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Fear, Racism, Agriculture: The Drive for Japanese Internment

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Aknowledgelements

To my dearest and most loving spouse: I dedicate this most laborious undertaking. You have sacrificed your time, energy, and emotions to ensure that this dissertation came to fruition. I would like to thank you for inspiring me to explore this research. I want to thank my grandfather for instilling a love of history and for encouraging me at every opportunity. Finally, I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Dr. Broom, Dr. Tarwater, and Dr. Skiles for their endless support and dedication to helping me complete this monumental understaking. Without your feedback and support this would not have been possible. Thank you.

Abstract

The focus of this dissertation is the timing of the forced evacuation of the ethnic Japanese population from the West Coast in 1942. This work focuses on three key factors driving the timing of the evacuation: racism, security concerns, and agriculture. Racism has been studied and written about extensively; however, an overview of this factor is critical as it directly influenced the removal of Japanese American citizens in addition to Japanese immigrants. This dissertation will focus on the intellectual origins of racism and prejudice by focusing on key figures and tracing the ideas and beliefs and how they influenced the laws that directly affected the ethnic Japanese and their removal. Security concerns for the West Coast stem from the actions of Japan after WWI when they expanded their territory virtually unchecked throughout the South Pacific. The violent nature of this expansion was front-page news in every major city in the United States for two decades before WWII. These actions by Japan fed the West Coast security concerns and fear of a potential fifth column living among the citizens on the West Coast. The final straw was the attack on Pearl Harbor; this act by the Japanese brought to the forefront the fear, racism, and intolerance that had been building on the West Coast since the late 1800s.

This dissertation takes all of these factors into account and focuses on the timing of the evacuation as it pertains to the spring growing season in 1942. The ethnic Japanese were deliberately evacuated during the spring growing season so their absence would not hinder the crop production of their farms and allow enough time for the Farm Security Administration, Wartime Civilian Control Administration, and the Department of Agriculture to find replacement farmers before the spring harvest. The Department of Agriculture fully implemented the Food for Freedom program months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and this program, run by the Department of Agriculture, dictated the amount and type of crops each farm in America needed

to produce. These assignments aimed to fulfill the Lend Lease obligations of the U.S. to its European allies and feed America. The Japanese farmers on the West Coast commanded a strong presence and contribution to the food supply. Although the total farms owned and operated by ethnic Japanese farmers numbered less than 7,000, they contributed over 50% of specific crops and almost 100% of others to local markets throughout the state. Due to the need for food production and the Japanese influence and contribution to the local food supply, the evacuation timing was explicitly built around the spring growing season to eliminate any potential for lost crops grown on Japanese farms.

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Conclusion.

Introduction

In 1942, the *Metropolitan Star* news declared, "Santa Anita racetrack re-opened this morning, not as a glamorous horse-racing plant but as a grim, wartime assembly center for Japanese aliens and American-born Japanese who were forced to evacuate their homes under Army orders."[1]

Some consider the Santa Anita racetrack the world's most famous horse racing track. This track is the place that saw the famed racing horse Seabiscuit compete and win his last great race before his retirement on February 9, 1940, all the while breaking the track record.[2] The park was also home to the 1984 Olympics equestrian competitions and has been the site of numerous movies. Santa Anita racetrack opened in 1934 and is situated on 320 acres, includes 1,800 accommodations for horses, and features a one-mile main horse track, a seven-furlong, and a six-furlong training track.[3] Santa Anita Park is in Arcadia, California, northeast of Los Angeles, and sits just south of the San Gabriel Mountain range, which many consider a perfect backdrop for this famous park. The iconic grandstand at Santa Anita is still the original; it runs 1,100 feet and can seat 26,000 spectators. The exterior façade features the original art deco installed during its construction, and the infield is designed to be a parklike setting and can accommodate up to 50,000 guests. This area also features 61 barns, can house upwards of 2,000 horses, and has a fully equipped equine hospital.

Santa Anita is a grand location for historical horse racing, but its history has a dark chapter. Its website states, "The track suffered a brief dark period during World War II when it

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[1] Metropolitan Pasadena Star-News. “Santa Anita Re-Opening.” April 3, 1942.

[2] Santa Anita Park Racetrack History, Stakes Schedule & More: Twinspires. *TwinSpires Horse Racing | Bet Online with TwinSpires*, 7 Feb. 2022, https://www.twinspires.com/race-tracks/santa-anita-park.

[3] Santa Anita Park, 2022.

became an assembly center, providing temporary housing for 20,000 Japanese Americans awaiting relocation to internment camps."[4]

Santa Anita racetrack was one of the sixteen locations hastily brought into operation and, at its height, housed 18,719 internees and operated six mess halls that each fed 3,000 people a day.[5] The assembly center operated from April until its closing on October 27, 1942, and was the largest and longest-running of the sixteen centers.[6] Santa Anita was also the site of a camouflage net factory and a school under the grandstands.[7] Initially, the internees occupied the horse stalls that still smelled of their previous occupants, made to stuff their mattresses with straw and sleep on the floor without privacy.[8] The assembly centers are a testament to the lack of preparedness on the part of the military and the haste with which the evacuation was undertaken. These centers were necessary because the government had yet to secure the leases to land required for the permanent camps. Due to this, the construction of the camps did not begin until the summer of 1942.

The forced evacuation and removal of the ethnic Japanese population is a well-documented historical event. Despite the in-depth research on the forced evacuation overall, the speed of the decision to evacuate and the factors contributing to the timing of the removal process have received little attention. Evidence shows that farm planting schedules directly influenced the immediacy of the decision to evacuate, with the goal of the military and government to find a solution that would allow for complete evacuation but keep Japanese farms actively producing. Farming schedules are a factor in the forced removal of Japanese and

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[4] Santa Anita Park, 2022.

[5] Girdner and Loftis, *The Great Betrayal,* 174.

[6] Jeffery F. Burton, *Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 156.

[7] Burton, *Confinement and Ethnicity,* 158.

[8] Allan R. Bosworth, *America's Concentration Camps.* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), 47.

Japanese Americans (hereafter referred to as the *Nisei* and *Issei* respectively). Although this is a significant factor in the overall scope, it culminated in decades of growing racism stemming from world events and anti-Asian sentiment.

In 1942, Japanese-owned or leased farms were responsible for approximately 40% of all California crop production and almost 100% of select fruit production, such as strawberries. No traction was given to the idea of mass removal, even though the influence of racial tension and prejudice was easy to see, as racial tensions in the area were at an all-time high. The consensus of the government and the Department of Justice was that no legal precedent would support mass incarceration. The DOJ refused to support the idea of mass incarceration and removal of Japanese-American citizens. They also stated they would not provide the staffing to forcibly remove people from their homes and businesses and lock them up in camps.

The removal of Japanese farmers is one of extreme delicacy. The war was already known as a war of production, and Japanese farms in California exceeded 6,000, producing roughly 40% of California crops in 1941.[9] The climate of California allows for year-round planting, and the forced removal of 1942 occurred after spring planting. The time between spring planting and spring harvest provided the military time to remove farmers from their lands and place custodians in their stead. The military timed their move perfectly and did nothing to upset the crop production for the spring of 1942.[10]

On September 8, 1940, Secretary of Agriculture Claude A. Wickard introduced the Food for Freedom program in San Francisco, California. This program played an essential role in the timing of the evacuation. The program was implemented in 1941 to organize farmers to scale up

[9] United States Congress House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. 77th Congress, 2nd sess. *National Defense Migration* (Hereafter Tolan Committee hearings), Part 31, 11655.

[10] "Kern County's Annual Crop Report for The Year 1942 To The State Director of Agriculture And The County Board of Supervisors." Crop Report. Kern County, 1943.

the production of certain foods such as beans, corn, and items such as wheat and short-staple cotton. Wickard headed the program and worked with farm representatives from the national level down to the state and county levels. Wickard's program implemented growing plans disseminated to area farmers, including ethnic Japanese farmers in California. This program guaranteed that the needed wartime crops were in the ground by the spring of 1942, allowing for the forced removal of ethnic Japanese farmers without losing their crops.

Envy over economic success and distrust over cultural separateness came to a boiling point when the Empire of Japan attacked the United States on December 7, 1941. This unprovoked attack confirmed the fears of the civilian and military world that the Japanese could not be trusted. As the president drafted his speech to seek a declaration of war, lobbyists immediately acted. These lobbyists represented the competing businesses and economic interest groups and pressured Congress and the president to relocate people of Japanese ancestry, both foreign and American-born citizens.[11]

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, which authorized the evacuation of all persons deemed a threat to national security from the West Coast to relocation centers further inland.[12] The order did not specifically name the ethnic Japanese as a threat. Approximately 250,000 Japanese had immigrated to the United States between 1889 and 1924 before quotas were adopted that ended Asian immigration.[13] Most of these immigrants took contract jobs in agriculture, and when those contracts ended, they started

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[11] Tetsuden Kashima, *Judgment without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment during World War II.* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 57.

[12] Kashima, *Judgment without Trial*, 108.

[13] Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 43.

small businesses and became very successful. Local citizens saw these successes as a threat to American society, a belief fueled by the building of Asian racism.[14]

The suggestions for removing Japanese farmers and replacing them with custodians of their land came to light during the Tolan committee hearings in Los Angeles in February 1942. Governor Olson of California testified before the committee that the need to continue the production of the Japanese farms was paramount and that a plan was needed to allow for the continued operation of the area farms.[15] Harold J. Ryan, Commissioner of Agriculture, Los Angeles, testified that a recent study showed that most of the crops grown in the L.A. area were grown by Japanese farmers, confirming this need. Ryan said that the farmers were harvesting early for fear of removal and thus losing the proceeds from their winter harvest; he further identified the Japanese farmers' reluctance to plant spring crops for this same fear.[16]

The central part of the process was the operation of assembly centers and custodial farm assignments by the military. These assembly centers were the first step of the internment process. The internees were processed, examined, labeled, and assigned to a camp in these locations. Internees stayed at these assembly centers for three to four months on average before moving to their permanent placement. The internees forced into the assembly centers lived in horse stalls, warehouses, sheds, pigpens, and makeshift tents with limited services.[17]

During this time, approximately 120,000 people were removed from the West Coast and sent to one of ten camps in undesirable parts of the country. The immediacy of the decision to intern Japanese Americans was based on the planting schedule of area farms as it pertained to

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[14] Robinson, *By Order of the President,* 15.
[15] Tolan Committee hearings, Part 31, 11673
[16] Tolan Committee hearings, Part 31, 11671-11676
[17] Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis. *The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese Americans During World War II*. (New York: Macmillan. 1969), 151.

Japanese families and workers. This decision was made quickly by General John L. Dewitt, commander of the Western defenses, and his aide, Colonel Karl Bendetson, to forcibly remove Japanese and Japanese Americans from the West Coast during WWII. As a result of this quick decision and the necessity of timing as it corresponded with spring planting, the logistics of removing, processing, housing, and general care of internees created a logistical challenge that put a strain on the American war effort by placing these demands on local civilian services and already short supplies.

The Executive Order did not specifically cite the removal of Japanese civilians to relocation centers. However, it gave the Secretary of War, Henry Lewis Stimson, and the military commanders, who had been delegated authority, the power to exclude persons from designated areas to secure national defense objectives against sabotage and espionage.[18] The order did not identify any specific group of people; however, everyone understood that it would be used to remove Japanese and Japanese citizens, first to relocation centers and eventually to permanent camps for their protection and the protection of the United States during the war.[19]

The underlying racism, fear, and bias had been growing in America for decades prior to the signing of Executive Order 9066. As Japan became an empire in the late 1800s and early part of the twentieth century, leaders began to fear Japanese expansionism as a potential threat to national security.[20] This belief fed into the American social structure through racial bias supported by generations of European settlers whose culture carried a traditional European view of Asia as an exotic, backward, and barbaric land.[21]

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[18] Kashina, *Judgment without Trial*, 7.

[19] Niiya Brian, "Executive Order 9066," Densho Encyclopedia https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Executive%20Order%209066.

[20] Brian, Executive Order 9066, 2020.

[21] Sarah M. Griffith, The Injustice of Internment: Expanding Coalitions in the Internment Era. In; *The Fight for Asian American Civil Rights: Liberal Protestant Activism, 1900-1950*. (Urbana, Chicago, Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2018.), 57.

The influx of Chinese laborers to the Western United States during the California gold rush laid the foundation for racial hatred. The influx stimulated a growing resentment among white laborers and nativists. To justify their demand to exclude Chinese immigrants, groups constructed and disseminated racist stereotypes of Asians as treacherous, servile, and uncivilized.[22] The strongest and loudest of these groups were the labor unions that formed in the late 1800s and fought to exclude ethnic Chinese from any part of the labor market. The belief that an influx of Chinese laborers would decrease wages and drive them out of work was driving their fear. These groups partnered with politicians and worked to pressure the Federal Government to stop Chinese immigration. Congress obliged these groups in 1882 with the first of several Chinese exclusion acts.[23] By the end of the 1800s, Chinese immigration was effectively non-existent. A new group of laborers would have to fill the needs of employers who continued to desire cheap labor. This role is the one that Japanese immigrants would come to occupy.

Systemic racism grew into American thought shortly after the introduction of the Chinese Exclusion Act, and by the early twentieth century, this form of racism was a mainstay in the media and daily news reports.[24] During this time, some social scientists distorted the works of Charles Darwin and his followers, claiming that the evolutionary competition between races governed human life and that the Japanese, now the focus of the racism and hatred as the ethnic Chinese were before them, were innately hostile to people of European descent.[25] At the time, it is believed that Franklin Roosevelt did not harbor nor support such radical racism. His lack of support for racist thought did not influence his understanding of the growing threat of the

[22] Robinson, *By Order of the President,* 94.
[23] Robinson, *By Order of the President* 95.
[24] Griffith, The Injustice of Internment, 54.
[25] Robinson, *By Order of the President* 96.

Japanese empire during the first part of the twentieth century. Roosevelt understood that the only Pacific threat the United States faced was that of the Japanese Navy.[26]

Despite the President's view on the people in question, pressured by the racist sentiment, the need for farmland control, and the timing of the attack, President Roosevelt took action after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. In contrast to the growing racism within the country, government intelligence groups were aware that agents and sympathizers aided Nazi Germany and their invasion of Norway and Western Europe.[27] During their invasions, this so-called "fifth column" was a key factor for Germany, and American military intelligence believed that Japan would use the same approach.[28] All did not share this view. On November 7, 1941, the president received a report on the West Coast situation from Curtis B. Munson, a Chicago businessman who had gathered intelligence for John Carter, a journalist assigned to help Roosevelt obtain information free from government influence.[29] This report is part of three submitted to the president and reads in part:

> There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents or agents already imported. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese "crackpot." In each Naval District, there are about 250 to 300 suspects under surveillance. It is easy to get on the suspect list, merely a speech in favor of Japan at some banquet, being sufficient to land one there. The Intelligence Services are generous with the title of suspect and are taking no chances. Privately, they believe that only 50 or 60 in each district can be classed as really dangerous. The Japanese are hampered as saboteurs because of their easily recognized physical appearance. It will be hard for them to get near anything to blow up if it is guarded. There is far more danger from Communists and people of the Bridges type on the Coast than there is from Japanese. The Japanese here is almost exclusively" a farmer, a fisherman or small businessman. He has no entree to plants or intricate machinery.[30]

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[26] Kashima, *Judgment without Trial,* 47.
[27] Ibid, 49.
[28] Kashima, *Judgment without Trial,* 50.
[29] Ibid, 52
[30] Ibid, 52.

Despite the lack of evidence supporting sabotage or any imminent danger to the West Coast, the perceived threat drove this fear. This perceived threat and resulting fear culminated in evacuation orders in March of 1942. The evacuation programs began swiftly, and many Japanese civilians did not have time to settle their affairs and thus lost businesses, homes, and property. In a series of announcements, Attorney General Francis Biddle stated that exclusion zones were in place around sensitive areas such as dams, airports, power plants, harbor areas, and military installations.[31] Many Japanese residents and business owners liquidated their assets without warning, resulting in staggering financial losses on properties and business investments.[32]

As evacuation orders were issued, Japanese farms were a strategic concern to the military. The government's "Food for Freedom" program, which began in 1941, called for increasing crops such as cabbage, lettuce, and beans while asking for a reduction in crops such as tobacco and grain. The Food for Freedom program sent a representative to each farm in the country to establish the expected crop yield for 1942. This action did two things: it documented the location of all Japanese-owned or leased farms and established the planting schedule for the spring of 1942 for these farms.

A significant part of the military's evacuation plan rested on information they had regarding the location of Japanese and Japanese Americans. How the military came into possession of this information is a continuing controversy over whether the Census Bureau breached the confidentiality of the census information to aid other government agencies in locating ethnic Japanese. A report presented in John Toland's work, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath,* details a meeting between Roosevelt's Secretary Grace Tully and Henry Field, an

[31] Kashima, *Judgment without Trial,* 52.

[32] Estlack, Russell W. 2011. *Shattered Lives Shattered Dreams: The Disrupted Lives of Families in America's Internment Camps*. Springville, Utah: Bonneville Books, 35.

aide to President Roosevelt, where Tully advised that the president was ordering him to produce full names and addresses of both foreign and American born Japanese.[33] Tully advised Field to use information from the 1930 and 1940 government censuses that covered evacuation regions. The Naturalization Act of 1940 provided the location of all foreign-born, American resident aliens who were required to register their address at their local post office.[34] This act, coupled with the census data from 1930 and 1940, would have granted the military every piece of information needed to ensure the swift removal of Japanese and Japanese Americans. How the military obtained this information is unknown despite several investigations.

The internment during WWII was a significant event that involved over 100,000 people, each with individual stories and experiences. One such story laid the groundwork for the ability of Japanese Americans to buy and maintain control of their land, whether it be a business, home, or farm, and that was the case of *People vs. Harada,* which began in December of 1916 and did not conclude until the California Superior Court Judge Hugh H. Craig, issued a ruling in September of 1918. The case centered on Jukichi Harada, his wife, Ken, and their three American-born children.

Jukichi Harada bought a house at 3356 Lemon Street in Riverside, California, on December 14, 1915. Harada paid $1,500 for the property, and he paid in cash. Harada's real estate agent assisted with the property's paperwork, title, and deed. Jukichi Harada, being a Japanese immigrant and thus barred from land ownership by the Alien Land Laws of 1913, put the home in the name of his three American-born children, the youngest of whom was nine. Harada stated then that he "had no intention of doing anything but make a gift of the property to

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[33] John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath.* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1982), 187.

[34] 8 Fam 301.6 Nationality Act of 1940. https://fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/08fam030106.html.

the children."[35] Jukichi Harada's name was not mentioned or listed anywhere on the legal paperwork on home ownership or any other form. The area that the home occupied was in a desirable neighborhood, close to schools, and the Harada family was the first Japanese family to move into the area. In the past, the Harada family had lost a child due to the cramped conditions of rooming houses, and Jukichi stated that he would do anything he could to provide a home with enough room for everyone.

The treaty between Japan and the United States, ratified in 1911 allowed ethnic Japanese to "own or lease and occupy houses" wherever Americans enjoyed a similar right. Harada's neighbors disagreed and worked night and day to force the family out, even hiring a lawyer who offered to repurchase the house for $2,000.00. A petition was signed upon Harada's refusal to sell, requesting the family be moved "beyond the tracks." This petition failed as well. In a last-ditch effort, the neighbors wrote to the real estate agent, who then wrote to California Attorney General Ulysses Webb and inquired whether "Jap Children" could own land. Webb responded that they could indeed.[36]

After thinking about it for a time, Webb decided to try and seize the Harada home despite his previous confirmation of the legality of their actions. Webb tried the case himself and attempted to prove that the home transaction was a scam and that Jukichi Harada was the home's legal owner. California law at the time allowed a person to buy something in the name of another. In that case, the person paying for the property would be a trustee listed on the filing; however, an exception in the law allowed parents to make unencumbered gifts to their children.

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[35] *People v. Harada,* et al., Riverside County Superior Court Case 7751.

[36] Bruce Castleman, "California's Alien Land Laws," *Western Legal History 7*, (winter/spring 1994): 36.

Webb further argued that the father was the owner since the entire family would occupy the home. The law was found not to support that logic either.

Harada's lawyers, who were both white, argued that the Alien Land Law violated the 1911 treaty and that the Supreme Court had yet to fully decide on whether a Japanese immigrant is or is not eligible for citizenship. His lawyers stated, "The legislature of the State of California, however, without a guiding decision from its supreme court, has jumped to the conclusion that Japanese persons are among those ineligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States."[37] His lawyers also cited *Wong Kim Ark* and claimed the same birthright citizen guarantees apply to native-born children of noncitizen Japanese.

The response from Webb came from his co-counsel, Miguel Estudillo, who stated that if the judge ruled for Harada, the land laws would be useless, and any Japanese native could own land. "Property can be purchased in the name of Japanese children, farmed by their parents, or rented to other Japanese for agricultural purposes. There is nothing to prevent the state of California from becoming Japanized!"[38] Estudillo was unaware of how true his words were regarding the future and property purchased by American-born ethnic Japanese children and worked by the entire family.

Judge Craig delivered a partial ruling four months after the closing arguments, stating, "The 1913 Alien Land Law did not conflict with the 1911 treaty, and therefore, the state of California had the right to forbid land ownership to aliens not eligible for citizenship."[39] After the partial verdict was released, both sides engaged in legal maneuvers to obtain a final and

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[37] *People vs. Harada*
[38] Ibid.
[39] Anti-Alien Land Law Upheld By Decision. Riverside Judge Rules it Doesn't Clash with Japanese Treaty, *Los Angeles Times*, April 5th, 1917, https://www.newspapers.com/image/380348887/.; *People vs. Harada*

thorough verdict. They succeeded as the final verdict delivered by the judge in September of 1918 ruled in favor of the Harada family:

> The argument of counsel for the plaintiff has been directed almost solely to a discussion of the relation of Jukichi Harada to this property but has lightly passed over the interests of these children, who are defendants. They are American citizens of somewhat humble station, it may be but still entitled to the equal protection of the laws of our land. Their parentage has nothing to do with their rights to hold property. That depends on their status as American citizens. Before any controversy arose, before the deed was drafted, before the opinion of the attorney-general was received, he told Noble (real estate agent) he wanted to buy the property for his children. He disclaimed any interest in it when he filed his answer herein, and when on the witness stand under oath, he said over and over that it was the children's property. He has never said anything else about it. These are matters in the record. Counsel for the plaintiff are too well versed in the laws to believe for one moment that a resulting trust could exist or be enforced in the face of those reiterated disclaimers on the part of Jukichi Harada, all of which are matters of record. He does not own nor can he ever own or hold any interest in fee in this property while the law remains as it is. If this is true, there is no violation of the Anti-Alien Land Law, and its purpose is accomplished.[40]

The Harada family remained in their home until they were forced into the Santa Anita assembly center in 1942 and then moved to Topaz, Utah, relocation camp. Jukichi and his wife Ken died in Topaz while their youngest son Harold fought in the famed 442nd Regimental Combat Team. At the end of the war, their daughter Sumi returned home, which had been cared for by a close white friend, and used the home to provide shelter for other internees who had returned from imprisonment to find nothing waiting for them. The Harada house was designated a National Historic Landmark in 1991.[41]

The Harada case is a case that laid the foundation for future ethnic Japanese ventures as it established the legality of American-born *Nisei* to own or lease land in the United States. As the research will show, the Alien Land Law of 1913 was only one of several attempts by lawmakers

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[40] *Documental History of Law Cases Affecting Japanese in the United States, 1916-1924.* Compiled by the Consulate General of San Francisco 2, 738.

[41] Mark Howland Rawitsch, and Lane Ryo Hirabayashi. *The House on Lemon Street: Japanese Pioneers and the American Dream*. (University Press of Colorado), 2012, 317.

to bar Japanese immigration, stop ethnic Japanese from owning or leasing land, and keep them from becoming successful in business ventures, particularly in the agricultural sector. While these laws all met with varied success, the Harada case set a precedent for allowing American-born *Nisei* to own or lease land.

The historiography tends to focus on the internment experience and moves past the beginning of the process, specifically the reasons behind the timing of the decision to forcibly remove over 100,000 people. The research presented here proves that the spring planting schedule of 1942 directly influenced the timing of the evacuation order. The specific timing was needed to maintain wartime food security. The need for continued farming operations during the war was paramount. Executing the evacuation in the middle of the winter season would have jeopardized the winter harvest and risked the spring crop never being planted, whereas waiting until the spring growing season would maintain production. Almost no scholarship exists on the farming influence of the evacuation; this research is working to help fill that scholarly gap.

Early scholarship argued that internment was a wartime mistake powered by fear, racism, and wartime hysteria. It was an acceptable excuse for almost forty years, and early works reflected this acceptance. Military historian Stetson Conn's *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts,* Allan Bosworth's *America's Concentration Camps,* and Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis's work *The Great Betrayal" The Evacuation of the Japanese Americans During World War II,* all reflect this sentiment on varying levels. Historians shifting from acceptance to disdain and regret moved their focus from strictly wartime government decisions to showcasing the internees' individual stories and the internment action's lasting effects.

The first written account of the internment process, written by Major Karl Bendetsen and presented by General John J. Dewitt, is an official report to the United States War Department on

June 5, 1943.[42] *The Final Report on the Evacuation of Japanese from Certain Military Areas in Western Defense Command* is over 600 pages and claims the Army did everything it could to make the transition to relocation camps as harmless and least impactful as possible. It states that the internees were happy in their new environment and had few complaints.[43] However, the report outlines the reasons for the actions the military and its civilian counterparts took with minimal detail. Dewitt chose to provide evacuation numbers and the services provided by the Army instead of an in-depth report on the actions leading up to the evacuation.

One of the first published works was *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese* (1949) by Morton Grodzins, a political scientist.[44] Grodzins is considered the first analytical interpretation of the internment decision. In the weeks following Pearl Harbor, reason and adherence to the law outmatched the underlying racism, prejudice, and hysteria growing on the West Coast for over a century. *Americans Betrayed* expanded on this idea with a focus on the rise of racism against ethnic Japanese beginning at the turn of the century. Grodzins dives into the role that the unofficial West Coast Congressional delegation played in fueling the rising voice of Western opinion favoring the removal of the ethnic Japanese.

The central thesis behind Grodzins's work is that West Coast pressure groups helped facilitate the decision to remove all ethnic Japanese by molding public opinion to favor their cause, which was, by and large, the takeover of Japanese farms. Grodzins provides proof for this thesis by highlighting the persistent push for evacuation and removal from these groups starting within ten days of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Grodzins asserts that these groups were motivated

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[42] Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, *Final Report. Japanese Evacuations from the West Coast, 1942,* (U.S. government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1943), n.p.

[43] Dewitt, *Final Report*, 152.

[44] Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), np.

by racism, greed, patriotism, and agricultural growth. Grodzins's work relies on primary source material, including interviews with key players such as Attorney General Ulysses Webb and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. Grodzin's work is the first to focus on the political and legal decisions that fueled the decision to intern the ethnic Japanese.

Following Grodzins lead, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II* (1954), by Jacobus tenBroek, Edward Barnhart, and Floyd Matson evaluate the history of racism and hysteria as it pertains to the decision to remove the ethnic Japanese. Their collective thesis states that the limited number of pressure groups is not to blame but rather the American public. The authors state that the American people should bear the brunt of the responsibility for the forced evacuation. The authors state, "None of the wartime acts of discrimination and expulsion are explainable without reference to their historical context; the heritage of prejudice and suspicion surrounding the Oriental, and more particularly the Japanese which had grown up through nearly a century along the Pacific Coast. Only against this background is it possible to understand the conditions under which an entire minority group was targeted for exile- specifically, to identify the war-activated beliefs and attitudes which bore upon that policy."[45]

The authors worked to show that California as a whole had campaigned against Asian immigration, including Chinese and Japanese, for over 80 years before 1941. They assert that the anti-Asian prejudice was part of the American mindset when Pearl Harbor occurred on December 7, 1941. This mindset saw Asians as treacherous, disloyal, and resistant to American

[45] Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II,* (United States: University of California Press, 1954), 3; Gerald Stanley, "Justice Deferred: A Fifty-Year Perspective on Japanese-Internment Historiography." *Southern California Quarterly* 74, no. 2 (1992): 188.

assimilation.[46] Their work claims Pearl Harbor was the catalyst that confirmed the fears and prejudices held by the American public and granted them authority to strike back at the Japanese. The authors further claim that the actions of DeWitt were born of racism and not any military necessity. This belief aligns with the thinking of the time; to lay blame on the military leader in charge was prevalent until the 1980s. Edward Barnhart's conclusion states that Americans "Were anxious, angry, and afraid, and in this mood, the familiar specter of 'yellow peril' appeared before them, and they struck blindly at its shadow."[47]

Edward Barnhart, the main critic of Grodzins's work, argues that Grodzins claims of numerous pressure groups are exaggerated. Barnhart ignores that Grodzins thesis describing pressure groups as the root cause has appeared in almost every historical account of Japanese internment since 1949.[48] Barnhart asserts that there were over 100 agricultural associations in California, and only four were calling for evacuation before February 14, 1942. Barnhart claims that the "pressure groups" effect is diminished when comparing the total numbers of groups with documentation calling for removal. Barnhart offers, "If DeWitt had received copies of all known resolutions of the groups which advocated Japanese evacuation in the days before February 14, his mail would have contained a total of thirty-two such recommendations."[49] This number is a far cry from the majority of the 100 agricultural groups and the 1,150 business organizations in California.

The reality is that when looking back on history through the lens of modern times, one cannot accurately measure the influence pressure groups, lobbyists, and business organizations

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[46] Ibid, 188.

[47] tenBroek, Barnhart, Matson, *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution:* 25; Gerald Stanley, Justice Deferred: A Fifty-Year Perspective on Japanese-Internment Historiography, 189.

[48] Stanley, Justice Deferred: A Fifty-Year Perspective on Japanese-Internment Historiography, 185.

[49] Ibid, 185; & tenBroek, Barnhart, Marson, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution,* 196.

may have had. Small groups are known to exert immense influence throughout history. A strongly worded letter, say to a governor or the assistant Secretary of war, could be converted to supporting removal and be in the perfect position of power to make it a reality. Barnhart's thesis contends that pervasive racism is the reason for internment; however, something caused the pressure groups, residents, and politicians to demand removal. Both works fight over dates, numbers, and pressure group's influence, all the while missing the importance of the time of moderation immediately after Pearl Harbor.

Like Grodzins work, *Prejudice, War and Constitution* races to the inevitable outcome of internment while skipping over the moderate period from Pearl Harbor through the end of January. Jacobus tenBroek all but verifies this by stating, "The events that constituted the episode may be briefly summarized. They began the day after Pearl Harbor with the selective apprehension and imprisonment of several hundred enemy aliens—Japanese, Germans, and Italians. To this precaution were soon added travel restrictions and contraband orders applying to all enemy aliens. Then came curfew, evacuation, and finally, detention. The last two applied on a strict racial basis to Japanese Americans only and regardless of citizenship."[50] These early works overlooked the time of moderation and support prevalent after Pearl Harbor, albeit briefly.

Alan R. Bosworth's work *America's Concentration Camps* (1967) provided an overview of incarceration. [51] Bosworth discusses the prewar relationship with the Japanese, decades of racism, and the meaning of removal and incarceration. Activist groups received the author's work well as he took a sympathetic stance favoring the internees. Bosworth's view was an overview, with little of his work showing in-depth detail into any specific set of events within the broader

[50] tenBroek, Barnhart, Matson, *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution:* 25; Gerald Stanley, Justice Deferred: A Fifty-Year Perspective on Japanese-Internment Historiography, 190.

[51] Bosworth, *America's Concentration Camps,* 1967, n.p.

scope of internment. He discusses the legal implications of the Supreme Court decision upholding the legality of the decision for mass internment. Bosworth's research reflects the time as an overview rather than an in-depth study, and his work ignores the individual stories of the internees.

Another notable work from the 1960s is by Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis titled *The Great Betrayal* (1969).[52] Unlike Bosworth's research, this work examines the specifics of internment. As with Bosworth, they tackle the decades before the war, examine the Japanese and American relationship, and continue to outline the events of internment to its completion in 1946. Unlike Bosworth, these authors focus on the people affected by Executive Order 9066. They discuss the day-to-day lives of the Japanese-American people immediately after Pearl Harbor and leading up to their forced evacuation. Their study is also the first to identify and grant attention to the generational gap in attitudes between the *Issei* and *Nisei* (First and second generation respectively). [53] Their work marks a shift in attitudes from the military's actions and an overview of internment to a more focused approach to researching the people and their stories.

Of the historians and researchers that have tackled the topic, Roger Daniels is considered the authority on the subject. Daniel's works include *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* and *The Japanese American Cases: The Rule of Law in Time of War.*[54] *American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1941-1945, 9 Vols.*[55] Daniels's first book was his

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[52] Girdner and Loftis, *The Great Betrayal*, np.
[53] Girdner and Loftis, *The Great Betrayal,* np.
[54] Roger Daniels, *The Japanese American Cases: The Rule of Law in Time of War*. (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2013), np.
[55] Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1941-1945, 9 Vols.* (NY, 1989), np.

dissertation titled *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese* Exclusion, 1962. The bulk of Daniel's study has been on immigration and ethnicity in American Culture. His works reflect his expert knowledge as he has written many more books and has over one hundred articles, most dealing with internment.

Roger Daniels re-examined the causes of internment in *Concentration Camps USA,* updated as *Concentration Camps North America*, as his research background is immigration and ethnicity, he works to find the reason behind the actions. [56] Daniels believes that history is about the successes and failures of the human race.[57] Daniels's early work incorporates elements from Grodzins and tenBroek et al. and explores the pressure group racism theory that led the military to decide on mass removal. *Concentration Camps USA* focuses on Provost Marshal Gullion and Major Bendetsen, the writer of DeWitt's Final Report. Daniels claims that responsibility for internment rests on these two individuals' shoulders. Daniels states that both men began campaigning to transfer the Enemy Aliens division from the Justice Department to the War Department. In doing so, DeWitt's commander, Secretary of War Stimson, would be in charge of actions taken to control enemy aliens.

Again, however, even Roger Daniels ignores the moderated attitude and support for ethnic Japanese that was prevalent following Pearl Harbor. During the 1970s and into the 1980s, there was a shift in the mindset of internment; the focus of most newly published works, such as Michi Weglyn's *Years of Infamy*, John Dower's *War Without Mercy* and Peter Irons' *Justice at*

[56] Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II.* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971), np.

[57] Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA,* 1971, np.

War, saw works focus on the people and their individual stories and the lasting effects of the injustice.[58]

These works proved pivotal in the history of the internment survivors and their descendants. The redress movement in the 1970s and 1980s gained momentum and popularity. Historians Roger Daniels, Peter Irons, and Michi Weglyn testified in Washington, D.C., and worked with the redress movement to challenge America and its "heroic" image during WWII by bringing to light the atrocities of internment. During this time, the idea of internment as a "wartime mistake fueled by hysteria and fear" was no longer accepted. Newly declassified documents allowed researchers to reveal that those who advocated for internment did so due to their underlying feelings of racism, greed, and political hunger.

Due mainly to these historians, the minds of politicians and judges changed due to pressure to acknowledge the injustice of WWII internment. Using primary source material, which now includes research focused on the internees' oral histories, they successfully got the government to acknowledge the injustice of the internment camps during WWII. In 1988, the Civil Liberties Act granted surviving Japanese Americans reparations and a formal apology from President Ronald Reagan. This accomplishment is a modern example of the power of historical research.[59]

Following these events, the research into internment did not slow down. Due to the acknowledgment by the government and a wealth of newly declassified material, new research on internment emerged at breakneck speed. During this time, Roger Daniels released his nine-

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[58] John W. Dower, and American Council of Learned Societies. *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.* Seventh printing, corr. by the author. ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993). Michi Weglyn, and Mazal Holocaust Collection. *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps.* Update, first University of Washington Press ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996). Peter H. Irons, *Justice at War.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), np.

[59] Congress.gov. "H.R.442 - 100th Congress (1987-1988): Civil Liberties Act of 1987." August 10, 1988. https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/house-bill/442.

volume collection of primary source documents on internment, *American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1941-1945, 9 Vols. (1989).*[60] Daniel's primary goal was to create a database allowing future researchers access to primary source material on the WWII internment. During this time, historians started interviewing internment survivors to preserve their stories. This process is ongoing with Japanese American history groups such as Densho and the Japanese American History Museum.

Recent scholarship focuses on the aftermath of internment and what life looked like after their stay in the camps. Yang Murray's *What Did Internment of Japanese Americans Mean* (2000) focused on exploring the struggle of Japanese-American College students.[61] A companion work by Gary T. Okihiro, *Storied Lives, Japanese American Students and World War II* (1999), showcases how these students were affected.[62] As the new millennium dawned, researchers and historians became singularly focused on individual stories and micro-histories of WWII internment.

Two controversial works of the revisionist era are Greg Robinson's *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* (2001)[63] and Tetsuden Kashima's *Judgment Without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment During World War II* (2003). Robinson argues that Roosevelt, not influenced by the calls for relocation by the commanders on the West Coast, pushed the process forward on his own. Robinson claims that Roosevelt was racist in this regard and wanted exclusion just as much as everyone else. The author cites Roosevelt's long history with the Empire of Japan as evidence. Kashima argues that the idea and

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[60] Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), np.

[61] Alice Yang Murray, and Roger Daniels. *What did the Internment of Japanese Americans Mean?* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000).

[62] Gary Y. Okihiro, and Leslie A. Ito. *Storied Lives: Japanese American Students and World War II.* (Seattle, Washington; London, [England]: University of Washington Press, 1999; 2001).

[63] Robinson, *By Order of the President,* np.

plans for internment were not sudden and reactionary but instead planned and prepared well before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

One of the more recent works is by Greg Robinson, *A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America.*[64] Robinson applies the term "confinement" to the act of internment as he believes the relocation camps' barbed wire and armed guard resembled a prison rather than a camp. He states that proper internment refers to a government's detention of enemy nationals during wartime.[65] This updated work by Robinson brings the topic of internment up to date with newly released digital sources. His examination breaks up internment during World War II into different lenses. The first focuses on confinement in North America. The second examines the transportation of Japanese from Peru to the United States. The third focuses on the Aleuts and Pribilof islanders, deemed the forgotten victims of internment.[66] Robinson's detailed work on the transportation practices of the Army during this time helped to detail the actions and planning undertaken during the evacuation of America's West Coast during World War II.

The most recent scholarship found is *Not White Enough, The Long Shameful Road to Japanese American Internment,* by Lawrence Goldstone (2023), and *Transborder Los Angeles, An Unknown Transpacific History of Japanese Mexican Relations,* by Yu Tokunaga (2023). Goldstone writes of the long process of racism that brought about the internment of the Japanese and Japanese-American population in 1942. This work comprehensively examines a century of bigotry against Chinese and Japanese Americans, culminating in the infamous Supreme Court decision Korematsu v. United States: the landmark ruling that upheld the illegal imprisonment of more than 100,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans. Goldstone claims that the event of

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[64] Greg Robinson, *A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America.* Ukraine: Columbia University Press), 2009.
[65] Robinson, *A Tragedy of Democracy*, 2.
[66] Robinson, *A Tragedy of Democracy,* 74.

internment was inevitable given the historical events that took place in the century leading up to the 1942 decision.[67]

Tokunaga and his work in *Transborder Los Angeles* focused on the farmland between 1924 and 1942. The author weaves together the history of Japanese and Mexican immigrants, who significantly developed California's agriculture. Japanese, Mexican, and white Americans developed a unique farmland hierarchy that generated conflicts and interethnic accommodation by bringing together local issues and international concerns beyond the Pacific Ocean and the US-Mexico border. Viewing these experiences in a single narrative form, Tokunaga demonstrates the close relationships between the ban on Japanese immigration, Mexican farmworkers' strikes, wartime Japanese removal, and the Bracero Program.[68] Tokunaga's work highlights the importance and long history of Japanese farming in California before the war.

Understandably, the mass removal of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast and forced internment of over 120,000 ethnic Japanese have commanded the attention of historians, scholars, and philosophers since WWII. There was, however, another larger population of ethnic Japanese that were affected, albeit much differently, on the islands of Hawaii. The historiography of ethnic Japanese and their treatment in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor has only recently begun to garner respectable attention that the West Coast has captured for almost a century. The University of Hawaii, Honolulu, is the leader in the research and study of the Hawaiian Japanese. The number of sources for the Hawaiian Japanese is minuscule compared to that of the West Coast Japanese.

Many West Coast internment studies mention Hawaii and their ethnic Japanese in

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[67] Lawrence Goldstone, *Not White Enough: The Long, Shameful Road to Japanese American Internment*. (University Press of Kansas), 2023, np.

[68] Yu Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles: An Unknown Transpacific History of Japanese-Mexican Relations*. (University of California Press), 2022, np.

passing, dedicating perhaps a chapter at most to the events in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor. These sources do not detail the reasoning behind the decision not to intern the entire Hawaiian Japanese *en mass* like their West Coast brethren. An in-depth study into the intricacies of the ethnic Japanese, Hawaiian, American, and Filipino relationships and how they affected the non-internment decision during WWII is lacking in the historiography and offers an opportunity for further in-depth study.

The historiography of the Hawaiian Japanese and their lack of internment started with *Hawaii's Japanese* (1946) by Andrew W. Lind. The author was a sociologist at the University of Hawaii and embarked on a study of the Japanese in Hawaii, focusing on WWII years and supported by the War Research Laboratory. This book briefly studies the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii during WWII, when the ethnic Japanese made up 38% of the total population. Lind's preface states, "The author, as a professional sociologist, was disposed to view the Japanese situation in Hawaii since December 7, 1941, as a social experiment of unusual significance and to apply to its analysis whatever scientific methods were appropriate."[69] Lind explores the relationship that the ethnic Japanese population had with other ethnic community groups and researches how the ethnic Japanese population would react to a full-scale war. Lind's work is excellent in its scope of research and presentation; however, it lacks the in-depth research needed to understand how the ethnic Japanese relationship worked to establish themselves within the community as a respected ethnic community who supported the United States despite their parent country waging war.

[69] Andrew W. Lind, *Hawaii's Japanese: An Experiment in Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. Preface, V.

The unpublished memoir of General Thomas Green, the JAG officer assigned to Hawaii from 1941-1943, should be included in the historiography of Hawaii. His memoir is a lengthy and detailed account of Green and his involvement in the development and implementation of Marshal Law on the islands after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Green's memoir is filled with inside details about the decisions of military leaders immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, lending significantly to the understanding of actions minutes and hours after the attack began. His memoir also discusses the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii. It explains their importance to the community and how the lack of prejudice and racism on the islands made for a very different community experience than one on the mainland.

Tom Coffman is considered the expert on Hawaii and its development as its nation within a nation. His works include *Nation Within: The History of the American Occupation of Hawaii* (1998), *The Island Edge of America* (2003), *How Hawaii Changed America* (2015), and *Inclusion: How Hawaii Protected Japanese Americans from Mass Internment, Transformed Itself and Changed America* (2021). Throughout his work, Coffman explains the dynamic of an inclusive community that worked from the ground up to protect the ethnic Japanese population. Coffman explains the importance of groups such as the Morale Committee and the Council for Interracial Unity and their work in warding off any forced evacuation despite the repeated demands of President Roosevelt and Major Karl Bendetsen.

A Word on Sources

Sources for this research vary from archive documents to recently published articles citing the constantly changing understanding of the treatment of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast and in Hawaii—a concerted effort to incorporate the sources spanning the 1940s through 2023. A clear difference in perspective is seen when comparing sources written before 2000 and

2023. During the first part of the 21st century, the research shifted from factual reporting to philosophical debate and the insulting of key players. For example, in Goldstone's *Not White Enough,* he repeatedly calls DeWitt and James Phelan "idiots" when explaining their comments and actions before the removal order. While blame has always permeated the research, it is clear that historiography is changing again.

The most reliable sources used in this research are the archival journals assembled by Roger Daniels. These collections, titled *American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942-1945,* are assembled into nine volumes and contain scanned copies of archival military documents. These documents, assembled chronologically, allow researchers to read, research, and interpret the events and decisions based on primary archive source material. These collections are found on the Densho encyclopedia website, free to download. The bulk of the research in this dissertation was completed using these nine volumes, backed up by secondary sources.

In the recent age of digitization, the California Online Archive stands out with its selection of archival materials. The sources gleaned from this database allowed for an in-depth study into the Farm Security Administration and their work with the Wartime Civil Control Administration to reassign ownership of farms and crops in order to ensure wartime food security. These sources were reliable and part of a collection that is still growing. While it is clear that many sources remain elusive, additional sources are released and declassified continuously. The historiography of Japanese internment cites the perceived fear of fifth-column activity in almost every book or article written, and while they all conclude that no subversive activity occurred, definitive proof of this is lacking. These sources cite the lack of evidence

suggesting otherwise. This lack of research represents another hole in the historiography and an opportunity for further research into the presence or lack thereof of subversive activity.

This examination informs the social and intellectual history field by completing the story of WWII internment in America. Most of the scholarship has focused on the relocation centers and the individual events within each. Due to the minimal attention paid to the evacuation process and timing of the decision, as it relates to the farm planting schedules, little is known about the plan the military developed. This examination of the process's beginning reflects the forced evacuation program and the reactionary need to use assembly centers, which only inflated the already terrible act.

This research process uses qualitative data and relies on personal accounts and documents that illustrate, in first person primary source, what the internees thought and how they responded to the sudden change in their society. The information gathered has been analyzed from an intellectual historical research method and focused on the primary reasons behind the decisions made by those who initiated the internment process. This work illustrates the mechanics of population removal and the complex process of changing a citizen into an internee without the legality of such an act ironed out.

The military did plan the evacuation around the planting/harvest schedule, and they executed it perfectly. Department of Agriculture crop reports from 1942 show a 1.2 million bushel increase in the California crop yield compared to 1941.[70] The Farm Security Administration worked with the Wartime Civil Control Administration to assign custodians to *Issei* and *Nisei* farms that did not have an already established agreement outside the program. The Tolan Committee reports and the transcribed telephone calls between General Dewitt and

[70] Crop Report. Kern County, 1943.

Colonel Bendetsen confirm that steps taken ensured the planting of spring crops before removal and the continued operation of the farms post-removal.

With the crop production problem solved, the attention turned to removal and assembly centers. These centers were the way stations of the internment process where confined internees waited until the details of their final destination were determined. Understanding how these critical months shaped the subsequent camp experience is critical to consider the internment's impact on the people involved. The assembly centers were a significant step in disconnecting citizens from their homes, businesses, community, and family traditions. Sometimes, these things were lost during the internment experience and never regained.

The historical act of internment is well known; as such, there is a vast amount of source material related to Japanese-American internment. The challenge is to find the primary sources focused on the timing of the removal as it pertains to the farming schedule of the spring of 1942. Digital military and civilian archives provide a great deal of primary source material. The approach herein examines the internment's social, cultural, agricultural, and military aspects. The goal is to show that the decision to intern these citizens was not a pre-planned event but rather a reaction to the bombing of Pearl Harbor supported by decades of racism. The timing of the final order for complete evacuation is the main focus of this research.

Chapter One – Foundation of Prejudice

Historian David McCullough said, “History is who we are and why we are the way we are.” A look back into history is needed if any understanding of the actions of 1942 is to be had. A review of the intellectual origins of race-based exclusionary laws is needed to do that. The foundation of the landmark decision to intern the ethnic Japanese population on the West Coast were planted in the mid-1800s and started with an influx of Chinese immigrants. This would culminate in a labor war and the formation of labor unions on the West Coast. These unions worked to protect the wages and rights of white workers, all the while fighting against the influx of any foreign workers who threatened to undermine their wages by working the same jobs for less pay. They would succeed in pressuring like-minded lawmakers into passing laws excluding Chinese laborers at the state level and eventually achieving complete Chinese immigration exclusion in 1882. This victory was short-lived as the replacement of those laborers came from Japan, as Japanese immigration saw a marked increase during those same years. An easy victory for the labor unions against the ethnic Japanese was not to be had, as several landmark legal cases set a precedent for land ownership and American Citizenship by birth on American soil.

Fear and Racism

The seeds of racism and segregation against the ethnic Japanese during World War II did not start when the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, and they did not start with the Japanese at all, but rather with Chinese immigrants. Chinese immigration sparked controversy and racism long before the 20th century and the influx of Japanese immigrants. The seeds were sown in 1848 in the hills of California for the full-scale removal of ethnic Japanese in the spring of 1942.

The need for labor in California started with the Gold Rush in 1848, and this event would usher in a flood of would-be millionaires to California in hopes of striking it rich. In less than a year,

the population of California grew by an estimated 80,000 people.[1] San Francisco was a hot spot, with 800 residents in 1848 and 25,000 by 1850. Most of these residents came from the East Coast seeking Gold, and others came from across the Pacific for the same reason. Chinese immigrants came to California with the same ambitions as those from the East Coast: stay long enough in California to get rich. In 1849, there were 781 people of Chinese origin and 40,000 by 1854.[2]

At the beginning of the Gold Rush, the Chinese were welcome; however, Americans became more resentful of their presence as the Gold became increasingly scarce. Foreign miners faced taxes in 1850, and white miners punished those who did pay. Due to the taxes, constant threats, and acts of violence, the Chinese gave up the hunt for Gold and worked as laborers, farmers, and servants in the white miner's camps. Among the jobs taken by the ethnic Chinese, the railroad was the most popular and took the most workers among all trades.

The railroad work did not last forever, and once it had reached its end, ethnic Chinese had no trouble finding work in a growing American West. They are paid very little and forced to work very hard. Although the working conditions and pay were miserable, the ethnic Chinese continued to work, knowing that what they had in America was better than anything they could expect back home. In 1868, the United States and China signed the Burlingame Treaty, granting China the most-favored-nation trade status, immigration, economic cooperation, and protection of each other's citizens while visiting the other's country.[3]

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[1] Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen, "The Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco and the Smuggling of Chinese Immigrants across the US. Mexico Border, 1882-1930," *Journal of the Southwest* 48 (spring 2006): 38.

[2] Hansen, The Six Companies of San Francisco, 40.

[3] Previous pacts, such as the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858, gave the United States and some European powers access to Chinese ports, allowed Christian missionaries to operate freely, and legalized the import of opium, giving the Chinese nothing in return except the promise not to overrun their country.

During this time, American citizens began to question the status of Chinese immigrants regarding their citizenship. Many Chinese immigrants were choosing to stay in the United States, and thus, their eligibility to apply for citizenship came into question. American citizens began to seek further interpretation of the 1790 law, which stated that only "white" people could become citizens in America. This interpretation meant that a person had to look white and claim they were white to become a citizen of the United States. If faced with a denied application in one state, an immigrant could quickly try again in a different state that was more lenient concerning immigration law, as no federal immigration bureau existed during the late 1800s.

The end of the Civil War brought increased confusion regarding citizenship as Congress debated to include people of "African" descent on its eligibility list. The attitude on the West Coast was made clear by Representative James Johnson, who claimed that" future greatness can best be secured by preserving the Caucasian blood in its purity; that the white is superior to the Chinaman."[4] Johnson set a precedent for racial thoughts on the West Coast, which was picked up by politicians repeatedly, as it proved to be a winning strategy during elections.[5]

As the ethnic Chinese population grew from 35,000 in 1860 to 63,000 in 1870, the drive to stop the continued immigration was growing on the West Coast. The citizens of the West, particularly California, saw the immigration of Chinese to be "pollution by an inferior race." In the mid-1870s, labor parties began to spring up in California, protesting the lowering of white workers' wages due to the comparatively low wages of the ethnic Chinese. They claimed that the employment of foreigners brought down their wages and demanded a stop to all ethnic Chinese labor. The leading labor party group in California was the Workingmen's Party of California, founded and run by Irish immigrant Denis Kearney. The main goal of this group was to put

[4] *Congressional Globe,* 41st Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 1, 756.
[5] *Congressional Globe,* 40th Cong., 3rd Sess., Part 2, 1036.

pressure on the politicians to stop the flow of Chinese laborers coming into the United States, working for subpar wages and thus bringing down the wages of white workers.

Kearney and his group became very powerful in the later part of the 1800s; however, Kearney's leadership style was autocratic, and his group eventually kicked him out in 1879.[6] Kearney and his group stoked the fire of racial prejudice in the political world, which only strengthened the resolve of the politicians and their drive to use racism as a winning ticket during elections. One of these politicians was a New York transplant named Horace Page. When he was twenty, Horace made his way to California in the 1850s and made a name for himself as a successful businessman, investor, and well-respected man in the community. He ran for Congress on the Republican ticket in 1872 and won by soliciting the support of the working class.[7]

At the beginning of his first term, Page seemed to be on the side of justice by attacking private firms' overpriced services provided to the government and saving the government millions of dollars. However, Page's actual target was not price gougers but rather the ethnic Chinese in the state of California. Within a few weeks of his arrival in Washington D.C., Page introduced a bill demanding that the United States "check or altogether prevent Chinese immigration to the United States."[8] Page easily won re-election; during his second term, he was the most outspoken anti-Chinese member in Congress. Page also re-introduced the requirement to the naturalization law that an immigrant must be a "free white person" in February of 1875.[9] Page continued to press his agenda, citing that only an act of Congress could stem the overflow of Chinese immigration in the country. He focused on two groups within the ethnic Chinese: the

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[6] The Workingmen's Party, *San Francisco Examiner,* May 8, 1878, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457636063/.

[7] C. C. Williams, Congressional Career of the Hon. H. F. Page, Representative of the Second District of California, and Re-nominated for a Fifth Term (San Francisco: Francis, Valentine & Co., 1880), 3.

[8] Williams*, Congressional Career of the Hon. H. E. Page,* 10.

[9] Ibid.

Chinese laborers and Chinese women. He believed that Chinese women were brought to the United States to become prostitutes, an attitude backed up by the high number of women forced into that profession due to the lack of opportunity that existed for them due to restrictive laws. His slogan was to "end the danger of cheap Chinese labor and immoral Chinese women."[10] His proposal is also the first in history to aim at limiting the immigration of a particular group of people based solely on their race.

Horace Page trod carefully as the treaty signed in 1868 was still in effect, and China could see any adverse action the U.S. took as an act of aggression. Page settled on proposing a bill that banned all unskilled Chinese laborers and Chinese women from entering the country to become prostitutes or concubines. The last part was vital as very few Chinese marriage ceremonies were legal; therefore, all Chinese women fit into Page's category of prostitute or concubine. Page stated in Congress that he wanted to "place a dividing line between vice and virtue."[11]

Page had all the support he needed for this bill, mainly from the labor groups, Churches, politicians, and even the American Medical Association. According to the AMA, the Chinese, particularly the women, were carriers of diseases that would resist cures if contracted by white citizens. With support such as this, the bill had no trouble passing both houses and was signed into law by President Ulysses S. Grant on March 3, 1875. The Page Act of 1875 started Chinese exclusion and the first restrictive federal immigration law in the United States. This act effectively banned the entry of Chinese women into the U.S. The act had a less noticeable impact

[10] George Anthony Peffer, "Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women under the Page Law, 1875-1882," *Journal of American Ethnic History 6* (fall 1986): 28.

[11] Proxy marriages, common in China, and polygamy would not be recognized in the United States. Even for traditional marriages conducted in China, it would fall to an immigration officer to decide legality.

on Chinese men entering the country. Employers on the West Coast still craved cheap labor and people with whom they could work almost to death. This need for cheap labor drove them to smuggle Chinese immigrants into the country any way they could. In response to the still-growing number of ethnic Chinese on the West Coast, officials enacted laws to make residing in the United States so hostile that the ethnic Chinese would leave on their own accord.

State laws such as the "Cubic Air Ordinance" and the "Pigtail Ordinance" aimed to force ethnic Chinese to leave. The Cubic Air Ordinance required at least 500 cubic feet of air per person living in a domicile. Fines could be between $10 to $500 and 5 days to 3 months in prison or both. While in jail, the Pigtail Ordinance came into effect. This law required that prisoners have their hair cut to within an inch of their scalp.[12] This law was a massive insult to the Chinese as they believed that cutting their "queue" (the long waist-length braid of hair) meant great suffering in the afterlife and disrespect to the current Emperor Qing, which guaranteed torture and death should they return to China.[13]

All of these racist and prejudice-driven laws may have stemmed the flow of immigration, but the Chinese people were resilient and were able to become very successful quietly. Many Chinese families became very wealthy, and rather than leave their less fortunate brethren behind, they pooled resources and protected each other. Several associations formed the "Six Companies" and became a formidable political force.[14] They had officers waiting for Chinese immigrants at the ports and brought them to their offices, providing them with food, water, money, and employment. When faced with discriminatory laws, the Six Companies would hire

[12] National Archives, htp://recordsoftights.org/events/125/pigtail-ordinance.
[13] Hansen, The Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco, 38.
[14] Ibid.

influential white lawyers to bring suit against the state or Federal Government. Most of these lawsuits were successful, much to the chagrin of politicians.

However, one failed lawsuit filed by the Six Companies would have a lasting effect for almost a century and impact the ethnic Japanese in the early part of the 20th century. This case was the case of A.H. Yup and his attempt to become an American citizen. Heard in 1878 by Judge Lorenzo Sawyer, the first judge asked to create a legal definition of "white" regarding immigration and naturalization. Sawyer did not take this task lightly and sought out every known scientific resource of the time. His search led him to the work of Johann Friedrick Blumenbach, a German Anthropologist, Charles Darwin, and Herbert Spencer. The question of the origins of the various races and whether or not there was a hierarchy among them dominated the scientific community in 1878.[15]

Friedrich Blumenbach was a German Anthropologist, and his work, a century before Spencer, categorized humans into five distinct racial groups: Caucasian, Ethiopian, American Indian, Mongolian, and Malay. Blumenbach found the most advanced and "ideal" racial group to be white Europeans and named them "Caucasian" because he believed them to be descendants of Adam and Eve and to have originated on the slopes of Mt. Caucasus in the Republic of Georgia.[16] Charles Darwin and his work on natural selection shattered many beliefs about racial hierarchy, as his work never confirmed its existence. In order to apply *Darwin's Origins of the Species* theory to Social Stratification, Darwin's work had to be altered, as he had disproved the theory of Racial Hierarchy. Herbert Spencer was the man for that job.

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[15] Goldstone, *Not White Enough,* 19.

[16] Nicolaas A. Rupke, *Johann Friedrich Blumenbach: Race and Natural History 1750-1850*, (Abingdon: Routledge), 2019, 104.

Herbert Spencer's initial goal was to create a framework that would explain human behavior using empiricist methodology. Spencer's work focused on social and natural sciences. Spencer concluded that life has and is traveling toward increasing differentiation, beginning with single-cell organisms and moving to the most complex creatures. Spencer further said that the differentiation cycle has continued since the Earth saw its first human. He states that humans are on a path of evolution that focuses on skill, intelligence, self-control, and the power to adapt through technological innovation. This stimulation caused nature to select the best of each generation for survival and advancement.[17]

While Spencer did not specifically identify race in his conclusions, Americans found it easy to extract what they wanted to hear and understand from his work. In their mind, the wealthier and more powerful a person became, the more they contributed to advancing the human race and, therefore, were the best and selected for advancement into the next generation. As a result of this study, Spencer found his following dominated by the white elite and politicians of the day, including people such as John Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.

As a result of Spencer and Blumenbach's studies of the hierarchy of race, Judge Sawyer relied on their research to decide what defined "white" in 1878 during the case of *Ah Yup*. He believed that stratification implied superiority for some and inferiority for others. It was for this reason that Sawyer wrote that "white" did not refer to just skin tone, stating, "Those called white may be found in every shade from the lightest blonde to the most swarthy brunette, yet as ordinarily used everywhere in the United States, one would scarcely fail to understand that the party employing the words' white person' would intend a person of the Caucasian race." He

[17] Samuel Morton, *Catalogue of the Skulls of Man and the Inferior Animals in; The Collection of Samuel George Morton*, (3rd Ed), 1849, np.

concluded that as race theorists insisted, the Chinese, as Mongolians, were not "white." This understanding meant that in the meaning of the term used in the United States naturalization laws, no Chinese immigrant could apply for American citizenship regardless of the length of stay in the country. This decision would hold for close to a century.[18]

American influence in Japan started with Commodore Matthew Perry and his flotilla of four warships arriving in Edo Harbor (now Tokyo) in 1853. Perry had specific instructions to persuade or compel the Japanese to open trade with the West. Ruled by an iron-fisted shogunate for two centuries, Japan was closed to foreigners. The only exception was a small Dutch trading station that operated under strict supervision. Through this trading station, there was a clandestine system of smuggling books and other printed material from Europe. Through this conduit, educated Japanese obtained books on Western-style government and began challenging the shogunate and His power.[19]

At the time of Perry's arrival, the country was on the verge of a civil war between reformers and traditionalists. In addition, the country was still reeling from the previous decades of disasters, including famine and farmer's riots, who were unhappy with the ruling samurai class. When the ships arrived in Edo Harbor, the ruling class saw their arrival as a provocation and threat to their power and oversight of the subject classes. Avoiding the ships was impossible; however, Perry had permission to use force to gain compliance if needed.[20] Perry used this permission and threatened to level the city if someone of power did not come and meet him and his crew. The Japanese relented and were not disappointed in doing so. Perry wielded heavy

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[18] Sawyer 155; *Central Law Journal* 387 (1878).

[19] Nobutaka Ike, "Western Influences on the Meiji Restoration," *Pacific Historical Review, 17* (February 1948), 2.

[20] Eijiro Honjo, "From the Tokugawa Period to the Meiji Restoration," *Kyoto University Economic Review* 7 (1932), 32.

weaponry, and his ships held sumptuous gifts, festival supplies, western technology, and instruments.[21] He went on to throw lavish parties, parades, musical performances, and technology shows that wowed the audiences. Although the Japanese were the unwilling hosts then, they tolerated his presence and were only moderately interested in his offers.

The goal of Perry's expedition was simple: secure a coaling station in Japan for American ships to refuel en route to China. America wanted a foothold in the east due to the vast, untapped resources of the area. The secondary goal of Perry and the West was to "bring Japan to a higher state of civilization." Perry exposed the Japanese to Christianity, republican government, and commerce to accomplish these goals. Initially, Japan's isolationist mindset and seclusion policy rejected all three notions. Americans persisted, believing they were eminently exportable to Japan and the world.[22]

Although Perry failed in his first attempt in 1853, he returned the following year with nine ships. Upon his arrival, the ruling class resisted any foreigners in all bays and harbors except that of Nagasaki. Perry had an advantage on this return trip; European powers were also pressing for access to Japan, and since Perry was the first to attempt to open trade negotiations, the Japanese dealt with him. This trip resulted in the Convention of Kanagawa and the agreement for American use of select ports, provisioning of American ships, humanitarian treatment of shipwrecked Americans, and trade with appropriate currency exchange. The established terms expected reciprocation, but this was not honored. Direct dealings with the Americans also precluded obtaining favorable terms from other nations.[23]

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[21] Jeffrey A. Keith, Civilization, Race, and the Japan Expedition's Cultural Diplomacy, 1853-1854, *Diplomatic History* 3, (April 2011): 179.

[22] Keith, Civilization, Race, 181.

[23] Keith, Civilization, Race, 197.

With the success of Perry's second expedition to Japan came a windfall of agreements between Japan and other nations such as France, Great Britain, Russia, and the Netherlands. Finalized in 1858, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, commonly called the Harris Treaty, effectively destroyed Japan's efforts to remain an isolationist country. These treaties allowed for a flood of commerce and trade, so much so that many Japanese ports became overrun with foreigners who, in most cases, outnumbered the locals. During this time, traditional Japanese society slowly disappeared and was replaced with an early version of a Capitalist society. Japan lost its ability to control its tariff rates and enforce the laws that foreigners continually violated.[24]

The presence of foreigners and a swift and cascading change in Japanese life and culture sparked a desire to expel the "barbarians." In a futile effort, several influential families and clans attempted to dislodge the West from their borders, but they all failed. In 1867, the wealthy farmers allied with the lower-class reformist samurai and challenged the Tokugawa shogunate regime. Without strong support for the shogunate, the regime fell. The younger samurai and their merchant and farmer allies chose to rebuild the government with a mix of Japanese and Western governing styles focused on modernization and reform. The result was a Japanese Emperor who was the ruler of Japan but with an administration that ran the country.[25]

The new government made sweeping changes to the old order, effectively wiping it out of existence and eliminating the caste system and any remnants of a feudal society. The ideals of Western nations, including expansive railway systems, education, military power, and foreign trade, replaced the old systems. In 1868, the new government met with King Kalakaua of Hawaii and organized a contract labor system to work the Hawaiian island sugar plantations. The

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[24] Sujin Eom, The Specter of Modernity: Open Ports and the Making of Chinatowns in Japan and South Korea, *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* 24 (2013), 42.

[25] Hideichi Horie, Revolution and Reform in Meiji Restoration, *Kyoto University Economic Review 22* (1952), 33.

contract, brokered by the American representative of Hawaii to Japan, outlined worker contracts that would last four years. Four hundred Japanese applied to the contract program, and 143 men, six women, and one child were sent to work in the sugar fields for $4 per month.[26]

Due to the conditions that Japanese laborers experienced, including backbreaking labor in stifling heat and abusive treatment by the Portuguese labor managers, this contract experiment ultimately failed. Records show at least one uprising where Japanese laborers fought back and injured the labor manager. Three Japanese laborers were charged and jailed for 300 days and fined $100. Within two years of this contract experiment, one-third of the laborers had returned to Japan, another third sailed to California, and approximately fifty stayed in Hawaii and married local women. These fifty families became the roots of the thriving and vibrant Japanese community that dominated society in 1941.[27]

Over the next twenty years, Japan overhauled every part of its culture, society, and government at breakneck speed. Seen by Western cultures as exotic and hypnotic, Japanese exports were becoming all the rage. 1876 saw Japanese culture center stage at the Centennial International Exhibition in Philadelphia, America's first World's Fair. The exhibit was one of the most popular at the fair and included a model home and a "bazaar," which sold many Japanese wares.[28] Japanese items and art were seen in middle-class homes as examples of cultural refinement and made everything else look vulgar and commonplace. Americans were both fond and in awe of the Japanese culture and welcomed it with open arms.

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[26] Gannemono, http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/journal/2018/8/30/gannenmono/.
[27] Gannemono, hup://www.discovernikkei.org/en/journal/2018/8/39/gannenmono/.
[28] Northeast Museum Services Center, Archeology & Museum Blog, https://nmscarcheologylab.wordpress.com/2014/09/18/a-tale-of-two-nations-victori-an-america-and-the-japan-craze/.

In 1879, former President Grant visited Japan on an extended stay and wrote how impressed he was with their progress as a nation. He noted that the growth of military power in just the past 12 years was astonishing. He cited that Japan had been the most enjoyable part of his world tour and was cultivated beautifully with breathtaking scenery and unmatched cleanliness.[29] Despite all its success, the Harris Treaty was indeed stifling Japan's growth, and it was involved in a territorial dispute with China over ownership of the Ryukyu Islands.

The timing of Grant's visit coincides with a change in the social culture of Japan, which had gone from a class-stratified society to a more capitalist nation with an eye on Western influences. His visit spawned commerce with Japan and a growing fascination with Japanese culture and style. Grant and the young Emperor Meiji spent time discussing politics and governance together.[30] The belief spread that Grant's visits granted him substantial influence on Japanese policy. By the time Grant left Japan in August of 1879, the United States had adopted almost an obsession with Japan. This obsession translated into commerce, creating a booming export market for old feudal Japanese artifacts that the new government was only too happy to discard. Americans bought these items and saw them as the height of style and fashion. Items such as kimonos, paper parasols, and folding fans became the fashion trend for ladies of all social ranks. [31]

Although this view of the Japanese was of high regard, it was mainly held only on the East Coast. It was not until a small percentage of easterners migrated to the West Coast that the belief that the Japanese were somehow superior to the Chinese, both personally and culturally,

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[29] Patrick Parr, "American President Ulysses S. Grant Talks Peace in Meiji Era Japan," September, 21, 2018, https://japantoday.com/category/features/lifestyle/american-president-ulysses-s-grant-talks-peace-in-meiji-era-japan.

[30] Parr, "American President Ulysses S. Grant."

[31] Jenn M., "A Tale of Two Nations: Victorian America and the Japan Craze," *Archeology & Museum Blog.*

began to spread.[32] These easterners took advantage of the completed transcontinental railroad, which made the trip west much more feasible than in previous years. The western half of this railroad was constructed by Chinese laborers and completed in 1869. At the same time, many employers were happy that many Chinese immigrants could avoid the Page Act and were still coming in looking for work.

A man who was not happy about the continuous stream of Chinese immigrants was Horace Page and his supporters. Even though he had successfully slowed the flow of immigrants down to a relative trickle, it was still not enough. Another factor that emerged was the growing voice of the labor movement, which saw Chinese immigration as a direct hindrance in their efforts to improve union members' wages. States such as California and Washington demanded that the Federal Government take immediate action before the country "becomes overrun." Page responded to these demands as before; he continued to press his anti-Chinese viewpoint and present anti-immigration bills to Congress. A bill he proposed after the pressure of the labor unions reached a boiling point was a bill that called for a complete ban on Chinese immigration. He submitted the bill on April 12, 1882, and although it appeared to target only laborers, its wording outlined that no Chinese immigrant could legally enter the country.[33] The bill also confirmed that any Chinese already in the country could not become citizens.

Signed into law by President Chester A. Arthur on May 6, 1882, the bill calling for the complete ban on Chinese immigration sailed through Congress. The full-scale Chinese Exclusion Act was in effect and was the first law passed in the United States that banned a specific national

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[32] Williams, *Congressional Career of the Hon. H. F.,* 3.

[33] Beth Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 61.

or ethnic group of people from entering America. This law stood for over five decades, repealed in 1943 when China became a member of the Allied Nations during WWII.[34]

Once fully enforced, the stream of Chinese immigrants stopped, and American businesses and labor groups searched for another source of labor for farms and railroads. Although the labor unions were the loudest voice for Chinese exclusion, employers still wanted the cheapest labor possible and did not want to meet the labor union's demands. They needed a new source of labor, one they could pay minimally and work longer and harder than American citizens. They found this source in the ethnic Japanese population.

The influx of Japanese immigration to the West Coast did not happen overnight or within the next few years. In 1881, seeing the coming ban on Chinese labor, King Kalakaua again visited Japan, spoke to Emperor Meiji, and requested to discuss the contract labor agreement program. Japan considered the harsh treatment of Japanese laborers and the failure of the first contract experiment an insult to Japan, and further emigration was prohibited.[35] Upon the King's reassurances and acknowledgment of mistakes, the King promised they would not happen again; the emperor reluctantly agreed to restart the contract program in Hawaii.

The influx of Japanese to Hawaii did not happen immediately; however, in 1885, Japan and the Kingdom of Hawaii signed a joint agreement to allow Japanese contract workers to emigrate to Hawaii on work contracts. The experiment was a success the second time around, and the agreement benefited both sides as Japan was still suffering from a class-stratified social structure with many farmers and laborers in poverty with scant opportunity to improve their lives. This program offered them an opportunity to do just that. Between 1885 and 1894,

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[34] National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/chinese-exclusion-act

[35] "Restrictions on Immigration; Private-Contract Immigration; Free Immigration," *Nisei* Veterans Legacy, https://www.nvichawaii.org/restrictions-im migration-private-contract-immigration-free-immigration.

approximately 30,000 Japanese government-sponsored contract workers came to Hawaii. The contracts had limits of three to five years and paid a much higher wage of $15 a month than the previous program of $4.[36] While the treatment of the laborers was much better, the work was still the same, and the ethnic Japanese found themselves toiling away chopping sugarcane in the Hawaii heat. The plantation owners strictly controlled the lives of the Japanese during their off hours, prompting growing resentment.

Rumors began to spread of better conditions and more profitable opportunities in the United States, prompting those who had finished their contracts to head to the West Coast. Census numbers indicate that the ethnic Japanese population on the West Coast increased from 148 in 1880 to 2,039 by 1890.[37] The pace of immigration increased dramatically in 1894 when most of the contract terms in Hawaii had ended. Plantation owners were required to pay higher wages and provide better living conditions to their workers without contracts. Most plantation owners chose to allow the contracts to end naturally. In addition, the United States and Japan signed a treaty that outlined that Japan would be treated as an equal partner and awarded complete tariff autonomy to Japan.[38] One of the stipulations of this treaty was the guarantee of immigration of Japanese nationals to the United States with the promise of being treated equally alongside U.S. citizens.[39] This stipulation was to be reciprocated in Japan as well.

Well-educated business entrepreneurs were migrating to West Coast cities during this time, all of which had the tentative belief that the Japanese were somehow “superior” to the

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[36] "Restrictions on Immigration; Private-Contract Immigration; Free Immigration," *Nisei* Veterans Legacy, https://www.nvichawaii.org/restrictions-im migration-private-contract-immigration-free-immigration.

[37] Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 69.

[38] Buel W. Patch, "Japanese-American Relations." In *Editorial Research Reports 1932*, vol. II, 245-68. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1932.

[39] Patch, “Japanese-American Relations.” 1932, 252.

Chinese, personally and culturally. With the influx of Japanese immigration, many U.S. businesses believed their problem could be solved. Japanese labor was filling the labor gaps, and business was booming. In California and Washington state, ethnic Japanese began to partner with farmers and businessmen to lure additional Japanese to the United States. In the beginning, employers and citizens patted themselves on the back, thinking that they had solved their labor problem with a group of people they, and the country, considered clean and morally superior to the Chinese.

Organized labor unions, however, held a different view. Labor union members believed the Japanese should be excluded from the labor pool and the U.S. altogether. In 1892, the San Francisco *Morning Call* ran a series of "investigative" articles that were nothing but racist rants about Japanese workers. One of their misinformation statements was the number of Japanese they claimed were in California at the time; their articles were always a tenfold exaggeration of the number of Japanese immigrants in the area. The *Morning Call* ran other articles citing that every cargo ship that arrives from Yokohama brings in "pleasant little people from the Mikado's realm, and they displace thousands of white girls and boys as domestics or in factories."[40] The *Morning Call* claimed that Japanese workers would take any job they could find, even at a lower wage than the Chinese laborers.

While the *Morning Call* affected the residents' local thinking, its impact was minimal. This thinking was due to the lack of Japanese residents in the area; people did not see the Japanese in numbers during their day-to-day activities and brushed off the warnings. Even so, the series sold enough newspapers and set the stage for an anti-Japanese sentiment that exploded as soon as the Japanese population increased. The residents did not have to wait long; in 1898, after

[40] Japanese Pouring In, *San Francisco Morning Call*, May 4, 1892, https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=SFC18920504.1.8.

six years of articles inciting racism, the U.S. annexed Hawaii and canceled all Japanese labor contracts. This annexation forced Japanese labor to head to the West Coast and into a racially charged climate.[41] Current West Coast Japanese residents, who enjoyed success as labor contractors, encouraged Hawaii Japanese laborers to migrate, and many did, becoming successful labor contractors themselves. Most of the new influx of Japanese went into the agriculture sector, with the rest filling the job openings in logging, mining, and factories.[42] Japanese continued to arrive, but it was not until 1900, with the arrival of 12,000 in a single year, that the population approached 25,000.

Labor unions and white supremacist groups continued to work to have all Japanese immigrants removed from American soil. Not realizing immediate success, they switched tactics and pressured lawmakers to deny any Japanese immigrants a path to citizenship, including birth on American soil.[43] They continued the work of the *Morning Call* and labeled the Japanese as "sneaky," "clannish," and "out to undermine white society." They labeled Japanese women as prostitutes and identified the once coveted Japanese art and artifacts of their culture as nothing more than pieces of an alien race that could never blend into American society.[44] In 1901, the United States Industrial Commission declared that the Japanese were "more servile than the Chinese, but less obedient and far less desirable. They have most of the vices of the Chinese but none of the virtues. They underbid the Chinese in everything and are as class tricky, unreliable, and dishonest."[45]

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[41] Emily Anderson, "Immigration," Densho Encyclopedia, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Immigration.

[42] Anderson, “Immigration,” np.

[43] Paul Finkleman, "Coping with a New Yellow Peril': Japanese Immigration, the Gentleman's Agreement, and the Coming of World War II,” *West Virginia Law* Review 117, no. 3 (2015), 1409-1451.

[44] Finkleman, "Coping with a New Yellow Peril, 2015.

[45] Devon Carbado, “Yellow by Law,” *California Law Review* 97 (June 2009): 641.

Organized labor unions went one step further and accused the ethnic Japanese of working to destroy the lives of American workers. An article in the American Federation magazine, the official magazine of the labor union, declared, "White workers, even the ignorant ones and the newcomers from southern and eastern Europe, possessed qualities enabling them to join and contribute to the labor movement. They could be taught the fundamentals of unionism and would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with faithful workers…. Unable to be 'assimilated,' the Japanese could not become 'union men.'"[46] Most ordinary white citizens believed that the ethnic Japanese should never be allowed to become U.S. Citizens and joined the movement.

Labor unions continued the fight against immigrants and leveraged law offices to terminate work contracts and eliminate possibilities of citizenship. The argument against citizenship did not win out, as several court cases prior to this fight established that the U.S. is a *jus soli* nation, and anyone born on American soil is an American citizen with all rights therein. This landmark decision occurred during *Wong Kim Ark vs United States*, brought to the Supreme Court in 1898. The Court ruled in favor of Wong in a 6-2 decision that Wong was indeed a citizen of the United States as he was born on American soil.[47] This decision established that the 14 Amendment applied to foreigners with children born on American soil and that the U.S. is a *jus Soli (Law of the Soil)* nation.

This decision would allow future Japanese immigrants to buy and lease land through their children as their children, having been born on U.S. soil, were considered American citizens. This conclusion would directly impact the forced evacuations of 1942 as the land seized from farming families did indeed belong to American citizens. Although the decision on *United States*

[46] Devon Carbado, "Yellow by Law," *California Law Review* 97 (June 2009): 641.

[47] Bethany R. Berger, "*Birthright Citizenship on Trial: Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark*," Cardozo Law Review 37 (April 2016): 1220.

v. Wong Kim Ark protected the ethnic Japanese and Chinese children, it did nothing to solve the labor shortage problem caused by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Filling these labor shortage spots were the ethnic Japanese, who were under attack by the labor unions, working to demonize any group who worked for lower wages as it hindered their chances to drive wages upward for themselves. The negative view of the ethnic Chinese and Japanese created a political utopia for those seeking elected office. Politicians used the steady stream of propaganda against the ethnic Chinese and Japanese as a political platform and a ready-made campaign issue. This perfect storm brought forth one of the most successful race-baiters in the nation, a "cultured" man from San Francisco who fed the racist sentiment for three decades.

James D. Phelan, an heir to a banking fortune, considered a cultured and classically educated man, was a fixture in San Francisco society. He ran for Mayor of San Francisco in 1896 with the promise of ridding San Francisco of the "Chinese and Japanese menace."[48] The now solidified belief was that the influx of migrant workers from Japan, who were having children born in America who could vote, would change the course of the political world in California. Phelan, though claiming he had no political skills, won a decisive victory over his Republican opponent and came to office promising to improve the city's water supply, pass a revised city charter, and cut the waste and extravagance that is the cause of high taxation, and to ensure the municipal offices were conducted without extravagance, waste or corruption.[49] He then added an additional promise to the people once he took office: Chinese and Japanese exclusion.

When Phelan first took office in 1897, the Supreme Court had yet to rule on *Wong Kim Ark*, and Phelan was no more anti-Asian than any other member of society. He immediately

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[48] Mrs. Fremont Older, *San Francisco: The Magic City* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1961), 187.

[49] Another Charter is Now Demanded, *San Francisco Call*, November 7, 1896, https://www.newspapers.com/image/77951366/.

changed this stance when he discovered its political advantage to side with the labor unions and push for the exclusion of ethnic Chinese and Japanese. Phelan claimed that "the Pacific Slope could be overrun by hordes of Japanese." These comments seemed out of context, considering that at the time, less than 10,000 ethnic Japanese were living on the West Coast and a microscopic number in San Francisco proper. In 1900, however, the influx of 12,000 Japanese in a single year convinced the people that Phelan's prediction was prophetic.[50] As his mayoral term continued, he became the most reliable spokesperson for white supremacy and gained the support of the San Francisco labor unions and anti-Japanese business leaders such as newspaper owners William Randolph Hearst and V.S. McClatchy.

Labor unrest in San Francisco began during the rebound from the Panic of 1893 and soon turned into full-scale labor riots. The goal of the labor unions was more reasonable hours, increased pay, Japanese exclusion, and benefits for families. After several strikes involving more than 20,000 people, the labor crisis ended with Phelan calling for the complete exclusion of Chinese and Japanese laborers. He stated that: "the character and rapidly increasing numbers of Japanese and other Asiatic immigrants a menace to the industrial interests of our people." During his tenure as Mayor of San Francisco, Phelan used every excuse he could to discredit the Chinese and Japanese residents. In February 1900, an incident gave him an ideal reason to attack these populations again. During the early part of the month, dead rats turned up on the streets of Chinatown; no one noticed until a man named Wong Chut Kink, a Chinese laborer, was found in the basement of the old Globe Hotel. A responding police surgeon noticed enlarged glands and

[50] Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 47.

other signs that caused him to believe the man's death resulted from the bubonic plague. He immediately reported the death to the Board of Health.[51]

Word spread to the police commissioner and then to the Mayoral office, where Phelan wasted no time taking action. Regardless of modern times' increased sanitation and cleanliness, Phelan knew that a case of the Black Death in Chinatown would quickly spread panic across the city, stir the hatred of the ethnic Chinese, and perhaps help him politically. Phelan publicly called the Chinese and Japanese "filthy races" and menaces to public health and ordered both Chinatown and the two small Japanese neighborhoods to be roped off and placed under quarantine. Phelan expected high praise from the public since his actions focused on the ethnic Chinese and Japanese and not on any white residents.[52]

His response to this perceived crisis was not what he expected. The Governor of California quickly saw the potential impact of a plague outbreak and what it would cost the shipping and commerce sectors. California Governor Henry Gage issued a string of denials and claimed that the reports of plague were politically motivated. Newspapers carried the story; even the *Morning Call*, usually a Phelan supporter, ran the story headline, "Fake Plague Part of Plot to Plunder."[53] The story said there was no plague in San Francisco, and anyone who supported such a rumor was only attempting to blackmail the city out of funds to feed the office-seeking hordes that followed Mayor Phelan.[54]

In an interesting twist, records show that Phelan's action may have saved the city. Several animals injected with the infected man's blood died a couple of days after the *Morning Call* ran

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[51] Police Block All Entrance to Chinatown, *San Francisco Examiner*, March 7, 1900, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457374498/.

[52] Plague Fake Part of Plot to Plunder, *San Francisco Call*, March 8, 1900, https://www.newspapers.com/image/78259029/.

[53] Plague Fake Part of Plot to Plunder, *San Francisco Call*, March 8, 1900.

[54] Ibid.

its article, confirming his infection with the plague.[55] Although perceived as racist, his quarantine actions likely saved thousands of lives. Nevertheless, San Francisco would fight the Black Plague for the next three years and lose approximately 100 residents to the disease. Although the plague was a legitimate threat, the ethnic Chinese and Japanese groups saw these actions as nothing but an attempt to blame them for every problem the city faced and to isolate and segregate them rather than the disease.

Their fears were easily substantiated when, on May 7, 1900, a well-attended mass meeting was held under the direction of the city's united labor organizations to protest the violations of the Chinese Exclusion Act and the influx of Japanese laborers.[56] Mayor Phelan, a keynote speaker at this event, arrived to a prolonged applause. He began by stating that the existing Exclusion Act was doing nothing to stem the growth of the Chinese labor class. He explained,

> But it is not a local question, a question that may affect the very existence of the Republic. The framers of our naturalization laws considered only the Caucasian race when they said that America should be an asylum for the oppressed. The Oriental races do not come here as an oppressed people seeking asylum. The decline of Rome dates from the time she brought the subjugated people to Italy as slaves and placed them on the farms and vineyards, driving the native-born population to the city. If America permits the free and unrestricted immigration of the servile races, the history of Rome will be repeated.[57]

A noted eugenicist, Edward A. Ross, a Stanford sociology professor, followed Mayor Phelan and stated, "In a thoughtful and eloquent discussion of the economic phases of the problem, the Chinese and Japanese are impossible among us because they cannot assimilate with us; they represent a different and an inferior civilization to our own and mean by their presence

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[55] Ibid.

[56] Warning Against Coolie "Natives and Japanese, *San Francisco Call*, May 8, 1900, https://www.newspapers.com/image/78268425/.

[57] Many Voices for Japanese Exclusion, *San Francisco Examiner*, May 8, 1900, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457649875/.

the degradation of American labor and American life." [58] Ross went on to demand protections for American workmen and American products. He also stated that training American guns on every vessel bringing Japanese to American shores would be better than allowing them to land.[59]

During this mass meeting, the most prolific complaint was the cheap labor the ethnic Chinese and Japanese offered employers. Due to this, labor unions could not negotiate higher wages for themselves as foreign laborers continuously undercut them. The second strongest complaint was that the sons of these foreigners, born on American soil, such as Won Kim Ark, could "steal" the vote. The union leaders demanded the expulsion of the ethnic Chinese and Japanese, regardless of citizen status. Mayor Phelan seized the opportunity to garner support by stating, "From whatever point of view we look, Asiatic labor is unwelcome, unsolicited, and unwholesome. More than that, the Chinese are springing upon us 'native sons.' They are a menace to our civilization and to everything we cherish.[60] The following day, spurred by this meeting, the Port Authority of San Francisco announced the detaining of all arriving Chinese who claimed to be American citizens until the completion of a thorough examination process, regardless of any documentation.

This mass meeting resulted in a series of resolutions drafted by the Labor Council and forwarded to state and local politicians. Their main resolution follows:

> Resolved, by the citizens of San Francisco, in mass meeting assembled this seventh day of May 1900, that we urge upon Congress to re-enact the Chinese exclusion act, with such additions as may be necessary to make it fully effective for the protection of American labor; and, be it further Resolved, That we also urge the adoption of an act of Congress or the adoption of such other measures as may be necessary for the total exclusion of all classes of Japanese other than members of the diplomatic staff. Such a law has become a necessity not only on the ground set forth in the policy of Chinese exclusion but because of additional reasons resting in the fact that the assumed virtue of

[58] Many Voices for Japanese Exclusion, *San Francisco Examiner*, May 8, 1900.
[59] Many Voices for Japanese Exclusion, *San Francisco Examiner*, May 8, 1900.
[60] Plague Fake Part of Plot to Plunder, *San Francisco Call*, March 8, 1900.

> the Japanese, i.e., their partial adoption of American customs, makes them the more dangerous as competitors.[61]

The Labor Council found the ethnic Japanese a threat due to their lack of assimilation and their success at assimilating. This meeting was not a spontaneous event as labor unrest in the area, and California in general, had been building since the recovery from the Panic of 1893. This recovery saw an explosion in worker demand, so much so that the San Francisco area saw employment levels near 100 percent. Labor groups saw the opportunity to strike and created official labor unions to achieve higher wages and shorter hours. In September of 1900, just a few months after the mass meeting, employers began to fire employees of labor unions and stated that they would only be re-hired if they quit their union. This action and demand caused a ripple effect in the working sectors of San Francisco as one employer after another followed this example. The labor unions responded with threats of strikes, promising to bring the entire economic machine of San Francisco to a grinding halt.[62] These labor unions represented seamen, longshoremen, and riggers, to name a few. Their goals were straightforward: hiring them back, lowering their working hours, and raising their pay. What resulted would shape the region's politics and directly impact the evacuation of 1942.

Beginning in March 1901, the labor unions had grown to include more than 3,400 laborers in various trades. They engaged in on-again, off-again labor strikes, frequently forcing the owners and employers to do the laborers' work. Of course, they could not produce their employees' output, but they did what they could to keep commerce moving. The situation continued to worsen for the employers. By July 1901, the labor unions represented 15,000

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[61] Goldstone, *Not White Enough*, 51.

[62] Teamsters Strike in San Francisco, *Stockton Evening Mail,* July 22, 1901, https://www.newspapers.com/image/609366389/.

laborers and had thirteen individual labor unions within the city.[63] The employers fought back, forming a secret group called the Employers' Association to check the labor unions' rising power.[64]

The owners of companies hired non-union men to unload and deliver cargo throughout the city to keep commerce moving. Constantly attacked by picketing labor union workers, they requested local law enforcement to protect these "drivers." Mayor Phelan weighed in on the issue and faced the prospect of violence against non-union workers at the hands of union ones; Phelan sided with the owners and assigned the police as escorts. Phelan was known to be sympathetic to the working class, but his friends and business partners were the owners of the companies making the request. This setup lasted barely 48 hours. On July 25, the police attacked a group of picketers, resulting in the beating of five union men by the police who claimed they were causing civil unrest; the labor unions denied this.[65]

Tension rose quickly, and the following night saw another incident between the police and union men. This time, the picketers closed in on the police officer who tried to beat a man, resulting in a full-scale riot involving over 1,000 people. By the end of the melee, several casualties were reported on both sides.[66] The result was the Employers Association giving an ultimatum to union men who were still working to leave the union or their jobs. Once again, the labor unions threatened a full-scale strike, and once again, Mayor Phelan had a choice of whose side to take. He again chose the employers' side and tried to negotiate an agreement with the

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[63] Thomas Walker Page, "The San Francisco Labor Movement in 1901, "*Political Science Quarterly 17"* (December 1902): 668.

[64] No Heavy Hauling Likely to be Done, Eighteen Thousand Men May Be Involved in Strike, *San Francisco Examiner*, July 22, 1901, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457700960/.

[65] Both Draymen and Employees Claim Gains in the Labor Controversy, *San Francisco Call*, July 24, 1901, https://www.newspapers.com/image/46528677/.

[66] Policemen Use Clubs and Mob Hurls Stones, *San Francisco Examiner*, July 26, 1901, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457714823/.

unions. This negotiation failed, and at the end of July, the Labor Council initiated a full-scale strike that brought commerce in San Francisco to a grinding halt. It was during this time that a swap of sorts took place. Union men who needed funds went into the country to work on farms and in agriculture. Those who were on the farms, replaced by the city workers, came into the city in an attempt to work for the employers. This program lasted a very short time as the picketing union men became militant and attacked all incoming farmers or country workers, many of whom never made it to their first day of work.[67]

As the strikes wore on, union men became increasingly desperate as funds began to dry up. The Employers Association stood firm in its resolve and did not give in to the laborers' demands. By August, the streets saw widespread violence, significant arrests, and even civilian casualties. Once again asked to intervene, Mayor Phelan chose the employers' side. At this point, the labor unions saw him as a traitor, and he realized that November's re-election chances were withering away.[68] The labor unions, realizing this as well, decided to change tactics and attack the labor issue at the ballot box. They knew the strike would fail soon as people would return to work to feed their families, so they organized a movement to get labor union leaders elected to the government. The labor unions organized four members from each of the 125 unions in San Francisco, which represented approximately 50,000 voters. The Employers Association did not take this movement seriously as they did not believe anyone within the ranks of the labor unions capable of winning, let alone serving, in a government capacity.

One man did not think this move was a joke and decided to help the labor unions, if only for his gain. Abraham Rueff was a San Francisco native born in 1864 to a prosperous Jewish

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[67] Policemen Use Clubs and Mob Hurls Stones, *San Francisco Examiner*, July 26, 1901.

[68] Visitors Formally Welcomed by Mayor Phelan, *San Francisco Call,* July 14, 1901, https://www.newspapers.com/image/46525065/.

merchant. He was a prodigy, eventually becoming fluent in eight languages, graduating Berkley at eighteen with high honors, excelling at law school, and joining the California bar at the minimum age of 21.[69] Rueff entered politics to end corruption and bring about reform. He formed the Municipal Reform League and frequently corresponded with another reformer from New York, Theodore Roosevelt.

While noble, Rueff's drive to bring about reform in California was doomed to fail before it started. Controlled by the Southern Pacific Railroad and many industrial barons, California was a terrible place to try to be an idealist. Rueff decided that if "you cannot beat them, you might as well join them." Upon hearing of the convention brought about by the labor unions and their four selected members from each of the 125 unions, Rueff decided to attend. He found chaos caused by the sixty-eight unions that had sent delegations whose assigned leaders did not want to cede authority to any other labor union group. Everyone was leery of the attempt to create a hierarchical organization. The only thing that all groups could agree on was their anti-Asiatic sentiments.

Using his wit, political savvy, and charm, Rueff seized the opportunity in the chaos to take over and become the convention's leader. He authored the policy declaration for the group and ensured it included a strict program of Asian exclusion.[70] Rueff selected Eugene Schmitz as the primary candidate for the Mayoral election scheduled for November that year. Schmitz had no political experience and was the perfect puppet for Rueff to control and guide as he set his sights on his advancement. Under Rueff's guidance, Schmitz memorized the City Articles and the

[69] Page, "The San Francisco Labor Movement in 1901, 681.

[70] Delegates Representing Many Labor Unions Meet in Convention to Nominate their Ticket, *San Francisco Examiner*, September 6, 1901, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457636052/.

California Constitution. He became an average orator but effective since Rueff wrote all his speeches with the perfect phrases and just the right things to say.[71]

During this time, the strikers continued to grow desperate yet insisted that they would stay the course for as long as it took to get the desired results. Rumors began that a deal was needed so people could return to work as the strikers were running out of money. Another riot broke out on September 28 when an armed mob attacked a small body of special officers and local police. Before the violence ended, thanks to the arrival of additional officers, several people were shot. The local papers whipped the event into a frenzy, attributing the building damage from bullets and bats.[72]

This riot, dubbed "The Kearney Street battle," was a disaster for the labor unions and a win for the Employers' Association. Public opinion shifted, and the Employers' Association was only too happy to exploit this development. They donated $200,000 to the police to increase manpower as the city braced for a war between the labor unions and the police. Local papers reported, "houses were barricaded, and old weapons were dusted off and brought back into service. Men stayed home by night and walked the streets heavily armed daily."[73] Although the labor unions continued to hold out, the public and Employers' Associations could see that the strike had failed. A settlement was announced on October 2, in which nothing additional was granted beyond what the Employers' Association conceded in the July agreement. The significant impact on the city and state was in city politics.[74]

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[71] Jules Tygiel,'. . . Where Unionism Holds Undisputed Sway: A Reappraisal of San Francisco's Union Labor Party," *California History 62* (fall 1983): 203.

[72] Strikers Attack Teamsters and Guards and in Fusillade Fired by Specials Two men in the Crowd Receive Serious Wounds, *San Francisco Call*, September 28, 1901, https://www.newspapers.com/image/46544416/.

[73] Page, *The San Francisco Labor Movement in 1901*, 684.

[74] Ibid, 685.

Mayor James Phelan did not run for re-election in November. The Democrats nominated Joseph Tobin, a Phelan acolyte, and the Republicans nominated the city auditor, Asa Wells. As for the dissatisfied and defeated labor group, anyone would do, and this is where Abe Rueff and Eugene Schmitz came in. They organized and mobilized the labor group into an effective campaign party. Although they could not secure a spot on the October 10 ballot, they secured one on the November ballot. Through an impressive campaign that showed Schmitz as a fellow laborer and not a "born into money" politician, in a surprising outcome, he won the election of 1901 and became Mayor of San Francisco.[75]

What occurred was a mayoral term full of bribery, blackmail, extortion, and thievery. A political observer, George Kennan, wrote in 1907:

> When Mayor Schmitz came before the voters of San Francisco as a candidate for re-election on the Labor-Union ticket in the fall of 1905, it was perfectly well known to the reading and thinking people of the city that Rueff, the Mayor, and the members of the municipal boards were blackmailers, extortioners, and thieves. The administration made a business of selling immunity to gamblers, prize-fighting promoters, and keepers of brothels. The police were giving protection to criminals, taking money, and blackmailing law-breakers, compelling, honest citizens to pay tribute to the police. It was well known that every branch of city government was shamelessly and almost defiantly corrupt.[76]

The main thing that kept Schmitz and Rueff in power was the belief and understanding that they were not taking money from the working class. They only took from the corrupt or rich, not the poor, so they were continuously re-elected.

Throughout their term, James Phelan continued the fight against the ethnic Chinese and Japanese residents. Even though Phelan was not involved in politics anymore, he organized a Chinese Exclusion convention where a resolution calling the "character and rapidly increasing numbers of Japanese and other Asiatic immigrants a menace to the industrial interests of our

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[75] George Kennan, "The Fight for Reform in San Francisco," McClure's, September 1907, 547
[76] Kennan, “The Fight for Reform in San Francisco,” 556.

people" was passed.[77] During the five years of Rueff and Schmitz's term, Phelan continued his attempts at reinvigorating Chinese Exclusion, and various parties in the city attempted to dethrone Schmitz and Rueff without success.

The San Francisco earthquake and resulting fire of 1906 brought about immediate change to the city and California. The earthquake and fires left 400,000 residents homeless, 28,000 city blocks destroyed, and 3,000 people dead. [78] Despite this destruction and tragedy, the city was not wholly destroyed. Everything from the buildings to the underground utilities was damaged or destroyed, leaving firefighters without water to fight the fires cropping up. These fires eventually destroyed 80 percent of the city. Even before the fires were out, rebuilding was taking place. The Federal Government sent money and troops to help maintain order, and plumbers and brick layers came by the thousands. Mayor Schmitz issued a shoot-to-kill order to stop looting and moved to gain control of neighborhoods as he attempted to redesign the city. One of these neighborhoods was Chinatown.[79]

The catastrophe destroyed Chinatown, home to roughly 14,000 residents. The lightweight wood buildings suffered extreme damage from the earthquake, and the fire burned away the rubble. There was nothing left of the area once the fires went out. The white residents did not concern themselves with helping Chinatown residents, only with the land where Chinatown once stood. On April 23, the *Oakland Enquirer* ran an article titled, "Let Us Have No More

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[77] Raymond L. Buell, "The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly 37*, no. 4 (1922): 612.

[78] Earthquake And Fire: San Francisco In Ruins, *Call-Chronicle-Examiner,* April 19, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/49604294/.

[79] Mayor Confers with Military and Citizens, *Call-Chronicle-Examiner,* April 19, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/49604294/.

Chinatowns in Our Cities," citing that the earthquake had provided an unprecedented opportunity to forever do away with the "huddling together" of Chinese in districts where it is undesirable.[80]

Due to its location, Chinatown was considered extremely valuable, and politicians immediately attempted to obtain it. Rumors of an abandoned Chinatown circulated a year earlier; the press had tried to push the idea, and the city tried to re-zone Chinatown into a business district and build a new "Chinatown" on the bay shore.[81] Rueff and Mayor Schmitz were the organizers of these rumors and plans. Attempts to move it forward after the earthquake never gained traction. The Chinese did not sit idly by and allow the takeover. They again turned to the Six Companies and hired prominent white lawyers to defend them. The Chinese consul joined the fight and filed an official complaint with the city and Washington D.C.

While the residents of Chinatown worked to establish a defense, Rueff and Schmitz attempted to herd the Chinese residents into a tent city they were erecting on the Presidio. Rueff knew that if one person returned to Chinatown, they would all follow and return to their former homes, and removing them would be impossible.[82] Rueff planned to move Chinatown to Hunters Point, an undesirable area of San Francisco Bay. Although Ruef was quietly soliciting offers for the land that Chinatown occupied, he ran into a significant problem. Chinese American citizens owned several parcels of land in Chinatown, and, at the time, there was no law or provision in place barring Chinese immigrants from owning and developing land and owning businesses.

In the end, the attempt at a land grab of Chinatown failed. Opposition to Rueff and his goals came from the government and business owners all over the country who enjoyed lucrative

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[80] Let Us Have No More Chinatowns in Our Cities *Oakland Enquirer*, April 23, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/998207322/.

[81] Earthquake in Chinatown, https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/earthquake-the-chinatown-story-chinese-historical-society-of-america/gQrsWsc?hl=en.

[82] First Permit for a Steel Building. Construction Soon to be Under Way, *San Francisco Call*, April 28, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/80941412/.

trade and business dealings with China and had no interest in losing such a profitable venture.[83] The Chinatown residents worked as a community and rebuilt their property while simultaneously fighting Rueff and Schmitz in city hall. The residents of Chinatown won in the end, rebuilding their town exactly where it was before, and as a bonus, in 1908, Federal investigators charged Mayor Eugene Schmitz and Assistant Abraham Rueff with extortion and corruption. Schmitz decided to leave the country and fled to Europe. Rueff worked to steer public attention away from his crimes. He once again turned to anti-Asian racism, this time focusing solely on the Japanese.[84]

The attack on Japanese immigrants began in the classroom with segregation acts aimed at Japanese students. On October 11, the San Francisco School Board ordered Japanese and Korean children to attend the "Oriental School." This school was a segregated elementary school previously reserved for Chinese students. Their justification came from an 1896 Supreme Court decision, *Plessy v. Ferguson,* and the separate-but-equal clause. This Supreme Court decision allowed the School Board to segregate "Mongolian" children into separate schools.[85] The Board did nothing to hide their intent, nor did they deny that this was segregation through and through. The timing of the School Boards' order allowed for Schmitz and Rueff to make martyrs of themselves and distract from their more glaring shortfalls.[86]

The School Board, claiming overcrowded classrooms were hindering the teaching of all students, called for a thinning of the classrooms and to remove the ethnic Chinese and Japanese

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[83] To Rebuild Chinatown Their Desire, *Oakland Enquirer,* April 23, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/998207322/.

[84] Kiyo Sue Inui, "The Gentlemen's Agreement: How It Has Functioned," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 122 (November 1925), 189.

[85] Raymond L. Buell, "The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly 37*, no. 4 (1922), 623.

[86] Buell, “Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation,” 623.

so the white pupils did not feel their influence.[87] The School Board's claim of overrun classrooms with ethnic Chinese and Japanese students was incorrect. Out of a registered population of approximately twenty thousand students, the initiative affected only 93. Abe Rueff's son-in-law, Aaron Altmann, a leading member of the School Board, claimed he thoroughly studied the issue; however, that study was never made public. Japanese community leaders stated that though the earthquake destroyed the schools, the Board of Education president had toured the newly opened schools and found minimal overcrowding. At the time of inspection, there were 25,000 registered students, and only ninety-three were non-white.

The focus shifted from the Chinese to Japanese immigrants due to their successes and lack of immigration control. The progress of Japan had not slowed since President Grant's visit; every sector of the country experienced growth and success, from education to military power. At the time of the School Board's segregation initiative, Japan's power was equal to any Western nation. America took note when Japan defeated China in 1895 and gained control of the Korean Peninsula. This victory and takeover put Japan at odds with Russia and the status of Manchuria and the northern part of the Korean peninsula. As Japan attempted to negotiate with Russia, European powers watched and waited. They did not have high expectations of Japan, and though they were aware of Japan's progress, they saw no issue with an Asian country defeating another Asian country, and they did not see Japan besting a country such as Russia.

This doubt proved to be a substantial underestimation of Japan's power and progress. Aiding Japan's success was the belief that the Russian commanders were lazy and incompetent aristocrats backed up by soldiers who did not have the work ethic or the initiative to complete any given task save for completing their term and going home alive. Once negotiations regarding

[87] Buell, 624.

Manchuria broke down, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, a warm-water Russian port. Japan did not declare war on Russia until hours after the attack. The conflict between Russia and Japan lasted eighteen months, culminating in Russia's defeat. Tsar Nicholas II requested peace with Japan, which agreed, and both sides requested President Theodore Roosevelt to act as a mediator. The resulting treaty granted complete control of Korea Manchuria and a lease of Port Arthur to the Japanese. President Roosevelt went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize; however, he drew accusations of favoritism towards Russia amongst the Japanese for not supporting and enforcing the reparations insisted on by the Japanese.[88]

No country in the world doubted that Japan had risen to become a world power; their defeat of the Russian Navy was proof of such status. Japan continued its expansion campaign without trying to hide its goals or purpose. Residents on the West Coast saw this agenda as a direct threat to their livelihood and overall welfare. The resident population was already in the midst of decades of Asian prejudice; it did not take much to rouse the populous into believing that Japan would soon invade America's shores.[89] The *San Francisco Examiner* ran a story in 1905 titled "And Now?" The story depicted Japan casting a shadow over the Pacific and onto the United States.[90] The story spurred segregationists into action. They attempted to convince the public that the Japanese were in a prime position to embed themselves in American society for nefarious ends. Abe Rueff hoped that choosing such a vulnerable target would convince these groups that his political machine was still in place and best suited to protect their mutual interests.[91] Rueff miscalculated his goal of replacing his scandal headlines with the headlines of

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[88] Greg Russell. "Theodore Roosevelt's Diplomacy and the Quest for Great Power Equilibrium in Asia." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (2008), 437.

[89] And Now?, *San Francisco Examiner*, September 8, 1905, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457507261/.

[90] And Now?, *San Francisco Examiner*, September 8, 1905.

[91] News of the Labor World, *San Francisco Call*, October 18, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/80979536/.

school segregation. Although the news about school segregation appeared in the local papers, the story was buried beyond page five. The articles were also wholly inaccurate, citing that Japanese children were crowding out the white children in the classroom. The public, it seemed, was concerned not with segregation but with Abe Rueff and his actions while in power.

Japan, however, did not take the situation lightly. The Japanese reaction would set in motion a series of events with repercussions lasting for decades. The secretary of the Japanese Association of America, Aaron Altmann, filed a formal protest with the school board, including the announcement of the segregation initiative. The protest was rebuffed immediately, and Altmann sent word of the order to newspapers in Japan. In his notice, he wrote, "Stand up, Japanese nation! Our countrymen have been humiliated on the other side of the Pacific. Our poor boys and girls have been expelled from public schools by the rascals of the United States, cruel and merciless like demons. Yes, we should be ready to strike the Devil's head with an iron hammer for the sake of the world's civilization…Why do we not insist on sending ships?[92]

In response to public anger and outrage, the Japanese government called in U.S. Ambassador Luke Wright and protested the actions of the West Coast. Japan saw the segregation of their children as a direct insult to their honor and threatened military retaliation. As Japan had recently defeated the Russian Navy at Port Arthur, Americans took Japan's threats seriously, seeing them as a significant military power, and feared Japan's eastward expansion. Ambassador Wright sent word to Secretary of State Elihu Root, citing that Japan had been grievously insulted by the United Statutes. His message read in part, "The reported exclusion of children from the schools has given the deepest offense as Japanese schools are open to foreigners. I believe it

[92] Masuda Hajimu, "Rumors of War: Immigration Disputes and the Social Construction of American-Japanese Relations, 1905-1913," *Diplomatic History* 33 (January 2009): 11.

possible that Japanese authorities can be induced quietly to check the importation of Japanese coolies into the United States."[93]

Secretary of State Root was surprised by this message because the School Board did not bother to notify state or federal officials. President Roosevelt understood the purpose behind this move as he was a full supporter of the prosecution of Rueff and his group. Roosevelt immediately instructed a cable to be sent to Wright to assure Japan that "The United States will not for a moment entertain the idea of any treatment of the Japanese people other than that accorded to the people of the friendly European nations."[94] Roosevelt then dispatched Secretary of Commerce and Labor Victor Metcalf to San Francisco with orders to investigate and, if possible, diffuse the situation. Metcalf was a native Californian and former Congressman; Roosevelt hoped these would aid him in his task.

Metcalf responded to Roosevelt on November 28th and stated that state law allowed for segregation, and it was unlikely that the action violated any part of the treaty with Japan. He said the likelihood of the Board changing or softening its decision was impossible. His notice stated, "After my conversation with the president of the Board of Education and his legal advisor, I judge it hopeless to look for any modification or repeal on the part of the board of the obnoxious resolution."[95] Japan was growing more aggravated, and reports were circulating in Europe that the country was willing to go to war over the issue. Residents in California played up the threats, claiming that both the United States and Japan were on advance guard.

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[93] Translation of Telegram to Elihu Root from Luke E. Wright - Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907. https://diva.sfsu.edu/collections/ga1907/bundles/215940.

[94] David Brudnoy, Race and the San Francisco School Board Incident: Contemporary Evaluations, *California Historical Quarterly 50* (September 1971): 297.

[95] Letter from Roosevelt to Metcalf, https:/ / diva.sfsu.edu/collections/ga1go7/bundles/215932.

The tension increased in December 1906 when California congressman Everis Hayes told a reporter, "The Japanese immigrant is not an immigrant in the ordinary sense of the word. They came to learn our weaknesses and defects so as to turn that knowledge to their own advantage. Before Japan went to war with China, she had an army of spies and observers in Manchuria. The Japanese knew more about the Russian army than the Russians themselves. They are doing the same thing now in the United States."[96] Shortly after this comment, the *Examiner* ran a front-page headline, "Japan Sounds Our Coasts. Spies of the Emperor Plat Monterrey Bay. Brown Men Have Maps and Could Land Easily."[97] The agents that this headline was referring to were Japanese fishermen who ingeniously worked up a way to dredge for abalone off the shores of Santa Cruz.

President Roosevelt discounted these reports as soon as his cabinet presented them, citing them as nonsense. Roosevelt made his feelings known on December 4, 1906, in his annual speech to Congress, stating:

> The overwhelming mass of our people cherish a lively regard and respect for the wicked absurdity when there are no first-class colleges in the land, including the universities and colleges of California, which do not gladly welcome Japanese students and on which Japanese students do not reflect credit. Throughout Japan, Americans are well treated, and any failure on the part of Americans at home to treat the Japanese with a like courtesy and consideration is by just so much a confession of inferiority in our civilization.[98]

The final report from Victor Metcalf, delivered just a few days after the President's address to Congress, was described as "sensational" by Congress. In the report, Metcalf outlined nineteen incidents of violence directed at ethnic Japanese residents. One of these incidents was

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[96] Californians Talking of War; Resent President's Attitude On Japanese Question And Score Intruders, *Boston Globe*, December 2, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/430823330/

[97] Japan Sounds Our Coast, *San Francisco Examiner*, December 20, 1906, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/458016628/.

[98] Densho Encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.densho.org/San_Ficisco_school_segregation/.

the murder of a Japanese bank president. In the report, he stated that he found no justification for the segregation order and claimed that: "complaints of the Japanese, while based on the alleged violation of treaty rights in the matter of equal treatment, were probably prompted by maltreatment of Japanese residents of San Francisco by members of labor unions and other organizations who objected to their presence as workers on the Pacific Coast. Some of these facts will not be to the liking of those engaged in what an administration official today characterized as 'an effort on the part of the labor unions to drive the Japs from the country.'"[99]

The *Examiner* quickly responded to this report with an article titled "Metcalf Sides with the Japanese." The article described the local union leaders as irate and livid at the accusations of actions that they had, in fact, committed. Aaron Altmann denounced Metcalf for going out of his way and mixing the School Board segregation issue with that of the labor clashes.

At roughly the same time, Abe Rueff, Eugene Schmitz, and their accomplices were desperate to avoid attention and conviction. Their attempts failed as District Attorney Langdon and his appointed Deputy Francis J. Heney moved forward in their efforts to convict Rueff and his accomplices. Heney's investigation picked up momentum and gained unlikely allies in the labor unions who were once Rueff and Schmitz's top supporters. Between October 22 and November 5, witnesses appeared before a Grand Jury to testify against Rueff and Schmitz. Indicted for extortion on November 16, 1906, Rueff turned himself in and posted bail immediately; Schmitz, who returned from Europe much to the public's surprise, did the same and vowed to continue to discharge the office of Mayor. This decision aimed to deflect as much hatred from him onto the

[99] Metcalf's Report Pro-Japanese?, *San Francisco Call*, December 11, 1906, https://www.newspapers.com/image/80982676/.

ethnic Japanese. He attended labor union meetings and vowed to execute the cause of keeping the United States "white and pure."[100]

On February 2, 1907, Ambassador Wright sent a message to President Roosevelt stating that he had received word from the best observers he had ever known, citing that England, Germany, France, and other European countries believed that Japan's attack on the United States was forthcoming. Wright did not say that the attack was imminent but did urge Roosevelt to take decisive action to avoid this potentiality. Wright stated, "No opportunity should be neglected to avert Japanese ill-feeling, especially as a collision would lead to very unpleasant immediate results, no matter what the remote results might be."[101] President Roosevelt was in a position to be able to tackle this problem as he was the only president with extensive contact with Japan and was fully aware of the urgency that this problem required.

Within two days of Ambassador Wright's message, an eight-person contingent led by Eugene Schmitz left San Francisco for Washington, D.C. Although Schmitz was under indictment, he shoehorned himself onto an invitation that the president sent to the School Board members to meet and discuss the segregation issue in San Francisco schools. Wrights's message reached the president's desk on February 6, 1907, one day before Schmitz and his group arrived. Someone in his party notified Schmitz that the actions of the San Francisco School Board had put the nation on the brink of war. He told reporters that he would be meeting with the president with an open mind and would listen to all the president had to say and that it was not true that he would not yield in any form.[102]

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[100] Buell, "Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation," 612.

[101] Schmitz and School Board off for Washington, *San Francisco Call*, February 4, 1907, https://www.newspapers.com/image/87805766/.

[102] President Must Make Good on Exclusion, *San Francisco Call*, February 8, 1907, https://www.newspapers.com/image/87807459/.

Schmitz came to Washington D.C. with a proposal for the President, one that stated if the president could negotiate a treaty with Japan that banned all "coolies" from immigrating into the United States, then the School Board might see fit to readmit the segregated students back into the public schools. After the initial meeting, the president requested Wright to confer with the Japanese government on their willingness to accept these terms. After several days, Japan advised that they were amenable to an agreement to trade emigrating laborers for school children. In order to bypass treaty ratification, President Roosevelt worked to enact a plan that would pass both houses easily.

On February 19, 1907, precisely thirty-five years prior to Executive Order 9066, an agreement was reached between Roosevelt and the School Board to desegregate the San Francisco school system in exchange for the United States issuing an immigration ban on Japanese laborers. A clause written by Secretary of State Root was added to the already-written Immigration Act of 1907, though convoluted and not mentioning Japan, allowing the president to issue Executive Order 589, which refused entry to any passport-holding Japanese immigrant attempting to enter the country.[103] Although he had promised Schmitz and the School Board, he failed to discuss the plan with Japan.

Before formal discussions with Japan, the School Board allowed forty-three Japanese schoolchildren to reenter San Francisco schools. After contacting Japan and notifying them of recent developments, Roosevelt successfully negotiated the Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan, so-called due to its lack of legal ties to any written treaty already in effect. This agreement simmered the anger of Japan, and they promised not to issue any other passports to laborers headed for either the United States or Hawaii except in the case of the "laborers who have

[103] Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice*: *The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 44.

already been in America and to the parents, wives, and children of laborers already resident there."[104]

At first glance, the agreement seemed to be working. In 1907, the last year before the agreement took effect, 30,000 Japanese, almost all male laborers, had entered the United States. The agreement was in full effect in 1909 and saw that number drop to 2,432 male laborers and 5,004 leaving the country. The Gentleman's Agreement had the opposite effect that labor unions and Schmitz hoped. With the allowance of wives, parents, and children, the West Coast saw an influx of Japanese immigrants joining their husbands and families already on the West Coast. Up until the Gentlemen's Agreement, almost all Japanese immigrants were male. In 1900, only 985 Japanese women were in the United States, and less than half were married. By 1910, the number of married women had increased to 5,581, all after 1907, and by 1920, that number had reached 22,193.[105]

Arranged marriages were common in Japan, and using a "go-between," men and women would send pictures of each other across the ocean. Japanese women who wanted to come to the United States would pick a husband from the photographs, send one back, and then participate in a marriage ceremony performed in Japan without the groom. Eventually, almost 10,000 of these "picture brides" would arrive in the United States. This influx of Japanese women sparked the growth of Japanese families. At the turn of the century, there were only 269 children; by 1910, the number had grown to 4,502, and by 1920, the number of children had multiplied to 29,672.[106] Another problem for those who wished for Japanese exclusion was that these children

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[104] Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice,* 45.

[105] Yuji Ichioka, "Amerika Nadeshiko: Japanese Immigrant Women in the United States, 1900-1924," *Pacific Historical Review 49* (May 1980): 341.

[106] Ichioka, *Amerika Nadeshiko: Japanese Immigrant Women in the United States, 1900-1924*, 354.

were birthright citizens as established in court cases such as *Wong Kim Ark* and would have all the rights that the anti-Japanese faction was trying to limit. In the end, a measure put into place to stem the tide of Japanese immigration did the opposite and increased the ethnic Japanese population on the West Coast dramatically. The entry of women into immigrant society was integral to the process by which Japanese immigrants sank roots on American soil.[107]

With the growth of families came the move out of cities and into the countryside in search of work and homes. Many Japanese families worked for white farmers and growers, but many managed to purchase farms for themselves, sometimes putting those farms and any other holdings in the name of their American-born children. The growth of Japanese farming would become a significant focus in the decisions to evacuate the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast in 1942. The labor unions and politicians successfully passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 but struggled to do the same for the ethnic Japanese population. Legal confirmation that anyone born on American soil was a citizen with all rights therein was confirmed, making all ethnic Japanese children born in America citizens by right. The labor unions, politicians, and media outlets would continue their fight against the ethnic Japanese, passing on their belief and passion for Japanese exclusion to the next generation of lawmakers and workers. They continued to build on the fear, racism, and prejudice that would be needed for the decision to evacuate all ethnic-Japanese from the West Coast in 1942 forcibly. Tracing the rise of this movement is vital due to the importance of Japanese farming and their contribution to wartime food security.

[107] Ibid, 355.

Chapter Two -- Exclusion Through Law

"History is instructive. What it suggests to people is that even if they do little things, if they walk on the picket line, if they join a vigil, if they write a letter to their local newspaper… Anything they do, however small, becomes part of a much larger sort of flow of energy. And when enough people do enough things, however small they are, then change takes place."
---Howard Zinn, American historian (1922-2010)

The origin and growth of racial tension, how it changed and adapted to impact the passage of restrictive land and citizenship laws, brings an understanding of the action taken by the military to evacuate the ethnic Japanese in the spring of 1942, despite their vital contribution to agriculture. A complete understanding of the labor issues and the need for uninterrupted farming production clarifies the evacuation's timing. The rising tension, fear, and strengthening racism were critical factors in how the West Coast overcame the importance of ethnic Japanese farming and their contribution to wartime food security and forced their removal. Each action by politicians, labor groups, and the media built upon each other until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Racial Tension 1908-1940

The start of 1908 saw the conviction of Abe Ruef, Eugene Schmitz, and their followers, but it did not signal the end of the push for Japanese exclusion and removal. The movement called for a new team to take up the fight, and one of those fighters was Democrat James Phelan, who would use the removal of Ruef and his gang to resurrect his political career. Phelan won election to the Senate in 1914 and again became the leading spokesman for Japanese exclusion. The prominent supporters of Japanese exclusion were the Democratic party; however, at the beginning of the 1900s, there was a new party that was bringing their support to the Democrats, and that was the Progressive Party.

The goal of the Progressives was to halt monopolistic control of the economy by large and powerful people such as J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller. To achieve

this goal, the Progressives worked to increase competition with controls to prevent the formation of new trusts that could become too powerful. The hope was to increase competition and thereby reduce industrial control, which would benefit organized labor when they fought for higher wages as they would not be fighting huge companies but smaller localized businesses. Progressives' application of their formula in California was different; however, while they did increase competition among the employers, they had not counted on the organized labor unions to continue to push for less competition in the labor market. To achieve this, the labor unions continued to attack the ethnic Japanese workforce. The labor unions' issue focused on sociological terms:

> Progressives in California believed that economic self-preservation was closely united with racial preservation. It was believed that if the Japanese were allowed to make economic inroads, it would be only a matter of time before they would make racial inroads. Intermarriage and propagation of their race would impair the Anglo-Saxon racial purity so important to the Progressives' concept of economic leadership.[1]

At the start of 1908, the California state legislature introduced multiple bills year after year in attempts to restrict the property, contract, and civil rights of resident Japanese immigrants. A bill presented in 1909 would require alien landowners to surrender their land after five years if they had not achieved citizenship. The bills also called for limits on land leases not to exceed one year, reimpose school segregation, and implement municipal segregation ordinances allowing cities to segregate ethnic Japanese into "ghettos."[2] These bills had the necessary and widespread support for approval, but none came to pass for more than four years.[3] The opposition to these bills came from Washington D.C., California residents, and a failing

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[1] Herbert P Le Pore, Prelude to Prejudice: Hiram Johnson, Woodrow Wilson, and the California Alien Land Law Controversy of 1913, *Southern California Quarterly 61*, no. 1 (1979): 100.

[2] Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 4.

[3] Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice*, 46.

belief that the Japanese would be invading. Outside of the West Coast, the country at large cared very little for a tiny percentage of the population on the West Coast.

The opposition in Washington D.C. started with President Theodore Roosevelt and continued with President William Taft—this stance was based on the same diplomatic issues that plagued the school segregation controversy in 1906. Japan took the United States' political actions very seriously, and, with their recent defeat of the Russians, they were no longer considered a weak military power. Military analysts began to believe that the Japanese would not be averse to engaging the American Navy. Washington D.C. was also aware of the increasingly important and profitable trading partner Japan was becoming and did not want to jeopardize that relationship. President Theodore Roosevelt also realized that the stance against the ethnic Japanese was primarily a political convenience based on manufactured arguments meant to get politicians elected. His condemnation of the "idiots" in California legislature was well known, calling them in 1905 "those infernal fools" whose behavior was "worse than the stupidity of the San Francisco mob."[4] He was determined to sidetrack and undermine any initiative by state governments to jeopardize the interests of the nation at large.

The 1909 bill that called for restricting property, contract, and civil rights of ethnic Japanese residents came to the desk of President Theodore Roosevelt rather than the newly elected President Taft. Taft, elected in November of 1908, would not take office until March 1909; thus, Roosevelt served until Taft took office. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Root took the issue directly to California Governor James N. Gillet, a fellow Republican. The three politicians discussed the dire consequences a bill such as this would bring should it come to

[4] Masuda Hajimu, Rumors of War: Immigration Disputes and the Social Construction of American Japanese Relations, 1905-1913," *Diplomatic History 3* (January 2009): 18.

fruition. Despite Japan taking this political action as a threat, the Gentlemen's Agreement reduced Japanese immigration to a net negative in 1908. The argument convinced Governor Gillett, and he withdrew his support. As a result, the measure disappeared.

Other forms of opposition to discriminatory legislation came to bear when approximately 500 of San Francisco's leading businessmen pledged the city to hold a great world exposition in celebration of the opening of the Panama Canal.[5] The fair organizers wanted the spectacle to be "more vast in scope and more magnificent in detail than the Chicago Columbian Exposition of 1893, or any world's fair before or since."[6] The fair would open in 1916 and feature a dedication to the return of San Francisco from the devastation of the 1906 earthquake as a city that had retaken its place among the nation's elite. The organizers of this event would eventually build a four-acre walk-through replica of Yellowstone, a six-acre Grand Canyon, and a working five-acre model of the Panama Canal. The Liberty Bell would be on loan, and the Ford Motor Company was to build a working production line that would build a car every ten minutes for four hours a day. Organizers decided to include a forty-three-story tower covered with over 100,000 pieces of polished glass brought in from Europe. Although nations worldwide would participate, organizers wanted one of the most critical and influential exhibits to be from Japan.

The idea behind such a significant representation from Japan was a business decision. The fair focused on San Francisco as a city that had returned from the brink of destruction and as an attractive location for tourism and business. The organizers were aware that outside of California, and even from within, the fascination with Japanese culture was still intense, and

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[5] Great Panama-Pacific Exposition Launched; Businessmen Pledge Support to the Project, *San Francisco Call*, December 8, 1909, https://www.newspapers.com/image/87853686/.

[6] Great Panama-Pacific Exposition Launched; Businessmen Pledge Support to the Project, *San Francisco Call,* December 8, 1909, 1.

organizers did not want to jeopardize the fair's success due to their private crusade against a few thousand ethnic Japanese workers. Although the fair was successful, and organizers brought over 18 million visitors to San Francisco between February and December 1915, anti-Japanese forces felt the fair was a significant setback in their efforts.

Anti-Japanese organizers suffered another defeat when President Taft signed a commercial and navigation treaty with Japan in 1911 and ratified it in Congress within five days of its signing.[7] While strongly backed by businesses throughout the country, anti-Japanese supporters rejected it as no language in the treaty would continue to restrict the immigration of ethnic Japanese. The anti-Japanese supporters wanted the immigration restrictions to be in writing as the Gentlemen's Agreement was still simply a verbal agreement between Japan and the United States. The Republican Senators representing California, Oregon, and Washington drowned out the voices of opposition. Democrats like James Phelan were free to voice their opinions, but the support needed to act did not exist.

By 1911, Hiram Johnson had replaced James Gillet as Governor of California, and while he was a Republican, he favored the anti-Japanese movement. Governor Hiram wanted a higher office and did not challenge a sitting president who was a party member. During Johnson's first term, President Taft had tasked Secretary of State Philander Knox to maintain contact with Johnson and remind him that "it was essential to refrain from allowing any legislation, be it anti-land or exclusion legislation, to be enacted against the Japanese."[8] The treaty moved without official opposition and included language the anti-Japanese feared. Its main clause stipulated that:

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[7] "The New Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation." *The American Journal of International Law* 5, no. 2 (1911): 445.

[8] Le Pore, "Prelude to Prejudice," 99-100.

> The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses, and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established.[9]

Other clauses in the treaty included protecting Japanese homes and businesses from arbitrary search and limited tariffs. An omission in the treaty was any guarantee that ethnic Japanese could purchase land; this issue was exploited two years later and impacted the evacuation of 1942.[10]

The West Coast Anti-Japanese Senators supported the treaty, based solely on the word of the Japanese ambassador, who promised the "honor" of the Japanese government that they would continue to exercise limitations on immigration from Japan to America.[11] The main concern for the West Coast politicians was the continued enforcement of the Gentleman's Agreement and limiting ethnic Japanese immigration. The anti-Asian and white supremacist groups refocused on a different target in their renewed attempt at Japanese and, indeed, exclusion of all Asian immigrants. Governor Johnson continued to hold off discriminatory legislation per the President's request, but he was finding it increasingly difficult to stand against Californians and their increased angst against ethnic Japanese land holdings. James Phelan wasted no time speaking his mind and wrote directly to then-presidential candidate Woodrow Wilson in 1912:

> The Japanese have invaded the central valleys of California. Take, for example, one highly productive fruit-growing valley known as the Vaca Valley. There, the Japanese, refusing to work for wages for the first year or so, bargained for a share of the crop and finally ousted, in many instances, the tenant farmers by offering the landowner

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[9] 57 Statutes at Large 1504.

[10] *Documental History of Law Cases Affecting Japanese in the United States, 1916-1924.* Compiled by the Consulate General of San Francisco 2, 738.

[11] Perkins Justifies the Upbuilding of the Navy, *San Francisco Call*, February 22, 1908, https://www.newspapers.com/image/93135448/.

> larger returns and, in some instances, acquiring the property by purchase. The white man is thus driven off the land to move farther away. The village stores, churches, and homes suffer and, in many instances, are left without patronage or occupants. In other words, the Japanese are a blight on our civilization, destructive of the home life of the people, driving the natives to the city for employment.[12]

Phelan may have correctly, however, inadvertently predicted an influx of Japanese immigrants in 1900; this assessment of a mass takeover of land was as inaccurate as the prediction that ninety-three ethnic Japanese schoolchildren would befoul all of San Francisco's schools. In 1913, a liberal estimate of the ethnic Japanese numbered 50,000 out of the total population of California of 2.5 million. Reports in 1912 showed 27 million acres of unimproved land in California, of which ethnic Japanese owned 127,726. Other statistics show a tiny percentage of Japanese presence in the agricultural sector, with 1,816 farmers owning 16,449 acres and leasing an additional 80,000 acres.[13] These population numbers should have comforted those fighting for anti-Japanese legislation, as it showed that the supposed high percentage of ethnic Japanese owning land did not exist.

The Democratic party, however, did not question Phelan and his assertions on the threat of Japanese land ownership. They were emboldened by Wilson's nomination for president as a victory would put a Democratic president in the White House for the first time in sixteen years. Wilson's presidential campaign received a boost when the Republican party split, with the conservative traditionalists remaining in the GOP and the Roosevelt-supporting Progressives forming the Progressive party. Even with the benefit of the split, Wilson acquired a powerful enemy in fellow Democrat William Randolph Hearst, who spread warnings of a coming Japanese invasion. He had secured a large inheritance from his father and created an empire in the

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[12] Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice, 55.*

[13] Masakazu Iwata, "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture, *Agricultural History* 36 (January 1962), 29.

newspaper business known for its lurid headlines and human-interest stories, Hearst Corporation. Although the titles and articles read well, they contradicted the facts.

Hearst's beliefs about the Japanese aligned with those of Phelan, and he used these beliefs and his ownership of the *Examiner* newspaper; he printed articles that cited the Japanese fleet steaming across the Pacific. He ran these articles daily and claimed that the ethnic Japanese already present in the country were soldiers in disguise working to stash food and weapons for the coming invasion. The lack of facts in these stories did not matter, as Hearst pointed out that Wilson was too weak to face this coming threat and unfit to serve in the White House. Hearst attacked Wilson in hopes of denying him the Democratic nomination. Research into Wilson's past provided plenty of ammunition as Wilson was known to have racist views of African Americans and immigrants from Southern Europe. Citing Wilson's book. In *History of the American People,* Hearst claimed that Wilson was partial to Asian immigration as his work talked about how "the Chinese were more to be desired, as workmen if not as citizens."[14]

Woodrow Wilson wanted to overcome these attacks and found that the only way he could win the Democratic nomination was to win the West, and to do that, he would have to speak unfavorably of Asian immigrants. James Phelan favored Wilson but was concerned that his seemingly favorable position on Asian immigration would make him unelectable. Phelan wrote to the Democratic National Committee inquiring if Wilson had spoken out against "oriental coolie" immigration. He further stated that Wilson should do so immediately as his five-volume history shows his favorability to Asian immigrants.[15] Eventually, Phelan and Wilson began to

[14] Wilson, Woodrow. *A History of the American People* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1903), 5: 213-214.

[15] Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice*, 55.

communicate directly. Phelan sent Wilson a statement on his position on Asian immigration that Wilson released under his name:

> In the matter of Chinese and Japanese Coolie immigration, I stand for the National policy of exclusion (or restricted immigration). The whole question is one of assimilation of diverse races. We cannot make a homogenous population out of people who do not blend with the Caucasian race. Their lower standard of living as laborers will crowd out the white agriculturists and is, in other fields, a most serious industrial menace. The success of free Democratic institutions demands of our people, education, intelligence, patriotism; and the State should protect them against unjust and impossible competition. Remunerative labor is the basis of contentment. Democracy rests on the equality of the citizen. Oriental Coolieism will give us another race problem to solve, and surely we have had our lesson.[16]

Wilson won the nomination and the presidency in the November 1912 election. Although he did not win California, he lost only by a tiny margin. Phelan and his supporters were thrilled with the result, believing they no longer had to worry about Washington D.C. having their hand in the state's business. The anti-Japanese group turned their focus to the small percentage of Japanese-owned farms. Only 331 Japanese-owned farms had approximately one acre out of every 8,000 acres in the state devoted to agriculture.[17] This small number was enough for the anti-Japanese groups as they saw this as the beginning of an all-out invasion of American farmlands. Their argument focused on the hard work and devotion to sacrifice of the ethnic Japanese as the reason they were a threat and would eventually overpower the whites. California Attorney General Ulysses Webb argued before the Supreme Court in 1923 that:

> The fundamental question is not one of race discrimination but of recognizing the obvious fact that the American farm, with its historical associations of cultivation, environment, and including the home life of its occupants, can not exist in competition with a farm developed by Orientals with their totally different standards and ideas of cultivation of the soil, of living and social conditions. If the Oriental farmer is the more efficient, from the standpoint of soil production, there is just not much greater certainty of an economic conflict which it is the duty of statesmen to avoid.[18]

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[16] *The American Journal of International Law,* 5, no. 2. Supplement: Official Documents (April 1911): 107-108.

[17] Iwata, "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture."

[18] *Porterfield vs. Webb,* 263 U.S. 295 (1923).

The anti-Japanese drivers continued their fight against ethnic Japanese by citing their perceived non-compliant attitudes and actions. They claimed that on many occasions, the ethnic Japanese refused to pick ripe fruit unless given a pay raise. This defiance was proof of the Japanese menace, as presented by Phelan and his followers. The populist sentiment remained solid and overpowering; support grew among business leaders, large farms, and fair organizers. Within a week of President Wilson's inauguration in 1913, two bills were presented to the California state legislature seeking to deprive noncitizens of the right to lease or own land. Japan reacted strongly, and there were rumors that they threatened to pull out of the Panama-Pacific Exposition and that a crowd of 20,000 people in Tokyo cheered when the Diet (Japanese legislature) demanded the Japanese fleet sail to California to protect Japanese Nationals and Japan's honor.[19]

Unlike previous administrations, outside of advising Governor Johnson of his disapproval, Wilson did nothing to stop the legislation. Any attempts to change the bill's outcome would have failed in a Progressive-dominated legislature-controlled California. It was said that "Wilson did not attempt to challenge the California law; nor did he take the issue to the people or Congress and thus force federal domination upon California."[20] Wilson instead informed the Japanese ambassador that the federal government could not overrule state law no matter his position and that the United States remained eager for cordial relations with Japan. Even so, legislators needed to enact the law without upsetting the small but vocal militarist groups in Japan and avoid any direct conflict with the wording of the 1911 treaty.

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[19] U.S. Demands Jap Explanation, *San Francisco Examiner*, March 20, 1919, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/458068665/; Le Pore, *Prelude to Prejudice*, 105.

[20] Le Pore, *Prelude to Prejudice*, 108.

The California legislature turned to Attorney General Ulysses Webb and Francis Heney, who were instrumental in bringing down Abe Ruef and his supporters in San Francisco. They both decided to pursue politics, and Heney began working toward a vacant Senate seat in the 1914 election. Webb and Heney drafted the following to be added to the restrictive land law passed in California:

> Sec. 1. All aliens eligible for citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this State in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this State.
> Sec. 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in section one of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy, and transfer real property, or any interest therein, in this State, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise and may, in addition thereto, lease lands in this State for agricultural purposes for a term not exceeding three years.[21]

The law also stated that any corporations formed by "aliens ineligible for citizenship" be treated the same as individuals, and land purchased violating the law would revert to state ownership.[22] The loophole was the eligibility to become citizens, and according to the government, the Japanese were not ineligible. Webb and Heney wrote the sections with the belief that the ethnic Japanese were judged as ineligible as they were neither "white" nor "African." These bills, presented to the public and legislators, insisted that their foundation was economics, not race. Webb admitted in a speech to the Commonwealth Club in August of 1913 that this was not the case, stating, "The fundamental basis of all legislation upon this subject, State and Federal, has been, and is race undesirability. The 1913 law seeks to limit their presence by

[21] Franklin Hichborn, *Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1913* (San Francisco: Press of the James H. Barry Company, 1913), 262.

[22] Hichborn, *Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1913,* 262-263.

curtailing their privileges which they may enjoy here; for they will not come in large numbers and long abide with us if they may not acquire land."[23]

Although not elected to the Senate until 1914, James Phelan, the former Mayor of San Francisco, led the debates in the state legislature. He easily side-stepped the opposition to the laws by the Panama-Pacific Organizers. Phelan cited that the Japanese are "as clever in diplomacy as they are able in agriculture and manufacturing." He went on to say that the Japanese are as anxious to participate in the Exposition as California is to have their cooperation. Phelan concluded by stating, "The future of California is of far greater importance than the success of the Exposition. And in saying this, I do not believe for a moment that in enacting this land legislation, you will jeopardize the success of the Exposition."[24] At the end of the debates, the bill quickly passed both houses, and though Wilson did send Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to dissuade Hiram Johnson from signing it into law, Johnson was unmoved. The first Alien Land Law went into effect in August 1913.

Ethnic Japanese challenged the law, claiming it violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1911 treaty. The argument regarding the Fourteenth Amendment carried the most weight as the argument centered around the statements "aliens entitled to citizenship" and "aliens not entitled to citizenship" as being "arbitrary and artificial," deemed a contrivance to prevent the Japanese from purchasing land. The question became, "Can persons within the jurisdiction of the state be put into a class by themselves because, for any reason whatsoever, they cannot become citizens and thus be subjected to special legislation imposing burdens not imposed upon other

[23] Hichborn, *Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1913,* 262-263.

[24] Ferguson, Edwin E. "The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, *California Law Review* 35, no. 1 (1947): 68.

persons?"[25] The text of the fourteenth amendment stipulates that equal protection to any "person," not just any "citizen," as such the California law would be illegal.

As the legal challenges to the 1913 law continued, no ethnic Japanese person would bring a suit questioning who was classified as an "alien ineligible for citizenship" for several years after its initial challenges. As with the Gentleman's Agreement, the law contained loopholes that were easier to exploit than to bring a court case against the Federal Government that would require time, money, and uncertainty of outcome. While Japan was outraged at the passage of the law, as predicted, they participated in the Panama-Pacific International Exposition in March of 1915, and both the fair and their pavilion were huge successes.

The Cooling Down Period

The legal challenges against the law of 1913 continued in the background of that year and continued for years to come. Meanwhile, the ethnic Japanese found no problems utilizing the loopholes provided by the law. Ethnic Japanese farmers placed their land in trusts and guardianships for their American-born children, formed agricultural landholding corporations, put land in the names of friends and American-born relatives, or entered into a three-year lease renewed at the end of the term for another three years.[26] Loosely enforced, the 1913 law had a marginal effect, and as a result, the law had the opposite outcome than what was intended by lawmakers. Ethnic Japanese landholdings rose from 17,035 acres owned, 89,466 acres leased, 50,400 acres sharecropped, and 37,898 acres contracted in 1910 to 74,769 acres owned, 192,150 acres leased, 121,000 acres sharecropped, and 70,137 acres contracted in 1920.[27]

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[25] Charles Wallace Collins, "Will the California Alien Land Law Stand the Test of the Fourteenth Amendment?" *Yale Law Journal* 23, no. 4 (1913-1914): 333.

[26] Keith Aoki, "No Right to Own? The Early Twentieth-Century 'Alien Land Laws' as a Prelude to Internment," *Boston College Third World Law Journal 19*, (December 1998): 56.

[27] Iwata, "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture," 30.

Lawmakers did not realize that authorities would be lenient with enforcing the land laws; however, there were two main reasons authorities did so. The first is the lack of perceived threat to white farmers in the State. Despite rampant arguments to the contrary by James Phelan, elected to the Senate in 1914, white farmers found it more profitable to sell or lease to ethnic Japanese, and sharecropping agreements were also more favorable. The second reason was Japan's entrance into World War I on the Allies' side. Although the United States would not enter the war until 1917, Japan assisted the Allied forces in keeping shipping lanes open and countering the U-boat menace. President Wilson and lawmakers saw no reason to provoke resident ethnic Japanese and possibly explain Japan's agitation for such action to their Allies, such as Great Britain.

The need for the United States to remain in good standing with her allies did not deter German-leaning William Hearst, owner of the *San Francisco Examiner*, from printing headlines citing Japan's imminent invasion and unwavering severity in their surrender demands. A two-page article published on October 10, 1915, stated, "Japan's Plan to Invade and Conquer the United States," "The Humiliating Terms of Peace Which Japan Intends to Force on a Beaten United States." The terms that Hearst highlights in his articles are the surrender of Hawaii and the Philippines and the waving of all restrictions on Japanese immigration, fishing rights, land-owning restrictions, and payment of reparations. Hearst stated that the source of this information was the famous Japanese book titled *Powerful and Official National Defense Association*.[28] This book was the work of a hard-core militarist who had no ties to the Japanese government.

The supporters of Phelan and Webb were unhappy in February 1917 when both houses of Congress overrode President Wilson's veto and passed an extremely restrictive immigration bill

[28] *San Francisco Examiner*, October 10, 1915, 26-27.

that excluded the Japanese. The Immigration Act of 1917 focused on immigration from eastern and southern European countries entering the United States from the east coast.[29] During the debate in Congress, a key conservative named Madison Grant contributed by citing his work, "The Passing of the Great Race or The Racial Basis of European History." His work took Social Darwinism further and claimed that the "Nordic" races are the highest order of humans. He further claimed that the Nordic races were being "polluted" by lesser subraces, such as the Slavs and southern Europeans (the focus of the immigration bill). Grant's suggestion of strict segregation and controlled breeding helped push the bills through both houses of Congress, but he also contributed to the eugenics movement that garnered a worldwide following, which included Adolf Hitler.[30]

Charles Darwin's half-cousin Francis Galton, a man obsessed with classification, developed the idea of eugenics. After Darwin published his work on natural selection, Galton began to study human traits and developed a theory of heredity and selective breeding called "eugenics." While he relied on hard data, Galton's findings were filled with assumptions and faulty from the start. Despite this, he proposed that improving the human species is possible through a selective breeding program to suffocate the "inferior races" out of existence. Societies sprang up worldwide to support this idea and a new way of thinking. The theory split into two: positive and negative eugenics. The positive eugenics goal is to have humans breed with other strong humans to create better humans. The negative eugenics goal was to prevent the

[29] Albert E Reitzel, "The Immigration Laws of the United States. An Outline." *Virginia Law Review* 32, no. 6 (1946).

[30] Timothy W. Ryback, *Hitler's Private Library* (United Kingdom: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2008), 110.

deterioration of the gene pool by preventing inferior humans from breeding with superior humans and, if possible, preventing them from breeding at all.[31]

Supporters of the negative eugenics model immediately saw that the best way to achieve this goal was to limit the number of "inferior" breeds. This understanding became the driver for restrictive immigration laws aimed at European nations. The data was used in 1917 to draft the immigration law that included an extensive list of people prohibited from entering the United States. The list included "idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded idiots, epileptics, insane persons, persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority, alcoholics, paupers, professional beggars, vagrants, persons afflicted with tuberculosis," among many others.[32] The reason behind Wilson's vetoing of the bill was the literacy requirement. This veto was his third of such a requirement, and he responded to the veto by stating, "It is not a test of character, of quality, or personal fitness, but would operate in most cases merely as a penalty for lack of opportunity in the country from which the alien came."[33]

None of these issues hit the West Coast anti-Japanese movement harder than the immigration law listed as the "*Asiatic Barred Zone."* The law prohibited immigration by "any natives of any country, province, or dependency situated on the Continent of Asia west of the one hundred and tenth meridian of longitude east of the Greenwich and east of the fiftieth meridian of longitude east from the Greenwich and south of the fiftieth parallel of latitude north, except that portion said territory situate between the fiftieth and sixty-fourth meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and the twenty-fourth and thirty-eighth parallels of latitude north, and no alien

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[31] Daniel J Kevles, and International Society for Science and Religion, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Cambridge: International Society for Science and Religion, 2007), 21.

[32] 39 Statutes at Large 874.

[33] Wilson Will Veto Immigration Bill; Objects to Literacy Test for New Citizens, *New York Times*, January 28, 1915, https://www.nytimes.com/1915/01/28/archives/wilson-will-veto-immigration-bill-objects-to-literacy-test-for-new.html.

now in any way excluded from, or prevented from entering the United States shall be admitted to the United States."[34]

The lengthy description of the location resulted in the exclusion of Japan and the Philippines from the Immigration Act of 1917. The reasoning behind this action was the existence of the Gentleman's Agreement, and Japan objected to being discriminated against while executing their part faithfully.[35] Phelan and the other Western congressmen were pressured to vote to override President Wilson's veto as the eugenics cause was center stage, and the entry of the United States into World War I was more and more likely, in which case they would be offending an ally. Against their judgment, the Western congressmen voted with the majority and passed the bill despite their objections.[36]

Western attention returned to California for things they could control and started enforcing the California land law of 1913. The *Harada* case featured in the introduction was the result of this pressure. The law was finally tested and failed against the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1911 treaty, which showed that the Alien Land Law did not violate the treaty but did not exclude American Japanese from owning or leasing land at their leisure. The outcome of this case would have far-reaching and lasting effects on land ownership of ethnic-Japanese farms and influence the decision to evacuate these farmers in 1942 forcefully.

The Great War and Beyond

The year 1919 was a turning point for the ethnic Japanese on the West Coast. There were several reasons for this: the results of the Harada case (see introduction), the end of the Great

[34] 39 Statutes at Large 876.

[35] Immigration Act of 1917, *New York Times*, February 6, 1917, https://www.newspapers.com/image/24850938/.

[36] Wilson, Steadfast in Hope to Stay War, Prepares Defenses, *San Francisco Examiner*, February 6, 1917, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/458051060/.

War, and the increase in Japanese landholdings. The critical ingredient for this turning point was the end of the war. Before WWI, the Japanese appeared as only a rising naval power in the Pacific, with many in the United States and Europe seeing the defeat of the aging and lazy Russian Navy in 1905 as no remarkable feat. Despite the rhetoric printed in the Hearst-owned newspapers, the government did not consider Japan to be a threat to the United States.

At the war's end, Japan had made it clear to the world that it was a legitimate military power with clear imperialistic ambitions. Japan also demonstrated its will and the means to pursue and achieve its imperialistic goals. The beginning of the war saw Japan join the Allies, and during the war, Japan succeeded in chasing out the Germans from Tsingtao and the South China Sea. In January 1915, Japan secretly delivered a list of twenty-one demands to the Chinese government. The demands, delivered in five groups, focused on China confirming Japan as the dominant foreign power in the region, Japanese partnership in iron, coal, and steel, and prohibiting China from conceding any coastal or island territory to anyone but Japan. The final group of demands brought the most controversy and demanded that China turn over control of its government, military, and industry to Japan. This last demand came with the threat of retaliation if the demands leaked to the public.[37]

Japan and China negotiated for three months before China leaked the demands to the Western allies. The United States and Great Britain condemned the demands and Japan's actions. Both countries exerted diplomatic pressure, and Japan ultimately rescinded the final group of demands for control of China's government.[38] While the end goal of the demands failed for the Japanese, the message it sent to the rest of the world was clear: Japan was determined to create

[37] Shin Kawashima, "What is the Historical Meaning of the 21 Demands? WWI and the Origin of Sino-Japanese Conflict," (*Social Science Japan Journal*, Volume 20, Issue 1, Winter 2017), 140–144.

[38] Shin Kawashima, "What is the Historical Meaning of the 21 Demands? WWI and the Origin of Sino-Japanese Conflict," 140–144.

its sphere of influence in an area where the West had held complete control for generations. In the United States, the anti-Japanese faction saw this as clear evidence of what they had been preaching for two decades.

A positive effect of these events was a softening of anti-Chinese propaganda. At this point in West Coast history, the Chinese, prohibited from immigration and citizenship, were content to live in their own communities, separated from the rest of society. When the war ended, the Chinese were seen as an object of sympathy due to the actions of the Japanese against their country. Korea was also a victim of Japanese barbarity, but interactions were minimal with so few Koreans in the United States. However, events in Korea would begin the attacks on the Japanese immediately following the Great War. On April 3, 1919, the *Examiner* ran an article about their rival publisher, V.S. McClatchy, and his trip to Korea with his wife. The *Examiner* quoted McClatchy:

> In the streets of Seoul, Mrs. McClatchy and myself saw girl students suspected of inciting rebellion against Japanese rule, led through the streets by armed Japanese soldiers. The girls, some of them hardly more than children, were bound in couples by their thumbs, the lashing being tied so securely that any attempt to pull apart would have dislocated their thumbs. About their necks were leather thongs, drawn tightly into the flesh so that an attempt to escape would have meant strangulation.[39]

Under normal circumstances, the public would question anything the *Examiner* wrote due to their disregard for factual reporting. In this case, however, there was merit to the story as it was not the first to reach the West Coast of Japan's cruelty in Korea and China. Accounts such as these were widespread and disseminated across every news outlet in the country. This article prompted James Phelan to characterize Japan as the "Germany of the Far East." Due to Japan being an ally during the war, forced to play nice, Phelan had toned down his anti-Japanese

[39] Publisher Tells of Korean Outrages, *San Francisco Examiner*, April 3, 1919, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457977869/.

rhetoric; however, he was up for re-election in 1920. Phelan's goal focused on using racial hatred to grant him another six years in Washington, D.C.

Phelan's had his re-election slogan, "Keep California White," printed on everything relating to his campaign, including newspaper articles. Phelan wasted no time launching his re-election bid and turning his sights back to exclusionary law aimed at ethnic Japanese and their land holdings. He was interviewed on March 31, 1919, while peace negotiations were underway in Paris, and stated:

> During my investigations into the Japanese situation, I find a general feeling of apathy in the public mind due to a lack of knowledge of the conditions. I find the best way to get recognition of a condition, the best to get action on the part of the men in power, is to make a noise. Publicity is something they do not like; the operations of the Japanese and their propagandists will not bear the scrutinizing light. They are exceedingly crafty, working in the dark, and when the light is directed upon them, they scamper and cover.[40]

James Phelan promised to enact a series of laws that would eliminate Japanese land holdings, close off immigration, and make life so difficult for the ethnic Japanese that they would leave on their own accord. Phelan did not realize that, at this point, most Japanese considered the United States their homeland, not Japan. Families had grown to include children born on American soil and legitimate American citizens with all the rights and privileges that came with citizenship. Thanks to the *Harada* case, land held in the names of American citizens, regardless of their parent's immigration status, could not legally be taken away. Phelan knew that acknowledging this and granting the ethnic Japanese any measure of humanity would not win him the election, so he played the racist card, supported by other white supremacist groups

[40] Phelan Declares Japanese Nation Menace to State, *Sacramento Bee*, April 1, 1919, https://www.newspapers.com/image/616757492/.

present in both state and local government, labor unions, and media barons Hearst and McClatchy.[41]

The Japanese Exclusion League of California would be one of Phelan's biggest supporters. Formed after merging several smaller groups, the league had the same goal of Japanese exclusion. The two most important groups were the Native Sons of the Golden West and the Native Daughters of the Golden West. It was founded in 1875 and "embraced only the sons and daughters of those sturdy pioneers who arrived on this coast prior to the admission of California as a state."[42] The groups boasted membership that included California's most influential and wealthiest figures. These members included Eugene Schmitz, Aaron Altmann, Ulysses Webb, Earl Warren, and James Phelan. The group's goal was to keep California "as it always had been, and God himself intended it shall always be – "the White Man's paradise."[43]

The Native Sons and Daughters groups officially became interested in the Japanese exclusion in 1907 when they passed a resolution calling for excluding all "Orientals." The reasoning for this resolution was the belief that it was economically vital to exclude "Orientals" as their presence had a direct effect on American wage levels.[44] A resolution passed by the groups in 1908 requested President Roosevelt to deploy the United States fleet in the Pacific to repel an imminent Japanese attack, as well as a statement in their publication *Grizzly Bear* demanding representatives to "vote for segregation of whites and Asiatics in the public schools" if deployment did not occur.[45] While groups such as the Native Sons and Daughters were

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[41] Goldstone, *Not White Enough,* 84.

[42] Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 85.

[43] Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion,* 85.

[44] Peter T Conmy, *The History of California's Japanese Problem and the Part Played by the Native Sons of the Golden West in Its Solution.* (Privately printed, 1942), 2.

[45] Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice*, 85.

common, they frequently drowned each other out. Anti-Japanese propaganda was abundant, with much of the message lost on the public and government.

James Phelan and V.C. McClatchy worked together to solve this problem and unite all Japanese exclusion groups into one large group that could speak with one loud voice. In September 1919, McClatchy and competitor Hearst organized a meeting in Sacramento to discuss the formation of an anti-Japanese league. Approximately one hundred of northern California's most prominent citizens attended and listened to various speakers address the "Japanese Problem." One of the key speakers was State Assemblyman Ivan Parker, who stated, "The state is beginning to feel the menacing advance of the Japanese who control 65 percent of the vegetable crop of the Sacramento Valley."[46] The meeting ended with the formation of the "Anti-Jap League." The new group worked over the next several months to solicit support from groups all over the State who were sympathetic to their cause, stressing that one powerful group would be more successful in passing legislation.

On September 2, 1920, almost a year later, the Sacramento Bee announced the "Japanese Exclusion League of California Formally Organized." The league officially joined the Native Sons and Daughters, American Legion, California Federation of Labor, Federation of Women's Clubs, California State Grange, the Farm Bureau, and the Loyal Order of the Moose. Although James Phelan was a key feature member in the league, its president was California State Senator James Inman, with McClatchy remaining the league's most powerful figure. With the league's formation came its first official statement, "The body will seek passage of an Anti-Alien Land

[46] Move to Keep Out Asiatics is Under Way, *San Francisco Examiner,* September 6, 1919, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/458023927/.

Act at the November election and also inaugurate nationwide propaganda to work for the control of the Japanese problem."[47]

The Japanese Exclusion League published a five-point program outlining their direction and goals for the coming years. Cancellation of the Gentleman's Agreement, exclusion of picture brides, rigorous exclusion of Japanese as immigrants, confirmation of policy barring Asiatics from American citizenship, and amendment of the Constitution providing that no child born in the United States shall have the rights of a citizen unless both parents are of a race eligible for citizenship.[48] For any of the laws to be changed, Federal intervention was needed; however, their immediate priority was to place a referendum on the November 1920 ballot. This referendum would create a new alien land law and close the loopholes created in the 1913 Alien Land Act.

The main goal of the league's referendum would be to prohibit the ability to lease land to aliens ineligible for citizenship, bar joint stock companies owned by those who were ineligible for citizenship from buying agricultural land, and prohibit Japanese noncitizens from acquiring land through inheritance.[49] The league utilized the State's newspapers and purposefully and successfully pushed its propaganda. Against the cries of the Japanese diplomats in Washington ringing loud and clear, the referendum passed by a margin of more than three to one. The new law, with the closed loopholes, put a stranglehold on Japanese farmers and angered the Japanese American Association, who stated that they would fight the law in court and would never give up.[50] They vowed to contest the prohibition against Japanese naturalization and the law's constitutionality, which they saw as violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

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[47] Japanese Exclusion League of California Formally Organized, *Sacramento Bee*, September 2, 1920, https://www.newspapers.com/image/616749670/.

[48] Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice*, 85.

[49] Ibid, 86.

[50] Japs to Enjoin Alien Law, *San Francisco Examiner*, November 4, 1920, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457851856/.

The *Examiner* responded to this promise with a statement that the Japanese lost at the polls and *"*are scheming to invoke the courts to compel their reception here upon equal terms with the whites.*"*[51] James Phelan saw the referendum on the land law as a win but was ultimately not re-elected. Phelan released a statement expressing his satisfaction with the passage of the anti-Japanese law. James Phelan would never hold public office again; however, his efforts to mobilize, encourage, and outright demand Japanese exclusion set the stage for several decades of bias, racism, fear, and prejudice.

The Immigration Act of 1924

The Immigration Act of 1924 ended further immigration from Japan while restricting the number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe to the U.S. It continued to carry the phrase "aliens ineligible for citizenship" that was so prevalent in the Alien Land Law of 1913 and the 1922 Supreme Court decision in *Ozawa v. United States.* Unlike previous laws that did not include anti-Japanese specific language, a special provision to make clear the exclusion of ethnic Japanese for citizenship was added. The law set quotas at two percent of each nationality residing in the United States in 1890; due to the small numbers of Japanese immigrants in 1890, ethnic Japanese were effectively excluded from immigrating to the United States. The lead-up to the act was a long road and involved a particular court case, *Ozawa v. United States.*

Takao Ozawa was born in Kanagawa, Japan, on June 15, 1875, and immigrated to San Francisco in 1894. He graduated from Berkeley High School in 1903, completing the scientific course.[52] In 1902, Ozawa filed a petition of intent to seek citizenship, and although the Chinese were excluded from citizenship, no such clause was in place for ethnic Japanese immigrants.

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[51] Japs to Enjoin Alien Law, *San Francisco Examiner*, November 4, 1920, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457851856/.

[52] High School Graduates to Receive Diplomas, *Oakland Tribune*, June 3, 1903, https://www.newspapers.com/image/73949778/.

Ozawa attended the University of California at Berkeley and left for Honolulu, Hawaii, after three years. He married, had five children, obtained a steady job in sales/clerical work for an American Sugar company, and led an exemplary life.[53]

In 1914, Ozawa applied for citizenship at Hawaii's federal district court office. The clerk at the court refused to accept his application and cited section 2169 of the *U.S. Revised Statutes,* which stated that the Naturalization Act "shall apply to aliens, being free white person, and to aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent." Osawa returned with two white character witnesses a few weeks later, and the clerk contacted Washington, D.C., for instructions. Washington, D.C., instructed the clerk to accept the application and let the matter be settled in court.[54]

Judge Sanford Ballard Dole, cousin to James Dole of Dole Foods, considered one of Hawaii's white elites, heard Takao Ozawa's first case. On January 29, 1915, Ozawa, acting as his attorney, endured a lengthy examination by Judge Dole on all points concerning America, particularly the American government. Judge Dole asked Ozawa if the Japanese regarded themselves as Mongolians, a key sticking point for immigration and naturalization laws. Ozawa replied, "Some of the scholars say that the Japanese are not Mongolians but are a mixture of Malay and other races."[55] This first round of hearings ended without a decision, and due to postponements, the second round did not begin until June 9, 1915. In this hearing, Ozawa asserted that there is no law prohibiting Japanese from naturalization and no Supreme Court

[53] High School Graduates to Receive Diplomas, *Oakland Tribune*, June 3, 1903.

[54] Japanese Petition For Citizenship Is Accepted In Honolulu, *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, October 16, 1914, https://www.newspapers.com/image/290280235/.

[55] Decision Held Up In Citizenship For Japanese, *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 30, 1915, https://www.newspapers.com/image/290256883/.

decision against a Japanese from naturalization. He cited fifty naturalized Japanese immigrants in the last twenty years as precedent.[56]

Seen as a veiled threat, Ozawa made a statement during his second court proceedings:

> What will the United States gain by humiliating the Japanese whom our Uncle Sam assisted to become one of the five great powers? She will only create bitter feelings in the minds of the Japanese, thus transforming a good friend into an enemy. The final result will be the greatest war between the European and Asiatic peoples. On the other hand, if the United States treats Japan fairly, the Japanese will surely respect the American people as never before. Peace between the United States and Japan will forever continue.[57]

The U.S. District Attorney J. Wesley Thompson replied to Ozawa's statement by filing an addendum calling Ozawa morally unfit for citizenship because he threatened war between Japan and the United States.[58]

The decision at this stage of the Ozawa case did not come until March 25, 1916, a ruling delivered by Judge Charles Clemons, who replaced the retiring Judge Dole halfway through the case. Judge Clemons ruled in favor of the government, contending that previous cases, such as *Ah Yup,* classified the Japanese as Mongolian and, therefore, ineligible for citizenship. His decision resonated with the West Coast and their efforts to exclude all ethnic Japanese life in the United States.[59] The laws in place in 1916 were making it difficult for ethnic Japanese to own and lease farms, which appeased the anti-Japanese groups. The goal of making it harder for ethnic Japanese was based on the ability to deny citizenship opportunities to ethnic Japanese and, therefore, bar them from owning or leasing land.

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[56] No Law To Keep Japanese From Citizenship?, *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 9, 1915, https://www.newspapers.com/image/291270454/.

[57] Threatens War If Japanese Are Denied Rights, *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 10, 1915, https://www.newspapers.com/image/291271420/

[58] Thompson Says Ozawa Threatened, *Honolulu Advertiser*, August 1, 1915. https://www.newspapers.com/image/268089184/

[59] Bars Japanese from Becoming Citizens Here, *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, March 25, 1916, https://www.newspapers.com/image/876838332/.

Takao Ozawa gathered support from groups in Vancouver and mounted an appeal, represented by an all-white law firm. The Ninth Circuit Court in San Francisco heard the initial appeal on June 1, 1917. The panel of three judges stated that this case was too significant for them to rule on and sent it to the Supreme Court for a final decision. At this time, the case had become front-page news. The ramifications of a definitive citizenship decision would have long-lasting and far-reaching effects throughout the country, particularly on the farmlands of California. The sensitivity of the ongoing Great War and the Paris Peace Talks postponed the case several times. On October 3, 1922, the case was in court, and arguments focused on the true definition of "white" as it pertained to the naturalization of citizenship.[60]

On November 13, 1922, the Supreme Court ruled against Ozawa on the basis that the Japanese were not a Caucasian race and, therefore, ineligible for citizenship in the United States.[61] The court used this decision as a precedent for another ruling on the same day in *Yamashita v United States,* thus voiding all previous naturalizations of the Japanese.[62] The court's decision was celebrated on the West Coast, particularly by James Phelan, V.S. McClatchy, and Ulysses Webb. The *Examiner* ran a front-page story citing the historical significance of this new precedent, "Two decisions that will go far toward checking the 'yellow peril' that menaces the country in general, and the Pacific Coast in particular, were handed down by the Supreme Court."[63]

This Supreme Court case is the landmark decision that established the ineligibility of ethnic Japanese immigrants to attain citizenship. Existing land laws were rewritten to exclude the

[60] 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
[61] 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
[62] 260 U.S. 199 (1922).
[63] Supreme Court Ruling Bars Japanese, *San Francisco Examiner*, November 14, 1922, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457819459/.

Japanese from obtaining land as they were now ineligible to become citizens, regulating them to the same level as the ethnic Chinese. States such as Washington used the California land laws as a template and quickly enacted land laws of their own, and while challenges to these land laws were common, the *Ozawa* decision continued to affect their outcome. With the citizenship question answered anti-Japanese groups moved to restrict ethnic Japanese from owning, leasing, buying, or selling any land. A case from Washington brought to the Supreme Court in 1923 showcased the underlying fear that was present should ethnic Japanese succeed in farming.

The case of *Terrance v. Thompson* was a case where a white plaintiff (Terrance) wanted to lease agricultural land to Nakatsuka, a resident alien, for a lease term of five years. At the time, Washington's State Constitution did not allow resident aliens to lease land. In addition, using California as a template, Washington added that any person who conveyed land to such an alien would forfeit the land to the State and be subject to fines or imprisonment.[64] The State of Washington's decision stated, "In the field of agriculture, the American and Oriental cannot compete. The possible result of such a condition would be that in the course of time, in certain sections of the country, at least, all lands might pass to these classes of aliens. The people of the State would then be entirely dependent for their very existence upon alien races who recognize to the State or Nation no other obligations than those forcibly imposed."[65] On November 12th, 1923, in a 6-0 vote, the Supreme Court agreed with Washington State and refused to allow Terrance to lease agricultural land to Nakatsuta.

Three other cases would challenge the alien land laws, *Porterfield v Webb, Webb v O'Brian,* and *Frick v. Webb,* and none would be successful in proving that the alien land laws violated the 1911 treaty or the Fourteenth Amendment. Ulysses Webb described the reaction to

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[64] *United States Reports*: Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court 24, 200.
[65] *Reports,* 207.

these challenges among the anti-Asian factions as "most gratifying and a great victory for California."[66] Columbia Law Professor Thomas Reed Powell took the opposite stance and published a detailed analysis of the decisions without racial overtones or commentary.[67] According to Powell, of particular note was the appearance that California and Washington's laws focus on agriculture as if farming represented an especially onerous threat to the American way of life:

> On the increase in the number of Japanese farmers does not disfranchise the citizens whom they displace. These judicial affirmations of the "obvious" need to be supplemented by some demonstration or assertion that ineligible aliens and non-declarant eligibles are more of a menace on the land than in the factory, shop, and kitchen. Such assertion appears a little later when Mr. Justice Butler observes that "the quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm lands within its border are matters of the highest importance and affect the safety and power of the State itself. Again we are not told why. One sees readily that allegiance has a close relation to matters within the scope of national authority, but its peculiar relation to fruit raising is less evident.[68]

Despite Powell's strong words, the four decisions taken together represented a crushing blow to the Japanese ability to establish themselves as successful farmers. Due to these decisions, Japanese-owned lands shrank from 74,769 in 1920 to 41,898 in 1925. Leased lands declined from 192,150 to 76,397 acres in the same year.[69] The West Coast remained convinced that ethnic Japanese immigrants threatened the country and their region. These fears and racial sentiments culminated at a time when the population of ethnic Japanese in California was approximately 70,000, or one Californian in fifty. Although the State had used all of its power after the passage of the Alien Land Act of 1920 and its subsequent referendums, it severely

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[66] Alien Land Law Upheld by Supreme Court, *San Francisco Examiner*, November 13, 1923, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457715426/.

[67] Powell was one of the most influential legal scholars of the day. He would later teach at Harvard for twenty-five years and be elected president of the American Political Science Association.

[68] Thomas Reed Powell, "Alien Land Cases in United States Supreme Court," *California Law Review 12* (1923-1924): 272.

[69] Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Distant Shore* New York: Little Brown, 1989), 206.

inhibited Japanese agriculture, and if further action were warranted, Federal intervention would be needed.

Senator Hiram Johnson and the California delegation held a critical organizational meeting in a House of Representatives room on April 20, 1921. The result of this meeting was the forming of an informal executive committee comprised of one senator and one representative from each of the twelve western states with the goal of exclusion. This group believed the West was under invasion via "peaceful penetration." While their arguments echo the sentiments of many other politicians and anti-Japanese groups from previous years, they never got to act formally. Shortly after their formation, the Supreme Court handed down the Ozawa decision, giving exclusionists the necessary power.[70]

The literacy tests enacted in 1917 did not have the desired effect of barring the "undesirables" that exclusionists were hoping for; in 1921, the United States adopted an immigration quota-based system dubbed The Emergency Quota Act. This emergency act responded to increased refugees fleeing a post-war-torn Europe, the Russian Revolution, and the Armenian Genocide. The new immigrants skewed sharply to southern and eastern Europe, an area the eugenicists claimed would pollute the country's Nordic ideal. Another factor was the increase in the labor force when the country was winding down from war production. This influx of immigrants sparked an outcry from the labor unions as fear of wage influence by immigration was again running very high. The labor unions saw: "A devastated Europe portrayed as a region filled with potential immigrants who would take any work in America, potentially depressing wages and taking jobs from Anglo-Saxons."[71]

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[70] Powell, "Alien Land Cases in United States Supreme Court," 271.

[71] Marouf A. Hasian Jr., "Conserving the Nation's Germplasm: Nativist Discourse and the Passage of the 1924 Immigration Restriction Act." *Legal Studies Forum 24* (2000), 163.

What became the National Origins Act of 1924, or The Immigration Act of 1924, originated in the House of Representatives in late 1923 under the chairmanship of West Coast representative Albert Johnson of Washington. After some back and forth with the House Committee on Immigration, an updated system of immigration quotas was adopted. The goal was to eliminate "non-Anglo-Saxon" immigration from eastern and southern Europe. The committee decided on a 2 percent quota based on immigration numbers from 1890. The decision to use the year 1890 was due to the drastic increase in immigration in the early 1900s. The committee also approved the complete exclusion of "aliens ineligible for citizenship."

The bill stalled for a time before officially being approved by the House. The pro-exclusionists did not control the Immigration Committee, and the Senate called for a Japanese quota rather than exclusion. They requested the Japanese Ambassador Masanao Hanihara to write a letter outlining the details of the Gentlemen's Agreement to help combat complete exclusion. Hanihara complied, and while he spoke accurately of the Gentleman's Agreement, one part of the letter stood out; "I have stated or rather repeated all this to you rather candidly and in a most friendly spirit, for I realize as I believe you do, the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure retaining the aliens ineligible to citizenship provision would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries."[72]

Seen as a veiled threat, the term "grave consequences" turned the opinion from quota to exclusion. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts stated, "The United States cannot legislate by the exercise by any other country of veiled threats."[73] Senators changed sides to support

[72] "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924, Volume II - Office of the Historian." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1924v02/d280.

[73] Hasian Jr., "Conserving the Nation's Germplasm: Nativist Discourse and the Passage of the 1924 Immigration Restriction Act."

exclusion, citing patriotic reasons, and the bill passed the Senate 62-6.[74] The bill's passage in the House was a win for organized labor, which spearheaded much of the lobbying in Washington, D.C. Supporters such as V.S. McClatchy, James Phelan, and Ulysses Webb were welcomed in Washington, D.C., as they worked to make sure this legislation passed into law. The group brought letters of support from many West Coast labor and exclusion groups, such as the American Federation of Labor and the Japanese Exclusion League, showing their support. With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, all but one of the basic demands of the anti-Japanese movement was satisfied, the outlier being to "amend the Constitution to deny citizenship to native-born Asians." Although exclusionists would continue to advocate denying the *Nisei* their citizenship, Congress never considered a possible amendment. With exclusionists such as James Phelan thoroughly happy with the Immigration Act of 1924 and the resulting Japanese exclusion, a sizable immigrant community with a growing number of *Nisei* children who were, by right, American citizens were left in the wake of this landmark immigration reform. The act had the desired effect of shutting down new Japanese immigration. In 1924, there were 8,801 Japanese immigrants, and only 723 immigrants in 1925. This number would not exceed 1,000 until after World War II.[75]

Despite the halt in immigration in 1924, the Japanese population continued to rise. For example, in 1920, the *Issei* population was 111,010, with 81,383 listed as "alien" and native-born *Nisei*, numbering 29,672, approximately 26.7%. By 1940, the *Issei* population was 126,947, with 47,305 listed as "alien" and native-born *Nisei*, numbering 79,642, approximately 62.7%.[76] In a

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[74] Immigration Bill Passes The Senate by Vote of 62 to 6, *New York Times*, April 19, 1924, https://www.nytimes.com/1924/04/19/archives/immigration-bill-passes-the-senate-by-vote-of-62-to-6-ban-on.html.

[75] Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Bgo4-330, https://ww2census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates1789-1945-pdf.

[76] Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Bgo4-330, https://ww2census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates1789-1945-pdf.

typical *Nisei* family, children were born between 1918 and 1922; this meant that the numerically most significant group of *Nisei* came of age between 1939 and 1943.[77] This new generation created two classes of ethnic people, one holding onto its roots in Japan, albeit very little, and one fully embracing the American way of life. It was understood that: "The *Nisei* had inherited from his parents a remarkable desire to succeed in the face of hardship, but had also learned the American definition of success, by which standard the accommodation made by his parent could not be considered satisfactory."[78]

Despite generational differences, their parents required *Nisei* to attend school and succeed in their scholastic careers. The *Nisei* succeeded academically but remained constantly underappreciated in and outside of school. Fully graduated and credentialed *Nisei* were virtually unemployable as teachers, scientists, or in any field outside the service or agriculture community. In a strange twist of fate, the exclusionists who worked for decades to create laws barring Japanese from land ownership, farming, and small business success created a community where agriculture and small business in Japanese communities were the only avenues available to ethnic Japanese. The *Issei* accepted this, but the *Nisei* did not; as one *Nisei* wrote in 1937, "I am a fruit stand worker. It is not a very attractive nor distinguished occupation. I would much rather it were a doctor or lawyer, but my aspiration of developing into such was frustrated long ago. I am only what I am, a professional carrot washer."[79] Saving enough money to buy a farm or a fruit stand was the level of success that the *Nisei* could expect.

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[77] Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Bgo4-330, https://ww2census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates1789-1945-pdf.

[78] John Modell, "Class or Ethnic Solidarity: The Japanese American Company Union." *Pacific Historical Review* 38, no. 2 (1969): 193.

[79] Modell, "Class or Ethnic Solidarity." *Pacific Historical Review 38*, no. 2 (1969): 195.

One of the benefits of having native-born children, *Nisei*, was taking advantage of the loopholes still present in the Immigration Act of 1924. Utilizing these loopholes was one of the main ways Japanese farms and landholdings continued to increase despite the increased agitation on the West Coast in the 1920s and 1903s. To avoid the law, a Japanese family would purchase land in the name of their native-born children, most of whom were coming of age in the 1930s. This situation required the appointment of a legal guardian or appropriately qualified trustee. Usually, guardianship of the native-born child was granted to the parents; however, this depended on the county where the family lived and how cooperative the local judge was.[80]

Another method used by the ethnic Japanese to avoid the difficulties of guardianship and a judge was to "borrow the name" of an American citizen of legal age. It was common for Hawaiian-born Japanese, older than those born on the mainland, to supply their name for this purpose. One such person is Kazuo Miyamoto, who wrote in his autobiography that distant relatives approached him during his Senior year at Stanford. He states, "The whole crux of the arrangement is in getting a trustworthy citizen who will not betray the Japanese farmers. Since you are twenty-one years old, you can lease these farms for us. What do you think? Mr. Tanaka will guarantee the expense to put you through medical school." Miyamoto accepted, saying, "Nobody could have planned anything more convenient at such an opportune time."[81]

As the number of Japanese farms and population continued to increase, despite the 1924 Immigration Act, hatred of the Japanese did not wane. People were convinced that the Japanese living in the United States, *Nisei* included, continued to hold a primary allegiance to Japan and threatened the labor force and the nation's overall security. Japan's political and social changes

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[80] Jean Pajus, *The Real Japanese California* (Berkeley, 1937), 131-134, 135-136; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Japanese Immigration: Hearings,* 66th Cong., 2d sess., 1921, 404, 873-876.

[81] Kazuo Miuamoto, *Hawaii: End of the Rainbow* (Rutland, VT. 1964), 237-239.

during the turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s fueled this fear. The turmoil began with the death of Emperor Meiji in 1912. Emperor Meiji was succeeded by his son Yoshihito, called Emporer Taisho, after succession. His poor health plagued Taisho's reign, and in 1921, he named his son Hirohito as prince regent.

Problems, including economic stagnation from the downgrade from the economic boom of World War I, besieged the country that Hirohito now ruled. For most of the 1920s, the Japanese economy remained dull, with low economic growth, mild deflation, and an unsettled financial system.[82] Two stock market crashes, bad loans, and a population that was becoming more urban, literate, and middle-class exacerbated the economic crisis in Japan. This change saw society beginning to make more sound financial decisions in the government and private sectors. In the years following World War I, a coalition of farmers, reformers, labor activists, intellectuals, and tenant farmers forced the government to adopt universal manhood suffrage in 1925, which was slated to take effect in 1928.

Emperor Taisho died in 1926, and his successor, Hirohito, was enthroned as Emperor Showa in 1928. As people celebrated universal suffrage, militarists focused on the coronation of the new Emperor as a continuation of the old tradition and the old ways. Adding to this sentiment was the failed assassination attempt of Hirohito in 1925 by a Communist Party college student, Daisuke Nanba. Nanba was executed shortly after his arrest. In response to this action, the Japanese government passed the "Peace Preservation Law," which aimed to arrest Communism but affected the whole population. The law stated, "Anyone who organizes a group for the purpose of changing the national polity or of denying the private property system, or anyone who

[82] Masato Shizume, "The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: Instability in the Financial System and the Impact of the World Depression," *Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies*, 2009, 4.

knowingly participates in said group, shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding ten years. An offense not actually carried out shall also be subject to punishment."[83] This law, while aimed at Communism, effectively barred anyone from organizing in disagreement with the government.

In 1928, the formal crowning of Hirohito (Emperor Showa) launched a sweeping reform across the country called "The Showa Restoration," aimed at glorifying the Emperor and traditional Japanese virtues and excluding Western influences, seen as greedy, individualistic, and assertive. The Showa Restoration aimed to restore Japanese ideals of "Japanese family-state and self-sacrifice in service of the nation."[84] As the government worked on the Showa Restoration, the military, seen as an extension of the samurai culture that had never lost influence in domestic and foreign policy, began encroaching on civilian life. Japan's victory over Russia, being on the winning side of World War I, annexing Korea, and having a strong military, commercial, and diplomatic presence in China emboldened the Japanese nationalists.

Japan saw itself as a world power, and its national pride demanded that the other great powers treat them as such. In the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Japan sat with the "big four," the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. In 1921, a nine-nation conference convened in Washington, D.C., to discuss naval military power. Japan obtained permission to expand its navy in the Pacific, though limited to 300,000 gross tonnages. The overall tonnage allowed for Japan was lower than that of the United States and Great Britain, a fact that Japan took personally. Japanese nationalists also viewed the tightening and elimination of immigration to the United States on racial grounds as an unforgivable insult. The United States, however, saw the Washington Conference as a success,

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[83] Peace Preservation Law, https://msuedu/~londo/FAU/4933_webPeace_pres_law.htm.
[84] Showa Restoration, http://motherearthtravel.com/history/japan/hisory-g.htm.

> Together, the treaties signed at the Washington Conference served to uphold the status quo in the Pacific: they recognized existing interests and did not make fundamental changes to them. At the same time, the United States secured agreements that reinforced its existing policy in the Pacific, including the Open Door in China and the protection of the Philippines, while limiting the scope of Japanese imperial expansion as much as possible.[85]

In 1931, Japan wanted access to the iron and coal it lacked on its soil, and ignoring the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed war, the Japanese overran the Chinese province of Manchuria and installed a puppet government. Japan's army occupied the Manchurian capital, seized the railway lines, and claimed that Chinese nationalists set an explosion off on Japanese-owned lines and that they were acting in self-defense. China denied their involvement, claiming Japan planned the attack for months. Japan also angrily denied their involvement; however, historians lean toward China's view of the events.[86] Western powers attempted to defuse the situation via the League of Nations; however, Japan continued to do as it pleased. Eventually, the situation stabilized, and Japan's message was clear: they were now a legitimate world power with extreme imperialist ambitions.

Anti-Japanese groups on the West Coast remained convinced that the *Issei* and *Nisei* were potential or actual agents of the Japanese government. During Japan's turmoil, fear of a fifth column preparing for an invasion of the United States began to spread throughout the West Coast. Emilio Mola Vidal, a Nationalist general during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), made a statement regarding the "fifth column.[87] Vidal stated, "A fifth column was already in place and operating inside the country itself." With 70 percent of the United States ethnic Japanese residing

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[85] United States Department of State Archive, https:/ /2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/88818.htm.

[86] Department of State, Office of the Historian, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/mukden-incident; Japanese Defeat Chinese in Battle; Capture Mukden, *San Francisco Examiner*, September 19, 1931, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/458069844/.

[87] Bolinger, Dwight L. "Fifth Column Marches On." *American Speech* 19, no. 1 (1944): 47–49; Whitaker, John T. "Prelude to World War: A Witness from Spain." *Foreign Affairs* 21, no. 1 (1942): 109.

on the West Coast, this perceived fear would be a driving force for suspending rights and seizure of property during the forced evacuation of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast in the spring of 1942.

The situation in the Pacific erupted again in 1937 when Japan, again claiming self-defense, attacked Chinese forces in northern China. Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek organized 50,000 troops to try and avoid the same outcome that Manchuria had suffered six years earlier. The efforts of the Chinese army failed as Japan overwhelmed them with superior numbers, training, and brutality. Japan pushed south and occupied more and more of China's east coast. The anti-Japanese groups on the West Coast, knowing that news of the mistreatment of the Chinese would not stir Americans' anger, put an American slant on the news coming out of China. The *Examiner* reported on July 21 that two American women, one the daughter of a naval officer, had been kicked and beaten by Japanese soldiers.[88]

In December of 1937, the anti-Japanese groups no longer had to blur the lines with news coming out of China. The Japanese reached Nanking, the capital of the Republic of China, on December 13, 1937, which resulted in "one of the most tragic military debacles in the history of modern warfare. In attempting to defend Nanking, the Chinese allowed themselves to be surrounded and systematically slaughtered."[89] The civilian casualties of Nanking became the most numerous victims of the atrocity as approximately 200,000 were killed, with estimates of rape ranging from 20,000 to 80,000 cases.[90] While most news outlets in the United States

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[88] Japan Soldier Beat U.S. Women, *San Francisco Examiner*, July 21, 1937, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/458054566/.

[89] ALL CAPTIVES SLAIN; Civilians Also Killed as the Japanese Spread Terror in Nanking *New York Times*, December 18, 1937, https://www.nytimes.com/1937/12/18/archives/all-captives-slain-civilians-also-killed-as-the-japanese-spread.html.; Yang, Daqing. "Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing." *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (1999): 842.

[90] Ibid.

focused on the mass executions of civilians in Nanking, the West Coast, and the anti-Japanese groups were focused on the relatively unknown incident of the USS *Panay.*

The USS *Panay* was an American gunboat ferrying American evacuees out of Nanking in the days before the Japanese invasion. Initial reports cited sixty-two dead or missing. The *Examiner* proclaimed that the *Panay* was on a mission of mercy when it was attacked and sunk by Japanese bombers.[91] The Japanese government apologized to the United States, claiming that the pilots had not seen the American markings on the ship and believed the ship to be Chinese. An American reporter with Movietone News was a passenger on the *Panay,* and the resulting film clearly showed American flags visible on both the ship and the lifeboats. The situation escalated, with Japan eventually offering reparations and President Roosevelt demanding an official apology and statement of regret from the emperor.[92]

The anti-Japanese groups on the West Coast seized the situation with the USS *Panay* and the behavior of the Japanese military and government. On December 17, 1937, the San Francisco Labor Council demanded a boycott of Japanese-made goods and Japanese-owned businesses in the city. When it was discovered that Japan had abandoned its treaty obligation to limit the size of its navy, which by 1940 had grown to 375 ships, with an emphasis on aircraft carriers, fears strengthened. In response, the American Navy had a fleet of 478 ships, which included fifteen battleships and six aircraft carriers. In order to dissuade Japanese expansion, the United States had forward deployed much of its Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii. Japan interpreted this as directly threatening its sea control, trade, national well-being, and strategy.[93]

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[91] Japanese Sink U.S. Warship, Victim of War Plane; Lost on a Mission of Mercy, *San Francisco Examiner*, December 13, 1937, https://sfexaminer.newspapers.com/image/457807152/.

[92] Arthur Scherr, "Presidential Power, the 'Panay' Incident, and the Defeat of the Ludlow Amendment." *The International History Review* 32, no. 3 (2010): 470.

[93] Gompert, David, *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn* (Rand Corporation, 2014), 95.

Although there was no evidence at the time that any ethnic Japanese immigrant to the United States was any less loyal to America than immigrants from any other nation, the actions of Japan in the 1920s and 1930s made them more vulnerable to racial stereotypes and government repression. As U.S. and Japan relations worsened in the early 1930s, the American government became increasingly suspicious of its large concentration of Japanese residents. By 1932, ethnic Japanese, whether immigrant, *Issei*, or native-born *Nisei*, were under surveillance by the intelligence agencies.[94]

Fifth Column

From 1939 to 1941, a recurring theme appeared worldwide in the media and news outlets. That theme was the emotional reaction that German aggression sparked in the minds of the United States and its allies. This unchecked German aggression always began with their fifth column, their "Trojan Horse," activated from within their target country by spies or supporters of the Nazi idea that had been in place before the war. German troops already implanted and established in the target country were awaiting orders to act. The thoughts and feelings of those attacked clearly show its effectiveness:

> There are large numbers of enemy agents in our own country, some of whom have already been living amongst us for a long time so that they might pave the way unobtrusively, by means of espionage and seemingly harmless measures, for the attack whose victims we have become. Another part consists of enemy soldiers who, now that the attack has started, have put on our uniform or civilian clothes or have disguised themselves as clerics or as women. Both these groups of agents are spying, and moreover, they are trying to get into contact with the invading enemy by performing special, seemingly harmless actions that contain some signal or message for him.[95]

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[94] Pedro A. Loureiro, "Japanese Espionage and American Countermeasures in Pre-Pearl Harbor California," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations 3* (fall 1994): 200.

[95] Major General J.F. C. Fuller: *The Second World War 1939-1945,* (London, 1948), 124; Louis Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, 249.

The Quisling movement in Norway is perhaps the most potent example of the Nazi idea of infiltrating a country before German troops arrive. Vidkum Quisling served as the Norwegian minister of defense from 1931 to 1933. Quisling left his position to establish a Norwegian fascist branch, the National Unity Party, to support Hitler and his ideals. Norway was a neutral country during WWII, but Quisling worked to undermine the country from within, garnering support and placing saboteurs in critical positions throughout the cities. Quisling traveled to Berlin in the spring of 1940 to meet with Hitler and convince him of the need to invade and occupy Norway. Hitler did so on April 9 and obtained complete control of Norway by June 10, with fifth-column help from Quisling and his supporters.

Norway was not alone in its fall due to fifth-column activity. Germany's rapid takeover of northern and western Europe shocked the United States and the allies. The accepted consensus among politicians and military leaders was that the rapid fall was not due to a superior military but due to Nazi fifth-column activity and their ability to create fear and panic, which undermined the French resistance from within the country.[96] These rapid advances in Europe and a complete takeover of a neutral country due to what Roosevelt referred to as "the Trojan Horse" spread fears of subversion and foreign propaganda in the United States.[97] It was understood that the fifth column was the advance force of the enemy sent to pave the way for the invading military through propaganda and sabotage.[98]

When the occasion did indeed arise for Hitler to declare war on the United States after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Germany's military had been taken up to such an extent in the

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[96] Experiencing History. "Roosevelt's Address on the 'Fifth Column.'" May 26, 1940. https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/roosevelts-address-on-the-fifth-column. & Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War.*

[97] Experiencing History. "Roosevelt's Address on the 'Fifth Column.'" May 26, 1940. https://perspectives.ushmm.org/item/roosevelts-address-on-the-fifth-column. & Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War.*

[98] Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War,*18.

deadly struggle in Europe that there was nothing left to conduct an offensive war on a large scale against the United States. Hitler abandoned the idea of bombing the big cities on the East Coast of America in the summer of 1943. Hitler knew the only way to succeed in defeating America was by throwing saboteurs into the fight. Only then would he be able to strike at his strongest industrial opponent successfully.[99]

This ongoing theme of German aggression, their alliance with Italy and Japan, and Roosevelt's acknowledgment of the successes of fifth-column activity in Europe validated America's fear of sabotage on their soil. This recurring theme, bolstered by claims of fifth-column work in Pearl Harbor, was continually used by anti-Japanese pressure groups on the West Coast to push for the complete removal of ethnic Japanese during the spring of 1942.

Anti-Japanese sentiment was pervasive throughout the West Coast, and the framework for the internment of ethnic Japanese was now set. The fear of Japanese influence in the agricultural sector, the aggression shown in their Pacific Basin expansion, and the perceived fear of the potential of a fifth-column presence were facts on the West Coast. This belief was based on the success of the fifth column during the Spanish Civil War and bolstered by the WWII success of Nazi Germany using the same tactic in their invasions. The tinder box was full; all that was needed was the spark, which came on December 7, 1941.

The decision of politicians, media outlets, and labor groups all led to a situation that mandated the evacuation of the ethnic Japanese population despite their vital contribution to food production. The intellectual history of fear, racism, and labor concerns came to a boiling point, providing a unique situation on the West Coast that was not present anywhere else in the country. Each act taken by the labor unions, politicians, and the media had an additive effect on the

[99] Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War,*19.

eventual decision to evacuate the West Coast ethnic Japanese population. Their farming contribution required a delicacy of timing for the evacuation to be effective and maintain wartime food security during the early war years.

Chapter Three -- Hawaii Exception

"If you want to understand today you have to search yesterday." Pearl S. Buck, American novelist (1892-1973).

Hawaii stands in contrast to the actions taken on the West Coast. The ethnic-Japanese population in Hawaii at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack was 157,000, or 37.3 percent of the total population. The policies regarding the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii did not involve removal but rather martial law for all residents. Martial law avoided the drastic action of full-scale removal, as seen on the West Coast. It can be argued that martial law turned all the Hawaiian Islands into one large internment camp for all residents.

Hawaii is also an island and relied on the West Coast for its food supply as its primary crop during the war was sugar and pineapples. The need for a constant supply of food made preserving ethnic Japanese farms on the West Coast even more critical. Although Hawaii acted in contrast to the West Coast evacuation, the need to feed Hawaii highlighted the importance of the ethnic Japanese farms on the West Coast.

Pearl Harbor

On December 7, 1941, at 7:55 a.m., Japan started its attack on the Naval base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack originated from four aircraft carriers located several hundred miles offshore of the island and included more than 300 torpedo planes, bombers, dive-bombers, and fighters. In one hour and fifteen minutes, the United States lost 2,335 military personnel and 68 civilians; of those civilians, half were Japanese fishermen.[1] The Navy lost nineteen ships; eight were battleships, three were cruisers, and three were destroyers; however, no aircraft carriers were lost as they were out on maneuvers during the attack. In the end, the Pearl Harbor attack

[1] Girdner and Loftis. *The Great Betrayal,*19.

claimed 3,500 lives. December 7, 1941, is a pivotal date in American history as the attack propelled the United States into war and conveyed the message that the two great oceans no longer provided enough protection.

The United States changed overnight from a country that was content to be on the sidelines, watching and reading about the carnage abroad from the safety of their homes to a country that took the attack personally and would rally every resource in the response. The United States responded with lightning speed; as President Roosevelt spoke with Congress, the military, civilian, and government agencies were placed on a war footing. Several changes occurred immediately, including factories ordered to convert to war production, newspaper restrictions, blackouts ordered, battle plans drawn up, reservists activated, and 1,200 ethnic Japanese arrested on the West Coast.[2]

The reaction to the Pearl Harbor attack played out differently for the ethnic Japanese population in Hawaii. The population of ethnic Japanese in Hawaii was larger than that of the West Coast at 157,905 people; moreover, they comprised approximately 37.3% of the total population.[3] By 1940, approximately seventy-five percent of the ethnic Japanese population in Hawaii was native-born compared to sixty-four percent and 2% of the population on the West Coast.[4] Factors such as limited land to build relocation camps, transportation difficulties, the work of morale committees, and the dependence of Hawaii on Japanese labor are a few reasons the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii did not experience mass internment. The situation in Hawaii warranted action, which came in the form of complete and total Martial Law for the duration of the war.

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[2] Girdner and Loftis. *The Great Betrayal*, 20; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 232.

[3] Hawaii Census, 1940.

[4] Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population 1940*, vol. 3, Characteristics of the Population, part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. government Printing Office, 1943), 585-601.

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, rumors spread that the bodies of enemy pilots were wearing class rings from the local high school.[5] Talk of retaliation within the Filipino community was common due to Japan's actions in the Philippines; however, no incidents of retaliation were recorded. The new Hawaii military commander, Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, who replaced General Short, stood firm against the rumors and reassured the ethnic Japanese population that they had nothing to fear as long as they obeyed the law. He stated, "We must remember that this is America, and we must do things the American way. We must not knowingly and deliberately deny any loyal citizen the opportunity of exercising or demonstrating his loyalty in a concrete way."[6]

The military leaders in Hawaii took an early and strong stance against any movement calling into question the allegiance of any resident group. This mindset sent a message that the military leaders in Hawaii had confidence in the loyalty of the resident Japanese population and gave them opportunities to prove this by acting as territorial guards and participants in other civilian defense activities.[7] The chief of the Military Intelligence unit of Hawaii defined the policy as one that strictly controlled those individuals among the Japanese group considered dangerous. The policy "did not impugn, because of race, the good name of the rest of them, alien or citizen." The chief of the Military Intelligence unit gave a speech at the University of Hawaii stating:

> How differently a Himmler or a Heinrich would have handled this delicate situation! Does anyone believe for a moment that any of the Axis crowd would give one of the enemy race a fair chance to prove himself? It would take much too long to tell you of the many concrete ways in which many of these people who were on the sport have proved their love for America. Americans of Japanese blood…are Americans and until

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[5] Cecil Henry Coggins, "The Japanese Americans in Hawaii," *Harper's*, June, 1943.

[6] Army Freezes Wages in Hawaii, *The New York Times,* December 23rd, 1941, https://www.nytimes.com/1941/12/23/archives/army-freezes-wages-in-hawaii.html.

[7] *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.* (University of Washington Press, 1997), 265.

> they prove (or show themselves dangerously capable of proving) traitorous, they should be treated as Americans. This must not be construed as sentimentality but rather as a sane, reasonable, democratic, and safe judgment. The Japanese element of the population, if accepted and united in purpose and action, is an asset to the community.[8]

There were several reasons for the level of tolerance and understanding that prevailed in Hawaii during the war. Hawaii did not experience a long history of anti-Asian prejudice; the islands' population was much more racially diverse than that of the West Coast, and Hawaii was not officially a state during the war, which kept any racist sentiment out of the halls of Congress. Military presence in Hawaii was also much more prevalent than that of the West Coast, so they had greater control over island activities.[9] Finally, there was a difference in opinion between the military commanders regarding the ethnic Japanese population. General DeWitt believed sabotage, espionage, and imminent attack would soon come from the West Coast Japanese population. General Delos Emmons trusted the Hawaiian-Japanese population and stood firm in supporting them. Emmons did not support radical plans of mass removal, citing labor shortages, lack of transportation, and complete lack of evidence citing fifth column activity.[10]

Defense of Oahu

Plans for defending Oahu were revised in 1923 and formally approved by Army Chief of Staff General John J. Pershing. The plan called for the internment of all enemy aliens on the islands; the Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare states, “The Department Commander will plan to provide for interned aliens and the civilian population, including plans for rationing,

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[8] Kendall J. Fielder, “Democracy and Military Necessity in Hawaii” (Address at the University of Hawaii, Thursday, March 25th, 1943), *Hawaii Educational Review,* April, 1943, 243.

[9] *Personal Justice Denied,* 262.

[10] WDC, *Supplemental Report on Civilian Controls Exercised by Western Defense Command,* January. 1947, 174-75.

conservation, and prevention of waste."[11] The Army's belief that internment was the only course of action for control of the ethnic Japanese population in Hawaii came in the form of several letters sent to the judge advocate general's office highlight. One of these letters is from then-Colonel John L. DeWitt.

General John L. DeWitt was the commanding general of the Western Defense Command during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although he was in charge of the West Coast of the United States and not Hawaii, he had studied the "problem" of the resident Japanese in Hawaii should a war break out with Japan. In 1923, then only an assistant chief of staff in the War Planning Department, Dewitt, helped modify and finalize plans for the "defense of Oahu" should America find itself at war with Japan.[12] DeWitt's work on the Orange War Plan and the Defense of Oahu may have influenced his later decisions regarding the internment of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast. DeWitt studied the problem and worked to improve the defense plans in 1923. He believed the only course of action that would ensure the safety of the islands was the internment of the resident Japanese population.

His secondary recommendation was to implement martial law over the entirety of the islands to control the remaining civilian population. He argued that martial law would be necessary and legal based on "military necessity." In addition to martial law, DeWitt further suggested that all enemy aliens should be registered immediately and those posing a security risk arrested when the nation entered a war with Japan. He further stated, "From a military standpoint and as a measure for adequate defense of the Hawaiian Islands in the event of war with an

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[11] Eaton, George B. Review Turabian "General Walter Krueger and Joint War Planning, 1922—1938." *Naval War College Review* 48, no. 2 (1995), 94; Gary Y. Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945* (Temple University Press, 1991), 61.

[12] Gary Y Okihiro, *Cane Fires,* 65; Klancy Clark De Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist: Karl Bendetsen, Perry Saito, and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2004), 184.

Asiatic Power or a combination of Powers including Asiatic power the establishment of complete military control over the Hawaiian Islands, including its people, supplies, and material, etc., is highly desirable."[13]

The revised plan included DeWitt's recommendation for suspending habeas corpus, installing a military governor of Hawaii, and controlling civil and judicial officials. DeWitt reaffirmed his suggestion of registration of enemy aliens, stating that classes should separate them: those deemed dangerous, those deemed not dangerous and permitted to work under armed guard, and civil workers such as servants, plantation workers, and merchants.[14] The revised defense plan featured selective detention, martial law, and registration of enemy aliens. This course of action would ensure the continued labor productivity of the islands; a key component missing from Dewitt's recommendations was how to classify an enemy alien. A large majority of the ethnic Japanese population were American citizens by birth; there was no clear designation within DeWitt's recommendations.[15]

Judge Advocate General W. A. Bethel weighed in on DeWitts's recommendation for complete martial law in a letter to DeWitt on June 28, 1923. Bethal advised that martial law was not authorized under the Constitution or currently existing statutes but can be adopted "only when necessity demands --- the necessity of national self-preservation and permitted only due to a compelling necessity."[16] Bethel agreed that any war with a strong Asiatic naval power where a large population of their ethnic citizens lived within Hawaii and if such persons were in a position to cause sabotage, commit espionage, or hinder military action, the martial law would be

[13] Okihiro, *Cane Fires,* 82; De Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist,* 78; Colonel John L. DeWitt to Judge Advocate General, May 21st, 1923, RG 165 WPD, File No. 986/14.
[14] Okihiro, *Cane Fires*. 1655.
[15] Okihiro, *Cane Fires* 1655. & De Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist,* 78.
[16] Ibid, 1666.

justified and legal.[17] Bethal finished his letter by stating that the writ of habeas corpus could not be suspended for the general population. Only those held by military authorities were subject to such a suspension. DeWitt submitted the plan, which was then distributed to appropriate military leaders with the changes and updates as presented by Bethal. The plan remained in effect and without another revision until WWII.

In 1937, a congressman from Mississippi, John E. Rankin, proposed martial law for Hawaii. In the weeks leading up to the attack on December 7, talk of martial law was common. An article published in the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* on November 18, 1941, titled "Why Attack the People of Hawaii?" was an argument against martial law and likened Hawaii to an enclave that "preserved intact their old-country traditions and methods of speech."[18] The article was a statement against martial law and a defense of the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii, as the article stated that "investigations have not found facts which would indicate or prove disloyalty but rather the reverse."[19] A September 1941 assessment reported that if an attack came, sabotage was expected and may, within a minimal time, cause significant damage.[20]

Colonel Bendetsen

General DeWitt was not the only high-ranking West Coast military officer to visit Hawaii and offer advice on controlling the ethnic Japanese population. Colonel Karl Bendetsen, who would become the head of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, which oversaw the removal of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast, visited Hawaii in September of 1941. Bendetsen would soon become one of the chief architects of the internment process.

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[17] Okihiro, *Cane Fires* 1655. & De Nevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist,* 78.

[18] Why Attack the People of Hawaii? *Honolulu Star Bulletin,* November 18th, 1941, https://www.newspapers.com/image/275109382/

[19] Why Attack the People of Hawaii? *Honolulu Star Bulletin,* November 18th, 1941.

[20] Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America*, 289.

Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy appointed Army Reservist Karl Bendetsen as his assistant on May 2, 1941. Bendetsen was a reservist from Washington state who became involved with pre-war activities when he lobbied for the extension of the peacetime draft. Bendetsen decided to become an active member of the Army in 1940 and reported to the Judge Advocate General's Office. Bendetsen's appointment to the JAG office made him uniquely able to mingle with leaders of much higher rank. Bendetsen caught the attention of Assistant Secretary McCloy, who solicited his help with a labor dispute involving the North American Aviation plant outside of Los Angeles.[21] During this labor dispute, President Roosevelt declared an *unlimited* national emergency due to the rising tensions with Japan and the ongoing war in Europe.[22] Roosevelt stated that all military and civilian defenses must prepare to repel aggression "directed toward any part of the Western Hemisphere."[23]

Immediately after his declaration, McCloy began working with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Secretary of War Stimson on a program to track enemy agents within the United States.[24] As McCloy worked with the highest military and civilian leaders to identify saboteurs, secure factories for war production, and assign expanded powers to the FBI, Major Bendetsen was with him every step of the way. In the early summer of 1941, McCloy requested Bendetsen to explore the concept of detention and internment for national security in the event of war.[25] While studying civilian rights, Bendetsen wrote, "A sovereign power can do whatever is necessary in a moment of urgency to protect itself."[26]

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[21] Tom Coffman. *Inclusion: How Hawai'i Protected Japanese Americans from Mass Internment Transformed Itself and Changed America* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2021), 108.

[22] Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Radio Address Announcing an Unlimited National Emergency.* Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209607

[23] Ibid.

[24] Coffman, *Inclusion,*108.

[25] Kai Bird, *The Chairman, John J. McCloy and the Making of the American Establishment,* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 93.

[26] Coffman, *Inclusion,* 109.

Major Bendetsen continued to rise in influence among the JAG and was reassigned to the office of newly appointed Army Provost Marshal General Allen W. Gullion and put in charge of military policing, prisoner exchanges, and internment.[27] Bendetsen received orders from Secretary of War Stimson in the summer of 1941 to tour and document existing detention camps run by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Major Bendetsen discussed the logistical needs to operate camps, administration requirements, and how to expand them quickly should the need arise with INS officials.[28] After visiting several locations that held marooned German and Italian sailors due to the war, he flew to Hawaii.

Major Bendetsen arrived in Honolulu, Hawaii, on September 7, 1941, and met with General Short and General Green of the JAG office in Hawaii. Bendetsen was in Hawaii for ten days, studied military intelligence activities, and inspected possible internment facilities at the Kilauea Military Camp in the Hawaiian National Park.[29] He noted in his trip outline that the "Jap vote controls this very political island. Therefore, good Americans who depend on Jap business and votes may give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt."[30] Upon returning to the mainland, he met General John L DeWitt at the Presidio in San Francisco before moving on to an inspection in Fort Stanton, Texas.

There are inconsistencies in the record regarding Colonel Bendetsen and his travel log during November 1941. During interviews in 1952 and 1981, as well as his biography by DeNevers, Bendetsen claimed to have traveled back to Hawaii in November of 1941.[31] During this trip, he claimed to have met with General Short, General Green, and Army intelligence

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[27] Coffman, *Inclusion,* 109.
[28] Ibid, 110
[29] DeNevers, *The Colonel and the Pacifist,* 62 -63; Coffman, *Inclusion,* 110-111.
[30] DeNevers, 63; Coffman, *Inclusion*, 111-112.
[31] DeNevers, 63-64; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America*, 315-317; Coffman, *Inclusion*, 111-112; Jacobus tenBroek, Transcript of Jacobus tenBroek Interview with Karl Bendetsen, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records. Online Archive of California, University of California, Berkeley, July 8th, 1952.

regarding the West Coast plan for full-scale evacuation of the ethnic Japanese population should there be an outbreak of war.[32] Research for this project has not produced official government travel records showing Bendetsen did, in fact, travel back to Hawaii in November. General Green's unpublished manuscript described a "visitor" who arrived from Provost Marshal Gullion's office and described a plan to fully relocate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast to locations "further inland."[33] While General Green and General Short rebuked this plan, this visitor pushed for Hawaii to parallel the West Coast plan.[34] The meeting had concluded with both Short and Green advising that the plan was inappropriate for Hawaii and questioned the legality of such a move.

The records show that Bendetsen did visit Hawaii in September for ten days and met with General Green, General Short, and a representative from the intelligence office. This fact being the case, it is unclear why General Green would refer to the person in November as just a "visitor." If it indeed was Bendetsen, it is unlikely that General Green would have forgotten Bendetsen in such a short time. It is more likely that Bendetsen is mixing up the dates, and all that he described occurred in September 1941. Despite the inconsistency of dates, the record shows that a meeting to discuss full-scale removal of ethnic Japanese took place in Hawaii in 1941, six months before the official order for removal on the West Coast.

Martial Law

The idea of military control over the Hawaiian Islands came about as early as the 1920s and were modified by Colonel Thomas Green, a JAG officer assigned to Hawaii in 1940. Greene

[32] Jacobus tenBroek, Transcript of Jacobus tenBroek Interview with Karl Bendetsen, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records. Online Archive of California, University of California, Berkeley, July 8th, 1952.

[33] Thomas Green, Unpublished Memoir, Personal Files 1943, pdf page 485.

[34] Green, pdf 485.

streamlined the legal requirements for complete martial law on the islands. Green knew that war with Japan was inevitable and stated in his memoir that he "was shaken" to discover that two-thirds of Hawaii's population was of Asian ancestry.[35] He believed that when war did come, civil law administration could not control the public, so he set out to change the laws. Green worked with an ex-Army officer and retired Federal judge, Edward Massee, to begin work on a legal way to suspend constitutional rights in the event of war.

Green spoke with the Hawaiian Army commander, General Herron, who immediately supported the idea and told Green to proceed with the utmost secrecy. Green crafted territorial legislation allowing the civilian government to continue operating under tight controls and suspending citizens' constitutional rights.[36] This initial plan was known as the Mobilization Day or M-Day plan, which became law in October 1941. Green continued his work and networked with the mayor of the city and county of Honolulu to relinquish control over the roads in the event of a military emergency. He states in his memoir, "I continued to draft a form to meet every contingency that occurred to me."[37] The more Green researched, the more he realized that the military could not manipulate a civilian government, so he started considering military rule.

Green worked to find the legal definition of martial law and concluded, "That martial law is not a law nor are the limitations or the responsibilities well defined anywhere."[38] He believed this meant martial law to be a set of powers without constraint. Green wanted to protect military commanders who administered martial law from the judgment of civilian courts. He wrote that judgment occurs "where the war or other emergency have long since faded into history and when

[35] Thomas Green, *Unpublished Memoir*, Personal Files, pdf 87.
[36] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* pdf 124.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* pdf 365.

the investigating tribunals invariably are endowed with special powers of hindsight."[39] Green began researching the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, finding that the act allowed for aliens from an enemy country to be "apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed," provided that the president identified that a "predatory incursion" was threatened, attempted or perpetrated.[40]

While this wording in an old law was promising, Green stated that he was looking for a more far-reaching system of power. In his research, he found Section 67 of the Organic Act. This act was the framework by which Hawaii had been incorporated into the United States, though not an official state at the time of Green's research. Section 67 empowered the appointed governor "in case of rebellion or invasion or imminent threat thereof" to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* and place the territory under martial law.[41] This section was written into Hawaii's Constitution in 1895 to put down a rebellion against the government. Green saw the wording as a way to address the threat of foreign invasion and any potential threat of an uprising by the locals.

Green regularly met with Army leaders to inform them of his progress and research. He noted, "My primary purpose was to ensure that even in a surprise uprising and casualties among us, the survivors would carry on."[42] Green labored to draft rules and general orders, resulting in a martial law system seen as wholly undemocratic. General Short arrived in Hawaii and replaced General Herron as the Hawaiian Commander during Green's work. Green observed that General Short and the Hawaiian Governor Poindexter were very sharp and intelligent men who readily agreed with his ideas and worked on martial law.[43]

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[39] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* pdf 365.

[40] Tom Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America: The Movement for Racial Equality 1939-1942* (United States: EpiCenter, 2015), 286.

[41] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* 368.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* 348.

Green was living in Waikiki when the attack on Pearl Harbor began on December 7. After hearing explosions, he rushed to General Short's office and found him in shock at the events unfolding around him. Green then asked the staff if anyone had called General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army in Washington, D.C., to which they replied that no one had. Thomas Green reported the attack to General Marshall, who said, "Oh my God," and hung up the phone.[44]

Immediately after the attack, General Short and General Green met with Governor Poindexter at the Governor's Palace. Both advised the governor to abandon the M-day initiative and declare Martial Law. Poindexter expressed concern that the Honolulu police were few and some were of Japanese ancestry. He stated that the Chinese and Filipino population might turn on the Japanese and kill them, or "the Japanese might go over to the enemy and that in any of these events, the local police would be virtually helpless, and that thousands of innocent people might be injured or killed."[45] He also added that he had unconfirmed reports that the Japanese community had already started an insurrection. Short and Green said they did not know when asked if the Japanese community would remain loyal to the United States.[46]

After a short pause, Poindexter advised, "General, I have thought it through. I feel that the situation is beyond me and the civil authorities, and I think the safety of the Territory and its citizens require me to declare martial law."[47] The meeting ended once Poindexter signed the declaration, and the Hawaiian Islands were under military control. The powers of administration, law-making, interpretation of laws, and punishment for violations were now in the hands of the

[44] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* pdf 641.
[45] Coffman, Tom. *How Hawaii Changed America*, 291.
[46] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* pdf 642.
[47] Ibid, pdf 642.

Army. Constitutional rights of citizens were suspended, including freedom of assembly, speech, and freedom of the press.[48]

In addition to martial law, Green would go on to write approximately 250 General Orders. General Order No. 5 dealt with the ethnic Japanese population and restated the position of the Army Intelligence at the rally quoted previously. In terms of the relationship between the military and the ethnic Japanese community, General Short, despite his failure on December 7, laid a solid foundation of trust with the ethnic Japanese community, one carried forward by his replacement, General Emmons. On December 21, Emmons sent a radio broadcast stating, "There is no intention or desire on the part of the federal authorities to operate mass concentration camps. No person, be he citizen or alien, need worry, provided he is not connected with subversive elements."[49]

Hawaii civilians lived under martial law, military orders, 151 Defense Act rules, 100 directives, 181 old series general orders, 70 new series orders, 12 security orders, and 12 special orders, in force at varying degrees, for the entire war.[50] These rules maintained order on the island, and while most of these rules applied to everyone, several applied only to ethnic Japanese civilians. Ethnic Japanese were not allowed to travel by air, change jobs or their residence, or travel from one place to another without approval. Ethnic Japanese were also barred from purchasing or selling liquor, being outside during military blackouts, assembling in groups without permission, or in a restricted area.[51] All ethnic Japanese were required to turn in all firearms, explosives, cameras, and radios.[52]

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[48] Green, *Unpublished Memoir,* 642.
[49] *Personal Justice Denied,* 265.
[50] Ibid, 266.
[51] Allen Gwenfread, *Hawaii's War Years* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1950), 112; *Personal Justice Denied,* 266.
[52] Ibid.

Starting as early as December 7, an imposed curfew applied to all island residents. The military also shut down bars, banned liquor sales, closed schools, rationed gasoline, stopped the sale of groceries to complete an inventory, and supplemented civil courts with military tribunals.[53] Military censorship was implemented within two hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor to prevent information of a military nature from leaving the island. The military inspected incoming mail and censored anything foreign, such as items written in Japanese, as were local and long-distance telephone calls. No foreign language speaking was allowed, and film development was only allowed with a permit. Radio and newspapers operated under military censorship, and the commanders canceled the Japanese newspapers until after the war.[54] Censorship on the islands did not end until August 15, 1945.[55]

Ethnic Japanese were forbidden to own boats and lost all fishing work once the war started. Other ethnic Japanese were barred from jobs and many were no longer allowed to teach at school. Some *Nisei* were required to wear black badges issued by the Army, which said "restricted," this identified them as persons not allowed into sensitive areas deemed so by the military.[56] All ethnic Japanese activities considered "un-American" were restricted, including the Buddhist religion, the primary religion of ethnic Japanese in Hawaii. The military governor's official position encouraged Buddhists to attend Christian churches.[57]

An ID registration project was suggested in June 1941 by the Office of Civil Defense to aid in the identification of people killed in an attack. The program was printing its first ID cards

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[53] Stetson Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 200; *Personal Justice Denied*, 267; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America*, 124.

[54] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 200; *Personal Justice Denied*, 267; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America*, 124.

[55] Allen, *War Years*, 146; *Personal Justice Denied,* 267.

[56] Duncan Ryuken Williams, "The Forgotten Internment of Japanese Americans in Hawaii," *Lit Hub,* February 25th, 2019, np.

[57] Williams, "The Forgotten Internment," np.

by December 7, and orders were sent for a full-fledged registration program for all residents on December 27, 1941.[58] Residents were required to carry identification cards at all times, and fines for not doing so ranged from $5 to $10 for citizens and $25 to $50 for enemy aliens.[59] In order to prevent large amounts of cash from becoming available to foreign agents, the currency on the islands was strictly controlled. No resident was permitted to hold more than $200, and new currency, valid in Hawaii only, was issued starting July 1942 through October 1944.[60] Martial law officially remained in effect until October 24, 1944; however, starting as early as March 1943, the civilian government and civil power were gradually restored.[61]

The institution of martial law in Hawaii had a central purpose of controlling the civilian population with special emphasis on the ethnic Japanese population. Despite the widespread rumors, before and after the attack, no sabotage, espionage, or subversive activity is known to have occurred in Hawaii. The lack of subversive activity held through to the end of the war in 1945; however, many military leaders and civilians believe this is simply because of martial law on the islands. As controls and restrictions loosened after the victory at the Battle of Midway, these same leaders and civilians were anxious to keep these controls in place.[62]

Among the concerns of military leaders was the pressing matter of food and supplies on the islands. The inventory of food and supplies immediately ordered after the attack showed a potential issue with feeding Oahu's civilian population and military personnel. The island's agriculture focused on sugar and pineapples, with most foodstuffs imported from the mainland. Before the war, the Army experimented with encouraging the production of foods that would

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[58] Williams, "The Forgotten Internment," np.
[59] Williams, "The Forgotten Internment," np; *Personal Justice Denied*, 267.
[60] *Personal Justice Denied*, 267.
[61] Williams, "The Forgotten Internment," np.
[62] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 201; *Personal Justice Denied*, 267; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America,* 136.

allow the islands to be self-sufficient, including stockpiling seeds and educational programs. This experiment had failed.[63] The Army's secondary plan to stockpile food in an emergency had received approval from the War Department, but Congress refused to authorize money to secure supplies. The island inventory determined that only a 37-day food supply for 250,000 people existed on the island, with no means of replenishing the supply without imports from the mainland.[64]

In order to maintain an emergency stockpile of thirty days and feed both the Army and the civilian population, the military would require a consistent supply of 32,000 tons of food per month from the mainland.[65] The bulk of this supply would be from the West Coast, most notably California, where farms under ethnic Japanese ownership provided a significant amount of the food supply.[66] In addition to these supply deliveries, the Army requested a six-month reserve of 48,000 tons of food and 40,000 tons of seed, fertilizer, farm implements, and seed to boost local food production.[67] Based solely on supply stockpiles of the West Coast, fulfilling the food requests of the Army in Hawaii was not a problem; however, in the weeks after Pearl Harbor, the supply lines from San Francisco to Hawaii were patrolled by Japanese submarines.[68] Another pressing issue was the lack of ships available to deliver these goods in such large quantities on short notice. Congress acted and quickly appropriated a revolving fund of $35,000,000 to finance shipments for as long as necessary to keep Hawaii fed. The first shipment to Hawaii began loading in San Francisco on December 20. The food supply issue was under control in February 1942, and the Department of Agriculture assumed control of the program.

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[63] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 201.
[64] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 201
[65] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 203.
[66] Iwata, Masakazu "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture," 25-37.
[67] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 203.
[68] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 202-203.

It is important to note that the bulk of foodstuffs sent to Hawaii were from the West Coast. Certain foodstuffs in California and the West Coast were predominately grown by ethnic Japanese farmers. While these farms predominately grew truck crops sold directly to consumers in markets, these ethnic Japanese farms allowed the larger farms to send their crops to canneries and onto Hawaii, Great Britain, and military units worldwide. Had the ethnic Japanese population been removed from the West Coast immediately after Pearl Harbor, a severe and catastrophic food shortage could have presented itself as early as the spring of 1942 due to the potential loss of winter crops and lack of spring planting. The military deliberately waited until the conclusion of spring planting before removing all ethnic Japanese on the West Coast to secure crops and ensure a food surplus rather than a food shortage.

Under pressure from Washington, D.C., General Emmons worked to derail his superior's efforts to implement a Hawaiian evacuation of the ethnic Japanese population. Secretary Knox was the first to request a complete evacuation of Oahu, and he did so on January 10, 1942. Emmons responded to the request by stating that evacuating the island's ethnic Japanese population would be dangerous and impracticable.[69] Erecting camps would require a large amount of materials already in short supply and guards for the camps when the number of troops in Hawaii was roughly half what was needed to provide for basic security. General Emmons also advised that the ethnic Japanese population provided most of the island's skilled labor. He stated that over ninety percent of the carpenters and the transportation workers were of Japanese ancestry, as were most of the agricultural workers, and were all "absolutely essential."[70] Emmons

[69] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 201; *Personal Justice Denied*, 269; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America*, 137.

[70] Ibid.

advised that if the War Department pressed for evacuation, it should be an evacuation to the mainland.[71]

Negotiation and argument between General Emmons and Washington, D.C., continued for the remainder of 1942. The primary reasoning for the refusal to fully cooperate with Washington, D.C., and evacuate or intern Hawaii's ethnic Japanese population was the growing disinterest of Army commanders to carry out these orders for the reasons previously discussed. After several meetings in the spring of 1942, President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and the Joint Chiefs settled on a plan to remove 20,000 "dangerous" Japanese residents from Hawaii and intern them in camps on the mainland. This plan was approved on March 13, 1942. After a visit from Assistant Secretary of War John C. McCloy, General Emmons received his official orders on March 27, 1942. General Emmons estimated that only 1,550 ethnic Japanese were considered "dangerous" and qualified for evacuation.

While on his trip to Hawaii, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy discovered that military officials in Hawaii opposed the large-scale removal of ethnic Japanese from the Hawaiian Islands to the mainland or an internment camp on a smaller island. McCloy reported that the Army and Navy preferred to "treat the Japanese in Hawaii as citizens of an occupied foreign country."[72] McCloy agreed with the commanders that internment on a separate island was impractical and that mass evacuation was impossible due to a lack of labor replacement, shipping, inability to provide facilities, and lack of military personnel to guard such facilities.[73] The Honolulu

[71] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 201.

[72] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 211; Hawaii Strong, Ready to Fight, McCloy Says, *Honolulu Advertiser*, March 28th, 1942, https://www.newspapers.com/image/258531148/; Lind, *Hawaii's Japanese,* 78.

[73] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 211; Lind, *Hawaii's Japanese,* 108.

newspapers published McCloy's statements on March 27 and 28 that the mass evacuation of the Japanese from Hawaii was "impractical and was not contemplated."[74]

While McCloy's visit to Hawaii and his statements regarding the impractical nature of evacuation should have settled the issue, they did not. Secretary of Navy Frank Knox continued to speak with President Roosevelt and push for full-scale removal of ethnic Japanese from the Hawaiian Islands. The president agreed with Knox and, while a plan existed for removing 20,000 "dangerous" Japanese residents, a meeting with the Army and Navy war secretaries and their advisers took place on April 28, 1942. All present, except Secretary Knox, agreed that wholesale removal was impractical. They did agree that General Emmons be authorized to evacuate ten to fifteen thousand Japanese men to the mainland.[75] Despite this meeting and another agreed-upon plan, President Roosevelt continued to pressure for full-scale evacuation from Oahu and placement on a smaller island in camps.[76] As a result of these meetings and the pressure from the president, McCloy advised Emmons that an alternative plan was needed if he was to avoid a direct order from the president for full-scale evacuation.

As General Emmons contemplated a new evacuation plan that would satisfy the Secretary of the Navy and the president, he carried out an evacuation that he proposed much earlier in the war. This plan called for replacing the Hawaiian National Guard units 298th and 229th Infantry. These units began their service in 1940 and, by 1941, were made up of and commanded by soldiers of Japanese ancestry. Reinforcements from the mainland arrived in May of 1942, and General Emmons organized the National Guard members of Japanese ancestry into a provisional battalion and shipped them to the mainland. This battalion comprised 29 officers and 1,277

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[74] Hawaii Strong, Ready to Fight, McCloy Says, *Honolulu Advertiser,* March 28th, 1942. https://www.newspapers.com/image/258531148/

[75] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 211-212.

[76] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 221-213.

enlisted men and became the 100th Infantry Battalion. This battalion saw action in the European theater and assisted with the landing in Italy in September 1943.[77] This unit became the second most decorated unit in history, behind the famed 442nd, based on size and length of service.

Due to the previously approved plan of evacuating military dependents to the mainland, General Emmons could not provide a plan to Secretary of the Navy Knox or President Roosevelt until October 1942. Emmons's plan was the same as he had previously submitted: removing approximately 3,000 ethnic Japanese residents to the mainland, except the evacuation would be compulsory and no longer voluntary. Despite the War Department's continued preparations for the mainland arrival of 15,000 ethnic Japanese, Washington finally realized that a large-scale evacuation was not likely to occur.[78]

The evacuation on Hawaii's islands paled compared to the West Coast, and despite General Emmons and his staff's belief that the Japanese did not pose a threat, a minimal number of ethnic Japanese did get sent to the mainland and an internment camp on the island. By December 1, 1942, the projections for ethnic Japanese evacuation and internment totaled 3,250 people.[79] The War Relocation Authority stated in mid-December 1942,

> During the next twelve months, the maximum number of evacuees could be approximately 5,000, but I believe the actual number will be no more than 3,000 and probably much less than that. The maximum shipment will be 150 every two weeks unless the Western Defense Command succeeds in having the minimum single shipment raised to 500. There are many reasons for such a small evacuation, but the most tangible one is the lack of transportation.[80]

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[77] Israel A. Yost, S. *Combat Chaplain: The Personal Story of the WWII Chaplain of the Japanese American 100th Battalion*. Edited by Monica E. Yost and Michael Markrich. (University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 54; Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 212.

[78] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost* 198; *Personal Justice Denied*, & Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed* America, 146.

[79] Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 200; *Personal Justice Denied,* 267; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America*, 147.

[80] Hawaiian Report, Edwin G. Arnold to Myer, Dec. 16, 1943. NARS. RG 210 (CWRIC 29554-60).

The arrested and detained ethnic Japanese residents were held in local jails, immigration offices, and internment camps in Haiku, Maui, or Camp Honouliuli on Oahu.[81] The Army also operated the Sand Island Detention Center on Honolulu harbor, which operated as a waystation for those transferred to and from the mainland.

In February 1943, Dillon Myer, the head of the War Relocation Authority, formally requested that all evacuations from Hawaii cease.[82] Dillon Myer took over as head of the WRA in June of 1942 when Milton Eisenhower moved to another division within the War Department. Myer claimed that the Hawaiian Japanese were "unwilling workers, and half had answered 'no' to the loyalty question number 28 on the selective services form."[83] There was also an issue of space, as the camps were reaching capacity and additional living space was unavailable. An official order from the War Department on April 2, 1943, instructed General Emmons to suspend all evacuations to the mainland of ethnic Japanese.[84]

A tactic to suppress any potential uprising or organization was to arrest the ethnic Japanese community leaders immediately. Of the 2,000 ethnic Japanese arrested during the war, those arrested were language teachers, priests, import-export traders, or someone who simply sent a Red Cross contribution to wounded Japanese engaged in China before Pearl Harbor.[85] Most arrested were Kibei, Japanese civilians born in Hawaii but educated in Japan. Several hundred ethnic Japanese were arrested but released after an initial inquiry, and several thousand more were investigated and cleared without being arrested or detained.[86]

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[81] *Personal Justice Denied*, 276.

[82] Ibid. Pp. 278.

[83] Scheiber, Harry N., and Jane L. Scheiber, eds. "Hawaii's Kibei Under Martial Law: A Hidden Chapter in the History of World War II Internments." *Western Legal History*, 2009; Conn, *Guarding Americas Outpost,* 20; *Personal Justice Denied,* 267; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America*, 148.

[84] Scheiber and Scheiber, "Hawaii's Kibei Under Martial Law," 24.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Scheiber and Scheiber, "Hawaii's Kibei Under Martial Law," 24; Conn, *Guarding Americas* Outpost, 210; *Personal Justice Denied*, 267; Coffman, *How Hawaii Changed America* 152.

The social impact of the immediate arrest and detention of community leaders had a cascading effect on the social hierarchy.[87] Families of community leaders, once living in the spotlight, were now outcasts and shunned by others in the community for fear of "guilt by association." The remaining ethnic Japanese were reluctant to accept leadership positions for fear of being detained, having become suspected by the authorities.[88] This act is perhaps the most substantial act by the military as the arrest and detention of community leaders was perhaps the most effective way to limit the power and organization abilities of the Japanese community. The culture of the Japanese holds community leaders in high regard, and without them, there is no direction. It is impossible to know if this act deterred any sabotage, but the removal of the leaders put the ethnic Japanese community quickly under the control of the military.

Morale Committees

The presence of Morale Committees was fundamental in maintaining and improving race relations in Hawaii before and after the Pearl Harbor attack. Before WWII, several citizens formed a Committee for Interracial Unity in Hawaii, a multiethnic group of civilian and military leaders.[89] The members of this committee included Chinese, Filipino, Korean, and Japanese members to act "as liaison between military authorities and the racial and national groups on matters relating to the general adjustment to war."[90] Membership in the group changed during its existence, but it always held representation from the three main ethnic groups in Hawaii: white, Japanese, and Chinese. The three top-ranking members held positions of respect in the community: YMCA director, Department of Public Instruction at the University of Hawaii, and

[87] *Personal Justice Denied*, 280.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Robert L. Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War." *Territorial Emergency Service Committees Report*, 1946, 14.
[90] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 16.

the University of Hawaii Board of Regents Chair. These individuals worked to create a group represented by all and not beholden to their ethnic group.[91]

Robert L. Shivers arrived as head of the FBI office in Hawaii in August of 1939 with an assignment to strengthen the internal security of the islands. In his final report, he stated that Hawaii had one of the most complex racial situations he had ever encountered. The three main non-indigenous non-white racial groups were Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese. Shivers identified that if war were to break out, two of the three main groups might be oppressed by the Japanese in the Pacific, causing racial tensions in Hawaii.[92] Racial unity could only be achieved by holding the racial groups together and working together as a united community in a common effort.[93] Shivers rightfully concluded that the internal security of the islands would be impossible without racial harmony and unity and, should security be compromised, it would hinder the Army and Navy from doing their jobs of fighting the war. A strong united front was vitally necessary to prosecute the Pacific theater war.[94]

Shivers began by surveying the islands and the communities to gauge the potential danger posed by the Japanese. Gradual suspicion of the ethnic Japanese community had been building over the preceding years, and Shivers needed to know if there was any merit to this movement. Shivers surveys focused on all racial groups' religion, education, civic, economic, and social status.[95] The surveys found no evidence that would question the loyalty of the ethnic Japanese population or any other racial group on the islands. Shivers acknowledged that a small percentage (.345%) of the *Kibei* population, Japanese born in the United States and educated in

[91] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 16.
[92] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 2.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 2.
[95] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 3.

Japan, could be classified as a potential security threat. Despite this, Shivers set out to accomplish the task of conditioning the Hawaiian population for war.

Seen as a significant threat in Hawaii and the West Coast, the Kibei were important in the overall scope of internment. The Hawaiian population of Kibei accounted for 37% of the total ethnic Japanese population.[96] Considered a unique threat to security, the Kibei were born in America and considered United States citizens but educated in Japan. Many thought the Kibei were perfect spies as they were American by birth but trained by the enemy. Approximately 10,000 Kibei were arrested or interrogated in one form or another during the war. Two thousand Kibei were incarcerated, and one-third were sent to internment camps on the mainland.

Before the war, several groups formed to unify all ethnic Japanese groups on the islands; these advisory groups formed between April and June of 1940 and were composed of Japanese Americans.[97] The members of the two advisory groups met regularly with Shivers and his FBI agents to discuss and appraise all aspects of the Japanese community. The meetings were held once a week and focused on internal security and the probable behavior of the ethnic Japanese community in the event of war. These advisory committees were able to keep the FBI and military informed on the state of mind of the ethnic Japanese community and worked with Shivers to create plans to control any subversive elements among ethnic Japanese in the event of war with Japan.[98]

Many of the plans created by the joint work of the FBI and the advisory group began before the war. One of the outgrowths of these plans was the creation of the Oahu Citizens

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[96] Scheiber and Scheiber, "Hawaii's Kibei Under Martial Law," 18.

[97] Scheiber and Scheiber, "Hawaii's Kibei Under Martial Law," 4; Office of the Military Governor. Morale Section. Emergency Service Committee. "Final Report of the Emergency Service Committee." (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii, May 1946), 4.

[98] Ibid, 4.

Committee for Home Defense, which embraced a wide range of leadership among the ethnic Japanese. This committee was formed in early 1941 and had the primary purposes of:

1. To work with the constituted authorities in the continuing task of evaluating what went on in the Japanese community.
2. To plan for and carry out the task of bringing out more positively the inherent loyalty of the ethnic Japanese toward the United States.
3. To prepare the Japanese community psychologically to their responsibilities toward this country in the event of war and for the difficult position in which the war would place them in their relationship with the rest of the general community.[99]

Oahu Citizens Committee for Home Defense accomplished a significant feat on June 13, 1941, when they organized the attendance of 2,000 ethnic Japanese residents to join a patriotic rally in the McKinley High School auditorium. The speaker at this rally was Brigadier General M.W. Marston, the assistant chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, Hawaiian Department, speaking on behalf of General Walter C. Short, the Commanding officer of Hawaii at the time.[100] This speech is the first known statement issued by the Army, specifically focused on the ethnic Japanese population in Hawaii and the Army's official attitude toward the ethnic Japanese population in the event of war. Speaking on behalf of General Short, Marston urged all people of all races to "place their trust in the constituted authorities and refrain from any acts which might disrupt a united citizenry and place the Army in the position of having to enforce peace and order in the civilian community."[101] Marsten ensured just treatment for all citizens regardless of race, fair treatment to ethnic Japanese, and swift punishment to all who violated the law or posed a threat to the United States. He ended by stating that there would be fair treatment of all ethnic Japanese so long as they acted in a manner that reflected loyalty to the United States and their

[99] Office of the Military Governor. Morale Section. Emergency Service Committee. "Final Report of the Emergency Service Committee." Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii, May 1946; Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 5.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 6.

community. This meeting helped ease the worries of the ethnic Japanese community and provided a clear window into the stance of the Army.

The Committee for Inter-Racial Unity in Hawaii was started in December of 1940 by a Chinese American at the height of the Sino-Japanese war. This committee had representatives from all major racial groups: Chinese, Japanese, White, and Hawaiian. The group's goals were to implement ways of combatting the growing resentment against ethnic Japanese residents. Other goals included preserving Hawaii's traditional pattern of race relationships and maintaining the existing racial harmony enjoyed on the islands.[102] Several essential guidelines highlight the group's form and function.

1. Interested in the immediate problem of national defense as far as these islands are concerned, but also in the way the people in Hawaii are going to live together after the emergency is over.
2. As far as the immediate present is concerned, unity of purpose and action is absolutely necessary for a strong national defense. We cannot afford to have a divided citizenry—one race set against another or one class against another. The people of Japanese ancestry, both citizens and aliens, compose about one-third of our population. Accepted and united in purpose and action, they are an asset to the community. Rejected and treated as potential enemies, they are a burden, even a danger, to our security.[103]

The committee understood their community and what was needed to maintain unity in Hawaii, should war reach the islands. This understanding helped them accomplish their goals of achieving racial unity.

To achieve this unity and to preserve the relatively fine human relationship which has so far prevailed in Hawaii, the people must:

1. Feel that Hawaii has something unique and worthwhile to preserve in a way of human relationships.
2. Accept the idea that a united citizenry is essential to our defense.
3. Have faith in the American way of life and be willing to protect it.

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[102] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 6; Final Report of the Emergency Services Committee.

[103] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 7.

4. Place absolute reliance in our constituted authorities, confident that they will treat everyone with equal fairness and see to it that he is so treated by his fellow citizens and that everyone acting in any way disloyal to the general welfare will be promptly and severely dealt with. There is no need for, and there must not be any vigilantism on the part of any group.
5. Overcome fear—fear on the part of the nationals of those countries with which we might become involved in a war that they will be mistreated and persecuted, and fear on the part of the rest of the people that these particular aliens might actively assist our enemies.
6. Develop a sense of personal responsibility to do everything possible to make Hawaii and the entire nation strong militarily and otherwise. This includes the aliens who must accept the fact that they owe a certain obligation to the land in which they are now living and that they will be protected and allowed to enjoy all normal privileges only as long as they obey our laws and conduct themselves constructively.
7. Be willing to give every loyal citizen, regardless of race, a place in the scheme of national defense. No group should be denied the opportunity to do its share merely because of racial considerations.
8. Remember that loyalty grows only when it is given a chance to grow. It does not flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion, discrimination, and denial of opportunities to practice that loyalty.[104]

The Committee for Inter-Racial Unity in Hawaii understood what was needed to maintain racial unity on the islands, and they worked to maintain it even before the war began, taking a proactive approach to the problem. The Committee and the Army realized that the ethnic Japanese were an essential group of people on the island; if they cooperated, they would be a considerable asset to the overall war effort. The Army communicated its expectations to the ethnic Japanese community well before the war started and the "Morale Committees," as they became known, worked to strengthen the racial unity already in place and have plans ready in the event of a war. These committees worked with military and civilian leaders to ensure the islands heard their message. These informal contacts and meetings, held throughout the islands, were publicized in the newspapers, which contributed to the civilian conditioning toward working

[104] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 7,8.

together in the event of war and trusting the authorities to handle the task of dealing with any potential subversive groups.[105]

These groups worked to maintain and strengthen communities that had already established racial harmony. The focus and goals of these committees showed the benefit of trust and working together rather than allowing perceived fear to dictate daily life. In contrast to the West Coast, Hawaii worked with different racial groups, with the military clearly outlining their expectations even before the war began. The presence of these committees before the war built the resilient framework to survive Pearl Harbor. After the attack and the start of the war, the Army saw the benefit of these programs and worked with them throughout the war.

The Emergency Services Committee maintained a Morale Section and worked directly with committees such as the Committee on Inter-Racial Unity to carry out plans to maintain racial harmony after the war began. The Morale Section of the Emergency Service Committee comprised representatives of Chinese, Japanese, and American racial groups. All members had been very active in the Inter-Racial committee and other groups before the war and would now be working directly with the Army and civilian "Morale committees" to accomplish the goal of continued racial harmony on the islands.

In addition to maintaining close ties with civilian committees, the Morale Section also maintained close relationships with the FBI and the Military Governor's office, civilian leaders, and organizations in the community. Its primary purpose was to Serve as a liaison between the Army and the civilian community on matters relating to public morale and work toward the maintenance of a unified and cooperative community.[106] In order to accomplish this work, sub-committees assisted with communication between the Army and the community to maintain

[105] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 8.
[106] Final Report of the Emergency Services Committee, 18.

positive racial feelings. These sub-committees also assisted the ethnic Japanese community organize war bond drives, blood plasma donations, volunteer services, and community meetings, which assisted with boosting morale and rumor control within the ethnic Japanese community. The Emergency Services Committee and Morale Section goals were:

1. To carry on a program of education which will strengthen the loyalty to America of both the citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry.
2. To help them demonstrate their loyalty in concrete ways to speed the defeat of Japan and all other enemies.
3. To help them face realistically and cooperatively the difficult situation in which the war has placed them.
4. To cooperate with the authorities in meeting the many problems which affect the security of the islands and the welfare of all the people.
5. To work for the application of the fundamental values of American Democracy in the treatment of all Americans, Regardless of racial ancestry, fully realizing that military and other requirements sometimes make impossible the full application of this principle.
6. To meet, in cooperation with the Army, the Red Cross, and other local, Federal, and Territorial agencies, certain morale and personal needs of our boys in the service and of their families at home.
7. To work with the leaders and organization of other racial groups for the preservation of Hawaii's traditional harmony among all races and the promotion of a united home front.[107]

The efforts of the committees and the Army were successful, as evidenced by the lack of mass incarceration of ethnic Japanese during the war. Military personnel, particularly African American soldiers and sailors stationed in Hawaii during the war, also noted a remarkable difference between the mainland and the islands. Their letters reflect this difference, many writing home of the wonders of Hawaii.

> "I thank God often for letting me experience the occasion to spend a part of my life in a part of the world where one can be respected and live as a free man should."

[107] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 10; Final Report Emergency Services Committee,11–15.

> "Honey, it's just as much difference between over here and down there as it is between night and day." (down there is a reference to the Jim Crow South)[108]

> One teacher wrote, "I have gained here at least the impulse to fight racial bigotry and boogeyism. My soul has been stretched here, and my notion of civilization and Americanism has broadened.[109]

Some despised that way of life as well, writing home that the whites had "let down their standards, there does not seem to be any race hatred or even race distinction. I don't want to expose our children to this for too long."[110] The arriving white soldiers and sailors, the majority of whom hailed from Texas and the Deep South, began to spread racial hatred among the white citizens of Hawaii in an attempt to "restore" the racial hierarchy.[111] Despite their efforts, the stability of racial harmony prevailed throughout the war and beyond, thanks to the firm stance of the military, promising fair treatment and a community dedicated to working together rather than infighting.

The Morale Committees, in their various forms, maintained stability and unity in the Hawaiian island throughout WWII and beyond. They proved that Hawaii and its people of various racial ancestry could work harmoniously through a significant crisis. The people of Hawaii showed that they were more concerned with the happenings of their current country rather than their home country and that their community, despite its racial mix, is American in thought, purpose, and action. The people of Hawaii cooperated with the authorities and trusted them to handle the task of flushing out any subversive activity while working with the military in any way they could to win the war in the Pacific.[112]

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[108] Bailey Beth L and David Farber. *The First Strange Place: The Alchemy of Race and Sex in World War II Hawaii* (New York: Free Press 1992), 133.
[109] Bailey and Farber, *The First Strange Place* 134.
[110] Ibid, 135.
[111] Bailey and Farber, *The First Strange Place,* 136.
[112] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 12.

While Thomas Green was the architect of Hawaiian martial law, he was not the only one who believed that the Hawaiian Islands required military rule. The action plan in the event of an attack on Hawaii was discussed and planned years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Military intelligence studied the issue of defending Hawaii and, more precisely, Oahu and Pearl Harbor in the decades leading up to WWII. The program "Project for the Defense of Oahu," formed a part of the comprehensive "War Plan Orange."[113] War Plan Orange was designed in anticipation of a war with Japan and began in the early 1900s by the War Plans Division. By 1921, the Secretary of War approved the plan for defending Oahu.

Hawaii was turned over to the military when the attack on Pearl Harbor ended, and any arrests focused on people believed to be a threat. The Governor of Hawaii, Joseph Poindexter, invoked the Hawaii Defense Act, suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*, and instituted martial law "during the emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed."[114] By December 10, the military and FBI had arrested 449 Japanese, German, and Italian nationals and 43 American citizens. As previously discussed, the Roberts Commission and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox highlighted the threat of sabotage and fifth-column activity in Hawaii. Roberts conveyed to Secretary of War Stimson his concern for fifth column presence, and, on December 19, he recommended the removal of all ethnic Japanese from the islands.[115] Hawaii military commanders outright ignored this recommendation.

Despite the push from Washington D.C. and other military leaders, the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii were not interned en mass. The military opted for Martial Law for the entire population versus selective internment. Although Martial Law was the result, approximately 3,250 ethnic

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[113] Maurice Marloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942,* (Washington, D.C.: government Printing Office, 1953), 6.

[114] *Personal Justice Denied,* 263; Conn, *Guarding the United States and its Outposts*, 199.

[115] *Personal Justice Denied,* 264.

Japanese were arrested and held until the end of the war. Hawaii was spared due to a combination of military leadership, a lack of anti-Asian sentiment ideas passed from generation to generation through leadership, and its multi-cultural population. The Hawaiian exception allowed ethnic Japanese to contribute to their community by serving as block wardens, police officers, shipyard welders, and active-duty soldiers.

Hawaii stands as an example of what could have happened on the West Coast had the ideas of key leaders and labor groups been different in the decades leading up to WWII. Hawaii was the victim of a direct attack; its ethnic Japanese population was much higher, and its strategic importance was greater than that of the West Coast, yet the outcomes could not have been more different.

Chapter Four -- Pressure for Removal

"History is a jangle of accidents, blunders, surprises and absurdities, and so is our knowledge of it, but if we are to report it at all we must impose some order upon it." Henry Steele Commager, American historian (1902-1998)

The months after the attack on Pearl Harbor showed little movement within the military to execute the removal of the ethnic Japanese on the West Coast. The military pointed to the Department of Justice as having jurisdiction to forcibly remove residents, while the public claimed it was the military's responsibility. With the immediate shock of Pearl Harbor wearing off, the West Coast pressure groups and politicians doubled their efforts in January and February to ensure the complete removal of the ethnic Japanese population.

Two main factors were hindering any removal plans from moving forward: establishing a safe and reliable food supply to Hawaii (food that came from the West Coast) and ensuring that the West Coast ethnic Japanese farms harvested their winter crop and planted their spring crops prior to removal. The military's primary goal was to ensure wartime food security, and to do so, they needed to execute a plan that was timed for the spring growing season. It is at this point that the decades of building anti-Asian sentiment in all its forms overcame the need for wartime food security and forced the military to execute a plan that solved both problems.

West Coast Evacuation

The decision for mass removal of all ethnic Japanese residents located on the West Coast was finalized in mid-February 1942; however, none of the agencies in command had prepared to move immediately. This lack of preparedness was partly due to a lack of facilities that could house the population, the need to complete spring planting, and funding for farm loans needed for the "custodians" of Japanese farms. In late February of 1942, the War Department found its

footing and worked to execute its plan for mass evacuation of the West Coast. The pressure groups, politicians, lawyers, bureaucrats, and white farmers had successfully pushed the War Department to make the crucial decision of mass evacuation.

On January 29, Attorney General Biddle's aide, James H. Rowe, discussed with Colonel Bendetsen a plan to remove all "aliens" and all people of Japanese descent from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound.[1] The implications of these actions had far-reaching effects as it is widely considered a "dress rehearsal" for the evacuation of the entire West Coast. Rowe stated, "The only thing that bothers me, if we agree upon one area, we might as well admit that we're going to have the problem in every prohibited area; they'll want all Jap citizens out. But anyway, I don't know what we can do."[2] On March 30, 1942, six days after General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 1., establishing the first restricted areas for evacuation, Bainbridge Island and its 250 ethnic Japanese inhabitants were forced to evacuate. The residents were transported by ferry to Seattle, then sent by train to the Owens Valley Assembly Center, later renamed Manzanar relocation camp, for the duration of the war.[3] Owens Valley Assembly Center opened on March 21, 1942, and was the first of the 16 Assembly centers used during the evacuation; the second, Santa Anita Racetrack, opened six days later, on March 27, 1942.[4]

Bainbridge Island was not the first area evacuated under "military necessity." The first was Terminal Island in Los Angeles, home to approximately 3,500 ethnic Japanese residents. Before Executive Order 9066, which authorized the military to remove anyone from a military

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[1] Roger Daniels. *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans* Reprint ed. Malabar FL: R.E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1986, 84.

[2] Telephone conversation, Bendetsen and Rowe, January 29th, 1942, Record Group 389, National Archives, Washington D.C. & Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 78.

[3] U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation,* (Washington, 1946), 155.

[4] Ibid.

area they deemed a threat, and General DeWitt's first Proclamation, the Navy issued notices on February 14, advising the island's residents to vacate by March 14, claiming it as a strategic military site. On February 25, new notices appeared that advised residents of a new deadline of midnight on February 27 to vacate.[5] There were no military facilities or infrastructure for evacuees at the time, so there was nowhere to send the residents. Most moved to friends and family's homes within the Los Angeles area, only to be forcibly removed again six weeks later. The residents of Terminal Island joined the residents of Bainbridge Island in Manzanar for the duration of the war.[6]

Political and civilian pressure for full-scale removal only increased after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Army and Navy officials began to pressure the Justice Department to remove "enemy aliens" from areas around vital military installations and war factories such as aircraft plants. Terminal and Bainbridge Islands were the first locations to be evacuated, but not the last. On January 27 and 29, General DeWitt met with California Governor Culbert Olson and Attorney General Earl Warren. The outcome of this meeting was a unanimous agreement that,

> There's a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese of all classes, that is, aliens and nonaliens, to get them off the land, and in Southern California around Los Angeles-in that area to - they want and they are bringing pressure on the government to move all the Japanese out. As a matter of fact, it's not being instigated or developed by people who are not thinking but by the best people of California. Since the publication of the Roberts Report, they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of enemies. They don't trust the Japanese, none of them.[7]

Colonel Bendetsen received this report and, on January 30, attended the meeting of the California House delegation; representatives from Washington and Oregon were also present.

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[5] Daniels. *Concentration Camps USA Japanese Americans and World War II* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 84; Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 91.

[6] Daniels. *Concentration Camps USA*, 92.

[7] Telephone conversation. Bendetsen and De Witt, January 30, 1942, Record Group 389, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; & Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 103.

This group was the delegation that Congressman Leland Ford put together to pressure the military into evacuating the West Coast of all ethnic Japanese residents. The group passed a resolution calling for the Army to take complete control over the "*enemy alien situation*" on the West Coast and demanding immediate and strong action.[8] This unofficial delegation sent a recommendation to Secretary of War Stimson, which stated:

1. A designation by the War Department of critical areas throughout the country and territorial possessions.
2. Immediate evacuation of all such critical areas of all enemy aliens and their families, including children under 21, whether aliens or not.
3. Temporary internment of evacuated aliens and families in available CCC camps pending completion of long-range resettlement or internment program.
4. Opportunity and federal assistance to dual citizens who live in critical areas for voluntary resettlement and evacuation as a patriotic contribution.
5. Federal assistance to all uninterned alien enemies and dual citizens whose means of livelihood are affected either by execution of the program outlined above or by unemployment brought about by other factors.
6. The development and consummation as soon as possible of a program of complete evacuation and resettlement or internment covering all alien enemies and dual citizens wherever located.[9]

These recommendations forced the top levels of the military to seriously consider what to do with the ethnic Japanese population on the West Coast. On February 1, Colonel Bendetsen met with Attorney General Biddle, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy Provost Marshal Gullion, and James Rowe and Edward Ennis of the Aliens Divisions of the Justice Department as well as J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI representing the civilian viewpoint of the West Coast situation. The meeting was heated as the Justice Department stood its ground and refused to approve a complete evacuation as it could not execute a plan as quickly as the situation required.[10] In the

[8] Daniels. 1971. *Concentration Camps USA Japanese Americans and World War II*, 84; Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 42; *Grodzins*, *Americans Betrayed,* 68.

[9] Lea to Stimson, January 30th, 1942. & Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 53.

[10] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA Japanese Americans and World War II*, 86; Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese,* 34; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 71.

end, all sides agreed on a proposed press release, of which a key sentence reads, "The Department of War and the Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at this time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race from the West Coast."[11] The key phrase "not at this time" indicates that the military was waiting for something. The likely scenario is that they were waiting for the winter harvest and planting of spring crops to be completed between February and March.

On February 2, General DeWitt met with California Governor Olson, Tom Clark of the Department of Justice, and representatives of the Department of Agriculture. This meeting was focused on the Department of Agriculture's concern about the outcome of the winter and spring crops should a full-scale evacuation be authorized. As noted, the ethnic Japanese farmer's contribution to food production was significant. The first discussion of full-scale evacuation occurred during this meeting. This "California Plan" proposed that all ethnic Japanese be removed from the coast and relocated to camps in the state's interior at a minimum distance of 150 miles from the seaboard.[12] In order to satisfy the Department of Agriculture's concern, the camps would allow "labor gangs" to be organized where men, women, and children could be released during the day to work in the agricultural sector and tend crops.[13]

Governor Olson

Governor of California, Culbert Olson, joined in on the debate between food and removal in January 1942. Olson was the first Democratic governor in forty years to not embrace an anti-Japanese policy.[14] Olson was concerned with the overall well-being of the ethnic Japanese and

[11] Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 34.
[12] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA Japanese Americans and World War II*, 86; Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese,* 34; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 72.
[13] Girdner and Loftis, *The Great Betrayal*, 65.
[14] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles: An Unknown Transpacific History of Japanese-Mexican Relations* 145; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 195.

did not strongly protest nor emphatically embrace the idea of mass evacuation. Olson was keenly aware of the immense negative impact that a full-scale removal would cause California in the short term and the issue of food shortages in the long term. Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Olson sent a message to JACL and urged them to announce and reaffirm their support for the United States publicly and continue to work in any type of production.[15] On January 28, 1942, Olson issued a statement, in conjunction with the proclamation issued by President Roosevelt on January 14, urging all Japanese, Germans, and Italian aliens fourteen years or older to register with the state so the government could keep them under surveillance.[16]

It was in January 1942 that Olson devised the "California Plan" and presented it to General DeWitt as a way to maintain crop production on Japanese farms yet maintain control over the entirety of the Japanese population. To accomplish this, Olson advised that the relocated Japanese needed to be kept within California, which he believed would solve both the military necessity and the crop production problems.[17] General DeWitt supported this California Plan; if it could "solve the problem of getting them out of the areas limited as the combat zone, that would be satisfactory. That would take them about 100 to 150 miles from the coast, and I think they will do that. They're working on it. I'm only concerned with getting them away from around these aircraft factories and other places."[18]

On February 4, Olson gave a radio address outlining the California plan discussed with General DeWitt. Olson explained that,

> General plans were agreed upon for the movement and placement of the entire adult Japanese population in California at productive and useful employment, within the

[15] Governor Olson's demand for Japanese American Citizens, *Rafu Shimpo*, December 13, 1941.

[16] Western Alien Register First *Los Angeles Times*, January 16, 1942, https://latimes.newspapers.com/image/380755453/.

[17] Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 86.

[18] Transcript of Telephone Conversation, DeWitt and Gullion, February 4th, 1942, Record Group 389, National Archives, Washington D.C.; Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942,* (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 144.

> borders of our State, and under such surveillance and protection for themselves. Such plans, we believe, are the most feasible for meeting this problem, both from the standpoint of State and national defense and from the standpoint of fairness to the Japanese people themselves. To lose the benefit of this Japanese labor in agriculture production would be a serious loss to our war economy.[19]

Olson recognized that the location of the West Coast made it vulnerable to enemy attack; however, removing ethnic Japanese farmers would create a wartime food security risk on the home front. Governor Olson's radio speech is crucial as it publicly acknowledged the importance of ethnic Japanese agriculture and his drive to keep ethnic Japanese labor within California. On February 6, the *Rafu Shimpo* published an article highlighting Olson's stance, "Governor Olson opposes the evacuation of Japanese to inland areas, considerable influence on the food problem." The article outlined Olson's explanation that the loss of ethnic Japanese farmers meant a "serious loss to our war economy."[20]

Governor Olson worked to promote his California plan any chance he had, and he won a victory in this regard when the USDA accepted his plan and lent it their support.[21] The same day that Olson was pitching the California Plan to DeWitt, Roscoe Bell, the secretary of the California Agricultural Land Use Planning Committee of the USDA Bureau of Agricultural Economics, sent a letter to the local representative of the County Farm Labor Subcommittees in California questioning the possibility of "using enemy alien evacuees for labor." This letter outlined four questions:

1. Which of the three nationalities are now members of your communities in sufficient numbers so that immigration of evacuees would not cause serious problems?
2. Are there any possibilities of housing these individuals with people now resident in the community?

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[19] Culbert Olson, "National Defense," Speech before the 17th District American Legion, Los Angeles, February 20, 1942, Olson Papers; Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angelese,* 145-146.

[20] Governor Olson Opposes the Evacuation of the Japanese to Inland, *Rafu Shimpo,* February 6, 1942.

[21] Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 37; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 32-34; Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 147.

3. Can you rally public support for an evacuation of enemy aliens into certain areas in your county?
4. What is the estimate of the number of people that could be handled by the various communities in your county?

The USDA presented the use of enemy alien labor as a way for local agricultural communities to contribute to the war effort. They explained that "an opportunity is provided for certain areas to build up a local reservoir of labor required to harvest the crops so vitally needed for defense."[22] Bell further advised in his letter that the USDA must recognize "the need for increased food production and the utilization of all available sources of labor in that production."[23]

By February 7, 1942, Bell received responses from twenty-five counties within California. Bell wrote a report based on the county responses and presented the report to the California USDA War Board. Based on the report, most counties showed "a willingness on the part of the local people to cooperate with the Federal Government in any evacuation plans undertaken."[24] The report also cited that while there was favorable feeling in most counties, there were several counties where the "anti-Japanese sentiment was stronger than that of the anti-Italian or German sentiment." The counties in question constituted the bulk of the San Deigo area in southern California.[25] This anti-Japanese sentiment contrasts northern California, where the ethnic Japanese were deemed acceptable and welcome.[26] This report shows that most California communities were willing to accept evacuated ethnic Japanese into their community to help with the needed labor to farm and bring in the harvest of their crops. The report also

[22] Roscoe E. Bell, Secretary of the California Agricultural (Land Use) Planning Committee of the USDA Bureau of Agricultural Economics, to Chairmen of County Farm Subcommittees, February 2, 1942, Ralston Papers.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Bell, Secretary of the California Agricultural (Land Use) Planning Committee, & Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 198-199.
[25] Bell, *USDA War Board,* 8.
[26] Ibid; Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 198-199

shows that the California plan, devised by Governor Olson, was viable as it was widely accepted by the public, as shown in Bell's report. Like the Hawaiian Japanese, the ethnic Japanese in California were equally crucial in the local economy and the agricultural sector in particular. Officials in California grappled with the dilemma of military necessity versus wartime food security.

While DeWitt agreed with the California plan, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and the War Department did not. The day before a call with DeWitt, McCloy received a telegram from a publisher of the West Coast Japanese farm industrial news forwarded from Secretary of Agriculture Clause R. Wickard, which highlighted the commitment of the Japanese Farmers.

> We Japanese farmers have complied to your call for increased production of food. Since the outbreak of war our loyalty has been questioned and the rumor that the entire Japanese in California may be evacuated dampened our spirit. We do not know what to do. The hesitancy can even be regarded as sabotage, we are willing to evacuate and begin a new start in safe territory so we can do our share in your program. We are effective only as farmers. If you have any plans or ideas please instruct us.[27]

After receiving the telegram and the report on February 3, 1942, McCloy called DeWitt and advised that someone in his position should not be making idle threats regarding full-scale evacuation and that he should use caution when sending press releases. McCloy stated, "There are so many that would be involved in a mass withdrawal, the social and economic consequences would be so great disturbances would be so great that we would like to go a little slowly on it."[28] One of the issues McCloy refers to is the agricultural loss should the crops on Japanese-owned or

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[27] Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II.* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971), Author Files, pdf, 178.

[28] Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II.* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971), Author Files, pdf, 179-188; Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles*, 198-199; Bell, *USDA War Board,* 12.

leased farms fall victim to an evacuation. As the telegram highlighted, the ethnic Japanese farmers were committed to doing their part in the war effort.

While General DeWitt and Governor Olson were seeing eye to eye on the California plan, Army officials such as Provost Marshall Guillion and Major Bendetsen were working with the War Department to prepare and present a plan for full-scale evacuation. Their position was supported by anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast, from within Congress, and the perceived fear of fifth-column activity. The Bendetsen plan of completely removing all ethnic Japanese residents created a labor problem that the War Department hoped to solve by bringing in laborers from Mexico. Mexican labor was not highly desired at the start of the war; however, with the war and labor shortage issue looming, the California Chamber of Commerce changed its stance and began to see Mexican labor as a viable alternative to Japanese labor in the agricultural sector. In March of 1942, the Chamber of Commerce manager Howard Miller presented this to Congress, stating that "the Japanese are rather large employers of Mexican labor and the operation of Japanese farms or conducted in a considerable degree by the employment of Mexican and other labor." Miller was implying that the existing laborers were already aware and trained to operate Japanese farms; as such, they were in a perfect position to simply "take over."[29]

Although Executive Order 9066 was signed on February 19, with military leaders pushing for complete removal, Governor Olson was still promoting the California Plan. The governor was traveling to various anti-Japanese organizations and outlining the plan to gain their support. On February 20, Olson visited the American Legion, which had continued to push for a nativist movement and fully endorsed and fought to enact the Japanese Exclusion in 1924.[30]

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[29] Tolan Committee, 11679, 11685, 11691.
[30] tenBroek, et al, *War and the Constitution,* 194; Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles*, 150.

Olson praised the Legion for being the only group with a realistic understanding of the problem at hand. The governor continued by repeating some of his main points from his February 4 radio speech, emphasizing that the loss of Japanese labor and agricultural contribution would devastate the war economy and wartime food security. He pitched his California Plan, citing that the plan would solve the military issue of removing ethnic Japanese from military areas while keeping them within the borders of the state to be utilized as farm labor so the food they grow could still be utilized.[31]

> It so happens, also, that agricultural production, and particularly of foodstuffs so important to maintain and to increase as a part of the program of production of food for victory of the Department of agriculture, is very efficiently carried on and performed by Japanese. To lose the benefit of this Japanese labor in agricultural production would be a serious loss to our war economy. That fact is taken into consideration in plans for regulating the activities of the Japanese. The fact that most of such agricultural production is within what is defined as the combat zone of California; that is to say, a strip extending inland for a hundred miles from the seashore, makes this phase of the problem most difficult.[32]

Even with the vocal support of Governor Olson, only so much could be done in the face of a federal decision for full-scale removal. The Tolan Committee began hearings two days after the signing of Executive Order 9066 to investigate the possibility of mass removal of the ethnic Japanese population. Governor Olson provided his testimony on March 6, 1942, when he agreed that the ethnic Japanese population should be looked at as a group rather than individually, as he had previously championed.[33] Olson stated that the Germans and Italians qualify to be examined as individuals, not ethnic Japanese. At the end of his testimony, he ultimately supported mass

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[31] Olson, "National Defense," np; Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 150-151.

[32] Culbert L Olson. “Radio Address by Governor Culbert L. Olson,” February 4, 1942. Berkeley Digital Assets. https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/jarda/ucb/text/reduced/cubanc6714_b015a17_0007_3.pdf.

[33] Tolan Committee, 11629-11642.

evacuation.[34] "I would say, though, in this process of evacuation, that the groups as a whole should be evacuated and then selections from them permitted to return."[35]

Olson's testimony is vital concerning the relationship between evacuation and farming, and while Olson did not discuss the need for specific timing for evacuation, he did identify critical factors that were taken into consideration when planning the evacuation. Olson's first point was that he had already told *Nisei* leaders that telling the loyal Japanese from the disloyal was difficult, which was a "most unfortunate disadvantage." The second point Olson made was regarding the JACL and ethnic Japanese businessmen and farmers who had previously stated that they were willing to participate in any program put forth by the government if it would establish their loyalty, stating, "I have found a willingness with such loyal Japanese citizens to abide by and voluntarily follow any program of evacuation of all Japanese that may be determined upon."[36]

The final point Olson focused on was the survey done by the Department of Agriculture on the willingness of counties in California to accept and house ethnic Japanese evacuees while also allowing them to work the fields during the day. The initial survey in December showed that most counties were willing to participate; a follow-up survey in February 1942 showed a much different picture.[37] The February survey found no county willing to participate in the California Plan. This change is evidence of the growing strength of the anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast just a few months after Pearl Harbor. This change in opinion coincided with the Japanese military expanding into every corner of the Pacific, defeating the United States in the Philippines

[34] Tolan Committee, 11629-11642.
[35] Ibid, 11634.
[36] Ibid, 11631.
[37] Tolan Committee, 11630.

and the British at Malay. This follow-up survey effectively ended any chance of Olson's California Plan.

The potential loss of ethnic Japanese labor created a severe problem on the West Coast, particularly in California. The solution to the problem was unclear, even after a thorough investigation by the Tolan Committee. Olson stated during his testimony that evacuation "will eliminate the possibility of having the benefit in agricultural production of Japanese labor during this war period. We are going to have some labor problems, I believe, in agriculture."[38] The governor supported the idea that new tenants should operate Japanese farms, but Olson did not believe sufficient manpower could be found.[39] Labor shortages were already being felt in Salinas as the winter lettuce harvest was in danger, as many Filipino workers had enlisted in the military.[40]

An article in the *Los Angeles Times* in April 1942 highlighted the need for labor as they reported on the evacuation of San Pedro, Long Beach Wilmington, Redondo Beach, Torrance, Signal Hill, and Hynes.[41] These areas were close to naval shipyards, Navy oilfields, an aircraft plant, and steel production, areas deemed sensitive by the military. The *Times* noted that of those evacuated, "most were Japanese farmers."[42] During this time, the FSA took control and facilitated the transfer of farmland to various "American owners going into production," to ensure crop production and harvest.[43] During the spring harvest season, local communities organized harvest days and contributed to harvesting the crops of local ethnic Japanese farms

[38] Tolan Committee, 11629-11642.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles*, 153.
[41] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 154.
[42] On The Home Front, *Los Angeles Times,* April 1942, https://latimes.newspapers.com/image/380791466/.
[43] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 154.

that were now empty. Although owned and operated by different tenants, the labor shortage was still a serious concern.

Despite the disagreements between DeWitt and his civilian chiefs regarding full-scale evacuation, Provost Marshal Gullion authorized Colonel Bendetsen to draft a plan to implement mass evacuation of the West Coast ethnic Japanese. Gullion's plan focused on a key provision requiring evacuation to an area outside the Pacific Coast. This plan did not include Japanese American citizens as the Army was still not confident enough of the success of that recommendation. Gullion was aware of potential consequences and advised McCloy,

> If our production for war is seriously delayed by sabotage in the West Coast states, we shall very possibly lose the war. I have not personally inspected the situation in those states, but from reliable reports from military and other sources, the danger of Japanese-inspired sabotage is great. That danger cannot be temporized with. No halfway measures based upon consideration of economic disturbance, humanitarianism, or fear of retaliation will suffice. Such measures will be "too little too late."[44]

In addition to pressure from the Provost Marshal General's office, pressure was mounting on the West Coast for mass evacuation and internment in camps. The Los Angeles *Times* reported on February 2 that all Japanese Americans were potential enemies.[45] On February 8, California Governor Olson issued a radio address stating that it was easier to determine the loyalty of Germans and Italians than of the Japanese.[46] Olson reported, "It is known that there are Japanese residents of California who have sought to aid the Japanese enemy by way of communication information or have shown indications of preparation for fifth-column activities."[47] The West Coast media continued to help create a regional climate of opinion advocating for the mass

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[44] Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of War, February 6th, 1942. Record group 107, National Archives; Roger Daniels*, American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942,* (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 148.

[45]Navy Raids Jap Islands, *Los Angeles Times*, January 29, 1942, https://www.newspapers.com/image/380816190/.

[46] Girdner and Loftis, *The Great Betrayal,* 98.

[47] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, 96; Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 110; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 132.

removal of the ethnic Japanese population. There was support for the so-called "California Plan," but most citizens were concerned that there would not be enough supervision and control of the Japanese population and feared sabotage of crops.[48]

West Coast congressmen took advantage of the building public pressure and organized themselves into an unofficial special interest group. This group, identified in the previous chapter, was the Pacific Coast Delegation. The delegation met several times in the House and Senate and was led in Washington, D.C., by Senator Hiram W. Johnson, the California progressive who secured the adoption of the Japanese Exclusion in 1924.[49] Johnson pressed for immediate evacuation and directed the delegation to pressure leaders to authorize such action. He argued that the people on the West Coast were "alarmed and terrified as to their person, their employment, and their homes."[50] Despite reassurances from the military that the possibility of a full-scale attack on the West Coast was not likely, the delegation continued to pressure the administration to act.

Attorney General Biddle had enough waiting and, between January 29 and February 7, issued six public announcements and established 135 separate areas in California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona as prohibited areas. These areas were based on the War Department's recommendations and called for completely excluding all German, Italian, and Japanese alien enemies.[51] The effective dates for these orders were February 15 and March 24. In addition to these prohibited areas, the Attorney General announced that the entire coastline of California from Oregon to 50 miles north of Los Angeles and extending inland from 30 to 150 miles was

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[48] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 133.
[49] Ibid, 133.
[50] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, 97; Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 110; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 133.
[51] Roger Daniels*, American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942,* (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 179.

declared a restricted area for all enemy aliens. This announcement did not include exclusion but set a curfew for all enemy aliens.[52] These proclamations did little to impact the ethnic Japanese population, as most of the population existed in Los Angeles and the valleys beyond the restricted areas. It did, however, send a clear message of the government's next move.

Biddle refused to include areas such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle, all sites supporting military manufacturing. He reasoned to Secretary of War Stimson that there was a high concentration of Japanese American citizens in those areas, and his office had no authority to remove American citizens from their homes. Biddle advised Secretary of War Stimson in a letter dated February 12, 1942,

> The question of whether the Japanese should be evacuated, whether citizens or not, necessarily involves a judgment based on military considerations. This, of course, is the responsibility of the Army. I have no doubt that the Army can legally, at any time, evacuate all persons in a specified territory if such action is deemed essential from a military point of view for the defense and protection of the area. No legal problems arise when Japanese citizens are evacuated; but American citizens of Japanese origin could not, in my opinion, be singled out of an area and be evacuated with the other Japanese. However, the result may be accomplished by evacuating all persons in the area and then licensing back those whom the military authorities thought were not objectionable from a military point of view. These suggestions are made to you for your careful consideration in view of your prior recommendations and of the probable necessity of your taking further vigorous action.[53]

Attorney General Biddle's letter was late in arriving to change the opinion of Secretary of War Stimson. The secretary and his assistant, McCloy, had already approached the White House and were working with President Roosevelt on a solution to the legality problem of forcing American citizens to evacuate the West Coast. Stimson and McCloy did talk to the president via phone on February 11. No recording of the president's phone exists, so no written record of this

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[52] Roger Daniels*, American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942,* (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 179.

[53] Biddle to Stimson, February 12th, 1942, Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Roger Daniels*, American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942,* (New York: Garland, 1989), personal file, pdf, 249.

phone call exists; however, an unsigned memorandum shows that the War Department wished for the president to choose from one of the four options presented.

1. Would FDR authorize the Army to move American citizens of Japanese ancestry as well as aliens?
2. Should they evacuate the entire West Coast, more than 100,000 people?
3. Should they undertake a large but not total evacuation of the major urban areas, involving perhaps seventy thousand people?
4. Should they restrict themselves to evacuating small areas around critical areas like aircraft factories, even though that would be more complicated and tension-producing than total evacuation?[54]

President Roosevelt refused to choose between the four options and authorized the military to do what it must to protect the West Coast, so Executive Order 9066 came into existence on February 19, 1942. Assistant Secretary McCloy telephoned Colonel Bendetsen in San Francisco and advised that the president gave the Army "*carte blanche* to do what we want to."[55]

Provost Marshal General Allen Gullion immediately saw the need for manpower to oversee and guard the camps to be too great for the military to accommodate. Gullion estimated there would be approximately 86,000 internees (40,000 of which he expected from Hawaii), with each camp housing 3,000, requiring 750 soldiers to guard each camp, totaling over 35,000 soldiers. In WWII, United States Army Divisions numbered about 15,000 each.[56] The military could not handle this type of demand. At a cabinet meeting on February 27, Secretary of War

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[54] Draft of Memorandum to President Roosevelt, February 11th, 1942, Record group 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[55] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA,* 112; Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans,* 98.

[56] Memorandum, Gullion, to Chief Administrative Services, Service of Supply, February 22nd, 1942, Record Group 107, National Archives; *&* Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. III: February 20th, 1942 – March 31st, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989).

Stimson, supported by Attorney General Francis Biddle, demanded that a civilian agency be appointed to handle the evacuation and relocation camps for the duration of the war.[57]

The result of the cabinet meeting was the formation of the War Relocation Authority, which would manage the relocation centers. The organization would also work with the ethnic Japanese to reassimilate into society after the war.[58] Director of the War Relocation Authority (WRA) was assigned to an official of the Department of Agriculture, Milton S. Eisenhower. By early March 1942, the organization was up and running, and Eisenhower was working on the logistics for mass removal. One of the main issues Eisenhower faced was the lack of adequate facilities to house the ethnic Japanese before moving them to the WRA camps. Pressure from civilian agencies, politicians, and the closing window for the spring growing season required assembly centers.[59]

On March 2, 1942, regardless of the lack of logistics, General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1.[60] This proclamation divided the states of California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona into two military areas: one and two. Military area number one comprised the western edge of California, Oregon, and Washington; it extended approximately 100 miles inland and contained further "restricted zones" contiguous to it. This proclamation did not require anyone to move voluntarily or be removed forcefully; it established restricted areas for Japanese, German, and Italian aliens.

An accompanying press release predicted the eventual exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area One.[61] In conjunction with the proclamation, the press

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[57] Eisenhower, Milton Stover. *The President is Calling* (United States: Doubleday, 1974), 105.
[58] Eisenhower, *The President Is Calling*, 106.
[59] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 237. Girdner and Loftis. *The Great Betrayal*, 324.
[60] U.S. Congress, *House Report No.* 2124, 77th Congress, 2-day Session, (Washington, 1942), 293-351.
[61] U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation,* (Washington, 1946), 26.

release described Military Area No. 2 as an area not subject to prohibition or restriction. Military leaders in the Western Defense Command hoped to encourage voluntary resettlement by ethnic Japanese residents from coastal areas, where most of the population resided, to areas further inland. A flaw in this plan was soon evident as interior states strongly opposed any potential Japanese migration to their territories. The military had not addressed the ongoing sentiment from states such as Utah, Nevada, Idaho, and Wyoming, who were adamantly refusing ethnic Japanese relocation across their borders.[62]

General DeWitt created the Wartime Civil Control Administration on March 11 and assigned Colonel Bendetsen to run the program. The goal of the WCCA was to facilitate the removal, processing, and placement of all ethnic Japanese. The Farm Security Administration operated under the WCCA umbrella, reassigned farmland, issued farm loans to incoming custodians, and ensured the evacuation did not affect the 1942 spring crop. Following the success of the Bainbridge Island removal on March 29, the WCCA divided the remaining areas of the West Coast into 107 additional sections.[63]

The sections were not equal in size but contained approximately 1,000 ethnic Japanese identified for removal. In each area, exclusions were drafted and posted in the press, in the area on poles, and on message boards at churches and grocery stores. These notices were sent out one week before the removal date to allow time for people to prepare. The evacuees reported to a Civil Control Station, where they were registered, given vaccines, had medical checkups, and assigned to an assembly center. The need to move the ethnic Japanese during the spring growing season necessitated using the assembly centers. The waystations were mostly fairgrounds, with minor conversions accommodating the 120,000 evacuees.

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[62] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, 51.
[63] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, 52.

The WCCA operated these assembly centers, and the average stay for the evacuees was three months, after which they transferred to one of ten relocation camps.[64] The complete evacuation of Military Area No. 1 was completed by June 5, 1942, and military Area No. 2 by August 7.[65] The evacuations progressed without disruption to any crops and the yield for 1942 was higher than that of 1941, proving the success of the Food for Freedom program and the timing of the removal of the ethnic Japanese farmers.[66]

Acts of Patriotism

Prior to the start of the war, ethnic Japanese rushed to show their patriotism and loyalty to the United States. A staple in the Japanese community was the dedication to one's country and government, and in many communities, the Japanese consulate was still the center of their community events. However, once 1940 began, the ethnic Japanese population was eager to denounce their support for Tokyo's invasion and occupation of China and adopted a neutral and somewhat hostile view of Japan.[67] As an example of their renewed patriotic focus, the Los Angeles *Nisei* Week festival, known for honoring Japanese biculturalism, was renamed the American patriotic festival.[68] JACL assisted by putting pressure on ethnic Japanese to renounce their dual citizenship to Japan and formalize their allegiance to the United States by holding only one passport. The Japanese American Citizens League also encouraged and promoted programs for the *Nisei* to raise money for the American Red Cross.[69] With the Selective Service activation

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[64] Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, 53-54.
[65] Ibid, 54.
[66] Department of Agriculture Crop Report, 1942.
[67] Robinson, *Tragedy of* Democracy, 50.
[68] Lon Y. Kurashige, *Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival, 1934 –1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 50-51.
[69] Kurashige, *Japanese American Celebration and* Conflict; Robinson, *A Tragedy of Democracy,* 50-51.

in mid-1940, several thousand *Nisei* from Hawaii and the West Coast joined the army and served honorably.

A *Nisei* named Gongoro Nakamura, president of the Central California Japanese Association, wanted confirmation from the government that the ethnic Japanese population would not be "locked up" in the event of a war. Nakamura wrote to the Department of Justice a guarantee that such action would not occur. Special Assistant to the Attorney General Lemuel Schoefield replied, "Law-abiding Japanese citizens would be treated as residents and not enemy aliens in case of war, and that no arbitrary confinement of any person could be upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment."[70] Doubt remained in Nakamura's mind, and in October 1941, he traveled to Washington, D.C., with *Nisei* journalist Togo Tanaka. Their goal was to obtain an official statement from the Justice Department.[71]

The pair met with Attorney General Franci Biddle, who affirmed that the ethnic Japanese population would be left alone, provided that the *Issei* were law-abiding and cooperative. The pair tried to meet with President Roosevelt but were unsuccessful; they met with the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, who promptly made a public statement praising the loyalty of the entire ethnic Japanese population.[72] Although they were not successful in obtaining a written promise of no action against them from the government, Nakamura and Tanaka demonstrated the desire of the Japanese community to be recognized as Americans first.

Hawaii saw ethnic Japanese leaders organize demonstrations of loyalty among its residents, including renouncing their Japanese citizenship. A suggestion by resident Fred Makino to bar all dual citizens from public employment produced a surge of fifty thousand *Nisei* to

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[70] Gongoro Nakamura, "Justice Department Concurs in Contention, Issei to be Considered Legal Residents," *Kashu Mainichi,* March 18th, 1941.

[71] Robinson, *Background to Confinement,* 51.

[72] Robinson, *Background to Confinement,* 52.

pledge their allegiance to the United States and sign a petition asking the U.S. State Department to help simplify the expatriation process.[73] A prominent non-Japanese congressional delegate, Samuel King, carried the petition to Washington, D.C., and presented it to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who was responsible for the Hawaiian territory.[74] This petition resulted in the Race Relations Advisory Group, whose members consisted of Charles Hemenway, a University of Hawaii Trustee, FBI Chief in Hawaii Robert Shivers, Shigeo Yoshido, a school administrator, and various military liaisons.[75] This group would later be a key influence in previously discussed moral committees.

Hawaii's ethnic Japanese population was spared the West Coast treatment despite the desire of senior military leaders in Washington D.C. to parallel the West Coast plan with that of Hawaii. The ethnic Japanese had established themselves within social and various other racial and ethnic groups throughout society. The ethnic Japanese were welcome in society and seen as part of the community, not a threat or competition. They had made themselves indispensable to the community; their crucial contributions to agriculture, service industries, and construction as skilled workers were especially needed once the war began.

Japanese Support

In 1929, a small group of *Nisei* college graduates founded the Japanese American Citizens League, hereafter JACL. They formed the league "in an effort to unify the *Nisei* and to help the second generation assimilate to white ideology."[76] Many of the group's originating founders were forced to attend segregated schools as children. They were told that only "the

[73] Eileen H. Tamura, *Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity: The Nisei Generation in Hawaii* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 85; Robinson, *Background to Confinement,* 53.

[74] Japanese In Hawaii Vow Allegiance, *Los Angeles Times,* April 9th, 1941, https://latimes.newspapers.com/image/380765245/.

[75] Robinson, *Background to Confinement,* 54.

[76] Goldstone, *Not White Enough*, 151.

complete immersion of Japanese Americans into the white community would allow *Issei* and *Nisei* to rise above any misconceptions or suspicions that white Americans may have had."[77] The group promoted the *Issei* as the cultural bridge between America and Japan and encouraged *Nisei* to do all things American to set an example of being the model American. The JACL even advocated that *Nisei* renounce their dual citizenship with Japan for America only.

This group worked with ethnic Japanese in the weeks following the declaration of war to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. On December 7, the national JACL officials telegraphed President Roosevelt, "In this solemn hour, we pledge our fullest cooperation to you, Mr. President, and to our country."[78] The JACL national president issued a follow-up statement in 1941, "There cannot be any questions. There must be no doubt. We, in our hearts, know we are Americans, loyal to America. We must prove that to all of you."[79] This proof of loyalty took many forms; for example, in San Francisco, the JACL sponsored a bond drive titled "Give a Bomber to Uncle Sam." Various chapters also coordinated war bond quotas ranging from $25,000 up to $75,000, recommended language schools voluntarily close for the duration of the war, and JACL members offered to help register enemy aliens.[80]

The JACL was not alone in its support of the ethnic Japanese population; numerous faith-based organizations expressed their belief in the loyalty of resident Japanese following the Pearl Harbor attack. Early attitudes of those supporting ethnic Japanese are well documented, as shown in a Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Aliens of Japanese Ancestry report. The group, formed in 1941, was led by the former president of the University of

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[77] Ibid; Roxana Johnson, "Be Good Americans: The Message of the Japanese American Courier," hups://depts.washington.edu/depress/japanese_american_courier Americanism.html.

[78] Goldstone, *Not White Enough*, 162.

[79] Nisei Pledge Allegiance to U.S., *Los Angeles Daily News,* December 9, 1941, https://www.newspapers.com/image/689199223/.

[80] *passim Nichi Bei,* December 5th, 1941, & February 3rd, 1941, & Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 185.

California. Its purpose was to prevent hostility toward ethnic Japanese during rising tensions with Japan before the war. The committee released a statement three weeks after the start of the war stating, "Californians have kept their heads. There have been few if any, serious denials of civil rights to either aliens or citizens of the Japanese race on account of the war. The American tradition of fair play has been observed."[81]

The Japanese American Citizens League was the first group formed to support ethnic Japanese, but they were not the only group to do so. The Fresno Japanese Association raised money for the city of Fresno to purchase a new ambulance for civil defense activities.[82] A pivotal statement was made by the Buddhist Mission of North America in January of 1942, condemning the attack on Pearl Harbor. This statement was important to the ethnic Japanese and the communities as the main religion for the Japanese was Buddhism. The Japanese American Committee for Democracy in New York issued a similar statement condemning the attack on December 7, 1941.[83]

Many organizations, including private welfare agencies, offered their assistance to ethnic Japanese immediately following the start of WWII. Organizations such as the International Institute and the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice worked to increase awareness that future events might fuel racial animosities, which must be opposed at all costs.[84] Initially strong, the support for the defense of ethnic Japanese began to wane at the end of January 1942. This reduction of support was due to the lack of knowledge these and other

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[81] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 181.

[82] Oakland JACL to Open Emergency Office Next Week, *Nichi Bei,* January 24, 1942, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19420125-01.1.5

[83] N.Y. Nisei-Issei Committee for Democracy States Aims in Newsletter Editorial, *Nichi Bei,* January 20, 1942, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19420120-01.1.5.

[84] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 181-182

support groups had of the rising pressure for widescale action against the ethnic Japanese population.

Attorney-General Francis Biddle was the first person who had any authority for the "control" of enemy aliens; as such, he was the one who received and reviewed all Washington, D.C. bound communication regarding this issue. Absent from the incoming mail was any awareness by the support groups of the possibility of complete evacuation until after Executive Order 9066 was issued.[85]

While a few letters opposed the rising demands for evacuation, the bulk of the outcry did not come until after 9066 was fully in effect. The groups that did vocalize opposition included the ministers of Congregational churches of Hollywood and Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Catholic Mission, the Seattle Oriental Evangelization Society, a minister of a Chicago Methodist church, a Baptist director from Home Missions Society of New York, and a group of ministers from Bethel, Washington.[86] While it is encouraging to see groups supporting equality and fair treatment of the ethnic Japanese population, their voices were drowned out by the sheer volume of outcry against them.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, the initial reports citing fifth-column activity as a factor in the devastation outlasted the three corrections to this report. The corrections and assurances made by the government and military intelligence agencies were drowned out by the constant rumors of Japanese blocking roads, firing on American troops, and guiding attacking planes to American bases.[87] Due to the overwhelming agitation, support attempts were few and ineffective. When the California State Personnel Board dismissed all

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[85] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 182; Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. III: February 20th, 1942 – March 31st, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), np.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, 11068-87, & Grodzins, 184 -185.

ethnic Japanese employees in 1942, protests were filed by the Northern California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union without success. The Los Angeles branch of the Civil Liberties Union issued a statement on February 14 and attested that most enemy aliens were "peaceable and law-abiding." The group went one step further and stated that the responsibility for dealing with enemy aliens was a federal matter and local action only "creates hysteria and disunity at a time of grave national emergency." While the Civil Liberties Union recognized that some within the ethnic Japanese population might be disloyal and a potential threat, that "should not be used as a pretext to justify the wholesale eviction of thousands of American citizens from their homes solely because of their racial origin."[88]

Individual citizens worked to create awareness of the growing resentment against the ethnic Japanese. The chief of the division of immigration and housing within the California Department of Industrial Relations, Carey McWilliams, wrote to the director of the Tolan Committee that "the Japanese situation was quite bad and greatly complicated by reason of the fact there are a number of special interest groups who are all too willing to take advantage of the situation and to muscle in on the Japanese." [89] McWilliams went on in his letter urging the Tolan Committee to investigate the entire situation and not be selective in their focus. McWilliams believed that if the Tolan Committee looked at all angles, it would allow the pressure groups to blow off steam and allow the ethnic Japanese to show their side in a way that would command nationwide attention and expose the self-interest and greed of the local pressure groups.[90]

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[88] Press Release, February 14, 1942, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California Records (Collection 900). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

[89] Carey McWilliams to Rober Lamb, January 26, 1942, Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.

[90] Carey McWilliams to Rober Lamb, January 26, 1942, Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319).

The pressure for more drastic action increased as the spring of 1942 approached, the actions of loyalty from the ethnic Japanese population did as well. Japanese communities doubled their efforts in Red Cross activities, purchasing war bonds, and proclamations of loyalty were abundant within the ethnic Japanese community. The Japanese farming community followed suit by embracing the Food for Freedom program and utilizing every inch of plantable land on their farms to grow the food needed for the war. At the end of January and beginning of February 1942, the first voices opposing the treatment of the ethnic Japanese *en masse* were heard. Leaders within the group began to vocalize their belief that the goal was to apprehend disloyal Japanese residents on a case-by-case basis and not oppress everyone, the entire ethnic Japanese population.[91] Despite these sentiments, Governor Olson met with a group of *Nisei* leaders on February 6 and shared the preliminary plans of voluntary evacuation from the West Coast. The response from the leaders was one of support and understanding, knowing that this would be the ultimate show of loyalty.[92]

When the ethnic Japanese community did take a stand, it was on the night of Executive Order 9066, far too late to make any difference in the coming actions. On February 19, 1942, the United Citizens Federation, representing several Japanese organizations, called a meeting in Los Angeles. Attended by over one thousand Japanese groups and community leaders, this meeting urged cooperation with military and government agencies in their efforts to uncover subversive actions by disloyal Japanese residents.[93] The chairman of the Citizens League, a Japanese anti-axis group, stated he was willing to be evacuated without protest if ordered to prove his faith in America. The overall mood of the meeting was passive, but everyone agreed that they "have the

[91] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 187.
[92] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 186-187; Goldstone, *Not White Enough,*154.
[93] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 187; Girdner and Loftis, *The Great Betrayal,* 216.

right to question the demand of the local politicians and newspapers and misguided men and women."[94]

The meeting saw several suggestions for actions, all of which were passive in nature and, due to the timing of the group's gathering, would not change the outcome. A Japanese businessman wanted a program where *Issei* could demand recognition as American citizens and recommended raising money to "make a coordinated effort to get better press in the city."[95] Several *Nisei* suggested raising funds and sending representatives to Washington, D.C., to present the group's cause directly to Washington officials. Carey McWilliams was in attendance and suggested that speakers should be chosen as group representatives and sent to appear before the Tolan committee, whose hearing would receive widespread publicity. Kay Sugahara, a fruit and vegetable farmer and merchant, was the most outspoken voice in opposition to evacuation. Sugahara urged the group not to take the threat of evacuation "lying down," and the ethnic Japanese should get out of the area if the Army and Navy deemed them to be a threat; however, he finished by saying, "If it's merely a question of fighting politicians who want to gain favor by harping on 'those defenseless Japs' we should fight them to the last ditch."[96]

The buildup to full scale removal of the ethnic-Japanese was slow and not immediate. It is clear that the military and Department of Justice did not want to move too quickly, however, the growing resentment and fear could not be avoided. As Japan continued its expansion in the Pacific and notching victories against the Allies, the fear on the West Coast grew. Officials in

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[94] Togo Tanaka. Interviewed by James Gatewood. December 13, 1997. In *Regenerations Oral History Project: Rebuilding Japanese American Families, Communities, and Civil Rights in the Resettlement Era: Los Angeles Region, Volume II.* Los Angeles: Japanese American National Museum.

[95] Tanaka. Interviewed by James Gatewood. December 13, 1997.

[96] Ibid.

California and Washington, D.C. were faced with a two front problem, how to legally remove Japanese immigrants and Japanese American citizens, and ensure wartime food security.

As Governor Olson created the so called California plan, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy directed General DeWitt to tread lightly and go slowly into it. This shows the awareness the War Department had regarding the importance of Japanese farming and wartime food security. McCloy's comment, "the social and economic consequences would be so great, disturbances would be so great," shows his awareness of the wartime food security problem and the departments desire to slow things down. An argument can be made that McCloy wanted to slow things down due to lack of infrastructure available for evacuation, lack of legal precedent, and lack of congressional approval. This argument is invalid as the only thing that became available when the decision for mass removal was made was congressional approval, the concern was focused on wartime food security.

In the end the civilian desire for mass removal won over the need for wartime food security and the military needed to respond. The military used the patriotism demonstrated by the ethnic-Japanee to ensure that the Winter crop was harvested and the Spring crop was planted before they triggered the removal. The shift from delaying the process to full scale removal can be seen in Governor Olson's Tolan Committee testimony as he changed from supporting Japanese farmers remaining in California and treating Japanese on a per person basis, to believing they need to be treated as a group and mass removal was the only option. This coincided with the signing of Executive Order 9066, the completion of the resupply of Hawaii, and Spring planting for the 1942 crop.

Chapter Five -- Waiting for Spring

"To study history means submitting yourself to chaos, but nevertheless retaining your faith in order and meaning." Herman Hesse, German writer, and poet (1877-1962).

Everyone on the planet has at least one thing in common: every person eats food. Agriculture is what turned early humans from hunter-gatherers to building cities and societies. Food has been a driving force behind many historical conflicts and plays a pivotal role in the world today. During the early stages of WWII, the importance of food was not lost on the Department of Agriculture and they worked with the military to ensure wartime food security. The Food Fights for Freedom program was responsible for assigning specific crops to farmers, conducting a census of operational farms in the United States, and other key roles.

Up to this point, the research has traced the intellectual journey of the anti-Asian prejudice and racist sentiment prevalent on the West Coast, as well as the exception to evacuation, as seen in Hawaii. This journey showed the labor disputes, the resulting anti-Asian laws forcing ethnic Japanese into rural communities to become farmers, and the success of Japanese Americans in protecting their rights as American-born citizens. At the start of WWII, anti-Asian sentiment was well established in communities and political offices on the West Coast. This is key to understanding both the decision to evacuate and the timing of the evacuation. The importance of ethnic-Japanese farms to the overall food supply on the West Coast was vital, and the decision to remove a group that was key to wartime production is a testament to the strength of the entrenched prejudice present on the West Coast. The government in Washington did not share this sentiment and recognized the impact removing the ethnic-Japanese farmers would have on wartime food security. Since the government could not

overcome the pressure and calls for removal on the West Coast, they did all they could to protect the food desperately needed for the war effort by timing the evacuation to eliminate crop loss.

On September 8, 1941, Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard gave a speech in San Francisco outlining how farming would win the war by growing the food that America and its allies needed during the fighting. The speech introduced the listeners to the agricultural production goals of 1942. The Food for Freedom program called for a sharp reduction in certain crops, such as cotton, and an increase in other crops, such as beans, celery, and lettuce. At the time of Wickard's speech, 1940 and 1941 were the highest farm production years on record, and this program called for more. The new program called for 1942 to beat out both previous years and produce more much-needed food. Wickard used an example of milk, which he claimed needed a production increase of at least 8% over the 1941 level.[1]

The achievement of the program goal with less available farm labor, limited new machinery, and shortages of things such as fertilizer and spray materials was a key point of Secretary Wickard. He called on farmers and citizens to band together, share resources, and build community events out of harvest months so that no food went to waste and everyone in Great Britain and the United States stayed well-fed. Wickard stated, “We are going into defense production and let business as usual wait.”[2] Wickard called on farmers to start defense production in the fall and winter of 1941 to reach the goals the Department of Agriculture outlined for 1942.

Created by a committee of experts from the Department of Agriculture, the Food for Freedom program members included nutritionists and consumer needs experts. This committee

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[1] Claude R. Wickard. “Agricultural Production Goals 1942,” September 8, 1941. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/1941-09-08a.html.

[2] Claude R. Wickard. “Agricultural Production Goals 1942,” September 8, 1941.

worked to learn the needs of the United States, its military, and allied countries such as Great Britain to fulfill the war's lend-lease requirements. The committee concluded that a great need existed for increased supplies of meat, milk, eggs, and essential fruits and vegetables. Wickard stated that the United States had already agreed to supply approximately one-fourth of Great Britain's animal protein needs for 1942.[3] The needs of Great Britain alone constituted a new market for enormous quantities of these staples.

Outside of the needs of the United States export requirements, the issue for America was the need to grow the stockpiles currently in place in 1941. The Department of Agriculture committee concluded the need to scale back crops such as wheat, cotton, and tobacco due to the large stockpiles in 1941. Secretary Wickard called for increasing finished and "non-perishable" foods such as canned items. These included evaporated milk, pork, vegetables, and dried eggs. There were two reasons for the needed stockpiles: First, to ensure that American citizens and soldiers had a plentiful supply of nutritious foods, and second, to provide for the people of Europe starving under invasion.[4] Like many in the War Department, Wickard believed that good food would spur the Europeans into action and fuel their resistance against Germany.

The Food for Freedom program handbook stated, "There will be only one way to measure your success in 1943. If, at the end of the year, your help has enabled the Nation's farmers to produce all the right kind of things necessary for military, civilian, and Lend-Lease requirements, only then will you have been truly successful."[5] Wickard proclaimed that farm resources must be used toward but one end-victory. Reaching the 1942 goals was the first step in

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[3] United States, Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics, & Farm Security Administration. "*Food for freedom: Informational handbook, 1943*" (1942), 1.

[4] Claude R. Wickard. "Agricultural Production Goals 1942," September 8, 1941.

[5] United States, Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics, and Farm Security Administration, 1943, 3.

feeding multiple countries and building the American stockpiles of food, “American farm families will help to write the history of the future.”[6]

While the logic behind the program's goals was sound, the Food for Freedom program was difficult to implement, involving nationwide logistics and accountability. Secretary Wickard outlined the Department of Agriculture's plan, which would begin with regional meetings that would end in local meetings in each State, outlining the needs of each farm in any given area. The first meetings began on September 15 in Salt Lake City, Chicago, and Memphis and were attended by farm organization leaders from every state. The goal of these meetings was to create the plans needed to enlist the participation of every farmer in the nation. The system would break down the goals and plans for each state from the national to the county level.

A vital component of these plans was to send Triple-A committeemen to every farm on record and work out a plan with the farmers based on what they could contribute. The idea is that a non-essential farm that grows cotton and tobacco could switch to growing beans and lettuce, which are wartime essentials. The reports were compiled once the committeemen had completed their tasks and an agriculture farming plan developed. This program helped to ensure that suitable crops for the spring of 1942 were in the ground and were not interrupted by the evacuation of the ethnic Japanese farmers. The program also ensured that a Department of Agriculture representative visited every registered farm. These visits provided demographic information, acreage, production value, and status of every farm owned or leased by ethnic Japanese farmers. The Food for Freedom program, coupled with the Nationality Act of 1940, ensured that the government was aware of the location of every resident alien on the West Coast.

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[6] Wickard, “*Agriculture Production Goals,*” http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/1941-09-08a.html

Wickard summed up the vital nature of this program and its need for success with the statement: "Our sole yardstick must be: 'Will it help win the war?'"

Troop Training and Population

As the shock of the Pearl Harbor attack began to wear off, and Californians learned to live with the fears of air raids and invasion, their war production came to life with a renewed purpose. The level of unemployment disappeared and every person was called upon to contribute to the war effort. California had ample resources, such as oil and minerals, to contribute to the war effort during WWII. New wartime industries sprang up overnight to utilize these resources. One of the most noticeable changes to California was the increase in population due to the westward migration of those still affected by the Great Depression looking for work. This population increase included Mexican workers as the border between Mexico and the United States opened to solve the agricultural labor shortage.

The resident population of California on December 7, 1941, was approximately 7.2 million people and growing.[7] Between 1940 and 1945, the California population grew to 9.344 million people.[8] The incredible growth of California's population powered its economic growth and set the stage for the state to become one of the most populous in the United States. The wartime economy of California saw the unemployment rate drop to almost non-existent levels, with the increase in jobs from 2.2 million to 3.3 million thanks to government contracts and an increase in military establishments.[9] This rapid increase in population raised the importance of

[7] Walton Bean, *California an Interpretive History*: (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973),512.
[8] Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population 1940*, vol. 3, Characteristics of the Population, part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. government Printing Office, 1943), 585-601.
[9] Bean, *California an Interpretive History,* 507; Gerald D. Nash: *The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War,* (University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 40.

wartime food security and the role those ethnic Japanese farmers had in guaranteeing that security.

California received 11.9% of all U.S. government war contracts, and the war production facilities contributed 17% of all war supplies manufactured in the United States.[10] The deserts of California became military bases, bombing ranges, and troop training centers. Tanks and infantry moved through farms, orchards, open fields, and towns, while harbors and airports became naval stations and air bases.[11] California would be home to more military installations than any other state throughout WWII.[12] The Army used California to train troops for both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters and, thanks to the state's diverse geography, this was easy to accomplish. California also had several arsenals and supply storage depots, such as Benicia Arsenal, Yermo Depot, and Sacramento Army Depot.[13] Wartime production and troop training was a boom for the California economy; however, the increased military activity created two problems: increased population and more people to feed, and troop movements and training drills that ethnic Japanese could witness.

The Desert Training Center in southeastern California and western Arizona is a prime example of sensitive army activities that military leaders did not want to be witnessed by potential fifth-column members. In late 1941, the Army created the Desert Training Center (hereafter DTC) to respond to the war in Europe and combat the German military in Africa. The area occupied by the DTC consisted of 18,000 square miles of desert and was specifically

[10] Nash, *The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War,* 41.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Nash, *The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War*, 42; "Historic California Posts: Major Navy and Marine Corps Installations During World War II.".
[13] "Historic California Posts: Major Navy and Marine Corps Installations During World War II."

selected to prepare troops for fighting a desert war.[14] The area selected was 98% federal or state-owned land, it was remote and rugged, it was primarily uninhabited, the existing aqueduct supplying California with water was available for troops, the area resembled Africa, and the area already had rail lines running through it for supplies needed by troops.[15]

In addition to the area designated for desert warfare training, four airfields provided air support to training armored divisions at the DTC. These air wings trained in bombing maneuvers and reconnaissance missions coordinated with DTC divisions. The goal of the DTC was to train troops in the most realistic way possible so they were prepared for the harsh reality of their environment when arriving at the front lines. Troops would spend thirteen weeks at the DTC, mostly training in real-time combat scenarios, sleeping on the ground, and eating rationed food with barely enough water to survive, all in preparation for a looming war. Approximately 180,000 soldiers, 38,000 vehicles, and thousands of other support staff were on-site at any given time. With the German defeat in Africa in May of 1943, the DTC was no longer needed, and the site was shut down by April 1944.[16]

The presence of the DTC and other military installations is an essential factor in the timing of the removal of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. As stated, the removal was timed to coincide with the spring growing season, thereby removing farmers from the land that needed little, if any, tending before the harvest. The importance of these crops is evident based on the increased demand for foodstuffs due to the increased population of civilian residents and troop training deployments in California. The timing of the removal also coincides with the

[14] "History of Patton's Desert Training Center in WWII," https://www.deserttrainingcenter.com/history.html#:~:text=To%20train%20U.S.%20soldiers%20to,Europe%20is%20over%20for%20us.

[15] Ibid.

[16] "History of Patton's Desert Training Center in WWII."

arrival of armored divisions to Camp Young, DTC headquarters, in March of 1942.[17] Starting in March, the DTC saw eighteen divisions, each consisting of fifteen thousand men, pass through the training grounds. They all required food and the guarantee that their training would be hidden from potential fifth-column members. When analyzed from these angles, it is clear that the evacuation timing was to ensure wartime food security and secrecy of troop training conducted on the West Coast.

The successful evasion of the 1924 Immigration Act allowed Japanese-owned farms to rise rather than decline, as hoped by its founders. The previous chapters outlined some ways that ethnic Japanese families outmaneuvered the 1924 law, but perhaps the most common was the unwritten arrangements that ethnic Japanese entered with farm owners. These farm owners would lease the land to a Japanese family and, on paper, "employ" the farmer as a farm manager. This distinction became an essential factor in later census reports as it showed the decline of Japanese farms when they were, in fact, on the rise. Edward K. Strong directed a survey of just 10 percent of the ethnic Japanese residing in California in 1930, and he concluded that many Japanese men were reporting themselves as simply managers or foreman.[18] This small survey pool showed that enforcement of the 1924 law was almost non-existent.

Cooperation was the key to evading the alien land laws, as white landowners were happy to lease to ethnic Japanese farmers because both stood to gain wealth from the arrangement. White landowners who desired to lease their land saw that adherence to the laws as written would severely damage their interests. They found it beneficial to find ways to evade the law when it was to their monetary advantage. In some areas, landlords and tenants ignored the law

[17] History of Patton's Desert Training Center in WWII.

[18] Edward Kellogg Strong, *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem*, (United States: Arno Press, 1970), 210.

and did nothing to hide their actions.[19] As the 1920s and 1930s wore on, more *Nisei* were becoming of age, allowing ethnic Japanese families to put the lease, or title of the land, in the name of their American-born children, thus avoiding the issue of the laws altogether.

The official census of farms conducted in 1942 was incorrect, as many Japanese farmers claimed only to be tenants or workers. Despite some census records also showing a decline in Japanese-owned or leased farm acreage, the opposite occurred. The laws did not drive ethnic Japanese out of the agricultural sector; many ethnic Japanese males were employed in farming as late as 1940. These farmers were self-declared owners and not employed as laborers. The U.S. Census and War Relocation records show that in January of 1942, Japanese-owned farms numbered 1,703 and 3,195 Japanese-leased. These numbers dramatically increased over the 1910 census, which showed only 233 owners and 1,547 leased farms.[20]

Table 1
U.S. Census and WRA Records of Japanese Farms
Based on Tenure Status California, 1910-1942

Date	Owners	Tenants	Managers	Total
1910	233	1,547	36	1,816
1920	506	4,533	113	5,152
1930	560	1,580	1,616	3,756
1940	1,290	3,596	249	5,135
1942	1,703	3,195	10	4,908

Source: For 1910 and 1920, U.S. Census, *Agriculture, 1920* V (1922), p. 312; for 1930 and 1940, U.S. Census *Agriculture, 1940,* III (1943), p. 224; for 1942, War Relocation Authority evacuee property records, Adon Poli, and Warren M. Engstrand. "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast." *The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics* 21, no. 4 (1945): 355.

[19] Strong, "*The Second Generation*," 211.
[20] Adon Poli, and Warren M. Engstrand. "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast." *The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics* 21, no. 4 (1945), 352–64.

Between 1932 and 1942, the owned farm and acreage increased dramatically while the leased acreage decreased. Such an apparent change in the shadow of the new alien land laws shows an underlying factor at play. That factor, commonly overlooked in records and census, was the change in demographics of the ethnic Japanese. The Immigration Act of 1924 effectively stopped the flow of immigrants from Japan; combined with average mortality, the population of ethnic non-citizen adult Japanese declined from 32,000 in 1920 to only 21,000 in 1940.[21] In 1920, the census showed 5,039 Japanese farmers and tenants; in 1940, the number had declined to 4,886. The difference in population relative to the decline in farms owned or operated by ethnic Japanese do not match. Between 1920 and 1940, the population decline was approximately one-third of the total adult alien Japanese population, higher than the corresponding farm owner/tenant decline in the same timeframe.

The factor commonly overlooked is that most American-born *Nisei* were coming of age during the 1930s, accounting for the shift in alien land ownership and the U.S. Census numbers. The *Nisei* coming of age showed that ethnic Japanese families put the farms and land in the names of their American-born children, a right upheld by the Harada decision in 1919. Table 2 shows the breakdown of the ethnic Japanese population between foreign-born and American-born Japanese.

[21] U.S. Census, *Population, 1920, III* (1922), p. 128; U.S. Census, *Population, 1940: Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race* (1943), 98.

Table 2.
Distribution of Japanese Population in the United States
By Decade 1890-1940

Area	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940
California	1,147	10,151	41,356	71,952	97,456	93,717
Washington	360	5,617	12,929	17,387	17,837	14,565
Oregon	25	2,501	3,418	4,151	4,958	4,071
U.S. Totals	2,039	24,326	72,157	111,010	138,834	126,947
American-born	…	269	4,502	29,672	68,357	79,642
Foreign-born	2,039	24,057	67,655	81,338	70,477	47,305

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Farm ownership by ethnic Japanese has never exceeded the one percent margin of total farm acreage in the evacuation area. Ethnic Japanese owned twenty-eight percent of Japanese-operated farms; the remaining farms were leased rather than owned. This figure shows that 78 percent of ethnic Japanese-operated farms operated under a lease. In the areas occupied by Japanese-run farms, leasing was typical as the concentration of farming was truck farming versus large-scale crop farming. There was a higher concentration of truck farming in California as it was more conducive to a variety of vegetable production on a single farm than large-scale single-crop production.

The high number of leased farms was due to the uneasiness of ethnic Japanese to invest heavily in land in areas deemed unfavorable to Japanese workers. Leasing land allowed for a family to move on short notice. If the farm is truck crop-focused, this also allows for minimal capital investment compared to large-scale single-crop production.[22] Ethnic Japanese-operated farms were smaller on average than others in the same area, farming the same crops. Approximately three-fourths of the Japanese-operated farms were 50 acres or less.[23] The farms

[22] Poli and Engstrand, "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast," 334-355; Iwata, "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture," 32.

[23] Poli, and Engstrand, "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast," 355.

seized during the 1942 evacuation ranged from two to 200 acres, with the smaller farms concentrated near urban areas.

The 1941 production figures show the importance of Japanese agriculture in California. Ethnic Japanese-operated farms grew forty-two percent of the State's commercial truck crops. These farms occupied 205,989 acres of land, of which they grew vegetables with a 1941 valuation of thirty to thirty-five million dollars and thirty-five percent by value of all vegetable crops in California.[24] These farms were responsible for raising ninety percent of snap beans, spring and summer celery, peppers, and almost all of the Strawberries; fifty to ninety percent of artichokes, cauliflower, cucumbers, spinach, and tomatoes; and twenty-five to fifty percent of asparagus, cabbage, cantaloupes, carrots, lettuce, onions, and watermelons.[25]

The particular skills of the ethnic Japanese in soil preparation, crop and seed selection, planting, cultivating, irrigation, and spraying allowed them to compete successfully against large-scale growers and shippers. Additionally, the success of Japanese farmers was their willingness to work as a team and organize cooperative farm organizations. Ethnic Japanese farmers operating as a cohesive group could meet and overcome any problem. Testifying before the Tolan Committee, a witness noted, "Japanese capacity for labor in the fields, growing, cultivating, and marketing truck crops is secondary only to their managing ability."[26] The Japanese-organized farm groups were able to maintain connections throughout the entirety of California, assisting them with channeling crops from farm to market. There is no evidence to indicate that any ethnic Japanese-operated farm played any significant role in white-dominated

[24] Poli and Engstrand, "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast," 357; WRA Evacuee Property Records; Tolan Committee, 11691.

[25] Ibid.

[26] United States Congress, *National Defense Migration,* Fourth Interim Report of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration (House Report No. 2124), 77th Congress, 2nd Session, May 1942, 118.

farmers' organizations such as the Farm Bureau Federation or the Grange, as these organizations, and others, were traditionally anti-Japanese.

The Japanese played a prominent role in developing the marketing system used to sell fruits and vegetables. As early as 1901, Los Angeles County saw at least one ethnic Japanese produce wholesaler operating at the City Plaza during the farmer's market. The official Los Angeles City Market was established in 1909 by a private corporation for $200,000, of which ninety-four Japanese owned eighteen percent of the stock.[27] The City Market had 180 growers selling produce from various stalls; 120 were ethnic Japanese farmers.[28] By 1941, there were 167 commission merchants in three Los Angeles wholesale markets; 29 Japanese owned and operated 134 of the available 232 produce stalls.[29] During 1941 alone, these stalls did approximately $26,000,000 worth of business, distributing thirty-seven percent of the produce handled in all three markets. Ethnic Japanese farmers sold seventy percent of all green vegetables at these three markets via their produce stalls.[30]

Ethnic Japanese farmers dominated the retail distribution of fruits and vegetables until 1942. Their ability to grow crops on small family-operated farms and not only survive but beat the competition of large-scale growers is a testament to their skill and determination. Farmers in the Imperial Valley, California, stated that small-scale vegetable production is too risky due to the difficulty of selling the crops at the market.[31] The same sentiment was felt amongst large-scale growers throughout California, leaving the truck crop market solely for ethnic Japanese

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[27] Iwata, "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture," 34.

[28] Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer, Removal and Return*, University of California Publications in Culture and Society,* Vol. IV, Berkely and Los Angeles; (University of California Press, 1949), 76.

[29] Bloom and Riemer, Removal and Return, 83-84.

[30] U.S. Congress, *National Defense Migration,* p. 120; Iwata. "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture," 36.

[31] Poli, and Engstrand. "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast," 358.

farmers. Table III shows the breakdown of crops grown by ethnic Japanese farmers and the total percentage of the crop for the state in April 1942, one month after the military evacuation order.

Type of Crop California	Acres	Percentage
Truck Crops	79,482	49.3
Field Crops	27,067	16.5
Grapes	27,694	16.8
Deciduous Fruits	17,736	10.8
Berries	6,075	3.7
Nursery Crops	2,934	1.8
Nut Crops	1,895	1.2
Subtropical Fruits	1,557	0.9
Totals	164,440	100.00

Source: WRA Evacuee Property Records; Adon Poli, and Warren M. Engstrand. "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast." *The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics* 21, no. 4 (1945): 357

The ethnic Japanese contributions to farming are clear, and their work and farm production were critical considerations during the evacuation and planning process, with a particular focus on the timing of the evacuation order. The question of farming and the need to continue to produce food was at the forefront of the evacuation planning process from day one. California's spring planting schedule calls for most foods to be planted after the last day of frost if frost occurs in the planting area. Foods commonly planted in February and March include beets, broccoli, cabbage, carrots, cauliflower, kale, lettuce, potatoes, onions and peas. Implementing the Food Fights for Freedom program guaranteed that all ethnic Japanese-owned farms planted the "required" spring crop for the war effort well before Pearl Harbor.

The anti-Japanese groups on the West Coast saw the attack on Pearl Harbor as proof of their long-standing belief that ethnic Japanese could not be trusted. The fact that Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack only fed the belief of Japanese treachery. Defending the Japanese on the West Coast had become impossible, and government action seemed imminent. The ethnic Japanese immediately arrested were businessmen, Buddhist Priests, Japanese language teachers,

and community leaders. [32] These men made the list for reasons as simple as writing letters to their families in Japan. Authorities thought that the ethnic Japanese were writing letters in code. Other Japanese men were arrested for observing traditional rituals. "More than 5,500 *Issei* men were eventually picked up and held as potential threats to national security."[33] The Department of Justice took these men to internment camps for hearings and an official legal review before release. The hearings and legal reviews did not always occur, as the *Issei* were held in confinement without trial or evidence and were not allowed legal representation.

The local communities were not interested in the potential innocence of the ethnic Japanese population. On December 8, 1941, the front page of the Los Angeles Times reported that "During the afternoon and night, close to 200 suspicious Japanese were rounded up by police, deputy sheriffs, and special officers working under the direction of FBI agents."[34] The *Examiner* reported on December 9 that a raid had occurred in Los Angeles by Japanese warplanes; this was a false report. The fear of Japanese subversion was beginning to sweep the nation, and American fears grew thanks to the daily news reports of the seemingly invincible and brutal Japanese armies moving unchecked in and around the South Pacific. Places such as Burma, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies fell to the Japanese might.[35]

Any hope of tolerance was replaced by fear and greed as white merchants and farmers set their sights on ethnic Japanese holdings. The white farmers desired to eliminate the competition of the Japanese farms, valued at $75 million and contributing to more than 40% of California's

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[32] Densho Encyclopedia, https:/ / encyclopedia.densho.org/ history/.
[33] Densho Encyclopedia.
[34] Goldstone, *Not White Enough*, 212.
[35] Richard Reeves, *Infamy: The Shocking Story of the Japanese American Internment in World War II* (New York: Holt, 2015), 20.

annual produce.[36] Moves against the ethnic Japanese population began financially as all Japanese-owned banks were immediately closed and taken over by the bank superintendent or the Alien Property Custodian, who then called for all outstanding loans to be settled.[37] The Alien Property Custodian seized approximately $27.5 million of business enterprises and real estate owned by ethnic Japanese, and the Treasury froze the deposits of *Issei* and N*Issei*, who had business dealings with Japan before the war.[38] This act by the Treasury effectively shut down the import-export business in the ethnic Japanese community.[39]

The Department of Agriculture faced a two-front problem, keeping Japanese farms producing food vital to the war effort and the Food-for-Freedom program, all the while removing the Japanese farmers from their lands. The agreed-upon compromise kept the farms producing, just not by the Japanese. Before this plan became a reality, local USDA officials were reacting to the financial problem created by the Treasury Department, the freezing of Japanese funds, and the takeover of Japanese banks.[40] The issue of financial freezing was terrible in Los Angeles County, which was home to approximately 39 percent of the total ethnic Japanese population in California and approximately 29 percent of the total Japanese population on the mainland. In Los Angeles County, in particular, 28 percent of employed ethnic Japanese engaged in agriculture, and 90 percent of Japanese farmers were tenant farmers.[41] These farmers contributed to the overall production of more than seventeen crops.

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[36] Poli and Engstrand. "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast," 360; Iwata, "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture," 38.

[37] *Personal Justice Denied,* 61.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Goldstone, *Not White Enough,* 214.

[40] Accounts Frozen, *Rafu Shimpo* (English section), December 9, 1941, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19411208-01.1.2.

[41] US Census Bureau, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population (Washington, D.C., 1943), Table 4, Race, by Nativity and Sex, for the United States: 1850 to 1940, and Table 25, Indians, Chinese, and Japanese by Sex, for Counties, and for Cities of 10,000 to 100,000, 19, 516, 567. & Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 74.

The act of the Treasury Department to freeze the financial securities of the ethnic Japanese halted the sale and distribution of Japanese produce and shut down three markets in downtown Los Angeles. A meeting was held on the morning of December 8, 1941, between the Chinese, Japanese, and white American vendors, approximately 200 people, and discussed the wartime situation. They all agreed that suspending the sale of produce would cause serious inconvenience to local and area residents. With the financial freeze, the ethnic Japanese farmers turned over their stored produce to the white merchants to sell before they turned rotten.[42] The act by the Treasury Department made all ethnic Japanese feel unsure and vulnerable regarding their finances, and many rushed to their respective banks only to find them closed or restricting withdrawals to American-born *Nisei* with a valid birth certificate only. Like the produce markets, many Japanese-owned businesses in Los Angeles' Little Tokyo were closed.[43] This knee-jerk reaction by the Treasury Department created a financial crisis in the daily lives of the ethnic Japanese.

The financial problem created by the Treasury Department was not just an issue for the Japanese farmers and business owners but also for the Department of Agriculture. The freezing of funds effectively shut down the ability of Japanese farmers to grow crops and contribute to the Department of Agriculture Food for Freedom program. Local USDA officials saw the financial freeze and the suspension of Japanese agriculture as a threat to wartime food security. Dave Davidson, chairman of the California USDA Defense Board, sent a letter on December 10 to various representatives of the county defense boards, citing, "All resources of alien Japanese are frozen. This creates a serious problem with the Food for Freedom program in areas where alien

[42] Leonard Broom and Ruth Riemer, *Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on Japanese Americans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 107.

[43] "Little Tokyo in wartime, almost all closed, banking transactions by Issei are prohibited," *Rafu Shimpo*, December 10, 1941, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19411229-01.1.1.

Japanese are employed." Davidson requested the representatives to ensure that employers do not hire labor to replace the Japanese. White landowners terminating leases and hiring non-Japanese farmers as replacements was a big concern. This concern was validated by the inability of the Japanese to pay for their leases, given that all of their financial capital was frozen.[44]

Davidson's letter indicated that the Treasury Department would be amending its approach to Japanese financial assets due to the concerns for the Food for Freedom program as well as the socio-economic safety of Japanese residents.[45] On December 11, the Treasury Department partially unfroze Japanese assets so residents could maintain a minimum standard of living. The new plan allowed *Issei* to withdraw up to $100 monthly (roughly $2,046 in 2023) provided they showed a notarized affidavit to designated banks.[46] While the change did help with the ability of ethnic Japanese to live day to day, they were still unable to accept funds for their produce directly from merchants or wholesalers. An ethnic Japanese organization, the Central Industrial Association of Southern California, stated, "Due to the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, Japanese *Issei* are not able to receive payment for their produce, so they could not make their living. This is a serious problem in terms of national defense. In time of war, the shortage of food, particularly fresh vegetables, will affect the spirit of soldiers on the war front and that of the people on the home front."[47] The ethnic Japanese found themselves in a position where they needed to sell the importance of Japanese Agriculture as a vital weapon against Imperial Japan.

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[44] Dave Davidson, chairman of the California USDA Defense Board, to chairmen of USDA County Defense Boards, December 10, 1941, Ralston Papers; US Department of Agriculture, Food for Freedom. & Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 140.

[45] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 141.

[46] Japanese Allowed to Withdraw up to $100, *Rafu Shimpo*, December 12th, 1941, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19411208-01.1.1.

[47] The Japanese Need to Ship *Rafu Shimpo*, December 12th, 1941, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19411208-01.1.1.

By December 13, the Treasury Department understood the importance of Japanese agriculture and began allowing Japanese farmers to accept payments from vendors and wholesalers. These transactions were to be done under strict government control and only through banks that the government designated, and Japanese farmers were required to bring in their expense receipts for reimbursement of the costs incurred for crop production.[48] On December 13, the Japanese farmers resumed shipment of their produce. While some were reluctant due to the difficulty of receiving payment, the local Japanese newspaper reminded residents that refusal to ship may be interpreted as sabotage and to "ship as much as possible in line with national defense policy."[49] In addition to the farmers going back to work, shops in Little Tokyo began to reopen gradually.

While the resumption of vegetable shipping signaled a gradual return to normal, the USDA was still concerned that partially unfreezing Japanese assets was insufficient to restore pre-war working conditions for ethnic Japanese farmers. Their focus was on crop production and the assurance of on-time planting of spring crops, a critical factor in the timing of the eventual evacuation. The USDA assigned P.A. Minges to survey ethnic Japanese farmers between December 19 and 24, 1941. Minges was considered a specialist in truck crops at the California Extension Service of the USDA and collected information from eleven California counties.[50]

Minges collected information through in-person interviews with Japanese farmers, investigating farming conditions, and working with local farm advisors and crop projections.[51] A

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[48] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 141.

[49] Japanese Markets and Distribution Recovered to Normal, *Rafu Shimpo*, December 12, 1941, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19411208-01.1.1.

[50] P. A. Minges, *"Report on the Effects of the Japanese War on the Japanese Alien and Native-Born Vegetable Growers of California,"* December 29, 1941, Ralston Papers; Linda L Ivey and Kevin W. Kaatz, *Documents of Japanese American Internment*. (Indonesia: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 5; Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles*, 142.

[51] Minges, *"Report on the Effects of the Japanese War on the Japanese Alien and Native-Born Vegetable Growers of California."*

key question asked by Minges was whether or not the Japanese farmers would be planting their spring crops and continue farming for the foreseeable future. His report noted, “Practically all Japanese farmers indicated that they are going ahead with present crops and are planning to continue farming in the future as usual.” Minges stated that many farmers had already signed lease extensions and had increased their acreage to increase crop yield to help with the Food for Freedom program. [52] Minges did note that there was a large number of white Americans who were anxious to gain control over the Japanese lands.

Minges' survey confirmed that the partial unfreezing of Japanese assets benefited the Japanese truck farmers; however, his survey identified four areas of concern that could impact these farmers soon.

1. Japanese-owned banks were still closed, which prevented account owners from accessing savings and obtaining loans needed for crop production. American banks were still making loans to ethnic Japanese farmers; however, Minges did not think that that would last much longer.
2. Laborers such as Filipinos have quit on the Japanese, and finding labor is becoming difficult. Minges believes that more Japanese will be hired on as laborers due to their increased unemployment due to the war.
3. Legal teams may begin investigating ethnic Japanese families and their land ownership/leasing practices. It is suspected that the legal status of leases and deeds placed in the names of American-born Japanese will be challenged as a sign of fraud and dishonesty. This could be used as a way to remove Japanese farmers from their lands. There is currently nothing in place to encourage or require white landowners to continue to lease to Japanese families.
4. Overwhelming anti-Japanese sentiment dominates the overall issue facing ethnic Japanese farmers. Oddly, this sentiment was stronger in areas where ethnic Japanese farmers dominated the production and distribution of vegetables. Minges’s survey also noted some concern among locals that the Japanese may attempt to sabotage the crops; however, Minges did not put much faith in these worries, stating, “The Japanese are interested in self-preservation and money, and are not likely to jeopardize their well being or pocketbook.”[53]

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[52] Minges, *"Report on the Effects of the Japanese War on the Japanese Alien and Native-Born Vegetable Growers of California,"* np; Ivey and Kaatz *Documents of Japanese American Internment*, 6-7.

[53] Minges, *"Report on the Effects of the Japanese War on the Japanese Alien and Native-Born Vegetable Growers of California,"* np; Ivey and Kaatz *Documents of Japanese American Internment*, 6-7.

The survey showed the importance of Japanese agriculture in California and provided an understanding of ethnic Japanese farmers as people working hard to achieve the American dream. Minges's belief that sabotage was the last thing that ethnic Japanese wanted to be a part of was correct based on the Japanese community's understanding that one's actions would affect the group. For example, immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese newspaper *Rafu Shimpo* issued a front-page story titled "We Are 100 Percent for The United States." The story continued with a warning to ethnic Japanese, citing that they need to remember their status as "permanent residents" who lived under and benefited from the U.S. Constitution, which calls on them to demonstrate 100 percent cooperation with the United States government.[54] The *Shimpo* followed up this story with another, citing, "Even if only one individual makes a rash action, that will throw all Japanese residents in the United States into the jaws of death and bring indescribably serious trouble to the whole Japanese immigrant society."[55]

As political pressure mounted on the West Coast, one of Minges's predictions came true in January 1942 when the California Senate voted unanimously for a resolution to "investigate any possible evasions of the Alien Land Laws and to prosecute to the utmost, any violations."[56] This resolution targeted the ethnic Japanese farmers to remove them from agriculture-rich lands. As noted, it was then that Congressman Leland Ford issued his letter to the Secretary of War calling for full-scale removal to concentration camps. Congressman Ford was not aware, or he was not concerned with, the fact that such a mass removal of ethnic Japanese residents would include all of the Japanese farmers and would endanger wartime food security. Prominent leaders

[54] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 144.

[55] "We Are 100 Percent for the United States," Rafu Shimpo, December 11, 1941, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19411229-01.1.1.

[56] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles,* 145.

of the state and federal governments joined in on the debate between mass evacuation and food security.[57]

Anti-Japanese sentiment reached a fever pitch with comments made by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox indicating the presence of fifth-column involvement on the island of Hawaii immediately before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Secretary Knox traveled to Hawaii on December 9, 1941, to investigate the attack and identify how and why everything went wrong for the United States. After his investigation, Knox blamed the ethnic Japanese population rather than the lax security protocols, errors in judgment, and ignoring clear warning signs. Secretary Knox returned to California on December 15 and told reporters, "I think the most effective fifth column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway."[58] Knox blamed Pearl Harbor on all ethnic Japanese, not only those in Hawaii, and anti-Japanese groups took advantage of this and immediately demanded the complete removal of the ethnic Japanese population.

Early Calls for Evacuation

Calls for immediate evacuation came after the attack on Pearl Harbor, more than a month before Executive Order 9066 was signed. Numerous anti-Japanese pressure groups began to write letters to congressmen requesting the immediate removal of the Japanese population. One resident of Los Angeles wrote to Attorney General Francis Biddle on December 13, 1941, "No Jap should be permitted to remain in America. Whether born here or not, they are Japs at heart and always will be. Whole districts in Los Angeles, both residential and business, are 100% Jap,

[57] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles*, 145; Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice,* 89; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 187.

[58] *Personal Justice Denied,* 55.

and no such opportunity as now exists may ever again be present to us, in all our future history, to ship them back to Japan."[59]

The local groups in California did not stop their calls for the removal of ethnic Japanese civilians, even after the evacuation was complete. The resolutions of numerous civilian defense councils became organized and collectively called for removing ethnic Japanese, both native and foreign-born. Groups active in making these demands were the Palm Springs Committee of the People, Orosi Citizens Committee, Lindsay Woman's Club, American Legion, and Disabled American Veterans of the World War.[60] The most active supporters of mass removal were agricultural groups, the California Joint Immigration Committee, and the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West.

The Western Growers Association was a cooperative organization that controlled approximately 85 percent of the field crop vegetables shipped from California. The members of this cooperative were responsible for shipping their crops to canneries, the East Coast, and abroad. This commercial level was a sector in which the ethnic Japanese farmer had no influence, and vice versa, as the cooperative did not engage in truck crop production. Although the two did not participate in farming the other crops, the Japanese farmers competed directly with association members.[61] One of the earliest calls for evacuation and the inflated need of ethnic Japanese farmers came from F.W. McNabb, an association official. In response to a report that 1,200 ethnic Japanese farmers controlled 37,100 acres of vegetable land in California, he sent a letter to the Monterey County Defense Council on January 3, 1942, stating:

> I feel that the danger of possible food shortage (vegetables) by reasons of elimination of Japanese growers has been unduly magnified; although the total, as shown by these

[59] J.R. Carter to Biddle, December 13th, 1941, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. I: July, 1940 - December 31, 1941*, (New York: Garland, 1989), personal Files, pdf, 149.

[60] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 170.

[61] Girdner and Loftis. *The Great Betrayal,* 22.

> preliminary and possibly not entirely accurate figures, is staggering, yet, I do not believe that any serious dislocation will occur if these alien Japanese growers are properly eliminated.[62]

His letter explained the potential for a shortage of certain commodities such as romaine, radishes, parsley, and possibly tomatoes. McNabb did not believe that the shortages would last as white farmers who competed with Japanese farmers before the war would take over the farms the ethnic Japanese occupied.

The Western Growers Association continued to press their belief that Japanese farmers were unnecessary and that their removal would cause little disruption in California crop production. The group worked in January 1941 to quell the rumor that they sought Japanese removal for their commercial interests. F.W. McNabb sent a copy of his estimate of Japanese vegetable production to California Attorney General Earl Warren as early as January 3, citing, "We trust that your office will make a sincere effort to eliminate as many of these undesirable aliens from the land of California as is possible at this time. Let me assure you that our entire organization is behind you squarely in any action you see fit to take in this matter."[63]

William Cecil, the director of the Department of Agriculture, received a letter from F.W. McNabb on January 10 protesting the Director's radio comments stating that ethnic Japanese farmers were responsible for 40 percent of the vegetables grown in California.[64] In his letter, McNabb urged clarification and hoped that Cecil misread the quote as it cast doubts on the feasibility of an evacuation program. In his letter, he stated:

> I can only hope that the radio broadcaster misquoted you because a statement of that sort, coming from the State Department of Agriculture, would be rather unfortunate for

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[62] F.W. McNabb to L.W. Wing, January 3, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 308.

[63] F.W. McNabb to Earl Warren, January 3, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 23.

[64] F.W. McNabb to William Cecil, January 10, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 29-39.

> the vegetable industry of California, particularly as the vegetable industry ever since December 7 has joined in every movement to eliminate Japanese growers from the vegetable picture and to move them at least 300 miles East from the Pacific coastline or preferably, in my opinion, 300 miles due west.[65]

The Western Growers Protective Organization did not limit their pressure for an evacuation to state officials. On January 22, 1942, McNabb sent Congressman John Z. Anderson a letter urging a program that required all ethnic Japanese to register. McNab felt they should be in "concentration camps" 300 miles west of the coastline if they were not American-born. McNabb outlined a weekly check-in program with local police for all proven, registered American-born Japanese, the requirement to move inland 300 miles, and placement on a restriction program where they cannot leave their communities without a police permit.[66] Ironically, with minor variations, several of those provisions came to pass before the end of 1942.

By February 1942, McNabb and the Western Growers Protective Association became impatient and sent an additional letter to Congressman Anderson criticizing the lack of action against the ethnic Japanese and the slow response to their letters. The same month, McNabb sent additional letters to Congressman Leland Ford praising the Congressman for his support and demands for the immediate evacuation of the ethnic Japanese.[67] In his letter to Congressman Ford, McNabb commented, "We on the Pacific coast feel that time is the essence of this matter and the evacuation of all Japanese should be accomplished at the earliest possible moment."[68]

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[65] *F.W. McNabb* to William Cecil, January 10, 1942, Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 29-39.

[66] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 24.

[67] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 25.

[68] McNabb to Ford, February 17th, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 27.

The Grower Shipper Vegetable Association of California was a sister organization to the Western Growers Protective Association and simultaneously pressed the issue of evacuation. The Vegetable Association shared many of the same members as its counterpart, the Growers Protective Association, and therefore shared the same views. The same day that William Cecil received a letter from F.W. McNabb, he also received one from the Grower Shipper Vegetable Association that was more direct and belligerent than that of McNabb. An officer of the Shipper group, O.L. Scott, took direct issue with Cecil's comments regarding the Japanese farmers representing 40 percent of California vegetable production. In the letter, he stated:

> We are hereby very forcibly protesting against any such information being broadcasted by anybody from any source, even if it were true. We are in war, and we are not shooting marbles and to say the least, we are astounded that one in your position would release any such information and we are going to take the necessary steps to see that it does not reoccur.[69]

These examples are only two of many that solidify the belief among California farmers and growers that the contribution of ethnic Japanese farmers was wholly unimportant. In 1942 both associations circulated an informational pamphlet titled, *No Japs Needed,* which focused on minimizing the importance of Japanese agriculture in California.[70] The pamphlet claimed that agriculture statistics showed ethnic Japanese farming contributions to be less than one percent of all vegetables produced in the United States for processing. The pamphlet further claimed that the ethnic Japanese truck crop contribution was three and a half percent of all crops grown in the United States, followed by a report that only 25 percent of all market crops are grown by Japanese farmers.[71] The pamphlet did acknowledge that Japanese farmers grew 60 percent of the

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[69] Scott to Cecil, January 10, 1942, Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Authors Files, pdf, 179.

[70] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation,* 26.

[71] Tolan Committee, *Hearings,* Part 29, Pp. 11000-1 & Part 29, 11006-8.

tomatoes used in the canning process. The solution to losing this contribution was to ration the citizens purchase of canned tomatoes.[72]

The Secretary of the Growers Shippers Association, Austin Anson, was reportedly in Washington, D.C., immediately after Pearl Harbor, lobbying for a complete Japanese evacuation of the area surrounding the Salinas Valley.[73] According to the *Saturday Evening Post,* Anson stated:

> We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well be honest. We do. It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown man. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over. They undersell the white man in the markets. They can do this because they raise their own labor. They work their women and children while the white farmer has to pay wages for his help. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want them back when the war ends, either.[74]

Austin Anson was an early voice in Washington D.C.; however, O.L. Scott was the first to call out the desire of the agriculture sector to have all ethnic Japanese removed from the West Coast. Scott penned a letter to Congressmen Anderson on December 23, 1941, stating, "It is far better to make the mistake of putting all Japanese under strict and rigid government control and supervision than it would be to have made the mistake of not having done it and too late find it should have been done."[75] The position of the West Coast growers was strengthened on December 31, 1941, when S.P. Brown sent a letter to Congressman Anderson outlining a more defined organizational position. S.P. Brown explained that directors from the Vegetable Association, the Salinas Chamber of Commerce, and the Salinas Citizens' Association held a meeting, and the result was a resolution endorsing the full-scale removal of ethnic Japanese from

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[72] Tolan Committee, *Hearings,* Part 29, 11000-1; & Part 29, 11006-8.
[73] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 28.
[74] Frank J. Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants," *Saturday Evening Post,* May 9, 1942, 66.
[75] Scott to Anderson December 23rd, 1941, Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. I: July, 1940 - December 31, 1941*, (New York: Garland, 1989), np.

the West Coast.[76] The Salinas American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars also backed the endorsement, though they were not present at the meeting. S.P. Brown ended his correspondence with the phrase: "Go into action, Mr., because action is what is going to count."[77]

For many years, the California Joint Immigration Committee focused on a problem they called the "dual citizenship" problem. The "dual citizenship" problem was the focus of their first public announcement after the attack on Pearl Harbor. They issued a press release to various California newspapers. They noted that fifth-column activity by Japanese residents in the Philippines and Hawaii had "startled the nation and brought to the for California's efforts to find a solution to the Japanese immigration question."[78] This committee believed that they had been struggling for years in their attempts to educate the public about the dangers on the West Coast. They believed this threat was the presence of "an increasing number of an alien and unassimilable race."[79]

Their press release was thorough in describing their fear of fifth-column presence on the West Coast and described the ethnic Japanese as "thrifty, industrious, imitative, clever, hardy of stock, militant opponents of race suicide, able to labor and thrive under living conditions impossible to an American, their education based on the divinity of the Mikado and the superiority of their race, and completely unassimilable, Japanese are to themselves all-sufficient."[80] At the time of the release, less than 25 percent of the American-born Japanese had divested themselves of their Japanese citizenship.

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[76] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 28.
[77] S.P. Brown to Anderson, December 31, 1941.
[78] J.W. Fisk to H.J. McClatchy, January 27, 1942; Committee Progress Report, January 27, 1942; Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 44.
[79] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 44.
[80] California Joint Immigration Committee, "Press Release 544," January 2, 1942.

On February 7, 1942, the California Joint Immigration Committee held its first official meeting since the outbreak of the war. During the meeting, Secretary H.J. McClatchy (son of V.S. McClatchy) outlined that the Committee's support was at an all-time high and that anything the committee wanted, "We ought to get now." Committee member Charles M. Goethe emphatically added, "This is our time to get things done that we have been trying to get done for a quarter of a century."[81] Other notable and supporting attendees of this meeting were Former Attorney General Ulysses Webb and Native Sons of the Golden West members John T. Regan and Ed. T. Schnarr, and California Attorney General Earl Warren.[82] The meeting focused on developing a technique to make their exclusion goal a reality.

Former Attorney General Webb, the same Attorney General Webb who fought the Harada case and lost, took issue with the committee and their plan to try and divide the ethnic Japanese group into citizens and non-citizens. Webb thought this tactic to be a grave mistake, believing that the singular goal of the committee and its supporters should be to remove all ethnic Japanese from the West Coast regardless of their citizenship status. Webb told the Committee that the younger American-born Japanese were more dangerous as they were not limited in activities as the *Issei* were educated, active, young, and vigorous.[83] Webb opposed any action dividing the Japanese population into groups; he believed all Japanese had a propensity for evil. He stated, "It isn't a question of place of birth with the Japanese; it is a racial question, whether they are

[81] California Joint Immigration Committee, Meeting of February 7, 1942, "Minutes," Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 16 - 17.

[82] California Joint Immigration Committee, Meeting of February 7, 1942, "Minutes," Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1.

[83] California Joint Immigration Committee, Meeting of February 7, 1942, "Minutes," Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 25-27.

Japanese or not. And if Japanese, they are educated, whether born here or elsewhere, in the Japanese faith."[84]

Attorney General Earl Warren sided with Former Attorney General Webb and told the committee that he believed any political approach would be too cumbersome. Warren advised that the Army oversaw protecting the West Coast; therefore, the Army would need to act. Warren stated. "I think we ought to urge the military command in this area to do the things that are obviously essential to the security of this State."[85] Warren showed the committee that the situation was military, not civil, and they could only get the results they sought through military action. The committee agreed on the recommendations and would focus their calls for evacuation of the West Coast on all ethnic Japanese, and they would be demanding action from the military. H.J. McClatchy stated, "So far as the individual *Nisei* is concerned, he has been educated to be a Jap, and he is a Jap---or at least ninety percent of them are Japs."[86]

Upon conclusion of the meeting, the Joint Immigration Committee adopted a new focus that redirected its demands and pressure from political allies to the military. The committee released another statement on February 13 that expanded on its previous statement by including its belief of fifth-column involvement in the Pearl Harbor attack; they believed that a fifth column was already in operation on the West Coast and that it was impossible to distinguish loyal from disloyal.[87] The Joint Immigration Committee fully believed that the loyal might suffer

[84] California Joint Immigration Committee, Meeting of February 7, 1942, "Minutes," Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 18-19.

[85] Ibid, 36, 48-49.

[86] Ibid, 54-55.

[87] California Joint Immigration Committee, Press Release, unnumbered, February 13, 1942, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, 11068-87.

in mass treatment; this was preferable to endangering the welfare of the nation. The release read in part, "Japanese Should be Removed Now!"

> It is resolved that the entire Pacific Coast to such extent landward as may be required to insure safety should be declared a combat zone, and that the Japanese, including Japanese citizens of the United States, be removed as quickly as possible from said zone, and…that where like dangers exist in the interior, other combat zones be established and like removals made therein…[88]

These are a few examples of civilian groups demanding the evacuation of all ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. The demands came immediately after Pearl Harbor due to rumors of fifth-column involvement during the attack and the fear that a fifth column was in place on the West Coast. Additional groups such as the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, Elks and Lions Clubs, and every division of the Veterans of Foreign Wars were vocal in their desire to have all ethnic Japanese removed from the West Coast.[89] If the importance of wartime food security not been a central concern, the evacuation would have occurred immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Political Push

Before the first week of January, there was no request from any congressman or senator calling for the evacuation of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. While the civilian groups gained strength and increased their collective volume, Washington D.C. was content to express faith in the ethnic Japanese. The first comments on the West Coast Japanese situation came from Congressman Bertrand Gearhart and H. Jerry Voorhis of California and John Coffee of Washinton state.[90] On December 10, 1941, Congressman Gearhart read a telegram in the House

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[88] California Joint Immigration Committee, Press Release, unnumbered, February 13, 1942, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, 11068-87.

[89] Aliens Banned From Fresno Air Base Areas, *Fresno Bee*, March 17, 1942, https://www.newspapers.com/image/701600494/.

[90] *Congressional Record,* 77th Congress, December 10, 1941, 9630.

of Representatives from the president of the Japanese Association of Fresno, California, offering the association's services in defense of America and the defeat of the Japanese Empire. “No sacrifice will be too great. We hope that we will be called upon.” Congressman Gearhart commented, “It is my privilege to transmit to the President of the United States a copy of the telegram which I have just received from an American patriot of Japanese origin.”[91] Congressman Coffee joined in by stating,

> It is my fervent hope and prayer that residents of the United States of Japanese extraction will not be made the victim of programs directed by self-proclaimed patriots and by hysterical self-anointed heroes. As one who has lived as a neighbor to Japanese Americans, I have found these people, on the whole, to be law-abiding, industrious, and unobtrusive. Let us not make a mockery of our Bill of Rights by mistreating these folks. Let us rather regard them with understanding, remembering they are the victims of a Japanese war machine, with the making of the international policies of which they had nothing to do.[92]

Congressman Voorhis rounded out the three by stating his goodwill toward resident Japanese by citing a newspaper story referencing a twenty-one-year-old *Nisei* who enlisted in the United States Army. The story was titled, “He’s of Jap Descent, but a fightin’ American.”[93] These three elected officials represented the smallest of small minorities regarding the West Coast Japanese, and while their moderate voices did not cease throughout the war, their voices were drowned out by the thunderous demands in favor of removal. Several congressmen have claimed credit for starting the conversation favoring removal; Congressman Leland Ford of Los Angeles was the first to become active in the fight for removal.

Congressman Leland Ford publicly changed his opinion on the West Coast Japanese population from one of tolerance in December 1941 to one of removal by January 1942. In a letter dated January 6, Congressman Ford wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, presenting a

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[91] *Congressional Record,* 77th Congress, December 10, 1941, 9630.
[92] *Congressional Record,* 77th Congress, December 8, 1941, A5554.
[93] *Congressional Record,* 77th Congress, December 16, 1941, A5706.

telegram from California resident Leo Carillo requesting the removal of ethnic Japanese farmers from the West Coast.[94] Congressman Ford highlighted Mr. Carillo's concern and agreed that the Japanese farmers, who operated most of the truck farms in the Santa Monica region, should be moved to the interior. Mr. Carillo's telegram was included in the letter, which stated, "Why not use legislation to compel all Japanese truck farmers, who control nearly every vital foot of our California coastline with their vegetable acreage, to retire inland."[95]

Congressman Ford sent a follow-up letter to Secretary Hull again on January 16. This letter suggested the removal of ethnic Japanese to concentration camps, regardless of their citizenship. Ford advised that he had received multiple letters from California residents asking for the complete removal of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. Ford's letter, written on January 16, was forwarded to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who held the letter for ten days before responding, highlighting Ford's belief that "any native-born Japanese willing to go to a concentration camp was a patriot; unwillingness to go was proof of disloyalty to the United States."[96]

Secretary of War Stimson responded to Congressman Ford on January 26 and appeared to agree with the Congressman's ideas. The end of his letter suggests a plan was in motion to solve the West Coast problem, "The Army is submitting recommendations to the Attorney General for designation by him of restricted areas on the Pacific Coast. This response and the pending alien enemy registration directed by the president should formulate the basis for a definite program of

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[94] Ford to Hull, January 16, 1942, Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 43.

[95] Telegram from Leo Carrillo to Congressman Ford, January 16, 1942, Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 26-28.

[96] Ford to Stimson, January 16, 1942, Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 27.

security from fifth-column activity emanating from this source."[97] Although Secretary Stimson's letter does not outline an evacuation plan, it shows escalation from tolerance to registration and restricted movement of ethnic Japanese.

Congressman Ford sent identical letters to the Secretary of the Navy Knox and the director of the Farm Security Administration. By the end of January 1942, Congressman Ford sent seven letters to executive officials calling for evacuating the West Coast of all ethnic Japanese people. Parts of Ford's letter were used for justification for evacuation for the remainder of the war:

I know that there will be some complications in connection with a matter like this, particularly where there are native-born Japanese who are citizens. My suggestions in connection with this are as follows:

1. That these native-born Japanese either are or are not loyal to the United States.

2. That all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentration camps. As justification for this, I submit that if an American-born Japanese, who is a citizen, is really patriotic and wishes to make his contribution to the safety and welfare of this country, right here is his opportunity to do so, namely, that by permitting himself to be placed in a concentration camp, he would be making his sacrifice and he should be willing to do it if he is patriotic and is working for us. As against his sacrifice, millions of other native-born citizens are willing to lay down their lives, which is a far greater sacrifice, of course, than being placed in a concentration camp.[98]

Congressman Ford continued his letter writing by including Attorney-General Francis J. Biddle on January 23, 1942, and it was at this point that Congressman Ford believed that if someone was not "loyal enough" to accept internment, they should be forced. Ford's letters to Biddle included copies of the numerous letters from various California residents requesting the removal of the ethnic Japanese population, specifically farmers. Attorney-General Biddle firmly

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[97] Stimson to Ford, January 26, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 28.

[98] Ford to Hoover and Knox, January 16, 1942, in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, Personal Files, pdf, 43.

opposed evacuation as he could not see a legal way to achieve this end. He wrote to Congressman Ford on January 24, "Unless the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, I do not know of any way in which Japanese born in this country, and therefore American citizens, could be interned." He continued on January 27, "This department has not deemed it advisable at this time to attempt to remove all persons of the Japanese race into the interior of the country."[99]

Congressman Ford was the first to speak about his belief in the necessity of evacuation of the West Coast of ethnic Japanese. Ford claimed the Japanese were making and sending propaganda broadcasts from Japan and that it would be a small sacrifice for a loyal American citizen of Japanese descent to go into a concentration camp for the duration of the war if it meant ensuring the safety of the West Coast.[100] By the middle of January, Ford had gathered reinforcements, and Congressmn Alfred Elliott, John Anderson, and Clarence Lea had all joined to form an informal subcommittee to address the West Coast problem.

Following the reports that the Department of Justice was unwilling to proceed with a program of mass evacuation, Mr. Lea organized the first meeting of the Pacific Coast Congressional delegations.[101] This delegation was the primary driver for political pressure and setting policy that allowed for the mass removal of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast. During the Tolan committee hearings, all involved congressmen took credit for making the evacuation of the West Coast a reality.[102]

The Pacific Coast Congressional delegation's suggestions and most influential work did not come from congressmen but from Thomas B. Drake, a Washington D.C. representative of the

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[99] Biddle to Ford January 24 and January 27, 1942, in Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II*, Personal Files, pdf, 67.

[100] *Congressional Record,* 502.

[101] Grodzins, *American's Betrayed*, 67.

[102] Tolan Committee, 11691.

Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. Thomas Drake's desire to present the idea of mass removal coincided with the Pacific Coast group's independent movement to hold a meeting of the West Coast representatives. This meeting occurred when Wayne Allen, the chief administrative officer of Los Angeles County, was in Washington D.C. to discuss the need for federal assistance with feeding and housing ethnic Japanese displaced due to prohibited areas announced by the Justice Department.[103] Allen's goal was to secure funding and assistance from the government to feed and house enemy aliens displaced due to prohibited areas and provide welfare services for ethnic Japanese terminated from employment due to the war.[104]

Department of Agriculture Steps In

A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture Claude A. Wickard to Secretary of War Henry S. Stimson dated January 16, 1942, requested Stimson use caution when considering the demands for evacuation on the West Coast. Wickard's concern focused on the upcoming winter crop harvest and the impending spring planting. In his letter, he outlined the need for "immediate action by the appropriate agencies of the Federal Government so that the supply of vegetables for the military forces and the civilian population will not be needlessly curtailed."[105] Wickard advised that a survey had been completed earlier in the year and revealed multiple factors that could affect the 1942 crop.[106] Secretary Wickard requested a conference of all agencies' representatives to create an action plan to keep the "land which is suitable for farming to be operated by proper individuals before it is too late to bring in the 1942 crop."[107]

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[103] Grodzins, *American's Betrayed*, 68-70.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Wickard to Stimson, January 16, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 45.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.

The concern for retention of the 1942 crops was communicated a week before Secretary Wickard's letter to Secretary of War Stimson. An investigation involving Norman Towson of the Foreign Funds Control Division, Treasury Department, John Lawler of the Office of the General Counsel, Treasury Department, and Murray Thompson of the Department of Agriculture occurred shortly after that. The Department of Agriculture ordered this investigation due to the fear that the 1942 production of vegetables by ethnic Japanese farmers in California might be lost.[108] The investigation focused on the ethnic Japanese farmers and the unique problems raised by the amount of farmland they controled and the amount of food they produced.

The investigation revealed vital factors that would directly impact the timing of the evacuation in the spring of 1942. Immediately, the investigation revealed the desire of all ethnic Japanese farmers to continue their work and plant the needed crops for the war effort.[109] These farmers eagerly signed up as part of the agricultural Food for Freedom program and dedicated themselves to fulfilling the increased production requirement for the 1942 season. The survey found that any reduction in crop yield would not be the result of action initiated by the ethnic Japanese farmers.[110] The farmers admitted to the investigators that they were concerned for their safety due to the organized propaganda against them. They feared violent acts on the part of the Filipino community and were worried about the availability of labor come harvest season.[111]

Japanese landholders were particularly worried about their leases concerning renewing or granting new leases to ethnic Japanese farmers. The 1924 Alien Land laws prohibited the leasing

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[108] Department of Agriculture Memorandum to Secretary of War, January 13, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[109] Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10, 1942.) & Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid.

or owning of land by alien Japanese. The investigation found that families easily circumvented these laws by placing the land in the names of their American-born relatives, white trustees, or guardians.[112] Up until the start of the war, the 1924 land law was not enforced in California. The investigation discovered that the burden to prove alienage is on the state, and the state Attorney General Earl Warren is now instituting a program to void all land leases that violate the statute.[113] The group did, however, discover that the California State Senate is working to take action by launching an investigation into ethnic Japanese land holdings with two goals: 1) To wipe out all phony land leases, 2) to completely put an end to all Japanese competition in the food business in California.[114] The investigation cited that although there were no pending charges or convictions, the mere idea of a threat like this could scare ethnic Japanese farmers into not planting future crops.

The concerns of ethnic Japanese farmers were not limited to leases, physical violence, and selling their crops; it was also financial. As previously stated, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Alien Property Custodian immediately closed and took over all Japanese-owned banks. The Department of Agriculture survey confirmed this to be the case and advised that the ethnic Japanese, though not exclusively, principally worked with American banks and institutions.[115] Famers need the support of financial institutions to obtain lines of credit to fund farming operations during various times of the season. Ethnic Japanese farmers commonly sought credit lines from $250,000 to $500,000, sometimes higher, during planting seasons. The survey spoke with Los Angeles bankers, the principal center of this financial enterprise, and

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[112] Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10, 1942. Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid,

[115] Ibid.

confirmed that Japanese middlemen could still secure lines of credit for ethnic Japanese farmers for the upcoming 1942 spring planting.[116]

The consulted bankers expressed concern regarding the rumors of potential state action against the leases held by ethnic Japanese farmers. Bankers stated that the credit lines available to American competitors of the ethnic Japanese farmers would not be adequate to enable them to take over the task of providing credit to the farmers.[117] The consulted bankers were concerned by the State Department of Agriculture's threats of 1) Refusing to issue any licenses to Japanese nationals, 2) Refusing to renew licenses already held by Japanese nationals, 3) Investigating requests for new licenses by citizens connected with Japanese nationals, and refusing to issue such licenses on any finding of a connection between the citizen and a Japanese national.[118] Any such action by the state government would immediately have a severe impact on the activities of the ethnic Japanese farmers as they would not be able to obtain essential lines of credit needed to continue farming operations.

The Department of Agriculture survey team attended a California USDA War Board meeting on January 6, 1942. The purpose of the meeting was to evaluate the status of ethnic Japanese farmers and present recommendations that the visiting inspectors would then present to the Army, Navy, and FBI as best handling practices of the ethnic Japanese situation in California.[119] The USDA War Board indicated that reports showed that all ethnic Japanese farmers engaged in truck crops will be moving forward with the planting of spring crops.[120] The

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[116] Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid.

[119] USDA War Board Meeting Minutes, *Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records*, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, BANC MSS 67/14c, folder A9.04, 1.

[120] USDA War Board Meeting Minutes, *Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records*, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, BANC MSS 67/14c, folder A9.04, 2.

reports, submitted by Professor Minges, a specialist in the truck crop industry, advised that there is strong anti-Japanese sentiment in the southern and southwestern areas of the state. Professor Minges's report cited concern that this sentiment could be used to encourage the boycott of Japanese-grown produce.[121] The public opinion wanted federal supervision of the ethnic Japanese to provide hope to the ethnic Japanese of profit from their crops or put the ethnic Japanese in concentration camps and force them to work where needed.[122]

The USDA War Board made a unanimous motion that the Army and Navy be requested to make decisions immediately regarding the areas in which enemy nationals will not be permitted.[123] The USDA War Board voiced its concern with the spring crop production and called for ideas to maintain crop production as requested by the Department of Agriculture Food for Freedom program. The War Board recommended, to obtain as much production as possible, that landlords of leased property be requested to continue to lease land to good Japanese farming tenants and operate the farms without interruption.[124] The motion was unanimous. The War Board advised the representatives that they felt the Japanese would be more willing to continue their food production under federal supervision, crop financing would be more accessible, and public sentiment would be more favorable and supportive.[125]

Labor shortages were of particular concern to the survey team as they continued their West Coast investigation. Due to the outbreak of war, labor shortages are inevitable as the draft is activated, and others move from farms into lucrative war production factories. The survey

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[121] USDA War Board Meeting Minutes, *Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records*, UC Berkeley, Bancroft Library, BANC MSS 67/14c, folder A9.04, 2.

[122] Ibid.

[123] USDA War Board Meeting & Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10th, 1942 & Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II,* Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[124] USDA War Board Meeting, 3; Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10th, 1942; Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II,* Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[125] USDA War Board Meeting, 4.

identified the shortage of labor that would be available to California farmers throughout the war, though the level of labor shortage was unknown. The ethnic Japanese faced a labor problem that was considerably worse due to the deteriorating relationship with the Filipino labor force. During a regular farming season, ethnic Japanese families can plant and care for their crops during the growing season; however, it is necessary to employ large amounts of labor during the harvest season. This job, up until the outbreak of the war, was predominantly filled by Filipino labor.[126]

There was substantial agreement throughout California that Filipino labor would not work for Japanese farmers, with Japanese workers, or under a Japanese foreman.[127] The alternative workforce would typically fall to Mexican labor via the Bracero program, but the relationship between Japanese and Mexicans is just as tense as that of their relationship with Filipinos.[128] There was also a strong sentiment among the ethnic Japanese of fear of violence by Filipinos, which led to the refusal to hire Filipino laborers despite their lack of willingness to engage with ethnic Japanese farmers.

The Department of Agriculture settled their survey with the following recommendations sent to the head of the Army, Navy, and the Secretary of War:

1. It is our belief that no further action by the Treasury Department under Executive Order 8389 is necessary or desirable.
2. We believe that prompt steps should be taken to meet the all-over labor shortage, possibly in the form of temporary importation of from 10,000 to 15,000 Mexican laborers.
3. Cognizance should be taken of the explosive nature of the political situation in California, and every effort should be made to counteract the campaign of the special interests against the Japanese to the end that the disturbance may be allayed as much as possible.
4. The problem being essentially one of public psychology, consideration may be given by several government Departments to the proposal that a Federal

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[126] Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10th, 1942. & Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II*, Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[127] Ibid, Personal Files, pdf, 29-37; *Poli*, and Engstrand. "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast."

[128] Tokunaga, *Transborder Los Angeles*, 165*;* Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10th, 1942, Personal Files, pdf, 29-37; Poli, and Engstrand. "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coast."

> conservator, custodian, or coordinator be appointed to supervise the situation with respect to the Japanese farm activities, not because of the direct necessity for any such action but solely in order that the Federal Government may occupy the field and thus prevent highly disturbing action being taken by individual communities. The function of this officer would be primarily one of convincing the general public that the Army and Navy and Federal Bureau of Investigation and all the other people charged with responsibility in the situation are doing their jobs and that there is no necessity for local vigilantes to take upon themselves the functioning of these agencies of government.[129]

The survey concluded that there was cause for concern that the 1942 crop would be lost if a plan for its preservation was not implemented. The survey stated in part;

> Recommendations of the California USA Defense Board Regarding the Status of enemy Nationals in California.
>
> 1. In order that no production of food will be lost, the board requests that the Army or Navy immediately make decisions as to the areas in which enemy national and/or Japanese will not be permitted to operate.
> 2. In order to obtain as much production as possible, the board recommends that landlords continue to lease land to Americans of Japanese ancestry who are good farmers and who will actually operate the land themselves and who upon investigation have been found to be patriotic American citizens.
> 3. The Board recommends that Filipino leaders be urged to consider the production of food as a national duty and that they should continue to work for those who upon investigation are found to be patriotic American citizens.
> 4. The Board recommends some sort of Federal protective supervision of Japanese for two reasons.
>   a. As a protective measure for the Japanese so they will not fear abuse from the public and, therefore, will continue their farming operations.
>   b. As a protective measure for the Government so they can watch the operations of the Japanese. The Board suggests that a federal custodian, wo knows all the legal aspects might be appointed on a county or smaller area basis and located at the headquarters of the County Defense Board or other appropriate place. This Board could advise him on all agricultural aspects.[130]

[129] Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10th, 1942 & Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II*, Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[130] Department of Agriculture Survey on West Coast situation, January 10th, 1942 & Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II*, Personal Files, pdf, 34-35.

As the West Coast was under the command of General John DeWitt, it would ultimately be up to the military and the Department of War to handle the issue of successful crop production and preservation. The Department of Agriculture sent Secretary of War Stimson an official letter with the survey team report and recommendations for the West Coast. Their letter cited the public's uneasiness due to "The reports of fifth-column activity on the part of previously trusted Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands."[131] The Department of Agriculture requested approval for the increased supervision of all ethnic Japanese farmers and requested a conference to consider appropriate action for avoiding a decrease in the 1942 crop production.

Armed with the powers granted by Executive Order 9066, General DeWitt began formally organizing the agencies that would execute the evacuation. The Army would carry out the formal organization and supervision of the program, but several civilian agencies would be formed and assigned tasks as well. These organizations include the Farm Security Administration, War Relocation Authority, and Wartime Civil Control Administration. The Department of Agriculture designated the Farm Security Administration (FSA) as its representative to handle the transfer of farmland and the protection of spring crops.[132]

General DeWitt created the Wartime Civil Control Administration on March 11 and assigned Colonel Bendetsen to run the program. The goal of the WCCA was to facilitate the removal, processing, and placement of all ethnic Japanese forced to evacuate. The Farm Security Administration operated under the WCCA umbrella, reassigned farmland, issued farm loans to incoming custodians, and ensured the evacuation did not affect the 1942 spring crop. The two

[131] Department of Agriculture Memorandum to Secretary of War, January 13th, 1942. Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II: January 1, 1942 - February 19th, 1942*, (New York: Garland, 1989), Personal Files, pdf, 29-37.

[132] DeWitt, Final Report, 53; Roger Daniels, *Politics of Prejudice,* 136.

agencies met several times to discuss an effective program of removal. On March 11, 1942, the evacuation plan was finalized.

The Regional Director of the FSA, Laurence I. Hewes, received a letter from General DeWitt authorizing the plan that the FSA developed with the WCCA. The March 15, 1942, letter outlined several orders; however, only one directly impacted crops.

1. To institute and administer a program which will insure continuation of the proper use of agricultural lands voluntarily vacated by enemy aliens and other persons designated by me and which will insure fair and equitable arrangements between the evacuees and the operators of their property.[133]

The FSA acknowledged the importance of crop protection and continuation in the opening paragraph of their final report, "The responsibilities of the Farm Security Administration were clearly set forth in this letter, namely (a) to insure continuation of the proper use of agricultural lands evacuated by enemy aliens and other persons designated by Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt."[134] They further clarified their program by stating, "The time of the evacuation came during the period of growth rather than planting."[135] This shows that the FSA and the military executed the evacuation during a time when minimal, if any, labor was needed, spring planting was complete, and they had time to replace the ethnic Japanese before harvest.

In order to facilitate the property transfer and allow new farmers to take over existing lands, farm loans were granted assisting replacement farmers. The War Department initially provided $1,000,000 to the FSA to make loans against evacuee crops and farm implements.[136] The loan program was thanks to Dewitt's telegram on March 14, 1942, sent to the War

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[133] DeWitt, Final Report, 56; Laurence I. Hewes. "*Final Report of the Participation of the Farm Security Administration in the Evacuation Program of the Wartime Civil Control Administration*." (San Francisco, California, June 5, 1942), Exhibit 1.

[134] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 2.

[135] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 31.

[136] Ibid, 54.

Department stating that his mission, "Renders imperative the availability of funds for the making of crop loans in order to avoid the loss of growing crops planted by Japanese farms who will be excluded from the Pacific coastal frontier."[137] These loans resulted in the procurement of substitute farm operators who would take over evacuated farms and other agricultural property.

General DeWitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 on March 24, 1942. This order triggered the evacuation of Bainbridge Island in Washington and established a civil control station in Winslow, Washington. On March 25, all ethnic Japanese families registered at a civil control station established in Winslow, WA. The Farm Security Administration and the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) used the evacuation of Bainbridge as a "soft launch" of their overall evacuation plan.[138] After this removal, a debrief was held at the Whitcomb Hotel in San Francisco. After this meeting, a refined plan for the complete evacuation of the West Coast was finalized and put into action. The West Coast was divided into areas covering approximately 1,500 ethnic Japanese residents each. A civil control station would be placed in each area to process the residents and direct them to their assigned Assembly Center.[139]

The Farm Security Administration Director Hewes received a memorandum from Colonel Bendetsen, Director of the WCCA, on March 27, 1942, outlining the authorization for freezing power over agricultural property and reiterating the importance of the FSA orders. Bendetsen reminded the FSA director that his mission is to evacuate the farms with "a minimum loss in agricultural production consistent with prompt execution and with a maximum of fair dealing to all concerned."[140] The memorandum also listed additional orders:

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[137] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 58; Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. III: February 20th, 1942 – March 31st, 1942*, Personal Files, pdf, 163.

[138] Hewes. *"Final Report of the Participation of the Farm Security Administration,"* 19.

[139] Hewes, *"Final Report of the Participation of the Farm Security Administration,"* 20.

[140] DeWitt, *Final Report*, 57.

> In responding to the request of the Commanding General to the Secretary of War, the Agricultural Department has therefore accepted the mission of performing the following:
>
> 1. To do everything reasonably necessary to prevent any crop loss subsequent upon evacuation and to reduce to a minimum the spoilage or loss of growing crops.
> 2. To assist the evacuee in providing a substitute tenant or operator and at the same time to preserve the evacuee's equity to the fullest practicable extent consistent with the circumstances in each case.
> 3. If necessary, take over and operate the property where, in the absence of such action, growing crops would be neglected or abandoned or where the evacuee's equity, though of reasonable substance, would otherwise deteriorate.[141]

On March 29 the Farm Security Administration (FSA) established an Evacuation Control Unit. The Evacuation Control Unit's job was to handle the functions of the civil control stations. The unit recognized that the total ethnic Japanese population embraced by the evacuation orders did not accurately indicate the number of farms the FSA would be responsible for handling. The FSA's primary responsibility was to facilitate the transfer of farm ownership from one operator to another without interruption to the crops currently on the farms.[142] The FSA thoroughly studied the areas, located the ethnic Japanese-owned farms, and mapped out the evacuation zones by county. This action allowed the FSA to adequately plan their involvement and handling of farm ownership and crop security during the evacuation.[143]

The Evacuation Control Unit assigned at least one FSA representative to each civil control station. If, during the processing of evacuees, it was discovered that they could not successfully transfer their property, the FSA would aggressively assist them in completing this with a deadline not to exceed 72 hours before an area of evacuation was completed.[144] This process also identified areas where the FSA would need to send representatives to inspect

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[141] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 57.
[142] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 20.
[143] Ibid, 21.
[144] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 23.

properties to ensure completed transactions and verify that all precautions were taken to avoid abandonment of land, crops, and machinery.[145]

The Farm Security Administration Finance Division authorized loans for the continuation of farming by the "custodians" or corporations that took over ethnic Japanese farms. The initial amounts authorized by Washington, D.C., and the Western Defense Command was $1,000,000 and were quickly exhausted. On April 4, 1942, Colonel Bendetsen sent a letter to the Farm Security Administration Regional Director Laurence Hewes advising him on the authorization to use funds for farm loans. This letter was in response to Hewe's request to use funds for corporations taking over the farming of ethnic Japanese land. Bendetsen advised that the loaning of funds is authorized so long as the reasoning behind the loan was for the preservation of crops. Bendetsen's response stated:

> So long as no loan is made out of the emergency funds in cases not falling within the specific purpose previously communicated, no objection is seen to a bonafide loan for the purpose of preserving and protecting growing crops, made to a corporation even if that corporation may have been organized at your direction for the purpose of providing a temporary farm management entity.[146]

The authority to use funds for corporations allowed the FSA to request an additional $5,000,000 on April 9, 1942. The President's Emergency Fund authorized the amount on April 24, 1942, and sent it to the FSA.[147] By the end of May, the FSA had used $3,584,025.42 for loans to new "custodians" of ethnic Japanese farms. A further $150,017.34 of funds was used for administrative costs.[148]

The FSA accomplished the evacuation and transfer of farmland so that the need to change land use, i.e., crop selection, has been checked or eliminated. Under normal circumstances, a

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[145] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 22.
[146] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 46.
[147] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 39.
[148] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 39.

farmer exercises free choice when planting crops during any given season. The impact of the war and the Food for Freedom program has changed that dynamic for the choice of crop and how farmers bring their crops to market. The removal of the ethnic Japanese farmers effectively destabilized the truck crop market and marketing facilities. A new system to bring crops to market was needed once the removal of ethnic Japanese farmers was complete.[149] The FSA facilitated the creation of farming groups and agreements were established with local processors, marketing agencies, and similar larger-scale enterprises to effectively replace the pre-existing truck crop markets.[150]

> Traditionally, an American farmer may exercise free choice in determining what crops he will plant and harvest. The skill and experience of the farm operator are important determinants of the types of crops which are produced, as well as the success which can be achieved under any crop planting program. The Japanese farmers possessed certain peculiar skills and experiences with reference both to farm practices and marketing of products which would be practically impossible to duplicate among any other group of farm operators. In certain instances, the retail as well as the wholesale markets for products from Japanese-operated farms were controlled exclusively by Japanese. The evacuation program thus effectively eliminated not only the farmer but also the marketing facilities for products from the farm. New arrangements and new marketing channels will have to be established. While such a situation existed only in certain particular localities and not generally it will undoubtedly influence the production of certain crops in such localities.[151]

The FSA faced a labor shortage created by removing ethnic Japanese farmers from evacuation zone No. 1. The Western farmers were aware of this pending shortage due to the war attracting farm labor to cities and war production. In response, they planted crops that required less seasonal labor to bring the crop to harvest. The FSA discovered that the ethnic Japanese farmers did not change to a less labor-intensive crop and could achieve most of their farm labor

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[149] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 30.
[150] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 30.
[151] Ibid.

by utilizing Japanese labor and relying on their family units for help.[152] Ethnic Japanese farmers did, at times, employ Filipinos, Mexicans, and American Indians for help during harvest season, but the bulk of their labor remained within the Japanese community.[153]

The evacuation of ethnic Japanese farmers created a massive labor shortage within the Western farming communities. This labor shortage was unique in that the skills that ethnic Japanese farmers possessed concerning their farming abilities were difficult to replace. Skills such as a high degree of accuracy regarding orchard pruning and a perfectly distributed irrigation system requiring only one farmer to implement and operate were common among ethnic Japanese farmers. The FSA received numerous messages from landowners and farmers interested in taking over Japanese farms once the ethnic Japanese evacuation was complete, but due to the lack of specialized skills of these replacement farmers, the FSA determined that the crop would have to be changed after the spring harvest in order to accommodate the skills of the new farmers.[154]

The FSA worked to ensure that needed crops were planted and would continue to be produced based on the needs outlined by the Department of Agriculture Food for Freedom program. The FSA identified primary crops that included tomatoes, beans, peas, spinach, lettuce, asparagus, and sugar beets and focused efforts on maintaining average production or achieving increased production due to the shift of ownership of producing farms. By the time the evacuation of Military Area No. 1 started, spring crops had been successfully planted, and the FSA identified lesser crops that were not a priority to protect and maintain. Of these crops, Strawberries stand out as an outlier.

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[152] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 30-31.
[153] Ibid, 19, 30.
[154] Hewes, "Final Report," 30-31.

Ethnic Japanese farmers were responsible for almost all of the strawberry production in California.[155] The strawberry harvest season is in April and July, respectively; thus, harvest occurred in the middle of the evacuation. While many strawberries did make it to harvest, the FSA identified that this fruit was also the most demanding in terms of labor and technical requirements and, thus, was not a priority to preserve.[156] The FSA noted some loss of the strawberry crop; however, as it is not a priority crop based on wartime needs, the FSA continued its operations during the strawberry harvest season. Farms focused primarily on strawberry production would have the crop immediately changed once new farmers took over the land and obtained farm loans to continue farming operations and change over the land.

Many farms in the evacuation area had planted the wartime-required crop before the evacuation orders in March 1942. The military targeted the evacuation for the spring growing season, and while strawberries would be a likely casualty, the timing of the evacuation was crucial for crop continuation. The FSA identified farms that grew perennial crops and were well established and recommended that the farmers taking over the land should continue with that crop but make more extensive use of the available land, i.e., plant crops on every available inch of soil.[157] The FSA concluded in their report: "It may be safely said that continuity of production for the present year has been fairly well insured, but no guarantees have yet been established which will permit a prediction that future shifts are not in prospect or if they occur, the extent and character thereof."[158]

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[155] Poli and Engstrand, "Japanese Agriculture on the Pacific Coas,"357; WRA Evacuee Property Records; Tolan Committee, *Hearings,* Part 31, 11683.

[156] Hewes, "*Final Report*," 31.

[157] Hewes, "*Final Report*," 31.

[158] Hewes, "*Final Report*," 32.

The Farm Security Administration claimed that they achieved the goal of crop preservation and continuance with a 99 percent success rate. The FSA worked under harsh conditions and a strict timeline but achieved this success with minimal crop loss, limited to only strawberries.[159] Their final summary concluded they achieved "the program's major objective, namely, without serious interruption of agriculture production."[160] The entire Military Area No. 1, approximately 90,000 ethnic Japanese, was cleared by June 5, 1942.

> It is the opinion of the Farm Security Administration therefore that the first objective, namely, to insure the continuity of agricultural production, has been accomplished beyond original expectations. To the limits of practicability, Japanese-operated farms are in the hands of competent management and the transition has been made without any serious interruption of farming operations. This, however, is a short-run accomplishment and there is no assurance that some future shifts in land use and types of crops planted will not occur.[161]

General DeWitt submitted his final report to the United States Army Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C., on June 5, 1943, and his statements corroborate those made by the FSA. DeWitt states that farming employed 45.3 percent of the total ethnic Japanese population and that approximately 6,000 farms existed; this included California, Arizona, Washington, and Oregon.[162] The farms comprised 260,000 acres, valued at $73,000,000, and per DeWitt's report, were a top priority of the WCCA.[163] DeWitt identified that ethnic Japanese farming interests were studied, and a plan was created based on that study. The plan provided the maximum speed and the minimum crop loss due to the removal of ethnic Japanese farmers.[164]

The WCCA focused heavily on the protection of the crops and triggered the evacuation to coincide with the spring growing season. This focus was deemed necessary due to the

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[159] Hewes, "*Final Report*," 42.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Hewes, "*Final Report,*" 32
[162] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 136.
[163] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 137.
[164] Ibid; Hewes, "*Final Report,*" 2.

Department of Agriculture production goals for 1942, outlined in 1941.[165] The ethnic Japanese farmers were expected to contribute to this effort and committed to doing so in various letters received by the War Department throughout the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942.[166] DeWitt cited that one of the most challenging tasks for preserving crops was the complicated and specific system of farming used by the ethnic Japanese farmers. DeWitt identified that finding replacement tenants capable of maintaining and increasing the production of the existing crops was challenging.[167] DeWitt stated:

> Japanese production was predicated upon the intensification of farming methods, frugality and economy of operation, minimization of water consumption, family labor, and special and peculiar skill; substituted operation on a practical basis at first seemed difficult if not an insurmountable obstacle from a production preservation standpoint.[168]

The previous section noted that the FSA solved this problem by allowing new tenants to change the crop for the summer season. This change allowed new tenant farmers to acquire the land, obtain loans from the FSA to continue production, harvest the spring crop, and then change it for the summer and all following seasons.

The fear of sabotage was ever present in the food industry and civilians and military alike were concerned that ethnic Japanese farmers would destroy crops. DeWitt warned farmers on March 7, 1942, simply stating, “Foodstuffs are vital in prosecution of the war, and for Japanese ranchers professing loyalty to the United States, there is no better way of showing sincerity than by continuing to raise crops. On the other hand, willful destruction of crops demonstrates disloyalty and unwillingness to cooperate.”[169] Public announcements were issued, ensuring that all citizens knew that any act to hinder the war effort would be considered treason. This threat

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[165] DeWitt, *Final Report*, 137.
[166] Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. II,* Personal Files, pdf, 284.
[167] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 137.
[168] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 137.
[169] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 138.

was aimed at the ethnic Japanese as they questioned whether they would see the profits from their spring crop if and when they were removed.

On March 9, an additional notice announcing that any ethnic Japanese farmer who plowed under their growing crops for fear of evacuation would be arrested and prosecuted as saboteurs.[170] According to DeWitt's final report, the first Civil Control station opened in Winslow, Washington, on March 24, 1942, and between this date and June 6, 1942, over 100,000 people were processed through 112 Civil Control Stations and evacuated. The evacuation was accomplished while maintaining the spring crop across 99 percent of all ethnic Japanese-owned farms. Perfectly executed, the timing of this removal occurred during the growing season of spring 1942, allowing for minimal crop impact while the land in which they grew changed ownership. The success of this program can be seen in the Department of Agriculture harvest report of 1942 compared to previous years.[171] This report shows a marked increase in production over 1941 numbers, a win for the Food for Freedom program.

The West Coast pressure groups won in the end, and their prejudice-based ideals pushed the government and military to act; however, the military did so with wartime food security in mind. In order to save food and ensure continued production, the military had to wait for three things: the resupply of Hawaii, the harvest of winter crops, and the planting of spring crops. As argued, Hawaii was sufficiently resupplied by January 1942, winter harvest was underway in February, and ethnic-Japanese farmers confirmed their willingness and commitment to continue spring planting, showing their support for the war effort. This was confirmed by many telegrams received by Secretary of War Stimson and Assistant McCloy and referenced in this chapter. The military was faced with one problem: the legality of forced evacuation of enemy aliens and

[170] Ibid; Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. III,* Authors Files, pdf, 198.
[171] Department of Agriculture California Harvest Report, 1942.

American citizens. The West Coast politicians and citizens provided the urgency as their entrenched mindset of racism and hatred played their part in pressuring Washington, D.C., to issue Executive Order 9066. The timing of this order was perfect as it came at the end of the winter harvest and spring planting. By the time the military was ready to remove the ethnic Japanese forcibly, wartime food security was assured as all spring crops were in the ground.

The Farm Security Administration took over the transfer of all the land with a strict schedule in mind. The need for rapid removal necessitated the use of assembly centers as the relocation camps were still under construction. The evacuation was universally presented to protect the West Coast from sabotage, espionage, and fifth-column activities. Racial, economic, and political drives were the foundation for disregarding civil liberties, culminating in mass evacuation and incarceration. The war provided a unique situation whereby a desire to protect the West Coast from the enemy intertwined with economic, racial, and political implications.

Conclusion

The ethnic Japanese were deliberately evacuated during the spring growing season so their absence would not hinder the crop production of their farms and allow enough time for the Farm Security Administration, Wartime Civilian Control Administration, and the Department of Agriculture to find replacement farmers before the spring harvest. Their goal was to ensure wartime food security. Evidence shows that farm planting schedules directly influenced the decision to evacuate, with the goal of the military and government to find a solution that would allow for complete evacuation but keep Japanese farms actively producing. Farming schedules are a factor in the forced removal of Japanese and Japanese Americans.

Although the farming schedules and crops are a significant factor in the overall scope, it culminated after decades of growing racism stemming from world events and anti-Asian sentiment. There are many ways in which the calls for the removal of ethnic Japanese hinged on falsehoods. One of the most powerful was the belief in Japanese involvement in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The report issued by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox only fed the fire of fear of fifth-column activity behind the surprise attack. Other falsehoods included accusations that the ethnic Japanese intentionally took up residence near military establishments, that attending Japanese language schools was a sign of loyalty to Japan over the United States, and that Japanese Americans were more dangerous because they adhered to Old World customs. As the weeks passed after Pearl Harbor, the arguments became more focused on justifications. People began stating that the evacuations could be done “kindly” or that the Japanese were not essential and unneeded in the farming community.

California’s anti-Asian prejudice began in the Gold Rush era of the 1850’s. The first experience of the *Issei* in the United States was the experience of the anti-Asian prejudice

generated by the influx of Chinese laborers in the late 1800s. Prejudice was a lesson that residents in California learned and were proficient in during the late 1800s and first half of the twentieth century. While racial prejudice was present throughout the United States, no single ethnic group experienced the level of assault as did the ethnic Japanese in the early 1900s. As shown in previous chapters, there seem to be four main reasons that lead to this conclusion: the Japanese were distinct in their appearance, and no amount of assimilation could change the appearance of their 'foreignness," and unlike the Chinese immigrants who were content to live in exclusive communities, the ethnic Japanese readily challenged the existing business structure and professions.

Additionally, the unpopularity of their native country fed the fear of suspicion solely focused on the ethnic Japanese population. Finally, concentrated in California, a state with a long history of anti-Chinese sentiment, this sentiment readily transferred to the Japanese population as anti-Asian prejudice remained strong. In the prewar years, the power of organized labor fed the anti-Japanese movement base quicker than it would have elsewhere in the country at the time. The opposition to the Japanese in California stemmed from nonrational fears.

The first signs of anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast appeared at the start of the 20th century due to the agitation of the California labor unions fueled by the 1900 meeting protesting Japanese immigration. The working class drove early anti-Japanese opinion with an emphasis on economic competition, making the laborer both the target of the agitation and the source of the support. This agitation was followed by a strengthening of the anti-Japanese movement, coinciding with the end of the Russo-Japanese War. The strengthening gained broader public support and reached all classes of the community. Public opinion gradually turned against Japan due to the growing pro-Russia propaganda the news media and government outlets

provided and their unexpected victory over Russia.[1] Already in the grip of the "yellow peril" fear, the West Coast developed a mindset of suspicion and apprehension.

Anti-Japanese groups began to call the immigration of ethnic Japanese a "peaceful invasion," and competition for labor remained a triggering source of agitation. The growth of public prejudice was evident during the segregation of schools in 1906, caused by the belief that "coolie labor was thwarting the work of the unions and lowering the American standard of living."[2] The prejudiced mindset was openly and proudly displayed during the school segregation incident by the San Francisco *Chronicle,* proclaiming that "our race feeling has shown itself*,"* and the *Call* stated, "we are unwilling that our children should meet Asiatics in intimate association. That is race prejudice, and we stand by it."[3]

During the first few years of the century, the rest of California held a less uniform opinion of the ethnic Japanese. In both Los Angeles and Fresno, articles in the *Times* and the Fresno *Republican* claimed that the majority of Californians are not in line with the thinking of the agitation of the larger cities of California against the Japanese. The *Times* openly defied the anti-Japanese groups by inviting ethnic Japanese to their county to engage in farm labor. Los Angeles County would become the highest populated county of ethnic Japanese farmers in California. Besides the large-scale businessmen and agriculturists who were pro-Japanese, religious and educational leaders deplored the agitation. Except for the South, pro-Japanese sentiment reigned throughout the country as the majority. The East Coast expressed bitterness towards the West Coast and their poor treatment of the ethnic Japanese population.

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[1] Chapter One, 64.
[2] Goldstone, *Not White Enough*, 78.
[3] Ibid.

Anti-Japanese agitation continued on the West Coast, reinforced after President Roosevelt issued statements denouncing the 1906 segregation acts and called out the West Coast anti-Japanese groups. Roosevelt claimed their "unworthy feeling" directed toward the ethnic Japanese was deplorable, and the School Board's action was one of wicked absurdity.[4] His comments, intended to quell the agitation and subdue the feeling of anti-Japanese sentiment, instead sparked a firestorm of protest in California and fueled the feelings of anti-Japanese groups. This reaction, in turn, pushed for additional legislation against the ethnic Japanese population. In January 1907, *Literary Digest* surveyed fifty of the leading newspapers on the West Coast and found only three containing pro-Japanese language. Although the validity of this survey was challenged, it is easy to see how the media partially fueled the rise in anti-Japanese sentiment. The *Digest* stated, "Most of the coast papers display an uncompromising antipathy against Japanese aggression and competition, against the President, and Secretary of Labor and Commerce Metcalf. [5]

Anti-Japanese groups were not limited to California. Washington State experienced anti-Japanese sentiments as well. In Seattle in early 1907, an anti-Japanese petition gathered 10,000 signatures and acts against ethnic Japanese residents, such as spitting or vulgar comments directed to them on the streets. Feeding off of the powerful anti-Japanese feeling in California, both Washington and Oregon joined the ranks of anti-Japanese, and the West Coast became an area with "a strong movement for exclusion, to which Roosevelt's indictment had contributed powerfully, was now underway on the Pacific Coast. Whatever views the region had been before,

[4] tenBroek et al. *Prejudice War and the Constitution*, 62.
[5] tenBroek et al. *Prejudice War and the Constitution*, 63; Johnson, *Discrimination Against the Japanese in California,*18.

there is no mistaking the fact that opinion, so far as it was expressed publicly, was now predominantly anti-Japanese."[6]

The difficulty in verifying and measuring public opinion and expression is that these feelings and indifferences rarely make themselves known in the media of the time. Groups and people most excited and drivien about Japanese exclusion were also the ones protesting and fighting for exclusion. Although those groups were a minority, their voices and actions should be weighed heavily on the record. Despite their efforts and the Seattle petition, the sentiment in Washington and Oregon remained predominately friendly towards the Japanese throughout the next twenty years. In 1939, a study conducted by Marjorie E. Stearns concluded that "relations between Japanese and white residents in Oregon and Washington have been remarkably friendly."[7]

Despite the difficulty of anti-Japanese sentiment finding its footing in the Pacific Northwest, it continued to thrive and grow in California. In 1909, Homer Lea claimed public opinion was "8 percent pro-Japanese, 22 percent indifferent, 30 percent hostile, and 40 percent belligerently hostile."[8] This public opinion report was the same year that the editor of the San Francisco *Chronicle* stated, "The opposition is very general, and there is not the slightest doubt that if a vote on exclusion were taken, it would be nearly as unanimous as the case against Chinese immigration in 1879."[9] Each of these observers was not unbiased in their remarks; thus, the absence of impartial surveys during this period makes an accurate interpretation of public opinion speculative and impressionistic.

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[6] tenBroek et al. *Prejudice War and the Constitution*, 65; Johnson, *Discrimination Against the Japanese in California,*42.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid; Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance*, 24.

[9] Young, "The Support of the Anti-Oriental Movement," 16.

Even with this handicap, it is clear that by 1910, the anti-Japanese feeling was reaching its peak, only seeing a slight reduction during WWI, before being strengthened again after the war's conclusion. The Hearst press's power was seen during this time as they and many other West Coast newspapers rallied against the ethnic Japanese community. In addition to the media attack, all three political parties, Democratic, Socialist, and Republican, supported anti-Japanese beliefs as it was a promise of a quick win at the polls. Due to this, politicians were very loud and vocal in denouncing Japanese labor and immigration. They quickly certified the “yellow peril” as a serious threat to the economy and white Americans. Partially driven by politicians' encouragement, the Asiatic Exclusion League grew to 110,000 members and 238 affiliated groups.[10]

The strength of the anti-Japanese groups and mindset waned slightly in the cities of the West Coast after 1910. The counterbalance to this decline was the growing opposition from farmers and rural communities as ethnic Japanese moved out of the cities and into the rural areas of California. The drive for this micro-migration was the anti-Japanese sentiment that ethnic Japanese workers faced in the cities. These residents attempted to escape the hatred and find work in farm fields. This migration and using the names of their native-born for land agreements was one of the many ways that ethnic Japanese retained their land despite restrictive land laws. This micro-migration was alarming to the agricultural groups and viewed with fear by everyone in the rural population. Small farmers feared competition, and more extensive operations were irritated by the desertion of their primary source of labor, ethnic Japanese. These worries and fears were the primary driver for the passage of the California Alien Land Law in 1913.

[10] Yamato, *Japanese in the United States*, 239.

During WWI, the overall public opinion of ethnic Japanese was significantly less hostile. This less hostile attitude was due to the Panama-Pacific Exposition of 1915, which made a concerted effort to showcase the Japanese culture in a positive light, Japanese participation in the war on the part of the Allies, and a decline in Japanese immigration thanks to the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907. A testament to the power of local newspapers is seen during this period, as magazines and newspapers were vehemently opposed to the resurgence of anti-Japanese agitation. Pro-Japanese groups and President Roosevelt convinced anti-Japanese Governor Hiram Johnson to oppose any amendment to the 1913 land laws. Sidney Gulick reported that the situation on the West Coast was "hopeful" after 1914 and concluded the "hostility was distinctly ebbing during the war."[11]

The ebb in hostilities and anti-Japanese agitation was overcome by the tidal wave of fear and prejudice just a few years later, in 1919. This wave of anti-Japanese drive continued to gain power until it saw the passage of The Immigration Act of 1924. This post-WWI anti-Japanese movement, as argued, was conducted with the cooperation of organized labor, agricultural groups, patriotic societies, and political organizations. This collection of groups experienced unprecedented success in barring Japanese immigration and establishing laws limiting their land leasing and ownership options. Opinion turned against the ethnic Japanese due to the military actions of Japan as they exercised an expansionist military plan post-war. Japan's brutal suppression of the Korean rebellion in 1919 and continued push to expand their empire. It is reasonable to assert that many citizens withdrew their support for ethnic Japanese due to the actions of their home country.

[11] tenBroek, et al., *Prejudice and War,* 70.

A survey of public attitudes was conducted in 1920 focusing on educators and businessmen whom Tasuku Harada interviewed. This survey concluded that hostility against ethnic Japanese was limited mainly to the agricultural and labor groups. H.T. Millis stated, "anti-Japanese feeling has been pretty general for some years in all classes of California other than the larger merchants, bankers, and professional men."[12] A conclusion by the Pacific Coast Race Relations Survey, which carried out extensive field investigations in the early 1920s, reinforced Millis by stating:

> Even to a newcomer on the Pacific Coast, it was soon apparent what groups were pro and anti-Asian and why this was so. The politician, legionnaire, native son, workingman, small farmer, and shopkeeper were usually against Asian immigrants or, at least, opposed to the Japanese. On the other hand, the president of the chamber of commerce, financier and banker, importer and exporter, absentee landowner, prominent rancher, mission secretary and church worker, social worker, and many schoolteachers and university professors were friendly to the Asiatic.[13]

With the passing of the Immigration Act of 1924, anti-Japanese groups saw their primary objectives of excluding Japanese, their right to hold land, and effectively eliminating Japanese immigration; the anti-Japanese groups disbanded. This united front consisted of labor, farm groups, patriots, and politicians such as James Phelan, Earl Warren, and Ulysses Webb. These former groups and members contented themselves to support resolutions reaffirming their hostility. As the racial and prejudice intensity increased, the ethnic Japanese population continued to move out of urban areas and into more rural parts of California. Slowed by the Immigration and Land Laws of 1924, but not stopped, the ethnic Japanese began to put their farms in the names of their American-born children and friends of the family. By 1930, the hostility within the political spectrum had even begun to wane. News outlets turned to other

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[12] The Japanese Problem in California: Answers (by Representative Americans) to Questionnaire. (United States, Recorder Printing and Publishing, 1922), 23-24.

[13] Merle Davis, "We Said: Let's Find the Facts," *Survey*, vol. LVI, 1926, 140.

stories, movies stopped portraying ethnic Japanese as subversive, and as a result, public opinion regarding the Japanese improved.

It should be noted that while public hostility declined during this time, this was not a sign of increased social acceptance of ethnic Japanese. Several studies of the mindset of the American public on the West Coast show an established stereotype based on more than three decades of racial hatred and fear. This mindset no longer required the constant prodding by West Coast pressure groups; it was self-sustaining.[14] Sentiment on the West Coast described the ethnic Japanese as "sneaky, dishonest, tricky, treacherous" and accused them of being "ruinous, hard or unfair competitors."[15] These anti-Japanese attitudes were reminiscent of the attitudes during the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924. It should also be noted that these attitudes also echo the cries for Chinese exclusion in the late nineteenth century.

The decades of racism and prejudice before the outbreak of war were prevalent enough on the West Coast and were discussed so frequently that the discussions had by the public became intense with racial overtones. These discussions and the belief that the ethnic Japanese were an existential threat are seen by using different derogatory terms to identify Japanese residents. These terms included "sneaky Japs, lousy snake eyes, and dirty yellow faces."[16] Statements against other races in California were common, such as comments against Germans, Italians, and Chinese; however, the ethnic Japanese were the primary target of racial slurs, showing the public belief in the "special danger" of the ethnic Japanese. These slurs show how Western anti-Japanese groups sorted the nation's enemies through a racial lens.

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[14] Emory Bogardus, "Social Distance: A Measuring Stick," *Survey*, vol. LVI, 1926, p. 169.
[15] tenBroek, et al., *Prejudice and War,* 28.
[16] Robinson, *By Order of the President,* 97.

Hostility against ethnic Japanese once again began to build after 1931 due to the actions of Japan. Once again, public opinion saw the ethnic Japanese as nothing more than disloyal and treacherous. The onset of the Great Depression helped fuel this agitation, which supported fears and insecurities throughout the country. A correlation links the Great Depression with anti-Asian sentiment. This agitation was seen in the 1870s and the action against the sandlotters and the Chinese issue, the 1890s when white laborers were driven from inactive industries into farm labor competition with Chinese immigrants, and again in the early 1920s against Japanese immigrants, culminating in the Immigration Act of 1924.[17] With the Great Depression in full swing, Americans were scared and looking for someone to blame, and minority groups gave them that opportunity. Americans felt justified in blaming the ethnic Japanese, who were convenient targets, as the brutalities of Japanese Imperialism graced the headlines almost daily.

In the face of growing opposition, the California Council on Oriental Relations, formed to aid Japanese immigrants, disbanded in 1934 after only three years. With the growing atrocities of the Japanese military, the war in Europe, and the competition for labor in the United States, the anti-Japanese feeling was running at an all-time high. By the end of the 1930s, the anti-Japanese stereotype was well established and embedded in the West Coast psyche, and the powder keg upon which the fuse was lit on December 7, 1941.

Despite the power of the rumors and stories of sabotage, in the eyes of citizens and anti-Japanese groups, the December 7 attack gave credit to their belief that the Japanese were "treacherous and barbarous by nature."[18] The prevalence of these views that led to the forced removal was only partially fueled by wartime hysteria. The Pearl Harbor attack and the outbreak of war was the catalyst that ignited the fuel that generations of racism and prejudice provided.

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[17] Robinson, *By Order of the President,* 97.
[18] Robinson, *By Order of the President,* 94.

The anti-Japanese groups, such as the California Growers Association, Western Growers Protective Organization, and many others, saw the war as an unprecedented opportunity to "get things done that we have been trying to get done for a quarter of a century."[19] The mistake in understanding the meaning of race on the part of the West Coast population, fueled by anti-Japanese groups, facilitated the false association of ethnic Japanese residents of the United States with those of the Pacific.

The first several weeks after Pearl Harbor were marked by weak conversations on the mass removal of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. Fueled by historical animosity and hatred, released due to the wartime tensions, demands for removal began to escalate as the weeks passed. The military and civilians alike tied race to allegiance, particularly in the case of the ethnic Japanese population. The unchecked aggression of the Japanese military in the South Pacific and the rumors of sabotage in Hawaii only strengthened the anti-Asian sentiment. Americans who supported their Japanese neighbors began to question their choice to do so as the power of fifth-column rumors took hold. The removal support was seen as patriotic, further encouraging the idea among non-Japanese residents and building support. Those beliefs were not based on facts but instead supported by deep-seated racial prejudice, the desire for economic gain, and political favor.

The ethnic Japanese struggled to find balance in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the start of WWII. The belief was widespread that the educated and assimilated Japanese were the most dangerous, as they were acquainted with American ways and best suited for espionage.[20] The majority of the ethnic Japanese population had chosen not to protest Japanese aggression in the South Pacific before the start of WWII and instead chose to advertise, with enthusiasm, their

[19] California Joint Immigration Committee, Meeting of February 7, 1942, "Minutes," 16-17.
[20] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 171.

American patriotism. The ethnic Japanese believed this would aid in their acceptance; however, it had the opposite effect, as many believed this to be a false flag.[21]

The ethnic Japanese community has never had an issue finding support before or during WWII. Various Church groups, such as the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, opposed the passage of the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act and exerted influence in favor of repealing this act from 1926 through 1931.[22] The efforts of the Church groups failed as their power, even combined, was no match for the power of organized labor, anti-Asian racist sentiment, and the drive of Western congressmen seeking political power by berating Asian immigrants.

Individual citizens worked to create awareness of the growing resentment against the ethnic Japanese and offer their support. People such as Carey McWilliams wrote to the director of the Tolan Committee that "the Japanese situation was quite bad and greatly complicated because of the fact there are several special interest groups who are all too willing to take advantage of the situation and to muscle in on the Japanese." [23] McWilliams went on in his letter urging the Tolan Committee to investigate the entire situation and not be selective in their focus. McWilliams believed that if the Tolan Committee looked at all angles, it would allow the pressure groups to blow off steam and allow the ethnic Japanese to show their side in a way that would command nationwide attention and expose the self-interest and greed of the local pressure groups.[24]

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[21] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 172.
[22] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 172.
[23] Carey McWilliams to Rober Lamb, January 26th, 1942, Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
[24] Carey McWilliams to Rober Lamb, January 26th, 1942, Carey McWilliams Papers (Collection 1319).

Although the efforts to support the ethnic Japanese failed, the drive to support them and fight anti-Japanese measures always existed. The patriotic acts of ethnic Japanese received wide publicity, and federal authorities attempted to enact a program of gradual moderation; although advertised as tolerance, it was a delay tactic to ensure successful crop production. When the ethnic Japanese community did take a stand, it was on the night of Executive Order 9066, far too late to make any difference in the coming actions. On February 19, 1942, the United Citizens Federation, representing several Japanese organizations, called a meeting in Los Angeles. Over one thousand Japanese groups and community leaders attended this meeting and urged cooperation with military and government agencies to uncover subversive actions by disloyal Japanese residents.[25]

The ethnic Japanese culture demanded obedience to one's country and government with respect for authority without question. This demand is evident in the delay before the ethnic Japanese community attempted to take a stand against the rising tide of prejudice and the threat of removal. No one could say the outcome if the community had taken a stand earlier than the night of Executive Order 9066. The world in which ethnic Japanese found themselves post Pearl Harbor was sensitive to their every action. It is possible that any united protest against evacuation may have been interpreted as disloyal, and the military might have moved to arrest and detain. Historians argue that arrest and detention is what happened and would have happened, regardless of their reluctance to protest.

A contributing factor to the widespread anti-Japanese movement was the ease with which citizens could identify the "enemy." To be classified as an enemy, a German would need to be a Nazi, and an Italian would need to be a Fascist. The ethnic Japanese did not have these

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[25] Carey McWilliams to Rober Lamb, January 26th, 1942, 187; Girdner and Loftis, *The Great Betrayal,* 216.

distinctions within their community; to the government, the military, and ordinary civilians, all Japanese (even Japanese American citizens) were enemy aliens. The military leaders in charge of the evacuation policy exhibited their racial drivers with comments made to the press and in their reports. General DeWitt commented, "The Japanese race is an enemy race, and the racial strains are undiluted."[26]

Anti-Japanese groups used the guise of patriotism when fighting for the full-scale removal of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. The demands for removal, driven by perceived fear and racist sentiment, were tied to patriotism, which made opposing the evacuation difficult. As discussions for an evacuation began to strengthen, supporters of the removal encouraged the ethnic Japanese community to cooperate as it was their patriotic duty. If they did not, they would be branded as disloyal and only serve to prove the point of the anti-Japanese groups. Using patriotism as a cover for the removal of ethnic Japanese was a reason used to silence non-Japanese evacuation opposition.

Furthering the support for evacuation was the sheer myth of factors contributing to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Rumors were told of pilots shot down wearing Hawaii high school rings, the presence of fifth-column activity, and exaggerations of ethnic Japanese on the islands actively fighting the military. The actions of Japan in the years preceding these rumors lent credibility to the stories and made it much easier for the public to accept. Groups opposing evacuation had accurate facts relating to ethnic Japanese, both in Hawaii and on the West Coast. These groups stressed the importance of Japanese farmers and their contribution to the supply of crops and food that was so badly needed. Opposition groups stressed that the increased population in California due to defense jobs and troop training necessitated every available

[26] Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice,* 147.

farmable acre was needed, and removing Japanese farmers would cause a catastrophic impact on the food supply.

The force fueling the push for evacuation by the pressure groups, politicians, and large farming corporations was the perceived fear of fifth-column activity, sabotage, and espionage. Arguments for and against evacuation lacked specific details concerning their individual viewpoints. As history has shown us, there were no confirmed acts of sabotage, espionage, or fifth-column activity; however, many records of the time are still sealed and classified. Between December 1941 and March 1942, the arguments and support for evacuation were more numerous, better organized, and publicized frequently. The truth about Pearl Harbor was not made public until after the evacuation was already in motion and the Farm Security Administration had reassigned several thousand ethnic Japanese farms to white "caretakers."

The victims of these arguments were the ethnic Japanese population on the West Coast, who were limited in their ability to oppose evacuation. Before the war, the political victories afforded ethnic Japanese were limited. Additionally, the ethnic Japanese population lacked internal solid cohesion, sufficient numbers, and mature leadership to be any threat to anti-Japanese forces. The Japanese community was lulled into a false sense of security by early support and statements made by Attorney General Biddle and President Roosevelt, denying action against the community would be taken. As late as February 8, 1942, statements were issued by high-ranking officials that the government did "not contemplate the wholesale and indiscriminate evacuation of all Japanese from the West Coast."[27] Instead of increasing their efforts in opposition to any possible evacuation, the ethnic Japanese continued to increase their demonstrations of loyalty and their promise of full cooperation.

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[27] Olson Calls for Sacrifices, *Niche Bei,* February 8th, 1942, https://hojishinbun.hoover.org/en/newspapers/jan19420208-01.1.1.

The final factor in the argument for evacuation was the term "military necessity," a vague yet all-encompassing term used to justify the evacuation and reassignment of farmlands in the spring of 1942. The phrase "military necessity" was issued to the public, assuming they would understand that unknown facts lay behind it. The Tolan Committee, critical of the injustices and questioning the legality of the actions, nevertheless wrote, "This committee does not deem its proper province to encompass a judgment on the military need for the evacuation orders."[28] This statement meant that the term "military necessity" was incontrovertible, even after years and decades of research done since the end of WWII. "Military necessity" was the blanket statement used to ensure no public opposition.

The wartime experience of the ethnic Japanese on the West Coast shows how the growth and stubbornness of racism can create an atmosphere perfectly set not only to allow but to encourage the total removal of an entire race of people from a geographic area. The importance of ethnic Japanese farming concerning wartime food security mattered little to those determined to have the entire population removed due to fear, land grabs, racism, or isolationism. Any of these factors alone would have been enough; however, on the West Coast during the war, they were all present thanks to almost sixty years of stewing racism and a mixture of all four factors.

Governor Olson saw the importance of ethnic Japanese agriculture. He attempted to promote and implement a plan to keep the labor inside state lines and eliminate a severe labor problem. Although his efforts failed, it shows that the importance of Japanese agriculture was not lost on everyone. Olson and others saw the importance of Japanese agriculture and the Japanese as trustworthy people who should be treated individually rather than as a whole. The growing strength and expansion of the Japanese military in the Pacific soon silenced any cry for fairness

[28] Tolan Committee Preliminary Report, 13.

or individual treatment. Military necessity was the phrase used to justify all actions taken against the ethnic Japanese. Military necessity won out over wartime food security, and the labor issue may not have been solved during the war without the Bracero program.

The forced removal of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast in 1942 was not a decision made in a vacuum. The seeds that led to the landmark 1942 events began before any measurable number of Japanese immigrants landed on the shores of the West Coast, before any Japanese-owned farms laid their first crop, and before most Americans knew where the location of Japan was on a world map. The focus of the rising hatred was on labor and labor wages. An argument brought to the Supreme Court in 1922 stated that the ethnic Japanese, who were much better farmers, would drive out the white farmers and force California to rely solely on Japanese farms for fruits and vegetables. The success of ethnic Japanese in farming was used against them in 1942 as the military waited for the completion of spring planting before forcing the Japanese into assembly centers and seizing their land. They enacted organized plans to ensure that the production of the farms never ceased and that the Food for Freedom program could count on those crops for the war effort.

The political atmosphere is one of the most vital factors driving the evacuation program. Before the war and immediately following December 7, California's director of agriculture made several statements highlighting the importance of ethnic Japanese farmers and crop production. The director repeatedly stated that these farms' production is vital to the state and the country's food production. Several powerful state agriculture groups, such as the Western Vegetable Growers Association, strongly objected to these comments and used political intimidation to silence the agriculture director. They feared the opposition groups would learn of the vital role that Japanese farms played in the overall food production of California, Hawaii, and the United

States, and it would build sympathetic feelings for the ethnic Japanese and destabilize the removal process. The various grower's associations wanted the land, but the timing had to be right so that the loss of crops during the transfer of ownership would be mitigated.

The political atmosphere created a juggernaut of support for anti-Japanese groups and government officials. During testimony at the Tolan Committee, thirty-three people submitted statements in favor of evacuation; seventeen were government officials. Of these seventeen, three were governors, two state attorney generals, and five mayors from major cities.[29] Prominent political figures were joined by lower-level political support from the American Legion, the California Joint Immigration Committee, and business representatives from urban and rural districts. By contrast, only thirty-four statements were submitted to the committee opposing evacuation, with none offered by any political party or group. These statements came from teachers, students, farmers, and ministers who did not have the power, even when combined, to fight big business and politics.

Race and not loyalty was the most powerful driving force for the mass removal of the ethnic Japanese population. Race was not the only factor, and the debate over military necessity and food security led to a growing demand for Mexican farmworkers to replace the ethnic Japanese. While the economic necessity of the West Coast Japanese was present just as it was in Hawaii, the organized anti-Japanese attitudes on the West Coast were strong enough to prevail. By looking at the complete removal of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast from the perspective of agriculture, we see that the removal was not solely about race, isolationism, land grabs, or fear but also about economics in wartime.

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[29] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 203-204; Tolan Committee, 11629-11642.

Factors regarding the economic drivers for the timing of evacuation can be seen in the regret of allowing ethnic Japanese farmers to shift from a laborer status to an entrepreneurial one. For three decades before the war, farm organizations did not inhibit the ethnic Japanese from becoming owners or leases on farms, believing that they would not be successful enough to become competition. This logic was flawed, as ethnic Japanese farming became the backbone of crop production in California by the onset of WWII. These same groups, such as the Western Growers Association, were among the most active organizations exerting pressure to accomplish the mass removal of ethnic Japanese farmers.

Immediate economic gain was often at stake as ethnic Japanese farmers dominated the truck crop industry. Removing this competition would allow larger farming organizations to monopolize the truck crop sector and reap the profits. In other instances, residents saw the ethnic Japanese threatening the "white farmer" and businessman.[30] This racial bias of the economic position of the ethnic Japanese is seen in a letter to California Congressman Anderson from the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association,

> You and I and thousands of other Californians know that if the Japs are permitted to own or lease land (when I say Japs I mean American born as well as aliens) it will only be a question of time when they will own all of the best farming land on the Pacific Coast. I am thinking of the generations of Americans to come who, although they are not yet here, are looking to us to protect them and keep our beloved country in our hands and not give it away to the Japs.[31]

Before the war, the ethnic Japanese purchased and leased land at higher rates than white tenants. The white owners of these lands saw the profit in this dynamic and put aside their racial bias in exchange for good tenants and profit. The war changed that outlook, heightened prejudice, and reduced opportunities for profit through relationships with ethnic Japanese

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[30] Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants," 66.

[31] O.L. Scott to John Anderson, May 12, 1942, in Roger Daniels, *American Concentration Camps, Vol. V: May 1942,* (New York: Garland, 1989), Author Files, 45.

farmers. Economic self-interest and racial prejudice paralleled, and the advent of war brought general prosperity through war production and added the essential ingredient of patriotism. The patriotic duty of every American to protect the West Coast from the enemy became tied to racial and economic drives.

This result was easily achieved as the stories of Pearl Harbor continued to reach residents on the West Coast. Supported by maps of the geographical locations of ethnic Japanese and their seemingly obvious intent to reside spread out and close to military installations and areas of importance, the news of the attack and the belief in imminent sabotage on the West Coast was accepted as an inevitability. These maps and news reports implied disloyalty, and the rumors of signaling devices in crop fields and fear of cultural differences present in language and religious schools helped strengthen the already strong underpinning of regional racial hatred among the West Coast residents against ethnic Japanese.[32] The regional belief was that ethnic Japanese interests, both patriotically and economically, ran counter to those of the white residents.

The regional arguments for mass removal did not provide concrete evidence showing a clear and present danger to the country. Despite the lack of evidence, the perceived fear of the Japanese presence on the West Coast culminated with the drastic action of forced removal. In hopes of removal for economic gain, claims that the ethnic Japanese population could pose a threat were exaggerated. With the high percentage of elderly *Issei*, immigration restrictions since 1924, and the ease of continued surveillance over the entire population, any presence of an actual threat was downplayed.

Due to the wartime confusion, the groups urging evacuation and removal acted quickly to pressure politicians and lawmakers. The government did not have a public information system

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[32] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 363; Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice,* 86; Goldstone, *Not White Enough,* 167.

and could not disseminate facts to residents quickly; therefore, it could not quiet the false fifth-column rumors regarding Pearl Harbor or educate the public on the Department of Justice control program.[33] The perceived fear continued to grow due to the government's lack of this ability and the unchecked progress of the enemy in the South Pacific at the beginning of the war. Although the confusion was corrected, denials of fifth-column activity distributed, and the Japanese progression unchecked in the Pacific, the calls for mass removal of the Japanese on the West Coast did not cease.

The racial, patriotic, and economic drives were aided and kept alive by public uneasiness and the perceived fear of sabotage and fifth-column activity. These drivers had the secondary effect of silencing those who would oppose the evacuation, labeling them as disloyal, and thus building a public that had passive support for the mass removal of the ethnic Japanese. With misinformation at an all-time high, the enemy gaining on the battlefield in all aspects, a weak government policy, and the silencing of those opposed to drastic action for fear of being charged with disloyalty, proponents of evacuation held complete sway. State and local officials were not ignorant of the political benefit of advocating for the mass removal of ethnic Japanese residents. A few congressmen and local representatives opposed removal; however, the screaming voices of those demanding action drowned them out.

The combination of racism, prejudice, economic self-interest, political gain, and patriotism was ultimately the source of action taken by the military, ending in completely removing ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. The reasons given were the protection of the West Coast from fifth-column activity and enemy invasion. While this is the reason given to the public, strong regional factors influenced the action taken by the military. This reasoning was

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[33] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 176; Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice,* 106; Goldstone, *Not White Enough,*168.

underpinned by racial animosity and economic and political greed. Under the impact of regional pressures, the mass removal of ethnic Japanese was a means to an end. The ethnic Japanese influence on the California agriculture economy significantly threatened local white farmers. The continued dedication of the ethnic Japanese to their culture, language, and education fed the public's opinion of them as undesirable neighbors.

The result was enormous pressure in favor of the forced relocation of a minority group from an area within the United States to relocation camps away from the West Coast. The anti-Japanese groups controlled the narrative and silenced those who opposed this drastic action. These pressure groups never stopped to consider the democratic consequences of their actions and pushed forward in every way possible to achieve their goal of mass removal. They saw the war as an opportunity to quickly seize the lands and profits of the ethnic Japanese farmers and rid themselves of an ethnic group that was the focus of generations of racism.

The historical factors leading to the forced removal of the ethnic Japanese population culminate in the historic regional racism, prejudice, and fear of fifth-column activity brought to a boiling point by a crisis in Hawaii and the start of hostilities with Japan. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor brought the crisis, which turned the irrational, unsubstantiated fear into a patriotic act. As previously outlined, the historical factors mainly were focused on racial prejudice; however, after the Immigration Act of 1924 stopped the influx of Japanese immigrants, the fear became focused on economic competition.[34]

The reaction to the Pearl Harbor attack played out differently for the ethnic Japanese population in Hawaii. Factors such as limited land to build relocation camps, transportation difficulties, the work of morale committees, and the dependence of Hawaii on Japanese labor are

[34] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, 174; Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice,* 67; Goldstone, *Not White Enough,* 140.

a few reasons the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii did not experience mass internment. The situation in Hawaii warranted action, which came in the form of complete and total Martial Law for the duration of the war. The military leaders in Hawaii took an early and strong stance against any movement calling into question the allegiance of any resident group. This mindset sent a message that the military leaders in Hawaii had confidence in the loyalty of the resident Japanese population and gave them opportunities to prove this by acting as territorial guards and participants in other civilian defense activities.[35]

There were several reasons for the level of tolerance and understanding that prevailed in Hawaii during the war. Hawaii did not experience a long history of anti-Asian prejudice; the islands' population was much more racially diverse than the West Coast. Hawaii was not officially a state during the war, which kept any racist sentiment out of the halls of Congress. Military presence in Hawaii was also much more prevalent than that of the West Coast, so they had greater control over island activities.[36] Finally, there was a difference in opinion between the military commanders regarding the ethnic Japanese population. General DeWitt believed sabotage, espionage, and imminent attack would soon come from the West Coast Japanese population. General Delos Emmons trusted the Hawaiian-Japanese population and stood firm in supporting them. Emmons did not support radical plans of mass removal, citing labor shortages, lack of transportation, and complete lack of evidence citing fifth-column activity.[37]

Calls for evacuation and internment in the event of war with Japan were heard in Hawaii starting in 1923. The plan called for the internment of all enemy aliens on the islands; the Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare states: “The Department Commander will plan to

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[35] *Hawaii Educational Review*, January 1942, 137.
[36] *Personal Justice Denied,* 262.
[37] WDC, *Supplemental Report on Civilian Controls Exercised by Western Defense Command,* January. 1947, 174-75.

provide for interned aliens and the civilian population, including plans for rationing, conservation, and prevention of waste."[38] As shown, one of these planning officers was John L. DeWitt. Although he was in charge of the West Coast of the United States and not Hawaii, he had studied the "problem" of the resident Japanese in Hawaii should a war break out with Japan. DeWitt studied the problem and worked to improve the defense plans in 1923. He believed that the only course of action that would ensure the safety of the islands was the internment of the resident Japanese population. This did not happen, thanks to the societal structure and race tolerance found on the islands of Hawaii.

The presence of Morale Committees was fundamental in maintaining and improving race relations in Hawaii before and after the Pearl Harbor attack. Before WWII, several citizens formed a Committee for Interracial Unity in Hawaii, a multiethnic group of civilian and military leaders.[39] These committees were deemed so vital to the war effort that the Emergency Services Committee maintained a Morale Section and worked directly with committees such as the Committee on Inter-Racial Unity to carry out plans to maintain racial harmony after the war began. The Morale Section of the Emergency Service Committee was comprised of representatives of Chinese, Japanese, and American racial groups. All members had been very active in the Inter-Racial committee and other groups before the war and would now be working directly with the Army and civilian "Morale committees" to accomplish the goal of continued racial harmony on the islands.

The Morale Committees, in their various forms, maintained stability and unity in the Hawaiian island throughout WWII and beyond. They proved that Hawaii and its people of

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[38] George B. Eaton, "General Walter Krueger and Joint War Planning, 1922—1938." *Naval War College Review* 48, no. 2 (1995),94 & Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii,* 87.

[39] Shivers, "Cooperation of Racial Groups in Hawaii During the War," 22.

various racial ancestry could work harmoniously through a significant crisis. Since Hawaii employed alternatives to mass evacuation, there is no reason to believe that the actions taken on the West Coast could have also been different. There were no known instances of sabotage or espionage by ethnic Japanese on the West Coast. The Justice Department was willing to provide the most flexible control procedures, including arrests and searches without warrants and removing suspected alien enemies from strategic areas for no cause save for living in that area.[40] General DeWitt and his decision for mass internment were accepted, even by those who might oppose mass evacuation, simply because it was a military decision.

The judgments and decisions made on the West Coast were nonmilitary and rested on a long history of prejudice. Those who pushed for removal linked ethnic Japanese to military dangers based on their belief that the Japanese were "almost wholly unassimilated, the racial strains are undiluted, and they are dual citizens owing allegiance to the Emperor of Japan."[41] The decision to evacuate the West Coast resulted from a prejudiced and racist philosophy, nurtured by regional pressures, justified by falsehoods, and timed during the spring growing season so vital crops were not lost.

The arguments used by the Western Defense Command (WDC) to justify mass evacuation for the West Coast applied to Hawaii more so than the mainland. The WDC argued that the concentration of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast directly threatened the nation. Nevertheless, in Hawaii, the population of ethnic Japanese was 36% higher than that of the West Coast, and no mass internment occurred. The WDC argued that ethnic Japanese populations were highly concentrated near military installations and sensitive areas. In Hawaii, ethnic Japanese comprised a large part of the labor force in the naval yards and military depots before and after

[40] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 131; *Personal Justice Denied,* 60.
[41] Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed,* 131.

the Pearl Harbor attack. The WDC claimed evacuation was necessary because of the possibility of enemy assault and invasion. However, Hawaii is fifteen hundred miles closer to the enemy and constitutes a strategic military position. Despite the seemingly higher calling for Hawaii to intern and evacuate its ethnic Japanese population, military leaders concluded it was unnecessary.

The fear of Japanese influence in the agricultural sector, the aggression shown in their Pacific Basin expansion, and the perceived fear of the potential of a fifth-column presence are facts on the West Coast. This belief is based on the success of the fifth column during the Spanish Civil War and bolstered by the WWII success of Nazi Germany using the same tactic in their invasions throughout Europe.

Timing

The argument presented here assesses that the foundation of the racist and prejudicial mindset of the West Coast fueled the drive for evacuation and overpowered the importance of ethnic-Japanese farmers and their contribution to wartime food security. The government and military knew they could not quell the West Coast fears and prejudice, and the evacuation timing was specific to ensure the security of spring crops. This racist foundation only allowed for the evacuation movement to gain strength, almost unincumbered. The need for wartime food security is the central driver of the timing of the evacuation.

To ensure crop retention and wartime food security, removing the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast was deliberately timed for the spring growing season. Research has shown the reasoning behind the decision to evacuate the ethnic Japanese; the why is well-researched and explained. Evidence explaining the timing of the evacuation, while minimal, is clear. There were several weeks of relative calm. Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor during this

time, moderation was encouraged by statements from military leaders promising that drastic action and removal would not happen. From a farming perspective, this time of moderation was the growing season for the winter crop, the need to resupply Hawaii, and the planting of spring crops. The military was aware of this and encouraged the public to contribute to the war effort in every way possible. This research argues that these actions ensured the winter crop harvest, resupply of Hawaii, and spring crop planting before the military took any action.

Evidence for the need for wartime food security is found by looking at the food shortage in Hawaii, the migration of defense workers to the West Coast, the fight to lift the banking freeze, and the increase in military establishments and training centers. These factors required increased food production to maintain an adequate food supply for residents, military training, and troops already deployed. As shown, the resident population of California on December 7, 1941, was approximately 7.2 million people and growing.[42] Between 1940 and 1945, the California population grew to 9.344 million people.[43] The wartime economy of California saw the unemployment rate drop to almost non-existent, with the increase in jobs from 2.2 million to 3.3 million thanks to government contracts and an increase in military establishments.[44] This rapid increase in population raised the importance of wartime food security and the role that ethnic Japanese farmers had in guaranteeing that security.

Due to the increase in population of residents, workers, and troops, the need to ensure continued crop production was vital. The military and government leaders worked to ensure the continued production of ethnic Japanese farms by stating that any act against wartime food production would be considered an act of sabotage. The military also understood that with the

[42] Bean, *California an Interpretive History*, 197.
[43] Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population 1940*, vol. 3, Characteristics of the Population, part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. government Printing Office, 1943), 585-601.
[44] Bean, *California an Interpretive History,* 197.

Food for Freedom in place, ethnic Japanese farmers were working to expand their farms and plant crops on every acre available in hopes of proving their loyalty. Many ethnic Japanese farmers signed additional leases granting them more acreage for this purpose. The military understood that the labor required to carry out these tasks did not exist. They deliberately waited for the ethnic Japanese farmers to finish the winter harvest, farm expansions, and planting of the spring harvest before executing a plan for complete evacuation.

Within days of the Pearl Harbor attack, all Japanese-owned banks were immediately closed and overtaken by the bank superintendent or the Alien Property Custodian, who then called for all outstanding loans to be settled.[45] This action effectively shut down the import-export business in the ethnic Japanese Community. The importance of these funds being released and for ethnic Japanese farmers to continue their farming operations can be seen in the immediate response by the Department of Agriculture demanding the reversal of this action. The USDA stated that all Japanese agriculture operations had halted, threatening the Food for Freedom program and wartime food security.

Dave Davidson, chairman of the California USDA Defense Board, sent a letter on December 10 to various representatives of the county defense boards, citing, "All resources of alien Japanese are frozen. This financial freeze creates a serious problem with the Food for Freedom program in areas where alien Japanese are employed."[46] Davidson requested the representatives to ensure that employers do not hire labor to replace the Japanese. The prevailing fear was that white landowners would terminate leases and hire non-Japanese farmers as replacements. This fear was validated by the inability of the Japanese to pay for their leases,

[45] *Personal Justice Denied,* 61.
[46] Chapter 5, 253.

given that all of their financial capital was frozen.[47] These actions prove the importance of the contributions made by ethnic Japanese farmers and their participation in the Food for Freedom program.

Further evidence of the importance of West Coast crop protection is found in Hawaii and its shortage of supplies following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Military leaders ordered a complete inventory of the island's supplies following the attack. The report showed a potential issue with feeding Oahu's civilian population and military personnel. The island's agriculture focused on sugar and pineapples, with most foodstuffs imported from the mainland. The island inventory concluded that only a 37-day food supply for 250,000 people existed without replenishing the supply without imports from the mainland.[48]

This food came from supply ships loaded in San Francisco harbor with food and crops grown on the West Coast. The military required a consistent supply of 32,000 tons of food per month from the mainland to maintain an emergency stockpile of thirty days and feed the Army and the civilian population.[49] Most of this supply would be from the West Coast, notably California, where most farms were under ethnic Japanese ownership and control.[50] To complicate food security further, Hawaii military leaders requested a surplus of 48,000 tons of food to be delivered and held in reserve in case supply lines to the mainland were lost.

Congress acted and quickly appropriated a revolving fund of $35,000,000 to finance shipments for as long as necessary to keep Hawaii fed. The first shipment to Hawaii began loading in San Francisco on December 20, and by February 1942, the food situation in Hawaii was under control, and the food supply program was transferred to the Department of

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[47] Chapter 5, 253.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Conn, *Guarding America and its Outposts,* 203.
[50] Iwata, "The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture."

Agriculture. The mitigation of this food security issue in Hawaii is further evidence of the intentional timing of the evacuation. Had the ethnic Japanese population been removed from the West Coast immediately after Pearl Harbor, a severe and catastrophic food shortage could have presented itself as early as the spring of 1942 due to the potential loss of winter crops and lack of spring planting. This research argues that mitigating the food security problem in Hawaii and signing Executive Order 9066 are not coincidences in timing.

By the middle of February 1942, all of the problems regarding wartime food security had been solved; Hawaii had its stockpiles and was receiving regular food shipments, the Treasury Department released its grip on ethnic Japanese accounts enough to allow continued farming operations, and the winter harvest was concluding, with spring planting imminent. Executive Order 9066 was signed during the transition between the winter and spring seasons in the California growing season. This timing allowed for the evacuation plan that was devised by Major Bendetson to be enacted.

The speed of the evacuation showed that military leaders knew the urgency of saving the spring crop. By early March 1942, the War Relocation Authority was up and running, and Eisenhower was working on the logistics for mass removal. One of the main issues Eisenhower faced was the lack of adequate facilities to house the ethnic Japanese before moving them to the WRA camps, which were incomplete at the time of Executive Order 9066. Pressure from civilian agencies, politicians, and the closing window for the spring growing season required Assembly centers. Proof of urgency is found in DeWiit's issuing of Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942, without any logistics set up for the housing of evacuees. The first Assembly Center to open was Owens Valley on March 21, followed by Santa Anita on March 27.

As General DeWitt realized the urgency too late to solve the logistics problem, he created the Wartime Civil Control Administration on March 11 and assigned Colonel Bendetsen to run the program. The goal of the WCCA was to facilitate the removal, processing, and placement of all ethnic Japanese forced to evacuate. If the order to evacuate had come later in the year, such as in July instead of March and April, the need for assembly centers would not have existed. This delay would have ensured the completion of the relocation camps and the spring harvest and summer planting; however, it is argued that had the military waited, the success of the Navy at Midway would have removed the need for such an evacuation. The military acted with the information they had when they had it. The WCCA focused heavily on the protection of the crops and triggered the evacuation to coincide with the spring growing season. This focus was deemed necessary due to the Department of Agriculture production goals for 1942, outlined in 1941.[51]

The Farm Security Administration operated under the WCCA umbrella, reassigned farmland, issued farm loans to incoming custodians, and ensured the evacuation did not affect the 1942 spring crop. The FSA final report finds the most robust evidence for the deliberate timing of the evacuation. The FSA report shows they made specific efforts to ensure crop retention and to work "within the spring growing season" to ensure no loss of crops. Due to the success of the Food for Freedom program, many farms in the evacuation area had planted the wartime-required crop before the evacuation orders in March of 1942. The FSA identified farms that grew perennial crops and were well established and recommended that the farmers taking over the land should continue with that crop but make more extensive use of the available land, i.e., plant crops on every available inch of soil.[52]

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[51] DeWitt, *Final Report*, 137.
[52] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 31.

The Farm Security Administration's final report claimed they achieved the goal of crop preservation and continuance with a 99 percent success rate. The FSA worked under harsh conditions and a strict timeline but achieved this success with minimal crop loss, limited to only strawberries.[53] Their final summary concluded that they achieved "the program's major objective, namely, without serious interruption of agriculture production."[54] As argued, the removal was timed to coincide with the spring growing season, thereby removing farmers from the land that needed little, if any, tending before the harvest. The importance of these crops is evident based on the increased demand for foodstuffs due to the increased population of civilian residents and troop training deployments in California.

A significant player in the decision to evacuate, Colonel Bendetsen participated in several interviews in the decades following WWII; these interviews helped illuminate the details of the evacuation program. In an interview with Standford University Professor Jacobus tenBroek on July 8, 1952, Bendetsen highlighted some of these details. In the interview, Bendetsen confirmed that the decision to evacuate ethnic Japanese from the West Coast was driven by fear of what the ethnic Japanese might do and were capable of doing.[55] The threat of sabotage, espionage, and what the ethnic Japanese population would do in the event of an invasion drove this fear. It fueled the pressure groups and the agriculture sector to call for complete removal. Bendetsen also claimed in these interviews that DeWitt ordered him to do "whatever it took to save the crops."

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[53] Hewes, *"Final Report,"* 42.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Jacobus tenBroek, Transcript of Jacobus tenBroek Interview with Karl Bendetsen, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records. Online Archive of California, University of California, Berkeley, July 8th, 1952.

General DeWitt submitted his final report to the United States Army Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C., on June 5, 1943, and his statements corroborate those made by the FSA. DeWitt identified that ethnic Japanese farming interests were studied, and a plan was created based on that study. The plan provided the maximum speed and the minimum crop loss due to the removal of ethnic Japanese farmers.[56] The evacuation was accomplished while maintaining the spring crop across 99 percent of all ethnic Japanese-owned farms. Perfectly executed during the growing season of spring 1942, the timing of this removal caused minimal crop impact while the land in which they grew changed ownership. The success of this program can be seen in the Department of Agriculture harvest report of 1942 compared to previous years.[57]

The fear of sabotage was ever present in the food industry, and civilians and military alike were concerned that ethnic Japanese farmers would destroy crops. DeWitt warned farmers on March 7, 1942, simply stating, "Foodstuffs are vital in prosecution of the war, and for Japanese ranchers professing loyalty to the United States, there is no better way of showing sincerity than by continuing to raise crops. On the other hand, willful destruction of crops demonstrates disloyalty and unwillingness to cooperate."[58] Public announcements were issued, ensuring that all citizens knew that any act to hinder the war effort would be considered treason. This threat was aimed at the ethnic Japanese as they questioned whether they would see the profits from their spring crop after evacuation.

It is hard to justify that the timing of the evacuation was due to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the beginning of WWII. The critical factor is the timing of the evacuation as compared to the date of the Pearl Harbor attack. Had the complete removal of the ethnic Japanese population

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[56] Hewes, "*Final Report,"* 2.
[57] Department of Agriculture California Harvest Report, 1942.
[58] DeWitt, *Final Report,* 138.

occurred in December or January, it is conceivable to believe that the forced removal was due to military necessity and a spur-of-the-moment decision based on the attack on Pearl Harbor. Military necessity would have been justified based on the threat of another attack, the rapid progress of the Japanese military in the Pacific, and the chaos and fear immediately prevalent on the West Coast. This action was not the case as the evacuation did not occur until the end of March and into April, with complete removal not achieved until the end of summer 1942.

The evacuation did not occur during the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor; thus, the argument that the evacuation was for military necessity is weakened. The delay in forced evacuation removes the military's justification of haste. The evacuation of the ethnic Japanese was deliberate and decided on months after the shock and confusion of the attack on Hawaii had worn off. This point is reiterated with the decreased threat of the Japanese Navy as 1942 progressed, all but being eliminated after the Battle of Midway. The order and timing of events after Pearl Harbor robbed the military and government of its claim to urgency. Executive Order 9066 was signed ten weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack. Another four weeks went by before Congress granted its approval. General DeWitt issued the first Proclamation approximately four months after the attack. The last internee entered camp on November 1, 1942, eleven months after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The activities of the military, government, and civilian pressure groups on the West Coast to execute full-scale evacuation occurred during the spring of 1942. The Japanese code was deciphered during this time, allowing the military to monitor the Japanese fleet closely, and the victory at Midway ensured the security of the West Coast.[59] The evacuations on the West Coast did not cease despite these events. Issued on July 22, 1942, the final Exclusion Order had an

[59] tenBroek, et al., *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution*, 199.

August 11 deadline for evacuation. The permanent relocation centers had not yet been constructed, forcing ethnic Japanese removed by June 6 into makeshift Assembly Centers. These actions call into question the claim of Military necessity to justify forced removal and incarceration for the whole after the battle of Midway secured America's Western front.

The military planned the evacuation around the planting/harvest schedule, and they executed it perfectly. Department of Agriculture crop reports from 1942 show a 1.2 million bushel increase in the California crop yield compared to 1941.[60] This crop report proves that crops were not lost, usable acreage was expanded and farmed, and all spring and summer harvests in 1942 were successful. Military leaders never overlooked the importance of wartime food security during wartime. In the case of the forced removal of ethnic Japanese from the West Coast, a unique situation existed where the majority of food grown in a specific geographic area was grown by the people the military wished to exclude. This factor required a unique and unprecedented approach.

[60] Crop Report. Kern County, 1943.

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