al-Qaeda decision-making; however, the execution and cadence in which al-Qaeda operated was a phenomenon that they wrongly attributed to individual characteristics.

An additional component to the US perspective holding a higher IDV perception of terror groups was (and continues to be) garnered by the belief that individuals who join a terror organization (or any terror group) do so by choice (Betts, 1978; Lowenthal, 2012; Thomas, 2008). American society is "fundamentally individualist in character, and choice fuels this individualism" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus & Schwartz, 2010, p. 355). Choice is considered a core value and critical component of the belief structure within Western individualism (Murray, 2013). It is present in the "legal and political systems, in education and caretaking practices, and even in interpersonal relationships" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus & Schwartz, 2010, p. 355). Moreover, the concept of choice is so fundamental in the West, particularly the US, that it helps shape the commonsense understanding of what it means to be a person (Bellah et al., 1985).

For an analyst to deviate from a cultural fundamental of this magnitude is incredibly difficult and creates an ethnocentric void. However, Horgan and Taylor (2001) have suggested

that “there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior” (Horgan & Taylor, 2001, p. 16). This framework of “why an individual becomes a terrorist” crafted by Crenshaw (1985, 1986) eluded Western intelligence and policymakers. Crenshaw (1985) articulates that individuals who accept a life within a terror organization are more susceptible to persuasion or succumbing to temptation versus individual choice in the Western sense (Hoffman, 2017a; Hudson, 1999). Choice is a powerful cultural condition based on decision-making frameworks that vary from person to person, and it remains a fundamental element that continues to elude the strongest analytical lines.

Masculinity v. Femininity: al-Qaeda & US Perspective

Embracing a radical worldview involves adopting a worldview that opposes mainstream society and endorses violence to achieve social or political change. In most cases, radicalization is caused by grievances, ideological socialization, social networking, and enabling support structures (Hafez & Mullin, 2015). When individuals become indoctrinated without prior activism, they typically do so at the hands of radicalized family members or friends who attempt to pass on their radicalism because of a preexisting bond of trust and personal interdependence (Hafez, 2016). The study of familial connection and peer-to-peer radicalization identified that individual motivation was not always helpful in explaining why individuals were involved in terrorism, as the motivation was not centered on the individual actors themselves but on the small extremist environment from which they originate. The research shows that extremism is manifested through friendship and kinship ties, thus making familial and community connections a critical component of jihad (Everton, 2015; Krebs, 2002; Stark & Bainbridge, 1980).

The exploitation of the family in this way creates a divergence in scoring for MAS, as the familial connection component is categorized as a primarily feminine characteristic in the MAS-scoring architecture. Whereas exploiting the familial relationship can be classified as unemotional and contemptuous, conduct that solely feeds individual or organizational needs is highly consistent with high-scoring MAS characteristics. Additionally, further evidence of high-scoring MAS is the connection of religion and the exploitation of the family and kinship to further organizational objectives. Hofstede (2010) ensures the delineation that “masculine cultures worship a tough God or gods who justify tough behavior towards fellow humans; feminine cultures worship a tender God or gods who demand caring behavior toward fellow humans” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 176).

Protection is another characteristic that should be explored when describing MAS scoring for al-Qaeda and Salafi-Jihad. The logic of protection, a highly masculine cultural characteristic, is demanded of al-Qaeda (Duriesmith & Ismail, 2022), as a core tenant of Salafism is to bring empowerment to Muslims and provide them strength and haven against Islam’s enemies, both internal and external (Arosoaie, 2015; Haykel, 2016, p. 71; Styszynski, 2014). In the eyes of al-Qaeda, there was an enormous emphasis on their long-term mission to protect the Muslim world against the unholy alliance of Christians and Jews (Moghadam, 2006, 2009; Nanninga, 2017). Under al-Qaeda leadership, the Muslim *umma*, in its entirety, must be protected by the “jihadist vanguard” as they continuously engage in the struggle with a coalition of enemies consisting of the Western world and its allies, the “treacherous rulers” of Muslim states (bin Laden, 2005, p. 217). Nanninga (2017) transposes al-Qaeda sentiment as follows:

The lands of Islam are being occupied by ‘infidel forces’ and Muslims are being

oppressed and humiliated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and elsewhere. According to al-Qaeda, Muslims themselves are to blame for this situation. They have deviated from the ‘pure Islam’ of the first generations of Muslims (‘the pious predecessors’, al-salaf al-sālih), which is the cause of their misery. (Bin Laden, 2005, p. 227; Nanninga, 2017, p. 159)

Thus, in the mid-90s, al-Qaeda was obliged to protect and liberate Muslim lands from “infidel forces” and establish an Islamic purification that would serve generation after generation of Muslims (bin Laden, 2005; Bodansky, 1999; Stengel, 2001). In the war al-Qaeda declared, it presents itself as the defender of Islam and the umma, creating a highly masculine culture predicated on protection, exploitation, and radicalization.

Like the preceding case studies, US intelligence did not explicitly consider cultural notions of masculinity or femininity. Nevertheless, there was a prevalent belief within intelligence circles that terrorism was predominantly associated with masculinity. According to the US perspective, terrorism was categorized based on political and religious factors (Hudson, 2013; Werd, 2020). These factors included adversarial relationships, the prominence of Islam that emphasized male authority, resolution of conflicts through further challenges, the mandate for assimilating outsiders, and notably, the organization’s emphasis on strength, dedication, loyalty, and performance (Hoffman, 2017; Schmid, 1983; Victoroff, 2005).

Violence was the language applied to al-Qaeda, and it was a framework the US intelligence apparatus understood. After the bombings in Africa and the USS *Cole*, al-Qaeda was dehumanized, and a narrative was created that all members of the terror organization needed to be exterminated—as there was no differentiated or empathetic possibility for the “rats, beasts,

snakes, vermin, daemons, or collective psychopaths” of al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism (Bruneau, 2016; George, 2020). Interestingly, the more the West dehumanized the radicalized groups, there was greater support for violent collective action and less willingness to support coalition objectives through foreign and domestic (US and Europe) Muslim communities (Kteily & Bruneau, 2016).

Moreover, the language leveraged by the US in intelligence and foreign policy held extremely high levels of masculine perception, as the verbiage “denied human beings traits that are uniquely human—traits such as the ability to reason that separate human beings from animals” (Haslam, 2006; Utych, 2021, p. 5). Tipler and Ruscher (2014) identify that the dehumanized group, in this case, Islamic extremists, were painted as void of cognition and, therefore, easier to eliminate (Tipler & Ruscher, 2014). The use of dehumanizing rhetoric was a powerful tool in the beginning stages of GWOT; however, the underlying rationale for its use was that the West viewed terrorism as an assertive and robust danger, both highly masculine characteristics. Ultimately, the US and coalition approach was to emasculate those dominant traits through dehumanization and powerful language to meet the objective—destroy terrorism.

Uncertainty Avoidance: al-Qaeda & US Perspective

The network in which al-Qaeda operated was unique as they were conscious about maintaining high attention to detail and the need for evolution as the society around them shifted (Jones, 2006; Venzke & Ibrahim, 2003). Al-Qaeda practiced flexibility and adaptability throughout the GWOT, identifying them as a difficult adversary for the West in the post-September 11, 2001, environment (Sageman, 2004). The adaptability, described in both PDI and IDV sections—regarding the transition following the 9/11 attacks from a consolidated group to a

decentralized cohort of active terrorism cells—identifies al-Qaeda’s ability to adopt organizational learning and evolution. Between 1996 and 2001, al-Qaeda leadership was a “vertical leadership structure providing strategic direction and tactical support to its horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations” (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 73). Within the CEO position, Osama bin Laden defined the organizational goals and a sense of purpose while simultaneously acting as the venture capitalist soliciting more funding (Hoffman, 2002, p. 38). However, after the American and British coalition dismantled the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001–2002, the unified approach to decision-making, training, operational coordination, and financing evolved, and al-Qaeda transitioned into a diffused global network (Jones, 2006). A cultural shift is present in the post-Taliban society; however, for most of the GWOT, al-Qaeda’s attention to detail through their integrated leadership structure remained at high levels (Moghadam, 2013; Rabasa et al., 2006; Rovner & Long, 2006).

The attention to detail within the command, control, and communication spaces in the pre-September 11, 2001, environment for al-Qaeda was extremely tight and well structured. Al-Qaeda leadership heavily influenced the network and outlying cells, “offering guidance, logistical backing, and financial support in addition to inspiration” (Borum & Gelles, 2005; Jones, 2006, p. 558; Katzman, 2005). The actions of Osama bin Laden and others within al-Qaeda leadership exhibited textbook UAI values through this behavior—avoiding ambiguity through enhanced attention to detail and condensed controls placed throughout the organization. Additional research labels similar behaviors exhibited by al-Qaeda leadership as a blend of ambitious, unprincipled narcissism and hostile neuroticism with an arrogant sense of self-worth with attempts to exploit Islamic fundamentalism in the service of their dreams of glory (Bergen, 2001; Immelman, 2002). Eventually, all actions and personality traits of al-Qaeda and its

leadership were to mitigate vulnerability and implement controls (Styszynski, 2014). It is understood that the attention to detail characteristic of this magnitude in conjunction with al-Qaeda's objectives is identified as a byproduct of neuroticism and narcissism. Thus, resulting in a cultural behavior that identifies low tolerance for ambiguity and a high presence of UAI.

According to the Global Terrorism Database of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, more than 104,000 terrorist attacks occurred between 1970 and 2011 (Global Terrorism Database, 2023). Out of the one hundred thousand plus attacks, very few have left long-lasting impressions on the geopolitical scale, void a few with exceptional novelty and notoriety, including the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, 1995 Sarin nerve gas attacks in Tokyo, and al-Qaeda's attack on the US homeland on September 11, 2001 (Moghadam, 2013). In the case of September 11, 2001, from a tactical and technological standpoint, the coordination and success of hijacking multiple airliners and subsequently crashing them into buildings was a form of unprecedented tactical innovation (Moghadam, 2013). Crenshaw (2011) articulates a similar sentiment as she identifies that 9/11 was a prime example of al-Qaeda's ability to exercise strategic innovation to circumnavigate Western intelligence and exploit American vulnerabilities (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 6). However, the premeditation or unique weaponry leveraged in terror attacks does not necessarily make the attacks creative or innovative.

Within the scope of UAI, creativity can take multiple forms; therefore, benevolent and functional creativity must be examined. Traditional studies identify benevolent creativity as a more civilized version of creativity manifested for appropriate purposes (Amabile, 1996; Kaufman & Baer, 2005). However, benevolent creativity remains subjective and is directly tied

to cultural ethics. Western cultures deem the following as appropriate purposes for creativity: “the artistic/aesthetic (the production of art, music, and poetry, for example), business (the provision of goods or services in exchange for payment) and engineering (the development of *products* for the benefit of society) and much more” (Cropley, 2005, pp. 1–2). Conversely, Benjamin and Simon (2002) state that al-Qaeda is genuinely creative and leverages the benefit of benevolent creativity through their ingenuity and desire to impose massive casualties on their target of choice (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). While the West views the creativity of terrorism, specifically al-Qaeda, as abhorrent, radical fundamentalists perceive their objectives as justified, disregarding societal norms. They believe creativity is accessible to all who choose to employ it, regardless of societal conventions. (Cropley, 2005, p. 3).

Functional creativity is centered less around the ethical and philosophical components and more aligned to the engineering or effectiveness of the creativity in action. According to Cropley (2005) and Sternberg (1999), functional creativity emphasizes novelty and relevance, meaning the creative action or item must be original, novel, and effective in filling a gap or void. As stated, if a creative element is novel but irrelevant, it is considered *aesthetic*, whereas an element that holds relevance but has no novelty is considered *routine* (Cropley & Cropley, 2005). Within the US perspective of al-Qaeda and the September 11, 2001, attacks, there was a perception of novelty and efficiency (Jervis, 2017). This was a link of two components—novelty and effectiveness—which had not been previously witnessed, and according to US intelligence, al-Qaeda’s creativity leading up to September 11, 2001, was minimal (Dahl, 2013a; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004).

A few examples of hijacking aircraft and flying them into buildings were: In 1976, when

a Japanese man wearing a kamikaze headband attempted to fly his Piper Cherokee into the home of a Japanese crime leader; and in 1994, when Frank Eugene Corder unsuccessfully attempted to crash a Cessna 150 into the White House (Dolnik, 2007). With a small sample size, not linked to terrorism, the novelty of this practice being used by Islamic fundamentalists in the US homeland was well outside the scope of possibilities (Dugan et al., 2005; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Rovner & Long, 2006). There was a sentiment of functional creativity among US intelligence professionals and policymakers leading up to September 11, 2001, as terror organizations were viewed as imitative and innovative but frequently replicated a perceived successful tactical or technological innovation established by another organization (Bloom, 2005; Jackson et al., 2005). The assumption that al-Qaeda was limited to repetitive and less than creative operational planning plagued US intelligence, specifically during the synthesis and analysis process, where innovative and imaginary thinking is encouraged (Dahl, 2013; Jervis, 2017; Walton, 2012).

Embracing ambiguity through innovation, trial and error, and bottom-up creativity does not necessarily negate the attention to detail or tight controls mandated throughout al-Qaeda operations. Pragmatism and top-down command still drove overall innovation and maintained the parameters in which the operation was to be conducted (Moghadam, 2013). Although the creative planning and operational vision originated from the bottom-up, the al-Qaeda emir, Osama bin Laden, approved, funded, selected members, and coordinated a singular focus and objective for all primary operations, including the September 11, 2001, attacks. The combination of both UAI themes being relatively polarizing on the surface but holding significant nuance based on specific scenarios and applications indicates a moderately high UAI disposition with a caveated aptitude for acceptable amounts of ambiguity to allow evolution and creative concepts

to emerge, but only if it furthers the organization's objectives.

An additional case for al-Qaeda's amplified use of creative and innovative thinking can be identified in the bottom-up approach that al-Qaeda leadership embraced from various jihadi entrepreneurs (Leah, 2011; Moghadam, 2013; Sedgwick, 2004). Al-Qaeda's internalized forms of flexible strategy frequently accepted proposals of radical martyrdom, as Osama bin Laden wanted to build a culture that venerated martyrdom. He believed that using such extravagant and creative measures against the "softer mentality" of the West would expand the amount of fear, terror, and confusion (Moghadam, 2006, 2013; Pape, 2005) These attacks, at times, would consist of leveraging women and children as martyrs (United Nations, 2017; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2007; Von Knop, 2007), which only exacerbated confusion and tested American resolve while simultaneously challenging the fundamental Western cultural understanding that women and children are to be protected at all costs (Ibrahimov, 2020; Speckhard, 2008; Von Knop, 2007).

Leading up to the attacks on September 11, 2001, the US intelligence indicated that al-Qaeda lacked creativity and innovation (Gill et al., 2013) while concurrently appreciating but undervaluing the attention to detail and well-organized network system. During the GWOT, the tone of understanding shifted significantly, as first-hand and lethal accounts of functional creativity in Afghanistan, Iraq and attacks in Europe increased significantly. Ultimately, the US perspective, within the construct of UAI, identified al-Qaeda as an organization that attempted to mitigate ambiguity but allowed individual or bottom-up tactics to be exercised in the field of battle. Additionally, there was a firm understanding throughout GWOT and the pre-September 11, 2001, environment that al-Qaeda leadership, specifically Zawahiri, Bin Laden, and al-Suri,

did not tolerate ambiguity in the command, control, and communication components of the organization (Dahl, 2013a; Sageman, 2004). However, locked modes of thinking and an inability to conceptualize creative solutions when faced with an enhanced problem set, such as al-Qaeda, minimized the US perspective.

Long-Term v. Short-Term Orientation: al-Qaeda & US Perspective

At this juncture, there is a clear indication of al-Qaeda's pragmatism and long-term orientation. Based on Osama bin Laden's psychological profile and well-documented leadership style, he continuously exhibited pragmatic characteristics. An excellent example of this is best captured with Osama bin Laden's interactions with Khaled Sheikh Muhammad, a contributor to the planning and execution of the September 11 attacks (Dahl, 2013a; Wright, 2007). Osama bin Laden carefully calculated and de-scoped the original plans that consisted of 10 aircraft being hijacked concurrently, nine of which would crash into both East and West Coast targets, including CIA and FBI headquarters, tall buildings in Los Angeles, and the State of Washington, nuclear power plants, and the East coast targets actually destroyed on September 11, 2001; with the 10th plane landing at a US airport, killing all adult males on board, and holding a press conference denouncing US support for Israel, Arab governments, and the Philippines (Moghadam, 2013; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). According to Khaled Sheik Muhammad's interrogation report, Osama bin Laden's concerns with the original plan surrounded its scale and complexity (Bergen, 2006; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Adopting a pragmatic approach assisted Osama bin Laden in differentiating the calculated and achievable options based on resources and capability versus the emotional desire to instill the maximum amount of fear and destruction of US targets (Jones, 2006).

Throughout the GWOT, al-Qaeda's strategic, ideological, and structural adaptations continuously paid dividends in prolonging the warfare of attrition; it also identified the cultural characteristic of perseverance. Al-Qaeda had an aptitude for weighing its strengths and weaknesses regularly, shifting to more favorable conditions, and extending the *us versus them* organizational mission (Braniff & Moghadam, 2011). Hofstede's (1991) definition of high-LTO scoring consists of "fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards—in particular, perseverance" (Hofstede, 1991, p. 235). Based on the high-LTO definition provided by Hofstede (Hofstede et al., 2010), al-Qaeda's adaptability, pragmatism, and objectives to protect the Muslim community for future generations are identifiable characteristics of a long-term disposition and present minimal evidence for a short-term orientation.

The US perspective of al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism—20-plus years post-September 11, 2001—is still a critical threat, but with much less concern than in the early 2000s (Smeltz & Sullivan, 2022). From an intelligence perspective, a basic understanding throughout the analytical lines emphasized a strong link between terrorism and the long-term objectives each group was demanding (Lake, 2002). Furthermore, there was a realization that non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, were not only seeking to challenge the state or international target but also implementing tactics to sustain a continuing and permanent presence and influence (Hansen et al., 2020). They achieved this through building capacity and resources, radicalizing communities, and strategically planning actions that would provoke and amplify their cause (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Walton, 2012).

The events of September 11, 2001, accomplished one of the goals of al-Qaeda: to heighten fear and anxiety throughout the West and produce harmful psychological effects on the

audience of the world (Crenshaw, 1986, p. 400). Furthermore, operations throughout the GWOT continued to impact the American perception and sense of security, leading to a continuous perceived risk of terrorism on US soil (Huddy et al., 2002; Stohl, 2008). To mitigate the growing long-term threat, the US concentrated on unsustainable military power in Afghanistan linked Saddam Hussein to the war on terrorism, and, most importantly, implemented a robust criminal justice approach to counterterrorism (Boyle, 2008; Stohl, 2008). The US and its coalition partners understood the GWOT would be a war against an unconventional tactic versus previous iterations of world war where there was a well-defined enemy.

Additionally, the National Security Strategies (NSS) published in 2002 through 2017 identified a decisive goal for the war on terror: “to establish a lasting normative prohibition on both states and non-state actors against engaging in or supporting terrorist activities” (Boyle, 2008, p. 192; Trump, 2017). The most recent NSS of 2022 of the Biden administration holds a meager paragraph about terrorism at the end of the manuscript, as terrorism was replaced with inclusivity and climate security as a top priority. However, until 2020, when DE&I initiatives supplanted legitimate national security issues, the strong policy language at the strategic level in concert with US intelligence maintaining a consistent analytical line identifying terrorism and Islamic extremism as a long-term threat identifies a perception of understanding that coordinates with the al-Qaeda disposition of high-LTO sentiments.

Indulgence v. Restraint: al-Qaeda & US Perspective

The sixth dimension, IVR, relates to the societal or organizational desire for gratification versus the delaying of basic human desires (Hofstede, 2001). In the case of al-Qaeda, IVR is a continuation or complementary construct to LTO but focuses less on organizational objectives

and more on individual psychology. As previously discussed, al-Qaeda, from an organizational perspective, demands characteristics of extreme self-restraint such as strict sexual practices, lacks freedom of speech, and is founded on firm religious principles and Salafi ideological mandates. Additionally, terror groups such as al-Qaeda are seen to align with the regional culture regarding IVR, which is identified as high restraint in Hofstede's (2001; 2010) work. The rationale is predicated on the strong connection and interdependency on religion, cultural psychology, and work ethic of those within the region and the generational link of those components (Almutairi et al., 2021; Callegari et al., 2020). Commonality can also be found between the regional analysis and al-Qaeda's cultural disposition through the fatalistic mindset as witnessed through sayings like "Insha Allah" or God willing when referring to inevitabilities and future tasks (Almutairi et al., 2021; Yasin & Zimmerer, 1995).

An additional IVR theme—feeling that what happens in life is not a product of one's own doing (it is dependent on other external factors)—is a reinforced belief structure prevalent in terrorist psychology (Hofstede et al., 2010; Post, 2005b). The inability to neither express oneself nor satisfy the natural human desire for indulgence, to even the slightest degree, breeds a need for validation (Mohammad, 2005). The strict societal constraints, inequality, oppression, and injustices perpetrated throughout the region amplify the internal struggle while simultaneously creating a need to assign blame to external forces (Alakra, 1993). Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups supplied the solution by providing a haven against the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions that plagued (and continue to plague) the youth of the Middle East.

The internal assumption of victimhood at the hand of the state, which was considered a puppet of the capitalistic and lustful West, manifested a psychological construct similar to

depersonalization (Jamieson, 2005). The continuous focus on external forces dictating the movement and lifestyle of individuals within a society left a substantial portion of disenfranchised adolescents prisoners of their own resentment (Stohl, 2005). In conjunction with building a restrained cultural disposition, individual victimization is present on a larger scale within Islamic extremism, known as inter-group competitive victimhood. Within al-Qaeda, the transference of individual victimization manifests a reality that their suffering is exponentially worse than that of the actual victims of their violent attacks (Noor et al., 2012; Pape, 2005). As a result, justification is created and motivates the perpetrating terror group to create a multitude of methods to inflict pain on any target they identify as an oppressor (Noor et al., 2017). The psychological impacts of victimhood can significantly alter an individual or organization's worldview, way of life, cultural continuity, norms, values, and language (Gone, 2008). Ultimately, within the scope of al-Qaeda, victimhood fostered an inflated view of one's self-worth and importance to humanity at large. This perception led to the organization becoming suffused with expectations of power and a belief in a special audience with Allah. (Meloy et al., 2001). This results in a suppression of life's gratifications, creating a low indulgence cultural disposition, but alternatively engrossing themselves in an introverted moral fantasy that is not necessarily restrained.

The US perspective regarding IVR is simplistic. Western culture identifies the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, specifically women and children, regardless of justification, as murder and an indulgent act of cowardice. It was difficult for US intelligence and the American perception of Islamic extremists to be categorized any other way in the post-September 11 environment (Walton, 2012). Similar to the concept of choice within IDV being an powerful cultural component, there is an ethnocentric void within the explanations and proper

application of people's choices, which in the West are typically associated with human rationality (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Keeping in mind choice is considered a core value and critical component of the belief structure within Western culture (Murray, 2013a). Al-Qaeda operatives' belief that there was no alternative except violence perplexed the intelligence community. In the West, a decision is framed based on rational choice and a preference between options, and there are always available options (Ibrahim, 2017; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In this case, the West would frame a violent terrorist attack as the perpetrator choosing between operating in a moral (good) or immoral (evil) space (Jervis, 2011). Personal life control is imposed on the individual perpetrating the act of terrorism; therefore, the outcome is commonly perceived as positive or negative concerning judgment through cultural norms (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979; Jervis, 1976; Johnston, 2005). The valuation process of decision-making and the associated outcome remains a highly culturally dependent component, and in the case of US intelligence and the American perspective of Islamic extremism, Western cultural bias became the dominant evaluation.

Cumulative Cultural Disposition Profile: Summary of Findings

There were several discrepancies when comparing al-Qaeda's cultural disposition based on the 6-D model and the US perception of Islamic extremism's cultural conditions. Within PDI constructs, al-Qaeda was identified as a decentralized hierarchy, resulting in a moderately high PDI score. The American perception was accurately attributed to this particular dimension but held several nuances due to the understanding of al-Qaeda being inadequate, which resulted in narrative inaccuracies and an underestimation of influential cultural components. Within the IDV framework, the first significant difference was identified, as al-Qaeda's ideological goals represent a more incorporated network environment with collectivist philosophies, while the US

perspective labeled al-Qaeda as a decentralized cohort of fractured individualists.

Table 3. Islamic Extremism: al-Qaeda Analysis & US Perspective of Subject

Cultural Dimensions	Al-Qaeda Disposition	US Intelligence Perspective
PDI	Moderately High	High
IDV	Collectivist	Fractured Individualists
MAS	Masculine	Extremely Masculine
UAI	Moderate Avoidance	Low pre-9/11; High post 9/11
LTO	Long-term Oriented	Long-term Oriented
IVR	Restraint	Highly Indulgent

Al-Qaeda was difficult to categorize within the MAS constructs provided by Hofstede (2010), as the connectivity and personal relationships built within the organization are feminine characteristics. Whereas the group's objectives, mission, ideological principles, and religious affiliation remain in the masculine domain (Hofstede, 2001). It is undeniable that at the regional and global level, al-Qaeda exhibits hegemonic masculinity, but at the local and community level, there is empathy, consensus, and coordination, which are direct characteristics of femininity (Hofstede et al., 2010; Messerschmidt & Rhode, 2018; L. Wright, 2007). The conflicting components identify the opportunity for more nuanced understanding when leveraging cultural dimensions as analytical evidence.

The results from UAI were also complex due to the given period before and after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Al-Qaeda's UAI disposition did not change within the period as they consistently avoided ambiguity; however, US intelligence shifted significantly. Pre-September 11, 2001, the US perspective articulated through memos, government working groups, and intelligence products (or lack thereof) identified al-Qaeda as accepting of ambiguity. This is due to inconsistent reporting, a misunderstanding of al-Qaeda's motivation, and misinterpreting cultural conditions. Post-September 11, 2001, during the GWOT, the

understanding of UAI characteristics significantly shifted in the other direction, and al-Qaeda was perceived as ambiguity-averse.

The US intelligence and American sentiment surrounding al-Qaeda's LTO disposition correlated correctly, as most Islamic extremist groups are long-term oriented. Finally, within the IVR dimension, there was a misconception on behalf of the American people, intelligence collectors, and policymakers, as they viewed al-Qaeda as highly indulgent based on Western moral and decision-making standards. However, al-Qaeda, within the IDV constructs, represents a restrained group of individuals with a heavy emphasis on the strong connection and interdependency on religion, self/organizational victimization, cultural psychology, and work ethic.

It is not enough, of course, to simply collect information. Thoughtful analysis is vital to sound decision-making.

—President Ronald Reagan

CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

Overview

Ethnocentrism, defined as the act of projecting one's own way of thinking and cultural norms onto others, remains a significant challenge in the intelligence community (Johnston, 2005). Essentially, ethnocentrism is a cognitive hurdle that influences how analysts perceive information and prevents them from considering a comprehensive point of view. As Shelton (2011) describes, scotoma signifies that an individual who cannot see certain facts or alternative perspectives is limited in their observations due to a sensory blockage of external information (Shelton, 2011). This cultural blindness usually stems from a lack of familiarity and awareness of other cultures, creating a sense of being confined within one's own cultural perspective (Snyder, 1977, 1990). Moreover, the human mind often accepts information that aligns with its existing beliefs and experiences and holds onto its own version of reality (Tice & Quick, 1997). This cultural blindness poses a severe problem in intelligence analysis since cultural factors are essential for producing an accurate and comprehensive intelligence product.

Ultimately, ethnocentrism results from a combination of cognitive and cultural biases that develop over a lifetime of cultural immersion, influenced by culturally specific mental shortcuts and gaps in information. It operates at an unconscious level and can be challenging to identify within oneself and equally hard to counteract. Ethnocentrism was found to be a primary culprit, responsible for intelligence failures that resulted in historical events such as the Attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (Benedict, 1946), the Chinese Intervention in Korea in November 1950 (Fehrenbach, 1963), the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 (Zegart, 2012), the Global

War on Terror and Islamic fundamentalism in September 2001 (Pape, 2005), and the Russian Intervention in the Syrian Civil War in September 2015 (Borshchevskaya, 2022; Nalbandov, 2016). In most of these cases, analysts accurately assessed the perpetrator's capabilities; however, ethnocentrism led to unexpected or unforeseen misjudgments of the adversary's intentions, objectives, or ideological motivations. These oversights and miscalculations stemmed from factual inaccuracies due to a lack of relevant cultural perspectives in analyzing these historical events, resulting in flawed hypotheses, judgments, and strategic policies.

While there is widespread acknowledgment of ethnocentrism in the intelligence process throughout the existing literature, there is a shortage of practical recommendations to address this issue. Typically, the solutions employed involve analysts using techniques like red teaming, playing the role of a devil's advocate, employing Team A/Team B analyses, conducting high-impact/low-impact probability assessments, and exploring "what if?" scenarios. These current strategies, such as training analysts to recognize cross-cultural differences or encouraging them to see the world from adversaries' perspectives, are inadequate when addressing ethnocentrism. This study successfully identifies an alternate avenue that goes beyond these practiced techniques to establish a more comprehensive process for intelligence analysts to effectively address ethnocentrism.

This study operates under the belief that understanding ethnocentrism by recognizing its complexities, enhancing analytical techniques to identify ethnocentric judgments, and making sense of ethnocentrism throughout the intelligence cycle can significantly reduce its impact on disseminated intelligence. Secondly, existing literature does not offer specific practices, training aids, or models to help intelligence professionals recognize or make sense of ethnocentrism's

continuous intrusion. Although intelligence analysts are warned about ethnocentrism, practical solutions are limited, leading to the attempt to minimize bias and enhance objectivity often being ineffective due to the lack of a researched framework and tested models.

Within the US intelligence lens, Johnston (2005) and Jervis (1976, 2011, 2017) define ethnocentrism as a strong connection to American psychological limitations, encompassing the false consensus effect, organizational bias, and American exceptionalism—a sense of cultural identity. Ethnocentrism, in anthropology, refers to judging other societies' customs based on one's own culture (Moles et al., 1977). Ethnocentrism outside the anthropological construct involves projecting one's own beliefs and value systems onto others' behaviors and motives. Ultimately, ethnocentrism creates a void of cultural understanding, amplifying culturally blind or unaware narratives within intelligence. To fill this void, a projection of personal perspectives is intertwined with synthesized information, causing inaccuracies and flaws. In an attempt to bridge this assessment gap, this study focuses on understanding and addressing ethnocentric bias and making sense of its presence within analyzed intelligence.

To do this, the study adopted a contemporary qualitative research approach, employing interpretive and materializing frameworks for examination. Analytical techniques, both inferential/deductive and generalizations based on inductive reasoning, were utilized to identify patterns or themes within underlying cultural values. The study delved into three specific historical events plagued with ethnocentrism, including the Attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, and the Global War on Terror specifically focused on al-Qaeda leading up to September 2001. A meticulous analysis of these cases explored complexities such as movements, decisions, intentions, human elements, and the final

actions of decision-makers.

The research methodology involved a thorough examination of documentation, archival records, the publicly available discourse of decision-makers, and macro-level identifiers like geographical, cultural, historical, and political norms. These factors, often overlooked in traditional intelligence analysis methods due to over-reliance on technical collection, will contribute to a comprehensive understanding. After concluding case study descriptions and conclusions, documents and archival records were reevaluated using a new analytical approach. This analytical review employed Geert Hofstede's (2001; 2010) Six-Dimensions of National Culture (6-D model) as a framework, which identifies cultural dimensions such as power distance (PDI), individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), masculinity vs. femininity (MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), long-term vs. short-term orientation (LTO), and indulgence vs. restraint (IVR). The 6-D model framework was selected due to its nuanced understanding of cultural dispositions, allowing for a comparative analysis of diverse cultural behaviors.

Unlike traditional intelligence techniques and methods focusing on contrarian techniques like devil's advocate, this study emphasizes the application of predetermined anthropological and cultural variables often overlooked in the analysis process. By applying the 6-D model, the study successfully identified that incorporating national cultural dimensions leads to different intelligence outcomes. Additionally, this research enhances awareness of ethnocentric biases within the intelligence community and provides a new analytical methodology that expands the analytical toolkit while integrating established techniques.

The study's research questions were designed to address five intricate yet straightforward queries that would garner the comprehensiveness and credibility of a study attempting to expand

the analytical toolkit:

RQ1. How can Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model be applied to information synthesis (which becomes intelligence)?

RQ2. Leveraging Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, what are the cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects (i.e., Imperial Japan, Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda)?

RQ3. Continuing to adopt Geert Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, what is the US Intelligence Community's perception of and American sentiment for the case study subjects?

RQ4. What variations or differing results, compared to the original ethnocentric analytical deductions, judgments, and decision-making of the case study event, emerge when applying accurate cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects?

RQ5. How can the cultural dimensions of the 6-D model, designed by Geert Hofstede (2010), elaborate basic analytical judgments while simultaneously identifying and making sense of ethnocentrism?

Many scholars believe holistic analytical methodologies incorporate five factors: accuracy, expertise, access, reliability, and objectivity (George, 2020). Undoubtedly, ethnocentrism and other cognitive biases can significantly impact all these factors. Ethnocentrism is consistently acknowledged as a persistent, systematic constraint faced by intelligence professionals, and these research questions were constructed with this limitation in mind. To answer all RQs, a qualitative multi-case study was leveraged to explore the intersection of intelligence and ethnocentrism and provide intelligence professionals with a roadmap for understanding and dealing with ethnocentrism. Research Questions One, Two, and Three explore the application of Hofstede's (2010) specific cultural dimensions through historical intelligence analysis to enhance analysts' recognition and understanding of previous ethnocentric voids.

These first three questions also frame the research methods and actions of the researcher throughout the study. Through cross-case study synthesis, Research Questions Four and Five delve into the potential for increased acculturation by conducting a comparative analysis of the case study subjects. Ultimately, the collective answers to these Research Questions encompass an objective to establish corrective measures in the analytical process, countering ethnocentrism. Collectively, this study underscores the implications of ethnocentrism in the realm of intelligence and emphasizes the need for cultural context frameworks to ensure the production of accurate and comprehensive intelligence.

Theoretical Framework and Research Implementation Strategy

This study draws upon two essential theoretical frameworks: Situational Awareness Theory (SA), proposed by Endsley (1995; 2003), and the Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking (D/F Theory) introduced by Klein, Phillips, Rall, and Peluso (2007; 2006). The SA fundamentally shapes the study's initial creation, scope, and design as it emphasizes perceiving elements in the environment over time and space, comprehending their meaning, and projecting their future status. Ultimately, SA is effective within intelligence analysis as it guides the focused collection and processing of information and identifies adversarial/friendly pressures, offering holistic judgments that ultimately aid critical decision-makers. On the other hand, the D/F Theory explores how new data influences existing frames or produces re-framing based on specific criteria. A frame represents an individual's perspective, directing interpretations and understanding of stimuli guiding how data is comprehended, explained, and predicted. The D/F Theory asserts that sensemaking involves fitting data into a frame and vice versa. Sensemaking starts with recognizing a situation or problem creating an initial understanding or frame. Frame development can lead to elaboration, where alternative reasoning paths are explored, or

questioning and comparison, where frames are challenged and refined based on data relevance and fit.

As Moore and Hoffman (2011) articulate, the interaction between data and frame is symbiotic, with new data influencing frame adjustments. Additionally, frames are limited by human cognitive capacity, leading to the development of smaller, digestible frames. Elaboration, questioning, and comparison are essential components of the sensemaking process, allowing for the incorporation of new data, re-framing interpretations, and ensuring the validity of understanding. Both SA and D/F Theory provide the opportunity to holistically analyze the problem set while simultaneously keeping all variables in scope. Through the framework of SA, the research identified the understanding of dynamic environments and the general integration of information. At the same time, the D/F Theory garnered a framework for processing new data, refining frames, and enhancing the sensemaking process, ultimately contributing to more precise and thorough research.

This study followed a traditional qualitative multi-case study approach, using various data sources such as documents, historical literature, and archival records. By way of the 6-D model, each dimension was divided into specific dispositions reflecting societal and organizational features. These cultural dispositions were analyzed in detail to align with the 6-D model definitions and predetermined themes such as:

- **PDI:** Inequality within a society or organization; how superiors within a society are viewed; centralization or decentralization
- **IDV:** Universalism or exclusionism; identification with “I” or “We;” competition or cooperation
- **MAS:** Familial values; behavior patterns; legacy cultural conditions; religious impact

- **UAI:** Attention to detail; compounding environmental factors; creativity and innovation
- **LTO:** Pragmatism and expansionism; humility; overall mission objectives
- **IVR:** Ethical code; anxiety levels; concept of choice

Additional themes were evaluated throughout the research process, specifically if the theme involved varying patterns, behaviors, or cultural values. Based on these thematic categorizations and classifications, the researcher conducted three examinations. First, the study determined the cultural disposition profile of each case study subject—identifying where the subject rated on a high or low scale of each cultural dimension. Second, the study analyzed the intelligence community's general perspective and American sentiment surrounding each case study subject using the same scale. Third, it compared each subject's accurate cultural disposition profiles with the intelligence community's perspectives, identifying variations, discussing differences, and reframing original thought processes.

The integration of Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, combined with the SA framework and D/F Theory constructs, to analyze historical nation-states and non-state actors has never been explored. Through examining specific cases and the associated subjects (Imperial Japan, Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda), an eight-decade-long sample size of intelligence affected by ethnocentrism was identified, analyzed, and synthesized through sensemaking and cultural frameworks. Despite the interconnectedness delivered through globalization, social maturation, and technological advancement, ethnocentrism has transcended generations and remains a vulnerability plaguing the intelligence community. This study captures the vulnerability of ethnocentrism, constructs a framework in which analysts can apply cultural dimensions, and then successfully identify and make sense of ethnocentrism within their analysis. Although there is

limited literature supporting the efforts of this study, notable figures in intelligence research have established a foundation upon which this study can build solutions to tackle the enduring issue of ethnocentrism. The following sections will consist of an in-depth discussion, capturing the comprehensive narrative and evaluation of the findings. Additionally, this chapter will identify the study's implications and limitations and incorporate any recommendations for future research.

Discussion

This study aimed to make sense of ethnocentrism by conducting a comparative analysis of case study subjects (Imperial Japan, Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda) cultural dispositions and the US intelligence perceptions of the subject. Each subject was examined through Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model, and the ethnocentric void within the American perception was identified. The study explored and highlighted the intricacies of cultural understanding and the challenges in accurately perceiving and interpreting foreign cultures. The following analysis underscores the importance of a deep and nuanced understanding of cultural dimensions, emphasizing the need for continuous learning and cultural sensitivity to bridge the ethnocentric gaps that naturally present themselves in the human consciousness. Throughout the comparative analysis within this section, common themes were identified when evaluating the discrepancies between the cultural dispositions of Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda, according to Hofstede's 6-D model, and the perceptions held by US intelligence. These themes include the misinterpretation of behaviors, cultural complexity, and limited understanding of different cultural perspectives. Within this section, each research question will be answered and discussed as they illustrate the study's overall applicability, effectiveness, and relevancy.

Cultural Disposition Comparative Analysis

The comparative analysis will systematically examine individual cultural dimensions, encompassing all three case study subjects separately. This approach aims to enhance comprehension of both the dimension and the diversity of results influenced by specific cultural concepts. The discussions will independently delve into the findings specific to each dimension, supported by relevant examples and evidence drawn from historical and cultural sources. This process will ultimately reveal distinctive cultural traits and patterns observed in each case while simultaneously answering how the 6-D model was applied to information synthesis, what were the cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects (i.e., Imperial Japan, Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda), and what was the US Intelligence Community's perception and American sentiment of the case study subjects (RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3).

A comprehensive comparative analysis will be conducted following the detailed exploration of each dimension separately. This analysis addresses two key questions: firstly, what variations or deviations from the initial ethnocentric analytical deductions, judgments, and decisions made in the case study event become apparent when employing accurate cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects (RQ4)? Secondly, how does the 6-D model by Geert Hofstede (2010) enhance fundamental analytical judgments and, at the same time, help recognize and comprehend ethnocentrism (RQ5)?

Power Distance Index

The *Power Distance Index* (PDI) was organized into three main themes consisting of inequality, how superiors within the society are viewed, and whether centralization or decentralization was desired. The dynamics of equality weighed heavily on the results of the PDI

scoring as higher inequality correlated to high PDI scores, and equality correlated with lower scores within the PDI. Industrialization and income distribution in Imperial Japan led to rising inequality from 1885 to 1941. Imperial Japan's high Power Distance Index (PDI) score indicated a societal acceptance of inequality, exacerbated by ethno-racial divisions during wartime. The Soviet Union, despite ideological aims of equality, had entrenched economic and social inequality, highlighting a contradiction between rhetoric and reality. Regarding al-Qaeda, identifying the accurate equality metric was difficult as its structure (from an organizational perspective) involved dispersed communication and individual cells, reducing hierarchical inequality within the group. However, al-Qaeda's recruitment tactics exploit socio-economic disparities and offer a sense of belonging, creating a paradox where individual members might feel equal within the organization despite the broader societal inequality in regions like the Middle East.

Exploring the equality theme regarding PDI emphasizes the complex nature and necessary balance between equality and perception. It's not a one-dimensional concept but a multifaceted interplay of economic, social, and organizational factors. Societal acceptance of inequalities, as reflected in high PDI scores, can exist alongside individual perceptions of equality within specific groups. This divergence highlights the importance of understanding how different cultures and organizations perceive and manage equality.

PDI's second and third theme explores the concept of superiors within societies and the associated severity of centralization. These themes examined how these leaders were perceived in different cultural and political contexts while also observing the desired governance type of the society or organization. Imperial Japan's historical reverence for its Emperor, considered a

living god, is deeply rooted in Japanese culture. Loyalty to the Emperor is intertwined with patriotism, forming a unique blend of hierarchical respect and national pride. This tradition of respecting superiors and accepting hierarchies for societal order contributed to a high score on the PDI.

Additionally, the research identified that Imperial Japan presented a façade of democracy with an elected parliament and a Western-style constitution. However, the presence of a national deity and significant influence from military and political leaders led to a high PDI score. This contrasted with the preferences of the Japanese population, who supported the emperor's rule but favored a decentralized government. In the context of the study, the pre-1945 structures in Imperial Japan resulted in a high PDI score, indicating a hierarchical cultural disposition. However, if only societal models were analyzed, Imperial Japan's score would be moderate, reflecting the complexities of its social dynamics.

The Soviet Union's centralized control, where planning authorities dictated production irrespective of consumer desires, necessitated a high degree of centralization and acceptance of superiors' authority. This is best captured in the political centralization components of the Soviet Union, as the single-party system and authoritarian rule monopolized political power. Economic centralization also increased PDI scoring, as the Soviet Union held state ownership of all industries, natural resources, and services, which granted the state the controlling hand in all production, distribution, and exchange. This top-down approach and adherence to central planning led to a high PDI score, aligning with Hofstede's (2010) findings. Additional contributions to the higher PDI score were the societal repression by the KGB and GULAG system in conjunction with the international centralization found in the Warsaw Pact and proxy

wars throughout the Cold War.

Al-Qaeda's structure under Osama bin Laden exemplified high PDI characteristics exacerbated by Osama bin Laden's charismatic leadership and ideological influence that transformed him into a mythical figure, guiding a global jihad. Al-Qaeda's network structure, while allowing flexibility when necessary, was fundamentally hierarchical, with affiliated groups adapting their goals to align with Osama bin Laden's vision, adding to the high PDI scoring. Ultimately, the documented perception of Osama bin Laden (through interrogation reporting and personal memoirs of al-Qaeda leadership) was one of a spiritual entity and ideological prophet, which reinforced a high PDI score.

The American perspective was influenced by cultural biases and lacked nuanced understanding, leading to misconceptions about the hierarchical structures within these societies. Where the American sentiment correlated with a high PDI score, there is a need to recognize the complexities within PDI themes to dictate diverse cultural contexts accurately. Imperial Japan demonstrated a high PDI score due to the presence of a national deity, Emperor Shōwa, who sat at the government's core, leading to Pearl Harbor and WWII. Conversely, Americans perceived Japanese immigrants in the US who exhibited qualities that aligned with American values as the cultural benchmark for Imperial Japan. As we now understand, the actions of Japanese Americans in the 1930s and 1940s did not reflect the true hierarchical nature of Japanese society, which led to misunderstandings about Japanese culture on behalf of American collectors.

Where the Soviet Union exhibited high PDI due to its centralization of political power, planned economy, and strict social and cultural uniformity, it was difficult for Americans and the US intelligence community to look past the influence of anti-communist sentiments. The

disposition was high PDI from both the Soviet Union and American perspectives; however, the emphasis on subjugation and communism consumed analytical thinking and skewed the understanding of the Soviet culture.

Al-Qaeda demonstrated a moderately high PDI score with nuances across themes. While it appeared highly decentralized and individualistic, there were centralized decision-making structures like Majlis al-Shura and the military committees. The US perception struggled to comprehend the cultural composition and strategic objectives of al-Qaeda leading up to September 11, 2001. The US perception of al-Qaeda's PDI score was moderately high; however, identifying the differences among the PDI themes would be critical when attempting to produce accurate intelligence.

Individualism v. Collectivism

Individualism v. Collectivism (IDV) also held core themes such as universalism or exclusionism, if the society or organization identified with "I" or "We," and if competition or cooperation were valued over one another. Collectivism in pre-WWII Imperial Japan was deeply ingrained in the society, reinforced by historical and cultural factors. Although extreme, the Japanese term *zentaishugi* reflects the connection between collectivism and dictatorial political systems. However, the Japanese people generally didn't use such extreme terms to describe their societal structure. Instead, phrases like *Aidagarashugi* (relationalism), *Kanjinshugi* (contextualism), and *shuhdanshugi* or "groupism" were used, emphasizing various aspects of collectivism (Itoh, 1991). The weak political establishment paved the way for the military to take control of Imperial Japan's economy and society, leading to a further deepening of collectivism and extending the deep cultural exclusionism sentiment. The narrative shifted to Imperial Japan

needing to protect its interests and residents against potential adversaries, emphasizing the collective identity and uniqueness of the archipelago.

Soviet collectivism was rooted in Marxist ideological components, but it can be argued that Leninism and Soviet Socialism significantly deviated from classical Marxism. The concept of class struggle and the transformation from individuals to societies were central tenets of Lenin's and Stalin's ambitions. The Soviet Union claimed to be an experiment in socialism, presenting itself as a superior alternative to capitalism for the entire world. This ideological motivation and its status as a global superpower drove the Soviet Union's collectivist identity. Additionally, the Soviet Union sought to rival and surpass the US, mirroring American exceptionalism in its own collectivist narrative. This ambition led to an emboldened global reach; however, under Soviet rule, exclusionism prevailed.

In the case of al-Qaeda, as an extremist group, it becomes apparent that al-Qaeda showcases complex belief systems and behaviors. While each cultural characteristic can contradict another, al-Qaeda predominantly exhibits collectivist traits. The organization prioritizes group interests over individual ones, even legitimizing practices that benefit the group at the expense of individuals. Within the IDV constructs, al-Qaeda justifies violence by emphasizing the group as the primary actor and instilling a sense of responsibility for the group among its members. This collectivist mentality is evident in the willingness of dedicated individuals to make sacrifices for the group's well-being, aligning with al-Qaeda's organizational expectations and reinforcing their low-scoring IDV approach.

The themes of "I" versus "We" and the level of competition or cooperation identified the cultural and social dynamics that are influenced through attitudes and behaviors centered around

loyalty, opposition management, and identity. In 1940s Japanese society, there existed an unwavering obligation to loyalty, where individuals owed allegiance to their superiors and peers, fostering cooperative behavior and minimizing direct competition. This contrasts with the American emphasis on individual achievement, reflected in the competitive nature of society, which is reinforced by the US Bill of Rights, Constitution, and antitrust laws promoting free market competition. Similarly, the Soviet Union's collectivist ideology centered around transforming individuals into a societal force of state-controlled equity, mandating the concept of "we" on everyone who was subject to the sovereign spaces of the Soviet Union. In the context of al-Qaeda, the transition from "I" to "we" was evident in the adoption of Salafi-Jihad, which provided disenfranchised Muslims with a sense of purpose and collective identity. The group's members acted not for individual gratification but to fuel the progression of the organization and the underlying Salafist ideology. This collective motivation became the driving force behind al-Qaeda, emphasizing the group's objectives over individual interests, aligning with the broader theme of collectivism in extremist ideologies.

The IDV cultural dimension had a profound impact on shaping perceptions throughout US intelligence. There was a stark contrast between American individualism and Japanese collectivism. American individualism, rooted in a historical and philosophical foundation, emphasizes free will, natural law, opportunity, and the pursuit of happiness. This individualism has influenced American political thought, leading to democratic principles and a competitive society. In contrast, Imperial Japan exhibited a collectivist mindset, where loyalty, societal harmony, and shared values took precedence over individual desires. While Imperial Japan did have a sense of independence, it was more of a nationalist property driven by fear of colonialism. The perception of Imperial Japan by the US was significantly influenced by this cultural contrast,

with the US strongly adhering to American individualistic values while perceiving Imperial Japan as adopting them superficially. From a cultural perspective, the US exhibited high levels of discrimination but found Imperial Japan politically favorable due to its adoption of free thought and republican political institutions. Imperial Japan's implementation of a constitution, an elected Diet, a comprehensive judicial system, and a Westernized marketplace contributed to this perception. Ultimately, Americans believed Imperial Japan stood for universal principles because the same terminology, such as constitution, democratically elected legislature, and republicanism, were used in Imperial Japan and garnered a high IDV score, diverging from the low-scoring disposition. This misunderstanding was a significant miscalculation by American diplomats and intelligence professionals leading up to the Attack on Pearl Harbor and WWII.

The US perception of the Soviet Union regarding IDV is similar to that of the PDI outcomes. It is understood that American intelligence surrounding the Soviet Union's actions in the Caribbean in 1962 was marked by ethnocentrism; however, delineating and compartmentalizing IDV components could have identified and made sense of the ethnocentrism. While the Soviet desire for communist expansionism was recognized, there was a failure to grasp the complexities of Soviet behavior, such as their aspiration to be treated as equals despite their collectivist ideology. American intelligence considered Soviet collectivism in broad terms but did not account for the nuances of Soviet identity and their emulation of American global hegemony. This oversight in 1962 was fueled by a limited view of Soviet society, influenced by propaganda, and simplified communist stereotypes. Unlike the Soviet approach, which focused on aspirations of what society could become, the American perception was rooted in what American society was (which ultimately ended the Cold War). These contrasting perspectives contributed to a misunderstanding of Soviet objectives and rationale.

Recognizing the nuances of cultural conditions like collectivism, specifically in the Cuban Missile Crisis scenario, is crucial in intelligence and international relations.

Within the IDV constructs, it was imperative to identify the post-Cold War era when discussing al-Qaeda, as that period gave rise to non-state actors and globalization. Additionally, the traditional intelligence frameworks, designed for nation-state analysis, were ill-equipped to understand the collective, network-based structure of al-Qaeda, thus producing an IDV perception of fractured individualists. Al-Qaeda's agility, operational networks, and decision-making processes, driven by a collective approach, confounded Western intelligence agencies leading up to September 11, 2001, and throughout the GWOT. Furthermore, the Western emphasis on individual choice, a core tenet of individualism, hindered the understanding of why individuals join terror organizations. The analysis introduces the concept of socialization toward extreme behavior, emphasizing the gradual exposure individuals experience, contrasting the Western notion of conscious, individual choice. This discrepancy in understanding led to faulty analytical estimations and misguided counterterrorism efforts.

Masculinity v. Femininity

Masculinity v. Femininity (MAS) constructs explored the influence of familial values, behavioral patterns, legacy cultural conditions, and the impact of religion on each of the case study subjects. Imperial Japan was highly complex when the MAS themes were investigated. From a familial values perspective, Imperial Japan emphasized traditional gender roles, where men were assertive, and women were reserved and subservient. However, Imperial Japan's familial values were deeply rooted in Confucian and Shintō beliefs, creating a delicate balance of masculine and feminine traits within family dynamics. The characteristics of femininity in

Shintōism advocated a deep reverence for nature, empathy, attributing divine spirits, or *kami*, to natural entities, where the masculine characteristics demanded the honor of the ancestors and reinforced absolute respect. Confucianism also added to the complexity as it stressed moral self-cultivation, emphasizing the development of virtues such as benevolence, loyalty, and righteousness. Confucian values encouraged accountability, education, and the pursuit of knowledge, qualities that are often associated with both masculine and feminine traits. However, Shintōism and Confucianism's impact on society reinforced gender roles, with men being assertive, competitive, and focused on material success, while women were expected to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Thus, Imperial Japan scored higher on the MAS scale.

Within the Soviet Union, familial values were extremely important as family bonds, with mothers playing a central role, were a critical component of Soviet life. The love and care within families provided a counterbalance to the state's efforts to control societal values, emphasizing the resilience of traditional familial virtues in the face of political upheaval. This balance of familial devotion was frequently challenged in the Soviet Union because communism challenged traditional gender norms. Women were not only expected to manage household chores but were also an integral part of the workforce, often engaging in heavy labor alongside men. This reshaping of gender roles was a significant departure from the past, challenging existing societal expectations and creating a more egalitarian environment in the workforce.

From a religious perspective, the Soviet Union, under Marxist ideology, fiercely opposed organized religion, particularly the Russian Orthodox Church. Marxism, rooted in militant atheism, saw religion as the "opium of the masses," distracting people from the class struggle.

This led to a significant conflict between the state and the church, resulting in the suppression of religious practices and the promotion of atheism as the official state doctrine. Despite these efforts, Orthodox values continued to influence society. Concepts like human dignity, freedom, and individual rights, which are inherent in Orthodox teachings, persisted in the collective consciousness throughout communism's subjugation and horrors, specifically under Stalin. This dichotomy created a complex cultural landscape where Marxist ideals clashed with deeply ingrained religious values, leading to a unique societal tension and a distinctive approach to traditional values.

Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union emphasized traditional family structures, but with varying degrees of adherence, al-Qaeda exploited family connections for radicalization, demonstrating the manipulation of familial ties for recruitment and operational control. Ultimately, the use of familial bonds for indoctrination strongly emphasized traditional gender roles and hierarchical subservience. This approach aligns with Hofstede's principles of masculine characteristics, where assertiveness, competition, and the pursuit of power and success are clearly valued through action. In this context regarding family structure, the manipulation of familial ties underscores al-Qaeda's pursuit of achieving radical objectives through exploitation and power manipulation.

From a religious perspective, Salafi-Jihadist ideologies promote strictly traditional gender roles, operate within patriarchal structures where male authority figures hold significant power and influence, and there is an assertion of power through acts of terrorism. Furthermore, radical martyrdom, when conducted with success, in Salafi-Jihadist ideologies aligns with masculine ideals of heroism and sacrifice. Within the al-Qaeda framework, martyrs are often celebrated for

their bravery, resolve, and willingness to die for the greater cause, reflecting traditional masculine values of courage and honor.

Within the MAS lens, the American perspective of the three case subjects identified a lack of deep cultural understanding, leading to misunderstandings and misinterpretations. This lack of understanding often led to the perception of these entities through a lens of masculinity, emphasizing assertiveness and dominance. Nationalistic fervor and adherence to certain ideologies often contributed to the perception of these entities as assertive and masculine. These ideologies' emphasis on strength, discipline, and aggressiveness reinforced the masculine stereotype. Ethnocentric views and discrimination played a crucial role in shaping the US perceptions of each subject, specifically the Soviet Union. Lack of empathy and deep understanding led to oversimplified interpretations of these cultures and ideologies.

Analysis of the US perception of Imperial Japan regarding MAS identified that to Americans in the 1930s and 1940s, Shintō was a complex and unfamiliar religious system that defied easy categorization within Western frameworks typically found within Christianity and Judaism. The absence of a single deity or a universally recognized religious scripture was competing with concepts such as animism, where natural objects and phenomena are believed to possess spiritual essence. Imperial Japan celebrating the beauty of nature and integrating it into all aspects of life, including art, poetry, and religious practices, significantly skewed US perceptions. Ultimately, the American thought of Imperial Japan was overly feminine from a MAS perspective, and the misunderstanding of Imperial Japan's assertiveness and aggressive foreign policy was due to cultural misunderstanding.

The MAS US perception of the Soviet Union was simplistic. Americans were fueled by

anti-communist sentiments and concluded that communist cultural norms were likely fostered in aggressively masculine settings. This belief was influenced not only by the study of Bolshevik behaviors but also by the Soviet ambition of state control, expansionism, and the desire for global hegemony. The American understanding of Orthodox virtues, the legacy of Russian culture, and familial values were limited, leading to an ethnocentric view that portrayed the Soviet Union as a political entity and highly masculine society.

Following attacks in Africa, the USS Cole, and September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda was dehumanized, portraying all members as rats, beasts, snakes, vermin, demons, or collective psychopaths with no room for empathetic components. US intelligence and foreign policy utilized language with strong masculine undertones, denying these extremists traits uniquely human, such as reasoning abilities. Dehumanizing rhetoric that labeled Islamic extremists void of cognition was a direct byproduct of the US perceiving terrorists as highly assertive, robust, and dangerous—all of which are highly masculine characteristics.

Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) primarily measures a society's tolerance for ambiguity and how their reliance on rules, structures, and detail-oriented planning corresponds with their desired controls. The themes that were explored to capture an accurate UAI disposition included attention to detail, compounding environmental factors, and creativity. Within the scope of UAI, Imperial Japan exhibited extremely high UAI scores due to several factors. The strict hierarchical power structure, Shintōism influenced by a Confucian framework, and continuous planning efforts contribute to a higher than usual score compared to other societies during the same period. Japanese society emphasized rules, laws, and codes of conduct, leading to stable and

orderly lives, a strong cultural component still enacted 100 years later. A history of horrific environmental factors, like earthquakes and tsunamis, creates constant fear and anxiety, reinforcing a focus on vulnerability; however, this fear of uncertainty is now considered a cultural strength rather than a weakness.

In regard to the attention to detail theme within MAS constructs, the Japanese practiced a slow pace of review, focusing on precision and eliminating uncertainties in everyday life. There was a significant emphasis on prioritizing thoroughness in their actions, leading to quality decision-making, according to Japanese standards. Accuracy was also a prevalent cultural characteristic within the attention to detail theme, as the Japanese ensured accuracy in tasks because they believed the slightest error would result in significant consequences. Japanese creativity was hindered by national etiquette and a strong aversion to failure. Community expectations, rooted in agricultural, religious, and political cooperation, stifled individual Japanese expression and societal creativity. In contrast, the US valuation of innovation, creativity, and individual success fostered openness to new ideas and problem-solving. These cultural differences in UAI reflect Imperial Japan's historical context and fear of ambiguity, contributing factors and influences on the Japanese aggression during World War II, and their efforts to control and assimilate cultures in Asia.

When evaluating the Soviet Union through the same three UAI themes, most cultural characteristics of Soviet society contributed to a high UAI score. In contrast to US intelligence, meticulous attention to detail was exercised within specific Soviet enterprises, and this is especially evident in their ambitious scientific endeavors, notably the Soviet Atomic Program and their Space Race programs. This attention to detail was vital in mastering complex fields like

nuclear physics, astronomy, and rocketry, leading to significant advancements. When the Soviet hand was forced by US advancement, there was a cultural response to eliminate ambiguity within the desired field of advancement and become a world leader.

Similar to Imperial Japan, environmental conditions were critical in shaping the Soviet Union's cultural response to ambiguity. The harsh geographical conditions characterized by severe cold, rugged terrain, and frequent natural disasters, created a demanding environment where adaptability was mandatory. The scarcity of resources due to the cold climate encouraged communalism and interdependence, reinforcing the need for detailed planning and control in everyday life. Unlike Imperial Japan, where creativity was blocked at the community or familial level, Soviet communism suppressed creativity at the political and society-wide level. The communism subjugation hindered generations of Soviets from exploring their creative potential, contributing to a culture where established norms and routines were favored over innovative thinking. In combination, each theme resulted in a high UAI score, accentuated by the establishment of strict social control and a cultural preference for established political methods, which led to a complex bureaucracy. Ultimately, the high UAI score reflected the Soviet people's (and their government's) inclination to avoid ambiguity and establish clear rules and procedures in all aspects of life.

Within the UAI constructs, al-Qaeda presented multiple sub-themes that slightly deviated from the traditional three (attention to detail, environmental, and creativity). Naturally, an organization like al-Qaeda holds significant cultural differences from nation-states such as Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union. Attention to detail within al-Qaeda was directly linked with control as al-Qaeda exhibited a high level of organizational leadership, thorough planning, and

strict constraints. These characteristics were not implemented into the culture for religious or political reasons, as they were with Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union, but to keep a tight grip on the network, the associated financing, and the logistical necessities of terrorism. Al-Qaeda's adaptability and evolution were also showcased within the UAI constructs as their transition from a consolidated group to a decentralized network of terrorism cells after September 11, 2001, attacks proved a measured tolerance for ambiguity. The terror group's adaptability demonstrated its ability to learn, change, and evolve strategies and structures based on external pressures and challenges, identifying a low-level UAI scoring. Additionally, al-Qaeda embraced ambiguity regarding allowing innovation, trial and error, and creative thinking within pragmatic boundaries. While maintaining strict controls, al-Qaeda authorized levels of uncertainty, enabling creative concepts to emerge if they furthered the group's objectives.

The analysis of cultural differences also shows moderate UAI scoring, specifically how al-Qaeda challenged Western norms and values by leveraging radical martyrdom and involving women and children in attacks. This tactic aimed to create fear, terror, and confusion by targeting fundamental cultural beliefs, showcasing the organization's understanding of cultural nuances. By 2010, both body-borne improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices targeting Western installations and personnel perpetrated by women were at an all-time high, maximizing the psychological and emotional impact on the mass public and occupying forces (Dearing, 2008). These themes collectively depict a complex and multifaceted organizational culture within al-Qaeda when applied through the UAI scoring system. Al-Qaeda's attention to detail, adaptability, creative strategies, exploitation of cultural differences, and bottom-up innovation all identified a nuanced approach to ambiguity; thus, al-Qaeda earned a moderate score for UAI.

The US intelligence and public perception regarding evidence of UAI considerations exhibited high levels of ethnocentrism across all three subjects. In the case of Imperial Japan, the US correctly perceived their high UAI due to meticulous planning and strategic objectives, reflecting their own cultural disposition. However, US decision-making in the lead-up to Pearl Harbor could have been improved if UAI characteristics were considered, explicitly surrounding erroneous US strategic assessments that hindered the accurate estimations of Japanese capabilities and intentions. This means that the US correctly captured the UAI high score of Imperial Japan; however, the US perception was shaped primarily by Japanese expansionism, and the lack of specific knowledge of Japanese reasoning led to conjecture and faulty deduction. The US believed that Imperial Japan exhibited an acute level of calculated control and fearlessness while simultaneously undervaluing the Japanese strategic intentions of their political and military culture, that originated during the European global colonization period.

The US intelligence community's understanding and incorporation of UAI, particularly in assessing the Soviet Union's actions in Cuba, was deficient, to say the least. In short, the US applied its own standards of behavior and failed to understand the Soviet Union's UAI-driven control regarding ideological expansionism. This inadequacy stemmed from a siloed analytical line and a lack of critical deduction among intelligence professionals and analysts who failed to empathetically perceive situations from the other side's cultural perspective. Assessments of the period (best captured in NIEs) relied on subjective judgments about how the Soviet Union should behave, ignoring objective analysis based on cultural contexts and ideological motives. Consequently, the US attributed a moderate/low UAI score, akin to its own score of 46/100, to Soviet actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, indicating a misinterpretation driven by ethnocentrism and flawed analytical judgment.

The US perception of al-Qaeda, considering UAI parameters, portrayed the terror organization as attempting to mitigate ambiguity but, conversely, allowing individual or bottom-up tactics to be executed on the battlefield. Before the September 11, 2001, attacks, the US intelligence apparatus underestimated al-Qaeda's creativity and innovation, which is well evidenced in *The 9/11 Commission Report*. The intelligence community recognized al-Qaeda's hyper-focused attention to detail and influential organizational structure led by leaders like Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden, and al-Suri; however, the US struggled to adapt its perspective, displaying a limited ability to conceptualize terrorism as an ambiguity-averse activity. The US continuously faced complex challenges posed by al-Qaeda, but their intentional attack on Western culture by exploiting norms and psychological components was unprecedented. This resulted in a faulty, low-scoring UAI portrayal, which caused inaccurate intelligence and misguided national strategy.

Long-Term v. Short-Term Orientation

Long-term v. Short-Term Orientation (LTO) themes leveraged to capture the most accurate cultural disposition consisted of pragmatic approaches taken by the case study subjects, national or organizational humility, and overall mission objectives. Within Imperial Japan's case, a complex interplay of cultural characteristics contributed to a more long-term-oriented disposition. Imperial Japan's expedited development during the Meiji Restoration and its expansionist policies were deeply rooted in cultural pragmatism, persistence, and adaptability. Imperial Japan strategically adapted to Western cultures, creating an illusion of Westernization. However, this adaptation cleverly exploited the Western understanding of truth. While Western logic adheres to a binary principle (if A is true, then B, the opposite of A, must be false), Eastern logic, as exemplified by Imperial Japan, allows for the simultaneous acceptance of opposing

truths (if A is true, its opposite B can also be true). This nuanced approach demonstrated Imperial Japan's pragmatic nature, which allowed Imperial Japan to align its objectives (becoming an Oriental power and spreading a sphere of influence across Asia and the Pacific) with its military and political actions. An attributable uniqueness to Imperial Japan, not seen in other nation-states during colonialism, was its ability to learn from other nations while retaining its core values. This presented an anomaly within the LTO constructs on a micro level, but the result of expansionism draws a clear connection to long-term orientation.

Throughout the Soviet Union analysis, it was evident that their cultural conditions and ideological evolution reflected a highly pragmatic mindset. This pragmatism was most prominent during the shift to Bolshevik socialism, where the adaptation to new ideologies was deemed essential for survival. Pragmatism in Soviet culture was reflected in their ability to replace individualism with collectivism, establishing connections between learning and labor and embracing ongoing social experimentation. Additionally, as seen in UAI, the Soviet determination in the Space Race reflected scientific prowess and a pragmatic move to maintain an advantage over the US. It was also evident that pragmatism was challenged when governmental mandates overtook societal choices through the framework of Stalinism and its horrors of communist-driven genocide. However, fundamentally, the Soviet Union was highly pragmatic, contributing to a high LTO score per Hofstede's (2010) LTO dimensions, emphasizing the migration from established ideologies, adaptability in societal traditions, and a maneuverable approach to truth to meet an intended objective.

During the exploration of LTO and al-Qaeda, the leadership of Osama bin Laden continued to be the most critical piece. His leadership style exemplified pragmatism, which was

evident in his interactions with key al-Qaeda figures like Khaled Sheikh Muhammad during the planning of the September 11 attacks. Osama bin Laden carefully adjusted the original plan, demonstrating his calculated approach that balanced achievable options with available resources rather than the planning process being solely driven by emotional desires for maximum destruction. This pragmatic decision-making highlighted al-Qaeda's adaptability and rationality, and his leadership style created a group culture of calculated pragmatism. Additionally, al-Qaeda exhibited strategic, ideological, and structural adaptations that prolonged its warfare of attrition. The persistence of al-Qaeda showcased perseverance and dedication to the mission, aligning with a specific section of Hofstede's (2010) definition of LTO, which emphasizes fostering virtues oriented towards future rewards. The final contributing variable to al-Qaeda's long-term oriented disposition was their overall mission, centered around protecting the Muslim community for future generations. This ambition reflected long-term orientation and provided minimal evidence for short-term orientation considerations.

Within the LTO constructs, the US intelligence perspective aligned correctly to all three case study subjects. For Imperial Japan, expansionism and respect for tradition were key factors shaping its perception of Japanese LTO. However, this understanding was somewhat limited as it predominantly focused on the broader societal context, not individual characteristics. The Soviet Union's long-term orientation was perceived through the lens of the Soviet ambition to expand communism globally. It was highly evident that American intelligence recognized the Soviet Union's goal of spreading socialism worldwide; however, there was confusion surrounding the Soviet leadership's hypocrisy, as their official attitude towards foreigners remained hostile and suspicious. Ultimately, the American understanding of Soviet culture was limited to the communist ideology, creating gaps in comprehensive understanding and resulting in a truncated

view of Soviet intentions and reasoning.

The US perspective of al-Qaeda correlated with a similar LTO disposition, as there was a constant emphasis on the strong connection between terrorism and the long-term objectives pursued by Islamic extremism. Further evidence of the US sentiment of long-term orientation being applied to al-Qaeda was in the wake of September 11, 2001, which achieved one of al-Qaeda's goals: to instill fear and anxiety in the West and create harmful psychological effects globally. To counter this growing long-term threat, the US employed unsustainable military power in Afghanistan, associated Saddam Hussein with the war on terrorism, and implemented a robust criminal justice approach to counterterrorism. With the understanding that the GWOT was a war against an unconventional tactic, unlike previous well-defined enemies in world wars, the American stance of long-term attention (through published NSS of 2002-2017) was to establish a prohibition against both states and non-state actors engaging in or supporting terrorist activities. Unfortunately, the most recent NSS of 2022, under the guidance of the Biden administration, placed minimal emphasis on terrorism, shifting focus towards inclusivity and climate security. Before and after September 11, 2001, there was consistency throughout the intelligence analyses and national strategies that identified terrorism and Islamic extremism as long-term threats.

Indulgence v. Restraint

Indulgence v. Restraint (IVR) themes incorporated the ethical code of a society and organization, anxiety levels, and, most importantly, the concept and valuation of personal choice. In Japanese society, there is a complex balance between indulgence and restraint. The Japanese ethical code emphasizes extreme fortitude and dedication to harmonious familial and professional relationships. Furthermore, commitment to community values and adopting the

national identity within the familial space, particularly linked to the emperor, was viewed as a spiritual obligation. While Imperial Japan appeared restrained on the surface, it was highly evident that heightened emotional responses to specific stimuli, optimism, and strong impulses were encouraged within specific boundaries. Within the same construct, physical pleasures were valued, but they were not to interfere with serious matters. The appreciation of self-gratification and emotional connections between the material and human domains were only cultivated within appropriate contexts and times. This was a cultural design, as the Japanese purposefully made life complicated in conjunction with sacrificing pleasures to better appreciate the moments of gratification.

The Soviet state was highly complex regarding IVR due to the political stimulus throughout the Soviet Union. Despite advocating for government and national transparency, the Soviet Union was extremely secretive, embracing practices of concealment and ruling through conspiracy. These governmental actions extended to all aspects of Soviet life, leading to widespread cynicism and pessimism among citizens. The natural cultural response resulted in a restrained society, demonstrating low indulgence according to Hofstede's (2010) cultural dimensions definitions. An additional component of the IVR scoring system being impacted by the government was the demand for citizens to dedicate their power and capabilities to their professional careers or communal activities to benefit their homeland. However, the cultural ideals demanded within the IVR scope, alongside MAS and UAI, contradicted the Marxist ideology. Leading to a highly restrained disposition, Soviet morals and ethics played a critical role in Russian culture and society, as there were continuous efforts to preserve tradition despite communist enforcement.

To best capture an accurate assessment of al-Qaeda's IVR disposition, the same themes were researched, which ultimately led to a more direct focus on organizational and individual psychology. From an organizational perspective, there were highly restrained characteristics such as strict sexual practices, lack of freedom of speech, and adherence to religious principles. From an individual perspective, it was evident that IVR scoring was impacted by the common belief among al-Qaeda members that external factors determine life's outcomes. Ultimately, this disposition of victimhood led to a need for validation and insight, a rational extension of blame assigned to external forces. These discrepancies were usually labeled as societal constraints, inequality, oppression, and injustices within their region of origin. Within al-Qaeda, this victimization was transferred and amplified, creating a justification for violent attacks on perceived oppressors. This sense of victimhood significantly impacted the individual's worldview, creating a reality of inconsistent cultural continuity, norms, and values of individuals and organizations. This created an unhealthy inflation of self-worth and importance, leading to a suppression of life's gratifications with immersion in an introverted moral fantasy. Consequently, al-Qaeda, from both an individual and organizational perspective, exhibits a low indulgence cultural disposition while engrossing itself in an imagined world of ethical superiority and indulgence.

The American perception of IVR for the three subjects often took a backseat to other cultural aspects, leading to oversimplified interpretations. Focusing on military expansionism, political hegemony in the Orient, and misunderstanding Japanese motivations clouded the American understanding of Japanese IVR during the pre-WWII period. Imperial Japan's restraint in balancing between emotional desires and duty was overlooked by US intelligence and diplomatic channels. The concept of Manifest Destiny, prevalent in American thinking,

contributed to the indulgent analytical line, considering American expansion essential and positive while viewing Japanese expansion as a collectivist encroachment on human rights throughout Asia and the Pacific.

The US intelligence viewpoint of Soviet IVR was dominated by the perception of global expansionism under the umbrella of Soviet collectivism. The spread of communism was seen by the West as a gratifying and fundamental need, but the primary consideration of restraint found within Russian tradition was not seen. The Soviet government's power and its impact on the global environment (specifically countries more vulnerable to the appeals of communism, such as Cuba) were acknowledged at length throughout intelligence reporting; the encroachment on foreign sovereignty and military domination over the US was viewed as indulgence rather than restraint.

In the context of Islamic extremism, specifically al-Qaeda, the US intelligence perspective was shaped by deeply rooted ethnocentrism, leading to a simplistic categorization that violent acts were undeniably indulgent acts of cowardice. It was difficult for US intelligence and the American perception of Islamic extremists to be categorized any other way in the post-September 11 environment. The intelligence community found it perplexing that Al-Qaeda operatives felt violence was their only option. In Western contexts, decisions are typically made through rational choices, weighing preferences between various options, all of which are considered available. In this scenario, the West would interpret a violent terrorist attack as the perpetrator choosing between moral (good) or immoral (evil) actions. The valuation process of decision-making and outcomes became culturally dependent, leading to a dominant Western evaluation.

Variations Between Cultural Disposition & US Perspectives

The presence of ethnocentrism is highly evident in the variations between the cultural disposition of the subject and the US perspective, specifically throughout the IDV, MAS, and IVR cultural dimensions. The differing results and core focus of the study (regarding attempts for improvement) that emerge when applying accurate cultural disposition profiles of the case study subjects in comparison to the US perception are as follows:

- *Imperial Japan*: The US perceived a highly collectivist (IDV) society as moderately low IDV and borderline individualistic. Imperial Japan's extremely masculine disposition was also identified differently within the US intelligence lens, as Imperial Japan was deemed a more feminine society within the MAS constructs. The final divergence was found within the IVR domain, as Imperial Japan was calculated as a restrained society which was perceived by the US as highly indulgent.
- *Soviet Union*: The US intelligence labeled the Soviet Union as a highly masculine society within the MAS dimension definitions; however, the Soviet society was aligned with more feminine characteristics. Within UAI, there was an identifiable difference between the predominantly high avoidance of ambiguity of the Soviet Union and the US perception that identified the communist state as embracing uncertainty in everyday life. Again, IVR was a dimension that held inconsistency, as the US assessment of the highly restraint Russian culture was perceived as moderately indulgent.
- *Islamic Extremism – al-Qaeda*: The US perception of a highly collectivist terror organization constituted al-Qaeda's actions as a cultural component, which manifested an analytical line that supported the idea that terror cells were filled with fractured individualists. Additionally, where al-Qaeda held a disposition of avoiding ambiguity,

scoring in the moderate range of UAI, the US underestimated al-Qaeda's creativity and innovation, resulting in a faulty portrayal of low UAI, leading to inaccurate intelligence and misguided strategies. Across all three case studies, IVR was miscalculated by US intelligence. Where al-Qaeda's ideological mandates built a restrained cultural disposition, the US viewed terrorism as a highly indulgent act through the Western cultural lens.

When comparing the three case studies across all dimensions of the 6-D model, there was consistency, with minor deviations within the rationale, for PDI and LTO. Within these two dimensions, Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda, a consistent perception associated with the subject's analyzed disposition was achieved. The most inconsistent dimension of the 6-D model was IVR, as the US perception was consistently opposite of the subject's dispositions. The US's ability to identify an accurate MAS estimation also proved problematic regarding Japanese and Soviet cultures; however, the al-Qaeda estimation was consistent within the MAS framework. The dimensions of IDV contained ethnocentric obstacles for US intelligence, specifically for Imperial Japan and al-Qaeda. Conversely, within IDV, the overpowering understanding of the Soviet devotion to Marxism mitigated any opportunity to misestimate a highly collective disposition. Moderate nuances compromised the UAI perceptions, specifically surrounding the Soviet Union and al-Qaeda. While the analysis of UAI for Japan was accurate, slight nuances within the UAI constructs hindered accuracy in US perception for the latter two subjects.

Making Sense of Ethnocentrism: Analytical Judgments

An analytical process is a systematic approach used by intelligence professionals to understand, dissect, and interpret information derived from collected data points, deduce

meaningful conclusions, build compelling arguments, solve problems, and manifest a rational decision-making framework. At the core of the analytical process is logic and reasoning, which permits the analyst to differentiate between the psychological environment (the world as an analyst sees it) and the operational environment (the world in which decision-makers will use intelligence) (Jervis, 1976). The effective parameters of logic within the realm of intelligence are shaped by the combined objectives, calculations, and perspectives of analysts, thus influencing the desired result of sound reasoning. However, cognitive biases such as ethnocentrism, an influential paradigm that distorts perception due to a lack of cultural understanding, can impact logic and produce faulty reasoning. The premise of this research is built on the recognition that attempting to mitigate ethnocentrism throughout intelligence analysis is futile. Instead, drawing from Moore's (2011; 2021) works and the insights of Kahneman (2011) and Klein (2009), this study asserts that enhancing human sensemaking abilities and awareness offers a more effective approach to recognizing ethnocentrism. This research posits that investigating skill-based and heuristic-based intuitive judgments can influence analytical estimations and, consequently, help analysts comprehend the ethnocentric gaps within analytical products.

With that understanding, this research, in its entirety, was designed to answer the following: How can the cultural dimensions of the 6-D model, designed by Geert Hofstede (2010), elaborate basic analytical judgments while simultaneously identifying and making sense of ethnocentrism? To answer this question (**RQ5**), specific subsets must be identified: (1) the definition of ethnocentrism, (2) the necessary components for comprehending ethnocentrism based on its definition, (3) analyzing the accomplishments of the 6-D framework through case study results, and (4) determining whether these identified accomplishments fulfill the requirements for making sense of ethnocentrism.

At its core, ethnocentrism serves as a cognitive barrier affecting how analysts perceive information, hindering them from embracing a comprehensive perspective. As stated previously, Shelton (2011) conceptualizes this phenomenon as a “scotoma,” indicating that an individual, limited by sensory blockages, fails to recognize certain facts or alternative viewpoints (Shelton, 2011). This cultural void often emerges from unfamiliarity, a lack of awareness, or a falsified perception of other cultures, leading to confinement within one’s cultural framework (Snyder, 1977, 1990). Additionally, the human mind tends to accept information that aligns with its existing beliefs and experiences, reinforcing its own version of reality, as seen throughout the three case studies (specifically IDV, MAS, and IVR). In the realm of intelligence analysis, this cultural narrow-mindedness presents a significant challenge because cultural factors are critical components when constructing a comprehensive narrative in intelligence reporting.

Fundamentally, ethnocentrism results from a blend of cognitive and cultural biases that develop over a lifetime of cultural engagement. Due to ethnocentrism operating at an unconscious level, attempts to remain objective are negated by specifically shaped, culturally induced mental shortcomings, resulting in information gaps and a reductionist or segmented perspective.

Based on its definition, the necessary components to capture the essence of ethnocentrism can be broken down by identifying critical cultural mechanisms. These structures encompass the social, psychological, and behavioral patterns that are shared and transmitted among members of any given society or organization. These components consist of norms and values, which are the shared expectations and regulatory parameters that guide specific behaviors. Furthermore, norms and values provide a framework for understanding acceptable and unacceptable behavior within a particular culture. The belief system is also a critical component of cultural evaluation as it includes not only religious beliefs but also moral codes and the associated ideologies that shape

the world view of individuals. The belief system component is vital within the research due to its influence on individuals and society within the realms of decision-making, ethics, and social mandates. Social institutions, symbols, language, and ritual/ceremonial practices form crucial elements of an individual's cultural surroundings.

Utilizing the cultural dimensions of the 6-D model, all the aforementioned cultural elements are categorized, evaluated, and presented in a qualitative and empirical manner. It is evident that the 6-D model offers a comprehensive understanding of the cultural context and inclinations within a society or organization. From an analytical standpoint, the 6-D model enables analysts to discern that distinct cultures possess varying viewpoints on fundamental societal aspects. For instance, in cultures with high PDI, hierarchical structures are respected, and authority figures are rarely challenged, which can impact how an analyst views information during the synthesis process.

Recognizing that societies such as Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda (which have high Power Distance Index scores) exhibit deep respect for authority figures and seldom question decisions made by government or religious leaders can significantly influence analysts' perceptions of these leaders' decision-making processes. Within high PDI environments, subjects or adversaries often resist change, and decision-making is centralized around specific individuals or small committees. Analysts must understand PDI constructs as they illuminate the decision-making processes in such societies, and their comprehension enables them to estimate a leader's behavior and resistance to change, thus developing strategies that respect the societal or organizational cultural hierarchies. The same principles can be applied to low PDI cultures, as those societies have a tendency toward equality and shared decision-making. Being aware of these distinctions prevents analysts from imposing their own cultural biases when interpreting

information, ensuring a more culturally sensitive approach.

The behavior of individuals, societies, and organizations stands as a crucial cultural component and a significant data point in intelligence analysis. While all six cultural dimensions highlight specific behavioral traits, the concept of collective achievement in the IDV paradigm, exemplified by groups like al-Qaeda, provides valuable insights for understanding complex cultural dynamics for intelligence analysts. The concept of collective achievement and its value within an organization, as demonstrated by al-Qaeda, can aid intelligence analysts in making more accurate estimations by providing insights into group dynamics, decision-making processes, and motivations. From an application standpoint, when analyzing a collectivist culture through IDV such as al-Qaeda, it becomes apparent that there is a strong emphasis on group cohesion, shared goals, and collective responsibility. After quality analysis, this understanding creates opportunities to employ strategies that disrupt or marginalize the organization's operational culture as a tightly knit unit. Furthermore, this insight aids in evaluating the significance and relevance of individual actions, shedding light on how these actions are influenced or guided by the overarching collective objectives.

Forecasting and predictive analysis are also available if precise IDV components are applied to the analysts' understanding. In the al-Qaeda scenario, where collectivist tendencies are motivated by ideological beliefs and values, understanding the shared motivations driving al-Qaeda's actions allows analysts to predict the group's responses to various stimuli, such as political events or military actions, with a higher degree of accuracy. Additionally, the IDV dimensions create a more in-depth opportunity for analysts to comprehend their observations surrounding behavioral patterns. Staying with the al-Qaeda case study, these patterns could have identified the terror organization's strong sense of loyalty to an ideological philosophy, their

willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the collective good of the organization's objectives, and the heightened sense of identity tied to the group. By recognizing these patterns within groups like al-Qaeda, analysts can anticipate the terror group's reactions to external pressures, detect recruitment strategies and tactics, and, most importantly, identify potential triggers for radicalization.

The competitive/cooperative spectrum and familial values embedded within MAS constructs, as exemplified by Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union, bear significant implications for intelligence analysis when studying the behaviors of subjects or adversaries. Understanding the positioning of these societies within the MAS framework, specifically on the competitive and cooperative scale, could have offered invaluable insights for intelligence analysts of the respective periods. All three case study subjects, driven by perceived necessity, embraced a competitive spirit; however, cooperation also played a significant role, which was evident through the deep familial dedication observed in Japanese and Soviet mothers, as well as the emperor and comrade relationships within the Japanese and Soviet male dynamics. The MAS dimension can provide vital context; in a competitive environment, specific actions are often motivated by individual achievements and ambitions, whereas in cooperative settings, the influence of group dynamics and consensus-building is more pronounced. Analysts can more accurately estimate the responses, motivations, decision-making processes, and potential conflicts of the subject or adversary by considering their predominant position on the MAS spectrum.

The cultural components of UAI also improve the analyst's capacity to create precise and thorough intelligence concerning behaviors, specifically focusing on how the subject or adversary reacts to abrupt changes or ambiguity. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union

exhibited high uncertainty avoidance, valuing stability and structured environments under government control, both in society and its governance. When viewed from an analyst's standpoint, the tendencies related to UAI could generate fresh analytical perspectives or enhance existing understanding. In the context of the Soviet Union, utilizing UAI might have offered a more lucid insight into Soviet operations and how Soviet society would react or adjust to novel stimuli.

Counterintelligence efforts are another component of intelligence that is critical across the community. Continuing with the example of the Soviet Union, research has definitively established that their attention to detail within the context of UAI constructs was exceptionally pronounced. This is best seen throughout the Cold War as the US and Soviet Union battled in the shadows under the espionage and intelligence collection umbrella. This holds significant importance for US analysts, as grasping an adversary's dedication to minutiae enables the adaptation and fortification of security measures to thwart infiltration or espionage attempts, thus meeting counterintelligence objectives. Moreover, comprehending the extent to which an adversary values detail assists in crafting appropriate offensive responses to counter their moves effectively.

In the case of al-Qaeda, the extent of their attention to detail was underestimated by US intelligence, and the terror group's careful planning ultimately allowed them to exploit vulnerabilities within the US national security framework. Suppose analysts had employed UAI in the pre-September 11, 2001, environment. In that case, there is a higher likelihood that analysts would have not only recognized al-Qaeda's efforts to conduct significant attacks that influenced the psychological mindset of the West but would also have established that their deceptive tactics were likely to be cross-border and exploitive. Additionally, a principle that

confounded US intelligence was the swift and unpredictable reactions of al-Qaeda throughout the GWOT, specifically during the decade when al-Qaeda was more centralized versus the post-September 11, 2001, attacks when they decentralized globally. Al-Qaeda's ability to rapidly adapt its tactics, change targets, or alter communication methods are key identifiers of allowing moderate ambiguity. If analysts had understood this cultural disposition, intelligence professionals could have prepared for and normalized unexpected shifts in al-Qaeda's activities and strategies, which in turn would have enhanced counterterrorism efforts. In examining LTO dimension across the three case studies, there was consistency, albeit with nuanced variations that will require continuous evaluation and keen observation by intelligence professionals. Recognizing the importance of long-term orientation was crucial in deciphering the strategic thinking and mission objectives for Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda, a fact not overlooked by US intelligence analysts. LTO can serve as a framework that enables the categorization, quantification, and estimation of the impact of cultural attitudes toward national or societal objectives. This understanding facilitates the creation of intelligence that is not only timelier and more relevant but also notably accurate. Additionally, with pragmatism within this framework, LTO further refines intelligence analysis by accounting for practical considerations of the subject or adversary while examining their real-world constraints, thus enhancing the overall effectiveness of the assessments.

The US intelligence perspective on the case study subjects within the IVR dimension remained persistently incongruent with the subjects' cultural tendencies. Even though Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda were categorized as belonging to a restrained society or organization, the US perspective identified them as moderately indulgent. When examining Imperial Japan, core IVR components emerged: group harmony, self-discipline, and adherence to

societal norms. At the same time, individualism was subordinate to collective well-being, which emphasized the restraint in personal desires to execute behaviors that served the collective entity. Understanding these elements of societal emphasis and harmonious coexistence in service of the state can amplify the value placed on conformity, operational motive, and the self-discipline of the subject or adversary.

Within the Soviet Union, we found conformity and societal adherence to socialist ideals influenced the IVR results; however, within the creativity characteristic, there was significant evidence of state control as individual aspirations were often subjugated to the state's and political party's collective goals. At an advanced level of analysis, recognizing and comprehending the nuances of the IVR dimension is necessary for intelligence analysts to maintain objectivity and precision in their assessments; however, the insight that IVR can provide, such as the ethical codes of a society and organization, the anxiety levels, and the valuation of personal choice are fundamental in building a psychological profile, adequate for analysis. For example, in the Soviet context, the emphasis on restraint and conformity was not merely a personal choice but a societal norm deeply rooted in the collective consciousness. The Soviet Union placed a high value on adhering to established rules and norms, promoting self-restraint and self-discipline for the greater good of the collective. This can be seen throughout chapter 5, where the Soviet government enforced strict central planning and emphasized industrial and technological advancements to develop society but to the detriment of the people's well-being. In this setting, decisions and policies were often made with a focus on progressing the collective evolution of the state and maintaining societal discipline. These components were continuously overlooked by US intelligence and US policy makers, and through the IVR framework, analysts could have avoided projecting their own cultural values onto the Soviet

context, as seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Instead of imposing Western ideals of individualism, personal freedom, and the US rendition of communism onto Soviet decision-making processes, analysts could have appreciated the societal context that motivated the expansionist endeavors of the Soviet Union.

Similarly to Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union, the IVR results of al-Qaeda identified a highly restraint society. Al-Qaeda was driven by Salafism, and loyalty to the organization, adherence to religious principles, and generational victimhood were critical characteristics that built a restrained disposition. A notable designation of IVR components can help analysts make sense of ethnocentrism in their approach to al-Qaeda, which is demonstrated within recruitment, radicalization, and martyrdom. These concepts remained enigmatic challenges for US intelligence and Western psychology for years. However, the IVR framework would have assisted in the sensemaking. For example, analysts would have come to appreciate that recruitment efforts were not solely driven by individual aspirations for power or recognition, a misperception that had been prevalent in US analysis. Instead, analysts would have identified that individuals being recruited and radicalized were deeply influenced by the collective objective of advancing the Salafi-Jihadist cause and finding purpose in a world that marginalized them. The IVR components can open new avenues for analysts to decipher a multitude of things. The IVR components offer analysts fresh perspectives, aiding them to decipher a wide array of elements across a multitude of intelligence disciplines. Within the al-Qaeda study, IVR could have provided greater insight into the terror group propaganda materials, recruitment strategies, and motivations behind radicalization, but with a culturally sensitive lens, devoid of Western cultural biases that skewed perspective.

Implications

Common themes attributed to ethnocentric biases consisted of misinterpretations, stereotyping and simplification, a failure to understand differing cultural norms and a limited capacity for empathy. These attributable errors in the US intelligence perception culminated in faulty deductions, leading to inaccuracies and poor decision-making. By acknowledging the importance of understanding the complexity of opposing cultures, this study raises the crucial and lingering question: how can making sense of ethnocentrism within intelligence analysis be achieved? It was concluded that employing an impartial cultural framework that captures the intricate interplay between cultural dimensions as identified within Hofstede's (2010) 6-D model and the field of intelligence analysis could effectively navigate making sense of cultural complexities and ethnocentric bias.

The research extensively explores the 6-D model and its application to three specific case studies (Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and Islamic extremism—al-Qaeda), demonstrating its effectiveness in unraveling intricate cultural intricacies typically overlooked in intelligence analysis. For instance, PDI reveals hierarchical structures in societies like Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union, providing valuable insights into the adversary's decision-making processes, and an analyst's understanding of these nuances enables them to accurately interpret behaviors and strategic choices. The IDV dimension illuminates group dynamics and shared responsibilities in organizations, most notably within the Soviet Union and al-Qaeda case studies. By applying the knowledge gained through the IDV dimension, analysts can build more holistic estimations specifically focused on behavioral patterns and operational decision-making approaches.

Within the context of MAS, the presence of a competitive spirit, strong familial dedication, and deeply rooted religious affiliations can aid analysts in forecasting future reactions

to external stimuli. These factors provide valuable insights into group or government motivations, decision-making processes, and potential conflicts within the cultural framework, particularly when core ideologies or fundamental values are challenged. If an analyst is more attuned to these characteristics, it allows the analyst to anticipate behavioral responses and societal dynamics, enabling more accurate assessments of complex cultural settings.

Furthermore, the study presents a compelling case for intensifying the attention of US intelligence toward comprehending UAI components. These components delineate a subject or adversary's tolerance levels and reactions to sudden changes or prolonged ambiguous situations. Undoubtedly, an enhanced emphasis on UAI components during the Cold War would have proven invaluable, given the significant disparity between the US perspective on the Soviet Union and the determined UAI disposition of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Long-Term Orientation (LTO) dimension provides insights into strategic thinking, assisting analysts in categorizing and estimating cultural attitudes, with a particular focus on the subject or adversary's level of pragmatism. A highly pragmatic entity adds complexity to intelligence analysis, as their unwavering dedication to a cause remains foundational, yet their methods to achieve the objectives can be flexible, evolving, or unpredictable. This study also challenged prior US intelligence viewpoints concerning the case study subjects' IVR tendencies. As mentioned earlier, the IVR framework provides the capability to build a more comprehensive psychological profile that identifies ethical standards, acclimation to stress levels, and whether the entity values personal choice or accountability. The inconsistent perspective observed in the US analysis across all three case studies underscores the need for a more in-depth evaluation of IVR components and an integration into the foundational teachings and principles of intelligence analysis.

To understand human behavior, the analyst needs to explore and examine not only the thought process of the subject under study but also interpret their preferred cultural norms and the environment in which they operate. Analysts need to explore culture more profoundly to make sense of the commonly intrusive ethnocentric bias. Utilizing the 6-D model, while not flawless, proves to be a more robust approach compared to previous bias mitigation methods and techniques. Hofstede's (2010) framework identifies cultural misunderstandings frequently missed when viewed from a Western standpoint. Additionally, it enriches the synthesis of information by offering a more comprehensive narrative. In the realm of intelligence analysis, considering all evidence and indicators is vital; the 6-D model can serve as an additional tool to produce quality cultural evidence, aiding analysts in effectively making sense of ethnocentrism.

Limitations

A primary limitation of this study lies in the complexity of cultural dynamics, which cannot be fully encapsulated by any model, including the 6-D model. Due to the intricacies and multifaceted elements culture personifies through a society or organization, no single framework can capture every nuance, as seen in the results of the case studies. Additionally, the study does not extensively explore potential biases within the 6-D model itself. While the 6-D model offers a valuable perspective, the model, like any other, might carry inherent biases based on its development context and the cultural lenses through which it was constructed. Moreover, the information being cycled through the 6-D model could be incomplete or victim to preconceived biases, making the results somewhat subjective and distorted.

Another limitation of this study is the potential oversimplification of cultural dimensions identified within the 6-D model. While the 6-D model provides valuable insights, the

framework's weakness is that it reduces cultural complexities to a few dimensions, which might overlook specific subtleties and variations within the cultures being analyzed. Lastly, this study acknowledges the ever-changing nature of global politics, military movement, deterrence, hard and soft power, and the shifting power dynamics of global players, all of which can significantly impact cultural perceptions and behaviors. The continuous growth of globalism and evolving geopolitical events, global economic changes, and diplomatic relations can alter cultural attitudes and value systems, which makes for a fluid environment. This presents a challenge to this study and the use of the 6-D model, as altered foundational cultural norms can create a distorted view within a fixed framework for the use of analysis. Ultimately, researchers and analysts must remain vigilant when creating estimations based on cultural dimensions, and they must continue to be critical when evaluating existing frameworks and adapting methodologies to capture the intricate realities of diverse cultures in an ever-changing world.

Recommendations for Future Research

- *Cross-Cultural Validation*: Further research could focus on cross-cultural validation of existing frameworks such as Hofstede's 6-D model. Validating these dimensions across diverse cultures and societies would enhance the accuracy and applicability of the 6-D model in different contexts.
- *Dynamic Cultural Analysis*: Understanding how cultures of subjects or adversaries evolve over time and adapt to global changes is crucial to comprehensive intelligence analysis. Research that delves into the dynamic nature of cultures, specifically in the face of globalization, technological advancements, and sociopolitical shifts, would undeniably provide valuable insights for intelligence analysis.
- *Case Studies and Real-Time Analysis*: Conducting in-depth case studies in real-time or near

real-time situations would provide practical insights into applying cultural dimensions in intelligence analysis. Observing how cultural factors impact decision-making during current events can offer timely and relevant data for analysis.

- *Technology and Cultural Analysis*: Explore the role of advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, in cultural analysis. These technologies could process vast amounts of cultural data, identify patterns, and assist analysts in understanding complex cultural dynamics.
- *Philosophies of Intelligence Professionals*: Further research exploring the philosophies of intelligence professionals and how their ideological and political affiliations shape their interpretation of data is a critical area when applying sensemaking techniques to ethnocentrism. Investigating how varying ideological perspectives, including extreme philosophies like post-modernism, radical feminism, social constructivism, political correctness, and culturally implemented victimhood, influence perception is essential for identifying ideological biases, ethical applications, interdisciplinary approaches, and analytical decision-making.

Summary

The primary objective of this study was to emphasize the impact of ethnocentrism in the field of intelligence analysis and to underscore the importance of using cultural context frameworks to ensure the production of accurate and comprehensive intelligence. As intelligence analysis forms the basis for significant decisions and strategic policy, analysts must ensure they are producing precise and relevant intelligence. In essence, it is crucial to provide policymakers with a more nuanced but exhaustive intelligence product to enable well-informed decision-making. The examination of Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and al-Qaeda in the case studies

highlighted distorted and ethnocentric perspectives, and these incomplete assessments are widely recognized as contributors to information gaps that had historically significant and relevant consequences.

This study continually asked a pivotal question throughout the research process: how can intelligence analysts navigate ethnocentrism? The answer emerged through the application of the 6-D model, which untangled cultural complexities and highlighted US perception gaps. The model's impact was especially notable in the PDI and IDV dimensions as both shed light on group dynamics and identified precise behavior estimations of the case study subjects. MAS also provided insight into behavioral responses to outside stimuli; however, these components were based on religious and familial dedication. The final three dimensions demanded more nuance, as UAI components clarified how ambiguity motivated the subject's strategies and tactical movements, while LTO's pragmatism construct dissected the subjects' strategic thinking. Finally, IVR, which was the most inconsistent dimension within the US perception, emphasized the necessity for analysts to incorporate IVR characteristics, such as ethical codes and how the subject values personal choice, into future analysis.

Within the framework of the 6-D model, this study showcased how analysts can uncover cultural nuances frequently ignored or misunderstood due to ethnocentrism. Overall, the study emphasizes that understanding the behaviors, decision-making processes, and group dynamics of diverse societies and organizations should not be overlooked but rather integrated as crucial evidence during the analysis phase of the intelligence cycle. By employing cultural dimensions, the study illustrates how these pervasive ethnocentric biases can be identified and comprehended, thus leading to the generation of precise and comprehensive intelligence. The 6-

D model approach clearly illuminated the complexities of ethnocentrism, and after careful review, this study can enhance the analysts understanding and interpretation of differing cultural behaviors, thus making sense of ethnocentrism.

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APPENDIX

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY.
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD

May 24, 2023

Travis Benson
Jared Perry

Re: IRB Application - IRB-FY22-23-1339 Making Sense of Ethnocentrism: Intelligence Analysis & National Cultural Dimensions

Dear Travis Benson and Jared Perry,

The Liberty University Institutional Review Board (IRB) has reviewed your application in accordance with the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations and finds that your study does not meet the definition of human subjects research. This means you may begin your project with the data safeguarding methods mentioned in your IRB application.

Decision: No Human Subjects Research

Explanation: Your study/project is not considered human subjects research because

(1) it will not involve the collection of identifiable, private information from or about living individuals (45 CFR 46.102).

Please note that this decision only applies to your current application. Any modifications to your protocol must be reported to the Liberty University IRB for verification of continued non-human subjects research status. You may report these changes by completing a modification submission through your Cayuse IRB account.

Also, although you are welcome to use our recruitment and consent templates, you are not required to do so. **If you choose to use our documents, please replace the word *research* with the word *project* throughout both documents.**

If you have any questions about this determination or need assistance in determining whether possible modifications to your protocol would change your application's status, please email us at irb@liberty.edu.

Sincerely,

G. Michele Baker, PhD, CIP
Administrative Chair
Research Ethics Office