

Liberty University
Department of History

A Jus in Bello Comparison of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan's Valley Campaign

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by
Jonathan Scott Thomas

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Doctoral Dissertation Committee:

Committee Chair: Dr. David Jonathan White

Reader: Dr. David T. Crum

Reader: Dr. Robert L. Glaze

Abstract

Just War Theory distinguishes between two levels of war, including *jus ad bellum*, or the just reasons for which the war is waged, and *jus in bello*, or just actions within the conduct of the war. This research paper focuses on *jus in bello* aspects of war, including non-combatant immunity, military necessity, and proportionality, in application to an understanding of history, that of the American Civil War. A significant question in this regard is how did commanders and their armies lead and conduct themselves in concern and adherence to the rules of warfare during campaigns in enemy territory? While the Battle of Gettysburg has certainly wielded an abundance of studies, the Gettysburg Campaign is less studied, especially in regard to the conduct of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia towards Pennsylvania civilians, particularly important as the northward movement of Confederate forces in the late spring and early summer of 1863 was the only major Confederate advance into Northern territory. To fully understand Confederate actions within Pennsylvania during Lee's Gettysburg Campaign, it is necessary to conduct a comparative study with a campaign waged by a Federal army in the South. Major General Philip H. Sheridan's Valley Campaign in the late summer and autumn of 1864, is suitable for such a comparison, due to a number of observable similarities and differences, related to *jus in bello* principles and the conduct of the Army of the Valley towards Virginia civilians.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Although the American Civil War has generated an enormity of scholarly inquiries, even prompting American academia and the general public to refer to it simply as “The Civil War,” the significance of the conflict still demands further investigation regarding the justness of the war, particularly in regard to how the fighting was waged. This study includes questions related to *jus in bello* considerations, that is, just actions within the conduct of the war, including the principles of discrimination, commonly understood as non-combatant immunity, proportionality of means, and military necessity, as part of the strategies pursued, and the operational campaigns conducted.

Within the past thirty years historians and other scholars have either utilized an application of Just War Theory in understanding the history of the American Civil War or explored questions in relation to how the war was waged. Major questions debated by historians related to the topic include, most prominently, the degree of violence, especially differences between the eastern and western theaters and Northern and Southern armies, and the general escalation of the conflict from its limited to absolute nature, shifting the fighting from soldiers on the battlefield to the involvement of civilian property on the home front.¹

¹ See for instance, Charles Royster, *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans* (1991); Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Steven V. Ash, *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Harry S. Stout, *Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War* (2007), 1; Murray N. Rothbard, “America's Two Just Wars: 1775 and 1861,” in *The Costs of War: America's Pyrrhic Victories*, ed. John V. Denison, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 1999); Daniel E. Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009); *American Civil War Guerrillas: Changing the Rules of Warfare* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013); D. H. Dilbeck, *A More Civil War: How the Union Waged a Just War* (2016); Aaron Sheehan Dean, *The Calculus of Violence: How Americans Fought the Civil War* (2018).

Despite the recent scholarly inquires related to just actions in the Civil War, there are a number of questions that remain. Of particular import, is how commanders and their armies led and conducted themselves in concern and adherence to the rules of warfare during campaigns in enemy territory. Two particular campaigns that are ripe for comparison in this context are Robert E. Lee's Gettysburg Campaign (June - July 1863) and Philip H. Sheridan's 1864 Valley Campaign (August – December 1864).²

Although there are histories of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan's Valley Campaign, a comparative assessment, especially in relation to *jus in bello* actions, is lacking. A few scholars have argued that Lee's Gettysburg Campaign was conducted no better or worse than Northern campaigns waged throughout the South. In order to substantiate or invalidate such a claim, a comparison of campaigns is necessitated. If Lee's Gettysburg Campaign was conducted similarly to Federal campaigns in the south, this must necessarily include campaigns renowned for their destructive element, such as Sherman's March to the Sea. Although Sherman's campaign through Georgia is both well known in the eyes of a popular audience and well-studied by academics, in relation to *jus in bello actions*, Sheridan's Valley Campaigns holds less prominence and is therefore fitting for further study.

Lee's Gettysburg campaign, as well as other Confederate incursions into the North in 1862 and 1864, occurred in Pennsylvania's Cumberland Valley, a part of the "Great Valley," which rests east of the Appalachian Mountains. and adjacent localities. A suitable comparison with the conduct of Confederate soldiers toward Northern civilians in Pennsylvania is the

² In my master's thesis I distinguished between Lee's campaign in Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg, the latter being a result of the former and not necessarily the culmination of Lee's strategy. For this dissertation, I utilized the more popular term denoting Lee's campaign in Pennsylvania, that is, "The Gettysburg Campaign." Jonathan Thomas, "General Robert E. Lee and a Double – Poled Strategy of Attrition during the Pennsylvania Campaign and the Battle of Gettysburg," Master's Thesis, American Military University, (Feb. 2019).

conduct of Federal soldiers toward Southern civilians in the Shenandoah Valley, also a part of the Great Valley, often simply referred to as “The Valley,” and nearby areas, which similarly suffered from continued Federal raids and occupations, as the attritional conflict brought an escalation of destruction along the disputed border. If Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign was no better or worse than Federal campaigns in the South, then the campaign should compare similarly in its conduct with Sheridan’s 1864 Valley Campaign.

Thus, an unexplored question significant to the study of *jus in bello* actions in the American Civil War follows, what similarities and differences exist in the conduct of Southern and Northern armies during Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan’s Valley Campaign? Related questions include, how did strategic goals shape the conduct of the campaigns? What actions were justified according to the rules of warfare? How did orders issued by commanders impact the conduct of their soldiers? How did soldiers and civilians view and understand the destructiveness of war? What were the perceptions of civilized and uncivilized warfare? What influences shaped and guided how the conflict was justified and waged? In sum, a plethora of questions are open to further investigation.

Despite a tendency by some historians to formulate an argument, often in alignment with contemporary trends of thought, and then only provide evidence which supports such a claim, excluding evidence to the contrary, leading to a slanted or even ideological interpretation of events, my research methodology is to consider the actions which transpired, and the corresponding understanding of those events, through the eyes of the participants, by including a broad array of source material from multiple perspectives, affording the ability to then make general conclusions. Primary source material utilized includes diaries, letters, memoirs and reminiscences, newspaper editorials and accounts, and official reports from civilians and soldiers

involved in the campaigns. Confederates in the II Corps, in particular, many of whom resided from the Valley, were not only prominently involved in the collection of supplies in Pennsylvania, but also later witnessed the destruction in the Valley and as such left valuable insight into each campaign. Answers to such glaring questions also requires, in part, an application of moral philosophy to the understanding of history, that of Just War Theory to the American Civil War. Just War Theory utilizes man's rational capacity of moral recognition in determining not only when wars ought to be fought and for which reasons, but how, once the war has commenced, warfare ought to be waged.

Such a study wields both historical and moral significance. Of historical import is that the eventual outcome of the Civil War is inevitably linked with how the war was waged. But furthermore, as America's most destructive war, in terms of the human and material cost, the Civil War also exhibited a measure of restraint in comparison to other conflicts across time and space. Therefore, an understanding of the rules of war through a historical framework provides context for political and military leaders today and the future to limit the destructiveness of war.

Although histories of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign are namely written in relation to the Battle of Gettysburg, just war actions evident in the campaign sometimes appear, to a larger or lesser extent, as part of the larger work. In one of the first major histories of the campaign, the Comte de Paris, Phillipe d' Orléans, *The Battle of Gettysburg*, who served as an aide under General McClellan, assessed that for the first time in the war during the summer of 1863 the Northern populace were made to pay for the war. Yet, there was "neither plundering nor incendiarism."³ Despite demands to lay waste to Pennsylvania in "ashes and blood," Confederate

³ Phillipe d' Orléans, Comte de Paris, *The Battle of Gettysburg* (Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1886), 53.

generals understood that such means were neither conducive to achieving Southern independence nor in alignment with Southern values.⁴ Lee issued strict orders prohibiting pillaging in response to such criticism, recommending moderation and respect for non-combatants and demanding that his men discard thoughts of revenge, leading the Count to describe, “biographers of this Christian soldier may always quote as a model for such chieftains as may be called upon to lead an army of invasion.”⁵

This line of consideration continued into the twentieth century. Sir Frederick Maurice, *Robert E. Lee The Soldier*, emphasized the difference of character in Lee’s and Jackson’s vision of warfare, the latter holding a “fierce Puritanism,” which would have made war terrible. During the Gettysburg Campaign, Lee ordered that scrupulous respect be exhibited toward civilians and private property, that all supplies requisitioned should be paid for and that offenders would be punished for those who violated his directives. Lee stressed to Confederate President Jefferson Davis that these measures were necessary for military discipline, in accordance with the dictates of humanity, and in agreement with his policy to promote a pacific feeling in the North.⁶

Douglass Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, stressed the “friendly spirit of the invasion,” that despite the “realities of war,” Lee’s order respecting private property was, as a whole, implemented by Ewell’s troops and a reiteration of his order was followed by the entirety of the army. The main difficulty rested in officers trying to keep their men from partaking in minor abuses, such as snatching civilian hats as they marched through the streets.⁷ Freeman reflected,

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 54.

⁶ Sir Frederick Maurice, *Robert E. Lee The Soldier* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), 203.

⁷ Douglass Southall Freeman, *Lee*, orig., 1934 (New York: Scribner, 2008), 307, 318-319.

that although Lee's orders were written with an eye to the encouragement of the Northern peace movement, it was indeed "drafted in sincerity" and "enforced with vigor."⁸

Glenn Tucker, *High Tide at Gettysburg*, emphasized Lee's decision to make the campaign "outstanding for its humaneness."⁹ Despite many soldiers and prominent men in the South expecting a campaign of vengeance and retaliation, Lee effectively quelled such sentiment. Everything requisitioned was paid for at fair market value, though venial offenses such as pilfering food and using fence rails for firewood no doubt occurred. In total, Lee's campaign managed to treat Pennsylvania civilians charitably, while still bolstering the Confederate cause through the acquisition of necessary supplies and food as well as the destruction of legitimate military targets.¹⁰

In the classic study of the Gettysburg Campaign, Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, continued this line of thought. He considered that Lee adhered to a concept of old-fashioned limited war and "refrained from a deliberate program of terror," as later seen in the twentieth century. While to some of his contemporaries such ideas appeared "unduly chivalrous and unrealistic," to proponents of modern total war they seem "wholly quixotic."¹¹ Although Pennsylvanians feared the worst and indeed faced hardships, they "were fortunate that it was Lee," who commanded the army, "and not someone like General Early."¹² Reasons for such a lenient policy included the efficient collection of supplies and food, the maintenance of discipline, and perhaps to encourage the Northern peace movement. Despite abuses by some

⁸ Ibid., 318.

⁹ Glenn Tucker, *High Tide at Gettysburg: The Campaign in Pennsylvania*, orig., 1958 (Golden Springs Publishing, 2015), 24.

¹⁰ Ibid., 24-66.

¹¹ Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command*, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner's, 1968), 153.

¹² Ibid.

individual Confederate soldiers and the negative impacts of the Confederate mission of acquiring essential supplies, as a whole, the “army never got out of hand.”¹³ As a forerunner of historical interpretations to come, Coddington noted the reprehensible nature of the capture of fugitive slaves.¹⁴

Steven S. Sears, *Gettysburg*, noted that although the campaign did “not leave a trail of deadly mayhem” and the Confederates “did not apply the torch to Pennsylvania, excepting select military targets, it nonetheless laid a heavy hand on the local inhabitants of central Pennsylvania through “officially sanctioned confiscation.”¹⁵ He denoted that “hungry and footsore and vengeful rebel soldiers” sometimes undertook “Solomonic judgements.”¹⁶ However, Sears depicted a general pattern of the campaign, that is, the Confederates, at least the main portions of the army, “seized whatever they could . . . but without resort to violence.”¹⁷

In the late twentieth century, particular attention was brought to the history of civilians in the Gettysburg Campaign through studies focused upon local communities. Robert L. Bloom, “‘We Never Expected a Battle’: The Civilians at Gettysburg, 1863,” explored the experience of Gettysburg’s civilians, including the interactions of Confederate soldiers and citizens of the town. “Testimony as to the ratio between damage done deliberately and inadvertently,” he explained “is conflicting,”¹⁸ While some civilians, in their descriptions of events, held a partisan lens, others, who may have suffered “less damage to their possessions” or who were “less inconvenienced,” in the end “felt less aggrieved and thus harbored less resentment.”¹⁹ W. P.

¹³ Ibid., 178.

¹⁴ Ibid., 161.

¹⁵ Stephen S. Sears, *Gettysburg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 107.

¹⁶ Ibid., 96.

¹⁷ Ibid., 108.

¹⁸ Robert L. Bloom, “‘We Never Expected a Battle’: The Civilians at Gettysburg, 1863,” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 55 no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 182.

¹⁹ Ibid., 182-183.

Conrad and Ted Alexander highlighted a mixture of Confederate restraint and abuses in the Greencastle - Antrim locality in southern Franklin County, through which the majority of the Army of Northern Virginia passed.²⁰

J. Matthew Gallman, with Susan Baker, “Gettysburg’s Gettysburg,” looked at how the town itself fared before, during, and after the war. The town gained a unique position amongst other communities in the North, that is, “it endured a moment of invasion and destruction akin to that experienced in the South.”²¹ The long-term impact of destruction however was marginal. Gallman and Baker assessed, “Communities across the South fared more serious challenges that were measured in months and years, rather than hours and days. In this sense, Gettysburg shared much more in common with the rest of the Northern home front than with the beleaguered Confederacy.”²²

Steven E. Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, stressed that the conduct of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign, in “most respects . . . was no better or worse than the Union armies that marched through various parts of the South at different times during the war.”²³ He noted that Lee’s orders respecting private property had a “definite purpose,” to portray the South as morally superior, effectively a form of propaganda.²⁴ He assessed that the orders were not readily obeyed, that stolen items were paid for in worthless Confederate money or the additional “ploy” of receipts designating future payment, and that the

²⁰ W. P. Conrad and Ted Alexander, *When War Passes This Way*, repr. (Greencastle, PA: A Greencastle Bicentennial Publication in Cooperation with the Lilian S. Besore Memorial Library, 1982).

²¹ J. Matthew Gallman with Susan Baker, “Gettysburg’s Gettysburg: What the Battle Did to the Borough,” in *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows*, ed. Gabor S. Boritt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 148.

²² *Ibid.*, 173.

²³ Steven E. Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2008), 27.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

object of the campaign necessitated the capture of supplies and food.²⁵ In one respect, he reflected that the operation was exceptionally worse than Federal campaigns, the “kidnapping” of free African American citizens, “plundering with an ideological bent,” serving as a reminder of what the war was really about.²⁶

Although the Battle of Gettysburg has generated numerous studies, including some which include a brief overview of the conduct of Southern soldiers toward Pennsylvania civilians, only one work has focused exclusively on the topic. Jason M. Frawley, “Marching Through Pennsylvania: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians During the Gettysburg Campaign,” challenged what he deemed “the myth of Confederate restraint,” in its absolute form, toward Pennsylvania civilians, an understanding of Southern soldiers as wholly virtuous during the campaign.²⁷ He described that such “a significant misrepresentation of history” stemmed from Lost Cause mythology and continues to shape historical memory by defenders of the Lost Cause.²⁸ Although he desired “not to overstate the transgressions of Lee’s troops,” since there exists “ample evidence” to the contrary, his emphasis remained one of similarities. He accordingly described that “many of Lee’s men behaved themselves during the Gettysburg Campaign much like many Federal soldiers conducted themselves honorably during Union marches through the South.”²⁹ Frawley further emphasized that the “Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863 was exceptional for neither its humility nor its destructiveness—in fact, it was not all that different than Union marches through the South.”³⁰

²⁵ Ibid., 25-32.

²⁶ Ibid., 27.

²⁷ Jason Mann Frawley, “Marching Through Pennsylvania: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians During the Gettysburg Campaign,” Ph.D. Thesis, Texas Christian University, May 2008, 7, 9, 210.

²⁸ Ibid., 213.

²⁹ Ibid., 214.

³⁰ Ibid., 19.

Recent scholarship has focused on specific subjects of inquiry, often those significant to the modern conscience, such as slavery. Ted Alexander, “A Regular Slave Hunt: The Army of Northern Virginia and Black Civilians in the Gettysburg Campaign,” at least in his title, portrayed “kidnappings” as central to Lee’s campaign in Pennsylvania. He described that “the abduction of free blacks and fugitive slaves” is often an overlooked subject within the Gettysburg Campaign and his work attempted to shed light on the matter. Yet Alexander acknowledged that the “existing evidence of Confederate abductions of African-Americans in southern Pennsylvania,” ultimately “raises more questions than it answers.”³¹

James M. Paradis, *African Americans and The Gettysburg Campaign*, explored the roles African Americans assumed during the campaign, including those of teamsters, soldiers, and laborers, as well as civilians and refugees. Regarding the capture of fugitive slaves, he entitled a sub-chapter “Pennsylvania Blacks Flee a Mass Kidnapping.”³²

David G. Smith, *On the Edge of Freedom: The Fugitive Slave Issue in South Central Pennsylvania, 1820-1870*, labelled his section on the Gettysburg Campaign as “The Ultimate Slave Hunt: The Confederate Invasion of Pennsylvania.”³³ Although he conceded that the total captured “may never be known,” he wrote that “it does appear that scores, if not hundreds were taken.”³⁴ Notwithstanding the unknown, Smith described that the campaign “inflicted substantial disruption on the African American community.”³⁵ He also argued that an auxiliary reason for

³¹ Ted Alexander, “A Regular Slave Hunt: The Army of Northern Virginia and Black Civilians in the Gettysburg Campaign,” *North and South* 4 no. 7 (Sep. 2001): 82-88.

³² James M. Paradis, *African Americans and The Gettysburg Campaign*, sesquicentennial ed. (Lanham NC: The Scarecrow Press Inc, 2013), xiii.

³³ David G. Smith, *On the Edge of Freedom: The Fugitive Slave Issue in South Central Pennsylvania, 1820-1870* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 189.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 190.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

the move north was to relieve the agriculturally rich lower Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces as well as to “restore a critically needed labor force.”³⁶

One of the first histories detailing Sheridan’s Valley Campaign was George E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*. The work included an extensive overview of the campaign, including a chapter entitled, “Pursuing Early and Laying Waste the Valley,” but in a period of reconciliation between Northerners and Southerners, Pond expressed less judgment in his conclusions and more concern toward detailing the events which occurred. He did however denote that Sheridan was overwhelmingly successful in the Valley and accordingly his “sound military judgement and tactical skill had shown him to be one of the ablest and surest of the great Union soldiers.”³⁷

For much of the twentieth century Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, particularly works related the destruction of civilian property, remained an area of little interest, besides references found within county histories. Recent interest however, in the last forty years, perhaps coinciding with that of Just War Theory, has generated a number of scholarly works. Jeffrey D. Wert, *From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864*, mainly focused on the military operation and its significant battles, limiting Sheridan’s destruction to a brief, but rather concise depiction of the event. During Sheridan’s withdrawal down the Valley, Wert described that Federal soldiers, “methodically blasted, burned, slaughtered and devastated nearly everything which could sustain Early’s legions between the Alleghenies and the Blue Ridge. The destruction was systematic and purposeful, ravaging the upper Valley with a fury and power no natural force

³⁶ David G. Smith, “Clear the Valley”: The Shenandoah Valley and the Genesis of the Gettysburg Campaign,” *The Journal of Military History* 74, no. 4 (Oct. 2010): 1069 – 1096.

³⁷ George E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864* (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1884), 254.

had ever brought.”³⁸ Wert also provided an assessment that such actions held little in common with past understandings of justified actions within war. “The withdrawal was a deeper slide into the abyss, another inevitable step away from the past. . . . Americans had never before seen such demolition, executed with this skill and thoroughness.”³⁹

Only one work has focused exclusively on Sheridan’s destruction in the Valley. John L. Heatwole, *The Burning: Sheridan’s Devastation of the Shenandoah Valley*, considered this “under studied” period of American history deserving of a detailed study. He reflected that with such little analysis of “The Burning,” it was “as if there was an unconscious effort from the beginning to remove the face of civilian suffering from the picture as a whole.”⁴⁰ The civilians of the Valley witnessed greater destruction than “the populace in any other region during the war.”⁴¹ Indeed, they were caught up “in some of the most devastating days in American history.”⁴² Moreover, Heatwole argued the destruction wielded a measure of strategic import, significantly shaping the outcome of the war.⁴³

In a reappraisal of the destruction, Michael G. Mahon, *The Shenandoah Valley, 1861-1865: The Destruction of the Granary of the Confederacy*, argued that the destruction of the Valley’s agricultural production occurred not in one campaign, but rather throughout the war, from amongst other reasons, military campaigns and raids, Confederate taxation, Federal occupation, a diminishing labor force, and weather. He disputed the notion that Sheridan’s destruction of the Valley hastened the end of the war, since he argued, the Valley was eliminated

³⁸ Jeffrey D. Wert, *From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864*, originally published South Mountain Press, 1987 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997), 158.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ John L. Heatwole, *The Burning: Sheridan’s Devastation of the Shenandoah Valley* (Charlottesville, VA: Rockbridge Publishing, 1998); x.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, xii.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, x.

as a key source of supply as early as the end of 1862.⁴⁴ What Sheridan effectually accomplished was to “destroy what remained for local consumption.”⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Mahon reasoned that “a considerable degree of devastation” did occur, and civilians suffered the “prospect of abject starvation.”⁴⁶

Gary W. Gallagher, *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*, edited a number of articles, the majority of which focused on impactful battles and able leaders of the campaign, although several related to the home front, the changing nature of the fighting, along with soldier and civilian reactions to unfolding events. William G. Thomas, “Nothing Ought to Astonish Us: Confederate Civilians in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign,” studied the impact of “hard war” on the Valley’s civilians. Although many residents of the Valley held particular expectations on what the war would bring, the sheer destructiveness of Sheridan’s soldiers stunned the citizenry. He described that “The war changed from something largely distant and contained to something unpredictable and invasive.”⁴⁷

Aaron Sheehan Dean, “Success Is So Blended with Defeat: Virginia Soldiers in the Shenandoah Valley,” considered how the Valley’s civilians and soldiers understood and reacted to the destruction in the fall of 1864. Soldiers of the Valley intertwined their duties to family and country, namely because they acted in defending their own communities. Those who witnessed the destruction not only struggled to materially reorganize their army after battlefield defeats, but also “their conceptions of the changing nature of the war and of their role in it.” The destruction

⁴⁴ Michael G. Mahon, *The Shenandoah Valley: The Destruction of the Granary of the Confederacy, 1861-1865* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), xii, 117.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁴⁷ William G. Thomas, “Nothing Ought to Astonish Us: Confederate Civilians in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign,” in *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

failed to accomplish its intended effect, that is, soldiers and civilians of the Valley expressed righteous anger and continued resolve, rather than despondency and submission. In the end, Dean assessed, the “barn- and mill-burning campaign led by Sheridan” only fueled their anger “to a harder temper, producing a sullen sheen of bitterness and mistrust that lasted well into the postwar years.”⁴⁸

Andre M. Fleche “Uncivilized War: The Shenandoah Valley Campaign, the Northern Democratic Press, and the Election of 1864,” assessed how the understandings of “hard war” shaped and impacted the presidential election that year. Democrats highlighted the “uncivilized” manner by which the Lincoln and his generals waged war. They alleged that “a merciless abandonment of the rules of warfare,” proved counterproductive, in that, it only hardened the resolve of Southerners to continue the war. Moreover, they worried abuses against private property against Southerners, “in pursuit of victory,” wielded the dangers of Constitutional rights in the North. Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, in particular, “epitomized all that Democrats perceived as wrong in the Republican- led war effort,” including the “wanton destruction of cropland.” Some Northern Democrats praised the way in which Lee waged war, because he “continued to view war as a contest between opposing armies that left civilians relatively undistributed.” The Democrats found in George B. McClellan, a presidential candidate whose conception of warfare matched that of Lee’s. Although they failed in their endeavor to gain an electoral victory, the Democrats hoped to win the 1864 election by criticizing military policy “that sought victory through ‘uncivilized’ means.”⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Aaron Sheehan Dean, “Success Is So Blended with Defeat: Virginia Soldiers in the Shenandoah Valley,” in *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*.

⁴⁹ Andre M. Fleche “Uncivilized War: The Shenandoah Valley Campaign, the Northern Democratic Press, and the Election of 1864,” in *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

Joseph Wheelen, “The Burning: Phil Sheridan determined to Show the Rebels a Hot Time in the Shenandoah Valley,” adapted from his biography of Sheridan, *Terrible Swift Sword: The Life of General Philip H. Sheridan*, referenced the destruction implemented by Sheridan as “calculated,” “methodical,” and “systematic.” He described that Federal leaders concluded, in addition to the attrition of Confederate manpower, in order to promptly bring the war to a victorious conclusion, “the war’s awfulness must also be carried to the doorsteps of Southern civilians, whose defiance kept the Confederacy alive.” They reasoned that the usage of guerilla warfare by the South “justified their jettisoning the old rules.” This conception of war “to sow ruin throughout the enemy homeland, wrecking the South's war industries, despoiling its farmlands and bringing hunger into the homes of its people,” was “never set down as policy, but its outlines were clearly visible” during Sheridan’s Valley Campaign.⁵⁰

Jeannie Cummings Harding, “Retaliation with Restraint: Destruction of Private Property in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign,” demonstrated the escalation of retaliatory warfare. Although she stated that an increase in the levels of destruction “would be an oversimplification,” she specified that “the destruction did seem to become less discriminate and more widespread as the campaign progressed.”⁵¹ Despite the increase in retaliation, she discovered that both sides, soldiers and civilians alike, ultimately “decided that hard war had limits.”⁵²

⁵⁰ Joseph Wheelen, “The Burning: Phil Sheridan determined to Show the Rebels a Hot Time in the Shenandoah Valley,” *America’s Civil War* 25, no. 5 (Nov. 2012); Joseph Wheelen, “Burning the Valley, August – November 1864,” in *Terrible Swift Sword: The Life of General Philip H. Sheridan* (Da Capo Press 2012), 121-137.

⁵¹ Jeannie Cummings Harding, “Retaliation with Restraint: Destruction of Private Property in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign,” Master’s Thesis, James Madison University, 2013, vi, 102.

⁵² *Ibid.*, vii.

Mark E. Neeley Jr., *The Civil War and The Limits of Destruction*, presented a revisionist assessment of the devastation incurred during “The Burning.” In a chapter entitled “The Shenandoah Valley: Sheridan and Scorched Earth,” Neeley downplayed the destructive element of the campaign, presenting it largely as a myth, and concluded that Sheridan did not employ a scorched earth policy. He emphasized, “The loose expression ‘the burning’ has served too long to obscure a more controlled and less complete series of acts in need of more precise description.”⁵³

The history of slavery within the Valley, has also been brought to the forefront of historical inquiry. Jonathan Noyalas, *Slavery and Freedom in the Shenandoah Valley During the Civil War Era*, focused on how African Americans in the Valley “resisted their enslavement,” including undertaking roles as soldiers, spies, teamsters, and laborers. Despite the “uncertain nature of freedom” throughout the war because of shifting occupations and varied Federal policies, by Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, freedom for slaves became more certain. However, both civilians loyal to the Federal government, or at least passive in their resistance, as well as free blacks, who owned property in the Valley, suffered from the destruction occurring during the campaign.⁵⁴

Only a few scholars have written works related to both campaigns. Edward J. Stackpole presented two independent related works. In *They Met at Gettysburg*, he devoted a chapter to the question “How the Confederates Behaved” and provided a few answers in the corresponding subsections, including “Confederate Conduct is Generally Good” and “Lee Restrains his Army.”

⁵³ Mark E. Neely Jr, *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 111.

⁵⁴ Jonathan Noyalas, *Slavery and Freedom in the Shenandoah Valley During the Civil War Era* (University Press of Florida, 2021).

Stackpole considered that while the history of warfare provided “few examples of forbearance by invading troops . . . Lee’s invasion of the North was one of the better examples.”⁵⁵ He also analyzed that Lee may have decided upon a conciliatory policy of respecting private property in order to influence foreign nations and those in the north favoring peace or his orders may have emanated strictly from his character, “with no ulterior motive.”⁵⁶

In *Sheridan in the Shenandoah: Jubal Early’s Nemesis*, Stackpole presented a more traditional military history and he reserved only one page to describe what he labelled the “Systematic Destruction of the Valley.”⁵⁷ In particular, Stackpole held a positive view of Sheridan’s abilities as a general, that is, “because the world loves a winner,” Sheridan’s errors paled “into insignificance when contrasted with his accomplishments.”⁵⁸ Because of this, he further emphasized that Sheridan “deserved the plaudits and gratitude of the Nation which he had done so much to preserve.”⁵⁹

In two separate works, Edward L. Ayers, undertook focused studies of local communities in proximate location to the border, including those of Franklin County Pennsylvania in the Cumberland Valley and Augusta County Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley. Within, *In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863*, Ayers described that “Lee seized the opportunity to show how an army should behave on enemy soil.”⁶⁰ He demanded his soldiers act “like Christian soldiers” and “not like the invading hordes,” under notorious Federal

⁵⁵ Edward J. Stackpole, *The Met at Gettysburg: A Step-By-Step Retelling of the Battle with Maps, Photos, Firsthand Accounts* (Harrisonburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1956), 27.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Edward J. Stackpole, *Sheridan in the Shenandoah: Jubal Early’s Nemesis* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1961), 269-270.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 399.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Edward L. Ayers, *In The Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 401

commanders. The policy brought both approval and disappointment.⁶¹ While “the line between fair dealing and retribution remained unclear,” ultimately Confederate soldiers “did not live up to Northern fears.”⁶² Acts of destruction were limited, in the main, to infrastructure targets, and the accumulation of military necessities such as horses and cattle were certainly within the rules of war. “One great exception,” wrote Ayers was “the carrying away of free negroes.”⁶³ He expanded upon this aspect of the Gettysburg campaign in *The Thin Light of Freedom: The Civil War and Emancipation in the Heart of America*, in addition to detailing an assessment of Sheridan's Valley Campaign, namely, that the destruction incurred during “The Burning” was more limited than it appeared at the time, in contrast with traditional interpretations of the event, and corresponding with revisionist ones.⁶⁴

James O. Lehman and Steven M. Nolt, *Mennonites, Amish, and the American Civil War*, detailed the experiences of religious pacifists during both campaigns. Those residing in the Cumberland Valley suffered significant property losses, but despite “occasional pillaging,” there was “little systematic destruction of civilian property.”⁶⁵ In the autumn of 1864, however, those residing in the Shenandoah suffered to an even greater degree. After Sheridan implemented Grant’s policy of “hard war,” the Valley garnered “a legacy of blackened ruin that served as a graphic counterpoint to the storied lushness of the area.”⁶⁶

Thus, the historical understandings of *jus in bello* actions within Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan’s Valley Campaign have changed over time. Initial interpretations of

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 402.

⁶³ Ibid. 405.

⁶⁴ Edward L. Ayers, *The Thin Light of Freedom: The Civil War and Emancipation in the Heart of America* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017).

⁶⁵ James O. Lehman and Steven M. Nolt, *Mennonites, Amish, and the American Civil War* (John Hopkins University Press, 2007), 133,

⁶⁶ Ibid., 199.

Lee's Gettysburg Campaign emphasized, in general, the good conduct of Confederate soldiers, with appropriate allowance afforded for the hardships endured by Pennsylvania civilians. Recent histories have rather highlighted Confederate abuses while in Pennsylvania, arguing that the campaign was conducted similarly to Federal campaigns throughout the South, and in regard to the issue of slavery, it proved substantially worse. Histories of Sheridan's Valley Campaign have also shifted. Early works stressed the greatness of Sheridan as a military commander, within more traditional military histories, while recent works have highlighted the destruction and the impact such devastation wielded on the civilian populace and the Confederate war effort. Among these recent works, interpretations are evident which underscore the widespread or limited nature of the destruction. In light of shifting interpretations and the recent attention afforded to the impact of war upon the civilian populace, comparative research on the conduct of the armies within both campaigns, related to *jus in bello* considerations, would certainly fill gaps in the literature by placing such actions at the forefront of the research.

The first two chapters are arranged sequentially focusing upon what happened in the corresponding campaigns so as to provide a firm basis by which comparisons can thenceforth be brought to light. The comparative chapters form the second half of the dissertation arranged according to topic, related to why events unfolded as they did and how soldiers and civilians understood and reacted to what transpired. Chapter Two provides an overview of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign. It answers questions related to the conduct of the Army of Northern Virginia towards Pennsylvania civilians. Chapter Three provides details concerning Sheridan's Valley Campaign and answers questions related to the conduct of Federal officers and soldiers towards Virginia civilians. Chapter Four explores similarities between the two campaigns. Topics include the geographic and demographic environment in which the fighting took place,

the implementation and impact of conventional warfare, understandings of civilized and uncivilized warfare, influences which helped to moderate violence, and the restraint exhibited in comparison to total warfare in the twentieth century. Chapter Five examines differences between the two campaigns, including, among other topics, conceptions of warfare, time differences, the implementation and impact of conventional warfare in comparison to “hard war,” and the issue of slavery. As a whole, a comparison between Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan’s Valley Campaign would uncover significant historical insights regarding how the fighting in the American Civil War was waged.

Chapter 2: Lee's Gettysburg Campaign

In the summer of 1863, General Robert E. Lee launched the Confederacy's first and only major offensive in Northern territory. He expected to accomplish a number of strategic goals in the movement, which would push the tide of war in the South's favor. With an offensive into Pennsylvania for the summer decided upon, a new question presented itself, that is, what ought to be the conduct of Confederate troops while campaigning in enemy territory. The Federal Government had recently issued on April 24th General Order No. 100, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, more commonly known as the "Lieber Code," after its principal author Francis Lieber, but because the Confederate Government had up to this point operated mainly on the strategic defensive, no official regulations were formed on their part.¹ Despite differences of opinion throughout the South as to whether they should pursue a campaign of retaliatory destruction, or a more civilized form of warfare while in Pennsylvania, the question essentially remained one for Lee to decide, and for him, it was never really a question. The campaign would be pursued in a civilized manner with respect exhibited toward civilians and private property.

The Army of Northern Virginia, divided into three infantry corps of approximately 20,000 men each, and a cavalry corps of about 10,000 men, advanced northward during the month of June 1863. As early as June 15th, Brigadier General Albert G. Jenkins' cavalry brigade

¹ Francis Lieber, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field or General Order No. 100* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863.)

crossed the Pennsylvania border. When the command reached Chambersburg on June 16th, Jenkins' first concern was to secure the public stores owned by the federal government. "The first thing they asked for when they came, was for the Quartermaster and commissary stores but they were all safe in Harrisburg," described Mr. Rutherford. The seminarian considered that "they seem pretty civil," as none had set foot on the seminary grounds, although later they fired on one man who ran into the seminary yard. The town was placed under martial law. No one could "leave without a guard at their heels."² Rutherford further observed that when they learned that "the most valuable things had been sent off or hidden before they arrived . . . they were a good deal disappointed."³

Because of the rapidity of the approach, many inhabitants in their haste to flee the city dropped various items, such as "clothes and household utensils," which were found scattered in the streets. Lieutenant Hermann Schuricht of the 14th Virginia Cavalry was ordered with part of his company "to move this unprotected property safely into the houses of its probable owners."⁴ Jenkins established his headquarters at the Courthouse, positioned pickets around the town, and scoured the country for horses, cattle, and sheep. The majority of the command encamped four miles north of town.⁵

Jenkins ordered the dry goods, grocery, and drug stores to be opened for at least two hours to allow his men to make purchases, "all of which were to be paid for, but, of course, in Confederate money."⁶ However, he "assured the citizens nothing should be taken but such

² Rutherford, Account of the Rebels Visit, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Hermann Schuricht "Jenkins Brigade in the Gettysburg Campaign: Extracts from the Diary of Lieutenant Hermann Schuricht, of the Fourteenth Virginia Cavalry," *Southern Historical Society Papers* 24, ed. J. William Jones. From the *Richmond Dispatch*. April 5, 1896. June 16, 1863.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Alexander Kelly McClure, *Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1905), 92-93.

clothing, provisions and drugs as the men needed.”⁷ The consequence for noncompliance was the forced opening of the stores and the taking of necessary supplies. Jemima Cree noted, “The General said there should be no goods touched except such as were really useful to the soldiers, and if any disobeyed orders, they would be punished. They behaved nicely.”⁸

The banks had sent away their money, stores their goods, and farmers their horses and cattle. They did however clean out what remained, although Jenkins’ orders respecting private property were strictly enforced. When one soldier seized some remnants of “ladies’ dress goods” from Jacob Hoke’s general store, which he deemed not worth hiding, Jenkins caught the man “by the back of the neck and ran him back into the store on the double – quick.”⁹ He then inquired if the soldier had gotten the items from his store and if he paid for them. When Hoke told him that he had taken them from his store without paying for them, “the General drew his sword, and flourishing it above the man’s head and swearing terribly, said, ‘I’ve a mind to cut your head off.’ Then turning to us he said, ‘Sell my men all the goods they want; but if any one attempts to take anything with out paying for it, report to me at my head-quarters.’”¹⁰ He emphasized to the store keeper, “We are not thieves.”¹¹ Officers in the quartermaster, commissary, and medical departments set to work collecting piles of hats, boots, shoes, clothes, and medicinal drugs. Amos Stouffer expressed that, the “rebs are mannerly yet and do not disturb private property. They have their pickets all around us.”¹²

⁷ Valley Spirit, July 8, 1863. Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

⁸ Mrs. Jemina Cree, “Jenkins Raid,” *Kittochtinny Historical Society Papers* 5 (March 1905 - February 1908): 95, Franklin County Historical Society, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

⁹ Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion of 1863 or Lee in Pennsylvania* (Dayton, OH: W. J. Shuey Publisher, 1887), 109-110.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹² Amos Stouffer, *Diary of Amos Stouffer (1863)*, *The Valley of the Shadow: Two Communities in the American Civil War*, Virginia Center for Digital History, University of Virginia (hereafter cited as VS). June 16, 1863.

Jenkins also ordered the Chief Burgess, Colonel Hockinson, to have the town's citizens bring in all the arms, muskets, pistols, sabers, etc., to the courthouse for confiscation, in the belief that his men had been fired upon by a citizen the night previous. He provided a deadline of two hours. A committee of citizens were ordered to take the names of all those who brought in a weapon. For those who failed to comply, it meant they would have to face the consequence of a search of their house and seizure of the weapons. The citizens accordingly brought forth between 450 and 500 weapons, enough to satisfy Jenkins. Only a few of the weapons were considered of sufficient value for military purposes, many being antiques, partially broken, shot guns, or of light caliber. Captain Fitzhugh, Jenkins's chief of staff, sorted the weapons deciding which ones to keep, destroy, or return to their owners. Union flags were also subject to confiscation. The penalty for concealing a firearm or flag included the payment of ten times its value or taking a trip to Richmond.¹³

There was also a search for runaway slaves, many of whom had fled from portions of the Union occupied lower Valley. "All forenoon they were carrying away mens clothing & darkeys," recorded Rachel Cormany.¹⁴ Rutherford described that they "sent them in droves to Hagerstown. They said they would not leave a contraband in Chambersburg."¹⁵ The Chambersburg *Valley Spirit* chronicled the event, which even included taking some of those who were free. "In their departure, this force of Jenkins carried away a large number of our colored population, old and young, male and female. Some of these were 'contrabands,' who had come to us from Virginia, but many of them were free, and had been born here and had lived here all their lives."¹⁶ William

¹³ *Valley Spirit*, July 8, 1863.

¹⁴ Rachel Cormany, *Diary of Rachel Cormany* (1863), VS, June 17, 1863.

¹⁵ Rutherford, *Account of the Rebel Visit*, 6.

¹⁶ *Valley Spirit*, July 8, 1863.

Heyser estimated Jenkins' troopers having taken as many as two hundred and fifty colored people "again into bondage."¹⁷

Military targets were destroyed including the dismantlement of the Scotland Bridge, a key piece of the Cumberland Valley Railroad which spanned the Conococheage Creek, and telegraph connections. Toward the evening of June 17th, Jenkins withdrew southward. A few members of the rear guard fired the warehouse of Oaks & Linn, but some of the nearby citizens quickly extinguished it. Cree considered it "a small matter" and not much damage was done.¹⁸

In addition to the raid upon Chambersburg, upon his withdrawal, Jenkins sent detachments towards the west and east, namely, to collect horses and cattle. On the night of June 18th, Colonel Ferguson with a command of about 200 troopers rode through Mercersburg and Cove Gap in North Mountain toward McConnellsburg. The next day, in Mercersburg, Dr. Philip Schaff, the head of the town's Marshall College, observed the command return from Fulton County with 200 captured cattle, 120 horses, and two or three negro boys.¹⁹ The same day, June 19th, a command under Hermann Schuricht veered eastward toward Waynesborough to capture horses and cattle.²⁰ Thereafter, Jenkins' brigade withdrew to southern Franklin County, where they remained collecting horses and cattle. From Winchester, on June 23rd, Kate Sperry heard of Jenkins capture of stock and accordingly penned "Gen. Jenkins is 'playing hob' with Union folks in Penn. Got a great many horses and cattle."²¹

Rather than destroying property, Jenkins role in his advanced raid was the capture of necessary supplies, paid for with Confederate money, a good deal of which however had been

¹⁷ William Heyser, Diary, June 18, 1863.

¹⁸ Cree, "Jenkins Raid," 98.

¹⁹ Philip Schaff, "The Gettysburg Week," *Scribner's Magazine* 16 (July-December 1894).

²⁰ Hermann Schuricht, June 19-20, 1863.

²¹ Kate S. (Sarah Catherine) Sperry, Sperry Diary, vol. 5, Library of Virginia, Accession Number 28532. Richmond, Virginia, 424 (hereafter cited as LV).

sent or secreted away. “Jenkins command did not destroy much property,” described Colonel Alexander K. McClure. “There was little left in the country that was useful to the army.”²² L. L. Huston communicated to her brother that the rebels “destroyed nothing but took all the good horses about Chambersburg.”²³ Major General Robert Rodes reported the success of the operation, in the collecting of supplies needed by the army, “during which time, with the aid of General Jenkins’ cavalry, the commissaries and quartermasters obtained, in a proper manner, large supplies in their respective departments.”²⁴ Hoke estimated that the loss during Jenkins’ raid was not less than \$100,000.²⁵

Before the main portions of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River, Lee issued stringent orders, officially entitled General Orders No. 72, on June 21st, concerning the behavior of his troops while in enemy territory. The order established rules for gathering needed supplies and emphasized respect for private property. Supplies and food would be purchased at fair market price by authorized officers in their respective departments. If payment in Confederate money was declined, the officer was then ordered to provide a receipt as evidence for future reimbursement. Both methods of requisitioning included the requirement that officers make duplicate copies detailing the name of the person, the quantity and kind of property, the price, and the intended use of the articles, one for the individual who supplied the goods and one for the chief of the department for which the goods were appropriated. Noncompliance meant that the required property could then be seized. The orders also warned of consequences for individual abuses to private property.

²² A. K. McClure, “Old Time Notes,” 92.

²³ L. L. Huston to Her Brother David Line, Milton Embick Flower Collection, Civil War Research Confederate Invasion, MG-207-013-012, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

²⁴ U.S. Government Printing Office, *The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, series I, vol. 27, part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 550 (hereafter cited as OR [Official Records] and all references refer to series I).

²⁵ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 113.

While in the enemy's country, the following regulations for procuring supplies will be strictly observed, and any violation of them promptly and vigorously punished:

I. No private property shall be injured or destroyed by any person belonging to or connected with the army, or taken, except by the officer hereinafter designated.

II. The chiefs of the Commissary, Quartermaster, Ordnance and Medical departments of the army will make requisitions upon the local authorities or inhabitants for the necessary supplies for their respective departments, designating the places and times of delivery. All persons complying with such requisitions shall be paid the market price for the articles furnished, if they so desire, and the officer making such payment shall make duplicate receipts for the same, specifying the name of the person paid, and the quantity, kind, and price of the property, one of which receipts shall be at once forwarded to the chief of the department to which such officer is attached.

III. Should the authorities or inhabitants neglect or refuse to comply with such requisition, the supplies required shall be taken from the nearest inhabitants so refusing, by the order and under the directions of the respective Chiefs of the Departments named.

IV. When any command is detached from the main body, the chiefs of the several departments of such command will procure supplies for the same, and such other stores as they may be ordered to provide, in the manner and subject to the provisions herein prescribed, reporting their action to the heads of their respective departments, to which they will forward duplicates of all vouchers given or received.

V. All persons who shall decline to receive payment for property furnished on requisitions, and all from whom it shall be necessary to take stores or supplies, shall be furnished by the officers receiving or taking the same with a receipt specifying the kind and the quantity of the property received or taken, as the case may be, the name of the person from whom it was received or taken, the command for the use of which it is intended, and the market price. A duplicate of said receipt shall be at once forwarded to the chief of the department to which the officer by whom it is executed is attached.

VI. If any person shall remove or conceal property necessary for the use of the army, or attempt to do so, the officers herein before mentioned will cause such property and all other property belonging to such persons that may be required by the army, to be seized, and the officer seizing the same will forthwith report to the chief of his department the kind, quantity and market price of the property so seized, and the name of the owner.²⁶

²⁶ General Orders, No. 72, Hdqrs., Army of Northern Virginia, June 21, 1863, R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General, By command of General R. E. Lee. OR, vol. 27 (3): 912-913; *Franklin Repository*, July 15, 1863, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Jacob Hoke considered that the object of the order was "to prevent the indiscriminate plunder of our people and to confine the demands of the army, and the methods to be employed in securing them, within the limits of civilized warfare. Under the regulations prescribed private property was to be respected, and in

The orders were in accordance with established Just War Theory. The Lieber Code stipulated, “Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offences of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other benefit of the army . . . If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated owner to obtain indemnity.”²⁷

Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell’s II Corps spearheaded the advance across the Pennsylvania border. He issued General Orders No. 49 on June 22nd, like Lee, concerning the conduct of his own troops, while in enemy territory.

In moving in the enemy’s country the utmost circumspection and vigilance are necessary for the safety of the army and the success of the great object it has to accomplish depends upon the observance of the most rigid discipline, The Lieut. General commanding, therefore, most earnestly appeals to the officers and men of his commanding, who have attested their bravery and devotion to the cause of their country on so many battle fields, to yield a ready acquiescence in the rules required by the exigencies of the case. All straggling and marauding from the ranks, and all marauding and plundering by individuals are prohibited, upon pain of the severest penalties known to the service. What is required for the use of the army will be taken under regulations to be established by the Commanding General, according to the rules of civilized warfare. Citizens of the country through which the army may pass, who are not in the military service, are admonished to abstain from all acts of hostility, upon the penalty of being dealt with in a summary manner: A ready acquiescence to the demands of the military authorities will serve greatly to lessen the rigors of war.²⁸

no case taken except when needed by the army, and then only by officers specially charged for that duty.” Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 175

²⁷ Francis Lieber, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, 12; E. P. Alexander explained the rationale for giving receipts. The stringent orders specified, “giving formal receipts in all cases, that the owners might have no difficulty in establishing claims and receiving payment at fair prices.” Edward Porter Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative*, by E. P. Alexander, with Sketch-Maps by the Author (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907), 372.

²⁸ General Orders No. 49, Hdqrs. Second Army Corps, By command of Lieut. Gen. R. S. Ewell – A. L. Pendleton, A. A. Gen. For a broadside of the order printed at the office of the ‘German Reform & Messenger’ Chambersburg, Pa, see Broadside General Orders No. 49, Headquarters 2nd Corps, Army Northern Virginia, June 22, 1863, by command of Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell, A. S. Pendleton, A.A. General, University of Virginia Archives, Albert & Shirley Small Special Collections Library, John L. Nau III Civil War History Collection, MSS 16459, Charlottesville, Virginia (hereafter cited as UVA); *Franklin Repository*, July 15, 1863. Jacob Hoke believed the order was issued by Ewell unbeknownst of Lee’s similar order, since Lee was still in Virginia at the time and Ewell in Pennsylvania. Jacob Hoke, *Historical Reminiscences of the War or Incidents which*

Set to initiate the campaign in enemy territory, Ewell went further than Lee, by not only detailing rules, but providing an explanation of their necessity, as he had previously done concerning captured federal property. He deemed military discipline essential to the success of their movements. Straggling and individual pillaging were averse to the maintenance of that discipline. He complimented his men by acknowledging their courage and patriotism, evident in previous battles, and sincerely appealed to them that they should follow Lee's regulations for the collection of supplies, which would shortly become known to them. But, in order to ensure Lee's and his orders were followed, he warned his own soldiers that disregard for the rules meant facing the direst consequences. Such orders he emphasized were drafted so that they may wage a war in a civilized manner. The order also warned Pennsylvanian citizens, distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, not to engage in acts of war or they may face appropriate consequences according to the case. Although Ewell understood warfare brought with it corresponding hardships upon the populace, he nevertheless stressed that such hardships could be lessened with the cooperation of the people.

On the same day, understanding that maintaining discipline amongst detached cavalry posed a significant challenge, Lee wrote to Ewell specifying that he establish firm command over his attached cavalry, suggesting that he send a staff officer to remain with Jenkins. Lee stressed that "every exertion should . . . be made to locate and secure" supplies, particularly flour for bread, the staple of a Civil War soldier's diet. Most prominently, Lee sent Ewell a copy of General Orders No. 72, informing him of his own belief in such a policy as well as exhorting him to ensure its implementation. "I send you copies of a general order on this subject, which I think

Transpired in and About Chambersburg during the War of the Rebellion (Chambersburg, PA: M. A. Foltz, Printer and Publisher, 1884), 51.

is based on rectitude and sound policy, and the spirit of which I wish you to see enforced in your command.”²⁹ To end the dispatch, Lee expressed his gratitude to Ewell for the success attained thus far and assured him of his confidence in his future actions.³⁰

Ewell crossed the Potomac River and the Pennsylvania border on June 22nd with Rodes division in advance. When Rodes reached Greencastle, he received Lee’s General Orders No. 72, although, like Ewell, he expected such a course of conduct, “At Greencastle, the orders of General Lee, regulating the conduct of troops and officers of all departments while in the enemy’s country, were received, but they had in substance been anticipated by orders first from the division and then from corps headquarters.”³¹

Lee’s orders were communicated not only to the officers, but to the soldiers as well. Robert Stiles, attached to the Charlottesville Artillery recollected that when they entered Pennsylvania, “General Lee had issued stringent orders against plundering.”³² During the march from Marion to Chambersburg on June 24th, Richard Emory Park recorded “General Lee has issued orders prohibiting all misconduct or lawlessness, and urging utmost forbearance and kindness to all.”³³ A member of the Stonewall Brigade in Johnson’s division, John O. Casler, described that although that members of his unit thought they would “have a fine time plundering in the enemy’s county, and live fine,” after crossing the Potomac, “General Lee had orders read out that we were not to molest any of the citizens, or take any private property, and any soldier caught plundering would be shot.”³⁴ Isaac Gordon Bradwell, in Gordon’s brigade,

²⁹ OR, vol. 27 (3): 914.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ OR, vol. 27 (2): 551.

³² Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1903), 199. Stiles, later reflected that “certainly in the main, the men carefully observed these orders.”

³³ Richard Emory Park, *Richard Emory Park War Diary 28 January – July 1863*, LV, Robert Alonzo Brock Collection. BR 631, 32.

³⁴ John O. Casler, *Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade*, 2nd ed. (Girard, KS: Appeal Publishing Company, 1906), 168.

wrote that General Lee's strict orders "were read to us as soon as we crossed Mason and Dixon's line."³⁵ In general, during this initial advance across the border, the orders were followed. Rodes reported that the conduct of his troops, composed of North Carolinians, Georgians, Alabamians, and Virginians, "was entirely in accordance with those orders, and challenged the admiration of their commanding officers, while it astonished the people along the line of march."³⁶

In Greencastle, on June 23rd, Ewell issued requisitions to the town's authorities. Chief Quartermaster of the II Corps, Major J. A. Harman, requested 100 saddles and bridles and 12 pistols, to be furnished by 2:00 p.m. Chief of the commissary department, Major A. M. Mitchell asked for onions, sauerkraut, potatoes, radishes, and other foodstuffs. Chief of the ordinance department, William Allen, requested 2,000 pounds of lead, 1,000 pounds of leather, 100 pistols, 12 boxes of tin, and 200 curry-combs and brushes. Chief of the Topographical Engineers, Jedediah Hotchkiss, asked for 2 maps of Franklin County. The town council replied however that the demands could not be filled, and no effort was made to enforce them. The Confederates did however secure some saddles and bridles as well as a good deal of leather. The stores were opened for business, but only a few transactions transpired.³⁷ Edward A. Moore, of the Rockbridge Artillery relayed that "many of the stores were open and full of goods," but since the citizens "refused to take Confederate money, and we were forbidden to plunder, we passed on, feeling aggrieved, and went into camp a few miles beyond."³⁸ Although the people of Greencastle were "skerd to death" as Confederate soldier J. F. Coghill put it, they "treated them with respect."³⁹

³⁵ I. G. Bradwell, "The Burning of Wrightsville, PA," *Confederate Veteran*, 27, no 1 (Jan. 1919): 300.

³⁶ OR, vol. 27 (2): 551.

³⁷ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 134.

³⁸ Edward A. Moore, *The Story of a Cannoneer Under Stonewall Jackson: In Which Is Told the Part Taken by the Rockbridge Artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1907), 182.

³⁹ J. F. Coghill, J. F. Coghill to Pappy, Ma and Mit, VS, June 25, 1863.

Rodes expressed considerable dismay over Jenkins inability to hold Chambersburg until the arrival of his division. “The result,” Rodes later reported, “was that most of the property in that place which would have been of service to the troops, such as boots, hats, leather, &c., was removed or concealed before it was reoccupied.”⁴⁰ However, on June 23rd, Jenkins entered Chambersburg again at 10:00 a.m. About 300 troopers entered town, while the others took positions in the vicinity. A committee of prominent citizens met Jenkins and were “given to understand private property would be respected, but they were to furnish provisions for 1,500 men,” William Heyser described. He further detailed, “The Rebels behave very well. Not a citizen molested or a house visited. We complied very well with their demands.”⁴¹ They proceeded to the public square and cut down all the telegraph poles and destroyed the wires. Beyond town they commenced to tear up the railroad generating fires with the cross ties and throwing the iron rails onto the fire in order to warp them. The Scotland bridge had been partially repaired by the Federal militia and after an attempt to burn the bridge proved futile, as the wet timber would not easily catch, they commenced cutting and sawing pieces of the bridge to ensure its inaccessibility.⁴²

Captain Moorman, commanding Company D of the 14th Cavalry and Major Bryan of Rodes Division led an expedition eastward to South Mountain to capture horses. On June 21st, the command of about 120 men passed through Leisterburg, crossed Monterrey Pass, and entered Fairfield in Adams County, encountering enemy pickets. The next day they returned to the mountains reaching Mr. Use’s Iron Works at 1 a.m. and, upon demand, were furnished with provisions. On June 23rd, the detachment reached Caledonia Iron Works and acquired 26 horses

⁴⁰ OR, vol. 27 (2): 551.

⁴¹ William Heyser, *Diary, of William Heyser (1862-1863)*, VS, June 23, 1863; Can also be found in the *Kittochtinny Historical Society Papers*.

⁴² *Ibid.*

and 22 mules with their gear. They collected rations from the overseer of the works and moved to Greenwood where they required citizens to feed the men and horses. That night, they returned to Greencastle and later on June 24th they rejoined their regiment at Chambersburg.⁴³

On June 24th, Rodes' infantry marched in pristine order through town and bivouacked 2 ½ miles beyond on the Conococheague Creek. They sung and cheered as they marched along, and their bands played Southern tunes. Colonel Cullen A. Battle, commanding the 3rd Alabama, was left as a guard to protect "people, property &c."⁴⁴ He described, "Never were people more surprised than the citizens of Chambersburg when they found they were in the hands of gentlemen."⁴⁵ He quickly discovered that residents of the town kept but little provisions on hand, perhaps to last a day or so, in contrast to the wealth of sustenance in the countryside, as the bulk of their supplies were stored in the warehouses. "Hence they came to us for means of subsistence" recorded Battle. "Some would ask for flour, and others for various articles necessary for their comfort. In almost every instance their requests were granted."⁴⁶

Ewell arrived in Chambersburg on Wednesday June 24th, as "a man of business." He appointed Colonel Willis, of the 12th Georgia, as Provost Marshall, who established his headquarters at the Courthouse and raised a Confederate flag from the cupula. Ewell established his own headquarters in the Franklin Hotel and issued a requisition on the innkeepers for

⁴³ Hermann Schuricht, June 21-24, 1863; Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 112-113.

⁴⁴ OR, vol. 27 (2): 551.

⁴⁵ Cullen A. Battle, *Third Alabama!: The Civil War Memoir of Brigadier General Cullen Andrews Battle*, CSA, new ed., ed. Brandon H. Beck (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2000), 81.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Battle also expressed, "When about to leave town after having been there five or 6 days a number of citizens headed by the mayor came and thanked the commander and the regiment for the uniform curtesy and kindness shown the people of Chambersburg during their occupancy of the town."

mattresses, blankets, quilts, sheets, and bed clothing to be delivered to the public-school building on King Street, where he intended to establish a hospital for the sick of his corps.⁴⁷

In order to ensure the good conduct of his troops, Ewell immediately issued upon his arrival General Orders No. 1 prohibiting nearly all sales of alcohol.

- I. The sale of intoxicating liquors to this command, without written permission from a major – general, is strictly prohibited.
- II. Persons having liquor in their possession are required to report the fact to the provost – marshal, or the nearest general officer, stating the amount and kind, that a guard may be placed over it, and the men prevented from getting it.
- III. Any violation of Part I. of these orders, or failure to comply with Part II., will be punished by the immediate confiscation of all liquors in the possession of the offending parties, besides rendering their other property liable to seizure.⁴⁸

Accordingly, instances of drunkenness were few and far between. The observant Hoke wrote that “If there were any cases of drunkenness among the soldiers, I did not see it.”⁴⁹

As the authorities of the town had fled, Ewell issued requisitions to the principal businessmen in the parlor of the bank, the sustenance and supplies of which were to be brought to the pavement just outside the Courthouse, with an attached deadline for compliance.

5,000 Suits of clothing, boots, hats, 100 Good saddles, 100 Good bridles, 5,000 Bushels grain, 10,000 lbs. Sole Leather, 10,000 lbs. Horse Shoes, 400 lbs. Horse shoe nails . . . 600 lbs. Lead, 10,000 lbs. Harness Leather, 50 boxes Tinplate, 2,000 lbs. Picket Rope, All the caps and powder in the town; also, all the oil . . . 50,000 lbs. Bread, 100 sacks Salt, 30 lb. Molassas, 500 barrels Flour, 25 barrels Vinegar, 25 barrels Dried Fruit, 25 barrels Beans, 25 barrels potatoes, 25 barrels Saurkraut, 11,000 lbs. Coffee, 10,000 lbs. Sugar, 100,000 lbs. Hard Bread.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Jacob Hoke, *Historical Reminiscences of the War or Incidents which Transpired in and About Chambersburg during the War of the Rebellion* (Chambersburg, PA: M. A. Foltz, Printer and Publisher, 1884), 7; Heyser, Diary, June 24, 1863.

⁴⁸ Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 138; *Franklin Repository*, July 15, 1863. The order was issued by Ewell’s A. A. General, A. S. Pendleton, by command of Lt. Gen. R. S. Ewell.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Heyser, Diary, June 24, 1863. The requisitions were issued by officers of the II Corps including Major W. J. Hawks, Chief Commissary of Subsistence, William Allen, Chief Ordinance Officer, and Major J. A. Harmon, Chief Quartermaster.

Ewell required the merchants to send him reports listing the contents of their stores. Afterward, squads of between six and eight men went around to the places of business securing the necessities, issuing payment in Confederate money. As Jacob Hoke, one of the prominent merchants, made “the only satisfactory report,” Major Hawkes ensured that his stocks were not disturbed, except for a couple of barrels of molasses, tea, and castile sap, which their hospitals utilized. Hoke did however receive another requisition by two ordnance officers for flannels and other woolen material to make artillery cartridges. Hoke saved the receipt for posterity, exemplifying the thoroughness of Confederate officers in following Lee’s regulations for procuring supplies.⁵¹

I hereby certify that I have received of J. Hoke & Co., merchants, Chambersburg, Pa., this 25th day of June, 1863, and in accordance with General Order No. 72, Head-quarters, and have furnished duplicate vouchers, 9 (nine) yards flannel at 63 1/3 cents per yard, \$5.90. John M. Gregory, Jr. First Lt. and Ordnance officer artillery 2nd corps.⁵²

Lee’s and Ewell’s general orders respecting private property were printed in mass at a nearby printing establishment, and “freely distributed upon slips among the people.”⁵³ Additionally, thousands of paroles were printed in expectation of captured enemy soldiers.⁵⁴ If abuses did occur, civilians, informed of the orders, could appeal to officers for restitution. Moreover, Lee did not wish to animate the retaliatory passions of the people, hoping to facilitate the growth of the Northern peace party and making sure his orders were well seen aided in this goal.

Supplies needed for the campaign were collected in Ewell’s wagon train, but other supplies, deemed military necessities for future operations, including ordnance and medical

⁵¹ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 143 -144. An officer later inspected his premises but did not venture to the cellar where his groceries were stowed.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 144.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 122, 146.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 145, 156. Hoke also wrote that paroles were printed for citizens.

stores were immediately sent back to Virginia. Alexander Sandie Pendleton, Ewell's assistant adjutant general, relayed home from their camp two miles north of Chambersburg on June 25th, "we are collecting large supplies of all sorts, mostly commissary stores, and sending them to Virginia."⁵⁵ Yet he further described that, "No violence of any sort has been done to any citizen. No women insulted, or anything done in any way to emulate the behavior of the Yankees in our country."⁵⁶ Jedediah Hotchkiss detailed that they got a good dinner at the hotel "and purchased many valuable supplies – levying contributions of the town."⁵⁷ In particular, he "procured maps, and engineering supplies and purchased some goods."⁵⁸ Ewell wrote to his sweetheart Lizzie from Chambersburg on June 24th, "It is wonderful how well our hungry, foot-sore, ragged men behave in this land of plenty – better than at home. But I try to have furnished, by impressments, what it is possible to get for our men."⁵⁹

Rodes reported the capture of between 2,000 and 3,000 head of cattle in their march into Pennsylvania, and between 1,200 or 1,500 of them were sent back for other units. Most of the horses, however, were captured by Jenkins men, who left very little for his infantry. Rodes stressed his "best efforts were made to suppress all irregularities," which were, in general, "cheerfully seconded by officers and men" and as a whole the orders issued by himself, Ewell, and Lee "succeeded satisfactorily."⁶⁰ He did hear of a few cases of fraud, the cavalry committing some violence to property in Greencastle, and "a few instances of forced purchases" were

⁵⁵ William Nelson Pendleton, *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton*, ed. Susan P. Lee (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1893), 281.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer*, ed. Archie P. McDonald. 2nd print, (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 154.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Richard S. Ewell, *The Making of a Soldier: Letters of General R. S. Ewell* (ed. Captain Percy Gatling Hamlin (Richmond, VA: Whittet & Shepperson, 1935), 121.

⁶⁰ OR, vol. 27 (2): 550. Ewell also specified the collection of nearly 3,000 head of cattle. *Ibid.*, 443.

reported to him, “but never established.”⁶¹ He detailed that one quartermaster, in particular, acquired non-essentials, such as velvet, but he “could not find him out.”⁶² Rodes also emphasized that in “all cases of purchase that came before me, the parties were fully paid and satisfied.”⁶³

Thomas Henry Carter, commanding an artillery battalion in Rodes’ division, emphasized “We are not allowed to injure or destroy property of any kind. Public property is destroyed by order & all things.”⁶⁴ Their quartermasters and commissaries paid for their supplies in Confederate money at market value. Although most businessmen and civilians accepted Confederate money, those who refused to agree to the transaction were “furnished with a certificate that property has been taken by our authorities.”⁶⁵ He presumed that they hoped “to be indemnified by the U.S.”⁶⁶

Soldiers also distinguished between official requisitions and private abuses. John Casler explained that the “infantry did not have much chance to plunder,” while marching during the day through towns, since they remained in closed ranks. Their quartermasters however “managed to gobble up everything they came to,” including horses and wagons from civilians, which they used to secure “provisions and goods from the stores.” In that way, Ewell “accumulated an immense train.”⁶⁷ James Peter Williams, conveyed that “Lee has issued positive orders against individual plundering & burning,” but he told the quartermasters to collect everything “that is

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Thomas Henry Carter, *A Gunner in Lee’s Army: The Civil War Letters of Thomas Henry Carter*, ed. Graham Dozier and Peter S. Carmichael (North Carolina Scholarship Online, 2015), 72.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ John O. Casler, *Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade*, 168

needful for the Army.”⁶⁸ While in the vicinity of Chambersburg they lived luxuriously getting butter, lard, molasses, and vegetables from the countryside and buying what they wanted in town. The quartermasters in particular “emptied every store in the place.”⁶⁹

Although major abuses were not prevalent, in General Order No. 51 four men were court martialed, including a lieutenant for drunkenness while on duty, and three privates, two for being absent without leave and one for breaking the 9th article of war. Punishments included the loss of rank for the officer and a forfeiture of three months’ pay for the privates.⁷⁰

Major General Jubal A. Early’s division advanced along the base of South Mountain from Waynesboro to Greenwood. Colonel, Clement A. Evans, in command of the 31st Georgia in Gordon’s brigade, recorded the progress of their march into Pennsylvania. From Waynesborough on June 23rd, he wrote to his wife Allie that “Our army has done no wanton damage. The discipline is strict and order is preserved.”⁷¹ In Quincy, Evans recorded that the town’s merchants sold to the Confederate soldiers “taking Confederate money freely.”⁷² Although in some instances abandoned houses were left to their mercy, Evans gladly wrote that “generally the orders have been observed.”⁷³ On June 24th, when his regiment rested near an abandoned house, he observed that some soldiers went into the yard to get cherries. “Fearing they might be tempted in some mischief” he followed them and found them near the milk and butter house and “although it was unlocked” and “they knew it was well stored, not a particle had been touched.”⁷⁴ Encamped near Greenwood on June 25th, he described that supplies needed for the

⁶⁸ James Peter Williams, *Letters of James Peter Williams, 1861-1865*, LV, acc. no., 25920, 41; James Peter Williams, *James Peter Williams to his Father*, June 28, 1863, VS.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

⁷⁰ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 153-155; *Franklin Repository*, July 15, 1863.

⁷¹ Clement A. Evans, *Intrepid Warrior, Clement Anselm Evans: Confederate General from Georgia, Life, Letters, and Diaries of the War Years*, ed. Robert Grier Stephens, Jr. (Morningside, 1992), 210-211.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 214.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 213.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 213-214.

army are impressed and paid for, “just like we do in Virginia.” Overall, he assessed “The soldiers generally are behaving well.”⁷⁵

George Nichols, a private in the 61st Georgia of Gordon’s brigade, described “Our quartermaster and commissary departments took every cow, sheep, horse, mule and wagon that they could lay their hands,” along with the essentials for the army’s standard diet, bacon and flour. However, this work fell solely on those duly constituted to perform it, as “Foraging was strictly prohibited among the men in line.”⁷⁶ James Sheeran, a Catholic Chaplain in Early’s division, relayed that the soldiers received liberal rations from the captured supplies. He visited Chambersburg where he found the town crowded with Confederate quartermasters, commissaries, and ordnance officers, who were all “busy emptying the stores of their contents.”⁷⁷

The citizens of Chambersburg considered that, after the removal of goods by their residents upon hearing the numerous rumors of Confederate advances and the repeated raids by Jenkins’ cavalry, they did not have much left to give. “On each side of the street, they stop and make further requisitions. There isn’t much left to take,” wrote William Heyser.⁷⁸ Despite this, the Confederates continued to find essential supplies. Heyser noted that the businessmen suffered the worst, although “Some of the Rebel officers were very considerate.”⁷⁹ His neighbor, Mrs. Murphy, a widow, succeeded in having her small store exempted from the requisition.⁸⁰ In

⁷⁵ Ibid., 218.

⁷⁶ George Washington Nichols, *A Soldier’s Story of His Regiment (61st Georgia) And Incidentally of the Lawton-Gordon-Evans Brigade Army of Northern Virginia*, intro, by Keith S. Bohannon (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2011), 115. Originally Published (Kennesaw, GA: Continental Book Co., 1961, c 1898).

⁷⁷ Reverend James Sheeran, *The Civil War Diary of Rev. James Sheeran*, ed. Patrick J. Hayes (Catholic University of American Press, 2016), 186.

⁷⁸ William Heyser, *Diary*, June 25, 1863.

⁷⁹ Ibid., June 24, 1863.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

addition to requisitioning of supplies, infrastructure and communication targets were again targeted for destruction. Rachel Cormany remembered the rebels cutting down telegraph poles and further demolishing the Scotland Bridge during the evening of June 25th.⁸¹

On June 25th, the II Corps advanced towards Shippensburg. During the march the Confederates found that the “land is full of everything,” and they accordingly collected abundant supplies from the countryside. Hotchkiss particularly remembered the fine cherries. But he logged in his journal, “Our men behaved admirably.”⁸² Ewell issued requisitions upon the town of Shippensburg and searched the shops and in this way, he reported that his command secured “many valuable stores.”⁸³ Amos Stouffer recorded the progress of the rebel advance on June 26th. “They are every place you hear off in this part of the State,” taking horses and cattle, including about one hundred cattle in the vicinity of Newberg, near the mountain. The mountain passes, where the valley famers had secreted their stock, were visited and provided Ewell’s corps with an abundance of stock. They remained in the area of Newberg, Strasburg, Orrstown, Roxbury, and Fannetsburg collecting supplies until they left the area on June 29th with an immense baggage train as well as captured cattle and horses. Stouffer noted that near his home they procured from the mill several hundred bushels of corn and oats. They also pressed the mill into service and made the civilians grind the wheat in order to procure rations.⁸⁴

As Ewell advanced northeastward, Brigadier General George H. Stuart’s brigade, of Johnson’s division, was detached to march westward into Fulton County. Johnson reported that the goal was “to collect horses, cattle, and other supplies which the army needed.”⁸⁵ In

⁸¹ Rachel Cormany, Diary, June 25, 1863.

⁸² Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 155.

⁸³ OR, vol. 27 (2): 443.

⁸⁴ Amos Stouffer, Diary, June 26-29, 1863; Hotchkiss made note of this expedition, that below Newberg, “Our cavalry is scouring the country for horses &c.” Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 155.

⁸⁵ No. 481. Edward Johnson Report. OR, vol. 27 (2): 503.

Mercersburg, Major Goldsborough acted as provost marshal. General Steuart and his staff assembled some of the remaining leaders of the town and informed them of Lee's orders respecting private property. Dr. Schaff remembered that they then "had a proclamation of Lee read, dated June 21st, to the effect that the advancing army should take supplies and pay in Confederate money, or give a receipt, but not violate private property."⁸⁶ A guard was provided for the Theological Seminary. The Confederates required that the stores be opened and some of them were nearly emptied of their remaining supplies, such as sugar, molasses, hams, candies, nuts, and cigars "for which payment was made in Confederate money."⁸⁷ Lieutenant Randolph H. McKim, an aid-de-camp on Steuart's staff, recorded that "The behavior of the men since we entered Pennsylvania had been most exemplary."⁸⁸ During the entirety of the march, he assessed that "Lee's army strictly observed the order of their noble chief, in which he charged his soldiers not to molest private property."⁸⁹ Near evening, Steuart continued his advance toward McConnellsburg, but he left a strong rear guard in town. No civilians were hurt and Schaff reflected that "upon the whole we had to feel thankful that they behaved no worse."⁹⁰

Major Harry Gilmore's 1st and 2nd Maryland cavalry battalions ascended North Mountain and joined Steuart's brigade. A minor skirmish ensued, but the advance continued down the opposite slope at night. Believing that a federal force occupied the town, Gilmore's battalion charged down main street, but no forces were found. Steuart's infantry brigade encamped outside

⁸⁶ Phillip Schaff, "The Gettysburg Week."

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Randolph H. McKim, *A Soldier's Recollections: Leaves from the Diary of a Young Confederate* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 164.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 160.

⁹⁰ Phillip Schaff, Philip, "The Gettysburg Week." Although not a resident of the town of Mercersburg, Jacob Hoke heard from the residents and relayed in his book, "The soldiers were forbidden to enter either the seminary or private houses under the penalty of severe punishment. The stores and shops were ordered to be opened, and the soldiers permitted to purchase whatever they needed. To their credit it must be said that everything was done in an orderly manner. No pillaging was permitted, and whatever was taken was by officers who made out bills and paid in Confederate scrip." Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 147.

of town, with the exception of Colonel Herbert's battalion. Gilmore recalled his orders that "Not a single house was allowed to be entered until the next day, when the commissary and quartermaster came and took possession."⁹¹ He ordered that the citizens remain in their houses and arrested a few who ventured onto the streets. For the next two days the command gathered supplies from the town and stock in the countryside, many of which were found secreted in the mountains. Near St. Thomas, Gilmore captured 60 cattle and 40 horses, some mules and a few militia. After the completion of their mission, Stuart's detached command marched to rejoin Johnson's division. A third of Gilmore's cavalry advanced northward as far as Burnt Cabins gathering horses and recrossed the mountain by the Strasburg Pass near Fannetsburg.⁹²

On June 27th, Rodes and Johnson's divisions continued their steady advance up the Cumberland Valley toward Carlisle. As at Chambersburg, Jenkins' brigade preceded that of the infantry and entered town at 10 a.m. and passed through toward Mechanicsburg. Late in the afternoon, the infantry of Rodes' division arrived, while Johnson's division remained a few miles to the southwest. At approximately 3 p.m., Ewell arrived in town and established his headquarters at the U. S. Barracks, the chief station for instruction for the cavalry of the regular army, where he was formerly stationed prior to the war. The infantry was quartered in the barracks, on the campus of Dickinson College, on the Baltimore turnpike, and a portion of the

⁹¹ Harry Gilmore, *Four Years in the Saddle* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1866), 94.

⁹² Gilmore, 95; OR, vol. 27 (2): 503; Jacob Hoke relayed, "The invaders disturbed nothing during the night, but in the morning they entered the stores and shops and helped themselves to whatever they wanted, in some cases paying in Confederate scrip." Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 152; John H. Nelson, *Confusion and Courage: The Civil War in Fulton County, Pa., June 1863, The Battle of North Mountain, The Battle of McConnellsburg* (McConnellsburg, PA: Fulton County Civil War Reenactment Advisory Committee, 1996); John H. Nelson, "On The Monday Before Gettysburg---The Battle of McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania," *United Daughters of the Confederacy Magazine* 48, no. 7 (July 1985): 17-20.

forces guarded the town. Jenkins' brigade encamped between three and five miles beyond town in direction of Mechanicsburg.⁹³

Ewell, cognizant of Lee's orders to respect private property as well as his own orders to his corps, in order to relay that conception of war to the people of Carlisle, issued an order on June 27th. "The General commanding the Confederate forces desires that no disturbance shall be given to [Northern] families, or private property – If a guard is thought necessary it will be furnished upon application at these Head Quarters."⁹⁴ Professor S. D. Hillman and a small group of citizens gathered near the street when a member of the General Ewell's staff assured them "that private property would be respected, neither women, nor children, nor citizens would be interfered with, and supplies and stores needed for their army would be taken by authorized persons, and their own soldiers kept from straggling and injuring the town in any manner."⁹⁵ Hillman held a special interest in the college and inquired as to what would become of its buildings, libraries, philosophical apparatus, and dormitories. The staff officer replied that, "None of these will be touched. You can have a guard if you wish it for them,' and to their honor be it said nothing pertaining to these were disturbed, excepting that they made a requisition upon us for a geological map of Pennsylvania."⁹⁶ Theodore M. Johnson, then a nine-

⁹³ Louis. Leon, *Diary of A Tar Heel Confederate Soldier* (Charlotte, NC: Stone Publishing Company, 1913), 330. Leon also expressed, "So far we have lived very good in the enemy's country." Stephen Dotson Ramseur, *The Bravest of the Brave: The Correspondence of Stephen Dodson Ramseur*, ed. George C. Kuhndahl (University of North Carolina Press, 2021), 151; O.R., vol. 27 (2): 551, Jedediah Hotchkiss "Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 28, 1863," Jedediah Hotchkiss Letters, VS.

⁹⁴ Hd. Qtrs. 2nd Army Corps, June 27, 1863, By order of Lt. Genl. Ewell, Officer L. E. Johnson ADC. Richard S. Ewell, Ewell Order June 27, 1863, Cumberland County Historical Society, folder 4-32, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Joseph A. Murray found, and later preserved, a broadside of Lee's General Orders No. 72 posted on the signpost of Hannon's Tavern, located on Hanover Street, southwest of the public square. Broadside of "General Orders No. 72," June 21, 1863, Civil War Resources, Location I-Original-1863-6, Dickinson College Archives & Special Collections, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, (hereafter cited as Dickinson College Archives).

⁹⁵ S. D. Hillman, "A Few Days Under Rebel Rule," *The Methodist*, July 18, 1863, Location: MC2000.9, B1,F3, Dickinson College Archives. Can also be found in the *Carlisle American* Wednesday Aug. 5, 1863, vol.. 9, no 20.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

year-old boy and son of Dr. Herman M. Johnson, president of the college, remembered that a guard was indeed established around their home and all the college buildings. The Colonel of the guards took his meal with them and “although the rebel soldiers camped on the campus, not a thing of ours was destroyed, nor was the least bit of damage done to college property.”⁹⁷ As a private institution it was certainly safe from destruction.

Targets for destruction included the railroad, telegraph lines, and bridges. James W. Sullivan, a teenager who lived in town, recalled that, “Until the night of the shelling [July 1st and 2nd] nothing else in the town, that I am aware of, was destroyed while it was in Confederate possession.”⁹⁸ Besides his own attachment to the barracks, Ewell also understood the necessity of adhering to Lee’s vision of civilized warfare and avoiding unnecessary destruction, so he accordingly reported “Agreeably to the views of the general commanding, I did not burn Carlisle Barracks.”⁹⁹

Ewell issued a requisition to the authorities of Carlisle “you are requested to furnish the following subsistence for the Army:” 2500 pounds of bacon, 100 sacks of salt, 1500 barrels of flour, 25 barrels of potatoes, 25 barrels of molasses, 5,000 pounds of coffee, 5,000 pounds of sugar, and 25 barrels of dried fruit. A deadline was attached for the collection, “The Above Supplies will be ready at 6 O’clock & delivered at the front of the Court House.”¹⁰⁰ The Confederates also collected a large supply of cattle, horses, and flour in the vicinity. A significant amount of grain was found in the stables of the U.S. barracks, although most of the

⁹⁷ Theodore M. Johnson, “Theodore M. Johnson Tells of Civil War Days in Carlisle,” *Carlisle Sentinel*, June 1924, Civil War Resources, Location: I-Original-1924-2, Dickinson College Archives.

⁹⁸ John Sullivan, Typescript of Seen in Carlisle, 1861-’65, Cumberland County Historical Society. Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 34-35. Can also be found as “Boyhood Memories of The Civil War, 1861-1865- Invasion of Carlisle,” July 1932, Civil War Resources, Location: I-Original-1924-2, Dickinson College Archives.

⁹⁹ OR, vol. 27 (2): 443.

¹⁰⁰ HdQrs. 2d. Corps, June 27, 1863, W. J. Hawks Maj Va 2nd Corps – 226 – L2007.112.004, Cumberland County Historical Society, folder 134-005; “Confederate Supply Requisition to ‘Authorities of Carlise.’ June 27, 1863, Civil War Resources, I-Friends-2013-5, Dickinson College Archives.

public property had been removed. But in the barracks, Rodes' quartermasters found musketoons, holsters, tents, and a small quantity of subsistence.¹⁰¹ A requisition was also made on the drug stores and they "cleared them pretty well of the articles needed for their medical department," according to Hillman. Additionally, "They visited other stores and took what they found and wanted, giving receipts therefore generally, but not always. The warehouses were pretty well depleted of the grain that could not be got away in time."¹⁰²

Because of their steady paced advance up the valley, Hotchkiss recorded that many of Carlisle's residents had plenty of time to send their valuables away and that "we do not find many things left to purchase," but what valuable supplies they did find were shipped southward. They did however find an abundance of food to eat in the countryside, of a diverse variety, which was beneficial for their diet, particularly purchasing or acquiring vegetables from the people. Hotchkiss regarded onions as an especial source of sustenance.¹⁰³ Hillman observed that within a North Carolina regiment "Some had chickens under their arms, some loaves of bread, some onions, and some eggs in their pockets," no doubt he assumed, "captured in the fat valley of the Cumberland."¹⁰⁴

Sullivan remembered that the Southern soldiers, which he deemed as a "harmless enemy" were "civil, even gentle" in their conversations with Carlisle's civilians. Indeed, the "scene became a picture of perfect peace," when the town's women, mothers and daughters alike, modestly joined in the talk, which "went on soberly and in uninterrupted kindliness."¹⁰⁵ He specified that "Not a word of rancor, of recrimination, of boasting, of menace, of bitterness, did I

¹⁰¹ OR, vol. 27 (2): 551.

¹⁰²S. D. Hillman, "A Few Days Under Rebel Rule." Hotchkiss estimated the requisitions at \$50,000. Jedediah Hotchkiss, letters, June 28, 1863.

¹⁰³ Jedediah Hotchkiss, letters, June 28, 1863.

¹⁰⁴ S. D. Hillman.

¹⁰⁵ Sullivan, "Seen in Carlisle," 35.

hear that evening. These Southern soldiers were patterns of discretion and even chivalry. They saw no occasion to play the victors. A seriousness of demeanor was their most striking trait.”¹⁰⁶ In conversation with Henry Fairfax, a Confederate soldier 17 years of age, Sullivan noted that the boy was “perhaps under orders to guard his tongue,” since his speech was rather reserved.¹⁰⁷ Later, two Confederates, assigned to search their home, politely spoke to his mother regarding the inconvenience and did not take anything from the residence.¹⁰⁸ Sullivan later reflected, “The attitude of the Confederates from the beginning had resulted in inspiring a feeling in our community that we were to be treated fully as well as circumstances permitted.”¹⁰⁹

Sullivan described only a couple of exceptions to the generally good behavior of the Confederates. In one instance, a sick rebel cavalryman who had taken shelter from the rain in a shed in order to acquire some rest. Two or three boys and citizens stood admiring the man, when the rebel suddenly awoke and drew his revolver in order to disperse the unwelcome crowd, apparently not trusting the enemy populace in his current plight. Another rebel soldier from the same company ordered a citizen to give him his umbrella during a heavy downpour. When the citizen refused to comply, the rebel drew his revolver prompting the surrender of the umbrella. Sullivan emphasized that these were the “Only hostile gestures toward any of the public I witnessed on the part of the Confederates.”¹¹⁰

On June 28th, after some skirmishing, Jenkins’ cavalry occupied Mechanicsburg, only seven miles distant from Harrisburg. After a requisition, Schuricht recalled that they “were treated by the citizens to a delicious dinner,” a hospitality which he surmised was to ensure their

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 37.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 38.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 40.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 41.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 38.

protection. On June 30th, Schuricht's men were employed in the destruction of the railroad, but skirmishing frustrated the work.¹¹¹ On Monday June 29th, at 9:00 a.m. Ewell received orders from Lee to abandon plans for the capture of Harrisburg and instead concentrate near Cashtown.

On the morning of Friday June 26th, Early's division, along with two battalions of cavalry, commenced their march eastward toward the Susquehanna River. Early decided to destroy Caledonia Furnace, owned by United States Congressman, Thaddeus Stevens. He did so on his own responsibility, recalling "neither General Lee nor General Ewell knew I would encounter these works."¹¹² The charcoal furnace, two forges, and a rolling mill were burnt by William H. French's 17th Virginia cavalry battalion. A large stock of provisions and some store goods were also appropriated, but "the houses and private property of the employees were not molested"¹¹³ The *Baltimore Daily Gazette* printed, "The only private property destroyed by the order of an officer in this valley [Cumberland] was the extensive iron works of Hon. Thaddeus Stevens."¹¹⁴ Responding to an inquiry as to his losses, Thaddeus Stevens wrote that his "losses have been exaggerated," which he estimated at \$75,000.¹¹⁵ Although Stevens' political

¹¹¹ Hermann Schuricht, June 28-30, 1863. Bridgeport is today referred as Lemoyne.

¹¹² Jubal A. Early, *Lieutenant General Jubal Anderson Early C.S.A.: Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War between the States* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1912), 256. Jacob Hoke also recorded in his work a letter from Early to professor and historian J. Fraise Richard dated May 7, 1887, where Early wrote that the works were "burned by my order, and on my own responsibility," as he had not received any orders to do so. Early stated that iron works were destroyed in the South, most notably the iron works of John Bell of Tennessee, the Constitutional candidate for president in 1860. Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion of 1863 or Lee in Pennsylvania* (Dayton, OH: W. J. Shuey Publisher, 1887), 171.

¹¹³ Jubal A. Early, *Autobiographical Sketch*, 256; For a specific study on the movement see, Scott L. Mingus Sr., *Flames Beyond Gettysburg: The Confederate Expedition to the Susquehanna River, June 1863* (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2011).

¹¹⁴ *Baltimore Daily Gazette*, July 25, 1863, Thaddeus Stevens Collection, ACHS.

¹¹⁵ Thaddeus Stevens, Lancaster, July 6, 1863, From Thaddeus Stevens Collection at the Gettysburg College, ACHS. Stevens commented, "The Government does not indemnify for such losses. "But all this gives me no concern, although it was just . . . We must all expect to Buffer by this wicked war. I have not felt a moment's trouble for my share of it. If, finally, the government shall be reestablished over our whole territory; and not a vestige of Slavery left, I shall deem it a cheap purchase." In Cumberland County, the other major iron manufacturing establishment, William Watts iron work at Pine Grove Furnace and nearby Laurel Forge, were not visited and destroyed by Confederate forces.

allegiance may have been on Early's mind, the destruction of the works, as an iron manufacturing establishment, was certainly within the realm of legitimate military targets.

On the afternoon of June 26th, Early's force reached the outskirts of Gettysburg. Colonel E. V. "Lige" White's 35th Virginia battalion of cavalry, numbering between 150-200 troopers, charged up Chambersburg Street at approximately 3:00 p.m. Professor of Mathematics and Science at Pennsylvania College, Michael Jacobs, criticized the action with the cavalry "shouting and yelling like so many savages from the wilds of the Rocky Mountains; firing their pistols, not caring whether they killed or maimed man, woman, or child."¹¹⁶ The apparent danger to civilians though was actually marginal and none were hurt. Kenton Neal Harper postulated that although they urged their horses on at top speed with revolvers in their hands incessantly firing "one may suppose without very malicious aim."¹¹⁷ Ten-year old Gates Fahnestock, also watching from the safety of his home, recalled that the boys "saw and enjoyed it as they would a wild west."¹¹⁸ Owen Hicks observed the rush of some young schoolgirls. Despite the excitement, he stopped and laughed as they rushed through mud and other obstacles. In reflection, Susan Myers stated that they "did no especial damage beyond scaring the residents by their shooting."¹¹⁹

The main reason for the sudden cavalry charge held a distinct military purpose, that is, the pursuit of Pennsylvania militia including Captain Robert Bell's cavalry and the Philadelphia City Troop. Henry Jacobs observed the pursuit with a telescope from his garret window. "Down the road the Confederate advance came, with Capt. Bell's cavalry dashing in front of them, and

¹¹⁶ Michael Jacobs, *Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg* (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippencott & Co., 1864), 15.

¹¹⁷ Kenton Neal Harper, *Memoirs*, compiled by Elwood W. Christ, Adams County Historical Society, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as ACHS). Original in the Clarke County Historical Society, Berryville, Virginia.

¹¹⁸ Gates D. Fahnestock, *Fahnestock's February 14, 1934 Speech Before the National Arts Club, New York City*, trans. David Reichley, ACHS.

¹¹⁹ Susanna Myers, "Some Battle Experiences as Remembered by a Young School Girl," *Gettysburg Compiler*, April 24, 1907, ACHS.

announcing their approach.”¹²⁰ Soon, the rebels dashed into Chambersburg Street, when he heard “a wild Southern shout” and some shooting in the area. Looking closer, he watched one of Bell’s cavalymen flee, followed by the rebels “in swift pursuit.”¹²¹ Indeed, Robert McClean noted the cavalry “firing at our retreating forces, several of which they captured.”¹²² The *Gettysburg Compiler* relayed that White’s cavalry rapidly charged up Chambersburg Street in pursuit of riders hurrying down York Street. “They fired a few shots, and the pursued were halted.”¹²³ After hearing the rebel yell, Sarah Barret King and her father watched the Confederate pursuit from their home on the southwest corner of York and Liberty streets. Although her father watched from an upstairs window, Sarah remained in observation on the porch refusing to come inside. White’s cavalry rode “at their greatest speed” in pursuit of Captain Bell, “whom they seemed very anxious to capture, although the captain kept himself “at a very tantalizing distance.”¹²⁴ Bell himself described that they had to get out of town quite rapidly.”¹²⁵

White’s troopers also pursued civilians who fled with their horses, hoping to secure the safety of their steeds. According to Lee’s orders, such attempts at removing property would result in the seizure of said property. In this way, White’s command captured a few horses, although most mounts had already been sent away. A group of citizens planned to gather with their horses at Cemetery Hill and together make their escape when a signal indicated a Confederate advance, but White’s cavalry arrived so rapidly that no signal was given. A number

¹²⁰ Henry Eyster Jacobs, *Memoirs of Henry Eyster Jacobs*, ed. Henry E. Horn (Huntingdon, PA: Church Management Service, Inc., 1974), 52.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Robert McClean, “A Boy In Gettysburg - - 1863: What He Saw During the Eventful Battle Days A Letter Written by the Same Boy Two Weeks After the Great Battle,” *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 30, 1909.

¹²³ *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 29, 1863. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

¹²⁴ Sarah Barret King, “Battle Days In 1863: Escaped from Town to Get into A Worse Plight, Thrilling Experiences of Families Going Away From Battle – Getting into Cavalry Fight,” *Gettysburg Compiler*, July 4, 1906, ACHS; also in “A Mother’s Story of the Battle of Gettysburg,” in *Compiler Scrapbook* 1, no. 2, published by the *Gettysburg Compiler*, January 1910.

¹²⁵ Major Robert Bell, ACHS, orig. *The Gettysburg Star and Sentinel* in 1883.

of citizens who hastily fled the scene were in consequence caught and brought back by the Confederate squadrons, whereupon after an explanation of “why they left their homes and who they were” they “were told to go to their homes, they would not be molested.”¹²⁶ One of those caught was Sam Wade. Tillie Pierce’s father had sent him away with their family’s horse. The Confederates later indicated to the family that they were after the horse and not Sam.¹²⁷ When Henry Ernest Troxell’s father, who owned a carriage shop, heard of the rebel advance, he quickly sent Henry’s two older brothers with a few horses and a buggy eastward. Soon the rebels arrived and were soon “after the people who were flying with their stock.”¹²⁸ Other civilians were captured fleeing on foot. David Conover and five others ran as fast as they could hoping to get home. A rebel shot his revolver as a warning for them to stop and inquired whether they were civilians or soldiers. The Confederate then scolded them for running, since it indicated to him that they were militia, and he may have killed them. David and the group were taken downtown where they remained until released.¹²⁹

The acquisition of fresh horses was certainly imperative for the cavalry command to maintain their quick paced advance eastward and they rushed from stable to stable in search of good horses, although most of them had been ridden to the east a few hours before. Not all the good horses however were taken. Agnes Barr remembered that although the Confederates found two “fine horses,” owned by their neighbor, and wished to have them, after a long discussion,

¹²⁶ John Charles Wills, “Reminiscences of the Three Days Battle of Gettysburg at the ‘Globe Hotel’ by John C. Wills, A Son of Charles Wills Proprietor and Landlord of the Hotel, Who Assisted His Father in Conducting the Business of the Hotel,” ACHS; also in *Adams County History* 13, no 4 (2007): 29.

¹²⁷ Mrs. Tillie (Pierce) Alleman, *At Gettysburg or What a Girl Saw and Heard of the Battle, A True Narrative* (New York: W. Lake Borland, 1889), 24-25.

¹²⁸ Henry Ernest Troxell, “The Carriage Maker’s Boy,” in *Battlefield Adventures* by Clifton Johnston (Boston, 1915), ACHS; Tillie (Pierce) Alleman, *At Gettysburg*, 24-27.

¹²⁹ David Conover, “Killing of Geo. W. Sandhoe: A Battle Story Told by David A. Conover: Events Leading up to Shooting of First Soldier at Gettysburg June 26, 1863,” *Gettysburg Compiler*, Sep. 27, 1905, ACHS.

they left without taking them. After a few more hours of searching for remounts the command left town.¹³⁰

Half an hour after the dash of White's cavalry, Gordon's infantry brigade entered town. When they reached the square, the band commenced to play Dixie and other Southern tunes. The Confederate flag was also raised. Guards were quickly placed on the diamond as well at places throughout the town to protect private property. The majority of Gordon's command marched through town and camped three miles to the east, in anticipation of its continued march. Colonel Clement Evans of Gordon's Brigade acted as provost marshal "to preserve order."¹³¹ He established his headquarters in the Court House and quartered his Regiment, the 31st Georgia, which acted as a guard.¹³² A squad of infantry was sent to the Lutheran Theological Seminary to see if any of the Pennsylvania militia were concealed in the premises, remembered Lydia Ziegler. After their investigation proved futile, they were informed that the building was a theological institution. Accordingly, a guard was placed around it.¹³³ John C. Wills asked General Early for a guard while supplies for the Globe Hotel, including "six barrels of whiskey, forty bushels of potatoes, three barrels of sugar, one barrel of syrup, and one tierce of hams and shoulders of cured meat," were being removed from a freight car, which "He kindly furnished . . . saying 'We will protect private property.'¹³⁴ Charles Tyson observed the infantry fill the road from side to side as they marched in column down Chambersburg Street. When some of the infantry halted, he took the precaution to lock the front door, but when a few soldiers tried the door, he offered them water, which they accepted. They also wanted bread and butter, but he told

¹³⁰ Michael Jacobs, *Notes*, 15; Agnes Barr, June 27th the Friday Before the Battle, ACHS.

¹³¹ Clement A. Evans, *Intrepid Warrior*, 221.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ Lydia Catherine (Clare) Ziegler, "A Gettysburg Girls' Story of the Great Battle," in *The Dead and Dying Were All Around Us: Stories from the Lutheran Theological Seminary during the Battle of Gettysburg and Its Aftermath*, Civilian Account Series 3 (Gettysburg, PA: Adams County Historical Society), 3-4.

¹³⁴ John Charles Will, *Reminiscences*, ACHS, in *Adams County History*, 32.

them that they themselves did not have enough “and they were satisfied far more easily than I expected; were very polite and gentlemanly.”¹³⁵ Most of Early’s division remained north of town and encamped near Mummasburg. Thirteen-year-old William H. Bayly fled with the family horses earlier in the day and when he returned to their farm three miles north of Gettysburg, his mother relayed “that no damage had been done by the troops.”¹³⁶

Early issued an order for requisitions to Mr. Kendlehart, president of the town council, which included 60 barrels flour, 7000 pounds of bacon, 1200 pounds of sugar, 600 pounds of coffee, 1000 pounds of salt, 40 bushels of onions, 10 barrels of whisky, 1000 pairs shoes, 500 hats, or \$5,000 cash. Kendlehart informed Early that as the merchants and bankers had already sent all their goods and money to safety, it was “utterly impossible to so comply.”¹³⁷ But Kendlehart added that he would request the stores open for business and citizens provide what food they could.¹³⁸ Early believed Kendlehart and with his mind fixed on the necessity of a quick eastward movement he decided to forgo the enforcement of the requisition. He later reported “I had not opportunity of compelling a compliance with my demands in this town, or ascertaining its resources, which I think, however, were very limited.”¹³⁹ After being taken back to town, David Conover remembered that when Gordons’ infantry reached the square some men rode up, most likely Early and his staff, and asked certain citizens for the town’s authorities. The citizens replied that the authorities were gone, along with the public funds and that “the only way to get money was to press the citizens.”¹⁴⁰ The officer assured them that “they wouldn’t do that.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁵ Charles J. Tyson, *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, March 29, 1884, transcript copied by Robert L. Brake, ACHS.

¹³⁶ William H Bayly, *Memoir of a Thirteen-year-old Boy Relating to the Battle of Gettysburg*, ACHS.

¹³⁷ Marghareta Kendlehart (McCartney), “A Story of Early’s Raid” *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 30, 1923, ACHS; David Kendlehart, *From the Gettysburg Times*, May 13, 1941, ACHS.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ No. 470, Jubal A. Early Report, OR, vol. 27 (2): 465.

¹⁴⁰ David Conover; “Killing of Geo. W. Sandhoe.”

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Afterward, the citizens were informed of the arrangement, and it proved beneficial to some. They learned “that no demands were to be made upon them by the Rebel soldier, and that all property would be protected, and it was,” recalled Fannie Buehler.¹⁴² There were some abuses, “but so far as could be done, the officers controlled their men, and all those in and around the streets behaved well.”¹⁴³ Philip Winter boarded up his cake and candy shop, but when the Confederates learned of the sweets behind locked doors the store reopened and Winter was “overwhelmed with orders,” doing the most business of his life, receiving Confederate money in return. A young onlooker, Charles McCurdy, even received a handful of candy from one of the Confederates.¹⁴⁴

As the majority of the storekeepers had sent away most of their goods there was not much left for the rebels. Gates Fahnestock noted that the Confederates did go to the stores, but “they found little.”¹⁴⁵ “They wanted horses, clothing, anything and almost everything they could conveniently carry away,” wrote Tillie Pierce, “Nor were they particular about asking. Whatever suited them they took.”¹⁴⁶ The town’s banks had also sent away their money. Samuel Bushman, a clerk at one of those banks, removed the funds prior to the Confederate arrival. When Early’s men did arrive, they took Samuel to the bank and made him show that it did not have any money there.¹⁴⁷ Evans recorded that they found very few boots, shoes, or hats although in provisions and

¹⁴² Fannie J. Buehler, *Recollections of the Rebel Invasion and One Woman’s Experience During the Battle of Gettysburg*, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 11.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Charles McCurdy, *Gettysburg: A Memoir* (Pittsburgh, PA: Reed & Witting Company, 1929), 4-5.

¹⁴⁵ Gates Fahnestock, Fahnestock’s February 14, 1934 Speech.

¹⁴⁶ Tillie (Pierce) Alleman, 22-23.

¹⁴⁷ Samuel M. Bushman, “Account of Samuel M. Bushman, in *Battlefield Adventures* by Clifton Johnston (1915), ACHS.

rations they fare better.¹⁴⁸ In the countryside, they acquired significant supplies of stock, corn, oats, hay, and meat.¹⁴⁹

Provost Marshal, Evans articulated, “Very little disturbance occurred” and the “town was kept very orderly and quiet.”¹⁵⁰ Isaac Gordon Bradwell, a member of Evans’ 31st Georgia, recollected that the only disturbance during their stay occurred when they first came into town. Some of the Irish soldiers from Hay’s Louisiana Tigers ventured into town and found some Irish citizens who sold them liquor, which led to a brawl between the Irishmen. When Bradwell and some other guards arrived on the scene the fighting quickly subsided, and no arrests were made.¹⁵¹ Before nightfall the rebel band serenaded the populace with more Southern tunes. In fact, Evans continued, “the citizens were very agreeably surprised to find that after ten o’clock at night their town was as quiet as usual and they could sleep in peace with the terrible Rebels all around them.”¹⁵² With an astute eye on the Court House, from her residence nearly opposite, Fannie Buehler seconded this occurrence, remembering that “the men were quiet and orderly.”¹⁵³

Military targets were destroyed, namely the infrastructure east of town. “I heard of no violent act or wanton destruction of property,” described Henry Jacobs, although he viewed the night sky light up red to the east from the intentional burning of the railroad bridge across Rock Creek.¹⁵⁴ The rail cars and engine house was also burned, and the tracks were torn up. As a whole, The *Gettysburg Compiler* summed up the conduct of Early’s troops, “Their deportment generally was civil.”¹⁵⁵ The demeanor of the Confederates surprised David Conover who

¹⁴⁸ Evans, 221.

¹⁴⁹ *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 29, 1863.

¹⁵⁰ Evans, 221.

¹⁵¹ I. G. Bradwell, “The Burning of Wrightsville, PA,” 300.

¹⁵² Evans, 219 - 221.

¹⁵³ Albertus McCreary, “Gettysburg: A Boy’s Experience of the Battle,” *McClure’s Magazine* 33 (July 1909): 243 - 253; Fannie J. Buehler, *Recollections of the Rebel Invasion*, 13.

¹⁵⁴ Henry Jacobs, *Memoirs*, 52.

¹⁵⁵ *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 29, 1863.

reflected on their conduct toward civilians, “I found the rank and file of the Rebel army much more intelligent than I ever had an idea and talked with a number. I saw no depredations or improper behavior. They were peaceable.”¹⁵⁶ The next morning Gettysburg’s resident awoke to find that Early’s division had abruptly left, continuing their march eastward. Prior to their departure, that morning, members of the 26th Pennsylvania emergency militia who had been captured the previous day were subsequently paroled in front of the Court House, except two officers.¹⁵⁷

In the eastern portion of Adams County, the Confederates marched through several small villages, including New Oxford. Charles F. Himes recalled, that on the morning of June 27th, “they came in pistols in hand prying into every corner,” but “after they found that we were not combatants they became sociable & amiable even friendly.”¹⁵⁸ Guards were placed at the stores and taverns, and they even “told the storekeepers not to open except under orders from an officer.”¹⁵⁹ When the stores opened the Confederates paid for everything in Confederate script. The infantry passed through rapidly four miles beyond, although they carried off sugar and other supplies from a nearby warehouse, even filling their canteens with molasses. “Their advance this way was heralded by the smoke of burning R. R. bridges & of a warehouse a few miles from here the owner of which was absent & whose wife refused to give up the key; on learning that it was private property they said they were very sorry & here they destroyed nothing not even a large quantity of hay ready for packing because it endangered town.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ David Conover, “Killing of Geo. W. Sandhoe.”

¹⁵⁷ OR, vol. 27 (2): 443, 465.

¹⁵⁸ Charles F. Himes, Milton Embick Flower Collection, Civil War Research Confederate Invasion, MG-207-013-012, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 3; also in Pocket Diary of Charles F. Himes, 1863, Civil War Resources, Location: MC 2000.1, B16, F2, Dickinson College Archives. June 27, 1863.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 3-4.

In western York County, the same morning, targets included the burning of bridges and the destruction of rail lines. Gulden's station, a brick warehouse, along the Hanover Branch Railroad was burned. As part of the Western Maryland system railroad, Early believed it was furnishing supplies for the Union Army. Mr. Hann's warehouse was likewise visited, but after Hann assured them that nothing was intended for government use, it was spared. Most of the horses had been taken across the Susquehanna, but losses to farmers included some livestock, grain, and forage, nothing of real complaint. Dr. C. E. Goldsborough, a resident of Hunterstown, noted that the burning of Gulden's warehouse was "the only act of vandalism committed"¹⁶¹

White's battalion advanced to Hanover Junction, sixteen miles east of Gettysburg on June 27th. From Gettysburg to Hanover the Confederates cut the telegraph lines, and near Hanover White's battalion destroyed the depot, some rail cars, and a few bridges in the vicinity, although one or two bridges were too heavily guarded by Federal infantry to destroy. When White's battalion occupied the town, Daniel Skelly observed the Confederates appropriate some packages from the express office, including some gloves for the firm of his employment, Fahnestock Brothers, and a jeweler's wagon with his loaded goods, "who was a little late in getting started out of town."¹⁶² As a whole, however, in eastern Adams County and western York County, the *Gettysburg Compiler* noted that, "No depredations of consequence were committed at Oxford or Hanover."¹⁶³

In York, the town's Committee of Public Safety met on June 27th. A prominent businessman, Arthur B. Farquhar, suggested they meet the Confederates before they entered the

¹⁶¹ William C. Storrick, "William C. Storrick Provides Interesting History of Cavalry Battle at Hunterstown and Suggests Erection of Suitable Marker," *Gettysburg Compiler*, Sept. 23, 1932, ACHS.

¹⁶² Daniel Skelly, *A Boy's Experience during the Battle of Gettysburg* (Gettysburg, PA. Privately Printed, 1932).

¹⁶³ *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 29, 1863.

town to negotiate a peaceable surrender. Having business connections with a number of Southerners, he “was certain they would keep faith as I knew the character of the men in charge.”¹⁶⁴ His plan was not seriously entertained however, so on Saturday afternoon Farquhar decided to pursue the endeavor on his own accord. At Abbottstown, he was escorted to Brigadier General John B. Gordon. Farquhar described the conversation,

The General was exceedingly courteous. . . . I said: ‘General Gordon, unless you have entirely changed from the character you used to have, you are neither a horse thief nor a bank robber, and fighting is more in your line than sacking a city.’ He evidently knew what I had in mind and smilingly admitted that perhaps I was right. He asked me what I would have him do. I said: ‘You and your men enter York quietly and then you sit down and make requisitions for whatever you reasonably want and our committee will see that they are honored.’ He thought for a second and then answered that he would be more than glad to make any arrangements that would spare the non-combatants of the town from the horrors of war, adding ‘We have been treated badly down the Valley, but General Lee is not inclined to retaliate.’ I wrote down in my memorandum book what he said and asked him to sign it so that I could relive the minds of the people of York. At that he was inclined to balk, but when I explained that it was not because I doubted his word but only to satisfy the Committee, especially the women of the town, who were very uneasy, he at once signed what I had written, which was to the effect that when his troops entered York and its vicinity they would not take private property or molest any one, but that they would expect some necessary supplies which we agreed to furnish.¹⁶⁵

After Farquhar returned to York, concern abounded about his lack of authorization to make an agreement with the Confederates, so David Small, George Hay, Latimer Small, Thomas White, and Farquhar himself, undertook a second visit and entered Confederate lines that same evening.¹⁶⁶ “General Gordon was a little more formal than in the morning,” wrote Farquhar, “but said the terms as agreed with me would be carried out, and the particulars would be arranged by General Early the next morning when he entered the town.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Arthur B. Farquhar, *The First Million the Hardest: An Autobiography* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 74-75.

¹⁶⁵ Farquhar, *The First Million the Hardest*, 75-76.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 77-78.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 78,

At 10 a.m. the next day, Sunday June 28th, Gordons's brigade marched "directly through" the town of York on its way to Wrightsville, as instructed by Early, with flags flying and bands playing. The citizens wanted to converse with them, but their officers hurried them through "at a quick step equally determined that we should not have a word to say to them."¹⁶⁸ In advance of the brigade Gordon sent a provost guard to occupy the city and lower the stars and stripes. Colonel Evans again served as provost marshal. He recorded, "Triumphal entry into York. I was sent ahead to establish a Guard & preserve order in the town. The troops passed through in admirable order."¹⁶⁹ Guards were posted in order to protect private property, as Cassandra Small relayed, "First we saw a picket in front of our door. Where he came from or how he got there, no one knew, he came so suddenly and quietly (other pickets were all along the street). When we spoke to him, he said they were only to keep the men in line."¹⁷⁰ Cassandra Small also described a conversation with Gordon, in which he emphasized the style of war they pursued,

Ladies, I have a word to say. I suppose you think me a pretty rough looking man, but when I am shaved and dressed, my wife considers me a very good looking fellow. I want to say to you we have not come among you to pursue the same warfare your men did in our country. You need not have any fear of us, whilst we are in your midst. You are just as safe as though we were a thousand miles away. That is all I have to say.¹⁷¹

She continued, "Such order and strict discipline as they were under; they all passed perfectly quiet – no noise at all."¹⁷² Another eyewitness relayed that Gordon spoke to a group of ladies, informing them that they did not come to pursue a retaliatory form of warfare and that "If a torch is applied to a single dwelling, or an insult offered to a female of your town by a soldier of this

¹⁶⁸ I. G. Bradwell, 300.

¹⁶⁹ Evans, 220.

¹⁷⁰ Cassandra Morris Small, "Letters of '63," Cassandra Morris Small Papers, MS 31138, York County Heritage Trust, York, Pennsylvania, 14 (hereafter cited as YCHT).

¹⁷¹ Cassandra Morris Small, Letters of '63," 15 - 16.

¹⁷² Ibid., 17.

command, point me out the man and you shall have his life.’¹⁷³ Respect toward women was paramount during the occupation, as Cassandra Small described, “They said, ‘Insult or injury offered to a female was punished with death and every man knew it.’”¹⁷⁴

When Brigadier General “Extra” Billy Smith reached the town square, the citizens “had reached the point of ebullition,” recalled Robert Stiles and “broke into enthusiastic cheers as they crowded about the head of the column, actually embarrassing its progress.”¹⁷⁵ Riding ahead of Early, the former Governor of Virginia, and the current Governor elect, Smith, “acceded to the half suggestion,” halted his brigade, and formed an impromptu political meeting.¹⁷⁶ From his horse the political general began to speak to the crowd.

My friends, how do you like this way of coming back into the Union? I hope you like it; I have been in favor of it for a good while. But don't misunderstand us. We are not here with any hostile intent-unless the conduct of your side shall render hostilities unavoidable. You can see for yourselves we are not conducting ourselves like enemies today. We are not burning your houses or butchering your children. On the contrary, we are behaving ourselves like Christian gentlemen, as we are. . . . What we all need, on both sides, is to mingle more with each other, so that we shall learn to know and appreciate other. Now here's my brigade—I wish you knew them as I do. They are such a hospitable, whole-hearted, fascinating lot of gentlemen. Why, just think of it - of course this part of Pennsylvania is ours today; we've got it, we hold it, we can destroy it, or do what we please with it. Yet we sincerely and heartily invite you to stay. You are quite welcome to remain here and to make yourselves entirely at home--so long as you behave yourselves pleasantly and agreeably as you are doing now. Are we not a fine set of fellows? You must admit that we are.¹⁷⁷

Robert Stiles recounted, “It was a rare scene - the vanguard of an invading army and the invaded and hostile population hobnobbing on the public green in an enthusiastic public gathering.”¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ “Eyewitness Account of the Confederate Occupation of York, Pa,” *The Daily Progress*, August 14, 1863, Raleigh, NC., orig. *The Baltimore Gazette*. Unknown date.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 19. On Gordon’s orders and conversations with citizens during the occupation of York see John Brown Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons; Atlanta: Martin & Hoyt Co., 1903), 142-143; No. 477, Report of John B. Gordon, OR, vol. 27 (2): 491.

¹⁷⁵ Robert Stiles *Four Years Under Marse Robert*, 203.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 203-204.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 203.

Suddenly General Early arrived in the lead of another brigade with “a volley of very heated profanity poured forth in a piping, querulous treble,” upset that the column had halted and having difficulty in making his way through the crowd. When he reached General Smith, he quickly pulled him back from being the center of attention exclaiming “General Smith, what the devil are you about! Stopping the head of this column in this cursed town?”¹⁷⁹ Smith replied that he was only having a little fun, “which is good for all of us.”¹⁸⁰ At the same time Smith understood the benefit in taking advantage of the rare opportunity of presenting their political case and emphasizing the civility of their military operations before people who, quite possibly, had the ability to end the hostilities when election time arrived next year. He emphasized to Early that he was merely “teaching these people something that will be good for them and won’t do us any harm.”¹⁸¹ The matter was “amicably arranged” between the two generals and the column marched on.¹⁸² The majority of the command encamped outside of town, two miles to the north at Lauck’s Mills, while Hoke’s brigade utilized the public hospital buildings as quarters.¹⁸³

Early formally presented two written requests to the Committee, then in session at the Court House, including requisitions for food, supplies, and money. These included sustenance for their commissary stores, 165 barrels of flour or 28,000 pounds of baked bread, 3,500 pounds of sugar, 1,650 pounds of coffee, 300 gallons of molasses, 1,200 pounds of salt, 32,000 pounds of fresh beef or 21,000 pounds of bacon or pork, the above to be delivered at the marketplace on

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 204.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 205.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ OR, vol. 27(2): 466.

Main Street at 4 p. m. and supplies for their quartermaster 2,000 pairs of shoes or boots, 1,000 pairs of socks, 1,000 felt hats, and \$100,000 in United States money.¹⁸⁴

The Committee established Ward Committees who went around collecting everything they could, particularly from local businessmen, giving “receipts for the contributions . . . assured by the Borough,” which assumed the debt and promised to repay the contributors for the supplies “out of the proceeds of a special tax.”¹⁸⁵ James Latimer wrote to his brother that when they arrived at his house, P. A. Small informed him that they had given them all the money they had, other people were doing the same, and he desired that he too contribute all his money. In the end, the committee collected between 1,000 hats, between 1,200 and 1,500 pairs of shoes, 1,000 pairs of socks and rations for three days or 30,000 rations, amounting to approximately \$15,000 worth of food and supplies. Only \$28,610 in greenbacks was collected, since the majority of funds had been sent for safe keeping to the east.¹⁸⁶

Early did not find any public supplies, but the stores were opened for business with transactions being completed with Confederate money. Soldiers were not allowed to leave a store until payment was made. Cassandra Morris Small recorded, “our people emptied their mills and opened their stores, but no soldier was allowed to go into the stores without a pass from General Early. They had plenty of confederate money and greenbacks, too – paid sometimes in one and sometimes in another. All stores were opened.”¹⁸⁷ Moreover, alcohol was strictly prohibited. “No liquor was allowed them; guards were stationed at every drinking house and bar.”¹⁸⁸ James Latimer described that the rebels “behaved very well did no damage in town to private property,

¹⁸⁴ Farquhar, 78-79; O.R. vol. 27 (2): 443, 466.

¹⁸⁵ Farquhar, 79.

¹⁸⁶ Farquhar, 79; OR, O.R. vol. 27 (2): 443, 466; Jubal A. Early, Original Requisitions, Papers, MS 11647, YCHT.

¹⁸⁷ Cassandra Morris Small, “Letters of ’63,” 19.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

except breaking into one or two houses on the outskirts, paid for what they bought in rebel money & in some instances in Greenbacks; and seemed to be entirely under the most perfect control.”¹⁸⁹

As throughout the invasion, farmers suffered the worst with the loss of stock, grain and forage, along with eatables. Rumors reached the townspeople of abuses toward private property in the outskirts of town. James Latimer described to his brother that those in the countryside “were plundered indiscriminately particularly by a Louisiana brigade. Horses and mules taken, houses broken open, and everything the thieves fancied stolen.”¹⁹⁰ A lady who lived on the outskirts however, four miles from York, who had Early’s troops pass near her home wrote to a relative in Baltimore,

I never saw better behavior maintained by a city military company upon parade day than was observed by this great body of men; I mean so far as quiet and respectful deportment is concerned to the people, who gathered upon every hand to witness their march. It is true many of them left the ranks and scattered themselves among the farm houses in the vicinity, to drink and bathe their faces at the pump, and in some cases to buy whatever the family was willing to sell them, such as milk, butter, chickens, &c. At some of the houses milk, butter, bread and pies were given them, and in some cases they refused to accept these things when offered them, saying they only came for water.¹⁹¹

She also noted that upon their return from Wrightsville, some of the same troops “repeated their visit to us, accepting only a drink of water, and stopping for a little chat.”¹⁹² Even Latimer considered that although “The Rebels committed all sorts of depredations in the Country,” he wrote that “they behaved pretty well in town.”¹⁹³ Discipline for disobedience to orders was accordingly carried out. For instance, members of Hays’ Louisiana Tigers, second lieutenants J.

¹⁸⁹ James Latimer, Papers, MS 12801, YCHT.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Unknown, “The Confederates in York,” *Baltimore Daily Gazette*, ACHS.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ James Latimer, Papers.

Warren Jackson and William C. McGimsey, of the 7th and 8th Louisiana respectively, took a “french leave,” marching two miles into town on June 29th. The next day they were accordingly placed under arrest for the trip.¹⁹⁴

Throughout York County, Early’s force also focused on the destruction of the bridges, rail lines, and the rolling stock of the Northern Central Railroad. Colonel French’s cavalry destroyed the bridges at the mouth of the Conewango Creek and all the bridges from that point to York. Early also had him destroy the remaining bridges between York and Hanover. Early also burned a few rail cars in York, but the depot, warehouse, engine house, and all the attached buildings were spared. Before leaving, Early addressed the citizens of York, detailing his leniency and encouraging them to consider the prospects of a negotiated peace.¹⁹⁵

I have abstained from burning the rail-road buildings and car shops in your town, because after examination I am satisfied the safety of the town would be endangered; and, acting in the spirit of humanity which has ever characterized my government and its military authorities, I do not desire to involve the innocent in the same punishment with the guilty. Had I applied the torch without regard to consequences, I would have pursued a course that would have been fully vindicated as an act of just retaliation for the many authorized acts of barbarity perpetrated by your own army upon our soil. But we do not war upon women and children, and I trust the treatment you have met with at the hands of my soldiers will open your eyes to the monstrous iniquity of the war waged by your government upon the people of the Confederate States, and that you will make an effort to shake off the revolting tyranny under which it is apparent to all you are yourselves groaning.¹⁹⁶

Such an order by one of the South’s leading proponents of retaliatory warfare demonstrated the impact of Lee’s policy of non-retaliation on his subordinate officers as well as Farquhar’s efforts

¹⁹⁴ Warren Jackson, “The Gettysburg Campaign – A Louisiana Lieutenant’s Eye-Witness Account,” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 30, no. 2, ed. Merl E. Reed (April 1963): 187.

¹⁹⁵ Jubal a. Early, *Autobiographical Sketch*, 260-262; OR, vol. 27 (2): 467.

¹⁹⁶ “Address of Gen. Early to the People of York, June 30, 1863,” YCHT.

of appeasement. Farquhar assessed the outcome of Early's occupation of York, "They had scrupulously kept to their agreement and York was unharmed."¹⁹⁷

On June 28th, Gordon continued with his command and marched eastward to capture the bridge spanning the Susquehanna River between Wrightsville and Columbia, but found it ablaze. The Confederates rushed toward the burning bridge to save the structure. Gordon implored the citizens of Wrightsville to provide buckets and pails to aid in the endeavor, but few could be found and soon the bridge was too far gone to save.¹⁹⁸ A citizen of Wrightsville, Calvin G. Smith, shortly thereafter informed the local newspaper of the incident, "a body of Georgia troops came rushing down Hellam street toward the river that they might go on the bridge to put out the fire. Some buckets were furnished, but the flames secured such headway that there was no chance to save the bridge from destruction."¹⁹⁹ Citizens later told John B. Linn that the Confederates "were very indignant about the burning of the bridge and tried to put the fire out and expressed great disappointment that they were unable to get over into Lancaster County."²⁰⁰

Soon, the wind spread the fire from burning the bridge to the lumber yards on the riverbank and then, to worsen the matter, the town itself caught fire. The citizens quickly supplied all the buckets, pails, tubs, pails, and pans Gordons's men could utilize in their attempt to save the town. Despite the exhaustive march, the Confederates then formed a bucket brigade reaching from the river to the houses, providing water to extinguish the flames, while others commenced to dismantle a few houses between the flames and the rest of town.²⁰¹ Isaac Gordon

¹⁹⁷ Farquhar, 80

¹⁹⁸ Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, 147.

¹⁹⁹ "Wrightsville Bridge (Burning of)," *Gettysburg Compiler*, January 26, 1886, ACHS, Extracts from the *Columbia Herald*; "Wrightsville's Capture by Gordon's Georgian: Stirring Scenes During Defense and Evacuation of Borough," in *Wrightsville – Confederate Occupation (1863)*, Folder 291-4, YCHT; Scott Mingus, *Beyond the Burning Bridge: Wrightsville, Pa., in the Civil War* (Scott L. Mingus Sr), 2015.

²⁰⁰ John B. Linn, *Journey of My Trip to the Battlefield at Gettysburg*, July 1863, ACHS.

²⁰¹ Gordon, *Reminiscences*, 492.

Bradwell recollected that “without orders everybody went to work to assist the citizens in their efforts to save their goods and to subdue the fire.”²⁰² Gordon underscored that despite an absence of fire engines, “My men labored as earnestly and bravely to save the town as they did to save the bridge.”²⁰³

Evans logged the event in his diary, “All militia, who ran as fast as possible & burned the Bridge. Town on fire – Rebel Regiments which had marched 25 miles that day work to stop the fire. Tear down houses & at last the fire stops, after burning six or eight houses. Wrightsville was a scene of confusion & excitement. But the splendid behavior of Rebel troops soon restored quiet – I again guarded the town.”²⁰⁴ An exception to the excellent conduct of the men was the capture of some liquor found secreted in a cellar, despite efforts to prevent it.²⁰⁵ One lady, whose house was saved that night, Mrs. Mary Jane Rewalt, expressed her gratitude to Gordon and his command by providing breakfast the following morning for as many soldiers as she could possibly provide for, which induced Gordon to entitle her “the heroine of the Susquehanna.”²⁰⁶

Later, the Union press blamed Gordon’s men for burning the town, which particularly incensed Confederate officers. Ewell emphasized in his report that while Gordon’s men “succeeded in extinguishing the flames,” they were “accused by the Federal press of having set fire to the town.”²⁰⁷ Gordon highlighted in his report “the base ingratitude of our enemies” when the Yankee press attributed the burning of Wrightsville to his brigade.²⁰⁸ The citizens of Wrightsville however relayed to other civilians throughout York County that it was entirely due to the efforts of Gordon’s men that the town was not burned. One civilian articulated that the

²⁰² I. G. Bradwell, 301.

²⁰³ Gordon, *Reminiscences*, 492.

²⁰⁴ Evans, 220.

²⁰⁵ I. G. Bradwell, 301.

²⁰⁶ Gordon, *Reminiscences*, 148-150. Gordon refers to her as Mrs. L. L. Rewalt.

²⁰⁷ OR, vol. 27 (2): 443.

²⁰⁸ OR, vol. 27 (2): 492.

Rebels “worked bravely the whole night to prevent this, assuring the people they had not come into their State either to burn or destroy private property; their mission here was to meet the Federal army.”²⁰⁹

Before the I and III Corps crossed into Pennsylvania, commanded by lieutenant generals James Longstreet and A. P. Hill respectively, Lee’s General Orders were relayed to the officers and soldiers in those commands. Major General Dorsey Pender, commanding a division in Hill’s Corps, wrote home to his wife from Shepherdstown on June 24th that “Gen. Lee has issued [an] order which altho' [it] prevents plundering, at the same [time] makes arrangements for the bountiful supplying of our people.”²¹⁰ John C. West, a private in the Texas Brigade of Hood’s Division, noted that while in camp near Berryville, Virginia, “it was formally announced that ‘we are about to go into the enemy’s country, that private property should be respected, that all pillaging and private foraging should be abstained from as the troops would be subsisted upon the very best the enemy’s country afforded.’”²¹¹ Thomas Ware, a private in Benning’s Brigade, also in Hood’s Division, recorded on June 23rd, “Orders read to us tonight relative to marching. No straggling, no pressing private property every man keep his place as we are going in M’d.”²¹²

In Greencastle, Major General George E. Pickett, commanding one of Longstreet’s divisions, described an incident to his future wife Sally, in which his personal example quelled the passions of his men and won over the sympathy of a devoted Union girl. A young girl rushed out and waved a United States flag, “protectively fasted it upon herself as an apron,” and derided the passing Confederates as traitors. With the knowledge that some of his men had homes in

²⁰⁹ Unknown, “The Confederates in York.”

²¹⁰ Dorsey Pender, *One of Lee’s Best Men: The Civil War Letters of General William Dorsey Pender* ed. William W. Hassler (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 252.

²¹¹ John C. West, *A Texan in Search of a Fight: Being the Diary and Letters of a Private Soldier in Hood’s Texas Brigade* (Waco, TX: Press of J. S. Hill & Co., 1901), 90-91.”

²¹² Thomas Ware, *35 Days to Gettysburg: Two Campaign Diaries of Two American Enemies*, ed. Mark Nesbitt (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 103.

portions of Virginia occupied at various times by Federal armies and “fearing lest some might forget their manhood,” Pickett, gentlemanly like, took his hat off, bowed to her, saluted the flag, and then faced his men. “And don’t you know that they were all Virginians and didn’t forget it,” described Pickett, and following their general’s example “almost every man lifted his cap and cheered the little maiden.”²¹³ Not only did his actions impact the discipline of his troops, but the young girl ceased calling them traitors, wishing she had a rebel flag too. “We left that ‘little Greencastle Yankee girl’ standing there with the flag gathered up in her arms, as if too scared to be waved now that even the enemy had done it reverence.”²¹⁴ Furthermore, Pickett emphasized that with morale high among his Virginians, there occurred “no straggling, no disorder, no dissatisfaction, no plundering, and . . . no desertions.”²¹⁵

One member of Pickett’s division, Sergeant-Major David E. Johnston, in Kemper’s Brigade, seconded this notion, that in spite of harsh looks by the populace, there was “no straggling, no desertion, no destruction of private property, no outrages committed upon non-combatants, the orders of the commanding general on this subject being strictly observed.”²¹⁶ On June 27th, passing Greencastle, Charles Minor Blackford, attached to Longstreet’s headquarters, saw little sign of being in the enemy’s country. Pennsylvanians were not entirely pleased to see the Confederates, but they expressed no hatred and were not shy in their interactions. “As no maltreatment is permitted, and no pillaging of other than their stock, they are so favorably disposed towards us that they almost seem friendly. Private property is respected and men are not allowed even to go into a yard to get water without permission of the owner.”²¹⁷ “The orders

²¹³ George E. Pickett, *The Heart of a Soldier: As Revealed in the Intimate Letters of Genl. George E. Pickett C.S.A.* (New York: Seth Moyle, 1913), 83.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ George E. Pickett, *The Heart of a Soldier*, 85.

²¹⁶ David E. Johnston, *The Story of a Confederate Boy in the Civil War* (Portland, OR: Glass & Prudhomme Company, 1914), 194.

²¹⁷ Susan Leigh Blackford and Charles Minor Blackford. *Letters from Lee’s Army*, 183-184.

even go so far, and they are strictly enforced,” he continued, “as to prohibit the burning of rails for firewood, a rule not enforced in Virginia and one I must say I think unnecessary here.”²¹⁸

Fitzgerald Ross, an observer from the Austrian army, saw that during their march towards Greencastle, the inhabitants of the small towns along the turnpike, came out of their doors and watched the columns as they marched along. Yet, “they were not in the least molested, of course, and seemed to have got over their first ‘scare’ at the strange sight.”²¹⁹

Hill’s Corps arrived in Chambersburg on June 26th and the 27th, turned east, and encamped on the Cashtown Pike. Longstreet’s Corps arrived on June 27th and the 28th, continued northward, and encamped along the Conococheague Creek. The *Franklin Repository* expressed that “When the rebel columns filed through Chambersburg, they marched with the utmost order and decorum.”²²⁰ Boastful expressions such as “laughing, talking loudly or singing was not indulged in.”²²¹ Pickett indeed ordered his bands not to play when they marched through town in the evening of June 27th, but when his division marched through the northeastern portion of the city some young ladies asked the band to play. Pickett then reversed his policy, and the nearby band played an array of music. Not satisfied with the selections, the young ladies asked the next band to play Dixie, but it did not oblige them. Quite dissatisfied, the young ladies inquired, “Thought you was rebels. Where'd you come from anyhow?”²²² David Johnston though remembered that when some ladies delivered “a sharp spicy address,” they responded with a cheer as their bands played Dixie and the Bonnie Blue flag.²²³

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Fitzgerald Ross, *Cities and Camps of the Confederate States*, ed. Richard Barksdale Harwell (Urbana: IL: University of Illinois Press, 1958), 36.

²²⁰ *Baltimore Daily Gazette*, July 14, 1863, orig. from the *Franklin Repository*.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² George E. Pickett, *The Heart of a Soldier*, 86-87.

²²³ David E. Johnston, *The Story of a Confederate Boy in the Civil War*, 196.

Lee and his staff arrived in Chambersburg on June 26th and established their headquarters a quarter of a mile outside of town in Shetter's woods. George P. Clarke's company from the 7th Virginia, in Kemper's Brigade, was detailed as a guard for the town. They established comfortable quarters in the town hall and although the citizens were sore to see them, they did not say anything about it.²²⁴ Colonel Arthur Fremantle, an Englishman observing the war with the Confederates, attached to Longstreet's headquarters, was impressed with the conduct of the troops he observed, "saw no straggling into the houses, nor were any of the inhabitants disturbed or annoyed by the soldiers. Sentries were placed at the doors of many of the best houses, to prevent any officer or soldier from getting in on any presence."²²⁵ When he ventured into town the following day, he again observes sentries posted "at the doors of all the principal houses."²²⁶

On June 27th, Lee reiterated his orders respecting private property in General Orders No. 73, this time however, like Ewell, he explained his rationale for doing so.

The commanding general has observed with marked satisfaction the conduct of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results commensurate with the high spirit they have manifested. No troops could have displayed greater fortitude or better performed the arduous marches of the past ten days. Their conduct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been in keeping with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise. There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness, on the part of some, that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own. The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the unarmed and defenseless and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only degrade the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movement. It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take

²²⁴ George P. Clarke, *George P. Clarke Diary*, June 20, 1863 – April 7, 1865, LV, no. 34036, 3.

²²⁵ Sir Arthur J. L. [James Lyon] Fremantle and Frank A. Haskell, *Two Views of Gettysburg*, ed. Richard Harwell (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1964), 23.

²²⁶ Sir Arthur J. L. Fremantle and Frank A. Haskell, *Two Views of Gettysburg*, 25.

Ho, *The Great Invasion*, 167-169, Shetter's Wood's became known as Messersmith's Woods.

vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain. The commanding general therefore earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain with most scrupulous care from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject.²²⁷

Through this civilized form of warfare, Lee desired to maintain discipline in the army, beneficial to linear tactics on the battlefield and the efficient collection of essential supplies on the march, as well as to win over the support of Northern civilians for upcoming elections by both demoralizing their morale, regarding their desire to see the war to its fruition, and heightening their respect for the Southern people. It is evident that he believed there were higher forms of authority dictating their conduct. Moreover, he considered that there was no greater disgrace than waging an uncivilized war, even more so than losing the war itself. As Ewell did before him, Lee utilized a variety of methods to ensure his orders were not only being followed by soldiers under his command, but also understood by men who, he considered, could differentiate between right and wrong. He praised their conduct during the march, reminded them of his orders to respect private property, listed his expectations for the continued campaign, earnestly exhorted them to follow his orders, and exerted his authority upon those who may be tempted to disregard the chain of command by warning of appropriate consequences for disobedience.

Pender explained Lee's reasoning for issuing these orders, "Until we crossed the Md. line our men behaved as well as troops could, but here it will be hard to restrain them, for they have an idea that they are to indulge in unlicensed plunder."²²⁸ Some of his soldiers not only held this

²²⁷ General Orders, No. 73, Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia, Chambersburg, Pa., June 27, 1863, Robert E. Lee. OR, vol. 27 (3): 942 – 943; *Franklin Repository*, July 15, 1863. Hoke noted that this order, unlike the one issued on June 21, was written by Lee himself and not his adjutant. Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 175.

²²⁸ Dorsey Pender, *One of Lee's Best Men*, 253.

idea of retaliatory warfare, but began to implement it, despite Lee's initial orders. Between Greencastle and Chambersburg Thomas Ware described, "The soldiers hardly respecting any thing, robing bee gums & poultry yards" besides their commissary agents "gathering up all the horses & beeves in the country."²²⁹ Hood's division marched through Chambersburg and as the town was under martial law with "guards at every corner," Ware lamented "we could get nothing."²³⁰ They encamped three miles outside of town however and "burnt all the fences around the corn fields," while some of the men ventured into the countryside to take advantage of the bounty surrounding them.²³¹ The following day, June 28th, they remained in camps and with passes granted, nearly half the regiment went out foraging collecting chickens, butter, milk, cherries, although they did pay for what they acquired.²³² After regimental inspection on June 29th, Thomas Ware recorded a stark change regarding their conduct, "very strict orders none permitted to leave Camps without a pass."²³³

There were exceptions to the orderly conduct of affairs. L. M. Blackford, serving as an officer on the military court of the I Corps, wrote that when they entered town the stores were all closed, although many of them were opened by threat. When a store opened, guards were, "in most instances," but not all, posted at the door and a limited number of troops were allowed to enter at a time. When they did get into the stores they bought "what few things we could find that

²²⁹ Thomas Ware, *35 Days to Gettysburg*: 122-123.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 123.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*, 129

²³³ *Ibid.*, 135. Mark Nesbit, the editor of Thomas Ware's diary, assessed that, despite Lee's General Orders No. 72, individual soldiers began to feast upon the rich countryside, "unspoiled despite two years of war," as private beehives and chicken houses were "clearly being used by individual soldiers for private consumption," although the public capture of horses and cattle were of a military necessity. He surmised, "No doubt it was the soldiers' actions outside of Greencastle that prompted the Confederate Army to declare Chambersburg under martial law and post guards about town. As well, it may have been the actions of ware and the rest of Hood's Division that caused Lee to issue General Orders No. 73 from his headquarters in Chambersburg on June 27, 1863. As if he is a father gently scolding a spirited child, he needs to punish but not to break, there is praise as well as stern admonishment in his orders."

we wanted with C. S. money.”²³⁴ In a few cases, soldiers got into stores where there was no guard present and stole what they wanted. He reflected, “There was, in short a good deal of lawlessness, but not as much as might have been expected under the circumstances.”²³⁵

As the soldiers marched through town some clandestinely exchanged hats with unsuspecting civilians watching the procession on the side of the road. Rachel Cormany heard of “their mean tricks” as some rebels exchanged hats and boots and that many “have chickens as they pass.”²³⁶ Although officers attempted to punish such actions, in some cases it was near impossible to do so. This was not always necessary either as hats and boots were subject to official requisition. L. M. Blackford noted, “Our whole party re-hatted themselves.”²³⁷ Rachel Cormany also described that some citizens were robbed of their pocketbooks, watches, and clothing,²³⁸ although Jacob Hoke underscored that such actions were never carried out “in the presence of an officer.”²³⁹ In particular, she heard from “Daddy Byers” that the rebels “robbed him of a good deal,” plundering his house and taking shoes, towels, sheets, and his horse. Initially, he “plead so hard” for his horse, “that they agreed to leave him,” issuing Byers a note of security for the protection of his horse, but another group of Confederates disregarded the note and appropriated the horse any way. Rachel articulated that some of “their neighbors fared worse yet.”²⁴⁰

William H. Boyle, in explanation of abuses to their Lodge room, alleged “Gen. Lees order to respect private property was laughed at by the villains that compose his army.”²⁴¹ He

²³⁴ L. M. Blackford, L. M. Blackford to Wm. M. Blackford, June 28, 1863, VS.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Rachel Cormany, Diary, June 27 - 28, 1863. She wrote that the “mean tricks” occurred “yesterday and before,” that is, on the 26th and 27th.

²³⁷ L. M. Blackford.

²³⁸ Rachel Cormany, Diary, June 28, 1863.

²³⁹ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 176-177.

²⁴⁰ Rachel Cormany, Diary of Rachel Cormany (1863), VS. July 3, 1863.

²⁴¹ William H. Boyle, William H. Boyle to Isaac H. McCauley, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, July 5, 1863.

initially begged an officer to respect the room, when they took possession of the hall. In response, Boyle wrote the officer “promised me it should not be disturbed and placed a guard over it.”²⁴² But the guard themselves disobeyed the orders and broke in the room three times and plundered it, in addition to nearby offices. They broke open the safes, carried off, or tore up, in order to get the lace and bullion, all the regalia, took lamp fixtures and books, in addition to scattering about that which they did not take.²⁴³ Dr. Phillip Schaff heard from a few of Chambersburg’s residents who told him that “terrible outrages” were committed by the rebels against its citizens, including one of major consequence, that one man was shot to get his money, as well as more moderate and minor abuses, such the robbery of a citizen or the exchanging of hats with civilians on the streets.²⁴⁴ Those who abused Lee’s orders and could be proven guilty were subsequently dwelt with as L. M. Blackford recalled, “We have held court to-day, though Sunday, and I have been very busy.”²⁴⁵

Iowa Michigan Royster, in Lane’s brigade of Penders division, also described the impact of Lee’s explanatory orders in a letter to his mother on June 29th. “Yesterday and the day before our soldiers plundered far and wide - taking butter, milk, apple-butter, fruit, chickens, pigs and horses and everything they could lay their hands on. . . . Yesterday however, Genl' Lee sent an order around that all stealing and plundering should be punished in each case with death, that officers should be held accountable for the execution of his orders, that he made war upon armed men - not upon women and children. The plundering will be stopped now.”²⁴⁶ He articulated that although quartermasters, commissaries, and surgeons “are empowered to impress everything

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Philip Schaff, “The Gettysburg Week,” July 1, 1863. These abuses were relayed to Schaff by Dr. Seibert and Mr. Stine. Dr. Schneck told Dr. Seibert how he was robbed losing his gold watch, passed down from his grandfather, and his pocketbook, with \$57 inside. In one instance, a man was relieved of the clothes he was wearing.

²⁴⁵ L. M. Blackford.

²⁴⁶ Iowa Michigan Royster, Iowa Michigan Royster to His Mother, June 29, 1863, VS.

necessary for the use of the army,” individual soldiers could only acquire what they themselves bought. He even heard that nine of their own soldiers were shot yesterday for stealing jewelry from a woman, although he failed to verify the truth of the rumor. He then considered that death is an accepted punishment for stealing, according to the articles of war, to be determined by a regimental court-martial. In any case, he expressed to his mother the newly accepted understanding amongst the more undisciplined units, “Gen. Lee seems determined to stop all marauding.”²⁴⁷

The soldiers with whom the editors of the *Valley Spirit* conversed spoke of Lee “as a rigid disciplinarian,” but this did not detract the men from believing him “the greatest general the world has ever produced.”²⁴⁸ On June 30th, Thomas G. Pollock, in Kempers’ brigade of Pickett’s Division, described to his father that “the army is reveling in good eating.”²⁴⁹ However, this bountiful accumulation of food was accomplished “regularly and in good order.”²⁵⁰ He articulated, “I have heard of no case of outrage to person or property. Such is Genl Lees order.”²⁵¹ Some divisions held a greater reputation for being “a wild set” and “difficult to manage.”²⁵² Colonel Fremantle noted that “it is the great object of the chiefs to check their innate plundering propensities by every means in their power.”²⁵³ Indeed, “No officer or soldier under the rank of a general is allowed into Chambersburg without a special order from General Lee, which he is very chary of giving.”²⁵⁴ Fremantle even heard of officers of significant rank being refused a pass.²⁵⁵ On June 29th, he described that “Lee has issued a remarkably good order on

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ *Valley Spirit*, July 8, 1863.

²⁴⁹ Thomas G. Pollock, Thomas Gordon Pollock to His Father, June 30, 1863, VS.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Arthur Fremantle, *Two Views of Gettysburg*, 28.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 27.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

non-retaliation, which is generally well received.”²⁵⁶ That same day he ventured into town again, as a British observer requiring no special pass, and “witnessed the singularly good behavior of the troops towards the citizens.”²⁵⁷ Indeed, he stressed “everything that can be done is done to protect private property and non-combatants, and I can say, from my own observation, with wonderful success.”²⁵⁸ Some undisciplined Texan soldiers were tasked with the duty of destroying barrels of whiskey, “a pretty good trial for their discipline,” and despite being upset that the only time they were allowed into town was for the purpose of destroying “their beloved whiskey,” they performed their duty as soldiers.²⁵⁹

Fitzgerald Ross described that “Wherever the army marches, the bar-rooms in the surrounding towns and villages are closed by the authorities, and no one is allowed to sell intoxicating liquors to the soldiers. Of course, a great many do drink wherever they can find an opportunity, but opportunities are very rare. I do not recollect ever to have seen a drunk private soldier in the South, though perhaps once or twice I may have seen an officer a little ‘tight.’”²⁶⁰ This was of course, not always the case, since Whiskey was sometimes used as a reward to maintain morale and as a stimulant in the midst of battle, and many preachers continually harped upon the necessity of quelling the harms of intoxicating liquor, but it does illustrate the tight reign of control the officers had over their men. When initially denied a hotel room, before payment in greenbacks, Ross commented to other foreign observers, “We manage these things differently in some parts of Europe, in wartimes in an enemy’s country.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 30.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 31.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 36.

²⁶⁰ Fitzgerald Ross, *Cities and Camps*, 34-35.

²⁶¹ Fitzgerald Ross, 38. The Louisiana Tigers for instance had a propensity to drink as well as a reputation for hard fighting. J. Warren Jackson noted that on June 26th, encamped outside of Gettysburg, the whole brigade got drunk after whiskey was issued. Warren Jackson, “The Gettysburg Campaign,” 187.

Chambersburg was once more subject to a requisition, although since Jenkins and Ewell's cavalry had already issued such requests as well as the removal or hiding of goods by the town's residents, supply acquisitions were very much reduced. Lee's Chief of Artillery, William N. Pendleton, wrote "Ewell and the cavalry ahead of him have swept along before us, so that we do not see the full harvest of Yankee alarm, etc. Houses are generally shut, and horses, cattle, etc., are missing."²⁶² From Fayetteville on June 28th, Major General Dorsey Pender, commanding a division in Hill's Corps, recorded in his diary, "The rascals have been expecting us and have run off most of their stock and goods."²⁶³ Ewell's chief commissary, Major W. J. Hawks, did notify Colonel R. G. Cole, chief commissary for the army, of the locations of 5,000 barrels of flour, which he discovered and saved for the rest of the army during his march.²⁶⁴ Henry Harrison Sneed, a commissary officer in Armistead's brigade of Pickett's division, secured some flour from the mills in the area around Chambersburg and also traveled the whole way to Shippensburg with twelve wagons to secure some flour that had been left in the depot. When he arrived there, he found that the Confederates guarding the flour had left and civilians were taking what they pleased, but he was able to secure enough for his unit.²⁶⁵

Major Raphael J. Moses, Longstreet's chief commissary, proceeded to town at 11 a.m. on June 28th with an official requisition to supply the corps with rations for three days. If the rations were not voluntarily given, he was to seize them by force. He was ordered to open the stores and seize everything the army wanted "in a regular and official manner," giving Confederate money according to its value or a receipt.²⁶⁶ Longstreet's Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant –

²⁶² William N. Pendleton, *Memoirs*, 280.

²⁶³ Pender, 253.

²⁶⁴ OR, vol. 27 (2): 443.

²⁶⁵ Henry Harrison Sneed, *Recollections of the Civil War and Other Items of Family History*, LV, acc. no., 40906, 27.

²⁶⁶ Fremantle, 26.

Colonel Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, remembered that they persuaded the principal merchants to remain open. As such, Sorrel relayed that “they displayed some of their wares, doubtless old or unsalable stuff that they could not hide.”²⁶⁷ He further specified that “everything was strictly paid for in our national currency – Confederate bills!”²⁶⁸ Their corps also “had the place well guarded and protected from plunder by loose bodies of men.”²⁶⁹ As Fremantle walked through town, he witnessed these pressing operations by Moses and his commissary agents as well as those of other departments. The only other soldiers he observed were those guards on duty. He returned to camp at 6 p.m., while Moses returned later that night. Moses expressed his discontent to Fremantle “at the ill-success of his mission.”²⁷⁰ He not only endured the contempt of the citizenry, but as most necessities had either been sent away or hidden in private houses, “which he was not allowed by General Lee’s order to search,” he was thoroughly exhausted and dissatisfied that he was only able to secure some molasses, sugar, and whisky. He was glad though at discovering a large supply of felt hats, hidden in a cellar.²⁷¹ “Our chief commissary, Moses, made a forced requisition and got some supplies and necessaries, not very much,” Sorrel recalled.²⁷² “He also managed to get a few felt hats, and deserved more, for he was grumbling furiously at the ill success of his important requisition for cash, stores, and army supplies; also for the sound rating and liberal abuse he had taken from the irate females in furious rage at his work.”²⁷³

²⁶⁷ Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1905.), 178. L. M. Blackford observed only between six or eight stores being opened.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 164.

²⁷⁰ Fremantle, 30.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, *Recollections*, 164.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 178.

Although Jacob Hoke's goods were spared by Ewell's commissary agents, he was not so lucky with Longstreet's, the molasses being purchased from his store.²⁷⁴ George P. Clarke also noted the acquisition of molasses "We have opened one of the stores this morning to get some molasses. We found plenty of them, which we made good use of. The citizens looked on but said nothing. . . . every thing passed off as quiet as possible."²⁷⁵ Soldiers collected the supplies on the streets and, before loading them onto their wagons, officers recorded the supplier, kind, and quantity. The next day Moses visited the stores and paid for the appropriated items. Hoke's house, which was deserted as his wife refugeed with some relatives, was also entered and nearly all of their clothing was taken as well as some canned fruit and bread.²⁷⁶ Despite these hardships, as a whole, Hoke considered that Lee's orders were in accordance with the rules of war. "Candor compels me to say that in the main these humane regulations end were observed. The taking of groceries, provisions, stationary, hardware, clothing, hats, boots and shoes, drugs, horses, cattle, corn, oats, hay, etc., was clearly within the rules of civilized warfare, and nothing more than the Federal army did when in the enemy's country. . . . This, to their credit be it said, they exacted of us without many acts of wanton and useless plunder."²⁷⁷

The scarcity of supplies did not entirely stop the Confederate acquisition of necessitated supplies. Spencer Glasgow Welch, in McGowan's brigade of Pender's division, wrote home that "We are taking everything we need- horses, cattle, sheep, flour, groceries and goods of all kinds, and making as clean a sweep as possible."²⁷⁸ Pender wrote home to his wife on his soldiers' conduct and their success in acquiring supplies. "They take poultry and hogs but in most cases

²⁷⁴ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 192-194. Hoke told Rachel Cormany that they took about \$500 worth of sugar and molasses. Rachel Cormany, *Diary*, June 29, 1863.

²⁷⁵ George P. Clarke, 3.

²⁷⁶ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 192-194. Rachel Cormany, *Diary*, June 29, 1863.

²⁷⁷ Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 175-176.

²⁷⁸ Spencer Glasgow Welch, *A Confederate Surgeon's Letters to His Wife* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1911), 57.

pay our money for it. We take everything we want for government use.”²⁷⁹ Lee reported to Davis that so far they acquired enough supplies in Pennsylvania to support Ewell and he hoped to continue to do so for the rest of the army. He emphasized, “We use Confederate money for all payments. I shall continue to purchase all supplies that are furnished me while north of the Potomac, impressing only when necessary.”²⁸⁰

While the majority of the army moved east across South Mountain, Pickett’s division, remained in Chambersburg to guard their line of supply, so as to ensure the arrival of necessary supplies, essential to their current campaign, and the return of captured supplies to Virginia, required for future operations. Pickett utilized the time to complete a more adequate destruction of the railroad. He received orders from Longstreet to do so, south of town, on June 29th, which specified, “The cross-ties should be burned, the iron injured as much as practicable, and the destruction made as complete as can be effected.”²⁸¹ McLaws and Hood were ordered to do the same north of town, before they moved eastward the following morning.²⁸² On June 30th, the Scotland Bridge was further demolished and five hundred men destroyed the railroad depot in town. The railroad track was torn up for four miles with the soldiers burning the ties and bending the rails. “You could mark the line of the railroad by the smoke of the burning ties,” observed William Heyser. Despite the targeted destruction, he also noted, “there is little damage to crops and grassland.”²⁸³ George P. Clarke relayed that from his regiment thirty-five men were detailed to tear up the railroad, along with others detailed for the same duty, destroying between two and three miles. For the military necessity, they utilized fences “and anything we get hold of,” Clarke

²⁷⁹ Pender, 253.

²⁸⁰ OR, vol. 27 (2): 297-298.

²⁸¹ G. M. Sorrel, Assistant Adjutant – General, to Maj. Gen. G. E. Pickett, Hdqs., First Army Corps, OR, vol. 51 (2): 729.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ William Heyser, Diary, June 30, 1863.

described, in addition to the ties, so as to generate enough heat to bend the iron rails. The work continued into July 1. “Nearly all of our Division,” wrote Clarke, were “out pulling up railroads and destroying public property in the town of Chambersburg.”²⁸⁴ Rachel Cormany heard chopping noises at a great rate that day, which she judged to be the rebels “breaking up the iron by the sound.”²⁸⁵

Major General J.E.B. Stuart, with an independent command of three cavalry brigades and discretionary orders, moved north around the Army of the Potomac. As Lee did with Ewell, because of Stuart’s detached command, Lee communicated to Stuart on June 22nd, his General Orders No. 72. “All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff officers for their respective departments – by no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.”²⁸⁶

In Hanover, Pennsylvania, Stuart found the town occupied by Gregg’s division of Federal cavalry where fighting eventually forced him to skirt around the town. As he advanced through western York County Stuart’s troopers collected horses, often exchanging their worn-out mounts for fresh ones. In combination with Early’s collection of horses in the region, James Latimer assessed that the two commands “made a clean sweep of the horses in the western half of the County; the two Codoruses & Dover suffering very severely.”²⁸⁷

Despite the initial fear and dread of Confederate occupation, prompting civilians to flee with their goods, having to fulfill Ewells requisitions, and the destruction of the railroad,

²⁸⁴ George P. Clarke, 3.

²⁸⁵ Rachel Cormany, Diary, July 1, 1863.

²⁸⁶ OR, vol. 27 (3): 913.

²⁸⁷ No. 565, Report of J.E.B. Stuart, OR, vol. 27 (2): 691-695; James Latimer, Papers; Scott Mings, *Confederate Calamity: J. E. B. Stuart’s Cavalry Ride Through York County*, Pa. (Scott L. Mings Sr., 2015).

comparatively thus far, the town of Carlisle had suffered little abuse to private property or damages from military conflict. Robert A. Welsh, a corporal in the 33rd Pennsylvania Volunteers, who had recently arrived along with other militiamen under the command Brigadier General William F. “Baldy” Smith, in conversation with residents of the town heard that the Confederates “had behaved quite well. The stores had been plundered but private houses had been generally left alone and the people treated quite civilly.”²⁸⁸

On July 1st, Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee and his brigade of cavalry reached the eastern outskirts of town. Out of rations, Stuart “desired to levy a contribution on the inhabitants” to feed his famished men.²⁸⁹ “Some of us nearly starved,” a soldier in the 2nd Virginia cavalry described. He had not received any rations since June 20th and besides what they got from the canal boats in Maryland, he had to beg citizens for food during the ride.²⁹⁰ Upon entering the town, to their surprise, they found it occupied by Smith’s force of militia and slight skirmishing ensued.²⁹¹ With Smith’s militia now concealed in various buildings, Stuart and Fitz Lee decided that they could not storm the town without significant loss.²⁹² S. D. Hillman considered that if the rebel cavalry charged, they would have suffered considerably from the firing of both the soldiers, and some citizens, from behind doors, windows, and housetops.²⁹³ So, Fitz Lee withdrew his troopers and planted his four-gun battery on a commanding eminence overlooking the town.

²⁸⁸ Robert A. Welsh, *Civil War Memoirs of Robert A. Welsh, 1912-1913*, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 8.

²⁸⁹ OR, vol. 27 (2): 696-697.

²⁹⁰ *Reminiscences of a Confederate Soldier of Co. C., 2nd Virginia Cavalry*, (Reprint 2020, orig., 1913), 81.

²⁹¹ Fitzhugh Lee, “Letter of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee Containing Allusions to the Shelling of Carlisle, Pa., July 1, 1863,” *Civil War Correspondence*, Cumberland County Historical Society. Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ S. D. Hillman.

He decided to warn the citizens by sending a few shells over the town and drive off sections of Landis battery then in the street.²⁹⁴ General Smith reported that “Shots were exchanged with our pickets, and several shells were thrown over the town, and one or two up the Railroad Street into the square,” where two sections of Landis’ battery were posted.²⁹⁵ S. D. Hillman depicted the shot and shell being thrown “over the town” and “through the streets.”²⁹⁶ C. Stuart Patterson, a member of Landis’s battery, noted that the first few shells were “fired at a considerable elevation and apparently going over the town.”²⁹⁷ The effect of these initial shells being thrown over the town Patterson described “was to clear the streets of all non-combatants.”²⁹⁸ Ten-year-old Mary Johnson later portrayed that the first shells went far over the town, while later the barrage increased in intensity as it swept gradually nearer the town. The “shot and shell, that had at first flown far over the town, had gradually been coming nearer, and now they were falling and bursting all about the campus and the president's house.”²⁹⁹

James Sullivan believed that the shells were intentionally directed over the town, so as to avoid civilian casualties. He also supposed that these first salvos were “Blank cannon shot,” as he was familiar with the noise from the reveille gun at the barracks. Uncertainty at the time though led him to contemplate whether it was “a destructive bombardment or merely a warning to citizens to take to cover. Or was there bad marksmanship?”³⁰⁰ However, “Non-combatants

²⁹⁴ Fitzhugh Lee, “Letter of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.”

²⁹⁵ OR vol. 27 (2): 224.

²⁹⁶ S. D. Hillman.

²⁹⁷ George Wood Wingate, *History of the Twenty-Second Regiment of the National Guard of the State of New York from its Organization to 1895* (New York: Edwin W. Dayton, Publisher and Bookseller, 1896), 216. Wingate wrote that in the dark the Confederate guns fired high, “particularly before the flag of truce was sent in, so that the shells, with the exception of those directed into the square, went over the outskirts of the town where the troops where the troops were stationed.” Wingate, *History of the Twenty-Second Regiment*, 241.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Mary (Johnson) Dillon, *In Old Bellaire* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap Publishers, 1906), 329-330. Despite being a novel, the general portrayal of events is fairly accurate, from the point of view of an eyewitness, that being of herself, although she did use different names for some of the participants.

³⁰⁰ Sullivan, “Seen in Carlilse,” 59.

were not being mercilessly slaughtered” and “no missiles had yet fallen about the square,” pointing him to the conclusion that it was merely a warning. Moreover, Sullivan could hear the long-drawn-out flight of the shells soaring high over him, the progression of which he calculated occupied a space of ten seconds. Beyond his own personal observations, he reflected that there were “reasons to believe that all, or nearly all, the shells thrown during the first spell of firing went clear over the town.”³⁰¹ The Confederate artillery commander could certainly see the crowds of citizens and soldiers collected near the square. “Had he so intended,” concluded Sullivan, “he could have quite accurately directed death dealing shot among them.”³⁰²

Stuart directed Fitz Lee to send an officer and a bugler into town under a flag of truce demanding the surrender of town, or at least the removal of the women and children, as the consequence for refusal meant he would shell the town. Stuart reported that he “disliked to subject the town to the consequences of attack,” but “at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations.”³⁰³ After some delay, Stuart sent a second message to the same effect, but Smith refused to surrender the town.³⁰⁴ Fitz Lee then decided that “there was nothing left but to fight for it.”³⁰⁵ Smith’s men initially occupied houses on the edge of town, accordingly, prompting some shells fired towards those structures. H. B. McClellan, of Stuart’s staff, remembered “throwing a few shells into the outskirts of the town, from which a constant fire of musketry had been maintained.”³⁰⁶

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ OR, vol. 27, (2): 696-697; OR, vol. 27, (2): 221.

³⁰⁴ OR vol. 27, (2): 221; Smith reported, “I sent an answer that the women and children would be notified to leave. In less than half an hour, another message was sent to the purport that, if not surrendered, the town would be burned. The answer was returned that one answer had already been given.” There are no other references to threats to burn the town.

³⁰⁵ Fitzhugh Lee, “Letter of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.”

³⁰⁶ H. B. McClellan, *The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1885), 331.

In the midst of the shelling, Frank Smith Robertson sought to quench his thirst by inquiring for water at a nearby residence. Discovering fifteen to twenty people huddled in the cellar, he took off his hat and politely inquired if he could have some water. After the refreshment, the civilians realized that the rebel posed no threat and inquired if there were any dangers from the cannonade to which Smith told them that as the cannons were facing the opposite direction firing into the city, there was none. He remembered that after that “we became quite sociable and I spent minutes talking to these people. They seemed surprised that I was a gentleman and meant them no harm. They became downright affectionate and presented me with a big plate of much needed food. Our parting was truly kind and a handshake was given all around.”³⁰⁷

After nearly two hours, near midnight, a lull in the bombardment occurred when Stuart sent a third message under a flag of truce with an officer and two troopers, again seeking a surrender of the town. Smith replied that “the message had been twice answered before” and the shelling recommenced.³⁰⁸ The interim afforded an opportunity for residents to leave town. Sullivan’s mother decided to leave with her family, but he recalled that she shortly changed her mind and they returned home. “Up to this moment,” Sullivan explained, “I had witnessed neither ruin nor carnage on all the battlefield that I had wandered over!”³⁰⁹ The shelling lessened in intensity and by 1 a.m. the firing ceased.³¹⁰

Stuart shifted his emphasis from the capture of the town to military targets outside of it. Frank Smith Robertson explained that Stuart only needed to point toward the targets, and he

³⁰⁷ Frank Smith Robertson, *In the Saddle with Stuart: The Story of Frank Smith Robertson of Jeb Stuart’s Staff*, ed. Robert J. Trout (Gettysburg PA: Thomas Publications, 1998), 78. He expressed, “I wish I could go back to that house and meet those people again.”

³⁰⁸ OR, vol. 27 (2): 221.

³⁰⁹ Sullivan, 51-52.

³¹⁰

accordingly delivered the order to Colonel William C. Wickham, commanding the 4th Virginia Cavalry, to burn the United States cavalry barracks, lumber yard, and gas works.³¹¹ Sullivan realized the shift, “I saw striking evidence that the Confederates knew their job. Long rows of the brick barracks buildings, in a direct line half a mile away, were in flames.”³¹² Stuart reported, “Although the houses were used by their sharpshooters while firing on our men, not a building was fired excepting the United States cavalry barracks which were burned by my order.” He explained why his orders diverged from those of Ewell, that is, “the place having resisted my advance instead of peaceable surrender.”³¹³ Fitz Lee planned to attack the town next morning, but that night Stuart received information regarding the outbreak of a pitched battle to the south. He was immediately ordered to concentrate with the rest of the army at Gettysburg.³¹⁴ Although the shelling of a town with innocent civilians was an unfortunate occurrence, Stuart and Fitz Lee attempted to mitigate the destruction by providing warning shots over the town, sending in three messages seeking the surrender of the locality, asking that women and children be evacuated, and when it became apparent the shelling was not having the intended effect, they shifted to more direct military targets.

On June 30th, Ewell commenced the concentration of his corps. The march brought the Confederates through several small towns north of Gettysburg. In Bendersville, Nellie Wilson said that the Confederates appropriated animals, particularly cattle and horses, for which they paid in Confederate money. In particular, they bought cattle from Jane and Ruth Wright and their brother Joe.³¹⁵ While Reverend Leonard M. Gardner, rode the family horse to the safety of

³¹¹ Frank Smith Robertson, *In the Saddle with Stuart*, 79.

³¹² Sullivan, 56.

³¹³ OR, vol. 27 (2): 697.

³¹⁴ Fitzhugh Lee, “Letter of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.”

³¹⁵ Nellie Wright, Nellie (Wright) Wilson, ACHS.

Harrisburg, he instructed his sister, Rebecca, to bake a sufficient amount of bread so when the Confederates arrived in Petersburg, she could give them all they wanted to eat so as to appease their appetites. He further instructed his family “to treat the men courteously and they would not be disturbed.”³¹⁶ When he returned, he found his family’s experience with the Confederates just as he predicted. “The soldiers came to the house, asked politely for something to eat, and the family began feeding them. They continued to drop in till the porch and yard were full of them. They conversed pleasantly with father.”³¹⁷ Another resident recalled the arrival of Jenkins’ cavalry in Petersburg about noon on June 29th. Jenkins required the citizens prepare rations for his men and then they started their search for horses, cows, and oats in the vicinity. The next morning, Rodes’ infantry arrived and completed a more thorough search, securing nearly all the secreted horses in the neighborhood. The merchants “suffered slightly,” except for Mr. J. A. Gardner, who had not removed his dry goods. Mr. Ephraim Hiteshew’s store was at one time forcibly opened, but since he had shipped off the greater portion of his goods, he only sustained a slight loss.³¹⁸

On Monday June 29th, in Hunterstown, Captains Crawford and Straley commanding a detachment of cavalry, occupied the town and established pickets to the east and south. Dr. C. E. Goldsborough detailed, “They are spoken of a very gentlemanly officers, and they and their lieutenants, Cook, Pugh, Brooks and Cheseborough, soon made themselves popular with the citizens by preventing any transgressions upon the part of the men composing the rank and

³¹⁶ Leonard M. Gardner, *Sunset Memories A retrospective of a life lived during the last Seventy-five years of the Nineteenth Century, 1831-1901*, ACHS.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ “York Springs Account,” *Gettysburg Compiler*, Aug 3, 1863, ACHS. Petersburg changed its name to York Springs.

file.”³¹⁹ On July 2nd, Captain Crawford informed the citizens that Stuart’s cavalry would soon pass through town and they were more than welcome to watch the procession near the square.³²⁰

Robert Bell’s family resided in Hunterstown, but as he had led his company of home guard cavalry across the Susquehanna River only his mother, sisters, and grandmother remained. When the Confederates arrived, a group of officers and several men knocked on his family’s door. After his mother answered, “they took off their hats and bowed very lowly.”³²¹ The officer spoke for the group and politely inquired if they could have something to eat. His sister, Fannie Bell, recalled that the Confederates “were as well-mannered as any men she ever saw.”³²² After the meal, they thanked her for the hospitality “and left without disturbing anything.”³²³ Indeed, “All the women thought the Rebels behaved themselves well”³²⁴

Near Middletown, John M. Bream remembered the Confederates marching toward Gettysburg on July 1st. A few Confederate officers filled a wagon with corn, wheat, flour, milk and took some horses, although his father had taken some of the horses and cattle to the woods. The officers inquired to Mrs. Bream as to the sympathies of her husband. Although informed that he was Union man, when she asked if they could leave one can of cream for her children the officer in charge “asked where she wanted it placed” and some soldiers then removed it to the cellar for her.³²⁵ The same day, three miles north of town Harriet Bayly was detained a short while by Confederate troops as she had been walking between the armies’ lines. After her release

³¹⁹ William C. Storrick, “William C. Storrick Provides Interesting History of Cavalry Battle at Hunterstown.”

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Jacob Taughinbaugh, “In Occupied Pennsylvania,” ed. T. W. Herbert, *Georgia Review* (n.d.):105 - 106. Jacob Taughinbaugh’s wife was the sister to Fannie Bell.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ John M. Bream, “Confederates Borrowed Food and Horses from Family,” *Gettysburg Times*, July 1938, ACHS.

she returned home and found a group of Confederates angered because of a gate and chain across her lane. When she offered to open it, “Then they were very polite and said they had come for our horses.”³²⁶ Informed that they could have the three or four colts if they could catch them as well as an old blind one, they then declined the offer, although another unit later acquired the horses. They asked for something to eat, however, paying her well.³²⁷

On June 29th, Heth’s division reached Cashtown, where they collected cattle, grain, and flour, having the citizens bake the flour into bread. Heth’s hat was in “a dilapidated condition,” so he instructed his quartermaster to bring him one of the acquired hats, but none fit. In order to make it fit, his clerk stuffed paper in it, which later saved his life.³²⁸ The following day, Pettigrew’s brigade of his division marched toward Gettysburg “to procure supplies,” but discovered the presence of Buford’s cavalry.³²⁹ On July 1st an encounter between Heth’s leading brigades conducting a reconnaissance in force met Buford’s cavalry brigades and the fighting shortly developed into a general battle. At approximately 4:00 p.m., the Federal forces were routed and the pursuing Confederates occupied the town.

The most immediate task at hand for the Confederates was rounding up Federal soldiers hidden throughout the town. Robert D. Carson, a boy little more than five years old, whose father was cashier at the bank, recalled the Confederates searching above for Federal soldiers, as he and the family remained in the cellar. Fearful that they might take away his uncle away, he recollected “what a talk there was about it all and, it was said, they had been very polite and gentlemanly which seemed a wonderful thing to me,” and there was, in actuality, not much

³²⁶ Harriet Hamilton Bayly, “A Woman’s Story: Three Days of Rebel Rule,” *Star and Sentinel*, September 25, 1888, ACHS. Middletown changed its name to Biglerville.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ Henry Heth, *The Memoirs of Henry Heth*, ed. James L. Morrison, Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), 172.

³²⁹ OR, vol. 27(2): 317.

danger in them taking his uncle.³³⁰ Daniel Skelly's mother convinced pursuing Confederates to let her take care of a wounded Lieutenant of the Iron Brigade, which they allowed and then she was able to hide him until after the battle.³³¹ When a rebel captain and two privates arrived in Catherine Foster's house, the officer "very politely inquired" if there were any Yankees hidden in the house, while the privates immediately commenced the search. When no Federal soldiers were discovered in the cellar, the officer stated that they had to search the upstairs as well, but he insisted to the residents to "come with us and see that nothing will be disturbed."³³² In addition to Federal prisoners, contrabands were also captured. Albertus McCreary recounted that "a great many" colored people who lived in the western part of Gettysburg, "were gathered together by the Confederate soldiers and marched out of town."³³³

Ewell ordered Harry Gilmore to act as temporary Provost Marshal of the town. The tasks before him included searching the town for prisoners and the collection of military supplies, notably arms and ammunition.³³⁴ At one house, Gilmore rang the doorbell and bluntly stated "Madam, you have Union soldiers concealed in your house, and I have come to search for them."³³⁵ Fannie Buehler, at once recognized the rebel from Baltimore, as she had read about his exploits and splendid uniform, but she "never expected to meet him face to face."³³⁶ She replied that there were wounded and fatigued Federals in the house, but none were concealed. To everyone's surprise some of the Federals and Confederates actually knew each other, as they had

³³⁰ Robert D. Carson, *Boy of Gettysburg Recalls Great Fray*, ACHS.

³³¹ Daniel Skelly *A Boy's Experience during the Battle of Gettysburg*.

³³² Catherine Mary White Foster, "Battle of Gettysburg: A Citizen's Eyewitness Account of the Battle of Gettysburg, with Background on the Foster Family Union Soldiers," ed. David A. Murdoch, ACHS, also in *Adams County History* 1, no 5 (1995): 50-51. Catherine Foster later moved to Johnstown, Pennsylvania witnessing the historic Johnstown Flood of 1889.

³³³ Albertus McCreary, "Gettysburg: A Boy's Experience of the Battle," 250.

³³⁴ Harry Gilmore, *Four Years in the Saddle*, 98. They captured 2500 arms, but these fell into hands of enemy when they vacated the town.

³³⁵ Fannie Buehler, 20.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

previously met while each were on picket duty, most likely during one of the common temporary truces to exchange goods. The renewed acquaintances talked and laughed for half an hour. The capturing of prisoners certainly held priority at the time, since after searching the cellar, Buehler's abundant stock of provisions, including hams, lard, butter, and potatoes was left untouched. Indeed, the association of friends proved beneficial to Buehler as she noted, "our stock of provisions was never disturbed."³³⁷

Charles McCurdy, then a young boy, later assessed that even though they were now in Confederate lines, besides "the despondency this caused, the change made little difference. The victors were considerate and did not annoy the populace with demands for supplies. So far as I know no dwelling that was occupied was entered or looted and the citizens were not molested."³³⁸ Doles brigade was positioned around the Jacobs household. Henry Jacobs remembered, "Our Georgian neighbors" were "very courteous and affable, and, while exultant at the result, had too much consideration for us to be defiant."³³⁹ Daniel Skelly reflected that the soldiers of Rodes' division, accustomed to interactions with Pennsylvania civilians during their extensive march through the state, were most considerate toward the populace. After the pursuit, Rodes men formed their line of battle on East and West Middle Streets, directly in front of his house. Skelly emphasized, "I want to pay a tribute to these veterans of the Confederate Army. They were under perfect discipline. They were in and about our yard and used our kitchen stove by permission of my mother... gentlemanly and courteous to us at all times, and I never heard an instance to the contrary in Gettysburg."³⁴⁰ In spite of the fighting during the day, Skelly and his family slept soundly that night. "There was no noise or confusion among the Confederate

³³⁷ Ibid., 20-21.

³³⁸ Charles McCurdy, *Gettysburg: A Memoir*, 11.

³³⁹ Henry Jacobs, 56-57.

³⁴⁰ Daniel Skelly.

soldiers sleeping on the pavement below our windows and we all enjoyed a good night's rest after the feverish anxiety of the first day's battle."³⁴¹

When the fighting trickled down on Wednesday evening, General Ewell and his staff took tea at John Crawford's house on the Harrisburg Road. Despite being "unwelcome guests," in a house only occupied by ladies who freely expressed their opinions of the war, Anna Young, sitting at the head of the table and serving the coffee, relayed that "They were all very polite and kind."³⁴² She was completely captivated by a few of them who "were handsome and intelligent" and they were all very accommodating.³⁴³ Miss Jane Smith described "They got plain fare and no welcome but treated us as a family with courtesy and were some of them evidently gentlemen."³⁴⁴ Although Ewell desired to make the house his headquarters, they declined, and he slept elsewhere, leaving a guard for their protection. On Thursday morning he returned for breakfast with generals Early and Rodes.³⁴⁵

Over the next two days, the battlefield shifted to the south of town. Civilians who still wished to flee from the town or retreat to places of safety were permitted to do so. "How changed the town looked when we came to the light," portrayed Sally Broadhead. "The street was strewn over with clothes, blankets, knapsacks, cartridge -boxes, dead horses, and the bodies of a few men, but not so many of these last as I expected to see."³⁴⁶ She inquired of the new

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Anna Mary Young, "Letter of Anna Mary Young to Her Cousin, July 17, 1863, in *The Soldier of Indiana in the War for the Union by Catherine Merrill* (Indianapolis, 1866), John S. Crawford Folder, United States Army War College; also in Annie Young, Letter, ACHS, orig. in Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Miss Jane Smith, "An Echo of the Battle from Gettysburg," *Star and Sentinel*, July 2, 1913, in Observations and Experiences of Residents of the John S. Crawford Home During the Battle of Gettysburg – 1, 2 and 3 July 1863, compiled by Robert L. Brake, John S. Crawford Folder, Robert L. Brake Collection, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Sallie Broadhead, *The Diary of a Lady of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: From June 15 to July 15, 1863* (The Cornell University Library Digital Collections), 14.

Rebels occupants, ‘Can we get out?’ They replied ‘Certainly,’ and furthermore, “they would not hurt us.” They then started home and found everything all right.³⁴⁷ Daniel Skelly remembered that “with certain restrictions we could go about town.”³⁴⁸ Robert McClean recollected that a fellow citizen had secured a pass from General Ewell for his father and the family to move where they might find safety, whether that be another location in town or through their lines to the outskirts of town, but his father thought it better to remain.³⁴⁹

When Federal shells began striking near the Bender residence on July 1st, Sarah King asked a Confederate soldier if he would escort her and her children through the lines back to town. The soldier said that they could only escort them so far, not being able to leave their position, but he would inquire if they could be passed from one unit to another and reach the town in that manner. However, he soon returned saying that it would be too dangerous. They informed her that they were on guard here for the night and that they would not be disturbed. “Take your rest as though no soldiers were near, although there are 1900 of your men in the woods across the road and our men are drawn up in line.”³⁵⁰ The next day, Mrs. Bender determined to leave, even though the guards assured her “nothing would be disturbed in house,” as long as she stayed, since they would be on guard duty. Finding it too unsafe however, Sarah King and her family, Mrs. Bender and her two daughters, and a few others then fled to the Spanglers. “Someone asked the guard if we dare pass, certainly they said.”³⁵¹ When they reached the Rhineharts, Sarah King considered “We were safe enough,” although there were “Rebs all around us.”³⁵²

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Daniel Skelly.

³⁴⁹ Robert McClean, “A Boy In Gettysburg - - 1863.”

³⁵⁰ Sarah Barret King, “Battle Days In 1863.”

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

Like the Federal soldiers who occupied the town before them, the Confederates considered the safety of Gettysburg's civilians an essentiality, according to their understanding that war be made upon armed combatants and not innocent men, women, and children. John C. Wills was chided by Early for viewing the battlefield from his rooftop. Although Early was most likely interested in ensuring that no information damaging their prospects in the fight reached Federal lines, he expressed concern for the safety of Wills and other civilians, scolding him that he might have been picked off by Federal sharpshooters on Cemetery Hill, believing he was a rebel. "Your people are on the streets; they are at their garret windows and on the roofs," said Early. "I sent Guards from door to door on your streets to tell them to go into their cellars or at least to remain within their houses, the only safe place for them."³⁵³ He stressed, "I want to save your people."³⁵⁴ Wills was told that he could go home and attend to his business, "and that no citizen should be molested in his person or in his business, and that they would protect private property."³⁵⁵

Quartermasters and commissaries continued to collect supplies during the battle and hungry soldiers continued to forage. Robert McClean remembered being "on the watch all the time," because every "half hour or so some famishing Reb, would come in the yard for something to eat."³⁵⁶ His family provided the rebels with what they could "until we were afraid of starving ourselves, then we got rid of them the best way we could."³⁵⁷ Animals too required feeding. Young John Cabell Early, a nephew of General Early, who had accompanied his father as he served on the general's staff, recounted finding corn for his horse and those of prominent

³⁵³ John Charles Wills, "Reminiscences of the Three Days Battle of Gettysburg at the 'Globe Hotel,'" ACHS, also in *Adams County History* 13, no 4 (2007): 36.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid/.

³⁵⁶ Robert McClean.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

officers, including Lee's horse Traveler.³⁵⁸ Anna Young described that although they were in Rebel possession for three days, "Their treatment of us was most courteous and kind; they did not take from us even a chicken; they did, however, take our cherries, currants, onions and potatoes, but that we thought no hardship."³⁵⁹ Some civilians took pity upon the starving soldiers. Mary Bushman Power Deardorf had risen early on the second or third day of fighting and baked a batch of bread and cherries pies. She also had beans, potatoes, and mush in the old bake oven in the outhouse. "The confederates pleaded for a share, offered to pay. I gave what I could spare and they were kind and gentlemanly."³⁶⁰ Although some people held an especial hatred for the enemy, Mary Deardorff articulated "my heart ached for every mother's son of them."³⁶¹

Foraging in the midst of the battle, with the rigors of combat, often became a matter of military necessity. Albertus McCreary remembered the poorly clad Confederates who did not have much to eat. One man in particular, poured molasses over a piece of moldy bread and ate it with much elation. "I asked him if that was all he had to eat. He answered, 'Yes, and glad to get it, too.'"³⁶² Another soldier climbed a cherry tree and sat eating from its branches "in a most unconcerned manner, although the bullets were cutting through the leaves continually."³⁶³ On July 3rd, some Confederates asked Mrs. Rhinehart for something to eat. She had just put her bread in the oven, after the fighting had dwindled down, but the starved Confederates began to

³⁵⁸ John Cabell Early, "A Southern Boy Remembers Gettysburg," *Civil War Times* 27 (August 2005): 27-32. Orig. *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, June 1911.

³⁵⁹ Anna Mary Young, "Letter of Anna Mary Young to Her Cousin, July 17, 1863," 119.

³⁶⁰ Mary Bushmann Power Deardorff, "Grandmother Bushman's Friendship Quilt," *Gettysburg Times*, July 1938, ACHS.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

³⁶² Albertus McCreary, "Gettysburg: A Boy's Experience of the Battle," 246.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 247.

immediately eat it, until they discovered it was not baked on the inside, whereafter they finished baking it.³⁶⁴

When the two armies established their forward lines, skirmishing increased. Major Eugene Blackford led a battalion of Confederate sharpshooters who took position on the southern edge of town establishing themselves in the houses “as near the enemy’s lines as possible,” in order to form a defensive perimeter as well as to target federal artillerists on Cemetery Hill.³⁶⁵ Despite her unwillingness, the sharpshooters occupied Mary Deardorff’s residence and other key dwellings, particularly on Breckenridge Street, providing the ability to fire on Cemetery Hill.³⁶⁶ The skirmishing occurred at rifle range, but in at least one instance the lines of battle made John Rupp’s house no-man’s land. While he remained in his cellar, Federal and Confederate troops occupied the opposite sides of his residence.³⁶⁷ Robert McClean emphasized that on Thursday and Friday “it was very unsafe to be on the street, as the bullets were flying down the street.”³⁶⁸ Stray shells sometimes exploded from Confederate batteries firing over the town toward Cemetery Hill. “Occasionally a shell would come into town,” Robert Mclean described. One such shell “entered the garret, rolled down the steps, through the open door and rested unexploded.”³⁶⁹ When Federal troops occupied the Mclean house on July 4th, a high building with a vantage point to the ridge beyond, his family fled fearing the Confederates may shell the house. They returned that evening however and discovered that only sharpshooting occurred.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁴ Sarah Barret King.

³⁶⁵ No. 527, Report of Maj. Eugene Blackford, OR, vol. 27 (2): 597-598.

³⁶⁶ Mary Bushman Power Deardorff, “Grandmother Bushman’s Friendship Quilt.”

³⁶⁷ John Rupp, Letter, July 19, 1863, ACHS.

³⁶⁸ Robert McClean.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

There were some instances reports of abuses to private property. Robert McClean noted that the rebels, “committed every act of theft, extortion, indecency and destruction imaginable: nothing hardly escaped them: what they could not use they destroyed or abused. Stores, unoccupied houses, stables, were broken open and searched, the parties taking whatever of value they laid their hands on.”³⁷¹ Although, McClean noted that his own family “escaped remarkably well.”³⁷² Beyond small scale abuses, such as the stealing of valued items by small groups of men or individuals, there was at least one major exception to Lee’s orders to respect private property, that is, the burning of a dwelling, the purposes of which extended beyond that of military necessity towards the imposition of retaliation. On the morning of July 4th, members of Hood’s Texas brigade burned a house and barn owned by Alexander Currens because some of the men had obtained poisoned food from the dwelling.³⁷³

Civilians who left their properties unoccupied typically fared worse in the damages and losses they sustained than those who remained. Michael Jacobs communicated that for some of the citizens who left during the battle “found to their sorrow, when afterwards they returned, that they had been pillaged by the Rebels during the absence; whilst most of those who remained at home during the battles of the three days, were enabled to save their property from indiscriminate robbery and destruction.”³⁷⁴ Liberty Hollinger described, “Many of our neighbors left their homes only to encounter greater danger elsewhere. Meanwhile, their houses were ransacked by the Confederates who took possession of most of the houses they found deserted

³⁷¹ Robert McClean.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Alexander Currens Farm, GNMP; John L. Black, *Crumbling Defenses: Memoirs and Reminiscences of John Logan Black*, ed. E. D. McSwain (Macon, GA: 1960), 45.

³⁷⁴ Michael Jacobs, *Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg* (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippencott & Co., 1864), 29.

and helped themselves to whatever they wanted, especially food.”³⁷⁵ Some Confederate soldiers eventually broke the lock to their family’s warehouse and “took what they wanted and then ruined everything else.”³⁷⁶ In other cases, however, her young sister and father were able to deter Confederate soldiers from entering their home and helping themselves to their patch of corn.³⁷⁷

Robert D. Carson explained that while some rebel soldiers came to their kitchen and asked for food, others broke into a store opposite their house. “I saw a hogshead of sugar they had broached and several of them with great lumps of brownish sugar in their hands.”³⁷⁸ When Michael Colver returned to the Seminary after the battle, he discovered his “books, trunks and other effects were gone.”³⁷⁹ He was told that student property was “according to the instruction of a rebel officer, placed in the president’s room and that during the time of the battle a guard had been furnished by the officer to protect such property.”³⁸⁰ The guard did not enter and secure the contents of the locked rooms however and after the battle those rooms were broken into, and valuables taken. However, “President Baugher’s room was filled from floor to ceiling with students’ books and clothing.”³⁸¹

When Charles J. Tyson returned to his home on Chambersburg Street, he happily recorded that he found “nothing wantonly destroyed,” although there were minor damages. The front door of the photography gallery was locked just as he left it, although some rebels were seen entering through the cellar for alcohol.³⁸² Sue King Black relayed, that a few rebels “did all

³⁷⁵ Jacob A. Clutz (Liberty Augusta Hollinger) and Elsie Singmaster, ed., “The Battle of Gettysburg,” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 5, no. 3 (July 1938): 167.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 169.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸ Robert D. Carson, *Boy of Gettysburg Recalls Great Fray*.

³⁷⁹ Michael Colver, *Reminiscences of The Battle of Gettysburg*, Robert L. Brake Collection: Civilians, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, orig. in *The Spectrum*, 1902, 180.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² Charles J. Tyson, *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, March 29, 1884.

kinds of mean tricks,” within the unoccupied Boyers house. They removed “window blinds, pictures, etc. up to the woods. They used the dough tray to feed horses and a drawer of the sideboard to mix dough. They opened a jar of black cherries, poured it down the stair steps, then cut a chaff bed open and spread it over them.”³⁸³ They then ensured their message for doing so was well received, having written on the wall ‘Done in retaliation for what was done in the South.’”³⁸⁴ Susanna Myers though remembered that the rebels did not raid the town very much. “They did go through the homes which had been vacated, but they treated the women, with a great deal of consideration.”³⁸⁵

During the battle Confederate reinforcements protecting the line of supply moved toward Gettysburg including Imboden’s, Jones, and Robertson’s cavalry brigades. On June 23rd, Lee sent Imboden a letter stressing the necessity of acquiring essential supplies, writing that he was to “make every exertion to collect all the supplies you can” and when he arrived with Ewell to continue to “aid in collecting supplies.”³⁸⁶ Moreover, as with other independent commands, Lee sent a copy of his General Order No. 72 and emphasized his wish to have it strictly followed, writing, “A general order on this subject I inclose for your government, which I desire that you cause to be strictly carried out.”³⁸⁷ Imboden then moved to Hancock, Maryland through McConnellsburg to Chambersburg.

On June 29th, Dr. Philip Schaff logged that Imboden’s brigade cleaned out the nearby farmhouses and secured at least 300 horses hidden in the mountains.³⁸⁸ At Mercersburg, on June 30th, Imboden and his staff issued requisitions for their command, which included 5,000 pounds

³⁸³ Sue King Black, Sue King Black, Robert L. Brake Collection, Civilians, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Susanna Myers, “Some Battle Experiences as Remembered by a Young School Girl.”

³⁸⁶ OR vol. 27 (3): 924.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Philip Schaff.

of bacon, 20 barrels of flour, 2 barrels of molasses, 2 barrels of sugar, 2 sacks of salt, and 150 pairs of shoes, to be supplied by 11:00. The consequence for noncompliance was the quartering of soldiers with the citizens. Reverend Thomas Creigh recorded that civilian committees were then appointed to go along with the Confederates in collection of the requisition. A large portion of the supplies were given and though Imboden issued no payment, he gave receipts for future reimbursement. Creigh thankfully noted that they did not collect anything from the ministers.³⁸⁹ In Chambersburg on July 2nd, Amos Stouffer recorded that Imboden's command "stole all the bees," and "took chickens &c. in the neighborhood."³⁹⁰ In particular, they acquired 150 bushels of corn, for which they paid in Confederate script.³⁹¹

Independent guerilla units also ventured into southern Pennsylvania, which did not always act in obedience to Lee's orders to respect private property. Schaff, contrasted the conduct of the regular army with these units. Between June 25th and 27th, he recorded, "The town was occupied by an independent guerilla band of cavalry, who steal horses, cattle, sheep, store-goods, negroes, and whatever else they can make use of, without ceremony, and in evident violation of Lee's proclamation read yesterday."³⁹² Their captain threatened to burn the town, if his command was fired up by the civilians. They also threatened to burn "every house which harbored a fugitive slave," after a twenty-minute deadline to give them up expired. Outside of town, when a farmer reportedly fired his gun upon them, they burned his barn and robbed his

³⁸⁹ Rev. Thomas Creigh, "Civil War Days in Mercersburg: As Related in the Diary of the Rev. Thomas Creigh, D. D. August 1, 1862 – July 20, 1865," prepared by the Rev. J. D. Edmiston Turner, Feb. 29, 1940 *The Kittochtinny Historical Society* 12 (October 1939 – March 1949): 35, Can be found in the Franklin County Historical Society, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

³⁹⁰ Amos Stouffer, Diary, July 2, 1863.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Philip Schaff, June 25 - 27, 1863. The band of guerillas were McNeill's Rangers. See Steve French, *Phantoms of the South Fork: Captain McNeill and His Rangers* (The Kent State University Press, 2017), 49-52. Schaff estimated their number between 50 or 80 and that they took as many as twenty-one African Americans. Schaff, June 25 – 27. Thomas Creigh estimated, "about a dozen colored persons" were taken, most of whom were contrabands, women and children. Thomas Creigh, "Civil War Days in Mercersburg," 35.

house. In a comparison of the actions between the regular infantry and this guerilla band Schaff assessed, “These guerillas are far worse than the regular army, who behaved in an orderly and decent way, considering their mission.”³⁹³ One of the guerillas said to him, “We are independent, and come and go where and when we please.”³⁹⁴

On July 1st, another independent unit appeared in Mercersburg. According to Schaff, that day “a lawless band of guerillas rode to town stealing negroes and breaking into Fitzgerald’s and Shannon’s stores on the Diamond, taking what they wanted and wantonly destroying a good deal.”³⁹⁵ Thomas Creigh observed that they took “six or seven of our free people of color.”³⁹⁶ Thomas That night the group “drove all the remaining cows away from the neighborhood towards the Potomac.”³⁹⁷ He considered it “the boldest and most impudent highway robbery I ever saw.”³⁹⁸

On the night of July 3rd, Lee’s extensive wagon trains, hauling the army’s wounded and supplies, commenced the withdrawal through the South Mountain passes at Cashtown and Monterrey.³⁹⁹ As the wagon trains progressed, Federal cavalry and militia attacked them. Robert Welsh recalled the curiosities in some of the wagons, “a melodeon, hoop skirts for women, men’s clothes, petticoats, spoons, dress goods, shoes, a churn, coop of chickens, a young pig, ducks, chairs, small tables, etc.,” indeed, “everything that could be imagined was in the wagons.”⁴⁰⁰ Although it is evident that some of the Confederates filled the wagons with their own acquisitions, whether purchased or stolen, Welsh also noted that the wagons contained army

³⁹³ Philip Schaff, June 25 - 27, 1863.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., June 27, 1863.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., July 1, 1863. This unit was a part of Mosby’s Rangers.

³⁹⁶ Thomas Creigh, 36.

³⁹⁷ Philip Schaff, July 1, 1863.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Kent Masterson Brown, *Retreat Through Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, & the Pennsylvania Campaign* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

⁴⁰⁰ Robert A. Welsh, *Memoirs*, 29.

supplies, “for it wasn’t altogether to carry loot that they were being drawn.”⁴⁰¹ During the retreat, in Waynesboro, a Confederate officer brought to the town’s Burgess some silver and urns, which were discovered in one of the wagons and since “his men were under strict orders not to take private property,” he accordingly determined to return the property to its owners. Mrs. Krauth, the owner of the items, held an ample amount of animosity toward the thieves, but “now she was even more impressed with the chivalry of the petty officer who had arranged for its return.”⁴⁰²

On the night of July 4th, and the morning of July 5th, the Army of Northern Virginia commenced its withdrawal towards the Potomac. Near Fairfield, George Neese and a few of his comrades sought shelter in a nearby stable during a torrential thunderstorm. To occupy their time, they decided to play marbles. When one accidentally rolled in a crack in the floor, they raised one of the boards to retrieve it and to their surprise found a large box filled with blankets, sheets, quilts, and clothing. Although hidden property was subject to seizure and despite being prejudged as “thieving Rebels,” Neese recalled “We left everything in the box and reported our find to the family that owned the stable, and told them to move their goods to the house and fear no danger of being molested. The family seemed to be astonished at our find and utterly surprised into coyish silence to learn that their goods were safe even when discovered by the dreaded Rebels.”⁴⁰³

In contrast to concealed possessions, hidden food was certainly confiscated during the withdrawal by starved men. After the action at Fairfield, John Blue of the 11th Virginia Cavalry of Jones’ brigade, recalled the hunger and exhaustion they suffered. Some of the men discovered

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Charles P. Krauth, “A Bouquet of Silver;” The daughter of the Waynesboro Burgess, Mrs. Lida Welsh Bender, wrote an article relating the incident, “Civil War Memoirs,” *The Outlook*, June 24, 1925, 298.

⁴⁰³ George M. Neese, *Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1911), 190-191.

a large farm half a mile from the road and requested permission to go to the house to relieve their stomachs. Although the farmers alleged that they did not have any food, the troopers were not so easily fooled and after searching the cellar they found enough food for more than the whole company including bread, meat, a basket of pies, a crock of butter, and a bucket of honey.⁴⁰⁴ After assuming a defensive posture around Hagerstown and Williamsport, on July 13th and 14th Lee ordered his army to recross the Potomac River to the Virginia shore. By the beginning of August, the Army of Northern Virginia had returned to where it launched the campaign two months prior.

In a measure, with the accumulation of essential supplies, the campaign achieved a degree of military success. The astute student of military strategy Edward Porter Alexander, wrote that in addition to the capture of military material, “large quantities of cattle, provisions, and supplies of all kinds useful to the army were now to be collected in the fertile farming country, into which the army had penetrated.”⁴⁰⁵ Of course, because of this collection of essential supplies, the hardships of war were not eliminated. There was a particular heavy burden placed upon the farmers and merchants of south-central Pennsylvania. But Lee’s orders respecting private, no doubt, certainly served to lessen the impact of war. Alexander noted, “Stringent orders were issued, forbidding the taking of private property excepted by duly authorized officers.”⁴⁰⁶ The orders were issued both for the success of the campaign and the war itself. A disciplined army was not only beneficial for the efficient collection of essential supplies on the march, but also for linear tactics on the battlefield. Respect exhibited toward Pennsylvania civilians and their property was also important so as not to animate retaliatory passions and

⁴⁰⁴ John Blue, *Hanging Rock Rebel: Lt. John Blue’s War in West Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley*, ed. Dan Oates (Shippensburg, PA: The Bird Street Press Publication, 1994), 204-205.

⁴⁰⁵ E. P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, 372.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

thereby win over a portion of the population to a peace footing. As a whole, Lee's orders were in accordance with the established rules of civilized warfare, including those recently recognized as Federal standards in the Lieber Code.

Lee made sure that his subordinates, tasked with temporary independent commands, not only received his regulations for procuring supplies, but also understood his desire to have those orders respecting private property properly carried out. These orders were also communicated to the rest of the army and even to Pennsylvania civilians. Because of this, civilians could appeal to guards for protection and seek corrective measures by officers when abuses did occur. Moreover, when instances of abuse began to increase as the main portion of his army crossed the Pennsylvania border, Lee issued an explanatory order. He complimented his soldiers, as a whole, for their conduct exhibited thus far, reminded them of his orders and their duties, explained their purposes and stressed the importance of following the orders, appealed to them as rational human beings, exhorted them to follow the orders, warned them of the consequences for their actions, and emphasized their obligations toward higher authorities than himself. In sum, Lee used every means possible to ensure his orders were followed.

In general, Lee's orders respecting private property were followed by the soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia and the campaign remained a civilized one. Authorities were sought out to seek peaceable surrenders and martial law was established with provost marshals and guards. The interactions with civilians were generally respectful and especial respect was shown toward women and children. Headquarters were often established in the Courthouses, where official business was conducted. Requisitions were issued to the town authorities, or in the case of their absence, to prominent citizens and the merchants themselves. Supplies were gathered according to military need by duly authorized officials. Purchases were made most often in

Confederate money, while in some cases, receipts were issued instead, for future reimbursement. The stores were also opened for the transaction of business, where individual soldiers could then make purchases. In a few instances, impressments were made for rations or other military necessities. In instances where civilians hid or removed their property, goods were then seized. Soldiers were held to account for abuses committed by court martial, if a provable offense, and officers served to correct wrongs when committed in their presence.

After the war, the state of Pennsylvania received as many as 4,305 claims, totaling \$1,831,161.74, for damages or losses sustained by citizens of seven counties in south – central Pennsylvania during the conflict, most of which having occurred during the Gettysburg Campaign. Damages or losses from Confederate forces included 3,186 claims, totaling \$1,649,107.27.⁴⁰⁷ Some localities suffered the unfortunate circumstance of being visited multiple times as different units passed through, each placing their own demands on the town. Chambersburg, the vital town through which nearly the entirety of the Confederate army passed, suffered significantly in the loss of goods, being nearly cleaned out of essentials. The *Valley Spirit* estimated the loss in goods within Franklin County, leaving out the general damage to property and land, as not less than \$200,000.⁴⁰⁸ According to the damage claims, Franklin

⁴⁰⁷ The claims were submitted from citizens of seven counties mainly from Adams, Cumberland, Franklin, Fulton, and York counties, as well as a few from Bedford and Perry counties. When the number of claims were added by county the total number amounted to 4,024, excluding those of Perry County and possibly 90 new claims which were not passed by the Commission of 1868, but were presented for the first time to the Commission of 1871, established to revise the previous awards. The number of claims submitted due to Confederate damages or losses are taken out of the 4,024 total. In adding the value of the claims, I found a \$10,000 discrepancy in Franklin County, between the particular values presented, of damages and losses sustained by Union and Confederate forces and whether those fell under the categories of realty or other personal property, as well as a \$4,523 discrepancy in Bedford County. Taking these discrepancies into account would total \$1,816, 638.74 in damage claims. A total of \$1,693,351.52 was allowed for reimbursement. An additional 656 claims, totaling \$1,628,431.58, were submitted separately for damages sustained during the burning of Chambersburg in 1864. Department of the Auditor General, Subgroup Records Relating to Civil War Border Claims, Series RG 2.70 Reports, Damage Claims & Claims Abstracts, etc, Box no. 1, Index to Damage Claims Applications Submitted Under Acts Passed 1863 – 1871, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

⁴⁰⁸ *Valley Spirit*, July 8, 1863.

County accounted for nearly half of the damages and losses sustained by Pennsylvania citizens, totaling \$849,398.23. However, there was little wanton destruction and nonessentials were mainly left undisturbed. Out of the claims submitted in Franklin County, less than three percent were due to Confederate damages to realty, while approximately ninety-four percent was due to the loss of other personal property to the Confederates.⁴⁰⁹

Gettysburg, no doubt, suffered the worst because of the battle, though it fared quite well when Early's troops previously occupied the town. And yet, some of the worst impacts of the war, such as the destruction of structures due to military necessity, occurred outside of town, where the major fighting took place. In Adams County as a whole, Confederate damages to realty in the county amounted to approximately twenty-one percent of the county totals, resultant from the fighting, while nearly sixty-four percent was due to the loss of other personal property to the Confederates.⁴¹⁰

During the fighting, officers and soldiers exhibited concern for civilians, who instructed them to leave or stay in the cellars, where they would remain safe. Civilian casualties, directly caused by the fighting, proved scarce during the battle and the campaign as a whole. Legitimate military targets, infrastructure and communication objectives, were destroyed including portions of the railroads, bridges, and telegraph lines. Prisoners were treated as non-combatants and in many cases paroled. The capturing of contraband slaves was certainly an unfortunate occurrence to the campaign, but this stemmed not from any military policy enacted by Lee, but rather from laws permitting slavery as a protected institution in the Confederacy, as it was by the United States Constitution prior to the war.

⁴⁰⁹ Department of the Auditor General, Damage Claims & Claims Abstracts. The \$10,000 discrepancy in Franklin County would equate to \$839,398.23.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

Although Lee's orders were followed in general, there certainly were exceptions. Some soldiers exchanged their worn-out hats, clothing, and boots for fresh ones, a few partook in outright theft, and many scavenged for food. For the most part however, rigid discipline was maintained over the infantry in the towns, on the line of march, and in camp, which meant that soldiers often did not even have the opportunity to commit abuses. As a whole, General Lee's orders were in accordance with the demands of civilized warfare and, in general, the men in the Army of Northern Virginia followed them in obedience to the desire of their commander.

Chapter 3: Sheridan's 1864 Valley Campaign

The Shenandoah Valley, often referred to as the breadbasket of the Confederacy, held strategic prominence for both the North and South. The Valley provided an avenue of movement, screened by the mountains to the east and west, for raids beyond the Potomac by Confederate armies or upon critical rail junctions by Federal armies. Although the Valley's agricultural bounty declined throughout the war, it still afforded a rich supply base for armies operating in the area. Military reverses during the first half of 1864 forced Grant to reconsider his strategy to win the war. The Overland Campaign failed to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, while incurring a staggering 60,000 casualties. In the Shenandoah Valley, the campaigns of major generals Franz Sigel and David Hunter, in May and June respectively, both faltered. The retreat of Hunter enabled Early to march to the gates of Washington itself, threaten the capital and cause a panic amongst the administration and the Northern people. The fighting in the late spring and early summer had also degenerated into retaliatory warfare negatively impacting civilians.

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, with Lincoln's support, hence shifted his strategy from defeating the Army of Northern Virginia on the battlefield to materially depleting Lee's resources through the exhaustion of the South's industrial, economic, and social infrastructure as well as Southern morale. A policy of conciliation now shifted toward the utilization of "hard war" measures, which included deliberate attacks on civilian property. The editor of the *Staunton Vindicator*, astutely observed, that although the Federals, during the beginning of the war, waged war upon armed combatants, "Now Grant, wearied and sick of fighting the veterans of Lee with

no avail, has turned his arms against the women and children of our land, hoping, doubtless, that he may gain a glorious victory over them, a result already discovered by him impossible to be attained over the former.”¹ Colonel David Hunter Strother, Hunter’s Chief of Staff, also opined, “The President’s call for five hundred thousand troops and the order to devastate the Valley look like desperate measures and confirm the failure of Grant at Richmond, if confirmation was wanted.”² The Federal High Command thus pushed the bounds of accepted conventional warfare as it implemented intentional widespread strategic destruction.

When Grant developed this “hard war” strategy, particularly for the coming autumn, both the disappointment of Hunter’s Raid and the impact of Early’s raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, especially upon Washington, influenced his thinking. The targeted destruction of the Valley’s agricultural resources ensured a duality of defensive and offensive objectives, including the prevention of future raids by Confederate armies and the attrition of Lee’s material resources and Southern morale. After the burning of Chambersburg, Horace Porter, Grant’s personal aid, stated that the general undertook such a policy to “not only to prevent these incursions into Maryland, but to move a competent force down the valley of Virginia, and hold permanently that great granary, upon which Lee was drawing so largely for his supplies.”³

As a whole, Grant planned to occupy Lee in Richmond and Petersburg, maintaining just enough pressure to force Lee’s defense of the capital, while he wore down the Confederacy’s fighting capabilities elsewhere, namely in Georgia and the Valley. Grant believed that “The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it was the principal store-

¹ “Retribution Will Come,” *The Staunton Vindicator*, October 21, 1864.

² Strother, *A Virginia Yankee in the Civil War: The Diaries of David Hunter Strother*, ed. Cecil D. Eby, Jr. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 281.

³ Horace Porter, *Campaigning With Grant* (New York: The Century Co., 1897), 270.

house they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond” and because it served as “an outlet to the north.”⁴

As early as July 14th, Grant underscored his strategic shift to Henry W. Halleck, Chief of Staff of the U. S. military, when he explained that Hunter’s pursuit of Early should be made so as to “eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with them.”⁵ The following day Grant further specified, “If Hunter cannot get to Gordonsville and Charlottesville to cut the railroad, he should make all the Valley south of the Baltimore and Ohio Road a desert as high up as possible. I do not mean that houses should be burned, but all provisions and stock should be removed, and the people notified to move out.”⁶

For the coming campaign, Grant determined to prioritize the Shenandoah Valley as an area of operations. On August 5th, Grant met with Hunter at Monocacy Junction and instructed him to not only attack Early, but also to destroy the Valley’s agricultural resources.

In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley . . . it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed destroy. It is not desirable that buildings should be destroyed they should rather be protected, but the people should be informed that so long as any army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.⁷

Grant selected Major General Philip H. Sheridan, his cavalry commander, to lead the army in the field, who he also informed of his instructions “to destroy all the forage and subsistence the

⁴ Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, vol. 2 (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1894), 316-317.

⁵ U.S. Government Printing Office, *The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, series I, vol. 37, part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 299-301 (hereafter cited as OR [Official Records] and all references refer to series I).

⁶ OR, vol. 37 (2): 329.

⁷ Grant to Hunter, In the Field, Monocacy Bridge, Md., Aug. 5, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 698.

country afforded.”⁸ Hunter though, believing his presence unnecessary, resigned and Sheridan assumed temporary command of the newly formed Middle Military Division.

The Lieber Code specified that “War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy” and “The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.”⁹ Despite this, however, as civilization advanced, so too did “the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.”¹⁰ Lieber summarized the general doctrine, that is, “protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private relations are the exceptions.”¹¹ Grant’s strategy to eliminate the agricultural capabilities of the Valley by targeting civilian property certainly pushed the boundaries of accepted *jus in bello* theory and ultimately confused the exception for the rule.

Sheridan’s field army operating in the Valley would eventually include three infantry corps and three cavalry divisions, in all totaling approximately 40,000 men.¹² Sheridan commenced implementing Grant’s orders of destruction in Frederick and Clarke counties soon after he took command. On August 10th, Sheridan took the offensive and pushed as far southward as Strasburg, but for a variety of reasons, the arrival of Confederate reinforcements on

⁸ Grant, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 317 – 318; Grant to Meade, City Point, VA., Aug. 1, 1864, OR, vol. 37 (2): 559; Grant to Halleck, Monocacy, Aug. 5, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 695.

⁹ Francis Lieber, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field or General Order No. 100* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863), 8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹² OR, vol. 43, (1): 696, 698.

his flanks, including the late arrival of his own reinforcements, attacks on his supply train, and a desire by the Lincoln administration not to risk an engagement in view of the upcoming presidential election, he decided to withdraw to Halltown, near Harper's Ferry. During the withdrawal he determined to carry out his "instructions to destroy all the forage and subsistence the country afforded."¹³

Sheridan issued orders from his headquarters near Middletown to his chief of cavalry Brigadier – General Alfred T. A. Torbert.

GENERAL: In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant General commanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give the necessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of a line from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat Gap. You will seize all mules, horses, and cattle that maybe useful to our army. Loyal citizens can bring in their claims against the Government for this necessary destruction. No houses will be burned, and officers in charge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the people that the object is to make this valley untenable for the raiding parties of the rebel army.¹⁴

The orders of destruction were implemented by his cavalry on August 17th. Brigadier General Wesley Merritt, recalled that the calvary was occupied in "driving all the cattle and live stock in the Valley before it, and burning the grain from Cedar Creek to Berryville."¹⁵ Although, he also emphasized that "No other private property was injured, nor were families molested."¹⁶ Captain Newel Cheney, of the 9th New York Cavalry in Merritt's division, wrote that on that day "the whole cavalry division moved back near White Post burning large quantities of hay and wheat."¹⁷ Colonel Charles Russel Lowell, commanding the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry, whose troopers

¹³ Philip Henry Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888), 477-484, 488-489; OR, vol. 43 (1): 19.

¹⁴ Headquarters Middle Military Division, Cedar Creek, Va., August 16, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 816; Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. 1, 485.

¹⁵ Wesley Merritt, "Destroying, Burning: Sheridan in The Shenandoah Valley," in *Battles and Leaders of The Civil War*, ed. Ned Bradford, 1 vol. ed. (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979), 538.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Newel Cheney, *History of the Ninth Regiment, New York Volunteer Cavalry, War of 1861 To 1865, Compiled from Letters, Diaries, Recollections and Official Records* (Jamestown, NY: Martin Merz & Son, 1901), 211.

covered the right rear of the army and withdrew northward to Winchester, described in a letter to his wife, “We are falling back . . . : with orders from Grant to drive in every horse, mule, ox, or cow, and burn all grain and forage.”¹⁸ He considered it “a miserable duty,” but one in which he and his command were obligated to carry out “till Winchester.”¹⁹ Sheridan reported to Grant, “I have burned all wheat and hay, and brought off all stock, sheep, cattle, horses, &c., south of Winchester.”²⁰

Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early and his soldiers, stunned by the scorched earth display before them, watched from their vantage point on Fishers Hill, though unable to challenge the numerical strength of the enemy. Jedidiah Hotchkiss, chief of Early’s topographical department, logged in his journal on August 17th, “We found the enemy gone this morning and the smoke rising from all parts of the Lower Valley from the burning of barns and hay and wheat stacks by the retreating Yankees.”²¹ As Lieutenant General Richard H. Anderson marched northwest toward Winchester that morning his assistant adjutant general, Major Osmun Latrobe, observed the “enemy retiring and burning all forage and subsistence before us.”²² Cavalryman Robert Thurston Hubard described the completeness of the destruction, the effect of which meant that their horses were left with little forage, “The enemy retreated before day and as he marched on burned every barn, wheat stack, hay rick and straw pile for miles on both sides of the road - - and even burnt several fields of timothy and blue grass dried by the drought which he thought might

¹⁸ Charles Russell Lowell, *Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell*, ed. Edward W. Emerson, repr., 1907 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), 324. Lowell was placed in command of the Reserve brigade on Sep. 10, 1864.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Sheridan to Grant, Berryville, VA., Aug. 17, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 822.

²¹ Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson’s Topographer*, ed. Archie P. McDonald, 2nd print, 1981 (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 222.

²² Osmun Latrobe, Transcript of the Diary of Osmun Latrobe, MSS5 1 L3543 1, Virginia Historical Society. Richmond, Virginia, 37.

afford some little nourishment to our horses.”²³ The *Staunton Vindicator* noted that Sheridan was unwilling to risk a pitched battle at the moment, and hence “hurried off at full speed, burning barns and grain, and carrying off stock, closely pursued by a portion of Early's forces.”²⁴ The *Richmond Daily Dispatch* relayed that Merritt's cavalry, after the fighting near Front Royal and their subsequent withdrawal, was occupied “burning the hay and wheat stacks in their route,” while the rest of Sheridan's cavalry during their withdrawal to Winchester “indulged their villainous propensities by burning barns, crops, and plundering the inhabitants generally.”²⁵

Civilians also bore witness to the destruction. Matthela Page Harrison, from her residence in Winchester, recorded in her diary on August 17th, “Fires of barns, stockyards etc. soon burst forth and by eleven, from a high elevation, fifty could be seen blazing forth. The whole country was enveloped with smoke and flame. The sky was lurid and but for the green trees one might have imagined the shades of Hades had descended suddenly.”²⁶ Sheridan's men did not limit themselves to the capture of livestock for the sustenance of his army, but systematically destroyed the area's agricultural capabilities. Harrison articulated,

They demanded food when they had just applied the torch to the provisions for the year, and indeed years, for now the seed which would have been sown has been destroyed. In almost every instance every head of stock was driven off. Those young animals that refused to go were shot down. . . . Large families of children were left without one cow. In many of the barns were stowed in an around carriages, all kinds of farming implements, wagons, plows, etc., and in no instance did they allow anything to be saved. . . . Hay, oats, and straw were burnt with the wheat. I cannot image what the poor cattle are to live on this winter. Owing to the great drought the field grass burnt like tinder. About half of the county was in flames. Some of the dwellings were sacked, clothing, provisions, male and female taken indiscriminately.²⁷

²³ Robert Thurston Hubard Jr., *Civil War Reminiscences of Robert Thurston Hubard Jr.*, UVA, MSS 10522, 108.

²⁴ *Staunton Vindicator*, Aug. 26, 1864.

²⁵ *Richmond Daily Dispatch*, Aug 22 and 23, 1864.

²⁶ Matthela Page Harrison, *Transcript of a Diary Kept by Mathella Page Harrison, The Wife of Dr. Benjamin Harrison, 1862-1864*, UVA, MSS 9759, 43.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Kate Sperry, residing in Newtown, was awakened early on the morning of August 17th watching Sheridan's men in full retreat, with some of them riding "mules with strings of chickens (captured) hanging on their backs – horses with every variety of everything looted from homes and stores packed on them."²⁸ Other Federal soldiers set fire to the old hospital, but the citizens were able to put out the fire. Her father returned to home and informed the family that "the Yanks burned every barn from there through Middletown and Front Royal, including Cousin John Chrisman's and all the outhouses."²⁹ They were even going to burn the house, but a wounded Federal soldier in the house prevented them from doing so.³⁰ Jacob R. Hildebrand walked northward on the Valley Pike to see his sons Benjamin and Gideon who he had learned were fortifying at Fisher's Hill. He saw them at Winchester after the Yankees withdrew. On August 19th, he started back home and recorded, "the Yankees are burning every barn they come across that has either hay or grain in it. I seen a good many that were smoking yet as I passed up the Valley Pike."³¹

Mary Greenhow Lee noted that the Yankees devastated the countryside during their withdrawal, "the barns, wheat, crops were all burned; stock & cattle of every kind stolen or destroyed."³² One house was fired, but it was quickly put out. Early's army soon arrived in pursuit and she hosted a few of the officers. The burnings however, only spurred on Early's determination to retain possession of the lower Valley. "The army moves tomorrow," she recorded on August 18th, "burning with vengeance on the Yankees for the terrible devastation

²⁸ Kate Sperry, *Diary*, Kate S. (Sarah Catherine) Sperry, Sperry Diary, vol. 5, Library of Virginia, Accession Number 28532. Richmond, Virginia, 544 (hereafter cited as LV).

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Jacob R. Hildebrand, *A Mennonite Journal, 1862-1865: A Father's Account of the Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley*, compiled by John R. Hildebrand (Shippensburg, PA Burd Street Press, 1996), 51.

³² Mary Greenhow Lee, *The Civil War Journal of Mary Greenhow Lee (Mrs. Hugh Holmes Lee) Of Winchester, Virginia*, ed. Eloise C. Strader (Stephens City, VA: Commercial Press, INC, 2011), 402. Can be found in The Winchester - Frederick County Historical Society, Winchester, Virginia.

which has marked their progress; barns, wheat, bacon everything destroyed.”³³ Confederate soldiers stopped to “express their indignation” at the orders, found in a letter, to burn her house and the Sherrard’s, who were both well-known secessionists. She articulated a few days later, on August 23rd, “Each day I hear more & more of the outrages of the Yankees in their retreat. The country through which they passed is laid waste.”³⁴

In the midst of the intentional strategic destruction, civilians continued to suffer from the effects of retaliatory warfare, which had occurred earlier that summer. James Williamson, a member of John S. Mosby’s partisan rangers, articulated that “the burning and destruction, commenced by Hunter, was resumed.”³⁵ A few nights after the attack on the train, on August 19th, a detachment of Mosby’s men, led by Captain William Chapman, attacked a picket-post of the 5th Michigan Cavalry near Castleman’s Ferry killing one Federal trooper, in addition to wounding one and capturing two more. Shortly afterward, Custer ordered the burning of the houses of five prominent citizens in the area.³⁶

Ann R. McCormick, residing in eastern Clark County, wrote to her sisters describing the burning of their house and barn. The morning after Chapman’s attack, a Federal captain arrived at their farm with “orders to burn every house.”³⁷ They were charged with harboring and abetting Mosby’s men, as a light was seen in the house the previous night. They explained to the officer that the reason for the light was simply to read a letter from their mother, informing the family of the death of their aunt. Ann’s father, Prudence McCormick, pleaded with Custer to spare their house and take him as a hostage instead, because there were two infants in the household and

³³ Ibid., 401.

³⁴ Ibid., 403.

³⁵ James J. Williamson, *Mosby’s Rangers: A Record of the Operations of the Forth-Third Battalion Virginia Cavalry* (New York: Ralph Kenyon Publisher, 1896), 213.

³⁶ Ibid., 213-215.

³⁷ Ann R. McCormick, (Mrs. J. Conway Broun), Clarke Co. Va., Aug. 24, 1864, Civil War-Burnings-Correspondence-Broun, Ann McCormick, Clarke County Historical Society, Berryville, Virginia.

both his wife and son-in-law were sick. But the pleas proved futile, and their house and farm buildings were plundered and fired. “What they did not carry off, they burned,” wrote Ann.³⁸ Terribly grieved at the sudden event, particularly the imprisonment of her sick husband, she lamented, “The labours of mother and father for thirty-three years were destroying in fifteen minutes.”³⁹ Among the other houses burnt included the residences of Mr. Sowers, Colonel Ware, and Colonel Morgan.⁴⁰

Chapman’s men attacked the 50-man detachment of the 5th Michigan after they had just burned the hay, wheat, barn, and set fire to the Morgan house. Because the Federals were burning civilian homes, Mosby’s Rangers took few prisoners.⁴¹ Ann McCormick heard that they killed as many as thirty of the Federals engaged in the burning.⁴² Olivia Jane McArtor, a Loudoun County resident who kept track of Mosby’s actions, recorded that his command “caught the Yankees burning a house, killed 30, took 7 men.”⁴³ In September, Mosby himself reported, “Such was the indignation of our men at witnessing some of the finest residences in that portion of the State enveloped in flames that no quarter was shown, and about 25 of them were shot to death for their villainy.”⁴⁴ According to the *New York Times*, of Aug. 25, 1864, the detachment’s casualties amounted to thirteen killed, two mortally wounded, and three slightly wounded.⁴⁵

Toward the end of August and the beginning of September the campaign became one of maneuver, with limited battles, but constant skirmishing. The lack of grain and forage in the

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ James J. Williamson, *Mosby’s Rangers*, 213-214.

⁴¹ James Williamson, *Mosby’s Rangers*, 213-216.

⁴² Ann R. McCormick, *Correspondence*.

⁴³ McArtor, Robert Clyde and Susan Aileen Bellinger, eds. *McArtor and Poston Family Diaries*, LV, acc. no., 41854, 22.

⁴⁴ No 5. Reports of Lt. Col. John S. Mosby, 43rd VA cav. battalion Hdqs. OR, vol. 43 (1): 634.

⁴⁵ James Williamson, 214.

lower Valley, resultant from Sheridan's destruction, however presented a problem for Early. James Matthew Wright noted that "The Yankees carried all the wheat and hay on their last retreat from Strasburg to Winchester."⁴⁶ He contemplated that they would have to fall back, after they consumed the local surplus, as they were "living wholly off of the country around south of us" and their lack of transportation would prevent the required amount of supply from reaching the army. The only remedy, if they were expected to remain in position during the fall and winter, would be to increase their wagons train to ensure a steady supply of essentials.⁴⁷ William Clarke Corson analyzed that to stay in the lower Valley during the winter would be "impossible however as it is too far to haul supplies from Staunton. For the present they "threshed out most of the wheat and secured nearly all the hay."⁴⁸ When Early advanced into Jefferson County, he conveyed to Anderson on August 19th, that for the present at least they could remain in the area since "No wheat has been burned in this country, and if we stay here we can live."⁴⁹ Lee was pleased that Sheridan was once again hemmed in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, as it would "give protection to the Valley."⁵⁰

Robert Thurston Hubbard, as late as the middle of September, denoted that they still had enough beef, flour, and apples, but their horses "fared badly getting only limited supplies of hay."⁵¹ The openness of the Valley favored the employment of cavalry, and as the Federal cavalry not only outnumbered their Confederate counterpart, but also outmatched them in equipment, the lack of forage only worsened the plight of Early's cavalry. "The cavalry is very much reduced as we have had nothing but grass for our horses since we left Culpepper C. H.,"

⁴⁶ James Matthew Wright, Wright Family Papers, 1856- 1868, LV, acc. no. 34480, 63.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 63-64.

⁴⁸ William Clark Corson, *My Dear Jennie: A Collection of Love Letters from a Confederate Soldier to His Fiancée During the Period 1861-1865*, ed. Blake W. Corson (Richmond, Virginia: The Dietz Press Inc., 1982), 129.

⁴⁹ OR, vol. 43, (1): 1,001,

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1,006.

⁵¹ Robert Thurston Hubbard, *Civil War Reminiscences*, 109.

described William Corson.⁵² Nearly all of the horses in Fitz Lee's division were exhausted. In Corson's company alone, thirteen horses were deemed unsuitable for combat in the last week of August. As each Confederate cavalryman was obliged to provide their own horse, many of the men had to return home to get fresh mounts.⁵³

Early, with only approximately 10,000 men, could not figure out why Sheridan, who possessed such a large superiority in numbers did not attack.⁵⁴ Sheridan determined to bide his time awaiting an opportunity to strike. On August 26th, Grant expressed his desire for Sheridan to attack if he found the enemy reinforcing Lee and ordered, "Give the enemy no rest, and if it is possible to follow to the Virginia Central road, follow that far. Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting." He emphasized, "If the war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste."⁵⁵

In the middle of September, Sheridan learned that Anderson with Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery marched southward to support Lee. With political dissatisfaction growing because of the current stalemate, particularly around Richmond and Petersburg, Secretary of War, Edward Stanton wished Sheridan to achieve a "positive success," and this appeared as a perfect time to do so. Grant met with Sheridan on September 15th in Charlestown and approved his plan of attack. Grant's purpose was not only to defeat Early or maneuver him out of the Valley, but also "to destroy that source of supplies for Lee's army, which constituted the Shenandoah Valley."⁵⁶

⁵² William Clark Corson, *My Dear Jennie*, 126.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁵⁴ OR, vol. 43, (1): 61, 1,002.

⁵⁵ Grant to Sheridan, City Point, VA., Aug. 26, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 917. Also see, vol. 43 (2): 202.

⁵⁶ Sheridan, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 6.

On September 19th, Sheridan defeated Early at the Battle of Third Winchester.⁵⁷

Winchester was once again under Federal occupation and martial law was established. Colonel Elisha Hunt Rhodes, commanding the 2nd Rhode Island of the VI Corps, left to guard the town, noted “No one, citizen or soldier, is allowed to leave the city, and martial law prevails.”⁵⁸ Some of the citizens were “very kind,” while others had “a rebellious spirit.”⁵⁹ When some of the ladies became “saucy” in their demeanor toward Yankee officers, they simply raised their hats and passed on.⁶⁰ Sheridan again defeated Early at the Battle of Fisher’s Hill on September 21st and the 22nd.⁶¹

While Sheridan assaulted Fisher’s Hill, Torbert, with Merritt’s and Wilson’s divisions, advanced down Luray Valley, with the intent to cross Massanutten Mountains toward New Market and cut off the Confederate retreat. On September 20th, Federal artillery placed on Guard Hill, overlooking the town of Front Royal, shelled Confederate pickets across the Shenandoah River. Lucy Rebecca Buck wrote that “some of the shells passed quite near us.”⁶² The following day, Confederate cavalry under Wickham withdrew southward and Torbert occupied the town, leaving a regiment as a guard. Lucy Buck provided Torbert’s men with milk and bread, as she had done with Wickham’s troopers previously. Some of the Federals “were rude and broke” and she expected that they “would have commenced pillaging and burning first thing upon their

⁵⁷ Scott C. Patchan, *The Last Battle of Winchester: Phil Sheridan, Jubal Early, and the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, August 7 – September 19, 1864* (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2018).

⁵⁸ Elisha Hunter Rhodes, *All For The Union: The Civil War Diary and Letters of Elisha Hunter Rhodes* (New York: Orion Books, 1985), 186.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Jonathan A. Noyalas, *The Battle of Fisher’s Hill: Breaking the Shenandoah Valley’s Gibraltar* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2013); Robert E. L. Krick, “A Stampede of Stampedes: The Confederate Disaster at Fisher’s Hill,” in *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

⁶² Lucy Rebecca Buck, *Shadows on My Heart: The Civil War Diary of Lucy Rebecca Buck of Virginia*, ed. Elizabeth R. Baer (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1997), 307-308.

entrance but on the contrary, they behaved quite decorously.”⁶³ After the brief engagement at Front Royal, on September 21st, Torbert pursued the Confederate cavalry southward, but his progress was blocked at Milford by fortified Confederate cavalry. A few days later, he found the position vacated and advanced toward New Market.⁶⁴

Partisan warfare could quickly escalate into a war of retaliation. Near Front Royal on September 22nd, after Torbert was in the process of withdrawing from the stalemate at Milford, some of Mosby’s men under Captain Chapman launched a surprise attack on a Federal wagon train, transporting their wounded. Thomas Ashby watched a portion of Mosby’s men gallop toward the wagon train only to see them scatter in all directions shortly thereafter, as they discovered it heavily guarded.⁶⁵ Lieutenant McMaster of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry was left dead, believed by the Federals to have been shot and killed after he surrendered.⁶⁶ Seven of Mosby’s men were captured and subsequently executed. Two of the men were hung from a large walnut tree at the entrance of the town, with signs attached around their necks, which read, “hung in retaliation for the Union officer killed after he had surrendered – the fate of Mosby’s men.”⁶⁷ The others were shot, which included seventeen-year-old Henry Rhodes. The young man

⁶³ Ibid., 308-309. Laura Virginia Hale looked at the History of Front Royal during the Civil War. Laura Virginia Hale, *Four Valient Years in The Lower Shenandoah Valley, 1861-1865* (Stephens City, VA; Commercial Press, Inc., 2008).

⁶⁴ No 134. Report of Maj. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert, Aug. 8 – Oct 31, Nov. 12 and 21-23, OR, vol. 43 (1): 428-429.

⁶⁵ Thomas A. Ashby, *The Valley Campaigns: Being the Reminiscences of a Non-Combatant While Between the Lines in the Shenandoah Valley During the War of the States* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1914), 290-292.

⁶⁶ Merrit Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 441. Merrit stated that Lt. McMaster was mortally wounded in the action. Confederate accounts differ. Thomas Ashby noted that Mosby’s men accidentally killed the Federal officer, who was sick in one of the wagons. Thomas Ashby, *The Valley Campaigns*, 292.

⁶⁷ John S. Mosby, *The Memoirs of Colonel John S. Mosby* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1917), 301-302. One of those hung according to the Richmond Enquirer was a soldier named Overby from Georgia. Amanda Edmonds wrote that Tom Anderson, who had a wife and two children in Fauquier County, was one of those hung. She wrote the inscription reading as “Hung in retaliation for the death of a Federal major, killed in an ambulance this afternoon.” Amanda Edmonds, *Society of Rebels: Diary of Amanda Edmonds*, Northern Virginia 1857-1867, rev. 2nd ed., ed. Lee Lawrence (Warrenton, VA: Piedmont Press 1& Graphics, 2017), 238.

participated in the raid so as to capture a good horse, which would enable him to join Mosby's command. Riding upon an older horse, he was subsequently captured. Without being able to say goodbye to his family and in spite of his widowed mother's and sister's pleas to spare his life and treat him as a prisoner of war, he was shot, nonetheless.⁶⁸ Sue Richardson described that Rhode's "poor mother is almost crazy" and that "such excitement and cruelty was never before witnessed here; it was distressing indeed."⁶⁹ This was particularly so, since Rhodes was killed in her family's field, nearly in front of their door, and the hanging of Overby and Carter occurred in what she called the mountain field.⁷⁰ Thomas Ashby, who was a schoolmate of Rhodes explained, "Our people were thrown into the deepest distress by this experience, and it was made more so because of the sad death of young Rhodes how was known to everyone. He was an amiable, kind, and industrious boy, and had been most helpful to his mother and sister."⁷¹

On November 6th, Mosby himself retaliated. Mosby penned a response to Sheridan on November 11th, hoping to avoid further escalation.

Some time in the month of September, during my absence from my command, six of my men who had been captured by your forces, were hung and shot in the streets of Front Royal, by order and in the immediate presence of Brigadier-General Custer. Since then another (captured by a Colonel Powell on a plundering expedition into Rappahannock) shared a similar fate. A label affixed to the coat of one of the murdered men declared "that this would be the fate of Mosby and all his men." Since the murder of my men, not less than seven hundred prisoners, including many officers of high rank, captured from your army by this command have been forwarded to Richmond; but the execution of my purpose of retaliation was deferred, in order, as far as possible, to confine its operation to the men of Custer and Powell. Accordingly, on the 6th instant, seven of your men were, by my order, executed on the Valley Pike — your highway of travel. Hereafter, any prisoners falling into my hands will be treated with the kindness due to their

⁶⁸ Thomas Ashby, *The Valley Campaigns*, 293.

⁶⁹ Sue Richardson, *Diary of Miss Sue Richardson, Recorded at "Rose Hill" Front Royal, Virginia, Oct. 1, 1863 – May 23, 1865*. (Front Royal VA: Warren Rifles Chapter No. 95 of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, 1956), Warren County Historical Society, Front Royal, Virginia, 76.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Thomas Ashby, 294.

condition, unless some new act of barbarity shall compel me, reluctantly, to adopt a line of policy repugnant to humanity.⁷²

The letter served its purpose and Mosby described, “No further ‘acts of barbarity’ were committed on my men.”⁷³

After battlefield victories at Third Winchester and at Fisher’s Hill, Sheridan advanced southward and commenced the destruction of the Valley as far south as Staunton. Sheridan had initially hoped to capture the majority of Early’s army, but the disappointments of his cavalry negated the plan. Not only did Torbert fail to break through Luray Valley, but Averell failed to pursue Early, so Sheridan relieved him of command, appointing Colonel William H. Powell, of the 1st West Virginia cavalry, as the new division commander.⁷⁴

Early retreated toward Port Republic, seeking the safety in Brown’s Gap. “The army was so de-moralized that nothing but the perfect security of the mountain fastness in which it had found shelter saved it from going to pieces,” reflected Robert Thurston Hubard. The movement however uncovered the richness of the Valley to the mercy of Sheridan.⁷⁵ Sheridan contemplated whether he should pursue the enemy towards Brown’s Gap, drive him, and advanced on Charlottesville and Gordonsville, but he decided against the movement.⁷⁶ Instead, his infantry advanced south of Harrisonburg, while his cavalry pushed toward Port Republic, Piedmont, Staunton, and Waynesborough. Grant later reflected that “one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished.”⁷⁷ That objective included living upon the resources of the upper Valley, “especially taking what might be of use to the enemy,” as well as the

⁷² Mosby, *Memoirs*, 302-303. As was customary during the period, Mosby ended his letter “Very respectfully, your obedient servant.”

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 303.

⁷⁴ Sheridan, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 43-45; Averell, *Ten Years in the Saddle*, 398-403. Powell was subsequently promoted to brigadier general.

⁷⁵ Robert Thurston Hubard Jr., 113.

⁷⁶ OR, vol. 43 (1): 50.

⁷⁷ Grant, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 331.

destruction of anything not consumed or utilized by the army, “so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there,” and if he did, they would have to bring their own supplies with them.⁷⁸

During Sheridan’s pursuit of Early through Shenandoah County, more conventional damages occurred. James Sheeran, a Catholic Chaplain, visited a Mr. Reilly in Woodstock on September 26th on his way to Winchester to administer to the needs of the Confederate wounded. “This poor man has suffered much, since I had seen him last,” wrote Sheeran. He suffered losses to his garden, corn fields, fences, hogs, hay, and his only horse was appropriated as the army acquired necessary supplies.⁷⁹ The widespread and systematic destruction of civilian property in Shenandoah County however, including the burning of barns and the destruction of all grain and forage, would not occur until Sheridan withdrew back down the Valley in early October.

On September 26th, the orders of destruction to “burn all forage, drive off all cattle, destroy all mills, &c.,” were issued to Torbert, in the advance of the army, who moved toward Waynesboro through Staunton, and Merritt, who pushed toward Port Republic.⁸⁰ A resident of Staunton, Joseph Waddell, worried for the consequences of a Federal raid on Augusta County, “This county is now rich in all that is needed to sustain an army. Legh tells me he has his wheat, oats and hay on hand, his corn is ready to be gathered, while his sheep, hogs, and even milch cows are fat enough for slaughter. So it is on every farm, and the mills are full of wheat. If the Yankees come, the loss to our army will be inseparable [irreparable].”⁸¹ On September 24th, anticipating a Federal advance on Staunton, an order arrived from Richmond for the immediate

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Reverend James Sheeran, *The Civil War Diary of Rev. James Sheeran*, ed. Patrick J. Hayes (Catholic University of American Press, 2016), 467-468.

⁸⁰ OR, vo. 43 (1): 49.

⁸¹ Joseph A. Waddell, *Diary of Joseph A. Waddell, The Valley of the Shadow: Two Communities in the American Civil War*, Virginia Center for Digital History, University of Virginia, Sep. 24, 1864 (hereafter cited as VS). Legh was his brother.

grinding of the wheat and the shipping of the processed flour to the capital. Waddell busied himself with the work and afterward fled eastward, when Early ordered the evacuation of the town.⁸²

Torbert led Wilson's 3rd division and the reserve brigade of the 1st division, commanded by Colonel Lowell, to Staunton, which it entered on September 26th. The force captured some Confederate wounded and convalescents. They also consumed or destroyed significant amounts of government property including hard bread, flour, tobacco, harnesses, saddles, small arms, clothing, camp equipage, and repair shops.⁸³ Brigadier General James H. Wilson wrote that "after supplying the wants of the command the balance was destroyed."⁸⁴ In town, private property was largely respected. Waddell heard that the Federal cavalry, occupying the town for two days, did "no injury to the citizens."⁸⁵ Indeed, they "entered very few private houses and committed no depredations of any consequence."⁸⁶

Torbert's cavalry initially focused on the destruction of military targets, particularly the railroad between Staunton and Waynesborough, destroying several rail bridges, track, and the depot. In Waynesborough, on September 28th, Torbert partially destroyed the vital iron rail bridge, which took the Virginia Central over the South Branch of the Shenandoah. Torbert found the railroad tunnel however defended by two companies of home guards and decided not to risk a fight. Early planned to attack Sheridan near Harrisonburg, but informed of Torbert's raid, he

⁸² Ibid., Oct. 8, 1864.

⁸³ No. 149. Col Charles R. Lowell Jr., 2nd MA Cav., commanding Reserve Brigade Sep. 8 – Oct. 4, OR, vol. 43 (1): 491; Charles Russell Lowell, *Life and Letters*, 350-351; Torbert reported the capture of "300 muskets, 75 sabers, 50 cartridge-boxes, 70 sets horse equipment's complete, 60 rounds fixed ammunition, 200 sets harness, 350 saddle-trees, 200 tents, 65 head beef-cattle, 57 prisoners, 25 wagons, 5 tons salt, 100 barrels flour, 500 bales hay, 1,000 bushels wheat, 125 barrels hard bread, 50 boxes tobacco, 50 horses, medical stores, &c." OR, vol. 43 (1): 429.

⁸⁴ No. 156. Report of Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, U.S. Army, commanding Third Division, of operations July 31-Septemebr 30, OR, vol. 43 (1): 519.

⁸⁵ Waddell, Diary, Oct. 8, 1864.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

marched to Waynesborough, especially to defend Rockfish Gap. The forces clashed on the night September 28th. Early hoped to surprise the isolated cavalry and achieve a minor tactical victory, but outnumbered, Torbert decided to withdraw to Staunton and continue to Spring Hill, “executing the order for the destruction of subsistence, forage, etc.”⁸⁷ On the morning of September 29th, Torbert marched northward to Bridgewater, while completing his orders of destruction.⁸⁸

On September 26th, Merritt with the 1st division, minus the reserve brigade, with the first brigade in advance, moved toward Keezletown and Port Republic, discovering Early’s army in Browns Gap and Kershaw’s division arriving from Swift Run Gap. Powell, then in command of the 2nd Division, followed Torbert toward Staunton, but veered left toward Piedmont implementing the destructive orders between Torbert and Merritt.⁸⁹ On September 27th, near Cross Keys, Colonel J. H. Kidd commanding the Michigan Brigade, assuming command the day before, after Custer’s recent promotion to divisional commander, discovered several mills along the river and soon had his men grinding flour and meal, which his commissary officers then issued to the regiments, “according to their needs.”⁹⁰ Kidd expressed, “We all flattered ourselves that we were doing a fine stroke of business.”⁹¹ After running the mills for about two hours, his “complacent state” was “rudely disturbed,” when Merritt rode up with his staff “in an angry

⁸⁷ OR, vol. 43 (1): 29; Torbert Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 429-430; Lowell Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 491; Jubal A. Early, *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence in the Confederate States of America containing an Account of the Operations of his Commands in the Years 1864 and 1865* (Lynchburg, VA: Charles W. Button, 1867), 97. The rail bridge was 235 ft. The Crozet tunnel was the longest tunnel in the U.S. when it was completed in 1858.

⁸⁸ OR, vol. 43 (1): 429-430.

⁸⁹ Torbert Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 429. Custer was assigned to command the 2nd division, but had not reached his troops to assume command. Merritt Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 442.

⁹⁰ J. H. [James Harvey] Kidd, J. H. Kidd, *Personal Recollections of a Cavalryman: With Custer’s Michigan Cavalry Brigade in the Civil War*, orig. Sentinel Press, 1908 (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2018), 210.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

mood, which he did not attempt to conceal.”⁹² Merritt reprimanded him for having not set the mills on fire and quite provoked, “he pointed to the west and one could have made a chart of Custer’s trail by the columns of black smoke which marked it.”⁹³ With orders to burn all the barns, mills, and haystacks, among other targets, Kidd relayed that Merritt “was manifestly fretting lest Custer should appear to outdo him in zeal in obeying orders, and blamed me as his responsible subordinate, for the delay.”⁹⁴ Fires were quickly started, not even taking the time to stop the wheels, the smoke of which showed that Merritt’s “loyalty was vindicated.”⁹⁵

On September 28th, Merritt was ordered to Port Republic, “but on the same night was directed to leave small forces at Port Republic and Swift Run Gap, and proceed with the balance of his command (his own and Custer’s Division) to Piedmont, swing around from that point to near Staunton, burning forage, mills, and such other property as might be serviceable to the rebel army or Confederacy.”⁹⁶ On September 29th, Sheridan reported to Grant that Merritt and Custer’s division were sent via Piedmont, “to burn grain, &c., pursuant to your instructions.”⁹⁷ Merritt specified that they marched on the 29th, “destroying mills and forage and driving off cattle.”⁹⁸ Custer, now in command of the 2nd division, moved from Cross Keys to Mount Sydney, “under orders to collect and drive off all stock, horses, &c., and to destroy all forage, grain, and flouring mills, returning to Mount Crawford,” where it encamped for the night.⁹⁹ On September 29th, Kidd’s brigade withdrew to Mount Crawford, the 6th Michigan having “orders to burn all barns,

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid, 210-211.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 211.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ OR, vol. 43 (1): 50.

⁹⁷ Sheridan to Grant, Harrisonburg, Sep. 29, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 29.

⁹⁸ Merritt Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 442.

⁹⁹ Reports of Brig. Gen. William H. Powell, U. S. Army, commanding 2nd, Div (Army of West Virginia), of operations Sep. 24 – Oct. 27 and Nov. 12, OR, vol. 43 (1): 508; On September 30 Wilson was reassigned to Chief of Cavalry of Sherman’s army and Custer assumed command of the 3rd Division. Powell resumed command of the 2nd.

&c.”¹⁰⁰ Major Charles W. Deane, commanding the regiment, reported that during the march toward Piedmont on the 29th he sent one battalion to “destroy mills, barns, &c., and bring in cattle.”¹⁰¹ Deane rejoined the brigade at Mout Crawford, the brigade “having destroyed a large amount of property and driven in a large number of cattle and other stock.”¹⁰² Devin’s Brigade on September 29th moved from Port Republic to Lewis’ Furnace, Piedmont, and Mount Crawford, “destroying and burning 82 barns containing hay and grain, 72 stacks of hay and grain, 5 flouring mills, 2 saw-mills, 1 iron furnace, 1 wagon loaded with grain, and 1 wagon load of flour, and drove in 321 head of cattle and 20 sheep.”¹⁰³ With his advanced infantry at Mt. Crawford, eight miles south of Harrisonburg, on September 29th, Sheridan assured Grant that he would “go on and clean out the Valley.”¹⁰⁴ He articulated, “The destruction of grain and forage from here to Staunton will be a terrible blow to them. . . . The country from here to Staunton was abundantly supplied with forage and grain, &c.”¹⁰⁵

Early’s men bore witness to the destruction, observing the burning from a distance. From the Blue Ridge above Port Republic George Washington Nichols, in the 61st Georgia expressed, “We had an elevated position and could see Yankees out in the valley driving off all the horses, cattle, sheep and killing the hogs and burning all the barns and shocks of corn and wheat in the fields, and destroying everything that could feed or shelter man or beast.”¹⁰⁶ The Valley

¹⁰⁰ No. 137. Report of Col. James H. Kidd, 6th Michigan, Sep. 26-Oct 27, OR, vol. 43 (1): 459-460.

¹⁰¹ No. 140 Report of Maj. Charels W. Deane, Sixth Michigan Cavalry Operations Aug 10-Oct 5, OR, vol. 43 (1): 467.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ No. 144. Thomas C. Devin, 6th NY Cav., commanding 2nd brigade of operations, July 4 – Oct. 21, OR vol. 43 (1): 477.

¹⁰⁴ OR, vol. 43 (1): 29.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 30.

¹⁰⁶ George W. Nichols, *A Soldier’s Story of His Regiment (61st Georgia) And Incidentally of the Lawton-Gordon-Evans Brigade Army of Northern Virginia*, intro. Keith S. Bohannon, orig. Kennesaw, GA: Continental Book Co., 1898 (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2011), 192.

accordingly filled with smoke, including that emanating from dwelling houses.¹⁰⁷ On Thursday September 29th, near Waynesboro, Hotchkiss observed the Federal cavalry in their work of destruction, “burning barns, mills, &c., as they went.”¹⁰⁸ To his astonishment they even, “made the night light with burning barns, hay stacks, &c.”¹⁰⁹ His colleague, Oscar Hinrichs, an engineer on Early’s staff, also watched the large fires in the direction of Staunton. “The enemy’s cavalry is riding rings around us and burns down our mills and barns, our wheat and hay, so that, even if we should wish to stay here, we won’t be able to, because of lack of food for man and beast. We are in a very sad position.”¹¹⁰ The following day, Hinrichs continued his observations and assessments. “The enemy seems to endeavor to burn down all mills and barns along the highroad. I pity the poor people; as far as I can see they will have an awful time getting bread. The enemy has burned at least 1,000 tons of flour, 10,000 bushels of wheat destined for our corps and has abducted all horses and cattle.”¹¹¹ John N. Opie recalled that as soon as Early left the Valley, it “was one scene of desolation and ruin,” including the burnings of mills, barns, and “in many instances,” dwelling houses, along with the consumption or wanton destruction of food, forage, and livestock.¹¹²

Civilians also recorded the devastation in the northern portions of Augusta County and the southern portion of Rockingham County, below Harrisonburg. On September 30th, Joseph Waddell received a letter from his father, which described the burnings of the previous day. “All day yesterday [Thursday] they were encamped near Middle River, and judging from the lights

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 234; OR, vol. 43 (1): 1,029.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Oscar Hinrichs, *Stonewall’s Prussian Mapmaker: The Journals of Captain Oscar Hinrichs*, ed. Richard Brady Williams (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 184 -186.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² John N. Opie, *A Rebel Cavalryman with Lee, Stuart and Jackson* (Chicago: W. B. Conkey Company, 1899), 254.

must have spent the day and night in burning barns. The whole heavens were illuminated until late bed time.”¹¹³ The “Yankees made a general burning of barns in the lower end of this country [Augusta] & the upper end of Rockingham county,” wrote Jacob Hildebrand on September 29th, and “also some houses.”¹¹⁴ William Pervayance Tams later reflected that no longer did Augusta County supply the wants of Lee’s army in Richmond, with products ranging from wheat, flour, and corn meal to beef and pork, because “Sheridan destroyed every shed, every barn, every fence in the Valley, and impounded all the horses and mules that had four legs and could move.”¹¹⁵

In the beginning of October, Sheridan concentrated the majority of his army around Harrisonburg. The burning accordingly continued. Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, commanding a brigade in Thoburn’s division, recorded on October 2nd, “Great droves of cattle and sheep are going past us north. Everything eatable is taken or destroyed.”¹¹⁶ He also reflected upon the strategic rationale for doing so, “No more supplies to Rebels from this valley. No more invasions in great force by this route will be possible.”¹¹⁷ On October 5th, Alexander Neil, a Union Surgeon described, “We are burning and destroying everything in this valley, such as wheat stacks, hay stacks, barns, houses. Indeed, there will be nothing but heaps of ashes and ruins generally between Staunton and Harper’s Ferry.”¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Waddell, *Diary*, Oct. 8, 1864.

¹¹⁴ Hildebrand, *A Mennonite Journal*, 52.

¹¹⁵ William Pervayance Tams, “Recollections of Augusta County: Address of Mr. William Purviance Tams, Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Augusta County Historical Society, at May Baldwin College, Staunton, Virginia, Monday November 9, 1964,” *Augusta Historical Bulletin* 20, No. 2 (Fall 1984), Augusta County Historical Society, Staunton, Virginia, 33.

¹¹⁶ Rutherford B. Hayes, *Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, 1861-1865*, ed. Richard Williams, vol. 2 (Columbus, OH: The F. J. Heer Printing Company, The Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, 1922), 521. Hayes was promoted to Brigadier General for his actions at the Battle of Cedar Creek on Oct 19, 1864.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Alexander Neil, *Alexander Neil and the Last Shenandoah Valley Campaign: Letters of an Army Surgeon to His Family, 1864*, ed. Richard R. Duncan (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1996), 68.

The morale of Early's defeated army recovered toward the end of the month, although there was only so much they could accomplish, being heavily outnumbered. Early did receive some reinforcements including Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's artillery as well as Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser's Laurel Brigade. Hinrichs deemed it essential to chase the enemy out of the region as early as possible and thence defeat the enemy, but outnumbered there was little, they could currently accomplish. On October 2nd, he recorded, "One Brigade of infantry went to a mill in order to save some wheat, which was safely brought back. Later on, Pegram's Brigade was sent there too to protect the wagons."¹¹⁹ Captain Samuel D. Buck, of the 13th Virginia, remembered that on the previous day they marched to Mt. Sydney where they "stood guard at a mill, protecting it while our rations of flour and meal were being ground."¹²⁰ A correspondent for the *Richmond Daily Dispatch* in camp near Mt. Crawford relayed that they captured about fifty cattle, which Sheridan was unable to carry away and extinguished a burning bridge and Sherman's Mill where they saved 150 barrels of flour and 1000 bushels of wheat. The correspondent also highlighted, "Almost every barn was burned - - scarcely one now remaining - - an those who, a few days ago, had harvested such abundant crops that their barns would scarce contain them, are now without a sufficiency for their own consumption."¹²¹ Hotchkiss noted in his journal on October 4th, "The enemy burned barns, &c., at night."¹²² Brigadier general Clement A. Evans recorded, "The horizon down the Pike toward Harrisonburg is lit up to night by the fires of burning barns."¹²³ He labelled such activity "fiendish work," because it destroyed thousands of dollars in private property. He did not venture to estimate the amount of wheat they

¹¹⁹ Oscar Hinrichs, *Stonewall's Prussian Mapmaker*, 188.

¹²⁰ Samuel D. Buck, *With the Old Confeds: Actual Experiences of a Captain in the Line* (Baltimore: H. e. Houck & Co., 1925), 121.

¹²¹ *Richmond Daily Dispatch*, Oct. 12, 1864.

¹²² Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 234.

¹²³ Clement Anselm Evans, *Intrepid Warrior, Clement Anselm Evans: Confederate General from Georgia, Life, Letters, and Diaries of the War Years*, ed. Robert Grier Stephens, Jr. Morningside, 1992), 463.

destroyed, but he did anticipate that Sheridan would probably move further down the Valley, “leaving us to contemplate the ruin they have wrought.”¹²⁴ Hinrichs also saw on the 4th “a big and bright light” from some of Sheridan’s burning activities. He noted that the Federals did not seem to care about their presence, nor a further advance up the Valley, as they continued “to burn down everything” without seeming “to think about tomorrow.”¹²⁵ Hinrich’s also provided an apt assessment of the burning pertaining to Sheridan’s strategy and conception of war, in that he “seems to get down to real war now, destroying everything which might be of help either to us or to the inhabitants of this region.”¹²⁶

On the evening of October 3rd, Lieutenant John R. Meigs, Sheridan’s Chief Engineer and son of General Montgomery C Meigs, Chief Quartermaster of Federal forces, was killed near the village of Dayton, a few miles south of Harrisonburg. Meigs and two topographical assistants were returning to their lines after plotting the country, when they observed Confederate scouts, who had been sent by Early toward Sheridan’s lines on mission of observation, and a confrontation ensued. One of those involved returned to the Federal camp and informed others of the event, whereupon a detachment sent forward the following day found the body of Lt. Meigs. Under the impression that Meigs had been murdered by men who were not in the Confederate army, Sheridan, at 2 a.m. on the morning of October 5th, ordered the burning of all buildings, including houses, mills, and barns, within a five-mile distance of where Meigs was killed, which included the town of Dayton. He intended the destructive act to serve as an example for those contemplating further attacks within, what he considered, his lines.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Oscar Hinrichs, 190.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Early, *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War*, 98-99; Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. 2, 51-52; James E. Taylor, *The James E. Taylor Sketchbook: With Sheridan Up the Shenandoah Valley in 1864, Leaves from a Special Artists Sketch Book and Diary* (Dayton, OH: Morningside House Inc. 1989), 430-433.

Custer was assigned the unenviable task of destruction, which commenced the following morning. At headquarters on the morning of October 5th, James E. Taylor, sketch artist and correspondent for *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, witnessed the “dramatic episode” of Sheridan “reiterating his stern edit” to Custer and then riding away with the exclamation “Look out for Smoke.”¹²⁸ Custer, in obedience to orders, commenced the retaliatory destruction. James E. Taylor described in his journal that “we were treated to a sight that must have appeased the ghost of him to whom the Holocaust was offered. The ugly columns of smoke that arose in succession from the Valley to the west, like a funeral pall, told too well that he was fulfilling his orders to the letter, amid anguish and misery for more than one innocent household possibly.”¹²⁹

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Wildes, in command of the 116th Ohio, whose troops had been quartered in the town, pleaded with Sheridan to spare the town. He wrote to Sheridan imploring him to revoke the order, in regard to the burning of the town itself, informing his commander of the sentiments and character of the people, many of whom were pacifists and Union sympathizers who treated his soldiers with a hospitality unique to the area. A messenger hand delivered the note to Sheridan, who “read the note and swore, read it again and swore, examined and cross examined the messenger.”¹³⁰ Although Sheridan was initially determined that the order should be executed, eventually he relented to Wildes’ plea and rescinded the order. Wildes had in the meantime bided his time and his men helped the citizens remove furniture from their houses. With the order for burning the town set for noon, the citizens of Dayton in the interim watched “the dense smoke now arising in all directions” throughout the country, illustrating the execution of the order. The messenger returned though just in time informing the

¹²⁸ James E. Taylor, *The James E. Taylor Sketchbook*, 434.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Thomas F. Wildes, *Record of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Regiment Ohio Infantry Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion*, (Sandusky, OH: I. F. Mack & Bro., 1884), 190-191.

soldiers of the cancellation of the destructive order. At first, the civilians thought the courier brought word to commence the burning and “the screams of women and children were perfectly heart rending.”¹³¹ When they learned however that the order had been withdrawn, many of the civilians were overcome with joy, the women fainted, the little children gladly clapped and shouted, and “the good news was too much for even the grim and sturdy old soldiers.”¹³² The soldiers then aided the rejoicing civilians in carrying their valuables back into their houses and the civilians prepared “a great quantity of provisions and delicacies” for the soldiers who were ordered to leave in the morning.¹³³

Sheridan directed Custer “to cease his desolating work” in the countryside, albeit after houses in the immediate neighborhood of the location of Meigs killing had already been torched. Instead of burning the town of Dayton however, Sheridan modified his orders to Custer “to fetch away all the able bodies males as prisoners.”¹³⁴ On October 5th, Lowell wrote to his wife from Mount Crawford, that Meigs was shot by a guerilla and “by order the village of Dayton and everything for several miles around was burned.”¹³⁵ General Sheridan reported from Woodstock on October 7th that Meigs was murdered and “For this atrocious act all the houses within an area of five miles were burned.”¹³⁶

Confederate staff officer, Major Henry Kyd Douglas noted in his journal that “as a holocaust upon his tomb,” Sheridan ordered “all the houses within an area of five miles to be burned.”¹³⁷ John Casler, a soldier in the Stonewall Brigade, whose homes and families were

¹³¹ Ibid., 191-192.

¹³² Ibid., 192.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ James E. Taylor, 434; Sheridan, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 52.

¹³⁵ Lowell, *Life and Letters*, 353.

¹³⁶OR, vol. 43 (1): 30.

¹³⁷ Henry Kyd Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 315.

primarily located in the Shenandoah Valley, described the destruction of the countryside nearby his own hometown of Dayton, the consequences of both the strategic burning ordered by Grant and the retaliatory burning ordered by Sheridan. “When we arrived in Dayton we saw a distressing sight – ruin and desolation on every hand. The enemy, in falling back, had burned all the barns and mills on their line of retreat.”¹³⁸ Despite the sparing of the village itself, Casler described,

But not so with the country, nearly every house and barn within the circle of five miles was burned. It was a rich neighborhood, with fine residences and outbuildings, and the barns full of grain and farm implements. They were not even allowed to save their household property. Oh! Those who never saw war have no idea of the ruin, desolation, death and suffering it brings. My mother, father and sisters went through this ordeal, and related the scenes to me when I arrived at home.”¹³⁹

The family did express their appreciation for Lieutenant Dutton, the quartermaster of the 116th Ohio, since he did everything he could for their protection.¹⁴⁰

Although Grant desired Sheridan advance to Charlottesville and Gordonsville, Sheridan, objected. He deemed it best “to terminate this campaign by the destruction of the crops in the Valley and the means of planting.”¹⁴¹ Grant accepted his subordinate’s plan and replied on October 3rd, “You may take up such position in the Valley as you think can and ought to be held, and send all the force not required for this immediately here. Leave nothing for the subsistence of an army on any ground you abandon to the enemy.”¹⁴² Even though Grant and Sheridan disagreed on their next move, the key component which both agreed upon was the destruction of the Valley’s agricultural capabilities, this time, in northern Rockingham and Shenandoah

¹³⁸ John O Casler, *Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade*. 2nd ed. (Girard, KS: Appeal Publishing Company, 1906), 239.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 240.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ OR, vol. 43 (2): 249-250.

¹⁴² Grant to Sheridan, City Point, VA., Oct. 3, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (2): 266.

counties. On the night of October 5th and the morning of October 6th, Sheridan's army commenced its withdrawal northward down the Valley, leaving their positions around Harrisonburg, Port Republic, Mount Crawford, and Bridgewater. The infantry marched on the Valley Pike, while the cavalry stretched across the valley in order to carry out the destruction ordered by Grant.¹⁴³

Tobert issued orders to his division commanders the previous night. Custer, now in command of the 3rd division, was instructed to move on the Back Road, and Merritt to start from Timberville and proceed on the Middle Road and the Valley Pike.¹⁴⁴ Merritt ordered his brigade commanders to "collect all stock and burn the forage you can't use."¹⁴⁵ Regiments would be detached to complete the destruction, while the rest of their command would be concentrated in a defensive posture.¹⁴⁶ For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Casper Crowninshield of the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry, who assumed command of the reserve brigade on October 5th, detailed that the 1st and 2nd U. S. cavalry and one squadron of his regiment were tasked with implementing the destructive orders. On October 6th, the two regiments and detached squadron were "on duty all day burning hay and grain and collecting cattle," during their march to Harrisonburg, and then to Timberville on the Middle Road.¹⁴⁷ Merritt reported his division as "destroying forage, grain, &c., and driving off cattle across the entire valley."¹⁴⁸ The next day his division continued "the work of destruction" as far as Edinburg.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³ James E. Taylor, 441; Frank M. Flinn, *Campaigning With Banks in Louisiana, '63 and '64 and With Sheridan in The Shenandoah Valley in '64 and '65*, 2nd ed. (Boston: W. B. Clarke & Co., 1889), 205. Flinn served in the 38th Massachusetts of the 19th Corps.

¹⁴⁴ Hdqs. Cav. Middle Military Division, Harrisonburg, Va., Oct. 5, 1864, Tortbert to Merritt, OR vol. 43 (2): 292.

¹⁴⁵ Merritt Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 442.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ No. 150 Lt. Col Casper Crowninshield 2nd MA Cav., commanding reserve brigade of operations, Oct. 5 – 31, OR, vol. 43 (1): 491.

¹⁴⁸ Merritt Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 442.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

“The march from Harrisonburg was memorable on account of the sight of burning barns, mills, and stacks of hay and grain,” described Major Aldace F. Walker, of the 11th Vermont Cavalry. He continued, “Pillars of smoke surrounded us through all of the three days, and though no houses were destroyed, everything combustible that could aid the enemy during the coming winter was burned, and all cattle and sheep were driven away.”¹⁵⁰ J. H. Kidd noted, “The work of incineration was continued, and clouds of smoke marked the passage of the Federal army.”¹⁵¹ James E. Taylor, on October 7th, observed the cavalry deployed across the valley implementing the orders “to drive off all stock and desolate the land . . . as was attested on each hand by columns of smoke arising from burning hay stacks, granaries, mills, store houses, and barns groaning with the gleanings of the field; in fact, all buildings except those sheltering the distressed people.”¹⁵² He elucidated that “It was a harrowing spectacle that met our eye. The Valley was filled with somber pillars of grimy smoke towering upwards and darkening the sky.”¹⁵³ He also thought “there was a solemn aspect to the whole in the troops moving monotonously through the distant fields with here and there a column of smoke rifting skyward where the torch bearers had left their mark in the zealous pursuit of their detestable work, upon which the towering range beyond might well frown its displeasure.”¹⁵⁴

Sheridan reported to Grant from Woodstock on October 7th that he planned to continue the work of destruction in northern Shenandoah County, “To-morrow I will continue the destruction of wheat, forage, &c., down to Fisher’s Hill. When this is complete the Valley from

¹⁵⁰ Aldace F. Walker, *The Vermont Brigade in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864* (Burlington, VT: The Free Press Association, 1869), 128. For his actions during the campaign Walker was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. *Ibid.*, 166.

¹⁵¹ Kidd, *Personal Recollections of a Cavalryman*, 212.

¹⁵² James E. Taylor, 441.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 446.

Winchester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will have but little in it for man or beast.”¹⁵⁵ Captain John V. Young, of the 11th West Virginia, wrote home on October 12th, “we have destroyed almost everything in this great Valley that man or beast could live on. We have burned all the mills, barns, grain, hay and has drove off all their stock even down to their milk cows and calves. How the citizen is to live is a problem for them not for me.”¹⁵⁶ No longer did commanders concern themselves with the issuing of guards to protect civilian houses, gardens, and cornfields. The soldiers as a result “take everything they want- milk, butter, apple butter, cheese and fruit of every kind. They kill every fat hog, pig, calf and sheep that hey find and carry them right by the Genls. Tent but he takes no notice of it,” wrote Young.¹⁵⁷ With his army under orders “to drive off all stock and destroy all supplies” as it moved northward, Sheridan recalled his accomplishment, “the many columns of smoke from burning stacks, and mills filled with grain, indicated that the adjacent country was fast losing the features which hitherto had made it a great magazine of stores for the Confederate armies.”¹⁵⁸

Civilians also bore witness to the devastation. Kate Sperry, who went to live with her aunt in North Carolina received a letter, dated October 7th, from her sister Jennie, who was near Staunton, which indicated that the “Yanks” left the day previous, but they “behaved worse than ever.”¹⁵⁹ In particular, Sheridan’s men “burned Mrs. Moore’s house and everything near Dayton . . . all the barns, mills and grain in the Valley gone.”¹⁶⁰ Siram P. Henkel recorded in his journal on October 7th that the Yankees passed down the Valley in the morning burning a great number

¹⁵⁵ OR, vol. 43 (1): 31.

¹⁵⁶ John V. Young, Letter, 12 October 1864, LV, acc. no. 42364, 1. Written to Dear Paulina, from Strasburg, Frederick Co. Va., dated Oct. 12, 1864.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Sheridan, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 56.

¹⁵⁹ Kate Sperry, *Diary*, 561.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. On Oct. 18th she received another letter from Jennie, “she gives me a horrible account of Yankee doings,” although Kate did not record the details. Ibid., 562.

of barns, including those of a few neighbors such as Samuel Myers, whose barn they burnt the previous evening, and Mr. Loore's, whose barn they burnt that morning.¹⁶¹ Anna Wayland watched Devin's brigade of cavalry pass Woodlawn in Shenandoah County on October 7th, "burning mills, barns, & some houses."¹⁶² In particular, on October 9th, they burnt the local Maphis Mill.¹⁶³ On October 8th, Joseph Waddell heard that the destruction which occurred in Augusta County, now extended to Rockingham County and all throughout the lower Valley.¹⁶⁴ Word also leaked out that the destruction was an intentional strategy developed by Grant himself. The *Richmond Daily Dispatch* of October 10th reprinted Grant's letter to Sheridan published by the *New York Herald* on October 5th, "ordering him to burn every house in the Valley; to destroy every mill, kill every horse, cow, sheep and hog; that he is determined to make the Valley a howling wilderness!"¹⁶⁵

When barns were burnt it deprived the Valley's farmers of their harvested crops, farming implements, and the seed required for planting in the spring. Randolph H. McKim, now a chaplain in Early's army, emphasized that "everything except the roofs over the people's heads" were destroyed.¹⁶⁶ Evans lamented, "The harvested wheat and hay of the Valley has gone with these burning barns."¹⁶⁷ John Hatcher noted that Sheridan not only "destroyed all the crops,

¹⁶¹ Elsie Renalds Newcomer and Janet Renalds Ramsey, *1864 Life in the Shenandoah Valley: A Compilation of The Journal of Siram Peter Henkel, The Letter Collection of Caspar Coiner Henkel, M. D., The Daily Dispatch of Richmond, Virginia* (Mechanicsville, VA: Battlefield Press, 2014), 231.

¹⁶² Anna (Kagey) Wayland, *Daily Journal of Anna (Kagey) Wayland, 1847-1865*, trans. by her son, John W. Wayland, 1935, LV, acc. no. 24649b, 152; Anna Wayland, *History of Shenandoah County*, 331.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Waddell, *Diary*, Oct. 8, 1864.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1864.

¹⁶⁶ Randolph H. McKim, *A Soldier's Recollections: Leaves from the Diary of a Young Confederate* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 231.

¹⁶⁷ Evans, *Intrepid Warrior*, 465.

mills, barns . . . and drove off all the horses, cattle, and other livestock,” but also destroyed the “farming implements” necessary to replenish their diminished grains and forage.¹⁶⁸

Confederate soldiers, many of whom called the Valley home, followed in the tracks of Sheridan and observed the destruction. Early determined to attack near Harrisonburg, but Sheridan precipitous withdrawal forced him to abandon the plan. The Federals left their camps on the night of October 5th and the early morning of the 6th, only “after burning in every direction,” reported Hotchkiss.¹⁶⁹ In his journal he emphasized, “The enemy did a vast amount of damage in Rockingham.”¹⁷⁰ Henry Kyd Douglas observed “great columns of smoke which almost shut out the sun by day” and at night, the “red glare of bonfires, which, all across that Valley, poured out flames and sparks heavenward and crackled mockingly in the night air.”¹⁷¹ In particular, he remembered the daughter of a clergy man nearly lose her sanity as their “stable and outbuildings were burning.”¹⁷² “The smoking embers of five hundred barns,” estimated Evans on October 7th, “tell how well Sheridan has performed his part.”¹⁷³ Because of such destruction he assessed, “The role of both Sheridan and Early in the Valley is played.”¹⁷⁴

In the march to Woodstock, following Sheridan to Strasburg, George Nichols and his comrades “found that he had burnt every barn and nearly every dwelling house from Staunton to Strasburg. Most of the dwelling houses in the towns were spared.”¹⁷⁵ Brigadier General Bryan Grimes wrote home from New Market on October 9th, that the Federals had been driven below Strasburg, but “they destroyed everything on their retreat . . . Country a perfect desolation. All

¹⁶⁸ Charles S. Hatcher, compiler, *Recollections of the Civil War 1861-1865*, compiled for John Edmund Charles Lewis Hatcher (Blacksburg, VA: Les Oakes, 2001), trans. LV, acc. no. 38168, 6.

¹⁶⁹ OR, vol. 43 (1): 1029.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 578.

¹⁷¹ Henry Kyd Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall*, 315.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ Evans, 464.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ George Nichols, *A Soldier's Story of His Regiment*, 192.

stock and provisions destroyed.”¹⁷⁶ As a result, they did not have “the wherewithal to subsist our army on.”¹⁷⁷ Major General Stephen D. Ramseur wrote to his wife on October 10th, “This beautiful and fertile Valley has been totally destroyed. Sheridan has had some houses, all the mills & barns, every straw & wheat stack burned. This Valley is one great desert. I do not see how these poor people are to live.”¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, they would now have to haul their supplies, if they wished to continue operations in the lower Valley.¹⁷⁹

Many of the Confederates could not understand why Sheridan did not attack them, but rather commenced to retreat down the Valley. “There must be something wrong with the enemy,” assessed Hinrichs. Initially, he could not understand what it meant, although he eventually came to comprehend what transpired, that “all the barns and almost all mills have been burned down.”¹⁸⁰ On the morning of October 7th, in particular, he “saw a lot of smoke from some burning houses.”¹⁸¹ John H. Worsham, a member of the Stonewall Brigade, described, “All the barns and mills were in ruin and it soon became evident that he intended carrying out his boast that when he was done with the valley a crow would have to carry his rations with him in order to get something to eat in going across it.”¹⁸² Major General John B. Gordon reflected that Sheridan “decided upon a season of burning, instead of battling; of assaults with matches and torches upon barns and haystacks, instead of upon armed men who were lined up in front of

¹⁷⁶ Bryan Grimes, *Extracts of Letters of Major – Gen’l Bryan Grimes, to His Wife: Written While in Active Service in the Army of Northern Virginia, Together with Some Personal Recollections of the War, Written by Him After Its Close, etc.*, 1st ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1996), 76.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Stephen Dotson Ramseur, *The Bravest of the Brave: The Correspondence of Stephen Dodson Ramseur*, ed. George C. Kuhndahl (University of North Carolina Press, 2021), 287.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Oscar Hinrichs, 192.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² John H Worsham, *One of Jackson’s Foot Cavalry: His Experience and What He Saw During the War, 1861-1865, Including a History of “F Company,” Richmond, VA., 21st Regiment Virginia Infantry, Second Brigade, Jackson’s Division, Second Corps, A. N. VA.* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1912), 121-122.

him.”¹⁸³ The sight of Sheridan “burning everything as he went” only spurred on their “determination to avenge this dastardly warfare,” as Captain Samuel D. Buck put it. “Our hearts ached at the horrible sight, our beautiful Valley almost a barren waste,” but because of their inferiority of numbers there was little they could do to prevent it.¹⁸⁴

On October 7th, from Woodstock, Sheridan reported the destruction wrought thus far to Grant, in order to demonstrate the success of their strategy.

The grain and forage in advance of these points up to Staunton had previously been destroyed. In moving back to this point the whole country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountains has been made untenable for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4[,000] head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and Little Fort Valley, as well as the main valley.¹⁸⁵

A committee from Rockingham County estimated the damages incurred in their county including the destruction of 450 barns, 30 houses, 31 mills, 100 miles of fencing, 100,000 bushels of wheat, 50,000 bushels of corn, 6,233 tons of hay, 3 factories, and 1 iron furnace, as well as the capturing of 1,750 cattle, 1,750 horses, 4,200 sheep, and 3,350 hogs. In addition to these losses, accounting for the losses in farm equipment, such as McCormick reapers and threshing machines, household and kitchen furniture, money, bonds, and other items, the committee estimated the cost of destruction at \$25,500,000 in Confederate money or \$5,100,000 in U. S. dollars.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ John Brown Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons; Atlanta: Martin & Hoyt Co., 1903), 327-328.

¹⁸⁴ Samuel D. Buck, *With the Old Confeds*, 121-122.

¹⁸⁵ OR, vol. 43 (1): 30.

¹⁸⁶ “Rockingham’s Losses,” *Rockingham Register*, November 11, 1864. The committee consisted of 72 people, including 36 Magistrates and 36 “citizens of respectability and standing” from all over the county. The percentage of losses in Rockingham County compared to the 1860 census include 27.88% of wheat, 32.51% of hay, 7.31% of corn, 9.06% of cattle (including beef and milk cattle), 22.23% of horses, 31.43% of sheep, and 8.98% of swine. In consideration of the decline of the Valley’s agricultural production from 1861 to 1864, a fair estimate being a 50% decline, these numbers increase to 55.76% of wheat, 65.02% of hay, 14.62% of corn, 18.12% of cattle,

On October 11th, Sheridan emphasized to Grant, “I have given you but a faint idea of the clearing out of the stock, forage, wheat, provision, &c., in the Valley.”¹⁸⁷ When his subordinates made their reports on the campaign Sheridan and Grant would have a better understanding of the impact of their strategy. Torbert reported the destruction, from August 8 to October 31, of 780 barns, which did not include the destruction implemented by the 2nd division, 57 flour mills, 4 saw mills, 1 woolen mill, 3 furnaces, 2 tanneries, 1 railroad depot, 4,955 tons of hay, 255 tons of straw, 272 tons of fodder, 420,742 bushels of wheat, 2,750 bushels of oats, 560 barrels of flour, and the driving off of 1,447 cattle, 1,631 sheep, and 725 swine. His command also captured 7,152 cattle, not including Merritt’s 1st division, along with 2,557 horses and 254 mules.¹⁸⁸ In his movement from Port Republic to Tom’s Brook, Merritt reported the destruction of 630 barns, 47 flouring mills, 4 sawmills, 1 woolen mill, 3,455 tons of hay, 255 tons of straw, 272 tons of fodder, 410,742 bushels of wheat, 3 furnaces, 515 acres of corn, 750 bushels of oats, 1,347 cattle, 1,231 sheep, 725 swine, 560 barrels of flour, 2 tanneries, 1 railroad depot, 2 wagons loaded with flour, in total, an estimated \$3,304,672 in damages.¹⁸⁹

After the reports of his principal subordinates were submitted, Sheridan provided a more accurate assessment of the damages done within the Middle Military Division from August 10 – November 16, which included 1,200 barns, 71 flour mills, 1 woolen mill, 8 saw mills, 1 powder mill, 3 salt works, 7 furnaces, 4 tanneries, 1 railroad depot, 435,802 bushels of wheat, 20,000 bushels of oats, 77,175 bushels of corn, 874 barrels of flour, 20,397 tons of hay, 500 tons of fodder, 450 tons of straw, 10,918 beef cattle, 12,000 sheep, 15,000 swine, 250 calves, 3,772

44.46% of horses, 62.86% of sheep, and 17.96% of swine. Joseph C. G. Kennedy, *Agriculture of the United States in 1860: Compiled From The Original Returns of The Eighth Census* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 158-160.

¹⁸⁷ OR, vol. 43 (1): 32.

¹⁸⁸ OR, vol. 43 (1): 436.

¹⁸⁹ OR, vol. 43 (1): 443.

horses, 545 mules, 12,000 pounds of bacon and hams, 10,000 pounds of tobacco, 947 miles of rails, 2,500 bushels of potatoes, and 1,665 pounds of cotton.”¹⁹⁰

Although most of the destruction occurred in the main Valley, there was also significant burnings in Luray Valley in Page and Warren counties, and according to Sheridan, in Little Fort Valley, although no substantial Federal forces traversed the latter.¹⁹¹ Colonel George W. Imboden noted, “The Yankees did not burn as much in this Valley (Page/ Luray) as in the other, tho they done a good deal of damage in the best part of the Valley.”¹⁹² On October 1st, Powell’s 2nd Division moved toward Luray, “driving off all stock of every description, destroying all grain, burning mills, blast furnaces, distilleries, tanneries, and all forage.”¹⁹³ On October 3rd, a reconnaissance party surprised a group of bushwhackers in the Blue Ridge Mountains and captured two of them, in addition to ten wagons filled with “plunder of every description” and medical supplies. The following day Powell had the two bushwhackers executed by firing squad in retaliation for the murder of one of his men by a bushwhacker. On October 5th, a detachment of 300 men under Major Farabee managed to cross the Blue Ridge and destroy the rail bridge over the Rapidan and then returned. Powell remained in the vicinity of Luray until the 7th, “subsisting entirely upon the enemy” and, in particular, destroying Peter Borsk’s tannery, “used

¹⁹⁰ Report of Property captured and destroyed (from the enemy) by Middle Military Division, Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, commanding, during the campaign commencing, Aug. 10, 1864, and ending Nov. 16, 1864. OR, vol. 43 (1): 37. The percentage of property captured and destroyed reported by Sheridan within the seven counties impacted in the Shenandoah Valley (Frederick, Clarke, Warren, Page, Shenandoah, Rockingham, and Augusta) compared to the 1860 census include 39% of wheat, 42% of hay, 5% of oats, 4% of corn, 4% of tobacco, 30% of beef cattle, 29% of sheep, 17% of swine, 17% of horses, and 178% of mules. In consideration of the decline of the Valley’s agricultural production from 1861 to 1864, a fair estimate being a 50% decline, these percentages increase to 79% of wheat, 84% of hay, 10% of oats, 8% of corn, 9% of tobacco, 60% of beef cattle, 59% of sheep, 33% of swine, and 34% of horses. In calculation of the percentages, I divided the 1860 census totals for Frederick, Clarke, and Augusta counties by two, in order to accurately reflect the destruction, since it did not occur in approximately half of those counties. Joseph C. G. Kennedy, *Agriculture of the United States in 1860*, 154 -165.

¹⁹¹ OR, vol. 43 (1): 30.

¹⁹² George W. Imboden, Letter, Oct. 12, 1864, LV, acc. No. 41948. The quote is taken from a second letter written by Imboden to his mother from Camp Milford on Oct. 17, 1864. George W. Imboden was the younger brother of Brigadier General John D. Imboden.

¹⁹³ Powell Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 508.

for the exclusive benefit of the rebel army,” the leather destroyed being an estimated \$800,000.¹⁹⁴

On October 7th, Powell moved down Luray valley to Front Royal.¹⁹⁵ In Front Royal, on October 8th, Sue Richardson recorded that the Yankees burnt the local mill. On October 10th, she expressed that they “destroyed corn around here” and foraged upon their farm and the nearby mountain. She underscored their conduct, “Some human, others quite beastly.”¹⁹⁶ The barn was torn down and the shop broken in. The next day a Captain established a guard and issued orders for his men “not to touch a thing.”¹⁹⁷ On October 11th, Powell moved through Chester Gap toward Sperryville, and subsequently Flint Hill, “collecting and driving off all stock that could be found on our route to that point.”¹⁹⁸ On October 13th, under the belief that a Federal soldier was murdered by two of Mosby’s men, by the names of Chancellor and Myers, two miles from his camp a few days earlier, Powell executed one of Mosby’s men, A. C. Willis, who was captured at Gaines’ Cross Roads the day previous. He was then hung with an inscription placed around his neck, which read “A. C. Willis, member of Company C, Mosby’s command, hanged by the neck in retaliation for the murder of a U. S. soldier by Messrs. Chancellor and Myers.”¹⁹⁹ Powell also detached men to destroy all the buildings, including the residence and barn, and forage on Mr. Chancellor’s property as well as drive off all his stock.²⁰⁰ Hotchkiss reported on October 13th, “Enemy burning [barns, &c.,] at Front Royal” and the following day that the “force of the enemy that had been destroying at Front Royal went toward Winchester.”²⁰¹

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. The soldier was found with his throat cut from ear to ear.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Sue Richardson, Diary, 79-80.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 81.

¹⁹⁸ Powell Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 508.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 509.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 509.

²⁰¹ OR, vol. 43 (1): 1030.

After the Battle of Cedar Creek, on October 20th, Powell's division once again moved up the Luray Valley. Although Thomas Ashby and his family proactively picked much of their corn, Ashby noted that the Federal troopers "cleaned up what corn they could find in the field."²⁰² The force withdrew from the Luray Valley on the evening of October 26th, after having failed to drive the Confederates from their stronghold at Milford. Powell described the state of the country in the Luray Valley, as having "been left in such a condition as to barely leave subsistence for the inhabitants."²⁰³ He estimated the property destroyed, including "grain, forage, flouring mills, tanneries, blast furnaces, &c.," along with the stock driven off, at over \$3,000,000, which he emphasized would have a severe impact on the enemy.²⁰⁴

Ashby remembered that "they swept our county [Warren] of everything that they could find in the way of food supplies; and what they could not carry away they set on fire or destroyed in other ways. They burned all the flour and grist mills in our county, with two exceptions, along the route of travel, all the barns that were stored with grain, wheat stacks, hay stacks, and fodder. The skys [sic] were red at night with the glare from these burning buildings."²⁰⁵ Afterward, the Federal cavalry determined that "they had cleaned up the country so thoroughly that it was hardly necessary to return; for they could not find enough food for the men and horses and perhaps deemed it unwise to occupy a territory that was unproductive."²⁰⁶ Elizabeth Ashby Buck wrote to one of her sons, Irving A. Buck, on November 1st and described "I cannot give you an idea of the state of things here and all that has transpired around here in the last two months . . . tis enough for me to say that the once beautiful and flourishing Valley is now almost a waste,

²⁰² Thomas Ashby, 297. They did however leave the corn stubble.

²⁰³ Powell Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 510.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.; OR, vol. 43 (1): 35.

²⁰⁵ Thomas Ashby, 298-299.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 300.

mills, barns, and houses burnt, crops destroyed and all kinds of stock driven off and many houses stripped of everything and families left destitute of necessitates.”²⁰⁷ Some of the families were thereby forced by necessity to draw rations from the Yankees.²⁰⁸ With the execution of Mosby’s men and the burnings, Lucy Rebecca Buck completely stopped recording daily events until February, when she recorded, “My diary was laid by. Those sad autumn days my heart was too sad. There was too much that [occurred] to record I had not the spirit to write.”²⁰⁹

While Sheridan’s army burned, Confederate cavalry did what they could to protect private property by attacking rear guards. On October 6th, Major General Lunsford L. Lomax, with Jackson’s and Johnson’s brigades, approximately 800 men, moved to Keezletown and beyond Mount Jackson. He captured about twenty prisoners and “saved two mills and several barns which they had prepared to burn.”²¹⁰ On the afternoon of October 7th, Rosser, in command of his own brigade and the two brigades of Fitz Lee’s division, caught up with detachments of Custer’s division engaged in their destructive orders, near Mill Creek. He described, “The barns, mills, stacks of wheat, oats, shocks of corn and in many instances the dwelling houses, wherein were sheltered only defenseless women and little children, had all been set on fire by the order of the commander of the Federal troops.”²¹¹ The smoke from the burning structures, acting “like a dense fog,” served to conceal his troops and he surprised and routed a section of their rear guard.²¹² He underscored, “It was the homes of the men of my brigade that were being given to

²⁰⁷ Irving A. Buck, *Dear Irvie, Dear Lucy: Civil War Letters of Capt. Irving A. Buck, General Cleburne’s AAG & Family, Letters from The Army and Letters from His Home in the Shenandoah Valley*, ed. William Petus Buck (Birmingham, AL: Buck Publishing Company, 2002), 267.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ Lucy Rebecca Buck, *Shadows on My Heart*, 310. She recommenced her diary on Feb. 13, 1865. My usage of the word occurred is an estimation, since the editor left the word blank.

²¹⁰ Lomax Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 612.

²¹¹ Thomas L. Rosser, *Riding with Rosser*, ed. S. Roger Keller (Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1997), 45.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 45-46.

the flames by Sheridan, and the fierceness of their attack showed me the bitterness of their hatred of the wretches who were thus destroying their homes.”²¹³ Rosser’s troopers managed to capture several hundred cattle and sheep, “which had been taken from the farmers,” some wagons, teams, and forges, and a few prisoners. The “greater percentage” of the prisoners who were engaged in the burning were killed by the angered Confederates. To Rosser, the prisoners they did take “seemed heartily ashamed that such cowardly means had been employed in the endeavor to crush a brave people who never declined battle, and who could at all times have been met on the field under the rules of civilized war.”²¹⁴

James E. Taylor remembered reports brought into headquarters that their cavalry “was not only active in their work of destruction,” but the Confederate cavalry became aggressive and gave “them considerable trouble,” due to the constant skirmishing with their rear guards. The main body would detach “parties to right and left to burn every mill, barn, haystack,” while the rear guard skirmished with the advance units of the Confederate cavalry. In particular, Custer, moving on the back road, encountered the difficulty of balancing “applying the torch and fending off the maddened Roser.”²¹⁵

Attacks by Confederate cavalry however did not entirely stem the tide of the burnings. On October 8th, the 9th New York Cavalry and the 1st New York Dragoons of Devin’s brigade were deployed to the right and left of the Valley pike “for the purpose of destroying grain, & c.”²¹⁶ Devin reported, “These two regiments burnt 115 barns filled with hay and grain, 206 stacks of hay and grain, 18 flouring and grist mills, 18,000 bushels of wheat, 1 woolen mill, 2 saw-mills, and 60 acres of stacked corn. The brigade also drove in 290 head of cattle, 319 sheep, and

²¹³ Ibid., 46.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ James E. Taylor, 446, 449.

²¹⁶ Devin Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 477.

75 hogs.”²¹⁷ Devin’s brigade also burned the railroad depot at Woodstock, a locomotive, and three cars.²¹⁸ Lomax advanced toward Woodstock and found the town in flames. He charged through the town, which prompted the Federal cavalry line to retire.²¹⁹ Hinrichs wrote that twelve of the houses “burned down completely,” while some others were saved from the inferno.²²⁰ The same day Rosser resumed the pursuit and again attacked Custer’s rear guard. Custer withdrew toward Sheridan’s main force.²²¹ Because of the aggressive cavalry, Sheridan halted the infantry and ordered Torbert to “whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped.”²²²

On October 9th the Confederate cavalry were defeated at the Battle of Tom’s Brook.²²³ Early informed Lee of the defeat and articulated that he believed Sheridan would not venture another campaign up the Valley because he burned all the bridges during his withdrawal. “He has laid waste nearly all of Rockingham and Shenandoah,” and because of this, Early wrote that he would have to “rely on Augusta for supplies, and they are not abundant there.”²²⁴ Early understood this as a critical component of Federal strategy, “Sheridan’s purpose, under Grant’s orders, has been to render the Valley untenable by our troops by destroying the supplies.”²²⁵

Rather than prevent Confederate movements in the Valley, the destruction only renewed and spurred on the efforts of Early’s army, as it did with Rosser and Lomax’s cavalry

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Lomax Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 612.

²²⁰ Oscar Hinrichs, 198. Oct. 8, 1864.

²²¹ Rosser, *Riding with Rosser*, 46-47.

²²² Torbert Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 431; OR, vol. 43 (1): 31; No. 157, Reports of Bvt. Maj. Gen. George A. Custer, U.S. Army, commanding Third Division, of operations October 9 and 19, OR vol. 43 (1): 520.

²²³ Custer Report, OR, vol. 43 (2): 520-522; Lomax Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 612-613; Rosser, *Riding with Rosser*, 47-49; William J. Miller, *Decision at Tom’s Brook: George Custer, Tom Rosser, and the Joy of the Fight* (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2016); William J. Miller, “Never Has There Been a More Complete Victory: The Cavalry Engagement at Tom’s Brook, October 9, 1864,” in *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*. The Confederate retreat would become known as “the Woodstock Races.”

²²⁴ New Market, Oct. 9, 1864, Early to Lee, OR, vol. 43 (1): 559-560.

²²⁵ Ibid., 560.

beforehand, prompted by material difficulties and a revenge mentality. Samuel D. Buck explained

We laid here for a few days suffering for want of food and no way of attacking such a force with any hopes for success, but Early concluded to hazard an attack. We were surrounded by difficulties. Every mill had been destroyed and no way to get flour or meal and no forage for horses; we had to fight, fall back or starve, so we concluded to fight.”²²⁶

John Opie clarified, “the devastation of the Valley made it untenable to our troops ever afterward, except when we brought our supplies with us.”²²⁷ Rather than securing their supplies directly from the Valley, shipments would have to be made by rail to Staunton and then transported down the Valley by wagon train. Evans supposed that “Sheridan will be required to do something else now, than to hold the passes of the Potomac,” such as moving upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville, since Early was “not in condition to cross” the Potomac because of their lack of sustenance.²²⁸ Early’s army simply could not remain in position because of their lack of sustenance, so Early decided to risk an attack. He assessed the situation, “I was now compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from it; and I determined to attack.”²²⁹

Heightened emotions from the burnings also led the Confederates to assume the aggressive. Chaplain Randolph H. McKim illustrated this sentiment when he wrote, “How my blood boiled as I saw the dense clouds of smoke ascending in different quarters of the horizon!”²³⁰ Ramseur, now in command of Rodes’ old division, wrote home to his wife, in what would be one of his last letters. On October 10th, with the recent burnings in mind, he confessed,

²²⁶ Samuel D. Buck, *With the Old Confeds*, 122; Samuel D. Buck, *The Battle of Cedar Creek, Virginia 19 October 1864, 1902*, LV, Robert Alonzo Brock Collection BR 598.

²²⁷ John N. Opie, *A Rebel Cavalryman*, 254-255.

²²⁸ Evans, 465-466.

²²⁹ OR, vol. 43 (1): 561.

²³⁰ Mckim, *A Soldier’s Recollections*, 231.

“I would be willing to take a musket and fight to the bitter end, rather than submit to these miserable Yankees.”²³¹ He provided an explanation as to why, “I think they have placed themselves outside of the pale of civilization by the course they have pursued in this Campaign.”²³² On October 15th, he postulated that they would “have some stirring work before long” and underscored “I do hope we will be enabled to punish them well. We ought to do so.”²³³

Lee was unsure if Sheridan “burning the bridges behind him and laying waste the country” proved his intent to leave the Valley. He analyzed that it might have been done to cripple Early’s army. In any case, Lee provided Early with varied instructions, dependent upon Sheridan’s actions, which included either detaching troops to the Richmond and Petersburg defenses or attacking the enemy.²³⁴ The Federals also understood Early’s predicament. Merritt accordingly described, “The result of the destruction of supplies in the Valley was now being felt by Early’s troops.”²³⁵ However, most Federal commanders believed Early would not dare risk an attack.

On the morning of October 13th, a portion of Early’s command won a minor tactical victory at the Battle of Hupp’s Hill. On the night of October 17th, a combined force, including Rosser’s cavalry and Bryan Grimes brigade of infantry mounted on horseback, launched a surprise attack on Custer’s encampment, but only found his rear guard.²³⁶ On October 19th, at the Battle of Cedar Creek, Early defeated Sheridan’s forces in the morning only to be themselves

²³¹ Ramseur, *The Bravest of the Brave*, 287

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*, 288.

²³⁴ Lee to Early, Hdqs., Chaffin’s, Oct. 12, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (2): 892.

²³⁵ Merritt, “Destroying, Burning,” 545. Merritt wrote that Early expressed, “As I could not remain at Fisher’s hill, for want of forage, I then determined to try and get around one of the enemy’s flanks and surprise him in camp.”

²³⁶ Bryan Grimes, *Extracts of Letters of Major – Gen’l Bryan Grimes*, 76-77; Rosser, 49-50. Rosser wrote that the infantry thought they should be compensated for the effort and plundered the camp for socks, handkerchiefs, corn cakes, and other articles they could carry in saddle pockets.

defeated in the evening.²³⁷ Even as the battle waged, the Confederates understood their plight, that is, because of the lack of sustenance in the area, the necessity of securing a significant victory or suffering the consequences that another tactical setback entailed. James M. Garnett, an ordnance officer in Ramseur's division wrote that morning near Mount Jackson, "This morning heard rapid cannonading just after sunrise; hope 'old Jubal' will drive 'em. We can't remain here long. Expect we will be found in trenches at Richmond soon."²³⁸ Gordon highlighted that before the attack everyone was "impressed with the gravity of the situation."²³⁹

The burnings, rather than ending the fighting, materially and mentally prompted an aggressive Confederate attack that wielded the possibility of achieving a significant victory. Although a measure of success was achieved in the morning, in the end, the Battle of Cedar Creek virtually ended major fighting in the Valley. Even more important, along with the victories a month earlier in September, the victory raised Northern morale and helped to ensure Lincoln's electoral victory a few weeks later.

Grant suggested a raid of destruction into Loudoun County as early as August. On August 16th, Grant wrote to Sheridan that if he could spare a cavalry division, to "send them through Loudoun County to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes, and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms. In this way you will get many of Mosby's men. All male citizens under fifty can fairly be held as prisoners of war, not as citizen prisoners. If not already soldiers, they will be made so the moment the rebel army gets hold of them."²⁴⁰ On August 21st, Grant stressed that while "stripping Loudoun County of supplies, &c.," Sheridan

²³⁷ Jonathan A. Noyalas, *The Battle of Cedar Creek: Victory from the Jaws of Defeat* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2009).

²³⁸ James Mercer Garnett, "Diary of Captain James M. Garnett: Ordnance Officer Rodes Division, 2nd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. From August 5th to November 30th, 1864, Covering Part of General Early's Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley," *Southern Historical Society Papers* 27 (January – December 1899): 13.

²³⁹ Gordon, *Reminiscences*, 336.

²⁴⁰ Grant to Sheridan, City Point, VA., Aug. 16, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 811.

should afford special treatment for loyal persons, exempting them from arrest and providing receipts for future reimbursement.²⁴¹ On November 9th, Grant inquired upon Sheridan whether they should notify all citizens, assumably loyal, living east of the Blue Ridge to remove their stock, grain, and provisions north of the Potomac. He underscored, “there is no doubt about the necessity of clearing out that country so that it will not support Mosby's gang. . . . So long as the war lasts they must be prevented from raising another crop, both there and as high up the valley as we can control.”²⁴² The question was whether they should afford the ability of the people to “save what they can.”²⁴³

During the operations in the Valley, partisan groups, including independent cavalry commands under the leadership of John McNeil, Harry Gilmore, E. V. White, and John S. Mosby, had targeted his wagon trains causing him considerable trouble. Counterinsurgency units formed under Captain Richard Blazer and Major H. K. Young achieved some success against the partisans, but they could not entirely eliminate them. Of those groups, Sheridan considered Mosby as the most troublesome.²⁴⁴ John Munson, one of Mosby’s partisans, wrote that “Hardly a day passed from the first of August . . . that some of our men were not troubling Sheridan.”²⁴⁵ When General C. C. Augur attempted to reconstruct the Manassas Gap Railroad in October, Mosby prevented its completion. On October 27th, Sheridan reported to Halleck that he would “secure Augur against all but Mosby,” and other partisans, which he deemed “one good regiment could clear out any time, if the regimental commander had the spunk enough to try.”²⁴⁶ In early November, Sheridan sent a brigade of infantry and a brigade of cavalry to protect the railroad

²⁴¹ Grant to Sheridan, City Point, VA., Aug. 16, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 869-870.

²⁴² Grant to Sheridan, City Point, VA., Nov. 9, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (2): 581.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ OR, vol. 43 (1): 55.

²⁴⁵ John W. Munson, *Reminiscences of A Confederate Guerilla* (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1906), 200.

²⁴⁶ OR, vol. 43 (1): 35.

workers. A small division of cavalry had been operating east of the Blue Ridge in the vicinity of Upperville, Paris, Bloomfield, and nearby areas. The cavalry force captured “a lot of stock, horses, sheep, and cattle” and “the grain, barns, subsistence, &c., so far as practicable, were destroyed.”²⁴⁷ On November 21st, Amanda Edmonds, who resided near the village of Paris in Fauquier County, simply recorded in her diary, “The Yanks burned our barn.”²⁴⁸ In order to protect the railroad against Mosby, Federal commanders also commenced threats of retaliation, if attacks continued, including forcing Confederate sympathizers onto the trains and intimidating that every secessionist house along the road within five miles would be destroyed, if the railroad was attacked. The intimidations however proved futile and eventually the work on the railroad was stopped.²⁴⁹

In late November and early December, as operations in the Valley subsided and the troops constructed winter quarters, Sheridan turned his attention eastward toward the heart of “Mosby’s Confederacy.” Sheridan thus intended to carry out Grant’s orders of destruction, as he had done in the Valley, between the Shenandoah River and the Bull Run Mountains in Loudon and Fauquier counties, “taking care to clear the country of forage and subsistence, so as to prevent the guerillas from being harbored there in the future.”²⁵⁰ Sheridan telegraphed Halleck from Kernstown on Nov 26th explaining his new mission.

I will soon commence work on Mosby. Heretofore have made no attempt to break him up, as I would have employed ten men to his one, and for the reason that I have made a scapegoat of him for the destruction of private rights. Now there is going to be an intense hatred of him in that portion of the valley which is nearly a desert. I will soon commence on Loudoun County, and let them know there is a God in Israel. Mosby has annoyed me considerably; but the people are beginning to see that he does not injure me a great deal, but causes a loss to them of all that they have spent their lives in accumulating. Those people who live in the vicinity

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Amanda Edmonds, *Society of Rebels*, 242.

²⁴⁹ John S. Mosby, *Memoirs*, 331-332.

²⁵⁰ Sheridan, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, 99.

of Harper's Ferry are the most villainous in this valley, and have not yet been hurt much. If the railroad is interfered with, I will make some of them poor. Those who live at home in peace and plenty want the duello part of this war to go on; but when they have to bear the burden by loss of property and comforts, they will cry for peace.²⁵¹

Sheridan's message provides intriguing insight into his conception of warfare and his strategy utilized to implement it. The targeting of Mosby's forces served as an available pretense for pushing the war beyond the bounds of conventional warfare, conducted between armed combatants, to one imposing penalties and hardships upon the populace which supported those combatants, through the intentional destruction of private property. In doing so, he hoped to, in part, undermine civilian morale leading to an abandonment of support for the Confederacy, as a whole, and Mosby, in particular.

Instead of targeting armed combatants, in which his numerical superiority could extend beyond a ten to one ratio, Sheridan employed the indirect approach, that is, of targeting the sustenance and forage upon which Mosby relied upon by capturing and destroying the agricultural capabilities of the local populace. In effect, this was an admittance that he could not defeat Mosby through a regular means of warfare, even through counterinsurgency efforts, although he never even attempted the action with an overwhelming superior force. "Unable to exterminate the hostile bands by arms," assessed Mosby, "Sheridan had applied the torch and attempted to drive us from the district in which we operated by destroying everything that could support man or horse."²⁵² James E. Taylor calculated that without a significant enemy army to confront, Sheridan turned his attention toward the guerilla bands, which had caused him so much trouble. He therefore targeted Mosby's rangers, "upon whom to first exercise his wrath by desolating their homes and firesides through the destruction of the fruits of their industry as by

²⁵¹ Sheridan to Halleck, Kernstown, VA., Nov. 26, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (2): 671-672.

²⁵² Mosby, *Memoirs*, 333.

destroying their means of subsistence he hoped to paralyze their vicious propensities.”²⁵³

Destroying the subsistence of the region, it was thought, would negate Mosby’s ability to remain in the area, supplied “by relatives and friends.”²⁵⁴ The “disagreeable task” was assigned to Merritt’s division.²⁵⁵

On November 27th, Sheridan instructed Wesley Merritt, now a Brevet Major General, to proceed east of the Blue Ridge via Ashby’s Gap on the 28th and commence operations against Mosby in an area between the Shenandoah River and as far east as the Bull Run Mountains as well as between the Manassas Gap Railroad and the Potomac River. Snickersville was to be his point of concentration for the five-day operation. Four days rations were issued to the troopers, but forage for the horses was to be gathered from the country. Sheridan also explained to Merritt his rationale for the burning raid.

This section has been the hot-bed of lawless bands, who have from time to time depredated upon small parties on the line of army communications, on safeguards left at houses, and on troops. Their real object is plunder and highway robbery. To clear the country of these parties that are bringing destruction upon the innocent, as well as their guilty supporters, by their cowardly acts, you will consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region the boundaries of which are above described. This order must be literally executed, bearing in mind, however, that no dwellings are to be burned, and that no personal violence be offered the citizens. The ultimate results of the guerilla system of warfare is the total destruction of all private rights in the county occupied by such parties. This destruction may well commence at once, and the responsibility of it must rest upon the authorities at Richmond, who have acknowledged the legitimacy of guerrilla bands. The injury done this army by them is very slight. The injury they have inflicted upon the people, and upon the rebel army, may be counted millions.²⁵⁶

²⁵³ James Taylor, 578.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ OR, vol. 43 (1): 55-56. Merritt earned his brevet promotion to major general for his actions at the Battle of Third Winchester.

Sheridan justified himself for ordering the destruction of Loudoun County and upper Fauquier County as a measure to prevent Mosby's command from annoying the rear of their operations, but then he claimed that Mosby's operations were minimal in their effects, seemingly negating such a rationale for attacking the area. Sheridan even considered the partisans "substantially a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry."²⁵⁷ He therefore refused to operate against them, but "in retaliation for the assistance and sympathy" given to Mosby's men "by the inhabitants of Loudoun Valley," he commenced operations of destruction against the civilians residing within "Mosby's Confederacy."²⁵⁸ It is thus evident, Mosby and his partisan rangers served, in part, as a pretext to implement Grant's orders, which served a duality of goals, including, not only defensive measures against Mosby, but offensive measures against the morale of the Southern populace itself. In essence, he blamed Mosby for the destruction which he wrought.

"In compliance with instructions received direct from army headquarters," on November 28th, Merritt commenced the burning raid, marching through Asby's Gap to the east of the Blue Ridge "for the purpose of destroying all mills, barns, forage, driving off stock, and capturing and dispersing the guerilla bands in a district of country described in orders."²⁵⁹ Two regiments of the 2nd brigade, under the command of Colonel Stags, moved northward along the foot of the mountains, spreading out toward Bloomfield, "carrying out the orders."²⁶⁰ A regiment of the 1st brigade, commanded by General Devin, moved through Grisby's store to the west of Piedmont,

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 55.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Reports related to actions Nov. 28 – Dec. 3, 1864 – Expedition from Winchester into Fauquier and Loudoun Counties, Va., No. 1. Report of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. Army, commanding First Cavalry Division, Hdqs., First Cavalry Division, Dec. 6, 1864, OR, vol. 43, (1): 671.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

“for the same purpose.”²⁶¹ The rest of the command rode to Upperville, where the entire division then concentrated.²⁶²

On November 29th, the 1st brigade first moved to Rectortown, with strong columns sent to Salem and White Plains. The brigade, with strong flanking columns, then moved to Middleburg, Philomont, and finally to Snickersville. Charley Farrel of the New York *Herald*, who accompanied the expedition as a reporter, relayed that alongside the column of cavalry were “flankers who burned the barns with their grain and bins of corn, hay stacks and grist mills and brought on large herds of sheep, hogs and cattle which were issued to the troops.”²⁶³ Merritt reported, “In this manner the county as far as the Little River turnpike was thoroughly swept over and destroyed by the evening of the second day.”²⁶⁴ Catherine Hopkins Broun and her husband Edward ran a general store in Middleburg, as well as owning a small farm in the countryside. She lamented on November 29th, “We have had a terrible day today.”²⁶⁵ Although their livelihoods were spared at the moment, she recorded in her journal, “Expecting every moment to be burned up. The barns all around us are on fire, burning all the hay, corn, and wheat, driving off all the cattle, sheep, hogs, &c., &c.”²⁶⁶ They accordingly prepared for the worst by packing valuables. At 8:00 p.m. she noted, “The whole heavens are illuminated by the fires burning and destroying as they go.”²⁶⁷ A nearby mill and barn filled with corn and hay, owned by Mr. Benton, was consumed in the flames, a spectacle which to Catherine, “looked

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ James E. Taylor, 578.

²⁶⁴ Merritt Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 671-672.

²⁶⁵ Catherine Hopkins Broun, *Dark Days in Our Beloved Country: The Civil War Diary of Catherine Hopkins Brown*, ed. Lee Lawrence (Warrenton, VA: Piedmont Press & Graphics), 105. Catherine’s father was Philip Hopkins, a Quaker and secessionist, the same as Catherine, in the nearby town of Bloomfield. Philip’s cousin was John Hopkins, the wealthy investor.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

terrific.”²⁶⁸ The reserve brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Crowninshield moved through Bloomfield, Union, and Philomont, before joining Merritt at Snickersville, completing their mission of destruction “pursuant to instructions received from the brevet major – general commanding.”²⁶⁹

While Ida Dulaney, who lived with her husband Hal on their farm near Upperville, provided bread and butter to some soldiers, two of Merritt’s staff officers rode up and inquired about a few of Mosby’s men who had fled from the area a little previous to their arrival. They informed her of the arrival of Merritt’s division, which had been sent to the area “to lay it waste with fire and sword, to render it utterly uninhabitable for Mosby’s Guerillas. They were, they said ordered to burn all forage, all grain, every mill, stable and barn, and to take off every head of stock they saw.”²⁷⁰ In a short time, nearly 200 men arrived, thirty of whom set fire to their haystacks and granary. Two of the soldiers guarded the flames until “it made such progress that it was impossible to save it.” When the guards left, she immediately called for help. Uncle Joshua, three little negro girls, and herself, with her child Jenny, collected buckets and ran to the fire. The granary was nearly finished burning, but the barn had just started to burn, and flames were bursting out of the stable. Above the stable was a large hay mow, which upon catching, would quickly consume the structure, so they concentrated their efforts in putting that out. Remarkably, they managed to extinguish the fire, although all the haystacks outside, and the

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Reports related to actions Nov. 28 – Dec. 3, 1864 – Expedition from Winchester into Fauquier and Loudoun Counties, Va., No. 2., Report of Lieut. Col. Casper Crowninshield, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, commanding Reserve Brigade, OR, vol. 43 (1): 672.

²⁷⁰ Ida Dulaney, Diary, 1861 July 25 – 1865 Jan 29, folder 3, LV, Acc. no. 42246, 245-247; Published as Ida Powell Dulaney, *In the Shadow of the Enemy: The Civil War Journal of Isa Powell Dulaney*, ed. Mary L. Mackall, Steven F. Meserve, and Anne Mackall Sasscer (2009), 245-246.

granary burnt to the ground. “When it was all over,” she contemplated, “I felt truly grateful that we had been able to save so much.”²⁷¹

Some neighbors were also able to save some of their property, including her Uncle Nathan, whose family managed to put out the flames consuming their barn, albeit, only after burning for two hours. At Welbourne the stable burnt, but the barn was saved. Mr. Bolling managed to save his barn, but all of his stock were driven off and all his hay brunt. Her relatives at Oatlands “were so fortunate as to to escape entirely.”²⁷² Other neighbors however were not so fortunate, including Mr. Fletcher, who’s only remaining structure was his farmhouse. She described that at Bellefield “every outbuilding was burnt, and so on through the country for a circuit of about forty miles.”²⁷³ She could even see the progress of the Yankee columns “by the dense columns of smoke arising one after another from every farm through which they passed,” observing one column progressing towards the Plains and another towards Bloomfield. When night came, they “could look out and see the whole country illuminated by immense fires.”²⁷⁴

On the third day, the 1st brigade moved, with the cattle it collected, from to Philomont to Snickersville, “sending out parties to complete the work of destruction.”²⁷⁵ The 2nd brigade marched through Philomont, Circleville, Hamilton, Waterford, and along the Catoclin Creek northward to the Potomac, concentrating at Lovettsville, while the reserve brigade moved east of the Blue Ridge to cooperate. On November 30th, the 2nd Massachusetts and 2nd U. S. Cavalry went through Wood Grove and Hillsborough to Cave Head on the Potomac, following the river to Lovettsville, “destroying all grain, forage, mills, distilleries, &c., and driving in all stock in

²⁷¹ Ibid., 246-247.

²⁷² Ibid., 247.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Merritt Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 671.

that part of the country.”²⁷⁶ In Lovettsville they joined with Devin’s brigade. A portion of the reserve brigade, the 6th U. S. cavalry, remained on the western side of the Blue Ridge and marched down the Shenandoah River, completing their instructions between the foot of the mountains and the river as far down as Rockford.²⁷⁷

On the morning of the fourth day, two regiments of the first brigade went to Millville and Middleburg “to complete any unfinished work in that country.”²⁷⁸ The other two moved toward the mountain as far as Ashby’s Gap, one remaining on the crest and the other at the foot of the mountain.²⁷⁹ Olivia McArtor wrote on December 1st that on Monday the Yankee cavalry arrived and “burned all the barns that had hay in,” including theirs, which was filled with clover. “We lost nearly everything,” she described, including some sausage from the hogs they had just slaughtered, 15 or 20 piglets, 40 sheep and calves, one horse, and all the chickens the soldiers could catch. Throughout the countryside, “They burned. . . mills & haystacks, took all the horses, cows & sheep they could find.”²⁸⁰ The same day, Catherine Broun saw a large fire below them. It appeared to her that it was in the vicinity of Aldie. In the meantime, Edwin removed hay, wheat, farming equipment, carriages, and wagons out of the barn, in anticipation of the destruction. He then thought it prudent to take his wheat to the nearby mill to have it ground, before the Yankees burnt it. When they arrived near mill however, to their dismay they found that it was already on fire, or so they assumed, since a quick glance of the area indicated the burning of barns and mills “in every direction.”²⁸¹ Catherine then took her telescope and went to the high ground upon their farm. She discovered that the Yankees “were burning all along the

²⁷⁶ Merritt and Crowninshield Reports, *Ibid.*, 671 - 672.

²⁷⁷ Crowninshield Report, *Ibid.*, 672-673.

²⁷⁸ Merritt Report, *Ibid.*, 671.

²⁷⁹ Merritt Report, *Ibid.*, 671-672.

²⁸⁰ McArtor, McArtor and Poston Family Diaries, 24.

²⁸¹ Catherine Broun, *Dark Days in Our Beloved Country*, 105-106.

mountain as far as Paris,” coming closer near Mr. Rector’s and Hatcher’s. Everyone appeared anxious that the Yankees should appear any moment. She accordingly described, “immense fires very near us.”²⁸²

Ida Dulaney noted that there were still two roads that the Yankees had not passed through, including the turnpike from Upperville to Middleburg and the road at the foot of the mountain from the Trappe to Upperville. She hoped that enough grain and forage was left in those areas for the civilians who had nothing left. She could see “no object in their coming back where they had already wrought such ruin.”²⁸³ She observed large fires in Loudoun County the night before “and a dense smoke hanging along the mountain that morning,” which she wrote “made me uneasy.”²⁸⁴ In particular, she saw a large fire toward Mr. Harrison’s. “While watching that, on the same road only nearer I saw another, and soon another, and another, till the mountain side was bright with them.”²⁸⁵ She realized a large Federal column was approaching them. Hal drove away the stock while others commenced to remove valuables from the barn. She “could trace their gradual approach by the column of smoke.”²⁸⁶ Indeed, “They burnt every stable, every barn and all the forage and grain as they had done on the other roads.”²⁸⁷ While they were watching the progress of one column, one of the children said that they were burning along the turnpike towards Middleburg. “Looking in that direction I could see immense fires,” described Dulaney “for there were many fine brans along that road.”²⁸⁸ From every side of the house, except one, they could see the fires. She counted about two hundred fires. The Yankee’s visited her brother Richards’ farm a second time and the structures which were extinguished the day

²⁸² Ibid., 106.

²⁸³ Ida Dulaney, *Diary*, 248.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 251.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 251

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 251-252.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 252

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

before were all consumed by fire. She observed the “unusually large column of smoke” coming from that direction. He lost that day all his granaries, two of his barns, eleven large stacks of wheat, and all his stock. Although the morning was bright and sunny, “before noon the whole country was wrapped in a pall of dense smoke, which each hour made denser as the day wore on.”²⁸⁹ In the entirety, the Federals burnt nearly everything in the vicinity of Upperville, as Dulaney lamented, “the whole country presented a vast picture of desolation and gloom.”²⁹⁰

On December 2nd, Merritt’s forces began their withdrawal back to the Valley. “In all these movements the orders from army headquarters were most fully carried out,” reported Merritt, “the country on every side of the general line of march was in every instance swept over by the flankers from the columns, and in this way the entire valley was gone over.”²⁹¹ John Scott, one of Mosby’s rangers who watched the destruction, explained how this “act of incendiarism in the most fruitful part of Mosby’s Confederacy” was carried out. The Federals utilized Paris and Snickersville as central points from which to send out detachments devoted to their “destructive mission.”²⁹² The Federals thus “expanded like a fan” throughout the area with “each soldier being armed with a torch, that terrible implement of war.”²⁹³ He further clarified, “The beautiful and productive region” was in this way “soon reduced to waste.”²⁹⁴ A large number of cattle were consumed, killed, or driven back to the Valley and most of the fattened hogs were killed on the march to camp. By December 3rd, the brief but destruction raid ended, as Merritt’s division returned to its encampment near Kernstown.²⁹⁵

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ OR, vol. 43 (1): 672.

²⁹² John Scott, *Partisan Life with Col. John S. Mosby* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1867), 376.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ OR, vol. 43 (1): 672.

Mosby's men could do little but watch the burnings and attack isolated units. Although the cavalry dispersed to maximize their potential for destruction, Merritt also took measures to prevent the isolation of small units, by concentrating his columns, particularly at night. He made efforts to capture the guerillas by stratagem, but often failed, as the rangers, who were skilled horsemen, had the advantage in the knowledge of terrain, particularly finding suitable hiding places in the mountains. Accordingly, there were only minor confrontations between Mosby's partisan rangers and Merritt's cavalry.²⁹⁶ Mosby and his men did not completely stand idle. Ida Dulaney noted that Mosby's men were about at night and the Yankees kept very close.²⁹⁷ Although the Yankees appeared to be everywhere, Catherine Broun occasionally observed a member of Mosby's force riding about. She particularly remembered that Colonel Mosby and about twelve of his men passed her on December 1st.²⁹⁸ At Bloomfield, the advanced guard of the 1st U. S. Cavalry were fired upon by two of Mosby's men, slightly wounding two Federals. Captain D. Henry Burtnete wrote to Brigadier General Stevenson on December 1st that "Mosby was encamped near Waterford last night, watching the burning of property."²⁹⁹ But Mosby did not attempt to interrupt their efforts. He thus relayed, "The destruction of property in this vicinity is complete."³⁰⁰ John Scott recalled observing the devastation, "As soon as night invested the scene, blazing fires were visible in all directions, lighting up with their lucid glare the whole of the vast circumference, while columns of dense black smoke mounted up from the burning

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ida Dulaney, *Diary*, 246.

²⁹⁸ Catherine Broun, 106.

²⁹⁹ OR, vol. 43, (2): 721.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

piles.”³⁰¹ Olivia McArtor recorded on December 1st that “Mosby’s men have captured about 20 of them.”³⁰² At least one straggler was killed near Berryville on their return to Kernstown.³⁰³

The intentional burning was not limited to secessionists alone, but also fell upon loyal Unionists in the northern portions of Loudoun County, many of whom were religious pacifists. When Samuel M. Janey, who had been visiting his grandchildren in New York, returned home on December 2nd, he discovered to his dismay the destruction wrought by the recent raid. Especially concerning to Janey was the destruction suffered by his relatives and neighbors, who composed the Society of Friends, a Quaker settlement who met monthly at Goose Creek, outside the village of Lincoln. He estimated the losses for Union men at \$256,000, which encompassed \$196,000 in property burned and \$60,000 in stock captured. The loss to his Friends at Goose Creek amounted to approximately \$80,000. Although he did not know estimates for the losses to secessionists, he assumed they were equally as great. His brother, Asa M. Janey, who was “one of the most thoroughly loyal citizens we have” lost significantly with the burning of his flouring and saw-mill and near 3,000 bushels of wheat. His own was loss small, since they did not burn his barn, as it was near to a dwelling, but they drove away his horses and cattle, which he owned in part with his son in law W. T. Shoemaker.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ John Scott, *Partisan Life with Col. John S. Mosby*, 376-378.

³⁰² McArtor, 24.

³⁰³ Crowninshield Report, OR, vol. 43 (1): 673.

³⁰⁴ Samuel M. Janey, *Memoirs of Samuel M. Janey: Late of Lincoln, Loudoun County, Va: A Minister in the Religious Society of Friends*, 1st ed., (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1998), 229-232. The losses for another nearby Quaker settlement, the Fairfax monthly meeting held at Waterford, amounted to \$23,000. Janey, at the insistence of his neighbors and other Union men in Loudoun County drafted a petition asking for compensation for damages done in the burning. A bill to pay for the livestock taken (about \$60,000) passed the House, but not the Senate. A bill to pay for property burned did not pass the house. Eventually the 42nd Congress in 1872 passed a bill for \$61,821.13 to be distributed to the claims of loyal citizens of Loudoun County for stock taken, but a bill to pay for the property burned never became law, although it passed both the House and Senate, albeit during different sessions.

Carolyn Taylor, another Quaker with Unionist sympathies, residing near Lincoln, wrote to her sister Hannah, living in Maryland, “oh what destruction there is in the neighborhood.”³⁰⁵ She detailed, “Word came last third day evening that the Yankees were coming and were burning everything before them, we felt quite uneasy though could not believe the full extent of what they were doing, but the next morning we heard it again and directly saw the smoke rising all around us from our neighbors’ barns stockyards and corn fields it was too true they had come to burn up everything but the houses, and of course in a great many places they were in great danger.”³⁰⁶ While the Federals spared her barn, due to its close proximity to the house and her special pleading, they took twenty-five sheep, four cows, three calves, their oxen, a horse, all their butcher knives, the carriage whip, and nearly half of the field corn was burned. She underscored that despite the saving of their barn, “we are broken up and as poor as poverty.”³⁰⁷ Her Uncle Bernard’s large barn was burned, the structure of which contained his “wagon, all kinds of farming implements, sleighs, goods, &.”³⁰⁸

Thomas Russell Smith, another Quaker active in the Goose Creek Meeting, whose farm, Hedgewood, rested about a mile outside of Lincoln, later reminisced, after climbing a nearby hill to observe developments on the morning of November 29th, “I found the burning was really in progress as I could see smoke coming up in all directions.”³⁰⁹ When the Federals arrived at Hedgewood, he voiced his concern to an officer that if they burned his barn, it would endanger his house. The officer looked at him “very unconcerned” and replied “not quite.”³¹⁰ Smith

³⁰⁵ Carolyn Taylor, Letter, Carrie Taylor to Her Sister, 3 December 1864, Taylor Family Papers, 1817-1872 (SC 0097), Folder5, Thomas Balch Library, Leesburg, Virginia. Also located in Civil War Research Collection, (SC0095).

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Thomas Russell Smith, Thomas Russel Smith Reminiscences, 1908 ((SC 0098), Thomas Balch Library, Leesburg, Virginia.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

relayed, “I asked for a little time to roll 5 barrels of flour out of the barn but he paid no attention to my request & told the men to proceed & they did with dispatch, striking matches & throwing them around from one end of the barn to the other, in hay mows & other places where there was anything to catch fire & apparently in less than five minutes the barn was a fire from end to end & top to bottom.”³¹¹ While his house did not burn, he lost his corn crib, wagon house, the hay, corn, and equipment stored in his barn, as well as his oxen and one hundred ewes. The next morning, his barn, being originally constructed of logs and only later boarded up from the outside, was still burning. He remembered, “we felt very blue to put it mildly with building in ashes sheep oxen & cows all gone with no milk for ourselves & 2 little children but we were thankful for them.”³¹² Another resident of Loudon County, Christian Nisewarner recorded in his daily journal, “Federal cavalry burnt barns, hay, wheat, corn, and drove off horses, cattle, etc. on Wednesday 30th Nov. and Thursday December 1st 1864.”³¹³ In particular, his father’s barn burnt on the evening of November 30th.³¹⁴

Lieutenant Colonel Casper Crowninshield, of the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry, commanding the Reserve Brigade, reported the destruction of 230 barns, 8 mills, 10,000 tons of hay, 25,000 bushels of grain and captured 87 horses, 474 beef cattle, and 100 sheep. He estimated the total value of captures and destruction at \$411,620.³¹⁵ As the other two brigades did not submit reports, this only accounted for perhaps a third of the devastation. However, rather than eliminating Mosby’s partisan rangers and turning the citizens against Mosby, the burnings only furthered the hostility of Mosby, his men, and the civilian population. Mosby later

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Christian Nisewarner, *Diary, 1861-1877* (SC 0040), Thomas Balch Library, Leesburg, Virginia. Also spelled Nicewarner or Nisewaner.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Crowninshield Report, OR, vol. 43, (1): 673. Hay amounted to the greatest value lost at \$300,000.

described that instead of “quelling” the efforts of his men, the burnings “only stimulated the fury of my men.”³¹⁶ Ida Dulaney specified, “In spite of it all I could but remark the cheerfulness with which the devastation was borne by all the inhabitants.”³¹⁷ Indeed, Mosby’s force would be one of the last Confederate units to lay down their arms.

As in the Shenandoah Valley, such destruction proved unnecessary and even detrimental to the future occupancy of the area. In addition to the hardships it imposed upon the populace, Janey assessed that the military expedient was “evidently a blunder.”³¹⁸ Federal troops reoccupied Loudoun County that winter, establishing an encampment near Lovettsville. “The very forage and subsistence they had recently destroyed was then needed by themselves.”³¹⁹ Supplies which could have been requisitioned now had to be transported from Maryland.³²⁰ The winter base would have also reduced Mosby’s ability to impose his own requisitions upon the populace. James E. Taylor calculated that “Sheridan justified himself in adapting this drastic measure believing it the only way to disperse the bands,” as his previous efforts proved futile in quelling Mosby’s rangers, who all too often retreated into the confines of the Blue Ridge, and Merritt, the ever-obeying soldiers, carried out his repugnant orders, “to the letter.”³²¹

On November 12th, Early advanced once more toward Winchester, but this time he found Sheridan well-fortified near Newtown. In December, the majority of the troops from both armies were redeployed to Richmond and Petersburg because of the shortage of food and forage. Sheridan analyzed that because of a lack of subsistence, Early was unable to continue to demonstrate against his army, as he did in November, to prevent him reinforcing Grant.³²²

³¹⁶ Mosby, *Memoirs*, 333.

³¹⁷ Ida Dulaney, *Diary*, 247-248.

³¹⁸ Samuel M. Janey, *Memoirs*, 230.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ James E. Taylor, 578.

³²² *Or*, vol. 43 (1):36-37, 1,032.

Colonel Thomas Henry Carter, commanding the artillery battalion of the II Corps, wondered what would now happen in the Valley. “We cannot winter where we are,” he assessed. “Forage is scarce already & has to be hauled a long distance.”³²³ He thought they could establish winter quarters near Staunton, because supplies could be shipped by rail, and Sheridan could establish their winter quarters near Martinsburg or Harper’s Ferry, but neither army could venture significant distances from their bases of supply, nor would they accomplish much if they did.³²⁴ In effect, Rockingham and Shenandoah Counties remained a no-man’s land. Carter further opined, “Our Cavalry will find it difficult to winter here since the destruction of the grain by the enemy.”³²⁵ Early established his winter quarters in Staunton, as Carter predicted, while Sheridan established his winter quarters north of Newtown around Bartonsville.

Robert T. Barton described that Springdale, the Barton Family plantation, rested squarely in the midst of the Federal encampment and “the beautiful farm was per force surrendered to absolute devastation.”³²⁶ The fences, both stone and rail, were destroyed, the woods cut down, and the fields suffered the consequences of heavy traffic and a prolonged encampment. Only one old horse, an old carriage, and one or two cows escaped. They were glad however, to have guards to protect the house and a kind Federal officer ensured their few stock left were supplied with provender. The family proactively saved beef and a few bushels of wheat was hidden under their beds. Those provisions and small supplies of salt, sugar, and other foodstuffs, which “gathered from various sources and economically used, served to keep away actual starvation until at last the supply being exhausted, the family had to beg rations from the Federal Army.”³²⁷

³²³ Thomas Henry Carter, *A Gunner in Lee’s Army: The Civil War Letters of Thomas Henry Carter*, ed. Graham Dozier and Peter S. Carmichael (North Carolina Scholarship Online, 2015), 265.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

³²⁶ Margaretta Barton Colt, ed. *Defend The Valley: A Shenandoah Family in The Civil War* (New York: Orion Books, 1994), 343.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 343-344.

According to Randolph Barton, Sheridan's men tore down uninhabited houses as well as fencing to construct their own winter quarters. Houses were searched, food appropriated, and some things stolen, but he remembered they were "strangely kind in giving guards often."³²⁸

The destruction of grain and forage in the lower Valley in August did not bode well for the Federals, who now had to transport their own supplies, as well as provide for the civilian population. Sheridan wrote to Grant on November 14th that their animals were "suffering very much from the cold weather and insufficiency of food."³²⁹ He also wrote to Halleck on November 25th, "My cavalry, through want of long forage and an adequate amount of short forage, is somewhat used up."³³⁰ In order to relieve the situation, the railroad was extended to Stephenson's Depot to expedite the arrival of forage.

With forage and grain exhausted in the Valley, Early's forces had to look elsewhere for sustenance. Confederate cavalry conducted raids at New Creek, Beverly, and Cumberland. What the Confederates could capture from Union garrisons, however, did not equate to the bountiful production of the Valley before its destruction. Because of the destruction of grain and hay, Early found it near impossible to sustain his cavalry in the field. Fitz Lee as a result moved Payne's and Munford's brigades to the east of the Blue Ridge. When William Clark Corson returned to his command that winter, he found it encamped near Middlebrook in Augusta County. He discovered that the "horses were starving to death and the men on the eve of mutiny."³³¹ Munford's brigade had been marching "every day for ten consecutive days stopping anywhere that they could get a day's rations of forage."³³² The brigade moved to Waynesboro

³²⁸ Ibid., 350.

³²⁹ Sheridan to Grant, Kernstown, Nov. 14, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 36.

³³⁰ Sheridan to Halleck, Kernstown, VA., Nov. 25, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (2): 669.

³³¹ Corson, 134.

³³² Ibid.

where he observed the horses biting bark from the trees they were tied to. They were then issued a small handful of hay that night and continued through Rockfish Gap to Charlottesville. The only forage they received was a little wheat-straw and “not a half enough of that.”³³³ Corson estimated Munford’s brigade would not have two hundred troopers fit for duty by spring. Many of the men went home and returned without their horses, not wishing to starve them to death. Since he returned to his regiment, he only received two feeds of corn, one feed of hay, and two of wheat-straw, and the condition of his horse accordingly worsened. Only twelve men in his company were fit for duty with suitable horses.³³⁴

Lomax’s calvary was sent westward into Pendleton, Highland, Bath, Allegheny, and Greenbrier counties where hay could be obtained. Only the Laurel brigade remained in the Valley, but it was dispersed as its troopers were allowed to return to their homes in order to feed their horses.³³⁵ “This was a deplorable state of things,” considered Early, “but it could not be avoided, as the horses of the cavalry and artillery would have perished had they been kept in the Valley.”³³⁶ Thomas Henry Carter also noted the scarcity of corn for their horses in the artillery, which now had to be hauled 60 miles, or 120 round trip.³³⁷ Sheridan commenced his final movement up the Valley on February 27th with two divisions of cavalry, advancing so rapidly that they afforded little time for the concentration of the dispersed Confederate cavalry. Sheridan once again defeated Early at the Battle of Waynesboro. Sheridan’s cavalry continued toward

³³³ Ibid., 135.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Early, *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War*, 122; Rosser, 61.

³³⁶ Early, *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War*, 122.

³³⁷ Thomas Henry Carter, *A Gunner in Lee’s Army* 271.

Charlottesville advancing all the way to Richmond, where he joined Grant and played a pivotal part in the coming Appomattox Campaign, which virtually ended the war.³³⁸

Sheridan's Valley Campaign certainly achieved a measure of success in bringing the war to its fruition. Supplies destroyed, consumed, or captured included a reported 1,430 barns, 89 mills, 7 iron furnaces, 557,977 bushels of grain, 30,397 tons of hay, 11,392 beef cattle, 4,404 horses and mules, 12,000 sheep, and 15,000 swine consumed or captured.³³⁹ The agricultural capabilities of the Valley, impacted by more than three years of war, a declining labor force, resultant from conscription and an exodus of slaves, taxation, and inflation, were already significantly diminished prior to Sheridan's campaign, but the widespread destruction in 1864 nevertheless negatively impacted Lee's ability to defend Richmond and Petersburg. He could no longer utilize the Valley as a source of supply to sustain a portion of his army in its confines nor threaten raids upon Washington and Northern territory across the Potomac, thereby keeping substantial Federal troops away from the Confederate capital. Most important, Sheridan's tactical successes occurred just when the North required a morale boost from the unrelenting attritional trench warfare outside of Richmond and Petersburg.

The defensive goal, to end Confederate raids north of the Potomac in western Maryland and south-central Pennsylvania as well as the threat which such raids posed upon Washington, and the offensive goal, to implement a strategy of attrition in order to exhaust Lee's capability to wage war were most assuredly legitimate military goals. However, to accomplish these ends through the intentional strategic destruction of civilian property were assuredly an improper

³³⁸ Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. 2, 112-123; Early, *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War*, 123-128; Richard G. Williams Jr., *The Battle of Waynesboro* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2014); Frederic C. Newhall, *With Gen. Sheridan in Lee's Last Campaign* (Philadelphia, J. P. Lippencott, 1866).

³³⁹ OR, vol. 43 (1): 37-38, 436, 443, 673. This does not include the destruction implemented by two brigades of Merritt's division during the burning raid into the Piedmont region.

means, as such orders disregarded the essentiality of non-combatant immunity. Although Sheridan's destruction certainly facilitated the end of the war, this could have been achieved through conventional military methods, and if not achievable, the rules of war still required making war only upon armed combatants.

Just as there are offensive and defensive campaigns, there are legitimate and illegitimate means for the implementation of those operations. If Grant desired to implement an attritional strategy in order to defeat Lee, he was required to do so, according to the laws of war, that is, waging war upon armed combatants. If Grant desired to prevent Confederate raids, he required a competent defensive commander to defend the line of the Potomac or an aggressive offensive commander that understood both the necessity of retaining the initiative and the essentiality of logistics. Territorial occupation, which afforded necessary protections to non-combatants, including payment or reimbursement for property requisitioned, would ensure the sustenance of their own troops, making Southern civilians fund much of the war, instead of their own populace, as well as negating Lee's ability to supply himself. Raids upon key strategic targets, such as iron works and railroads, would diminish the availability and transportation of essential supplies. And most important, pitched battles waged against Lee's secondary armies wielded the capability of not only materially reducing Confederate strength, but raising Northern and lowering Southern morale. The demoralization of the Southern populace was a legitimate goal, but instead of targeting civilian property, noncombatant immunity required Grant do so by targeting Southern combatants upon the battlefield or within campaigns, not the livelihood Southern civilians. The burnings also negatively impacted their own ability to live upon the land in the lower Valley and in the Piedmont region, the requisitions of which would have also served to make the enemy populace feel the burden of war.

In the midst of strategic destruction, the retaliatory warfare inaugurated earlier that summer continued unabated, particularly related to partisan warfare. Francis Lieber acknowledged that retaliation is a part of the law of war, but it is the “sternest feature of war.” Its appearance should be utilized as a means of “protective retribution,” and never assume the form of “mere revenge.”³⁴⁰ Moreover, retaliation required caution, being resorted to only “after inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.”³⁴¹ Amanda Edmonds lamented upon the unfortunate detail of retaliation, “The innocent have to suffer for the cruelties inflicted by others.”³⁴² The inability to defeat Mosby’s partisans Rangers, who so often disappeared into the fastness of the mountains, was no excuse to attack civilian property throughout the entirety of two counties. Partisan warfare, of formally organized detachments, was a legitimate method of waging a defensive war against superior numbers. If Sheridan desired to eliminate Mosby as a threat, he was obligated to attack the combatants themselves, making greater counterinsurgency efforts in that regard, rather than target civilian property as an indirect expediency toward that goal. But, according to Sheridan, the burnings in the Piedmont area were not only retaliatory, but also strategic.

Moreover, the destruction was ultimately unnecessary as Sheridan could have continued his attacks upon Early’s defeated and demoralized army, particularly due to the disparity in numbers. Rosser later reflected, “Sheridan was retreating from an army under General Early much inferior to his own in numbers and equipment, and this wholesale destruction of property was not a military necessity, and Sheridan’s boast, ‘that a crow could not fly over the without

³⁴⁰ Francis Lieber, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, 9.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² Amanda Edmonds, 238. She expressed this remark in reference to execution of Mosby’s men at Front Royal.

carrying its rations,' in the track of his torch was a shameless admission of cruelty."³⁴³ Instead, the burnings flamed Confederate passions and reinvigorated them to renewed efforts at Tom's Brook, Cedar Creek, and within Mosby's Confederacy. The Battle of Cedar Creek, in particular, came very close to being a pivotal Confederate victory. If Grant and Sheridan desired an early end to the war, the quickest way to such an end was most assuredly the targeting of Early's army and not civilian property. As a whole, Grant subordinated the rules of warfare, pushing the boundaries of military necessity, to winning the war, the destruction of which was readily and agreeably implemented by Sheridan.

³⁴³ Rosser, 46.

Chapter 4: Similarities

In a comparison of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan's Valley Campaign some similarities are certainly evident. The environment in which the campaigns occurred held significant similarities including the geographic setting, civilian populations, and civilian sentiment, corresponding to their respective causes. Both civilians and soldiers, Northerners and Southerners alike, also expressed a variety of opinion in relation to how they thought the war should be conducted, while in enemy territory. Furthermore, in addition to the negative impacts which the fighting itself wrought, the offensive movements by large armies within enemy territory brought forth requirements necessary for the continuance of military operations and negatively impacted local civilians. In neither campaign, however, did the fighting degenerate into warfare which directly targeted noncombatants themselves, as occurred throughout much of the twentieth century.

Penned in by abruptly rising heights to the east and west, the Valley's flat lands and gently rolling hills, along with its many creeks and rivers, not only provided scenic beauty, but also produced a significant agricultural bounty. According to the 1860 United States agricultural census, the counties in which the campaigns transpired held substantial percentages of their respective states' fiscal value of farmland, along with the value of its agricultural implements and machinery, as well as its livestock totals and crops yields, indicative of the area's agricultural development and production.

The five counties in Pennsylvania through which Lee's Army of Northern Virginia marched during the Gettysburg Campaign, in the Cumberland Valley and its adjacent areas, included approximately ten percent of the cash value of farmland and the agricultural machinery and implements in the state, along with ten percent of its horses, twenty percent of its asses and mules, and of especially import, the area produced twenty percent of Pennsylvania's wheat.¹

The nine counties in Virginia in which Sheridan's Army of the Valley implemented their destructive orders, within the Shenandoah Valley, often labelled the "Breadbasket of the Confederacy," and adjacent areas to the east, included approximately fifteen percent of the cash value of farmland and the agricultural machinery and implements in the state, fifteen percent of its horses, seventeen percent of its wheat, nearly thirty percent of its rye, twenty percent of its hay, nearly fourteen percent of its beef cattle, and nearly fifteen percent of the value of its livestock.² Although the armies in both campaigns did not traverse through the entirety of these counties the approximation clearly demonstrates the agricultural bounty of the areas involved.

During the Gettysburg Campaign, many Confederates, especially those residing outside of Virginia, or the Shenandoah Valley in particular, marveled at the spectacular, almost foreign, landscape of the Cumberland Valley, untarnished by the effects of prolonged warfare. The Texan, John C. West, described that the topographical beauty increased "in its charms" from

¹ Joseph C. G. Kennedy, *Agriculture of the United States in 1860: Compiled From The Original Returns of The Eighth Census* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 122-125. The counties included are Adams, Franklin, Culton, Cumberland, and York. Although Lee's army marched through Washington County, Maryland, I have not included Maryland, as a border state, as part of the study.

² Joseph C. G. Kennedy, *Agriculture of the United States in 1860*, 154-165. The counties included are Frederick, Clarke, Warren, Page, Shenandoah, Rockingham, Augusta, Loudoun, and Fauquier. The totals do not include Berkeley, Jefferson, and Rockbridge counties, which comprise part of the Shenandoah Valley, since they were not impacted by Sheridan's targeted destruction of the Valley's agricultural production. One should note that in the 1860 agricultural census, the counties which would become West Virginia were included in the state totals, which would consequently make the percentages of the area even greater.

Culpepper to Chambersburg.³ In Pennsylvania, he considered the area between Greencastle and Chambersburg, “the most beautiful country I ever beheld,” denoting, “the entire landscape covered with the most magnificent farms, orchards and gardens.”⁴ In addition to the wheat, “the staple product in this portion of Pennsylvania,” which looked “splendid,” as it was “just ready to cut,” the countryside afforded loaded apples trees and delicious ripened cherries.⁵ Thomas Pollock considered Franklin County, “a beautiful country overflowing with wealth & fatness.”⁶ In admiration he wrote, “Every inch of ground seems to be producing something.”⁷ Daniel Ross denoted from Chambersburg, “Pennsylvania is the finest country I ever traveled through in my life.”⁸

Many Federals likewise admired the scenic beauty and the agricultural bounty of the Shenandoah Valley. Encamped near Winchester, Alexander Neil, a Federal surgeon, wrote to his friends that they now entered “the most beautiful country I ever saw. Everything is perfectly lovely and enchanting here this time in the season.”⁹ When Major Aldace F. Walker first viewed “that beautiful Valley, the garden of Virginia,” while looking down into the Lower Valley near Snicker’s Gap, he observed, “The surrounding country dotted with houses and groves and waving fields, well watered with wandering brooks, the fertile farms with harvests even then ripening in abundant promise, the occasional glimpses of the blue Shenandoah rushing past the

³ John C. West, *A Texan in Search of a Fight: Being the Diary and Letters of a Private Soldier in Hood’s Texas Brigade* (Waco, TX: Press of J. S. Hill & Co., 1901), 81.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁶ Thomas G. Pollock, Thomas Gordon Pollock to his Father, June 30, 1863, *The Valley of the Shadow: Two Communities in the American Civil War*, Virginia Center for Digital History, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia (hereafter cited as VS).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Daniel Ross, Letter 30 June 1863, Daniel Ross to His Sister, in Ross Family Correspondence, 1861-1864, Library of Virginia, Accession Number 21089, Richmond, Virginia (hereafter cited as LV).

⁹ Alexander Neil, *Alexander Neil and the Last Shenandoah Valley Campaign: Letters of an Army Surgeon to His Family, 1864*, ed. Richard R. Duncan (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1996), 27. May 10, 1864.

very foot of the mountain, on the rugged side of which we stood, and the blue hills bounding the landscape where it faded into indistinctness,” all of which he measured, “made up a most glorious view, scarcely equaled on the continent in its mellow beauty.”¹⁰ Colonel Charles Russel Lowell penned to his wife from New Market on September 24th, “If you could only look in here for a minute, - it’s in the loveliest mountain scenery you can imagine.”¹¹

Not only did the beauty and agricultural productivity of the areas involved bear similarities, but so did its population. Both the Cumberland and Shenandoah valleys, contained significant populations, though not a majority, of Christian German pacifists, often referred as Pennsylvania Dutch, or simply “Dutch.” These included among others, Mennonites, Amish, and Dunkers, who’s reformed anabaptist theology guided them toward principles of non-violence. Eventually, both governments introduced laws by which conscientious objectors could avoid conscription, if they paid fines to avoid military service. As many of these pacifists remained home to tend to their farms, while others entered military service, it presented the impression, especially to those not familiar with the area, that the population was predominantly “Dutch.”

In Pennsylvania, Robert Thurston Hubard noted, “The horses like the women belong to the heavy Dutch breeds.”¹² Not only were their houses “very plain,” but their “heavy style, or dingy red color” afforded “unmistakable evidence of the Dutch & German descent of the occupants.”¹³ He observed few belonging to the established churches, that is, Episcopalians,

¹⁰ Aldace F. Walker, *The Vermont Brigade in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864* (Burlington, VT: The Free Press Association, 1869), 40- 41. Walker was breveted Lieutenant Colonel for his actions during the campaign. *Ibid.*, 166-167.

¹¹ Charles Russell Lowell, *Life and Letters of Charles Russell Lowell*, ed. Edward W. Emerson, repr., 1907 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), 349.

¹² Robert Thurston Hubard Jr., *Civil War Reminiscences of Robert Thurston Hubard Jr.*, University of Virginia Archives. Albert & Shirley Small Special Collections Library, MSS 10522, 80, Charlottesville, Virginia. Hereafter cited as UVA.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Presbyterians, Methodists or Baptists, but many Lutheran, Dutch Reformed, Dunkers, Quakers, and Mennonites.¹⁴ The German pacifists in the Shenandoah Valley almost seemed foreign to the tidewater Virginian Captain Richard Henry Watkins. He considered their “habits and mode of living” as thoroughly “Yankee.” They seemed to live upon apples, milk, and cold bread. The women were “extremely coarse” and many walked barefoot just as those he observed in Pennsylvania.¹⁵

For many of these pacifists, there existed a measure of detached indifference to the outcome of the war, and political matters as a whole, or at least a dispassionate allegiance to their cause, as their concerns were grounded in the attention afforded to their farms and their faith. To them, it made little difference whether Confederate or Federal forces laid claim to their crops and stock, through taxation by their own government or requisitions by the enemy. Perhaps because of their avoidance of military service, some men expressed negative views toward these pacifist populations, who they deemed more concerned about their own affairs than winning the war. James Peter Williams considered Pennsylvania “inhabited by the hardest looking set of people – abolition Dutch.”¹⁶ Specifically, those in and around Chambersburg he described as “The meanest looking white people I ever saw.”¹⁷ In Virginia, Colonel Thomas Henry Carter wrote, “Fishersville has a half dozen indifferent houses in it . . . The owners would sell their souls for money, like the rest around here.”¹⁸

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Richard Henry Watkins, *Send Me a Pair of Old Boots & Kiss My Little Girls: The Civil War Letters of Richard and Mary Watkins, 1861-1865*, ed. Jeff Toalson (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2009), 321.

¹⁶ James Peter Williams, James Peter Williams to his Father, June 28, 1863, VS.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Thomas Henry Carter, *A Gunner in Lee's Army: The Civil War Letters of Thomas Henry Carter*, ed. Graham Dozier and Peter S. Carmichael. North Carolina Scholarship Online, 2015), 277.

Not everybody spoke of these pacifists with condemnation, however. Although Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet's assistant adjutant general, noted their indifference to politics and the war, with "no thought but for their big horses and barns, huge road-wagons like ships at sea, and the weekly baking, and apple-butter," and while many of them could speak no English, he respected that they were a "hard-working" and "thrifty class."¹⁹ In admiration of their barns, found in both the Cumberland and Shenandoah Valleys, Brigadier General John B. Gordon believed such impressive structures represented "in their silent dignity the independence of their owners."²⁰

There were also pacifists who expressed loyalty, or at least sympathy, to their representative causes. Peter Nissley, a Mennonite Minister from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, in his language detailing the events which led to the burning of the Columbia Bridge, though in strict adherence to the principles of non-violence, differentiated between the Confederates and their own men, signifying sympathy to the Union cause.²¹ Jacob Hildebrand, a Mennonite Deacon residing in Augusta County, Virginia paid his taxes, fulfilled impressments, and donated to the wounded, in addition to having his three sons serve in the Confederate army, although, as a leader in his church and having a farm to tend to, he paid a large sum for his own avoidance of military service.²² Throughout the campaigns, both armies had to deal with these noncombatants, the majority of whom, firmly held to their nonviolent principles and only wished to be left alone.

¹⁹ Gilbert Moxley Sorrel, *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1905), 179.

²⁰ Gordon, *Reminiscences, of the Civil War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Atlanta: Martin & Hoyt Co., 1903), 141.

²¹ Peter Nissley, Peter Nissley, to John F. Funk, Aug. 6, 1863, JFFC. Found in James O. Lehman and Steven M. Nolt, *Mennonites, Amish, and the American Civil War* (John Hopkins University Press, 2007), 140-142.

²² Jacob R. Hildebrand, *A Mennonite Journal, 1862-1865: A Father's Account of the Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley*, compiled by John R. Hildebrand (Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1996).

The population throughout the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys, as well as the adjacent areas to the east, and Fulton County, Pennsylvania to the west, included, in the main, a mixture of Germans, who did not exclude themselves from military service, Scotch-Irish, and English, the numbers of which differed according to county.²³ Farmers and farm laborers comprised the majority of occupations. As agricultural communities, the population throughout the area was generally dispersed. Each area did however hold the eighth largest city in their respective states, which included York, Pennsylvania and Winchester, Virginia, though the former doubled the latter in its population, as did the total population of Pennsylvania to Virginia.²⁴

Although pacifists expressed an indifference to the outcome of the fighting, both armies also contended with civilians sympathetic to their cause and those ardently opposed to it. The citizens of the Shenandoah Valley, initially opposed to secession prior to the war, became ardent supporters of the Confederacy. Similarly, the citizens of the Cumberland Valley, initially sympathetic to the South, became firm supporters of the Union. There were exceptions to each, with Unionists in Shenandoah Valley and copperheads in the Cumberland Valley. In general, however, the Potomac River served as a line of division between North and South.

Within the Lower Valley, north of Winchester, sentiment for the Union was evident, coinciding with the route of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, areas of which formed newly constituted West Virginia in 1863. John Dooley described

²³ See for instance, John Walter Wayland, *The German Element of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia* (Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company, Printers, 1907); I. H. M'Cauley, *Historical Sketch of Franklin County, Pennsylvania*, 2nd ed. (Harrisburg, PA: Patriot Publishing Company, 1878); George R. Prowell, *History of York County Pennsylvania*, 2 vol. (Chicago: J. H. Beers & Co., 1907); NA, *History of Cumberland and Adams Counties, Pennsylvania* (Chicago: Warner, Beers & Co., 1886).

²⁴ Joseph C. G. Kennedy, *Population of The United States in 1860: Compiled From The Original Returns of The Eight Census* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 406-441, 500-523. Accounting for the secession of West Virginia from Virginia, the population of Pennsylvania was greater still.

Martinsburg as “quite a Yankee town,” since many of its citizens showed their displeasure upon their arrival.²⁵ Five miles north of Martinsburg, Colonel Clement A. Evans observed, “The people about here are nearly all Unionist.”²⁶ They did receive many cheers in Darkesville, but now they faced “scours of sour Tory faces.”²⁷ Between Martinsburg and the Potomac, Major General Lafayette McLaws depicted, “many houses were all dark, the curtains drawn and the people either absent or invisible - showing an evident dislike to our cause.”²⁸ In Martinsburg, in particular, he noticed “all the finery of a thriving Yankee town.”²⁹ Indeed, “Many women & children made faces at us as we marched along, and although we could not hear them, we could see their mouths moving,” and he could estimate “from their expressions, that they were not kind to the Southern cause.”³⁰ In Williamsport, to McLaws, the people appeared more friendly, but he soon discovered, to his dismay, this was only a superficial display of loyalties.³¹

The majority of the citizens of Winchester were avowed secessionists in 1863. In the midst of Federal occupation under Milroy, prior to the Gettysburg Campaign, Mary Greenhow Lee, often expressed her distain for the Yankees. For instance, on June 9th she articulated the negative impact which the “detestable Yankees” had upon their daily lives, which she characterized as “the sickness they have brought among us.”³² A fellow secessionist, Miss Jackson, a few days prior, told Lee and others that while a former friend from Philadelphia tried

²⁵ John Dooley, *John Dooley's Civil War: An Irish American's Journey in the First Virginia Infantry Regiment*, ed. Robert Emmett Curran (University of Tennessee Press, 2011), 152. June 25, 1863.

²⁶ Clement A. Evans, *Intrepid Warrior, Clement Anselm Evans: Confederate General from Georgia, Life, Letters, and Diaries of the War Years*, ed. Robert Grier Stephens, Jr. (Morningside, 1992), 206.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Lafayette McLaws, Lafayette McLaws to Emily (probably McLaws), June 28, 1863, VS.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Mary Greenhow Lee, *The Civil War Journal of Mary Greenhow Lee (Mrs. Hugh Holmes Lee) Of Winchester, Virginia*, ed. Eloise C. Strader (Stephens City, VA: Commercial Press, INC, 2011), 241. Can be found in The Winchester - Frederick County Historical Society, Winchester, Virginia. June 9, 1863.

to court her, “nothing would induce her to be seen on the streets with a Yankee Officer.”³³

Another, Cornelia, when conversing with a Yankee officer, “told him we hated the North as a nation & individually & much more of the same style.”³⁴ The “rebels” of Winchester, which Lee and other community members who supported secession called themselves, were thus readily overjoyed at the appearance of Ewell’s forces in the late spring of 1863 and their restored freedom within Confederate lines that summer.

By the fall of 1864, since many residents of Winchester fled southward as the war progressed to avoid living under Federal occupation, the town assumed mixed sentiments, the outward product of which followed the successes of the armies. When Sheridan first advanced in early August, Elisha Hunt Rhodes expressed his surprise at the kindness displayed to them, finding many Unionists in the town. The Hollingsworth family, strong Unionists who owned a large flour mill, offered him accommodations, which he declined, though he did accept their invitation to eat meals with them.³⁵ In early October, he assessed, “The people not all rebels by any means,” although he attended church services with a number of “Rebels.”³⁶ After the Confederate defeat at Tom’s Brook, Rhodes noted, “The loyal people in Winchester rejoice, and the Rebels are downhearted,”³⁷ but after hearing the news of the successful Confederate surprise attack at Cedar Creek, he depicted, “The Union people were filled dismay . . . while the Rebels were jubilant.”³⁸

³³ Ibid., 239.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Elisha Hunter Rhodes, *All for The Union: The Civil War Diary and Letters of Elisha Hunter Rhodes* (New York: Orion Books, 1985), 178. August 12, 1864.

³⁶ Ibid., 190, October 9, 1864.

³⁷ Ibid. October 11, 1864.

³⁸ Ibid., 193. October 20, 1864.

There were still pockets of secessionists throughout areas north of Winchester, despite being under Federal occupation for the majority of the war and being surrounded by Unionists. From Hedgesville, Virginia [West Virginia], Oscar McMillan described the sentiment of the town to his sister, “all the citizens are good secesh, which don’t make them any pleasanter neighbors.”³⁹ In Fauquier County and the lower portions of Loudoun County, areas of which comprised the heart of “Mosby’s Confederacy,” the citizens were ardent secessionists, while in northern Loudoun County, near the Potomac, as it was to the west, Unionist sentiment reigned supreme. For instance, near Piedmont, Virginia, to the east of the Blue Ridge in Fauquier County, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, McLaws depicted in June of 1863, “The people appear to be all true to the south, and detest the Yankees most cordially. Milroy in particular.”⁴⁰

Below Chambersburg, in Washington County Maryland there existed significant sentiment sympathetic to the Confederate cause, with the major exception being Williamsport, and other towns along the Potomac River. George P. Clarke considered Williamsport “inhabited by a great many Yankees,” which he observed “from their actions.”⁴¹ In particular, as they marched through town, some “ladies turned their backs upon” them as their band played Dixie, “which they did not seem to fancy very much.”⁴² After crossing the Potomac, Evans deemed that the citizens of the country “are thoroughly Union,” as they were “met with not a single sing of encouragement.”⁴³ But when they reached Boonsboro, not far off, he noted “the feeling is better and many expressed their hearty wishes for our success against the detested tyranny of the

³⁹ Oscar McMillan, *Civil War Letters of Oscar McMillan*, Dec 22, 1864, McMillan Family Papers, UVA, MSS 15284, folder 3, 20.

⁴⁰ Lafayette McLaws, *A Soldier’s General: The Civil War Letters of Major General Lafayette McLaws*, ed. John C. Oeffinger, (The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 192. June 18, 1863.

⁴¹ George P. Clarke, *George P. Clarke Diary*, June 20, 1863 – April 7, 1865, LV, no. 34036, 2. June 25, 1863.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Clement A. Evans, *Intrepid Warrior*, 204.

Yankees.”⁴⁴ Osborne Wilson depicted that in Kellysville, near the Potomac, “People look very sour at us,” though in Boonsboro, he added, “Many of the citizens of this pleasant little town look cheerfully at us.”⁴⁵ In Hagerstown, L. M. Blackford “met with a very pleasant bevy of Southern sympathizers.”⁴⁶ At one house in particular, he “was hospitably entertained both at breakfast & dinner and had various other kindnesses extended.”⁴⁷ He emphasized that “These good people I shall always remember with especial gratitude.”⁴⁸

Such sympathetic sentiment, for the most part, subsided when the Confederates entered Pennsylvania. John Garibaldi, a soldier in the Stonewall Brigade, recorded, “The people of Pennsylvania treated us kindly but I think it was only from their teeth out.”⁴⁹ Thomas Pollock thought it amusing “to witness the anxious stare with which we are regarded,” as their sunburnt and poorly clad troops marched in closed ranks, in cadence to the tune of Dixie, with their Enfield muskets shining in the sun and their flags flying, while they passed through the many towns in southern Franklin County.⁵⁰ “Sadness is on the countenance of all,” he described, “but some try to look fierce and angry and tell us confidently we will never get back.”⁵¹ In Greencastle, George M. Neese noticed some beautiful women, though “they looked as sour as a crab apple, frowns an inch wide and warranted pure vinegar playing over their lovely faces, like the shadow of a cloud that fits across the blushes of an opening rose.”⁵²

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Osborne Wilson, *Osborne Wilson's Civil War Diaries, 1861-1865*, compiled by George Osborne Wilson, Jr. (Meadville, PA: Christian Faith Publishing, Inc., 2019), 298.

⁴⁶ L. M. Blackford, L. M. Blackford to Wm. M. Blackford, June 28, 1863, VS.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ John Garibaldi, John Garibaldi Letters, July 19, 1863, to wife Sarah. Virginia Military Institute Archives, Manuscript no. 284, letter no. 14, Lexington, Virginia. Camp Near Darksville, Berkeley County, Va.

⁵⁰ Thomas G. Pollock, Thomas Gordon Pollock to his Father, June 30, 1863. VS.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² George M. Neese, *Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1911), 186.

From Chambersburg, Ewell wrote home to Lizzie, “It is like a renewal of Mexican times to enter a captured town. The people look as sour as vinegar and, I have no doubt, would gladly send us all to kingdom come if they could.”⁵³ In Chambersburg, Alfred Mallory Edgar observed, “All of the citizens are very hostile to us. No one has a civil word or look for us. In fact, they are very rude.”⁵⁴ Though Rachel Cormany expressed sympathy to the Southern soldier in uniform, she held no such sentiment for their cause or occupation of the town. “I did wish I dared spit at their old flag,” she penned in her diary on June 27th.⁵⁵

In portions of Adams and York counties, the Confederates met a more sympathetic populace, illustrating their trade connections with Baltimore, which was itself, in many ways a Southern community, held as a strategic point by the north. Osborne Wilson depicted on their march to York, “Pass through many pleasant little towns on the road. Many of the citizens are ‘copperheads’ and sympathize. They say we, they hope, will be successful.”⁵⁶ When they reached York, he described, “Some of the people we pass in the road cheer ‘Jeff D.’”⁵⁷ Thus, it is evident that both armies contended with a mixture of civilians who held to a variety of sentiments concerning their support for their respective causes, namely with greater support for their own cause resting nearer their bases of operations.

As both campaigns occurred within enemy territory, soldiers and civilians throughout the North and South expressed sentiments detailing their support or opposition for the forms of warfare adopted by their commanders, either in favor of an adherence to civilized warfare or

⁵³ Ewell Letters Richard S. Ewell, *The Making of a Soldier: Letters of General R. S. Ewell* (ed. Captain Percy Gatling Hamlin (Richmond, VA: Whittet & Shepperson, 1935), 121. June 24, 1863.

⁵⁴ Alfred Mallory Edgar, *My Reminiscences of the Civil War, With the Stonewall Brigade and the Immortal 600* (Charleston, WV: 35th Star Publishing, 2011), 130.

⁵⁵ Rachel Cormany, *Diary of Rachel Cormany* (1863), VS. June 27, 1863.

⁵⁶ Osborne Wilson, *Osborne Wilson's Civil War Diaries*, 300.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

adopting measures of retaliation and destruction, what the proponents of the former referred to as uncivilized warfare. With the war having wrought destruction, mostly incident to the movement of armies, throughout Virginia, along with several Federal commanders having disregarded particular aspects of the rules of warfare, many Confederates certainly harbored a revenge mentality in the summer of 1863. Richard Beale articulated this mindset, “The time had come to pay back in some measure the misdeeds of men who, with sword and fire, had made our homesteads heaps of ruin, and, in many instances, left our wives and children not a horse, nor cow, nor sheep, nor hog, nor living fowl of any kind.”⁵⁸ Joseph A. Waddell commented, “Oh that the Yankee advocates of this war may experience at their own firesides and in their own persons some of the horrors they have inflicted upon us! Perhaps they will then be more disposed to desist from their attempt to subjugate or devastate our country.”⁵⁹ Wounded at Chancellorsville, Alexander Sterrett Paxton, serving in the Stonewall Brigade, missed the Gettysburg Campaign, but he wrote on June 26th, “Am getting well fast & will soon be able to go back to shoot at the Yankees again. The Army now is over in Penn & Md. wish I was there too. I’d make the old Penn dutch roll up their eyes.”⁶⁰ According to Dr. Philip Schaff, in Mercersburg, Brigadier General John D. Imboden “remarked to a citizen in town, that if had the power he would burn every town and lay waste every farm in Pa.!”⁶¹

Soldiers who favored a retaliatory form of warfare often explained to civilians that what their own countrymen did was significantly worse. Imboden explained to a citizen of

⁵⁸ R. L. T. Beale, *History of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry in the War Between the States* (Richmond, VA: B. F. Johnson Publishing Company, 1899), 81.

⁵⁹ Joseph A. Waddell, *Diary of Joseph A. Waddell*, VS. June 22, 1863.

⁶⁰ Alexander Sterrett Paxton, *Alexander Sterrett Paxton Diaries: Volume Five, July 15, 1862 – June 26, 1863*. Transcribed winter / spring 2012, 68. June 26, 1863.

⁶¹ Philip Schaff, “The Gettysburg Week,” *Scribner’s Magazine* 16 (July-December 1894), 21-30. June 30, 1863.

Mercersburg, “You have only a little taste of what you have done to our people in the South. Your army destroyed all the fences, burnt towns, turned poor women out of house and home, broke pianos, furniture, old family pictures, and committed every act of vandalism. I thank God that the hour has come when this war will be fought on Pennsylvania soil.”⁶² Overhearing the conversation, Dr. Philip Schaff reflected upon this common accusation of abuses throughout the South and even confessed that, if true, which in a few cases he knew to be so, that they warranted retaliation. “This is the general story,” wrote Schaff,

Every one has his tale of outrage committed by our soldiers upon their homes and friends in Virginia and elsewhere. Some of our soldiers admit it, and our own newspaper reports unfortunately confirm it. If this charge is true, I must confess we deserve punishment in the North. The raid of Montgomery in South Carolina, the destruction of Jacksonville in Florida, of Jackson in Miss., and the devastation of all Eastern Va., by our troops are sad facts.”⁶³

During Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, Federal soldiers retained thoughts of Confederate abuses during Early’s raids north of the Potomac that summer, especially the burning of Chambersburg. In the midst of the burning in the Lower Valley in August of 1864, “Remember Chambersburg was their watch word,” described Matthella Page Harrison. In light of this, Harrison echoed the feeling against retaliatory warfare held by many civilians living on the border, “Retaliation may be glorious for the interior of Dixie but to those in the poor debatable land its fires are almost beyond endurance.”⁶⁴ When Lucy Rebecca Buck remonstrated against the depredations being

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Matthella Page Harrison, Typescript Transcript of a Diary Kept by Mathella Page Harrison, The Wife of Dr. Benjamin Harrison, 1862-1864, MSS 9759, UVA, 43.

committed by Federal soldiers the same month they replied, “This is nothing to the way the Rebs did in Maryland.”⁶⁵

Some soldiers, while they expressed remorse over the impact of their campaigns, dialed down such empathy when they considered the damage caused by the enemy. While in Pennsylvania, Daniel Ross wrote to his sister on June 30th, “I can’t help feeling sorry for the citizens to save my life,” especially because of the evident fear they exhibited when they would see the rebels approach, but as he reflected upon the destruction that the Yankees wrought upon his native state he considered, “I can’t have much sympathy for them.”⁶⁶ Elisha Hunt Rhodes described that as it seemed as though the entire city of Winchester was in mourning, due to the majority of ladies being dressed in black, “It made me sad to see the people so sorrowful and weeping, but when I remembered that they brought their troubles upon themselves and that the women encouraged the men to make war on the Government, I could not help feeling that their punishment was just.”⁶⁷ Even the destruction of public property engendered thoughts of regret, but as legitimate military targets, such reflection subsided into an understanding of the military necessities of war. William W. Sillers described to his sister in August of 1863 how General Fitz Lee burned the U. S. barracks near Carlisle and added “It seems a great pity, when I think of it,” but then he postulated, modifying to a degree his disapproval, “they belonged to Lincoln.”⁶⁸

Other soldiers and civilians considered civilized warfare as the appropriate means of waging war. They expressed regret at the adoption of uncivilized actions, exhibited concern that

⁶⁵ Lucy Rebecca Buck, *Shadows of My Heart: The Civil War Diary of Lucy Rebecca Buck of Virginia*, ed. Elizabeth R. Baer (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1997), 301. Lucy Rebecca Buck exclaimed, in her written response, to the accusation, “False cravens!”

⁶⁶ Daniel Ross, Letter 30 June 1863, Daniel Ross to His Sister.

⁶⁷ Rhodes, *All For the Union*, 189.

⁶⁸ William W. Sillers, William W. Sillers to Frances Sillers Holmes, Manuscripts of the American Civil War, Sillers-Holmes Family Correspondence, trans. Paul Patterson and George Rugg, MSN/CW 5025-12.

the fighting may degenerate into a destructive and retaliatory conflict, and voiced their approval of maintaining civilized warfare. Franklin Gaillard depicted this understanding, while near Chambersburg on June 28th. “Gen. Lee has issued very stringent orders about private property. He is very right for our Army would soon become demoralized if they were allowed to do as many of them would like to. Many of them think it very hard that they should not be allowed to treat them as their soldiers treated our people. But we must not imitate the Yankees in their mean acts.”⁶⁹ Iowa Michigan Royster remembered, “I never saw people so submissive and badly scared as these people in my life.”⁷⁰ He considered that their conscience must have been at work, since they knew “how their soldiers have desolated Virginia and they fear that ours will retaliate.”⁷¹ Nevertheless, “I can’t bear it,” wrote Royster, “I hate to take anything when it is given from fear.”⁷² During the shelling of Carlisle, Captain Frank Smith Robertson, Stuart’s assistant engineer officer, recalled, “After seeing all those ladies and children, I remember I somehow didn’t like the crashing of shells among the houses.”⁷³ After leaving Carlisle, George Beale, in his exhaustion from the rigors of the campaign, could not help but reflect upon the destruction they inflicted upon the town, including the “wickedness” and the “horrors” which the war wrought. As he observed the illuminated mountainside, though mostly resultant from the burning of the barracks and the gas works, he described that “frightened women driven with screaming children, in terror from burning homes, could not have suffered much more keenly,

⁶⁹ Franklin Gaillard, Franklin Gaillard to “Sonny” Gaillard, June 28, 1863, VS.

⁷⁰ Iowa Michigan Royster, Iowa Michigan Royster to His Mother, June 29, 1863, VS.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Frank Smith Robertson, *In the Saddle with Stuart: The Story of Frank Smith Robertson of Jeb Stuart’s Staff*, ed. Robert J. Trout (Gettysburg PA: Thomas Publications, 1998), 78.

than many of the ‘vandal rebels’ who with ‘fiendish delight’ beheld the conflagration in Carlisle that night. Truly, I was made to feel unhappy.”⁷⁴

Although the editor of the *Staunton Vindicator*, W. H. H. Lynn, understood the sentiment desirous of retaliation, due to Federal abuses committed throughout Virginia, he hoped his readers would appreciate and come to concur with Lee’s orders. He wrote,

We are at present witnessing an advance into the country of the enemy which has long been desired by many, . . . Many have believed that the only way to make the mass of the Northern people see the outrageous impropriety of conducting the war on their uncivilized plan was to make them feel some of the burdens of that plan, and let them realize that plunder and destruction was not and could not be confined to one side alone. Those who have desired to hear of retaliation for our wrongs will perhaps be disappointed to a great extent. . . . while our armies will draw what they may need from the inhabitants of the invaded country, thro’ the proper officers yet destruction of private property will not be permitted. Could our people divest themselves of the feelings excited by the wrongs they have suffered they would agree to the propriety of the course. As it is, the remembrance of wrongs so lately inflicted will cause many to feel disappointed. We are satisfied that our able Generals know what is the proper course to pursue and in pursuing it will meet with the hearty concurrence of those even whose disappointment may be greatest.⁷⁵

After witnessing firsthand under Hunter, the escalation of the conflict, which retaliatory warfare wrought during the summer, and realizing an intentional strategy of destruction, targeting civilian property, only worsened the war’s impact, Colonel David Hunter Strother offered his resignation when Sheridan assumed command. Many of his relatives resided on the border, both North and South, and he feared the desolation such a policy would bring. He specified, “I am sorry to see this warfare begun and would be glad to stop it . . . A war of mutual devastation will

⁷⁴ George W. Beale, *A Lieutenant of Cavalry in Lee’s Army* (Boston: The Gorham Press, 1918), 115.

⁷⁵ “Our Advance,” *Staunton Vindicator*, July 3, 1863.

depopulate the border counties which sustain all my kindred on both sides of the question. I would fain save some of them but fear that all will go under alike in the end.”⁷⁶

Charles Lowell expressed to his wife both his approval for strategic destruction and his reservations about the kind of warfare inaugurated. In charge of the right rear of the Army of the Valley during Sheridan’s withdrawal in August, “with orders from Grant to drive in every horse, mule, ox, or cow, and burn all grain and forage,” in his case, occurring in southern Frederick County below Winchester, he penned home a few days later, that it was “a miserable duty.”⁷⁷ After the death of Lieutenant Meigs and the order to burn the village of Dayton and the surrounding area, he wrote home the following day, “I am very glad my Brigade had no hand in it.”⁷⁸ However, in the same letter he approved of such action, “if it will help end bushwhacking.”⁷⁹ Moreover, he endorsed strategic destruction, “I would cheerfully assist in making this whole Valley a desert from Staunton north ward, — for that would have, I am sure, an important effect on the campaign of the Spring,” but in regard to “partial burnings,” he deemed, “I see less justice and less propriety.”⁸⁰ Lowell additionally expressed that he was “sorry enough” that his brigade had a role in the hanging and shooting of Mosby’s men near Front Royal. “I believe that some punishment was deserved,” he opined, “but I hardly think we were within the laws of war, and any violation of them opens the door for all sorts of barbarity, it was all by order of the Division Commander, however.”⁸¹ He further lamented, “The war in this part of the country is becoming very unpleasant to an officer's feelings.”⁸²

⁷⁶ David Hunter Strother, *A Virginia Yankee in the Civil War: The Diaries of David Hunter Strother*, ed. Cecil D. Eby, Jr. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 280-281.

⁷⁷ Charles Russell Lowell, *Life and Letters*, 324. August 19, 1864. Near Berryville.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 353. Oct. 5, 1864. Near Mount Crawford.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

The *Valley Spirit*, on October 19, 1864,⁸³ reprinted an article from the *New York World* and provided its view concerning the recent destruction of private property in the Valley, “If this is the way the war is to be carried on in the future. God save the people along the border!” The article, entitled “The Shenandoah Valley Made a Barren Waste,” based upon two accounts, one of them from an officer in the army, detailed “the manner in which Gen. Grant’s orders ‘to make of the Valley a barren waste,’ was executed.”⁸³ The editor of the *New York World* detested how Grand and Sheridan waged war in the Valley.

I think I may safely say that for real devilish malignity and cool-blooded brutality, the execution of his order surpasses all the cruelty of Butler, and, in all save one particular, equals even the atrocity of Turchin. What do the readers of the *World* think of the wanton burning of twenty-seven hundred barns, filled with wheat, and more than eighty mills for grinding wheat and corn? This was done by soldiers of "The Union," with the Union flag waving over them.⁸⁴

The article further contemplated that the worst abuse though occurred when Sheridan ordered the burning of civilian homes outside of Dayton, in retaliation for the murder of Meigs.⁸⁵ Hence, it is apparent that throughout both campaigns, soldier and civilian sentiment, within both armies and sectional communities, regarding how they believed the war ought to be waged, formed a mixture of retaliation and restraint.

Conventional warfare negatively impacted civilians throughout both campaigns, simply due to the advance of the armies and fighting on the battlefields. Although Sheridan’s Valley Campaign inaugurated the Federal policy of “hard war,” elements of conventional warfare continued to impact civilians as it did during the Gettysburg Campaign. Of course, the most negative impact of conventional warfare was what Edward R. Rich, a trooper of the First

⁸³ *Valley Spirit*, Oct. 19, 1864. Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Maryland Cavalry, C.S.A., called “the cruel hand of war,”⁸⁶ that is, death upon the battlefield, which also included deaths due to disease, resultant from the fighting, the rigors of campaign, or even in camp, producing the loss of husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons for their loved ones at home. Yet, in addition to this “cruel hand of war,” civilians also faced disruptions to their everyday lives and the loss of personal property.

One unfortunate reality for those living on the border was that they had to endure numerous alarms indicating the approach of the enemy forces and attempt to decipher whether such rumors were true or false. When confronted with rumors of the Rebel advance upon Winchester, the probable and then actual defeat of their forces, and the continued northward movement of the Confederates afterward, Dr. Philip Schaff considered, “These ‘rumors of war’ are worse than ‘war’ itself.”⁸⁷ He further reflected, “I now understand better than ever before the difference of these two words as made by the Lord, Matt. xxiv. 6. The sight of the Rebels was an actual relief from painful anxiety.”⁸⁸ Prior to the arrival of Milroy’s defeated forces in Chambersburg, on June 13th, William Heyser indicated that there was “more talk of an impending invasion of our valley.” He understood the negative psychological effects of these numerous rumors. “Much of the news is false we hear, but it serves to upset the people.”⁸⁹ On June 19th, he further recorded, “Much rumor – one knows not what to believe.”⁹⁰ Though after a report of the Rebels being in Greencastle, he felt certain the main Confederate army would enter Pennsylvania.⁹¹ “Reports we have in abundance,” recorded Reverend Thomas Creigh from

⁸⁶ Edward R. Rich, *Comrade Four* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1907), 80.

⁸⁷ Philip Schaff, “The Gettysburg Week,” June 16-18, 1863

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* The Bible Verse referred to is “And you will hear of wars and rumors of war; see that you are not alarmed; for this must take place, but the end is not yet.”

⁸⁹ William Heyser, *Diary of William Heyser (1862-1863)*, June 13, 1863, VS.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, June 19, 1863.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, June 21, 1863.

Mercersburg on June 26th, “but they are so vague, and so conflicting that we can repose no confidence in them.”⁹²

With the proximity of Gettysburg to the border, Charles McCurdy relayed that from the very “beginning of the war we had been expecting Rebel raids.”⁹³ In June 1863 numerous rumors of the rebel advance circulated throughout the town. On June 17th, Salome Myers articulated that one such report temporarily “set the town in a perfect uproar,” though it ultimately proved false. She emphasized, “I am getting very tired of all this fuss consequent upon border life though the numerous reports do not alarm me. On the contrary I am sometimes quite amused by seeing the extremes to which people will go.”⁹⁴ In May and June, Fannie Buehler wrote that these rumors of Rebel raids were a “daily, ‘almost hourly,’” occurrence.⁹⁵ Robert McClean described to his cousin that in the days preceding the arrival of Confederate forces, “nothing was done but listening to, and discussing the returns of the hour, for every hour had its own.”⁹⁶ Because of the frequency of rumors coupled with the falsity of such claims the people of Gettysburg came to think they may not show at all, as Buehler relayed, “it grew to be an old story.”⁹⁷

In Carlisle, James Sullivan wrote that the common cry, “The rebels are coming!” was so often heard in the early portions of the war, “that its effects came to resemble the skepticism of

⁹² Rev. Thomas Creigh, “Civil War Days in Mercersburg: As Related in the Diary of the Rev. Thomas Creigh, D. D. August 1, 1862 – July 20, 1865,” prepared by the Rev. J. D. Edmiston Turner, Feb. 29, 1940 *The Kittochtinny Historical Society* 12 (October 1939 – March 1949): 35, Can be found in the Franklin County Historical Society, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. June 26, 1863.

⁹³ Charles McCurdy, *Gettysburg: A Memoir*, pg.

⁹⁴ Salome Myers Stewart, *The Ties of the Past: The Gettysburg Diaries of Salome Myers Stewart, 1854-1922* (Thomas Publications, 2013), 160.

⁹⁵ Fannie J. Buehler, *Recollections of the Rebel Invasion and One Woman’s Experience During the Battle of Gettysburg*, United States Army War College. Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 6.

⁹⁶ Robert McClean, “A Boy In Gettysburg - - 1863: What He Saw During the Eventful Battle Days A Letter Written by the Same Boy Two Weeks After the Great Battle,” *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 30, 1909.

⁹⁷ Fannie J. Buehler, *Recollections of the Rebel Invasion*, 6.

those sheep farmers in the fable of hearing the alarm ‘Wolf! Wolf!’”⁹⁸ On one occasion, in the confusion throughout the town in the middle of June, reports circulated that a Rebel column was advancing, which merely turned out to be a poor farmer leading a few of his horses into town. “So it goes,” wrote William Heyser, who was then attending church, the main question being “what is fact and fancy.”⁹⁹

The residents of Winchester fared exceptionally worse, since the armies continually disputed control of the town. After the withdrawal of the Army of Northern Virginia from the Lower Valley, following the Gettysburg Campaign, rumors of a Federal advance quickly alarmed the populace. “This life is terrible,” wrote Matthella Page Harrison, “not to know at what time the wretches may descend upon us.”¹⁰⁰

In the fall of 1863 and the spring and summer of 1864, the residents of the Upper Valley faced numerous reports, some legitimate and some unfounded, of Federal advances up the Valley. After the Confederate defeats at Winchester and Fisher’s Hill, civilians anticipated a major advance of Federal forces up the Valley. Initially, when news of Early’s defeat at Fisher’s Hill reached Staunton, “For an hour or more, opinion wavered as to the truth of the report,” described Joseph A. Waddell, “but finally settled down into the belief that it was substantially correct.”¹⁰¹ He ascribed his own feelings as “staggered and overcome.”¹⁰² Indeed, “Anxiety and

⁹⁸ John Sullivan, Typescript of *Seen in Carlisle, 1861-’65*, Cumberland County Historical Society. Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 23. Can also be found as “Boyhood Memories of The Civil War, 1861-1865- Invasion of Carlisle,” July 1932, Civil War Resources, Location: I-Original-1924-2, Dickinson College Archives & Special Collections, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as Dickinson College Archives).

⁹⁹ William Heyser, *Diary*, June 21, 1863.

¹⁰⁰ Matthella Page Harrison, *Diary*, 44.

¹⁰¹ Joseph A. Waddell, *Diary*, Sep. 23, 1864.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

gloom was depicted in every countenance,” particularly as news trickled back as to the magnitude of the defeat, that is, the complete route of their army.¹⁰³

Because of the numerous rumors of reported advances by the enemy, in order to protect private property from being subject to requisitions, or from the prospects of theft, civilians became rather adept in either hiding, or removing to a safe location, their necessitates and valuables. The Susquehanna River and the Blue Ridge to the east provided safe havens for the residents of the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys, to remove themselves or their property from the areas in which the movement of armies and fighting occurred, for their own well-being and to avoid property losses. Fearful of the advances of the enemy armies, some citizens continued further to safer locations still, such as Philadelphia or Richmond, the cities wielding the highest concentrated populations in the states. In other cases, local hiding places within the dense foliage of the mountains themselves or upon their own premises proved suitable to the occasion. Besides those who fled in order to protect their property, others refugeed in order to evade capture including, in the north, public officials and contrabands, and in the south, males of military age and slaves sent by their masters.

Between June 16th and 18th, 1863, Dr. Philip Schaff recorded the measures that the citizens of Mercersburg undertook in anticipation of the impending arrival of Confederate forces, including the “Removal of goods by the merchants, of horses by the farmers; hiding and burying of valuables, packing of books.”¹⁰⁴ Among those who refugeed included the “flight of the poor contraband negroes.”¹⁰⁵ L. L. Huston wrote to his brother, “such a skedaddling of horses,

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Philip Schaff, June 16-18, 1863.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

negroes and abolitionists there never was known.”¹⁰⁶ As for himself, he did not consider it of paramount importance that he follow suit. “I had never thought of leaving my home and times would have to get pretty hard when I run away and leave my things behind.”¹⁰⁷ Robert McClean wrote to his cousin in July 1863, recounting his June experiences, “The merchants here packed up and shipped their goods to the cities and other places of fancied security, the farmers began to leave with their stock, the government officials, postmaster, U. S. Assessor, and others ‘skedaddled.’”¹⁰⁸

As the village of New Oxford rested on the turnpike to the Susquehanna, between Gettysburg and York, a resident of the town, Charles F. Himes, observed that “One day the current of men, women, children, & horses with all movable valuables set through our village towards the Susquehanna, the next day the counter current set in when it was discovered that the Rebs had retreated or that they were in smaller force than supposed or that they had not been about at all.”¹⁰⁹ Indeed, according to Himes, he received little sleep because “All hours day & night were filled with noises of wagons.”¹¹⁰ While the citizens of New Oxford remained, in general, “many of them when the skedaddlers from the upper country came here for safety began to think it was not safe here and went to York, wilst many from York went to Lancaster and many from Lancaster to Philad. & the poor Philadelphians having no whiter to go resolved to defend their city to the last.”¹¹¹ Philadelphia served as a city of safety for refugees as its populace

¹⁰⁶ L. L. Huston to Her Brother David Line, Milton Embick Flower Collection, Civil War Research Confederate Invasion, MG-207-013-012, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Robert McClean, “A Boy In Gettysburg.”

¹⁰⁹ Charles F. Himes, Milton Embick Flower Collection, Civil War Research Confederate Invasion, MG-207-013-012, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

accounted for nearly twenty percent of the state's population.¹¹² Daniel Skelly, a resident of Gettysburg, who had been away from home most of the month of June, arrived in Hanover on June 26th, expecting to return home by rail. The train however rolled along eastward "filled with people getting away from the Confederates. They included revenue officers and clerks, in fact all persons who had any office under the government."¹¹³

Decisions as to whether one should remain, or refugee with personal property were heightened in the midst of battle. For those civilians who lived west and north of Gettysburg, the fighting on July 1st meant that they had to make quick decisions as to whether they should remain in place or flee. Sarah Slentz, living on the McPherson farm on the Chambersburg Pike, recalled, "Instantly, all was confusion, and before a moment more had passed, myself and five children, driving our cows before us, were fleeing towards the town of Gettysburg."¹¹⁴ She and her children only managed to save the clothing on their backs, remembering that the children ran without shoes, stockings, or hats. The cattle were lost before they reached town, but they managed to take refuge in the cellar of the Seminary.¹¹⁵

Before the arrival of Sheridan's troops in August, the Steele family, residing in Newtown, Virginia prepared for their arrival. "All that day we were busy hiding our household effects, digging holes in the yard and garden, hurrying everything that we did not have immediate use for, such as silverware, queens ware, meats, and even some clothing. The poultry was all caught

¹¹² Joseph C. G. Kennedy, *Population of The United States in 1860*, 431-432. There were 565,529 people in Philadelphia out of 2,906,215 people in the state of Pennsylvania or 19.46% of the total population.

¹¹³ Daniel Skelly, *A Boy's Experience during the Battle of Gettysburg* (Gettysburg, PA. Privately Printed, 1932).

¹¹⁴ Sarah J. Slentz, "Local Woman Fled With Mother to Seminary Here," *Gettysburg Times* (July 1938), Adams County Historical Society, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as ACHS).

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* She says this occurred on the morning of June 30th, but as nothing eventful transpired then, which would induce confusion, it is most likely that the accompanying confusion occurred on July 1st.

and housed, the cows were locked up, and the horse was sent to the back country.”¹¹⁶ Before Sheridan’s second advance up the Valley in September, the Barton family salted and stored beef in various locations throughout their home and a few bushels of wheat, “which had escaped the fire,” during the burnings in August, were hidden in bags under their beds.¹¹⁷ “Advised of the probable appearance of the Yankees,” remembered Jacob Yost, his grandmother “made hasty preparations to hide the silver and small valuables about the house, and to refuge the horses and what remained of the other live stock.”¹¹⁸ On September 26th, with rumors of Federal cavalry in Staunton, Reverend Francis McFarland, a resident of Bethel, recorded that he “Spent much time hiding property.”¹¹⁹ During both campaigns, the removal and hiding of private property, due to the disturbances brought by rumored advances of the enemy, certainly were a constant inconvenience to the civilians residing in the paths of the armies.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, horses, asses, and mules were indispensable to military operations, utilized by the cavalry, artillery, and wagon trains. Horses were indeed a key acquisition for Lee’s army while in Pennsylvania. “We need them much,” assessed Charles Blackford. Accordingly, he noted horses were quickly collected, “Horses are becoming quite plentiful as they are sent back by our vanguard.”¹²⁰ Charles Edward Lippitt, while near Chambersburg, observed “several droves of horses going South.”¹²¹ However, the collection of horses for military purposes was done in an official manner. Franklin Gaillard described, “We

¹¹⁶ Between the Lines: The Civil War Diaries, Letters and Memoirs of the Steele Family of Newtown, 1861 – 1864. L. A. Fravel / Stone House Foundation, Draft as of 9/10/2008, Newtown History Center, Stephen’s City Virginia, 249.

¹¹⁷ Margaretta Barton Colt, ed. *Defend The Valley: A Shenandoah Family in The Civil War* (New York: Orion Books, 1994), 343-344.

¹¹⁸ Jacob Yost, Jacob, *Memoirs of Jacob Yost*, *Augusta County Historical Society*, Staunton, Virginia, 63.

¹¹⁹ Francis McFarland, *Diary of Francis McFarland*, VS, Sep 26, 1864.

¹²⁰ Susan Leigh Blackford and Charles Minor Blackford, *Letters form Lee’s Army or Memoirs of Life in and Out of the Army in Virginia During the War Between the States* (J. P. Bell Company, 1894), 181-182.

¹²¹ Charles Edward Lippitt, *Diary of Lippitt*, Charles Edward (1863), VS.

are getting a large number of horses,” but he also stressed, “this is being done by proper authorities.”¹²² Isaac Vermillion Reynolds, a trooper in Jenkins’ brigade, wrote home to his wife that during their advance to Harrisburg they “captured horses and cattle by the hundreds,” but they were “not allowed to keep them,” as “they were turned over to the qd.m. [quartermaster].”¹²³ Although Sheridan’s forces consumed, captured, or killed livestock, valued horses were similarly appropriated for military usage. “They tried to drive the colts off,” wrote Daniel K. Schreckhise to his brother. Fortunately for him though, his colts “ran off & came back.”¹²⁴

One such reason horses were in constant demand, is that in the midst of campaigning, horses became fatigued, which required replacements. I. Norval Baker, a trooper in Imboden’s brigade, recorded that his horse died from the fatigues of the Gettysburg campaign, bringing his total to four horses which he had “rode out of service.”¹²⁵ In order to remain mounted, he bought another horse for \$300.¹²⁶ Frank Smith Robertson relayed that because of Stuart’s fast paced advance, many of the mules captured from a Federal wagon train outside of Rockville, Maryland broke down due to fatigue. As substitutes they acquired “Pennsylvania’s big farm horses in place of them.”¹²⁷ Louis N. Beaudry, chaplain in the 5th New York Cavalry, recorded on September 29th, 1864, on their way from Spring Hill to Bridgewater, after their withdrawal from Waynesboro, that twenty-eight fatigued horses “gave out and were shot.”¹²⁸ To replace their

¹²² Franklin Gaillard, Franklin Gaillard to “Sonny” Gaillard, June 28, 1863, VS.

¹²³ Isaac Vermillion Reynolds, Letter, 20 July 1863, LV, 40674.

¹²⁴ Daniel K. Schreckhise, Daniel K. Schreckhise to James M. Schreckhise, October 17, 1864, VS.

¹²⁵ I. Norval Baker, Copy of Fragments of Diary of I. Norval Baker, Private in Company “F”, 18th Virginia Cavalry, Imboden’s Brigade, Confederate States of America, Typescript, Manuscript MS0357, Virginia Military Institute Archives, Lexington, Virginia.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Frank Smith Robertson, *In the Saddle with Stuart*, 77.

¹²⁸ Louis N. Beaudry, *War Journal of Louis N. Beaudry, Fifth New York Cavalry*, ed. Richard E. Beaudry (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers), 173.

losses, “Some good horses in the country were found.”¹²⁹ Civilians therefore suffered substantial losses in the loss of valued stock.

Foraging, carried out by official parties for collection by the commissary department and by individuals, who were either famished or in search of a change in their usual diet, was apparent in both armies during the campaigns, leading to the loss of eatables for the citizens resting in the path of the forces. Osborne Wilson, a soldier in Smith’s brigade within Early’s division, which advanced through untarnished lands, emphasized the bounty they received. “Since the invasion of Pa. we have lived well, get too much for soldiers.”¹³⁰ Although official requisitions abundantly supplied many of the Confederate units which first entered Pennsylvania, for some units entering areas already gone through, individuals took to foraging to supplement their rations. John C. West detailed, “This amounted to an official falsehood or mistake, as the sequel showed,” since he did not think they were supplied with enough food by their commissaries. He further wrote, “I had intended to allude to that ‘official falsehood’ referred to above, but let it pass. Suffice it to say that if we had depended on our commissaries, we would have suffered seriously for food.”¹³¹

Foraging was of such import to the soldiery that John Price Kepner, a hospital steward in the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry recorded the actions in his diary. On September 6, 1864, in the Lower Valley, he recorded, “Was out foraging in the morning & successful too.”¹³² In the Upper Valley, he detailed on September 27th, “Out foraging in the afternoon,” since they had “drawn no rations for 8 days.” The following day, near Harrisonburg, a comrade out foraging secured “a

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Osborne Wilson, 301.

¹³¹ John C. West, *A Texan in Search of a Fight*, 97.

¹³² John Price Kepner, *Diary of John Price Kepner for 1864*, Sep. 6, 1864, Virginia Historical Society, MSS 2 K 4455 b, Richmond, Virginia. Kepner became a hospital steward on Sep. 3, 1864.

porker weighing 250 pounds.”¹³³ On October 24th, in Luray Valley, he recorded, “Teams out foraging brought in a good load of hay corn and eatables.”¹³⁴ The following day seven headquarter teams were captured while foraging, though they were protected by one company of infantry as guards.¹³⁵ Lucy Rebecca Buck endured a group of Federal soldiers who “thronged the kitchen and stole the food from the fire where it was cooking.”¹³⁶ They quickly consumed her preserved blackberries and raspberries as well as her aunt’s pickles. One held a duck in his shirt in his haversack.¹³⁷ Colonel Thomas F. Wildes, in command of 116th Ohio, depicted that while they were stationed near Harrisonburg, they were short of rations much of the time, especially the officers. Foraging trains were thus sent out daily. Quartermaster Sergeant Ezra L. Walker, then acting as the Regiment’s Sergeant Major, and his orderly accompanied the trains on September 27th, 29th, and 30th, acquiring among other eatables, bread, cabbage, beets, tomatoes, onions, honey, apple butter, sweet potatoes, and chicken. Wildes summarized their foraging ability, “The general results show that Waker and Webster were good foragers.”¹³⁸

Foraging continued even in spite of adequate rations, particularly for desired meals. Near Whitehouse, Virginia on September 16th, Albert N. Hubbard described that while they received enough rations from Uncle Sam, their drummer went out foraging and returned with a hen, which he then cooked, feeding three of them.¹³⁹ While Alvin Voris described that “Uncle Samuel furnishes the boys with food and clothing in part,” he measured, “the balance we can do without

¹³³ Ibid., Sep. 27-28, 1864.

¹³⁴ Ibid., Oct. 24, 1864.

¹³⁵ Ibid., October 26, 1864.

¹³⁶ Lucy Rebecca Buck, *Shadows of My Heart*, 300-301. August 18, 1864.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Thomas F. Wildes, *Record of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Regiment Ohio Infantry Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion*, (Sandusky, OH: I. F. Mack & Bro., 1884), 188-189.

¹³⁹ Albert N. Hubbard, *Lot of 66 Letters by Albert Newell Hubbard*, 34th Massachusetts Infantry, 1862-1865, Sep. 17, 1864, UVA.

or steal from the enemy.”¹⁴⁰ Charles Godfrey Leland, a Pennsylvania emergency militiaman, explained that he quickly developed an “Indian-like instinct” when it came to foraging, something he considered deeply imbedded in his nature. When his command approached a house, he became an expert “at divining, by the look of wagons or pails or hencoops, whether there was meal or bread or a mill [meal] anywhere near.”¹⁴¹ A fellow comrade, R. W. Gilder remembered, “being so starved as to eat crackers that had fallen on the ground” and grains of wheat directly from the field.¹⁴² Foraging did not always disturb private property as soldiers collected wild berries along the Blue Ridge. Ted Barclay, a soldier in the Stonewall Brigade, recorded his brief departure “to gather some blackberries to make a pie.”¹⁴³ He underscored their reliance upon the edibles, “We have been living on theme since we came across the ridge.”¹⁴⁴

Foraging did not stop while in their own territory. Mary Fastnacht recalled her family’s hunger for fresh bread on July 4th, after eating quick substitutes such as corncakes for most of the week. Her mother accordingly stayed up most of the previous night baking. “When my Father got home, he said to Mother, ‘I guess your bread is gone.’ Mother wouldn’t believe it, but he was right – not a bit left. Our own men had taken it all.”¹⁴⁵ John O. Casler, a member of the Stonewall Brigade, continued his foraging exploits in Virginia as he had done in Pennsylvania. Following the Gettysburg Campaign, while near Orange Court House, a guard was posted near a large field of sweet corn. Members or their pioneer company would “steal a few ears of corn,”

¹⁴⁰ Alvi Voris, *Civil War Letters of Colonel Alvin Voris*, *Harrisonburg Rockingham Historical Society*, Dayton, Virginia, 59. Voris further specified that the officers were not quite so well off, but made shifts to get enough to eat and drink.

¹⁴¹ Charles Godfrey Leland, *Memoirs*. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1893), 264.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 268.

¹⁴³ Ted Barclay, *Letters from the Stonewall Brigade, 1861-1864*, ed. Charles W. Turner (Natural Bridge Station, VA: Rockbridge Publishing Company, 1992), 99. August 3, 1864.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Mary Fastnacht, *Memories of the Battle of Gettysburg*, ed. Timothy H. Smith and Andrew I. Dalton, *Civilian Account Series 2* (Gettysburg, PA: Adams County Historical Society), 10.

hiding them under their jackets while they visited the brigade encampment. Moreover, as the field was located along the Rapidan River and no guards protected its borders, they would cleverly swim down the river with sacks, fill their sacks with corn, and then swim back. “We managed in that way to steal about half the corn that was in the field,” recalled Casler, “although it was guarded night and day as long as we remained in that camp.”¹⁴⁶ An ordnance officer, Captain James M. Garnett, recorded near Waynesboro on September 29th that while spending the night near Early’s Headquarters he “had to plunder a field of corn to get feed for our horses.”¹⁴⁷ Minor military actions even corresponded to the need for select eatables. When Early learned of “a fine lot of hogs” within the enemy skirmish line outside of Halltown in August of 1864, he immediately ordered Gordon’s Division to secure the hogs. The mission proved successful “and that night all had pork for supper.”¹⁴⁸

The destruction of fences was another negative impact incident to the movement and fighting of the armies. Fences were broken-down during battle, so as to afford the ability to maneuver extended lines of troops, and throughout the campaign to allow an ease of movement. Sections of torn down fence could be reconstructed, but fences were also utilized as a source of dry wood for cooking and boiling water. The British military observer, Lieutenant - Colonel Sir Arthur Fremantle, moving northward with McLaws division, observed “that the moment they entered Pennsylvania the troops opened the fences and enlarged the road about twenty yards on

¹⁴⁶ John O. Casler, *Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade*, 2nd ed. (Girard, KS: Appeal Publishing Company, 1906), 188.

¹⁴⁷ James Mercer Garnett, “Diary of Captain James M. Garnett: Ordnance Officer Rodes Division, 2nd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. From August 5th to November 30th, 1864, Covering Part of General Early’s Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley,” *Southern Historical Society Papers* 27 (January – December 1899): 10.

¹⁴⁸ John H. Worsham, *One of Jackson’s Foot Cavalry: His Experience and What He Saw During the War, 1861-1865, Including a History of “F Company,” Richmond, VA., 21st Regiment Virginia Infantry, Second Brigade, Jackson’s Division, Second Corps, A. N. VA.* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1912), 250.

each side, which enabled the wagons and themselves to proceed together.”¹⁴⁹ He further specified however, “tis is the only damage I saw done by the Confederates.”¹⁵⁰ Colonel Richard Beale, in command of the 9th Virginia Cavalry, described how they disassembled sections of fences at Hanover on June 30th and at Gettysburg on July 3rd, so as to allow their cavalry to charge. In observation of the Gettysburg battlefield after the fighting, Albertus McCreary described, “The fences were all down; only a few posts, here and there, were left, like sentinels on guard.”¹⁵¹ During the skirmishing outside of Harrisburg, Robert A. Welsh, described that they had to utilize a different source of wood for their fires, since their “Johnnie friends had burned all the fences in sight.”¹⁵² In other localities however, Welsh specified, “In places the fences were down; in others, intact.”¹⁵³

After the Battle of Cedar Creek, Sheridan’s army established their winter quarters in the midst of Bartonsville and Springdale, the Barton’s family plantation, as well as the surrounding countryside. Robert T. Barton remembered “the beautiful farm was per force surrendered to absolute devastation. The fences, stone and plank were destroyed; the pretty woods cuts down; and the fields were marked and crossed with miry roads. In the general destruction one old horse, an old carriage and one or two cows alone escaped.”¹⁵⁴ Near the close of the war, Irwin C. Fox, observed below Winchester that “most of the Country is striped of fences and many of the houses deserted.”¹⁵⁵ In a trip to Charlestown from Harpers Ferry after the war, John T.

¹⁴⁹ Sir Arthur Fremantle and Frank A. Haskell, *Two Views of Gettysburg*, ed. Richard Harwell (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1964), 22-23.

¹⁵⁰ Sir Arthur Fremantle, *Two Views of Gettysburg*, 23.

¹⁵¹ Albertus McCreary, “Gettysburg: A Boy’s Experience of the Battle,” *McClure’s Magazine* 33 (July 1909): 251.

¹⁵² Robert A. Welsh, *Civil War Memoirs of Robert A. Welsh, 1912-1913*, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 7.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁵⁴ Margaretta Barton Colt, ed. *Defend The Valley*, 343.

¹⁵⁵ Irwin C. Fox, *Civil War Diary of Irwin C. Fox, 1861-1865*, call number: MSS 12086. UVA. April 5, 1865.

Trowbridge depicted, “We passed through a region of country stamped all over by the devastating heel of war. For miles not a fence or cultivated field was visible.”¹⁵⁶ A Union man from Winchester informed him, “It is just like this all the way up the Shenandoah Valley.”¹⁵⁷

Fields of grain and hay were also negatively impacted by the presence of armies, due to columns on the march traversing the open ground, often because of poor weather conditions or the necessity of accelerating their movements, encampments, the pasturing of horses and stock, and the necessity of tactical movements on the battlefield. Charles Edward Lippitt was glad to see that they were “allowed to walk through wheat fields &c.,” during their march through Marion and Chambersburg, instead of being confined to the “muddy roads.”¹⁵⁸ In Chambersburg, William H. Boyle wrote, “Many farms are destroyed by roads over them and encampments upon them.”¹⁵⁹ When Early’s troops passed through Gettysburg, Robert McClean expressed, “We had the honor of having one of their camps on our farm, about a mile from town.”¹⁶⁰ The Confederates “did comparatively little damage, except where they encamped,” relieving them of some of their fences, hay, and straw.¹⁶¹ Because of the Battle of Gettysburg, his family also sustained damage to their farm. “There artillery made roads over the grain fields, destroyed fences, injured the barn, and did other damage.”¹⁶² Near Fairfield, George M. Neese detailed that they positioned their guns in a bountiful field of wheat, standing nearly as high as his head and

¹⁵⁶ John T. Trowbridge, *The South: A Tour of Its Battlefields and Ruined Cities, A Journey Through the Desolated States and Talks with the People* (Hartford, CT: L. Stebbins, 1866), 69.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Charles Edward Lippitt, *Diary of Lippitt, Charles Edward* (1863), VS.

¹⁵⁹ William H. Boyle, *William H. Boyle to Isaac H. McCauley, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 5 July 1863*, The Gilder Lehman Collection, GLC09180.02.

¹⁶⁰ Robert McClean.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

thickly planted, all ready for harvest. He accordingly assessed that it was rather “a shame to have war in such a field of wheat.”¹⁶³

When Sheridan advanced up the Valley toward Harrisonburg after the victory at Fisher’s Hill, in order to hasten the pursuit of Early’s forces, the artillery, ambulances, and baggage wagons moved over the Valley pike, while the infantry and much of the cavalry marched in several columns on both sides of the road, damaging crops alongside the roadway.¹⁶⁴ Jacob Hildebrand recorded that when the Federals again advanced up the Valley in March of 1865 a neighbor brought her horse to his farm for him to feed it hay, since “the Yankees fed all their hay & corn when encamped on their farm.”¹⁶⁵

Conventional warfare also included the destruction of military targets, whether publicly or privately owned, particularly relating to the enemy’s infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities, such as railroads, bridges, telegraph lines, and iron furnaces. Both armies targeted a variety of these essential establishments for the prosecution of the war.

While Sheridan’s Valley Campaign brought forth greater destruction than the impacts of conventional warfare, neither campaign degenerated into warfare which targeted civilians directly, often seen throughout much of the twentieth century, as commanders targeted property rather than persons. Although Federal leaders envisioned and then implemented a policy of “hard war,” which intentionally targeted civilian property, such destruction was limited to strategic targets which contributed to the agricultural production within the areas engaged. Grant’s orders, first given to Hunter and then to Sheridan, directing the destruction of the Valley’s agricultural

¹⁶³ George M. Neese *Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery*, 189.

¹⁶⁴ George T. Stevens, *Three Years in the Sixth Corps: A Concise Narrative of Events in the Army of the Potomac, From 1861 to the Close of the Rebellion, April, 1865*, 1st ed. (Albany, NY: S. R. Gray, Publisher, 1866), 409.

¹⁶⁵ Jacob R. Hildebrand, *A Mennonite Journal, 1862-1865*, 56.

production, excluded the burning of private homes. “It is not desirable that buildings should be destroyed they should rather be protected.”¹⁶⁶ Grant also stressed that an explanation of the military necessity be provided to the civilians, that is, “the people should be informed that so long as any army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.”¹⁶⁷ Accordingly, on August 16th, prior to implementing the destructive orders throughout the Lower Valley, Sheridan ordered Torbert that although he was to destroy hay and wheat and seize stock, “No houses will be burned, and officers in charge of this delicate, but necessary, duty must inform the people that the object is to make this Valley untenable for the raiding parties of the rebel army.”¹⁶⁸ Merritt later described that in implementing this order, though they drove off cattle and other livestock and burned grain, “No other private property was injured, nor were families molested.”¹⁶⁹ Before the destruction of the Upper Valley during the withdrawal from Harrisonburg to Strasburg, commencing on October 6th, Sheridan reported, “The most positive orders were given, however, not to burn dwellings.”¹⁷⁰ In his orders to Merritt directing the destruction of the upper portions of Fauquier and much of Loudoun counties, given on November 27th, Sheridan specified “that no dwellings are to be burned, and that no personal violence be offered the citizens.”

Although houses were not targeted for strategic destruction, they were sometimes burned as a matter of retaliation for actual or perceived abuses to the laws of war, such as at Dayton. In

¹⁶⁶ U.S. Government Printing Office, *The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, series I, vol. 43, part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 698 (hereafter cited as OR [Official Records] and all references refer to series I).

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Sheridan to Torbert, Hdqs. Middle Military Division, Cedar Creek, Aug. 16, 1864. OR, vol. 43 (1): 43.

¹⁶⁹ Wesley Merritt, “Destroying, Burning: Sheridan in The Shenandoah Valley,” in *Battles and Leaders of The Civil War*, ed. Ned Bradford, 1 vol. ed. (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979), 538.

¹⁷⁰ OR, vol. 43, (1): 50; Headquarters Military Division of the Gulf New Orleans, Feb. 3, 1866, Following Report of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, Aug. 4, 1864, commenced; Frank M. Flinn, *Campaigning with Banks and Sheridan*, 2nd ed. (Boston: W. B. Clarke & Co., 1889), 205.

other cases, some houses may have burned from individual retaliatory actions, an accidental spreading of the flames, as occurred at Woodstock, or the intentional burning of their own homes by refugees moving northward, knowing that they would never return.¹⁷¹ Even so, civilians themselves never became intentional targets and murders committed against civilians were a rarity. During the entirety of the Gettysburg Campaign only one murder appears in the historical record. Charles Edward Lippitt heard of the incident, “Tis said one murder was committed by a Southern soldier, but as the parties were drunk I did not here what was done with the men.”¹⁷² The *Franklin Repository* mentioned the murder of Mr. Strite, “a peaceful and inoffensive citizen. According to the paper, three rebels from Hill’s Corps ventured to his farm three miles south of Chambersburg on the Greencastle Road and robbed him. A short time later, two more soldiers arrived for the same purpose, but when he refused, they murdered him.”¹⁷³ Major John Cheves Haskell, an artillery officer in Hood’s Division, only heard of “one act of violence, the murder

¹⁷¹ George Washington Nichols, a private in the 61st Georgia, observed houses burning during both the Federal advance up the Valley and their withdrawal down the Valley. He stated that most of the houses in the countryside burned, but those in town were spared. George Washington Nichols, *A Soldier’s Story of His Regiment (61st Georgia) And Incidentally of the Lawton-Gordon-Evans Brigade Army of Northern Virginia*, intro, by Keith S. Bohannon (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2011), 192. According to William H. Martin, his unit alone burned some 60 houses. William H. Martin to His Wife, Oct. 11, 1864. Quoted in Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 183. Henry Keiser described that some individual soldiers attempted to burn Winchester on Aug. 17, 1864, in retaliation for the burning of Chambersburg, but the flames were quickly extinguished. Quoted in Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 183. Carolyn Taylor wrote in her letter to her sister on Dec. 3, 1864, “I have heard of several houses being burned by the fire from other buildings, none around here except Israel Young’s. Carolyn Taylor, Letter, Carrie Taylor to Her Sister, 3 December 1864, Taylor Family Papers, 1817-1872 (SC 0097), Folder5, Thomas Balch Library, Leesburg, Virginia. Also located in Civil War Research Collection, (SC0095). Thomas Russell Smith described, “During the burning the brick walls of the house were so hot you could scarcely hold the hand on them & had the wind changed to the north, the house would certainly have burned too.” Thomas Russell Smith, *Reminiscences*, 1908 ((SC 0098), Thomas Balch Library, Leesburg, Virginia. Hotchkiss recorded in his journal on Oct. 6, “A good many Dunkers left the country and went with the Yankees. They burned some of the houses they deserted.” OR, vol. 43 (1): 578.

¹⁷² Charles Edward Lippitt.

¹⁷³ *Franklin Repository*, July 15, 1863, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

and robbery of an old man, and the first news we got of it was the sight of two murderers, hanging by the roadside, having been executed by General Lee's orders."¹⁷⁴

During Sheridan's Valley Campaign, David Getz, "a simple minded," young man of about thirty years old, was murdered, despite his intellectual deficiency, which exempted him from military service, after being accused of guerilla activity. "The fact that Davy was mentally deficient was doubted by no one," described John H Grabill. Indeed, "A single glance at his countenance would convince any one."¹⁷⁵ He did however own an old musket for hunting small game and one day, while engaged in the sport, near his hometown of Woodstock, Federal soldiers demanded to know whether he was a bushwhacker. Not knowing the terminology and not understanding the implication of the accusation, Getz replied, "Why, yes." He was immediately taken prisoner and eventually taken forty-five miles to Bridgewater to face his execution, despite the pleas of the citizenry of the town, including numerous women, Moses Walton, a distinguished lawyer, and a few Union men, including Adolph Heller, whose home Custer and Torbert occasionally established their headquarters within, who beseeched General Custer to release the innocent man, but to no avail.¹⁷⁶

During both campaigns, the contending armies treated women and children with exceptional respect. While many men often refuged to secure the family's livestock, many women often stayed behind, to look after the family homestead, despite being in the midst of the enemy armies. Rather than concern over sexual assault, often a fear when a victorious army

¹⁷⁴ John Cheves Haskell, *The Haskell Memoirs*, ed. Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), 48.

¹⁷⁵ John H. Grabill, "The Murder of David Getz: An Instance of the Brutality of Custer," *Southern Historical Society Papers* 27 (1899): 372. Written to the editor of the *Richmond Dispatch*, from Woodstock, Virginia, Feb. 10, 1900, Published by the *Richmond Dispatch*, Feb. 18, 1900.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 372-374. Grabill knew the Getz family and wrote his account after having talked to persons who were present and are still living in Woodstock.

entered enemy territory throughout much of the twentieth century, women were often upset over the entering of their private dwellings, particularly their bedrooms, which as a matter of Victorian mores was not deemed appropriate.

Before crossing into Pennsylvania, Evans wrote home to his wife, “but for you I should enjoy an invasion very much,” illustrating the moderating influence of loved ones at home.¹⁷⁷ Robert Stiles, at one point while in Pennsylvania, rode up to the fence in a front yard and asked an elderly lady for a drink of water from the well. Permission was granted and he thanked her. He then met the lady’s daughter and two sons. The five- or six-year-old trembled at the thought of the vaunted rebels and accordingly hid in the bed, but in a few minutes, when he ascertained the friendliness which Stiles displayed, became best of friends with the rebel. The ten- or twelve-year-old boy then arrived, inquiring, “Mother, mother! May I go to camp with the rebels? They are the nicest men I ever saw in my life. They are going to camp right out here in the woods, and they are going to have a dance, too!”¹⁷⁸ Despite this being Harry Hays’ Louisiana Brigade, which civilians often feared, due to rumors spread indicating a poor reputation concerning their conduct toward civilians, the mother, despite initial hesitation, granted her son permission to attend, after the Frenchmen in the brigade promised that he would ensure his safe treatment.¹⁷⁹ When Major Henry Kyd Douglass, Ed Johnson’s assistant adjutant general, was wounded at the Battle of Gettysburg and left behind, his mother and sister traveled from their home on the Potomac through both armies to Gettysburg. He thought that for a non-combatant to travel through enemy territory “was a reckless thing to do.”¹⁸⁰ But “from the time they left home, during the several

¹⁷⁷ Evans, 205. June 17, 1863, Darksville, Virginia.

¹⁷⁸ Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert*, (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1903), 200-201.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 202.

¹⁸⁰ Henry Kyd Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 253.

days they were on the journey, they met with no disagreeable incident, nor a discourteous word. They came and went in absolute safety and when blocked by artillery or cavalry or wagon trains they were helped on their way.”¹⁸¹ Jacob Yost became “terror-stricken,” when about a dozen or more Yankees confronted his grandmother barring entrance to their smokehouse. But when he saw “They were good-natured and were laughing at her efforts to bar them from the spoils,” he considered, “it gradually dawned on me that if they would not hurt Grandmother they would not hurt me, so I mustered up courage and went out to the smoke-house.”¹⁸²

Unoccupied houses often suffered worse than those in which the inhabitants remained, namely, due to the reality that soldiers had little qualms taking what they required, or in some cases that which they wanted, from empty dwellings, but when forced to face the human aspect upon which their requirements or wants impacted, they shied away from confrontation, deeming the hassle not worth the time, or their conscience dictated that they leave things alone. When confronted by individuals who remained at home, or who watched over the residences of their neighbors, private property was respected to a greater degree. John N. Opie met an “angry woman” while engaged in the “disagreeable business” of collecting horses for the artillery. She shouted, “You will have to take that horse out of here over my dead body, you nasty Rebel.”¹⁸³ John Opie decided to leave the horse and move on to the next farm hoping to avoid such a confrontation. There are three things which I fear,” recollected Opie, “women, snakes, and lightning.”¹⁸⁴ Anna Garlach told of a Rebel soldier who burst into her family's Baltimore Street residence and mounted to the second floor. Her mother protested, "You can't go up there. You will draw fire on this house full of defenseless women and children." Accordingly, the man

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Jacob Yost, *Memoirs*, 63.

¹⁸³ John N. Opie, *A Rebel Cavalryman with Lee, Stuart and Jackson*, 177.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 177-178.

departed.¹⁸⁵ Robert McClean observed some Confederate soldiers who began to open a kitchen window of an unoccupied neighbor's house and expressed his wish that they "would respect private property."¹⁸⁶ He was pleasantly surprised when his little endeavor proved successful and "was regarded rather unexpectedly."¹⁸⁷

In Newtown, John M. Steele remembered during Sheridan's withdrawal in August that a Federal soldier entered their house and took a loaf of bread. Confronted by one of the family, who pleaded, "Please give me back that bread. It is all we have," the soldier "looked her in the eye for a minute [and] then handed it to her saying he couldn't stand that, [and] walked away like a gentleman, muttering that he couldn't stand no lady begging him for bread."¹⁸⁸ Unfortunately, another soldier was not so charitable and ended up taking the bread.¹⁸⁹

Many civilians were even able to influence the conduct of soldiers, by appealing to the men's needs, and who knew they were under orders to respect private property. William H. Bayly stressed that by serving a good meal his mother "secured the goodwill of an officer who placed a guard on the premises."¹⁹⁰ John M. Steele described, "When we would hear of the approach of an invading army, we would generally prepare for them, by fixing something good for them to eat, as we nearly found them hungry," both to make a profit selling eatables and to influence their behavior.¹⁹¹ Jacob Yost considered his grandmother a "real diplomat." In anticipation of Federal foraging parties, she ordered "mammy" to bake a lot of biscuits. Although

¹⁸⁵ Anna (Garlach) Kitzmiller, "Mrs. Kitzmiller's Story," *The Gettysburg Compiler*, August 23, 1905.

¹⁸⁶ Robert McClean.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ *Between the Lines: The Civil War Diaries, Letters and Memoirs of the Steele Family of Newtown*, 240-241.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 241.

¹⁹⁰ William H. Bayly, *Memoir of a Thirteen-year-old Boy Relating to the Battle of Gettysburg*, ACHS

¹⁹¹ *Between the Lines: The Civil War Diaries, Letters and Memoirs of the Steele Family of Newtown*, 250.

the Federal soldiers quickly found the hams, they brought out biscuits, with apple butter and milk, which quickly garnered the attention of the soldiers. Afterward, a “further search of the premises was perfunctory.”¹⁹²

Officers from both armies, despite enforcing official requisitions and targeted destruction, often ensured soldiers did not loot and plunder. A few soldiers operating under the guise of searching for Yankees, entered Catherine Foster’s home. “I remonstrated,” wrote Foster, “informing them that their officers had repeatedly searched the day before. They swore at their officers and said they would search for themselves.”¹⁹³ They demanded fifty dollars from her father, pointing a gun at him in order to facilitate the forfeiture of money. When they were told he did not have fifty dollars, they demanded what he had, which only amounted to three dollars, and after pointing a gun at him and then swearing at him, they left. She reported the conduct of the two “desperadoes” to officers by the doorway who “said I should have come to the door immediately and sent word by any one to General Rhodes on the next corner, Middle Street. But they assured me we should be guarded another night. Accordingly, Captain Kitchen, I think of North Carolina, came and presented the men who were to protect our house. We were not again disturbed in two succeeding nights and days.”¹⁹⁴ Near Waynesboro, during Sheridan’s last advance up the Valley in March of 1865, some Federal soldiers raided the smoke house of Dewitt Gallaher’s mother, taking her hams and broke into the pantry on the back porch taking more items. Later, Dr. Hunter McGuire, recently paroled, and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Forsythe, Sheridan’s Chief of Staff, visited the house for a meal. While preparing their meal, she

¹⁹² Jacob Yost, 64.

¹⁹³ Catherine Mary White Foster, “Battle of Gettysburg: A Citizen’s Eyewitness Account of the Battle of Gettysburg, with Background on the Foster Family Union Soldiers,” ed. David A. Murdoch, ACHS, also in Adams County History 1, no 5 (1995): 51-52.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

appealed to Lieutenant Vail for protection who “at once gave her a guard and drove the thieving rascals off.”¹⁹⁵ Forsythe offered protection for the family and “also stopped their plundering and burning down at the Tanyard nearby.”¹⁹⁶

Furthermore, military technology, designed for linear tactics upon the battlefield, was not as destructive of civilian residences or dangerous to civilians themselves, compared to contemporary modern warfare, so long as the bombardment was not intentional and concentrated in its purposes. Civilians could find adequate shelter in their basements, which if done so in the twentieth century, there still existed a good chance of death. When the citizens of Carlisle awoke on the morning of July 2nd, they discovered the Confederates gone and the town marred with marks of an artillery engagement. However, the damage was comparatively minimal. James Sullivan even expressed that “in comparison with my vexations of this day,” which included a toothache, “the shelling had been fun.”¹⁹⁷ He considered that the term “damage” “might suggest exaggeration of the total effects of the shelling.”¹⁹⁸ Although the town looked much altered to John K. Stayman, upon his return home, he had no doubt the town would be revived to its former state of existence. Business would revive when the merchants returned their goods and the farmers harvested their crops, and buildings could be repaired with a little brick-and-mortar. But he questioned whether the government would rebuild the barracks, which had suffered the most. “They are now a heap of ruins,” described Stayman. He considered it paramount that the

¹⁹⁵ Dewitt Clinton Gallaher, *Diary of DeWitt Clinton Gallaher (1864-1865)*. Note March 1865, March 1, 1865.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Sullivan, 61.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

barracks were immediately rebuilt and “in even better style than before,” so as not to leave a permanent stain of the rebel visit on Pennsylvania soil.¹⁹⁹

Civilian casualties were also miniscule. Despite over 50,000 soldier casualties, encompassing about 5,000 immediate deaths, at the Battle of Gettysburg, only one civilian, Mary Virginia “Jennie” Wade, died directly from the fighting, demonstrating that only armed combatants remained the targets of the contending armies.²⁰⁰ During the Battle of Third Winchester, Mary Greenhow Lee depicted, “shells flying around all the time,” including one which burst over a nearby house. Illustrative of the general safety for civilians however, as most of the fighting occurred outside of the town to the east, she described that Bob, just wounded acting as a volunteer aide to Ramseur, in concern for the safety of Lee and the other women on the street from the danger of the passing shells, “implored us to go to the cellar, but we laughed at the idea, though the shells were screaming round us.”²⁰¹

In most instances, prisoners were treated as non-combatants. Exceptions to the rule included instances in which violations of the rules of war, or perceptions thereof, nullified non-combatant immunity, such as guerilla activity outside of a military organization or the destruction of civilian property. Francis Lieber explained, “It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in hatred and revenge, to give no quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that it will not give, and therefore will not expect, quarter.”²⁰² Waddell observed on June 22,

¹⁹⁹ John K. Stayman, Letter from John K. Stayman to Edgar E. Hastings July 1863, Location, I-MachemerA-1975-1, Dickinson College Archives.

²⁰⁰ Mary Virginia Wade, “Jennie Wade,” in *Marial Deeds of Pennsylvania* by Samuel Bates (Philadelphia: T. H. Davis & Co. 1875), 1109-1110, ACHS.

²⁰¹ Mary Greenhow Lee, *The Civil War Journal of Mary Greenhow Lee*, 416.

²⁰² Francis Lieber, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field or General Order No. 100* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863.) Lieber added a caveat that a commander may be permitted to do so “in great straights,” when threatened with his own survival and was unable to encumber himself with prisoners.

1863 when Federal prisoners captured from the Second Battle of Winchester marched through Staunton, en route to Richmond by rail, that they “were much better clad than their captors who guarded them.”²⁰³ On June 26th, in Gettysburg, an officer helped Henry Jacobs pass the guard and visit with some of the prisoners of the 26th P.V.M. resting on the steps of a church. He was very much surprised by the encounter. “The courteous treatment was certainly very different from anything I expected to receive.”²⁰⁴ After the fighting on July 1st subsided, Albertus McCreary articulated that the Confederate soldiers and their Union prisoners “seemed to be on the best of terms, and laughed and chatted like old comrades.”²⁰⁵

Although “miserable cowards, . . . who bullied and mistreated unfortunate prisoners when they had the power to do so,” existed in both armies, reflected John L. Collins, a cavalryman in the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, captured during the pursuit of Lee after the Battle of Gettysburg, “the true soldier never did, and I never saw anything but kindness shown to the prisoners that my regiment took, and I never experienced anything but kindness from the men who guarded me from Gettysburg to Staunton.”²⁰⁶

James F. Crocker, captured at Pickett’s Charge, as a former graduate of Pennsylvania College, was conferred with a “great honor — the honor of personal confidence — absolute confidence,” as Federal authorities presented him with a pass to freely walk about town, as he put it, so as to “avail myself of the opportunity of getting a new suit.”²⁰⁷ He thought, “They

²⁰³ Waddell, Diary, June 22, 1863.

²⁰⁴ Henry Eyster Jacobs, *Memoirs of Henry Eyster Jacobs*, ed. Henry E. Horn (Huntingdon, PA: Church Management Service, Inc., 1974), 52.

²⁰⁵ Albertus McCreary, 246.

²⁰⁶ John L. Collins, “My Sight Left Me and I Threw Myself Down on the Roadside to Die: A Prisoner’s March From Gettysburg to Staunton,” in *Battles and Leaders of The Civil War*, ed. Ned Bradford, 1 vol. ed. (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979), 408. Collins did however face several abuses, including a Confederate officer demanding his spurs and threats to kill him, if he did not continue marching. An officer however ensured he was not killed and instead he was transported by wagon.

²⁰⁷ James F. Crocker, “Prison Reminiscences,” in *Gettysburg – Pickett’s Charge and Other War Addresses*, orig. 1915 (Charlotte, NC: Strait Gate Publications, 2010), 54.

somehow knew—I know not how—that I could be trusted; that my honor was more to me than my life.”²⁰⁸ When a slight injury on his lip did not heal, while imprisoned on Davis Island, New York and such an operation performed in prison had the likelihood of going gangrene, he was once more given parole to attend to the malady. He described, “I again had the freedom of a Northern city. And although I walked the streets in Confederate gray, no one showed the slightest exception to it or showed me the least affront.”²⁰⁹

Elisha Hunt Rhodes stated the presence of Rebel surgeons providing care to their wounded in Strasburg, who were given paroles to do so.²¹⁰ John Blue conveyed that even though it was well known by Yankee scouts that he was recuperating from a wound, received during the Gettysburg Campaign, at his father’s house near Romney, then within Federal lines, he was not troubled in any form. Indeed, Blue remarked, “The Yankees treated me in this respect with great consideration.”²¹¹ One day, a local Union man informed a Federal Captain leading a scouting expedition of his presence and it would now be a good time to secure his capture. The captain sarcastically replied, “yes it would be a good time to go down there and leave one corpse dressed in gray and bring back a half dozen dressed in blue.”²¹² He knew Blue and thought that it would be better to “leave him alone while he is doing no harm.”²¹³

There were several factors which helped to modify the worst abuses possible in warfare. Some historians have referred to the Civil War as a war between brothers, sometimes in the literal sense, but certainly so as a whole. In nearly all wars, even in those in the twentieth

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 75

²¹⁰ Elisha Hunt Rhodes, 186-187. September 27, 1864.

²¹¹ John Blue, *Hanging Rock Rebel*, 212. Blue was from Romney, in Hampshire County.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

century, there exists, most typically, a sense of common brotherhood among the soldiery fighting on the front lines, emanating from honor due to the profession, but this was particularly apparent in the fighting exhibited in Pennsylvania and Virginia during the Civil War. The common idealized perception of soldiers trading tobacco for coffee in the east certainly existed, especially when camp life and the absence of fighting brought forth boredom. For instance, after the armies had settled down into winter quarters following the Gettysburg Campaign, John Blue relayed that pickets from the warring armies met on an island, considered to be neutral ground, to trade tobacco, coffee, saddles, newspapers, and even arms, partaking in card games, without mentioning the war.²¹⁴ Samuel D. Buck also remembered that “the men talked and traded papers,” and “joked with each other,” while positioned along the Rappahannock River in the fall of 1863.²¹⁵

Additionally, the principal commanders in the contending armies were well acquainted with one another from their training at West Point and from their common experiences in the United States military, during the Mexican American War and in times of peace. For example, Custer and Rosser, whose cavalry squared off at Tom’s Brook, and later at Lacy’s Spring, were classmates at West Point. Preceding the battle, the two partook in a general display of acknowledgement toward one another, reminiscent of an honorable duel and characteristic of civilized warfare. Rosser described the incident, “With my field glasses I easily recognized Custer as he rode along in front of his line and he evidently recognized me about the same time, for he wheeled his horse around facing me and gallantly raised his hat and made me a profound

²¹⁴ John Blue, *Hanging Rock Rebel: Lt. John Blue’s War in West Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley*, ed. Dan Oates (Shippensburg, PA: The Bird Street Press Publication, 1994), 224.

²¹⁵ Samuel D. Buck, *With the Old Confeds: Actual Experiences of a Captain in the Line* (Baltimore: H. e. Houck & Co., 1925), 91.

bow, which I returned, as the men sent up a deafening cheer. Then, as his bugles sounded the charge, on came his dark battalions with the fury of a might cyclone.”²¹⁶

Most of the prominent military commanders of both armies, sometimes in contrast to some civilians and particular civil leaders, were never so ideological as to form a dogmatic hatred for the enemy, though a disdain for the opposing cause could certainly appear evident. General Pickett, for instance, exemplified this sentiment in a letter to his future wife, Sally.

NEVER could quite enjoy being a ‘Conquering Hero.’ No, my dear, there is something radically wrong about my Hurrahism. I can fight for a cause I know to be just, can risk my own life and the lives of those in my keeping without a thought of the consequences; but when we’ve conquered, when we’ve downed the enemy and won the victory, I don’t want to hurrah. I want to go off all by myself and be sorry for them — want to lie down in the grass, away off in the woods somewhere or in some lone valley on the hillside far from all human sound, and rest my soul and put my heart to sleep and get back some thing — I don’t know what — but something I had that is gone from me—something subtle and unexplainable—something I never knew I had till I had lost it — till it was gone – gone-gone!²¹⁷

Due to the proximity of the fighting to the border, relations and acquaintances sometimes even helped to alleviate a policy of destruction. For instance, Ewell wrote to Lizzie, whose mother was a native of York, Pennsylvania, “I don’t know yet if we will go to York – anyhow we will be tolerably close to it. I will let your relations off tolerably easy on your account – probably not taking more than a few forks and spoons and trifles of that sort – no house burning or anything like that.”²¹⁸ Cassandra Morris Small relayed that “General Gordon said he knew all about the

²¹⁶ Thomas L. Rosser, *Riding with Rosser*, ed. S. Roger Keller (Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1997), 47.

²¹⁷ George E. Pickett, *The Heart of a Soldier: As Revealed in the Intimate Letters of Genl. George E. Pickett C.S.A.* (New York: Seth Moyle, 1913), 81.

²¹⁸ Richard S. Ewell, *The Making of a Soldier*, 121.

Smalls,” and as such he determined “their mills shouldn’t be touched.” She supposed that “Ewell and Trimble must have spoken about them.”²¹⁹

Both sides also shared a common influence, which helped to modify the worst effects of warfare, that is, their shared Christian faith. Although entering “Yankeedom,” William N. Pendleton, wrote of the necessity of Christian obedience, the mindset of which certainly helped to lessen the negative abuses inherent to the movements of an army operating within enemy territory, “May the Lord go with us to restrain from evil, uphold in duty, strengthen for efficient service, protect from injury, and guide to victory, justice, and peace!”²²⁰ Following the Battle of Gettysburg, private charities, including the Sanitary and Christian Commissions, along with the Sisters of the Poor, provided invaluable aid to the wounded suffering in temporary hospitals. Sallie Broadhead deemed this “merciful work,” which was “aided by private contributions.”²²¹ She insisted, “Without the relief they furnished, thousands must have perished miserably, and thousands more have suffered from want of the delicacies, food and clothing their agents distributed, before the Government even could bring assistance. They are God’s blessed agencies for providing for the needy soldier. . . . Whoever aids them is engaged in the noblest work on earth, and will be amply rewarded even here, to make no mention of hereafter.”²²²

Henry Kyd Douglas recalled the Christian charity afforded him and his comrades by the Picking family near Hunterstown, after suffering a wound at Gettysburg. Some of the wounded Confederates, in order to express their thankfulness for the charity displayed, when they

²¹⁹ Cassandra Morris Small, Cassandra Morris Small, “Letters of ’63,” Cassandra Morris Small Papers, York County Heritage Trust, 13.

²²⁰ William Nelson Pendleton, *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton*, ed. Susan P. Lee (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1893), 280. June 23, 1863.

²²¹ Sallie Broadhead, *The Diary of a Lady of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: From June 15 to July 15, 1863* (The Cornell University Library Digital Collections), 25.

²²² *Ibid.*

recovered, helped the Pennsylvanian civilian harvest his wheat. Douglas reflected, “God, every now and then, does make such people as Mr. and Mrs. Henry Picking and breathes into them his spirit of Christian charity, benevolence, and unpretentious nobility, to let the world know to what a high place he could lift up mankind – if they would only let him. But he doesn’t make such often.”²²³ One’s faith also helped to alleviate distress which the war brought civilians. Rachel Cormany, worried about her husband, especially with communication cut to the outside world during the Confederate occupations of Chambersburg, she inscribed in her journal that in addition to keeping herself preoccupied with daily chores, she also read “about the great revivals of ‘56 & ‘57,” and accordingly she “felt much happier than in the forenoon, enjoyed a sweet season of prayer.”²²⁴

Alexander Neil remembered the Biblical injunction “Love Your Enemies, do good to those who hate you &c” and consequently provided the same medical treatment to a rebel major, from “the hotbed of secession,” Charleston, South Carolina, which he gave to his own men.²²⁵ Colonel Alvin Voris’s contrasting thoughts as to the glory of battle, in the midst of the fight at Third Winchester, and the dreadful cost realized thereafter, epitomized the distinction between fighting armed combatants on the battlefield and the engaging in the Christian duty of charity toward one’s enemy, when the fighting ceased. He wrote,

The grandest human effort I ever witnessed or ever expect to witness is a great battle. The most welcome sight I ever realized was the flight of the enemy in defeat. I cheered my men forward in the charge, I shot my pistols in the flying squads of the fleeing rebels with perfect delight . . . fiercely urging my men to . . . take all the prisoners possible, . . . But when the horrible work was all over I did really pity the poor deluded creatures who fell or were driven before us. In my deliberate moments I pray God I may never be compelled to see such sights again. The inspiration of a battle is indeed most devilish, but the after scenes fill the

²²³ Henry Kyd Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall*, 252-253.

²²⁴ Rachel Cormany, *Diary*, June 19, 1863.

²²⁵ Alexander Neil, *Alexander Neil and the Last Shenandoah Valley Campaign*, 78. November 4, 1864. From Newtown. The Confederate officer was Major Clayburne of the 2nd SC.

heart with painful regrets and sorrow. My God, what horrors a victory develops. These completely over shadow all the glories.²²⁶

During the pursuit he accordingly comforted a “poor rebel soldier who was suffering terribly and wanted his head bolstered up” by putting his overcoat under his head. In the next moment, he partook in the continued pursuit, “hoping to disable” more of the rebel soldiers.²²⁷

In a *jus in bello* comparison of both campaigns, similarities are no doubt apparent. The environment in which the campaigns were waged included military operations conducted in essentially the same valley, divided only in name north and south of the Potomac River, and nearby regions. Both areas were renowned for their natural beauty and abundant agricultural production. The armies in their offensive movements into enemy territory each encountered populations opposed or sympathetic to their cause, depending on the locality, in addition to a group of pacifist civilians, largely indifferent to the outcome of the war. Soldiers and civilians from both the North and South expressed their approval or disapproval to the types of warfare pursued.

Both campaigns brought forth the impact of conventional warfare, that which occurred incident to the movements and conduct of the armies, negatively impacting civilians. Although Sheridan’s Valley Campaign implemented a policy of “hard war,” these effects of conventional warfare were clearly visible underneath the larger destruction. Due to life on the border, numerous reports and rumors of enemy offensives constantly troubled civilians, who in consequence, often undertook preparations to protect their personal property by hiding or removing items to a safe location. Soldiers foraged, whether for official requisitions or individual needs and wants. Horses were sought as an essential component to nineteenth century warfare.

²²⁶ Alvin Voris, *Civil War Letters*, 59.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

The armies, in their movements and fighting, broke and consumed fences, changed the structure of roads, impacted crop yields, and damaged structures. Additionally, the armies sought the destruction of military targets, which would ensure strategic damage to the enemy's infrastructure and communication abilities. As a whole, as civilians saw warfare brought to their doorsteps, they endured corresponding hardships associated with the impact of conventional warfare.

Neither campaign however degenerated into the type of ideological warfare, exhibited throughout much of the twentieth century. Most importantly, the direct targeting of civilians remained out of the question. Especial concern was exhibited toward women and children. Civilians who left their houses unoccupied fared worse in the loss of, and damages to, personal property, than those who remained at home, since they could influence the conduct of the soldiers as well as appeal to officers and guards for protection. In addition, many soldiers intentionally avoided confrontation, deeming it not worth the hassle or unable to face the realities that their campaign imposed upon the populace. The overwhelming majority of the fighting occurred outside of towns on the battlefield between armed combatants and civilian casualties were minimal. Accidental or intentional shelling did some damage, but because of nineteenth-century technological capabilities, towns escaped major destruction from shelling. Non-combatant immunity included protection afforded to prisoners, the exceptions being instances in which the rules of warfare were not followed, or at least assumedly broken. Moreover, acquaintances, family relations, ideas of honor, the common experience of soldiers on the front lines, pre-war experiences, and a shared Christian faith helped to alleviate some of the worst abuses which warfare can sometimes generate.

Chapter 5: Differences

Despite several similarities between Lee's Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan's Valley Campaign, there are significant marked contrasts, related to *jus in bello* actions undertaken by the armies. Observational differences between the campaigns, with the benefit of hindsight, are certainly manifest as are observations articulated by civilians themselves. Additionally, common criticisms of Confederate actions in Pennsylvania can be compared to Federal actions in the Valley.

One major difference apparent between the campaigns, is that of policy goals, related to the waging of the war itself, and the strategy employed, in order to achieve those goals. In pursuit of securing their independence, the South held no desire to conquer Pennsylvania, but on the contrary, sought the abandonment of Federal war efforts. Though Lee's strategy was to be offensive in its execution, it remained defensive in its purpose. In the offensive movement, among other objectives, Lee sought to collect essential supplies and provender for their current and future military operations, thereby providing relief to Virginia farms and making the North fund the war. He furthermore anticipated the possibility of fighting a battle under favorable circumstances.

The North, on the other hand, sought the submission of the Southern states to Federal authority, in pursuit of permanent union. In order to achieve such a goal, Grant's strategy in the second half of 1864, employed by Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley, similarly included fighting on the battlefield, but dissimilarly, instead of the collection of supplies for continued

military operations, included the destruction of the Valley's agricultural capabilities, in order to permanently, so long as the war continued, end military operations in the area. The purposes for the destructive component of the strategy included the prevention of Confederate raids north of the Potomac and the exhaustion of Southern resources and morale.

Soldiers demonstrated that they understood the strategies pursued by their commanders. While in Pennsylvania, Confederate soldiers measured the positive effects a movement into Northern territory would generate. "Our Army will not cost the Confederacy a great deal as long as we remain in Pa.," assessed Benjamin L. Farinholt, in the 53rd Virginia. He further measured, "I suppose we will necessarily have a big fight before we leave the state."¹ He thought such a strategy the correct one. "I believe unless we do bring it home to them in this manner they would be willing to carry it on indefinitely."² While positioned near Chambersburg, Franklin Gaillard assessed, "Gen. Lee is going to support his Army over here and this will tax the people here and make them feel the war."³ John Garibaldi penned to his wife, that the people of Pennsylvania "seem to be very much unconcerned about the war, very seldom they see a soldier, and they hardly know what war is, but if the war was to be carried on there as long as it was carried on in Virginia they would learn the effects of it, and perhaps would soon be willing to make peace like we are."⁴ James Peter Williams similarly considered, "I believe the only way to end the war is to carry it into the enemy's country."⁵ Indeed, "There is one thing certain," he described. "I intend to live well when I get up there among those rich Pennsylvania Dutch. We have got to do

¹ Benjamin L. Farinholt, Benjamin L. Farinholt to Leila Farinholt, July 1, 1863, *The Valley of the Shadow: Two Communities in the American Civil War*, Virginia Center for Digital History, University of Virginia (hereafter cited as VS).

² Ibid.

³ Franklin Gaillard, Franklin Gaillard to "Sonny" Gaillard, June 28, 1863, VS.

⁴ John Garibaldi, John Garibaldi Letters, Manuscript no. 284, July 19, 1863, to wife Sarah, letter no. 14, Virginia Military Institute Archives, Lexington, Virginia. Camp Near Darksville, Berkeley County, Va.

⁵ James Peter Williams, Letters of James Peter Williams, 1861-1865, Library of Virginia. Accession Number, 25920, Richmond, Virginia, 38.

some hard fighting though & I would not be at all surprised if we fought the 3rd battle of Manassas before long.”⁶

In the Valley, soldiers from both armies also demonstrated they understood the strategy underlying Sheridan’s destruction of the Valley’s agricultural production. Geroge T. Stevens, an infantryman in the VI Corps, considered that as “cruel as it seemed,” Sheridan’s destruction of the Valley “was fully justified as a matter of military necessity,” since, as long as “a rebel army could subsist in the valley, . . . a large force must remain to guard the frontier of Maryland.”⁷ Chaplain John R. Adams assessed on October 4, 1864, “According to all appearances, the Confederates cannot rely much longer on the valley’ for supplies. What we do not forage for ourselves will be consumed by fire ere we leave.”⁸ In observation of the destruction unfolding before his eyes, Richard Henry Watkins reflected “The Yankees are seriously endeavoring to starve us into submission.”⁹ Although the Confederates thought they could “hinder any further advance,” he further assessed, “the Valley however will be left a vast scene of desolation & suffering and the Government must look elsewhere for the supplies.”¹⁰

Marked contrasts also exist in the conceptions of war held by Lee and Sheridan, which accordingly impacted the way in which their campaigns were waged. Lee’s conception of war is evident in his issuance of General Orders No. 72, detailing official regulations for the collections of supplies in Pennsylvania, and especially within General Orders No. 73, explaining the rationale behind his previous instructions. He stressed that warfare principally remain a contest

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ George T. Stevens, *Three Years in the Sixth Corps, A Concise Narrative of Events in the Army of the Potomac, From 1861 to the Close of the Rebellion, April, 1865*, 1st ed. (Albany, NY: S. R. Gray, Publisher, 1866), 411.

⁸ John R. Adams, *Memorial and Letters of Rev. John R. Adams* (Privately Printed, 1890), 159.

⁹ Richard Henry Watkins, *Send Me a Pair of Old Boots & Kiss My Little Girls: The Civil War Letters of Richard and Mary Watkins, 1861-1865*, ed. Jeff Toalson (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2009), 327. Camp near Bridgewater, Virginia, 15 miles below Staunton. October 5, 1864.

¹⁰ Ibid.

between armed combatants, that duties required by “civilization and Christianity” demanded sharp distinctions between combatant and noncombatant, public and private property, in addition to targeted and wanton destruction. Essentially Lee envisioned sharp moral barriers between right and wrong. Even though he understood limited war did not entirely eliminate abuses to the rules of warfare and disruptions to civilian life, he considered it of paramount import that the fighting remained limited in its nature, however polarizing the causes, so as to prevent an escalation of the conflict into an unlimited contest. He dismissed calls for retaliation to avenge the wrongs perpetrated against them and emphasized that the means by which the war was waged, at minimum, equaled in importance the cause for which it was waged, as he considered there “no greater disgrace,” than abandoning, or even blurring, the rules of warfare, even than that of losing the war itself.¹¹

As such, civilized war is often likened war to a duel or game between professionals, as sharp distinctions are made between combatant and noncombatant. John B. Gordon, for instance, speaking of Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign wrote of it as a “game of battle.”¹² Lee’s exceptional ability to conduct such a game of maneuver and battle, in addition to the glory, honor, comradery, duty, self-sacrifice, and other positive elements associated with warfare, did not however distract him from the negative realities of war, even within his conception of limited war, such as death, the loss of loved ones, the consumption of private supplies and food on the

¹¹ Mark Nesbitt, the editor to Thomas Ware’s diary commented on Lee’s General Orders and Lee’s corresponding conception of war. “On all levels, from great nations to innocent individuals, war is, unequivocally, the cruelest and most hideous aberration of man. Throughout these orders, however, rings the spirit of Robert E. Lee. Regardless of how horrible war could be – and he had seen it as a soldier for more than half his life – Robert E. Lee would make it, by sheer power of personality and influence, as civilized as it could be made. Yet wars, in spite of all that can be done, suddenly take on a life and wicked momentum all their own.” Thomas Ware, *35 Days to Gettysburg: Two Campaign Diaries of Two American Enemies*, ed. Mark Nesbitt (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 126-127.

¹² John Brown Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons; Atlanta: Martin & Hoyt Co., 1903), 339.

campaign, and the destruction wrought in certain localities from the fighting . He expressed a duality of thought, related to the positive and negative aspects of war, in his often-quoted remark, “It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it.”¹³ In an interview with Lee at his headquarters outside of Chambersburg, Mrs. Ellen McLellan, a resident of the town, also provided a glimpse into Lee’s conception of war, in particular, the end for which wars were waged, that of peace. She depicted, “he assured me the war was a cruel thing, and that the only desired that they would let him go home and eat his bread there in peace.”¹⁴ She further revealed, “All this time I was impressed with the strength and sadness of the man,” marking a duality of resolve to continue the game, per his duty, and a melancholy understanding of the realities of war.¹⁵

Lee’s conception of warfare is also apparent in the writings of a few of his officers and soldiers during the Gettysburg Campaign, including his lack of belief in retaliation and that

¹³ Ralph Keyes, *The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When* (St. Martin’s Press, 2007), 239.

John Esten Cooke, an aide to Stuart, first attributed the quote to Lee, after he observed the repulse of Meade’s attack at Fredericksburg. The original read, “It is well that this is so terrible! we should grow too fond of it!” John Esten Cooke, *A Life of Gen. Robert E. Lee* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1871), 184. Richard M. Weaver contended that such profound thoughts illustrated that Lee was not only a soldier and aristocrat, but also an intellectual, that is, “a man of reflection.” In regard to the quote, he commented “Here is a poignant confession of mankind’s historic ambivalence toward the institution of war, its moral revulsion against the immense destructiveness, accompanied by a fascination with the ‘greatest of all games’. . . To Lee, as to Washington before him, the whistle of bullets made a music, and the natural man responded. But this observation rebukes the natural man and tells him that further considerations are involved. Thus Lee, at the height of his military fortunes, recognizes the attraction of the dread arbitrament, but at the same time sees the moral implications. Coming from one who delivered mighty strokes of war, the observation is itself a feat of detachment.” In sum, Lee held “the right proportions of realism and moralism.” On Lee’s conception of war, Weaver articulated that “Most important of all, Lee seems to have felt that it is possible for civilization to contain war, or to go on existing in the presence of war if self-control is not entirely lost.” Although many moderns consider civilized war as an oxymoron, Weaver articulated, “The deeper the foundations of a civilization, the more war seems to be formalized or even ritualized, and the failure to hold it within bounds is a sign of some antecedent weakening on the part of that civilization. This explains why Lee always operated with a certain restraint which, some have affirmed, caused him to fall short of maximum success in the field. There is a great ethical encouragement in this knowledge. To him as to a number of grave thinkers the touchstone of conduct is how one wields power over others.” Richard Weaver, “War So Terrible: Robert E. Lee the Philosopher,” *The Georgia Review*, 2, no. 3 (Fall 1948), 297-303.

¹⁴ Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion of 1863 or Lee in Pennsylvania* (Dayton, OH: W. J. Shuey Publisher, 1887), 198.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

warfare is waged only upon armed combatants. William N. Pendleton, chief of Lee's artillery, ascribed, "This country [Pennsylvania] has felt no war. We shall not take vengeance for their atrocious wrongs against us."¹⁶ Artilleryman George M. Neese, speaking of the women of Greencastle, wrote "We did not come here to harm nor molest the charming creatures, but we may hurt some of their relations if they get after us with guns."¹⁷ During fighting near Fairfield, a young lady inquired of Neese whether she could give care to a wounded man lying on the road near her family's barn. He informed the lady "to go and take care of as many wounded as she could find and assured her that our men would not disturb her nor willingly interfere with her humane and laudable mission."¹⁸ He emphasized to the lady, "that we did not come to Pennsylvania to make war on women."¹⁹

The policy of "hard war," on the other hand, envisioned by Lincoln and Grant and implemented by Sherman and Sheridan, followed a conception of war, which blurred the boundaries of limited warfare. Such a conception of war is epitomized in Sherman's famed utterance that "War is Hell."²⁰ The phrase denotes a signification that warfare cannot be refined

¹⁶ William Nelson Pendleton, *Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton*, ed. Susan P. Lee (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1893), 281.

¹⁷ George M. Neese, *Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery: A Gunner in Chew's Battery, Stuart's Horse Artillery Army of Northern Virginia* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1911), 187.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Sherman never wrote the phrase or spoke it in a speech, but he did not deny that he said it to others in his conversations. Ralph Keyes, *The Quote Verifier*, 240-241; William T. Sherman, *Home Letters of General Sheridan*, ed. M. A. DeWolfe Howe (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), 309. The Just War Theorist Michael Walzer contended that Sherman's maxim "sums up, with admirable brevity, a whole way of thinking about war," stressing the *jus ad bellum* component, on why one fought a war, while virtually ignoring the necessity of the *jus in bello* aspect, on how one waged war, "a one sided and partial way of thinking," argued Walzer, "but powerful nonetheless." Walzer aptly defined *jus ad bellum* as "justice of war," which "requires us to make judgements about aggression and self defense" and *jus in bello* as "justice in war," which focuses on "the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement." As a whole, assessed Walzer, Sherman's maxim is "an attempt at self-justification," for his criticized decisions in the war such as the bombardment, and later the burning, of Atlanta. Walzer further analyzed that Sherman's conception of war held that since the war was "entirely and singularly the crime of those who begin it," he could not be blamed for the way in which he waged it, that brought their side closer to victory. Sherman theorized on war as though its conduct could not be refined, and yet he went about refining it, limiting the destruction he wrought to that of civilian property, and though indirectly imposing hardship upon civilians, not directly targeting civilians themselves. Walzer's idea of Just War, not only included the reasons for

or limited in its nature, but rather takes on an unlimited nature inherent to its very existence. In an exchange of letters with John B. Hood, over the treatment of Atlanta's civilians, he further specified, "You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out."²¹ To Sherman, the ultimate responsibility for the heightened destructiveness of war rests not with the commander in charge of implementing increasing devastation, and corresponding hardships, but rather those who inaugurated, and then continued, the war itself.

This conception of war did not sufficiently distinguish between *jus ad bellum* causes and *jus in bello* actions, submitting whatever import the latter may hold to the more important former, that is, of securing victory for a just cause, even if done so through questionable means. Because this conception of war emphasized the cause for which the war was waged and not the way in which it was waged, more drastic measures, muddling the line of demarcation between combatant and noncombatant, which served to hasten the end of the seemingly endless fighting, appeared justified to its adherents. Sherman articulated that they "should not relax our energies or be deluded by any false hope of a speedy end to this war, which we did not begin, but which

which it was waged, but also the way in which it was waged. "The two sorts of judgement [justice of war and justice in war] are logically independent." Furthermore, "It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules." Additionally, "Sherman wants to judge war only at its outermost boundaries. But there is a great deal to be said about its interior regions, as he himself admits. Even in hell, it is possible to more or less humane, to fight with or without restraint. We must try to understand how this can be so," denoting, in contrast to Sherman, "Some wars are not hell." Or, to put in another way, "War is hell. But it is necessary to say more than that, for our ideas about war in general and about the conduct of soldiers depend very much on how people get killed and on who those people are." Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 3rd ed (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 22 -33

²¹ William T. Sherman, *Home Letters*, 309; William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, vol. 2 (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1875), 126.

we must fight to the end, be it when it may.”²² In sum, as in other matters of moral philosophy with a relativistic ideal, Sherman’s conception of war specified that the ends justified the means.

Sheridan, like Sherman, fully immersed in the conception of warfare that “War is Hell,” completely agreed with Grant’s policy of destruction for the Shenandoah Valley. Reflective of this conception of war, Sheridan later wrote,

I endorsed Grant's programme, for I do not hold war to mean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, and material interests be ignored. This is but a duel, in which one combatant seeks the other's life; war means much more, and is far worse than this. Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see but little of the horrors attending such a duel, and even growing different to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselves with encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause, to fill up the shattered ranks as death thins them. It is another matter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to their own doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss of property weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, than the sacrifices made on the field of battle. Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one great conflict.²³

Thus, Sheridan articulated that war is not only a contest between armed combatants, but a significantly worse event, a fight to the finish involving combatant and noncombatant alike. In order to hasten the end of a conflict, he believed the war must be brought to the home front, to the civilians who remained at home untouched, in many ways, by the costs of the fighting, and who sustained the men fighting at the front, providing material and morale support. The demoralization of civilian morale and the exhaustion of the enemy’s material resources, public and private alike, through strategic destruction, Sheridan argued, was the surest and quickest way to ensuring the submission of a people at war,

²² Sherman, *Home Letters*, 308.

²³ Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888), 486-488.

rather than the defeat of the enemy army on the battlefield, though the strategy which he implemented included the latter component as well.

As an observer during the Franco – Prussian War, Sheridan further articulated this conception of war to the Prussian Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, “The proper strategy consists, in the first place, in inflicting as telling blows as possible upon the enemy's army, and then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace, and force their government to demand it. The people must be left nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war.”²⁴

Federal soldiers in the Army of the Valley articulated this same conception of war, that abuses to private property in warfare, was justified by the end pursued. From Berryville, on September 5, 1864, Albert N. Hubbard corresponded to his wife that he hoped she would “never know the horror of war as the folks in this place do.”²⁵ However, he articulated, “it is the fruit of secesh and let it come till the last armed fo [sic] expires or returns to the support of the old flagg [sic] which we have sworn to protect and that will be done.”²⁶ In consideration of the destruction wrought by Sheridan and his army in the Upper Valley, Chaplain John R. Adams, accordingly

²⁴ Dr. Moritz Busch, *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History, Being a Diary Kept by Dr. Moritz Busch*, vol. 1 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1898), 127-128. This occurred at a dinner hosted by Bismarck on Sept. 8, 1870, about a week after the German victory over the French at Sedan. Among the guests included three Americans, including Sheridan and his Chief of Staff during the Valley Campaign, James W. Forsyth. Sheridan made the comment in discussion of the action at Bazeilles, also on Sept. 1, where the Germans burnt the village after French civilians took up arms to aid their regular forces in defense of the town. Bismarck stated that the French peasants could not be permitted to defend the position as, not being in uniform, they could not be recognized as combatants. Abeken considered that Bazeilles was harshly treated and thought the war ought to be conducted in a more humane manner. Busch wrote that Sheridan held a different opinion than Abeken, as “He considers that in war it is expedient, even from the political point of view, to treat the population with the utmost rigour also.” Busch described his own thoughts in reaction to Sheridan’s take, “Somewhat heartless, it seems to me, but perhaps worthy of consideration.”

²⁵ Albert N. Hubbard, *Lot of 66 Letters by Albert Newell Hubbard, 34th Massachusetts Infantry, 1862-1865*, Sep. 5, 1864, University of Virginia Archives, Albert & Shirley Small Special Collections Library, MSS 10522, Charlottesville, Virginia (hereafter cited as UVA).

²⁶ *Ibid.*

wrote on October 4th, “War is terrible in its effects, but the Rebels should have anticipated this before they ventured to test its scathing scourges. Poor Virginia will have occasion to rue the day she invited the Confederacy to make her border lands the battleground for Rebels!”²⁷ Near Harrisonburg, Alexander Neil, on October 5th expressed a similar understanding, that is, the destruction wrought was due to the waging of the war itself and not due to how the war was being waged. “They express themselves as heartily tired of the war and now fully realize that Secession has been a dear thing to them. Those who have lived before the war in the most affluent and elegant circumstances and in a country the most fertile and beautiful in the world are now reduced to the most abject poverty and beggary. Alas! How the proud and might have fallen by this infatuated Secession. They are now reaping its rewards.”²⁸

The scale to which the armies applied military necessity as a modifying factor to noncombatant immunity also differed. During Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign, military necessity remained most prominently at the tactical level, so as to secure victory on the battlefield. On July 1st, a few structures were burnt, which the Confederates justified as a matter of military necessity. In the midst of the fighting, Federal sharpshooters occupied the Reverend Charles G. McLean’s farmhouse. Amelia Harmon and her aunt, then living in the house, hid in the cellar while the battle raged above. Because of the Federal usage of the building for skirmishing, the Confederates burnt the structure and escorted the ladies behind their lines to the west. Harmon reflected, “We were doubtless the only persons on the Union Side who were fed from General Lee’s commissary during the Battle of Gettysburg. And so far as I know our house was the only

²⁷ John R. Adams, *Memorial and Letters of Rev. John R. Adams, D. D.: Chaplain of the Fifth Maine and the One Hundred and Twenty-First New York Regiments During the War of the Rebellion* (Privately Printed, 1890), 159.

²⁸ Alexander Neil, *Alexander Neil and the Last Shenandoah Valley Campaign: Letters of an Army Surgeon to His Family, 1864*, ed. Richard R. Duncan (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1996), 68.

one actually set on fire deliberately by the enemy.”²⁹ The Herbst farm also rested in the middle of the fighting. When the Confederates took possession of the place, John Herbst came out of the cellar and a rebel soldier “or officer of low grade” told him that he had orders to burn the buildings, since Yankee skirmishers had been firing from them. The barn was burnt, but in the farmhouse the man discovered some wounded soldiers, one Union and two Confederates, who begged him not to burn it, since one of them was too badly wounded to be removed. Accordingly, the house was not burned.³⁰

While the Confederates justified the burning of select barns as a matter of military necessity on the first day of fighting, the Federals did the same on the third. After heavy skirmishing on the Bliss Farm, as those of the McLean and Herbst farms, inconveniently located between the lines, on July 2nd and July 3rd, the buildings were burned, as they had become a haven for Confederate sharpshooters targeting their position on Cemetery Ridge. William Bliss, his wife, and two daughters lost everything in the fire, having been “turned out with nothing but the clothes they had on,” as well sustaining damage and losses to their fences, cattle, and crops, due to the ferocity of the fighting.³¹

Of Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, Grant justified his orders for the destruction of the Valley’s agricultural production, as a military necessity, so as to secure direct strategic results, which included the protection of Maryland and Pennsylvania from continued Confederate raids

²⁹ Amelia Harman, “Harman Farm,” *Gettysburg Times*, July 29, 1939, Adams County Historical Society, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, 29 (hereafter cited as ACHS). Also located in Gettysburg National Military Park Library and Research Center, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as GNMP).

³⁰ John Herbst, Damage Claim, ACHS, also located in GNMP.

³¹ John M. Archer, *Fury on the Bliss Farm at Gettysburg* (California: Savas Publishing, 2012). William Bliss supposedly commented “if I had twenty farms I would give them all for such a victory.” William Bliss, ACHS. Original found in an article in the *Gettysburg Star* written sometime between the fall of 1865 and the summer of 1866. According to ACHS, found in Battle of Gettysburg 1863, Library of Congress. Edward McPherson Papers, Box 98, p. 135.

north of the Potomac, in addition to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the exhaustion of Confederate resources, including its agricultural production and civilian morale. Chaplain John R. Adams recorded his understanding of military necessity on October 6 1864, “Nothing particularly new or interesting on the march except the fires; for the military necessity requires that no forage should be left in the valley, upon which Rebel raiders can live if they want to come up into Pennsylvania or Maryland. They would certainly have poor picking in the valley.”³² However, such an application of military necessity on such an enlarged scale holds less justification for the overriding of noncombatant immunity, in relation to the destruction of civilian property, because such destruction is a direct component of its implementation, rather than an incidental one, as seen at the tactical level. An example of military necessity, incident to the fighting of armed combatants rather than an implementation of intentional destruction, during the Valley Campaign occurred when Thomas F. Wildes’ 116th Ohio Infantry Regiment advanced in late August on a reconnaissance “to burn some grain and hay stacks, behind which the enemy were sheltered.”³³

More justification is certainly apparent for the defense of Northern territory against Southern raids than the offensive purpose of exhausting Confederate resources, since military necessity on a strategic scale encompasses that which is necessary so as not to lose the war, rather than actions which are taken so as to win the war. Even in the former case, such justification of the destruction for a defensive purpose is dampened because it is carried out through unjust means, the direct destruction of private property being the key component for its implementation. If Grant desired to defend Northern territory against Confederate raids and

³² John R. Adams, *Memorial and Letters*, 160.

³³ Thomas F. Wildes, *Record of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Regiment Ohio Infantry Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion*, (Sandusky, OH: I. F. Mack & Bro., 1884), 157-158. August 26, 1864.

conduct a strategy of exhaustion against Southern resources, noncombatant immunity required him to do so by attacking, or defending against, Confederate armies and targeting legitimate military targets such as the Confederacy's infrastructure and its public supplies, instead of directly targeting civilian property.

Even though many political and military leaders, as well as soldiers and civilians, initially considered the conflict would be quickly resolved, it soon degenerated into an elongated struggle, which meant that the fighting appeared quite different at its final stages than its commencement, as the war shifted from the battlefield to the home front. Alexander K. McClure pondered the difference, "Few of even our most intelligent citizens of the present time take pause to consider how entirely different were the purposes and efforts of the Government at the beginning of our civil war from the purposes and efforts after it had been in progress for nearly two years."³⁴

During the 1862 Valley campaigns, the treatment of Southern civilians by Federal forces was largely similar to the conduct of Confederate soldiers toward Northern civilians during Lee's Gettysburg Campaign. The armies foraged upon the land as they maneuvered for tactical advantage on the battlefield and civilians suffered from the effects of limited warfare, but civilian property was largely respected. From Harrison's Landing on July 7, 1862, while in command of the Army of the Potomac, George B. McClellan declared that the war "should not be, at all, a War upon population; but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states or

³⁴ A. K. McClure, *Recollections of a Half Century* (Salem, MA: The Salem Press Company, 1902), 469.

forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. Pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes.”³⁵

Not only are differences, concerning the conduct exhibited toward the civilian population’s property, apparent between the early and later portions of the war, but there are stark differences even throughout 1864, when the Shenandoah Valley once again reached strategic import, between the campaigns of Franz Sigel, David Hunter, and Sheridan. Virginians in the Valley observed the general escalation of the conflict, including a young Mennonite, Peter Hartman. Sigel’s campaign looked fairly similar to those of 1862, culminating in the Battle of New Market. The worst behaved soldiers he considered those under Hunter. “Those men acted the worst of any men I ever heard of in my life. They riddled feather ticks and pillows.”³⁶ Occurring during their retreat, he surmised, “This was a matter of revenge,” due to their defeat at Lynchburg.³⁷ A sharp contrast in the conduct exhibited toward private property by essentially the same troops in such a short period of time illustrates the impact which commanders, and their policies toward civilians, had upon the conduct of their troops.

However, the campaign which wrought the most damage to the area was that of “General Sheridan’s never-to-be-forgotten raid.”³⁸ Indeed, Hartman articulated, “We just began to realize what war was when Sheridan made his raid.”³⁹ After a visit to Weavers Church, he returned home and found “the whole farm was overrun with soldiers shooting the stock.”⁴⁰ The soldiers killed about thirty fattened hogs, all their chickens, and about thirty or forty sheep. Fortunately,

³⁵ George B. McClellan, *The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865*, ed. Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989), 344, 591, 595.

³⁶ Peter S. Hartman, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, ed. H.A. Brunk (Lititz, PA: Eastern Mennonite Publications, 1988), 21.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

one hog survived, having hidden under the pen, and his father managed to gather enough corn to fatten it up, but even so, that was all the meat his family had that winter.⁴¹ Jacob Yost similarly recalled the escalation of campaigns, “First came the dashing raids of cavalry, carrying off grain and other supplies; then the heavier pressure of infantry and artillery, and the inauguration of a policy of destruction. Barns and mills were burned and the land laid waste.”⁴²

Not only did Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign differ, in the conduct exhibited toward civilian property, with Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, but also with another Confederate raid, though on a lesser scale, into Pennsylvania, which culminated with the burning of Chambersburg. Before and after Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign, in the fall of 1862 and the summer of 1864, Confederate cavalry launched raids through Franklin County towards Chambersburg, which illustrate the differences, associated with the date of the campaign, by which Confederate forces treated civilian property

Colonel Alexander K. McClure’s experiences during the three Confederate raids are representative of the varied Confederate actions toward Pennsylvania civilians over time. During Stuart’s raid in 1862, McClure not only enjoined a prominent role in the informal surrender of the town, but also witnessed a visit to his estate, Norland, on the western outskirts of town. The Confederates collected horses and corn, consumed firewood provided to them, and upon McClure’s request, the officers partook in coffee and a meal, while they conversed with the federal officer. Although under orders to capture McClure, recently promoted as assistant adjutant general to Pennsylvania’s Governor, Andrew Curtin, they dared not injure his hospitality.⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid., 24. Hartman did note that they left some chickens and four milk cows.

⁴² Jacob Yost, *Memoirs of Jacob Yost*, *Augusta County Historical Society*, Staunton, Virginia, 61-62.

⁴³ A. K. McClure, *Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1905), 584-587.

During Lee's Gettysburg Campaign, in 1863, McClure decided he better not risk capture once again and instead removed himself from the possibility by traveling to Harrisburg. His wife however remained behind and afforded care to Confederate wounded in their barn. After the Confederate departure, McClure admitted that "Most of the people as they returned to their homes were amazed to find their property in comparatively well-preserved condition, as Lee's orders against the wanton destruction of property were scrupulously enforced by the infantry."⁴⁴

In 1864, during a raid led by Brigadier General John McCausland, McClure's estate was selected for especial destruction, as was the town of Chambersburg, as a matter of retaliation for the burning of private dwellings throughout the Valley by Hunter. Initially, financial compensation was sought by Early, but when the citizens of Chambersburg refused, McCausland implemented his additional orders, upon refusal to pay, to burn the town.⁴⁵ Captain Smith, the son of Virginia's Governor "Extra" Billy Smith, led a detachment which burned McClure's residence and the barn with all its crops. McClure himself had fled to Shippensburg at the insistence of his wife and family and McClure's close friend, General Darius N. Couch, commanding the Department of the Susquehanna. Mrs. McClure, who remained behind as before, was denied time to safely secure most of the family's valuables, only having ten minutes to exit the dwelling. Another farm owned by McClure, then occupied by Mrs. Boyd, the wife of Colonel Boyd of the 1st New York cavalry, was not burned by Harry Gilmore, although he was detached for that purpose.⁴⁶ Hence, a sharp contrast is apparent between Confederate actions

⁴⁴ A. K. McClure, *Old Time Notes*, vol. 2, 105.

⁴⁵ John McCausland, "The Burning of Chambersburg," in *Annals of The War*, orig. in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times* (Philadelphia, PA: The Times Publishing Company, 1879); Rev. Benjamin S. Schnecke, *The Burning of Chambersburg* (Chambersburg, PA, 1864). McClure considered the burning of Chambersburg a result of Hunter's "brutal vandalism" and his "military incompetency." McClure, *Old Time Notes*, vol. 2, 158, 167.

⁴⁶ A. K. McClure, *Old Time Notes*, vol. 2, 158-169; Harry Gilmore, *Four Years in the Saddle* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1866), 210-213.

toward civilian property, while in enemy territory, in the early and later portions of the war, and under Stuart's, Lee's and Early's commands.

One of the foremost differences between the conduct of the armies toward civilians and private property during the campaigns is reflected in the policies of Lee and Sheridan, directly related to such conduct. While Lee sought to replenish his exhausted commissary and quartermaster departments, through the acquisition of essential supplies and provender, he also desired to leave enough for the subsistence of the civilians in the localities through which his army passed. Sheridan, on the other hand, sought the destruction of the Valley's agricultural production, so as to eliminate the Valley as an area of operations and a source of supply for the Confederate army, even to the point of making the Valley inhospitable to its civilians, prompting committed secessionist to leave the area and providing means of relocation to loyal Unionists and neutral pacifists.

Several Confederate officers and soldiers, during the Gettysburg Campaign, detailed that they operated under orders to leave the civilian populace adequate stock for their own livelihood and sustenance. Major Harry Gilmore, commanding a detachment of two Maryland cavalry battalions, spearheading the advance of General Stuart's infantry brigade into Fulton County Pennsylvania, articulated, "My orders were, in all cases where the horses had not been run off and hidden, to leave a pair of plow-horses to each family, and to take no milch cows at all. These orders were strictly obeyed, and the people were much surprised and pleased at the good behavior of our troops. A large proportion of my men were of the best families in Maryland, and there was no difficulty in controlling them."⁴⁷ John N. Opie recalled an instance when he and a squad of men were detached to impress horses for the artillery. He specified, "The orders were to

⁴⁷ Harry Gilmore, *Four Years in the Saddle*, 95.

take one horse out of every four.”⁴⁸ As the Confederates concentrated towards Gettysburg two Confederates asked Charles McCurdy’s Uncle, who lived near South Mountain, for a wagon to replace their broken one, as one of their wheels broke. His uncle “said that, as they needed only a wheel, there was no occasion to take a whole wagon and suggested that if one could be found to fit it would fill their needs. They agreed to this and went off with a wheel. Maybe they were farmers and forgot for a moment that they were dealing with an enemy.”⁴⁹

Military targets remained the sole destructive aim. William Heyser observed the destruction of the railroad, indicating, “You could mark the line of the railroad by the smoke of the burning ties,” but he noted “little damage to crops and grassland.”⁵⁰ After the Confederate departure, Amos Stouffer recorded on various dates the harvesting of his grain that July, indicating that Lee did not undertake the intentional systematic destruction of the enemy’s grain, which stood contrary to his goal to acquire sustenance. But, as late as July 22nd, Stouffer detailed the impact of the movements of an army in a locality, as he had not yet had to opportunity to make his hay, “owing to the Rebs who have pastured nearly all our grass.”⁵¹ Rather than worrying about the destruction of grain by the Confederates, William Heyser stressed about the weather, that is, the abundance of rain, in consequence of which, he detailed, “The grain is in danger of spoiling.”⁵² A. K. McClure, described that “Many of the farmers had left their golden wheat fields ready for the reaper, but fortunately the Confederates expected to occupy the valley and harvest it, and no destruction of the grain fields was permitted. Most of the crops were thus

⁴⁸ John N. Opie, *A Rebel Cavalryman with Lee, Stuart and Jackson* (Chicago: W. B. Conkey Company, 1899), 177.

⁴⁹ Charles McCurdy, *Gettysburg: A Memoir* (Pittsburgh, PA: Reed & Witting Company, 1929).

⁵⁰ William Heyser, *Diary*, of William Heyser (1862-1863), VS. June 30, 1863.

⁵¹ Amos Stouffer, *Diary*, Diary of Amos Stouffer (1863), VS. July 11, 14, 15, 22, 31 1863.

⁵² William Heyser, *Diary*, July 7, 1863.

saved, and in a few weeks industrial operations in the shops and valleys were generally resumed.”⁵³

Robert Stiles relayed an incident, though he did not observe it personally, which demonstrated Lee’s goal of acquiring supplies, rather than damaging manufacturing establishments beneficial to civilians. He heard that while Ewell was in Carlisle a few prominent citizens visited his headquarters to discuss several matters, one of which related to a local mill, which largely supplied the needs of the poor, who were currently in difficult straights, due to its current inactivity. They inquired if he had any objection to it recommencing production. Ewell supposedly responded, “Why, no . . . certainly not. It isn’t my mill; what have I got to do with it anyhow? But stop, maybe this is what you want – if any of my people should interfere with your use of your mill, you come and tell me.”⁵⁴ John O. Casler remembered, during the withdrawal to the Potomac, one day when they found themselves out of rations, the officers, out of military necessity, let them kill any stock they found. The men accordingly decided to venture toward a nearby mill, where they found hidden supplies, which they appropriated to meet their needs. However, illustrative of Lee’s purposes in the campaign, the mill was not destroyed, as the soldiers focused upon their immediate needs and not the strategic destruction of the enemy’s resources.⁵⁵

Communities which rested in the line of Confederate operations, and in consequence suffered repeat visits, as multiple units traversed through the area and made their own requisitions upon the town, fared the worst. As Imboden’s command passed through Mercersburg on June 30th and issued further requisitions upon the town, Schaff worried, “If they

⁵³ A. K. McClure, *Old Time Notes*, vol. 2 104.

⁵⁴ Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1903), 205.

⁵⁵ John O. Casler, *Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade*, 2nd ed. (Girard, KS: Appeal Publishing Company, 1906), 178.

go on this way for a week or two we will have nothing to eat ourselves.”⁵⁶ According to Schaff, Imboden’s men said “as long as Yankees have something, they will have something.”⁵⁷ In contrast to the bounty evident throughout the countryside, in Chambersburg, citizens relied upon stocked goods in the stores and warehouses in town and after repeat visits by different Confederate units issuing their own requisitions, the supply for the townspeople had become severely diminished. One woman, Mrs. Ellen McLellan inquired upon a captain if she could make Lee aware of the poor state of sustenance for the civilians. She accordingly had an interview with Lee at his headquarters in Shetter’s Woods on Sunday June 28th.⁵⁸

I stated to him our need, and told him starvation would soon be at hand upon many families unless he gave us aid. He seemed startled by this announcement, and said that such destitution seemed impossible in such a rich and beautiful grain- growing county, pointing to the rich fields of grain all around his camp. I reminded him that this growing grain was useless to us now, and that many of our people had no means to lay in supplies ahead. He then assured me that he had turned over the supplies of food he found, to his men to keep them from ravaging our homes. He said ‘God help you if I permitted them to enter your houses. Your supplies depend upon the amount that is sent in to my men.’⁵⁹

Lee then asked Mrs. McLellan to send one or two prominent men of the town to him. When she replied they were all gone, he inquired whether a miller could be sent, so he could gain some idea as to the quantity of food required for the civilians of the town. Later that day, she received notice of an order from General Lee for the guard at Stouffer’s mill, detailing a number of barrels of flour for the poor of the town. Unfortunately, however, Mrs. McLellan noted that before Judge Kimmel could issue the order, Lee had left and it was of no assistance.⁶⁰

In contrast to Lee’s purposes during the Gettysburg Campaign, that of supply acquisition, and his conception of war, which demanded, as part of distinctions between combatant and non-

⁵⁶ Philip Schaff, “The Gettysburg Week,” *Scribner’s Magazine* 16 (July-December 1894), 21-30.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion*, 197. Also referred to as Messersmith’s Woods.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

combatant, as little of an impact as necessary upon the civilian populace, Sheridan, in pursuit of his goals during his 1864 Valley Campaign, that of systematic strategic destruction, and his conception of war, which necessitated a heavy burden placed upon the civilian populace, in regard to the loss of private property, so as to bring about a diminishment in civilian morale, sought to destroy as much of the Valley's agricultural production as possible and relocate loyal citizens and those with pacifist tendencies. Randolph H. McKim noted how Sheridan's men systematically destroyed barns, crops, and farm implements, indeed "everything except the roofs over the people's heads."⁶¹ In addition to the burning of agricultural targets, civilian's stock was either consumed, killed, or appropriated. Daniel K. Schreckhise informed his brother of this on October 17th, "The yanks stripped some people of all of their stock."⁶² After the war, Brigadier General Wesley Merritt specified that during their withdrawal down the Valley "the cavalry was deployed across the Valley, burning, destroying, or taking away everything of value, or likely to become of value, to the enemy."⁶³ He further detailed, "There is little doubt, however, that enough was left in the country for the subsistence of the people, for this, besides being contemplated by orders, resulted of necessity from the fact that, while the work was done hurriedly, the citizens had ample time to secrete supplies, and did so."⁶⁴

Yet the scale of destruction ultimately prompted many civilians to exit the Valley, concerned about their ability to survive the coming winter. While many secessionists moved southward, those with Union sympathies or pacifist tendencies refuged northward. Sheridan stated that these latter refugees, most of them Dunkers who, as consciousness objectors, desired,

⁶¹ Randolph H. McKim, *A Soldier's Recollections: Leaves from the Diary of a Young Confederate* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), 231.

⁶² Daniel K. Schreckhise, Daniel K. Schreckhise to James M. Schreckhise, October 17, 1864, VS.

⁶³ Wesley Merritt, "Destroying, Burning: Sheridan in The Shenandoah Valley," in *Battles and Leaders of The Civil War*, ed. Ned Bradford, 1 vol. ed. (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979), 543.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

in part, to flee conscription, filled over four-hundred wagons, which he provided for their journey, transporting them as far as Martinsburg.⁶⁵ “Thousands of Refugees are fleeing north daily,” observed Alexander Neil. He assessed their rationale for doing so, that is, “nothing but starvation would stare them in the face to stay in this valley the coming winter.”⁶⁶ Jacob Hildebrand observed, as early as September 25th, refugees going down the Valley, while Early’s army stood in Brown’s Gap.⁶⁷ The ever-observant Jedediah Hotchkiss similarly recorded in early October, “A good many Dunkers left the county and went with the Yankees.”⁶⁸ Daniel K. Schreckhise also informed his brother that “a great many family members” ventured “off to the yanks from Rockingham,” even including “some men that had fine farms.”⁶⁹

One of those refugees who decided to go north with Sheridan was Peter S. Hartman. As a religious pacifist who had dodged the Confederate draft for almost a year now, since the conscription agents did not think him old enough as of yet, Hartman anticipated that the South’s manpower shortage would eventually necessitate his service and he could not afford to pay the fine, nor could the Mennonite church, since he had not been a member before the war. Another reason for the mass departure of Mennonites and Dunkers was that Sheridan had destroyed most of the barns and nearly all the forage in the Valley, hence destroying their livelihood. Sheridan “burned most of the barns in the valley,” indeed “only three or four Mennonites barns escaped,” recorded Hartman.⁷⁰ Before the Federals departure from the Upper Valley, Hartman recalled

⁶⁵ Government Printing Office, *The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, series I, vol. 43, part 1, 30 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 299-301 (hereafter cited as OR [Official Records] and all references refer to series I).

⁶⁶ Neil, *Alexander Neil and the Last Shenandoah Valley Campaign*, 55.

⁶⁷ Jacob R. Hildebrand, *A Mennonite Journal, 1862-1865: A Father’s Account of the Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley*, compiled by John R. Hildebrand (Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1996), 51-52.

⁶⁸ Jedediah Hotchkiss, Jedediah. *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson’s Topographer*, ed. Archie P. McDonald (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 235; OR, vol. 43 (1): 578. Oct 6, 1864.

⁶⁹ Danile K. Schreckhise to James M Schreckhise, October 17, 1864.

⁷⁰ Peter Hartman, *Reminiscences*, 27.

“General Sheridan sent word out all over the country that if anyone wanted to leave the country and go north he would send teams out after them.”⁷¹ He decided to travel to Staunton on September 25th, the farthest he had been from home at that point. Anxiety about his forthcoming trip, in addition to the destruction going on around him, certainly prevailed in his mind, “Now, I was going, not knowing whether I would ever get home again or not, and the country was all over with the fire and sword.”⁷² Along with six other Mennonite boys, Hartman travelled to Harrisonburg where they were “put under arrest” and taken by a guard to Sheridan’s headquarters.⁷³ As Sheridan and his staff officers wrote them passes to proceed northward with their wagon train, Sheridan commented to the boys, “If any of our men have taken any of your horses and you can find them, you go and get them and take them along north.”⁷⁴ Hartman stated that he knew where two of their horses were, whereupon Sheridan replied, “If you get your horse, you must come back here and get a pass for the horse.”⁷⁵ Taken as far as Martinsburg, Hartman then continued into Pennsylvania, eventually finding work and a place of refuge in Cumberland County.⁷⁶

The same destruction and confiscation of private property repeated itself during Merritt’s burning raid east of the Blue Ridge throughout Loudoun and upper Fauquier counties. Immediately prior to the raid, Ida Dulaney asked two of Merritt’s staff officers, who arrived at

⁷¹ Ibid., 24.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 25

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 25-29.

her residence to inquire of her who the men were that just rode from her house, “if they did not intend leaving milk cows to the families.” In response, “they said not one.”⁷⁷

Such destruction in the region and in the Lower Valley ultimately proved detrimental to the establishment of winter quarters by Federal troops. Sheridan found himself having to attend to the needs of the civilians within his lines. Robert T. Barton, remembered, as winter quarters for Sheridan’s remaining troops in the area rested, in part, squarely upon the Barton plantation, that the beef and little amount of wheat that they had hidden, “with such small supplies of salt, sugar & c. as had from time to time been gathered from various sources and economically used, served to keep away actual starvation until at last the supply being exhausted, the family had to beg rations from the Federal Army.”⁷⁸

An example of the diverging policies exhibited toward civilian property can be readily seen with the capture or burning of hay. Amongst other agricultural targets, Sheridan burned privately owned haystacks and stored hay within barns. Hildebrand recorded on September 27, 1864, “this afternoon the Yankees burned all the hay near the C. R. Road.” In particular, he “saw them set fire to Mr. J. H. Coiners haystacks.”⁷⁹ On the other hand, during the Gettysburg Campaign the Confederates were concerned with acquiring hay as a source of fodder, rather than destroying it so as to denude the enemy of its usage. Mrs. Jemima Cree detailed that they worried Jenkins’ men would burn about one hundred tons of hay owned by the United States government in Chambersburg, especially as such an incineration could very easily lead to a general conflagration of the town itself. Dr. Schnecke interceded for the citizens and offered to burn the

⁷⁷ Ida Dulaney, Diary, 1861 July 25 – 1865 Jan 29, folder 3, LV, Acc. no. 42246, 245-246. Published as Ida Powell Dulaney, *In the Shadow of the Enemy: The Civil War Journal of Isa Powell Dulaney*, ed. Mary L. Mackall, Steven F. Meserve, and Anne Mackall Sasscer (2009). The men were three of Mosby’s rangers.

⁷⁸ Margaretta Barton Colt, ed. *Defend The Valley: A Shenandoah Family in The Civil War* (New York: Orion Books, 1994), 343-344.

⁷⁹ Jacob Hildebrand, *A Mennonite Journal*, 52.

hay themselves a safe distance from the town, so such a tragedy did not occur. Jenkins agreed to this, but as he had no orders to do so, he instructed Schneckle to await further instructions. Such a legitimate order of destruction, that is, of the enemy's public property, never transpired. Rather than being destroyed, the hay was most likely consumed when the main Confederate body advanced through the town.⁸⁰

Another difference is that in addition to the impacts of conventional war, now the effects of "hard war" further impacted the plight of civilians. The lack of grain and forage, resultant from Sheridan's burning, certainly negatively impacted the citizens of the Valley. Near Staunton, Waddell observed the desolation upon his land and documented in his diary on October 12th, "The country is wasted by war . . . at this usually abundant season of the year, people heretofore accustomed to live in ease and luxury, are scuffling for the meanings of life. How different it was from years ago!"⁸¹ Kate Sperry received a letter from her sister Jennie on October 29th, which detailed their father was contemplating of moving to Charlottesville as "there's nothing in the Valley to live on . . . and that all we have there can be summed up in a few words."⁸² Even their staple supply of apple butter dwindled, as people spread it on their roofs "to put out the fires when Sheridan burned the barns."⁸³ Jennie and their mother, most importantly, had each other, but besides that, she penned, "neither of them have much left."⁸⁴ John D. Baldwin wrote from Harrisonburg to the Confederate Secretary of War on October 12th, "The condition in Rockingham County is most deplorable. A food panic threatens. I recommend it of utmost importance to suspend for a time at least the call under Order 77 so far as this county is

⁸⁰ Mrs. Jemima Cree, "Jenkins Raid," *Kittochtinny Historical Society Papers* 5 (March 1905 - February 1908): 98.

⁸¹ Joseph A. Waddell, *Diary of Joseph A. Waddell*, VS. Oct. 12, 1864.

⁸² Kate (Sarah Catherine) Sperry, *Sperry Diary*, vol. 5, LV, acc. no. 28532, 567.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

concerned. The magistrates of the county now assembled here recommend that course. . . .

Excuse me for repeating that I regard this matter of extreme importance.”⁸⁵

To worsen the matter, a significant drought in the summer of 1864, coupled with a harsh winter, reduced the supply of food that escaped the burning. On July 23, 1864, a mile below Strasburg, Robert Depriest, a member of the Stonewall Brigade, who accordingly knew the area well, informed his wife of the drought in the area and the corresponding “twisted up” corn. If it did not rain soon, he warned there would be no corn in the area and he instructed his wife to buy “as much flower as you can.”⁸⁶ Austin Fenn, a Federal soldier from Vermont, believed they were due for a wet November because the summer and early fall was so dry.⁸⁷ James Matthew Wright wrote home, “We had a very dry summer here in the Valley. Corn was very much injured thereby.”⁸⁸ Fortunately, the fall provided significant amounts of rain and he described the abundance of apples, “there are more apples than I ever saw I think to the trees.”⁸⁹

Thomas Ashby described that they lived upon alternatives to flour and cornmeal. Potatoes served as a substitute for bread, molasses made from sorghum for sugar, parched rye for coffee, and sassafras routes for tea. There was also an “abundance of food that could not be removed,” such as small fruits, nuts, wild game, and poultry that hid in the bushes or evaded capture. Ashby reflected upon the difficult times, “But for these resources our people would have starved.”⁹⁰

⁸⁵ John D. Baldwin to Hon Secretary of War, Harrisonburg Oct. 12, 1864, OR, vol 43, (1): 892-893; On the hardships of the Valley’s civilians see William G. Thomas, “Nothing Ought to Astonish Us: Confederate Civilians in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign,” in *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*.

⁸⁶ Robert H. Depriest, Letters, 1862-1864, LV, acc. no., 37726.

⁸⁷ Austin Fenn, Letters, 1862-1865, LV, acc. no., 45585.

⁸⁸ James Matthew Wright, James Matthew Wright to Louisa Frances Wright, Sep. 12, 1864, Wright Family Correspondence, 1856-1868, LV, acc. no., 34480, 64.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰ Thomas A. Ashby, *The Valley Campaigns: Being the Reminiscences of a Non-Combatant While Between the Lines in the Shenandoah Valley During the War of the States* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1914), 299. According to Ashby, other scarcities included salt, leather, and clothing.

The quick arrival of cold weather caused difficulties as much as the drought in the summer. In Lexington, Cornelia Peake McDonald's children planted and cultivated a large patch of potatoes, which were stored in the attic to dry. On the night of October 22nd, a severe freeze destroyed the entire batch of potatoes. She lamented, "So perished our only certain hope of food for the winter."⁹¹ Peter Hartman received a letter from his sister, which "told how hard they had it that winter."⁹² Because the destruction occurred in the autumn, the impact affected civilians to a greater extent, including into the following year, as the necessary seed for spring planting, stowed away in their barns, was also consumed in the flames.

When Confederate soldiers, who called the Upper Valley home, returned after the war ended, they observed the destruction left by Sheridan. Jacob Yost described that the Confederate soldiers returned to find their homes desolated, their lands laid waste, and their children half starved.⁹³ "When the war ended, of course Augusta County was a wreck as stated by Sheridan," articulated William Purviance Tams. "The stores of Staunton had no goods in them, and the only money was worthless Confederate currency."⁹⁴ Efforts to rebuild commenced nevertheless, under Federal occupation, included the rebuilding of barns, sheds, and fences with the help of credit afforded them by Baltimore bankers.⁹⁵

A sharp contrast also exists in the divergence between the expectations held by civilians and the realities of the campaigns. Many Pennsylvania civilians anticipated actions far worse than those which occurred during Lee's Gettysburg Campaign. In anticipation of a Confederate

⁹¹ Cornelia Peake McDonald, *A Diary with Reminiscences of the War*, 212.

⁹² Peter Hartman, 28-29.

⁹³ Jacob Yost, *Memoirs*, 68.

⁹⁴ William Purviance Tams, "Recollections of Augusta County: Address of Mr. William Purviance Tams, Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Augusta County Historical Society, at May Baldwin College, Staunton, Virginia, Monday November 9, 1964," *Augusta Historical Bulletin* 20, no. 2 (Fall 1984): 34. Located in the Augusta County Historical Society, Staunton, Virginia.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

raid on Chambersburg, William Heyser detailed that “Many families are hiding their valuables, and preparing for the worst, including some “preparing to leave town.”⁹⁶ Having decided to refugee north himself, when he arrived in the Pennsylvania capital on June 16th, he found the state’s records being removed, “under the expectation that Harrisburg will be burned.”⁹⁷ The following day, he heard of rumors that their “stores have all been plundered and that the public building may be burned that houses army stores.”⁹⁸ Instead, by the end of the day, he learned that Jenkins’ men withdrew towards Hagerstown, “after having done minimum of damage to the town.”⁹⁹

George Washington Nichols recalled that as their regiment marched through Chambersburg, the first infantry to do so, a little eight-year-old girl inquired, “Mama, are those men rebels?”¹⁰⁰ After her mother replied in the affirmative, she exclaimed, “Why, mamma, they haven’t got horns; they are just like our people.”¹⁰¹ In his official report, Major General Robert Rodes conveyed that the Pennsylvanians were “very generally expected to be treated by us with the wanton cruelty generally exhibited by their troops when they are upon our soil. As a general rule, they apparently expected to see their houses burned down and all their property carried off or destroyed.”¹⁰² On the contrary, Rodes reported that the good behavior of his soldiers “astonished the people along the line of march.”¹⁰³

⁹⁶ William Heyser, Diary, June 14, 1863.

⁹⁷ Ibid., June 16, 1863.

⁹⁸ Ibid, June 17, 1863.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ George Washington Nichols, *A Soldier’s Story of His Regiment (61st Georgia) And Incidentally of the Lawton-Gordon-Evans Brigade Army of Northern Virginia*, intro, by Keith S. Bohannon (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2011), 115.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² OR, vol. 27 (2): 551.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

James Matthew Wright wrote home from Franklin County that “the people appear to be perfectly surprised at our coming here and some of them are scared nearly to death. They appear to think we will take everything we may want and destroy the remainder they may have.”¹⁰⁴ Instead, he emphasized, “I have heard of nothing being taken or destroyed yet and I hope there will be no necessity for either.”¹⁰⁵ James Peter Williams similarly explained, “They were scared nearly to death at the bare idea of having the rebel army among them & evidently expected to be just burnt alive.”¹⁰⁶ Henry Kyd Douglass recalled Ewell’s staff establishing their headquarters in the house of a clergymen whose feeble attempts at concealing his horse equipment in the hay was laughed at during breakfast. “By that time he found out that we were not on a plundering expedition and joined in our laughter at his feeble attempts at concealment.”¹⁰⁷

In Carlisle, when Jenkins’ cavalry first entered the town, James Sullivan expressed, “From what many persons said afterward we learned that at this stage of the taking of the town a horrid uncertainty as to what treatment its people were to receive was general in the homes.”¹⁰⁸ His own mother, watching the advance of Confederate troopers on horseback in a compact column slowly trotting toward them, shrieked, ran home with James along her side, locked the door, and bolted the shutters.¹⁰⁹ However, Sullivan observed no destruction of private property by Ewell’s troops. Indeed, “from the soldiers came civil, even gentle, replies. In half an hour we boys had each several acquaintances among the harmless enemy.”¹¹⁰ Moreover, in a short while

¹⁰⁴ James Matthew Wright to Lousia Frances Wright, Wright Family Papers, LV, June 25, 1863, 49.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ James Peter Williams, James Peter Williams to his Father, June 28, 1863, VS.

¹⁰⁷ Henry Kyd Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 246.

¹⁰⁸ James Sullivan, Typescript of Seen in Carlisle, 1861-'65, Cumberland County Historical Society. Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 27-28. Can also be found as “Boyhood Memories of The Civil War, 1861-1865- Invasion of Carlisle,” July 1932, Civil War Resources, Location: I-Original-1924-2, Dickinson College Archives & Special Collections, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as Dickinson College Archives).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 35.

thereafter, “The scene became a picture of perfect peace, when our girls . . . came and stood modestly by their mothers listening to what the soldiers, so touchingly like our boys, had to say. The talk went on soberly and in uninterrupted kindness.”¹¹¹ Jedediah Hotchkiss wrote home to his wife that the Yankees “confidently expected us to burn everything and lay waste to the country and they thought we would be justified in so doing.”¹¹² Instead however, he informed her “they found us doing all things decently & not disturbing them except to supply our army with everything it needed.”¹¹³

Gettysburg’s residents also expected worse treatment at the hands of the rebels than they actually received. Late in the evening of June 20th, they discovered the sky to the south, in the direction of Emmitsburg, Maryland, ten miles distant, suddenly illuminated, which spurred the cry that “the Rebels have crossed the line and are burning Emmitsburg and are marching towards Gettysburg.”¹¹⁴ Fannie Buehler recalled, “we all believed the story, we were in a condition to believe anything, either good or bad, and the whole town was in the streets all night long discussing the probabilities of and possibilities.”¹¹⁵ Only later did they discover the rumor false. While the fire did indeed occur, it had nothing to do with the advance of the Confederate army. When the town residents were finally confronted with the presence of rebel forces, during Early’s occupation of the town, Colonel Clement Evans, whose regiment remained in town as a guard and quartered themselves in the courthouse, detailed “The town was kept very orderly & quiet. The citizens expected us to revel & riot all night, burning & destroying property. They

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Jedediah Hotchkiss, Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 24, 1863, Jedediah Hotchkiss Letters, VS.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Fannie Buehler, Fannie J. Buehler, *Recollections of the Rebel Invasion and One Woman’s Experience During the Battle of Gettysburg*, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 8.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

were therefore very much surprised at the quiet of the town.”¹¹⁶ Fannie Buehler similarly relayed, “The town was not burned down, the Court House remained uninjured,” and “the men were quiet and orderly.”¹¹⁷ In York, Cassandra Morris Small noted “They destroyed some property but nothing like what was expected.”¹¹⁸

The expectation that the Confederates may wage a war of retaliation was still prevalent as the main body of Lee’s army entered Franklin County. Major General Lafayette McLaws wrote, “The men I spoke to, acknowledged that the brutalities practiced by their troops, upon the Southern people, fully justified our retaliating and were surprised at our moderation.”¹¹⁹ During the Battle of Gettysburg, Albertus McCreary depicted an illustrative example of the fear that overcame civilians when confronted by the unknown. As they hid in their cellar, suddenly the doors opened and five Confederates jumped down. “We thought our last day had come,” remembered McCreary. “Some of the women cried, while others, with hands clasped, stood rooted to the spot with fear.”¹²⁰ His father inquired what they wanted and begged them not to harm any of them. One of the Confederates replied, “We are looking for Union soldiers.”¹²¹ Though his father stated that there were none, they conducted a search nonetheless, allowing the formerly frightened civilians to go upstairs. McCreary described a sharp change in their mindset, “From that time on we had no fear of harm from the individual soldiers.”¹²²

¹¹⁶ Clement A. Evans, *Intrepid Warrior, Clement Anselm Evans: Confederate General from Georgia, Life, Letters, and Diaries of the War Years*, ed. Robert Grier Stephens, Jr. (Morningside, 1992), 219-220.

¹¹⁷ Fannie Buehler, *Recollections of the Rebel Invasion* 13.

¹¹⁸ Cassandra Morris Small, “Letters of ’63,” *Cassandra Morris Small Papers*, York County Heritage Trust, York, Pennsylvania.

¹¹⁹ Lafayette McLaws, Lafayette McLaws to Emily (probably McLaws). June 28, 1863, VS.

¹²⁰ Albertus McCreary, “Gettysburg: A Boy’s Experience of the Battle,” *McClure’s Magazine* 33 (July 1909): 245-246

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 246.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 246.

On July 4th, when the Federals reoccupied the town, there was a fear Lee would shell the town. Michael Colver, then a senior at Pennsylvania college ventured to return home, but when he reached the crest of Cemetery Hill he was “met by some of the citizens who told us they were ordered to leave their homes as the rebels would shell the town.”¹²³ He subsequently turned around to his former place of refuge until Monday July 6th, but no shelling took place.¹²⁴ Oscar McMillan penned to his sister later in the month, that although their family homestead in Gettysburg, Wild Wood, was “visited by the destruction and desolation of battle,” he gladly discovered that their home “escaped as well as it did,” since he “expected to find it worse than it was.”¹²⁵ The most significant loss to the family were “in articles which money cannot replace.”¹²⁶ During the Confederate withdrawal from Gettysburg to the Potomac, at least one civilian thought the Confederates still might launch a campaign of retaliatory destruction for their failures on the battlefield. Isaac H. McCauley wrote from Chambersburg on July 5th, “If they retreat through here I fear they will destroy the town.”¹²⁷ Focused on saving the supplies and food accumulated during the campaign, along with their wounded, the Confederate column which passed through Cashtown pass did not even venture to visit Chambersburg, but skirted the base of South Mountain so as to expediate their withdrawal to Virginia.

In a few instances, during Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, Confederate soldiers and civilians likewise contemplated the possibilities of Federal retaliation, expecting the worst. James Matthew Wright heard a rumor that the Federals “had orders to burn Winchester,” during

¹²³ Michael Colver, *Reminiscences of The Battle of Gettysburg*, Robert L. Brake Collection: Civilians, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, orig. in *The Spectrum*, 1902.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*; “Lee Refused to Shell Gettysburg,” *Winchester Evening Star*, August 31, 1915, File: V5 – Lee, Robert E., GNMP.

¹²⁵ Oscar McMillan, *Civil War Letters of Oscar McMillan*, McMillan Family Papers, UVA, MSS 15284, folder 3. Camp at Frederick, Maryland. July 27, 1863.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ William H. Boyle to Isaac H. McCauley William H. Boyle, William H. Boyle to Isaac H. McCauley, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 5 July 1863, The Gilder Lehman Collection, GLC09180.02

their withdrawal in August, but were prevented from doing so, due to the Confederate pursuit. Again, in the first half of September, he described “I understand they say they will burn it if ever they get there again,” hoping that they would be prevented from getting there. When the Federals reoccupied Winchester, after the Battle of Third Winchester, the town was not burned as they had no intention of burning the town or private dwellings.¹²⁸ In anticipation of a Federal advance up the Valley, after the Battle of Fisher’s Hill, Joseph A. Waddell visited his sister, who had been “suffering intensely from nervous apprehensions, dreading lest she and her children would be slaughtered, or at least starved to death.”¹²⁹ Although the latter scenario was in the range of possibilities, dependent upon a number of factors, the former was not, as Sheridan targeted private property and not the noncombatants themselves. Waddell’s own “feelings of anxiety,” were much in tune with the expectations of a Federal advance, anticipating he would once again have to depart from the Valley, not knowing he described “how those dear to me are to subsist, or whether they will not be driven from home.”¹³⁰ However, for the majority of Valley residents and Confederate soldiers, their former experiences of Federal campaigns and occupations shaped their expectations for Federal actions in the second half of 1864. Although many Southerners stressed abuses by Federal armies throughout the south, even prior to Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign, Valley residents were ultimately shocked at the utter destruction wrought by Sheridan, the devastation being even exceptionally worse than they expected.¹³¹

¹²⁸ James Matthew Wright to Louisa Frances Wright, Wright Family Correspondence, LV. Camp near Winchester. September 12, 1864. Henry Keiser described that some individual soldiers attempted to burn Winchester on Aug. 17, 1864, in retaliation for the burning of Chambersburg, but the flames were quickly extinguished. Quoted in Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 183.

¹²⁹ Joseph A. Waddell, Diary, Sep. 23, 1864.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Jeffrey D. Wert wrote in this regard, “But no Confederate soldier or Valley resident could have foreseen the destruction which occurred – Americans had never before seen such demolition, executed with this skill and thoroughness.” Jeffrey D. Wert, *From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*. Simon and Schuster, 1989), 153. While William G. Thomas entitled his article detailing the experience of

During the Gettysburg Campaign, some Pennsylvania citizens considered the conduct of the Confederate soldiers as even better than their own troops. Such sentiment stemmed not so much from actualities, but from higher expectations for their own army than that of the enemies.

James Sullivan assessed,

Judged by conduct the Confederates, so far as I heard opinions expressed, had won a general verdict in their favor. Their behavior was better, as to language especially. I heard Confederates more than once say, in effect, that every Southern soldier was expected to be a gentleman. What was meant, I suppose, was that their Army of Northern Virginia was disciplined and held to a civilized bearing toward the general population. I heard report of but one serious infringement of that rule. On the other hand, I was witness on several occasions to unprovoked insults offered citizens by the militiamen.¹³²

One reason for such a discrepancy between the conduct of the Confederates and that of their own troops was an animosity which developed between New York and Pennsylvanian during the campaign and the war. Sullivan, in particular, denoted an episode in which men from the Twenty-Second New York were hospitably invited into the Shafer mansion, stationed in front of it, and abused their invitation by damaging furniture and defacing walls. He described that their citizens only exhibited kindness and generosity to the raw recruits, who years later themselves described their reception by the Pennsylvanians “as hostile or at least the reverse of friendly.”¹³³ Even with the Confederate shelling of Carlisle, the value of the claims due to real estate damages

Confederate civilians during Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, “Nothing Ought to Astonish Us,” within the work he explained the shift in the Federal policy toward Southern civilians ultimately surprised them. He specified, “Confederate civilians in the Shenandoah Valley might have thought they knew what to expect of the war by 1864, but they soon found themselves taken aback by Union successes and Union aggressiveness, determination, and competence. They admitted to themselves that while nothing ought to astonish them, nearly everything in the summer and fall of 1864 did.” William G. Thomas, “Nothing Ought to Astonish Us: Confederate Civilians in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign,” in *The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

¹³² James Sullivan, *As Seen in Carlisle*, 66.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 67.

from Federal forces in Cumberland County just about doubled the value of the claims due to real estate damages from Confederate forces in the county.¹³⁴

This animosity between New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians was replicated in Chambersburg. After the withdrawal of Jenkins' troopers in the middle of June, New York militia entered the town to provide protection. William Heyser observed the militiamen were "very disgusted as they had yet to see a Pennsylvania Company on the job."¹³⁵ In conversation with one in particular, the New Yorker criticized the state of affairs, "Dam your State, we came here to protect it, where are your Pennsylvania soldiers!" If they don't soon appear, we shall go home."¹³⁶ After the Confederates withdrew from Pennsylvania and Federal troops entered the town in pursuit, Heyser noted that some companies of the New York militia got drunk disrupting the peace of the town. In contrast, he emphasized, "We saw none of this among the Rebels."¹³⁷ Amos Stouffer similarly recorded a few days later, "The New York militia that are coming up from Harrisburg it is said destroy more property than the rebs. Our own people dred them very much."¹³⁸

While near Gettysburg, and during the battle, Northern civilians and Federal soldiers also encountered difficulties between themselves. Theodore Gerrish, a private in the V Corps of the Army of the Potomac, recalled how they had expected the civilians of Maryland and

¹³⁴ In Adams County, the situation was reversed, as the value of the claims due to real estate damages from Confederate forces were more than double the value of the claims due to real estate damages from Federal forces. In Cumberland County, Federal forces caused \$22,197.22 in damages to real estate, while Confederate forces caused \$10,881.50 in damages to real estate. In Adams County, Federal forces caused \$44,728.20 in damages to real estate, while Confederate forces caused \$117,679.87 in damages to real estate. Department of the Auditor General, Subgroup Records Relating to Civil War Border Claims, Series RG 2.70 Reports, Damage Claims & Claims Abstracts, etc, Box no. 1, Index to Damage Claims Applications Submitted Under Acts Passed 1863 – 1871, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

¹³⁵ William Heyser, Diary, June 20, 1863.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., July 9, 1863.

¹³⁸ Amos Stouffer, Diary, July 11, 1863.

Pennsylvania to be in arms ready to repel the Confederates, but instead they “were surprised at the indifference of the people.”¹³⁹ Although the people welcomed the Federal army, he remembered “they also endeavored to make money by selling us water, fruit, and provisions at most exorbitant prices. We usually purchased their entire stock; and we had no money, told them to ‘charge it to Uncle Sam.’ They endeavored to shame us by comparing our conduct to that of the rebels, but they soon learned that words had no effect upon hungry Yankees.”¹⁴⁰

Some Confederates also commented on the discrepancy upon which Pennsylvania civilians held between the conduct of their army and that of the Federals. Lafayette McLaws wrote home on June 28th, “the poorest classes told me that our troops behaved better to them than their own did.”¹⁴¹ Robert Stiles similarly recalled, “I was constantly told by the inhabitants that they suffered less from our troops than from their own, and that if compelled to have either, they preferred having ‘the rebels’ camped upon their lands.”¹⁴²

Even the arch abolitionist Thaddeus Stevens considered the conduct of their own troops as worse. After a visit to Franklin and Adams counties, following the campaign, he wrote to the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, explaining that the citizens of the region, though “distressed and provoked,” at what he considered Confederate robberies, “have now nearly forgot their hatred of the rebels in a greater indignation against the Federal troops that are infesting the region.”¹⁴³ He explained, “Since the enemy left, a set of Union soldiers acting under the orders of one Provost Marshal have been plundering the people of what little they had left.”¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Rev. Theodore Gerrish, *Army Life: A Privates Reminiscences of the Civil War*. Portland, ME: Hoyt, Fogg & Donham, 1882), 98-99.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Lafayette McLaws, *A Soldier's General: The Civil War Letters of Major General Lafayette McLaws*, ed. John C. Oeffinger (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 194.

¹⁴² Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert*, 199.

¹⁴³ Thaddeus Stevens, Lancaster, Sept. 1, 1863, Thaddeus Stevens Collection, ACHS.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

He provided a few examples, which he stressed served to exemplify hundreds, or even a thousand, other cases. In one instance, “The rebels came to a farmer who had six good horses, and took them all, but left two or three old ones as they said in exchange. The farmer could do no better, and took them and was trying to put out his seed with them. A U.S. officer came, broke open his stable, threatened to shoot him, and took them away.”¹⁴⁵ In another instance, “The rebels found a man with a good wagon. They asked him to exchange it for one of theirs which had a broken axle-- He objected; they told him they would have it but would give him sixty dollars confed. money to boot – He could do no better and consented. A Federal officer came and seized the wagon and took it away.”¹⁴⁶ Providing one more example, Stevens wrote, “A man had been obliged to sell his grain for confederate money, he bought a horse with that money. It was also taken because it was purchased with rebel money.”¹⁴⁷

Stevens, likewise, considered such actions perpetrated by their own troops as the robbery of private citizens, and not legitimate capturing of enemy property. Stressing the divide however, he noted, “The farmers say the rebels plundered them more like gentlemen than our own ruffians.”¹⁴⁸ Stevens was certainly worried over the election impact of such poor behavior by their own troops, as it “justly provokes and alienates the farmers of Penna.”¹⁴⁹ He reflected, “To be destroyed by our own scamps is hard to be borne.”¹⁵⁰

A similar sentiment, of holding their own army to higher standards of conduct than those of the enemy, existed amongst the residents of the Shenandoah Valley, as Confederate soldiers foraged, impressment officers collected taxed goods, and conscription officers enforced the draft.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

For example, in late June 1864, after Hunter's exit from the Valley and Early's march down the Valley in pursuit, Joseph A. Waddell recorded, "It is almost as great a relief to get rid of our army as of the Yankees — in some respects they have done as much injury as the latter. Two rascals among them went to Legh's this morning, in his absence, and took off the Yankee horse he had. I felt this loss more than all the others."¹⁵¹ Jacob Yost articulated, "The visits of Confederate representatives in search of food and supplies began to be dreaded almost as much as the raids of the Yankees. The little that escaped conscription by the military authorities and was not absolutely necessary to the home family subsistence was boxed up and forwarded to individual members thereof – soldiers at the front – or divided with those in the neighborhood who had practically nothing."¹⁵² However, such references holding higher expectations for the conduct exhibited by their own troops than those of the enemy, virtually disappeared during Sheridan's burning of the Valley, as the greater impact of "hard war," imposed upon the Valley's civilians unprecedented devastation throughout the region.

Differences are also apparent between the campaigns in relation to common criticisms of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign. First of all, as Lee's and Grant's orders differed, in general, according to respect exhibited toward private property and the destruction of private property, respectively, so too did exceptions to the orders, as abuses of Lee's orders were evident during the Gettysburg Campaign and instances of respect exhibited toward private property were apparent during Sheridan's Valley Campaign. John Cabell Early later perceptively wrote that during Lee's Gettysburg Campaign, "Both from the orders of the officers, from General Lee

¹⁵¹ Joseph A. Waddell, *Diary*, June 28, 1864. [deleted: The loss of the horse Legh had troubles me more than all we suffered from the Yankees.]

¹⁵² Jacob Yost, 67.

down, and the dispositions of the soldiers, there had been little or no plundering; but of course, in so large a body of men there were necessarily some wrong doers.”¹⁵³

That exceptions to Lee’s General Orders No. 72 no doubt occurred, is apparent in his issuance of General Orders No. 73, written as an explanatory order to further reduce the “few exceptions,” which occurred up to that point.¹⁵⁴ Even with this order, the *Valley Spirit* recorded on July 8th, “a number of private houses and offices were entered, and two or three book cases and iron safes were broken open, and many valuable books and papers destroyed and carried away. A number of farmers houses in the country were also ransacked and pillaged.”¹⁵⁵

While John B. Gordon articulated, “the orders from General Lee for the protection of private property and persons were of the most stringent character,”¹⁵⁶ he recorded “two insignificant exceptions.”¹⁵⁷ In one case, when some of his men appealed to him for permission to use a few rails located nearby, Gordon agreed “that they might take the top layer of rails, as the fence would still be high enough to answer the farmer’s purpose.”¹⁵⁸ However, when he awoke in the morning, Gordon found that “the fence had nearly all disappeared.”¹⁵⁹ As it turned out, his soldiers outsmarted their commander’s instructions to suit their purposes and each man took what appeared to him as the top layer of rails.¹⁶⁰ The other case, regarded the acquisition of horses. Some of his soldiers thought to apply the Confederacy’s conscription law, to fill their ranks with “able bodied men” in the South, to the drafting into their service of Pennsylvania’s

¹⁵³ John Cabell Early, “A Southern Boy Remembers Gettysburg,” *Civil War Times* 27 (August 2005): 29, Originally Published in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, June 1911.

¹⁵⁴ OR, vol. 27 (3): 942 - 943.

¹⁵⁵ *Valley Spirit*, July 8, 1863. Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.

¹⁵⁶ John Brown Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, 144.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 145.

“able bodied horses” in the North, though most Pennsylvanian farmers removed their horses before the arrival of Gordon’s column, and of those remaining horses, their owners did not so easily fall for the scheme of having their horses drafted into Confederate service.¹⁶¹

In at least one instance, “Lee himself seemed to disregard entirely the soldiers’ open acts of disobedience,” according to Tally Simpson, of the 3rd South Carolina. Simpson relayed an incident in which a “party of some thirty or forty men” collected a variety of fowl, including guineas, chickens, ducks, and turkeys from a local farm. Lee happened to pass by at the time, and the elderly lady of the farm, whose efforts to deter the men from taking her fowl proved futile, thought she would speak to the general regarding the matter. but Lee “without turning the direction of his head, politely raised his hand to his hat and said, ‘Good morning madam,’ and then went his way.”¹⁶² While Simpson declared that the episode meant that even their Commander-in-Chief sanctioned such marauding expeditions, this very well could have been an episode of official foraging, due to the number of men engaged in the party.¹⁶³ In comparison of the loss of one’s fowl or the destruction of one’s barn, in addition to the loss of one’s fowl, most farmers would prefer the former over the latter.

While abuses to private property appear to be the exception to the rule during Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign, within Sheridan’s Valley Campaign the policy pursued meant abuses to private property was the rule rather than the exception. Henry Kyd Douglas observed, “Official authority for much of the destruction has been denied; but when a General says to his soldiers,

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Dick and Tally Simpson, “*Far, Far from Home: The Wartime Letters of Dick and Tally Simpson Third South Carolina Volunteers*,” ed. Guy R. Everson and Edward H. Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 262.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

‘Go forth and burn and destroy,’ what can he expect?’¹⁶⁴ Yet, there were instances of Federal soldiers moderating, or entirely disregarding, the destructive orders, the most prominent of which, included Colonel Thomas F. Wildes persuading Sheridan to stop the unwarranted destruction of civilian dwellings in the town of Dayton. In some instances, barns and other structures were spared. John O. Casler described that

some of the Federal soldiers would burn the property with fiendish delight and not let the people save anything, not even wearing apparel, while others, more humane, would not burn them if they could possibly avoid it, and would tell the women that they would set them on fire in order to shield themselves and obey commands; but that they would fire them in such places that it would not do any harm for some time, and as soon as they got out of sight they, the women, could extinguish the fire.¹⁶⁵

Casler deemed such actions as “very rare cases,” but he did see “several barns after the war that were saved in that manner.”¹⁶⁶

Furthermore, while in Pennsylvania, according to Lee’s orders, it is evident the Confederates generally paid for the supplies and eatables they collected and consumed, there existed an absence of reimbursement for that which Sheridan destroyed in Virginia, during the burning. Even though some Pennsylvanians deemed the payment in Confederate money as virtually worthless, due to the United States lack of recognition for the sovereignty of the Confederate States and its inflation, the value of the currency was largely dependent upon the outcome of the campaign and the war, which was communicated by Confederate soldiers to Pennsylvania civilians. Michael Jacobs indicated that the Confederates “re-enacted their old farce of professing to pay for what they took, by offering freely their worthless ‘Confederate’

¹⁶⁴ Henry Kyd Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall* 315.

¹⁶⁵ John O. Casler, 242.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

scrip; which, they said, would, in a few days, be better than our own currency.”¹⁶⁷ Robert Emory Park, for instance, recorded on June 25th, “Breakfasted with a citizen, who refused all pay, though I assured him Confederate money would soon take place of greenbacks.”¹⁶⁸

In many cases, in order to compensate for the discrepancy between the value of the currencies, merchants adjusted their prices or Confederate soldiers paid extra. The *Valley Spirit* indicated that Jenkins troopers paid for that which they took at the merchants’ own prices. Confederate surgeons requisitioned medical supplies from the drug stores, “for most of which they paid the prices asked in Confederate money.”¹⁶⁹ The dry goods and grocery stores also did a good deal of business, as “The rebels generally seemed willing to pay in their own scrip,” even at “whatever prices the merchants placed upon their goods.”¹⁷⁰ A. K. McClure detailed that while most of the stores were largely empty, having shipped away most of their goods, of the stock that remained, “the Confederate customers cleaned out the remnants and paid liberal prices in Confederate money.”¹⁷¹

Thomas M. Griffith gave an indication as to the difference of values, appraising the Confederate scrip “will bring 50 cts. on the dollar.”¹⁷² In the Chambersburg stores, L. M. Blackford wrote that “their prices varied in an advance of from 10 to 50 per cent on old figures, but at this no one complained.”¹⁷³ Pender informed his wife of his efforts to supply her with

¹⁶⁷ Michael Jacobs, *Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg* (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippencott & Co., 1864), 17-18. Indeed, today Confederate money, as an artifact from the past, is of more value than United States money, due to its historical significance and its comparative scarcity.

¹⁶⁸ Robert Emory Park, “War Diary of Captain Robert Emory Park, 12th Alabama Regiment, January 28, 1863 – January 27, 1864,” *Southern Historical Society Papers* 26 (January – December 1898).

¹⁶⁹ *Valley Spirit*, July 8, 1863.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ McClure, *Old Time Notes*, vol. 2, 93.

¹⁷² Thomas M. Griffith, Letter from Thomas M. Griffith to His Siblings, July 3, 1863.

¹⁷³ L. M. Blackford, L. M. Blackford to Wm. M. Blackford, June 28, 1863, VS.

items she either needed or desired. “I bought a few articles for you yesterday and will get you a nice lot before we leave. We pay about 200 percent.”¹⁷⁴ During the Battle of Gettysburg, Sue King Black wrote that in exchange for baking, the Confederates gave her mother a fifty-cent piece and herself a bunch of silk skins of all colors. She further described, “Offered me more but I wouldn’t take it.”¹⁷⁵ Charles F. Himes recalled that in New Oxford everything was paid for in Confederate money. Some Confederates even “had the conscience to return some articles because the merchant didn’t seem to value the scrip.”¹⁷⁶ To him, it seemed as though “they were so generous with it that it didn’t seem as if they valued it.”¹⁷⁷ Some “said they wanted to contract a heavy debt in Penna.”¹⁷⁸ Sometimes however, merchants and other civilians submitted to whatever price the Confederates specified for payment. From Chambersburg, James Peter Williams wrote to his father, “We bought everything we wanted at our own price in the town.”¹⁷⁹

Although many Pennsylvania civilians were weary of accepting Confederate money, due to the low fiscal value of the currency, they nevertheless accepted the payment as the best option available to them. Alfred Mallory Edgar specified, “We have plenty of Confederate money and pay for everything we get, although the citizens are very much opposed to accepting our money, but we insist and they finally end by taking it.”¹⁸⁰ Some Confederates acquired eatables without pay however, benefiting from the fear exhibited by the civilians. John O. Casler recollected, “Of

¹⁷⁴ Dorsey Pender, *One of Lee’s Best Men*, 253.

¹⁷⁵ Sue King Black, Robert L. Brake Collection, Civilians, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

¹⁷⁶ Charles F. Himes, Milton Embick Flower Collection, Civil War Research Confederate Invasion, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 4; Also in Pocket Diary of Charles F. Himes, 1863, Civil War Resources, Location: MC 2000.1, B16, F2, Dickinson College Archives. June 27, 1863.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ James Peter Williams to his Father, June 28, 1863.

¹⁸⁰ Alfred Mallory Edgar, *My Reminiscences of the Civil War: With the Stonewall Brigade and the Immortal 600* (Charleston, WV: 35th Star Publishing, 2011), 130.

course we could go to the houses and get all we wanted to eat without money, for they did not want our money, and were glad to give us plenty through fear.”¹⁸¹

Other Confederate soldiers complained that they could not complete individual transactions because Pennsylvanians would not accept their currency. “I didn’t buy anything while I was over the river,” penned Robert Depriest to his wife. “The money would not pass there, and can’t pass it here for nothing but tobacco at two dollars a plug.”¹⁸² Ewell, in particular, did not allow the use of force against the civilian populace for the acceptance of their currency, for individual transactions at least. Major Campbell Brown, of Ewell’s staff, informed his sister and mother, “We have actually got again into the neighborhood where a five cent piece is worth something.”¹⁸³ While chickens sold for only ten cents and butter for twelve and a half cents, he also detailed “we generally have to pay in Yankee money for them as Genl Ewell does not allow us to force our own currency upon the people.”¹⁸⁴ Near Chambersburg, Charles Edward Lippitt, detailed “the men caught some fowles [sic] on the road, but were made to offer to pay for them.”¹⁸⁵

When no compulsion was necessary, the exchange of currency, even paying extra, still worked in the favor of the Confederates, so many completed individual purchases for their loved ones at home. Campbell Brown purchased dresses, and other dry goods for the women in his family, which cost him \$160, though it would have cost his family \$700 in the south, if they could even get it. He specified the dresses cost fifty cents a yard and he thought in United States

¹⁸¹ John O. Casler, 168.

¹⁸² Robert H. Depriest, July 18, 1863. From Berkely County, Virginia.

¹⁸³ G. C. [George Campbell] Brown to his Sister and Mother, June 25, 1863, VS; G. Campbell Brown, *Campbell Brown’s Civil War: With Ewell in the Army of Northern Virginia*, ed. Terry L. Jones (Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press, 2001).

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Charles Edward Lippitt, *Diary of Charles Edward Lippitt (1863-1864)*, VS.

currency the price would have been about twenty-five cents a yard. He stressed “I bought for C.S. money & used no threats for compulsion whatever.”¹⁸⁶

While most payments were made in Confederate scrip, some Confederates paid in greenbacks, when it was available. In York, where Early appropriated a substantial amount of United State currency, Cassandra Morris Small wrote, “They had plenty of Confederate money and Greenbacks, too – paid sometimes in one and sometimes in another.”¹⁸⁷ In Gettysburg, at the Globe Inn, Confederate officers brought the hotel a significant increase in business. On the morning of July 2nd, they filled a long dining table that seated forty-six people. Afterward, the officers, mainly from Early’s division, who were located in close proximity to the hotel, dined at the establishment for breakfast, dinner, and supper, and to the surprise of John Wills, they paid with United States currency.¹⁸⁸ When the Confederates asked Harriet Bayly for something to eat, she gave them plenty enough to indulge their appetite and relayed “for which they offered me Confederate money.”¹⁸⁹ She replied that she “would have ‘none of that,’ but that I would take the genuine article – good greenbacks – if they had it; and they paid me well.”¹⁹⁰

In some cases, instead of payment in Confederate money, receipts were given so as to provide evidence for future reimbursement. Robert McClean recounted that on the night of July 1st, a rebel captain from a North Carolina regiment, along with twenty of his men, awoke their family with a requisition for their bacon. His father accordingly showed him to the smoke house

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Cassandra Morris Small, “Letters of ’63,” 18-20.

¹⁸⁸ John Charles Wills, “Reminiscences of the Three Days Battle of Gettysburg at the ‘Globe Hotel’ by John C. Wills, A Son of Charles Wills Proprietor and Landlord of the Hotel, Who Assisted His Father in Conducting the Business of the Hotel,” ACHS, 29. Also in *Adams County History* 13, no 4 (2007): 35. Because of the demand, Wills raised the price of whiskey from 5 cents to 10 cents per drink and the price of meals from 35 cents to 50 cents.

¹⁸⁹ Harriet Hamilton Bayly, “A Woman’s Story: Three Days of Rebel Rule,” *Star and Sentinel*, September 25, 1888.

¹⁹⁰

and they took two hams, in addition to some pieces of beef. Though one man reminded the captain “that beef was not included in the order he had from his General, and which he showed,” the officer contemplated that that the intent of the order given must have included beef, in addition to ham. The Confederate officer “weighted it, gave us a receipt, and told us our government ought to pay us for it!”¹⁹¹ Some other Pennsylvania civilians concurred with the belief that their government would reimburse them for their losses. While John J. Garnett’s artillerists foraged upon a local farmer, enroute to Gettysburg, he described

Anxious to make amends, so far as my own conscience was concerned, I leaped the fence with my horse and rode up to where the old Dunker was sitting. ‘At what do you value your loss?’ I asked. ‘It is of no account,’ he answered. ‘The Town Council has given you permission to take all you find, and if they don’t pay me, Abe Lincoln will. Don’t trouble yourself, sir.’ This philosophical view of the matter seemed to be shared by all the residents of the town of Gettysburg on the arrival of the Confederates, and it proved very agreeable to the tired and hungry throng which had arrived among them.¹⁹²

During Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, while during periods of maneuver and occupation, outside of the burnings, Federal soldiers similarly paid for eatables, many civilians were generally not compensated or reimbursed for the strategic destruction to their farms and homesteads. For example, John M. Steele recalled one day when the Yankees entered Newtown, “before the day was over we had sold out of apples and pies,” selling the apples at five cents apiece and pies at fifty cents each. In total, he thought they made about twenty dollars.¹⁹³ Elisha Hunt Rhodes also stated that his command found plenty of food not so often found as

¹⁹¹ Robert McClean, “A Boy In Gettysburg - - 1863: What He Saw During the Eventful Battle Days A Letter Written by the Same Boy Two Weeks After the Great Battle,” *Gettysburg Compiler*, June 30, 1909.

¹⁹² John J. Garnett, *Gettysburg: The Bloodiest Battle of the Civil War*, 25. The section was entitled “A Farmers Faith in Lincoln.

¹⁹³ *Between the Lines: The Civil War Diaries, Letters and Memoirs of the Steele Family of Newtown, 1861 – 1864*. L. A. Fravel / Stone House Foundation, Draft as of 9/10/2008, Newtown History Center, Stephen’s City Virginia, 249. Not all the pies in Newtown held the same appeal.

components of their daily rations, including milk, peaches, and grapes, specifying “which the people gladly sold to us.”¹⁹⁴ Quartermaster Sergeant Ezra L. Walker, while foraging on September 27th, promised a Dunker woman that they “would pay her for everything we got.”¹⁹⁵ In regard to the strategic destruction however, such examples of payment made to civilians or the issuance of receipts for destroyed property are not as manifest, though Sheridan did inform his chief of cavalry, Brigadier General Alfred T. A. Torbert, within his orders of destruction, written on August 16, 1864, “Loyal citizens can bring in their claims against the Government for this necessary destruction.”¹⁹⁶ After the war, Southern Unionists who were able to prove their loyalty and the validity of their claims were compensated for some of their losses.¹⁹⁷

In regard to the acquisition of provender and supplies, Lee’s orders to his army during the Gettysburg Campaign encompassed everything which was required of him by the rules of warfare, including instructions to immediately compensate civilians for their losses, through the issuance of direct payments, or if such payments were refused, written receipts for future reimbursement, the payment of which would be decided by the outcome of the war. It is generally evident that his subordinate officers and the soldiers in their commands followed the instructions and paid for that which they took. It is also apparent that concerning individual purchases outside of their military needs, that the use of force was prohibited. The inflated value of the Confederate dollar, due to the creation of a new currency and its implementation in the midst of war was an element outside of Lee’s ability to control, due to his role as an army

¹⁹⁴ Elisha Hunter Rhodes, *All For The Union: The Civil War Diary and Letters of Elisha Hunter Rhodes* (New York: Orion Books, 1985), 187.

¹⁹⁵ Thomas F. Wildes, *Record of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Regiment Ohio Infantry Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion*, (Sandusky, OH: I. F. Mack & Bro., 1884), 188.

¹⁹⁶ Headquarters Middle Military Division, Cedar Creek, Va., August 16, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 816.

¹⁹⁷ The Southern Claims Commission was created by an Act of Congress on March 3, 1871, in order to compensate loyal Union Southerners for supplies confiscated by Federal armies. Throughout the entirety of the South, out of 22,298 claims, 7,092 were allowed.

commander, besides the favorable impact upon the value of the Confederate dollar, which his continued military success may generate. In any case, the spirit of Lee's orders to respect private property was often applied, even in spite of the low value of the Confederate currency, as Confederate soldiers and Pennsylvania merchants often compensated for the discrepancy.

Although slavery is often considered the major difference between the North and South, there are also differences, related to the capture of slaves and the taking of free African Americans, within the campaigns themselves. During the Gettysburg Campaign, many contraband slaves and free African Americans fled across the Susquehanna River, under the fear of being captured. That contraband slaves, and even some free African Americans, were captured and taken south by Confederate soldiers during the Gettysburg Campaign is certainly apparent.

Although the capturing of contrabands was intentional, as masters claimed a right to their labor, as it was under the United States Constitution in the antebellum period, and as it continued to be in the Confederacy, the "kidnapping" of free African Americans was not intentional. The Confederates during the Gettysburg Campaign, and the South as a whole, differentiated between free African Americans and those in slavery. Jacob Hoke, for instance, noted that during Jenkins Raid both free African Americans and contrabands were caught, but when Dr. Schneck went to General Jenkins' headquarters, he was able to secure the release of Esque Hall, Henry Deitrick and Samuel Claudy, all free African Americans, after assuring Jenkins that they were longtime residents of Chambersburg and not fugitive slaves.¹⁹⁸ Also during Jenkins Raid, Jemima Cree observed Confederate troopers scouting around and "gathering up our Darkies," including two of whom she knew, Mag and Fannie, whom they had by the courthouse along with about twenty-

¹⁹⁸ Jacob Hoke, *Historical Reminiscences of the War or Incidents which Transpired in and About Chambersburg during the War of the Rebellion* (Chambersburg, PA: M. A. Foltz, Printer and Publisher, 1884), 38-39.

five other women and children. She interceded for Mag, informing the Confederates that she was born free. The guard however told her that “he could do nothing,” as he was only “acting according to orders,” those of Jenkins, and that they were preparing to leave. Cree supposed that “if I could have had time to have seen the General,” she might have secured the release of Mag, but Fannie, as a contraband, she “could do nothing about her.”¹⁹⁹ McNeill’s Rangers, according to Dr. Philip Schaff, “claimed all these negroes as Virginia slaves” and when he inquired upon one of the guards whether he felt “bad and mean in such an occupation,” the man “boldly replied” that “he felt very comfortable,” since “they were only reclaiming their property which we had stolen and harbored.”²⁰⁰ One man from Mosby’s Rangers did however, a few days later, reply to a Pennsylvanian civilian, when asked if they took free negroes as well as contrabands, “Yes, and we will take you, too, if you do not shut up!”²⁰¹ That some free African Americans were taken, in addition to contrabands could have possibly stemmed from instances of mistaken identity, a revenge mentality by select individuals, or even a belief that most of the African Americans on the border counties were fugitive slaves.

Not all of the contrabands protested against their return to Virginia as at least one of those captured welcomed the departure, due to the difficulties she experienced in Pennsylvania and the comforts she remembered back home. Lucy Rebecca Buck wrote that a part of their family’s servants, Mahala and her children, who had left the plantation were captured, along with some thirty others and taken as far as Greencastle by a cavalry guard. Mahala recognized one of the cavalymen, serving as a guard for the group, who was also from Front Royal and according to Buck, “made herself known to him - said she wished she was back in her home, that ‘twas a

¹⁹⁹ Mrs. Jemima Cree, 94.

²⁰⁰ Philip Schaff, June 27, 1863.

²⁰¹ Ibid., July 1, 1863.

good one and that now she had spent all her money and was without food and had no one to provide for her.”²⁰² Nothing was known of another servant family, “Harriet and her clique,” who had also left the plantation seeking their individual freedom.²⁰³

Although contraband slaves were intentionally reclaimed as slaves and taken south during the campaign, for the most part, by independent cavalry units, Lee never prescribed specific orders to do so and it certainly was not a primary goal for the campaign. Rodes issued no official orders to Jenkins for the capture of contrabands. His written instructions, rather, dwelt with the necessity of “obtaining supplies of cattle and horses.”²⁰⁴ The divisional commander did however, according to the Confederate newspaper correspondent Peter Wellington Alexander, act in the favor of the slave owners, by threatening the people of Greencastle that “he would not leave on brick standing upon another,” if the contrabands, who were rescued from Jenkins’ guards, and then concealed, by some of the town’s citizens a few days previous, were not returned.²⁰⁵ Alexander detailed that “the negroes were produced in the time specified, and were sent on to Virginia whence they had escaped.”²⁰⁶ The threat was likely an empty one, due to Lee’s orders to respect private property, and the episode does not indicate that the orders to

²⁰² Lucy Rebecca Buck, *Shadows on My Heart: The Civil War Diary of Lucy Rebecca Buck of Virginia*, ed. Elizabeth R. Baer (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1997), 228.

²⁰³ *Ibid.* The story was relayed to Lucy Rebecca Buck’s father from a cavalryman on July 3, 1863. One reason many of the contrabands captured in southern Pennsylvania were women and children is that many of the male slaves in Virginia had been impressed to go to Richmond to work on its defenses. Lucy Rebecca Buck recorded on the same date, “The men had all been sent to Richmond to work on fortifications.” In Pennsylvania, African American males were also employed in the construction of defenses, for example, outside of Carlisle and Wrightsville.

²⁰⁴ OR, vol. 27 (2): 550.

²⁰⁵ Peter Wellington Alexander, *Writing and Fighting the Confederate War: The Letters of Peter Wellington Alexander Confederate War Correspondent*. Edited by William B. Styple. Kearny, NJ: Belle Grove Publishing, Co., 2002), 158. Alexander referred to the contrabands as “runaway negroes.” He is contradictory in his statements of the action taken by the citizens of Greencastle. He stated that they “rescued” the contrabands, perhaps because that is what the citizens of Greencastle considered themselves as doing, but then shortly later he calls those same citizens, “kidnappers.” Rodes threat appears as an empty one, as Alexander described that the citizens took “the hint.”

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

capture contraband slaves emanated from Rodes himself, but rather, that the general reacted to the actions already undertaken by Jenkins.

Grant's strategy, on the other hand, geared toward the total destruction of the Valley's agricultural capabilities included positive orders not only to destroy crops and to carry off livestock, but also to carry off negroes, in order to prevent planting in the future.²⁰⁷ Such an order suggests that the liberation of slaves was not only an end in of itself, as abolitionists desired, but a means utilized to accomplish the desired end of reunion, that is, the elimination of the Valley's workforce. Similar instructions were previously presented to Sheridan by Grant for Loudoun County.²⁰⁸

Sheridan began the implementation of these orders in the Lower Valley even before the commencement of the burnings. Matthella Page Harrison, for example, recorded on August 11th 1864, "We are again relieved from the hated presence but their visit has been very disastrous to us for they have carried off George who has hitherto been a faithful servant."²⁰⁹ It appears however that Sheridan did not forcibly execute the orders in the Upper Valley, instead relying on the widespread destruction caused during the burning to prompt the relocation of African Americans as northward bound refugees, along with the Dunkers and Mennonites, or as southward bound slaves, following their masters, no longer able to live in the area. One reason for this may be the low numbers of slaves in an area heavily populated by the Germans, in addition to a departure of slaves from the area due to Hunter's Raid, a few months prior, and

²⁰⁷ Grant to Sheridan, Aug. 26, 1864, OR, 43(1): 917. Also see, vol. 43 (2): 202.

²⁰⁸ Grant to Sheridan, Aug. 16, 1864, OR, vol. 43 (1): 811.

²⁰⁹ Matthella Page Harrison, Transcript of a Diary Kept by Mathella Page Harrison, The Wife of Dr. Benjamin Harrison, 1862-1864, UVA, MSS 9759, 43. Harrison also specified the previous year, in the summer of 1863, "All of our servants were captured and it was almost with feelings of regret I heard it. They were given me so much trouble this winter I almost hate the sight of a black face except my dear old mammy and Jacob, who were faithful." *Ibid.*, 37. June 17, 1863.

impressments in Richmond.²¹⁰ Joseph A. Waddell recounted, “It is said that a Yankee officer made an address to the negroes after they got through tearing up the Railroad track. He was anxious for the young men to go off with them, but would not advise the old men to leave their houses; if, however, the latter chose to go, they would be taken to Washington city where arrangements would be made of which they could work for a living.”²¹¹ John R. Adams recorded on October 8th, “Refugees also multiply on our hands, white and black, all seeking another and a Northern home, diminishing the amount of labor in the valley.”²¹²

Slaves in the Upper Valley, like contrabands and free African Americans in Pennsylvania, also faced stressful experiences as refugees, though of course under different circumstances, having to flee with their masters. While many slaves fled from their masters during Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, some remained committed to them. Joseph A. Waddell’s one slave, Moses, informed him of the advance of Sheridan’s army up the Valley in late September. He sent another one of his slaves, Wright, to inform his brother Legh of the impending arrival of the Federals. On September 27th, he noted that the Yankees “impressed all

²¹⁰ In Shenandoah, Rockingham, and Page counties, the Germans accounted for an estimated three-quarters of the population. In southern Frederick, western Warren, and the upper portions of Augusta County, they accounted for about one – half of the population. As such, the number of slaves in those areas were small compared to the areas in which the Scotch-Irish and especially the English settled, particularly in Rockbridge and Clarke counties, respectively. According to the 1860 census, in Shenandoah County the slave population only accounted for 5% of the county’s population, in Rockingham 10%, and in Page 10%, in comparison to 23% in Rockbridge and 47% in Clarke. Joseph C. G. Kennedy, *Population of The United States in 1860: Compiled From The Original Returns of The Eight Census* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864). In the 1860 census, there were more free African Americans in the counties through which Sheridan implemented his destruction, (6,380 or 3.57% of the area’s population), than there were in the counties through which Lee’s army marched, (5,086 or 2.71% of the area’s population), as there were more in Virginia (58,042 or 3.64% of the state’s population) than Pennsylvania (56,949 or 1.86% of the state’s population). Pennsylvania counted no slaves in the state. The counties through which Sheridan implemented his destruction counted 40,716 slaves, or 22.81% of the area’s population, and Virginia counted 490,865 slaves, or 30.75% of the state population. The census also distinguished between free black and free mulatto. On estimations concerning the population percentages of Germans in the Valley, see, John Walter Wayland, *The German Element of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia* (Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company, Printers, 1907).

²¹¹ Waddell, Diary, Oct. 10, 1864; Waddell, *Annals of Augusta County Virginia From 1726-1871*, 2nd ed., rev. and enlarged, (Staunton, VA: C. Russell Caldwell, Publishers, 1902), 498.

²¹² John R. Adams, 161, October 8, 1864.

the negro men into their service and took them down the Railroad to destroy the track and bridges,” including two of his own, Moses and Stephen. Wright learned of the impressment and instead spend the day hidden in a spare room, “reading Bancroft’s History of the United States.”²¹³ Waddell emphasized, “The impressed negroes were very indignant, and did much less damage to the Railroad than they could have done.”²¹⁴ He further articulated that not all African Americans were enthusiastic about leaving. In reply to the offer to work in Washington, “an old negro” responded “Humph! . . . plenty work here.”²¹⁵ While Sheridan’s troopers occupied Staunton, Waddell observed, “A considerable number of negroes went off from the town and vicinity with the Yankees,” though he added, “None of ours.”²¹⁶

As a whole, Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan’s Valley Campaign hold significant marked contrasts. The policy goals sought and the strategy utilized to bring those goals to fruition contrasted sharply. Lee’s strategy in Pennsylvania included the issuance of requisitions for the purposes of their current offensive campaign and continued defensive military operations, in order to bring about a negotiated peace, so as to achieve their independence, whereas Grant’s strategy intended for Sheridan in Virginia, included the destruction of the Valley’s agricultural capabilities for the prevention of further military operations in the area, as a means to secure a total victory, and ultimately, to force the submission of the Southern States and the Southern people to Federal authority.

The Federal proponents of “hard war” held an entirely different conception of warfare than that held by Lee. While Lee considered war an evil, he also believed its worst effects could

²¹³ Joseph A. Waddell, Diary, Oct. 8, 1864, see footnote 5 concerning Moses and Waddell. Waddell explained, “He is a slave only in name, and some of my waggish friends have started the question, Whether Moses belongs to me, or I to Moses!” Found in his *Home Scenes and Family Sketches* (Staunton, VA: Stoneburner and Prufer, 1900); Joseph A. Waddell, *Annals of Augusta County*, 498.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., Oct. 10, 1864.

²¹⁶ Ibid., Oct. 8, 1864.

be limited by waging it according to certain rules, which in effect, reflected a balanced understanding that how one conducted the war was as important as the ends for which it was waged. The Federal advocates of “hard war,” on the contrary, operated under the contention that the fighting for what they considered a just cause, justified harsher measures toward Southern civilians, in order to hasten total victory, namely, that the ends justified the means, aptly summarized in Sherman’s expression that “War is hell.” These contrasting conceptions of warfare certainly impacted the conduct of their armies toward civilian property. Both the North and South had proponents of the contrasting conceptions of war, including McLellan who mirrored Lee’s vision of war, and implemented it while he was Commander-in-Chief in 1862, and Early who implemented a retaliatory form of warfare, contrary to Lee’s own vision of war, particularly when he ordered the burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania in 1864.

There were also vital differences in time, concerning the *jus in bello* actions within the related campaigns. Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign lay in between two smaller raids into Franklin County Pennsylvania, including Stuart’s in 1862, operating under Lee’s orders, and McCausland’s in 1864, operating under Early’s orders. In 1862, Stuart collected horses, destroyed public works, captured governing officials, and foraged as necessary, while McCausland burned the central portions of Chambersburg, including private homes. Lee’s Gettysburg campaign held similarities with Stuart’s raid and marked contrasts with McCausland’s.

Sheridan’s Valley Campaign occurred in the fall of 1864, being the culmination of events which transpired in the spring and summer. Sigel’s advance up the Valley in May 1864, as were the Valley campaigns in 1862, was largely fought according to conventional methods, including seeking victory on the battlefield, along with the destruction of military targets and the

appropriation of public goods during the campaign, while foraging throughout the territory, largely similar to actions occurring during Lee's Gettysburg Campaign. Hunter's Raid, while mainly continuing to target military objectives, brought the fighting in the area into a period of retaliatory warfare with the vengeful burning of private property. Sheridan's Valley Campaign however, surpassed in intensity and destructiveness the two preceding Federal campaigns in the Valley, by intentionally targeting private property, as part of intentional strategic destruction, including the burning of barns and mills, filled with grain, seed, and farm equipment, consuming, appropriating, or slaughtering stock, and relocating those who worked the ground, essentially targeting that which would prevent agricultural production in the Valley.

The policies pursued by Lee and Sheridan, concerning the respect exhibited toward private property differed significantly. Lee's policy stressed the necessity of taking what they needed for the continuance of their military operations, though leaving enough for the livelihoods of the civilian populace in the localities through which his army passed, while Sheridan's policy sought the wholesale destruction of the agricultural capabilities in the areas through which his army passed, forcing the exit of avowed secessionists from the Valley and providing transport for loyal Unionists and neutral pacifists to refugee northward, essentially making the Valley a no-man's land. Pennsylvania civilians also recorded the results of the Gettysburg Campaign as having been better than their expectations of a Confederate army marching virtually unhindered through the south – central portions of the state, while the devastation wrought upon the Valley shocked Virginia civilians accustomed to more conventional impacts upon their livelihoods. Moreover, holding higher expectations for the conduct of their own troops than those of the enemy, Pennsylvania civilians expressed their irritation with abuses conducted by Federal troops during the Gettysburg Campaign, while

during the destructive portions of Sheridan's Valley Campaign, Virginia civilians held no such notion.

Several common criticisms of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign, in comparison with Sheridan's Valley Campaign fail to summarily distinguish it as a campaign abusive of the rules of warfare. Whereas Lee ordered the payment for supplies his army took, most often in Confederate money, or the issuing of receipts for future reimbursement, Sheridan did not pay for that which he destroyed, nor generally reimburse those who suffered significant losses, though some soldiers paid for eatables. While many in the North considered payment in Confederate money a farce, the value of the Confederate currency would correspondingly coincide with the incurred success of the Confederates during the Gettysburg Campaign in particular, as well as the war as a whole. Lee's orders to pay for that which he took were in accordance with the rules of warfare, whereas Sheridan's absence of such payment for that which he destroyed was out of the bounds of civilized war, as a whole, and his instructions specified within the Lieber Code, in particular.

Although the capture of contraband slaves, and even some free African Americans, during the Gettysburg Campaign occurred, Lee issued no positive orders to do so. It was certainly not a primary goal of the Gettysburg Campaign, but rather an incident which occurred within the campaign. Grant, on the other hand, issued positive orders to "carry off . . . negroes," in relation to his strategy of exhaustion to achieve victory, so as to denude the Valley of a labor force during the war, of course granting slaves their individual freedom in the process.²¹⁷

²¹⁷ OR, 43(1): 811, 917.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In a *jus in bello* comparison of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign and Sheridan's Valley Campaign, while similarities are no doubt apparent, there are also sharp contrasts which fundamentally differentiate the two campaigns. Benjamin L. Farinholt, in the 53rd Virginia of Pickett's Division, aptly summarized the general conduct of the Army of Northern Virginia during Lee's Gettysburg Campaign in a letter he wrote to his wife from Chambersburg on July 1, 1863. "Our soldiers have burnt no houses and no barns as the Enemy do and are obeying strictly Genl Lee's orders to 'take no property unless we pay for it' but we have burnt some larger iron works, foundries &c, and are tearing up their Rail Road by whole-sale."¹ In general, they did not retaliate for abuses inflicted upon them, followed Lee's orders to respect private property, compensating Pennsylvanian civilians for their transactions, whether those be of official requisitions or individual purchases, and their destruction continued to be of conventional military targets, including the enemy's infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities.

Similarities between the two campaigns are certainly evident. The environment in which the campaigns were waged held similarities in relation to the geographic setting and the sentiments of the civilian populace. Both Northerners and Southerners favored aspects of what they deemed as civilized or uncivilized war. Similar impacts of conventional warfare upon civilians were also evident in both campaigns, incident to the movement and fighting of the

¹ Benjamin L Farinholt, Benjamin L. Farinholt to Leila Farinholt, July 1, 1863. Valley of the Shadow. Two Communities in the American Civil War, Virginia Center for Digital History, University of Virginia.

armies, including amongst other effects, damages to fences, crops, and structures, losses in horses, livestock, food, and other supplies, as well as the immense distress associated with living upon the border and having the enemy army marching through one's locality, such as facing numerous rumors, experiences as refugees, and sheltering during the fighting.

Yet such similarities diverged with a positive addition to conventional impacts, in the implementation of a "hard war" policy, that of intentional strategic destruction of civilian property, as many civilians suffered even greater losses and hardships. Jacob Hoke, a prominent citizen of Chambersburg who bore witness to Lee's Gettysburg Campaign and reflected upon much of the war, wrote of this addition,

General Lee fully appropriated to the use of his army the resources of our people, conveying away with him all he had transportation for. All was, however, taken under special instructions and by specified officers, and either paid for in such money as he had, or vouchers given. In the valley campaigns, Hunter and Sheridan did what Lee did in Pennsylvania, except paying for what they took, and *in addition* destroyed what they could not consume or carry away. This was done as a war measure to deplete the resources of the enemy. The Valley of Virginia had been the great store house from which supplies had been drawn for the army about Richmond, and it was deemed necessary to destroy these resources. Consequently all the grain, provender, and cattle that could not be used were destroyed, and barns, granaries, mills, and factories burned. It was an extreme measure allowable under the circumstances.²

Regardless of Hoke's allowance for Sheridan's destruction as a "war measure," he certainly noted an observable difference between the campaigns, in that Sheridan conducted his campaign, in some ways similar to Lee, but he also went exceptionally further. Sheridan still fought pitched battles, winning significant victories at Third Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek, appropriated or destroyed public stores of supplies, and targeted railroads. But, in addition to these actions, besides the absence of financial compensation for that which he took, Sheridan

² Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion of 1863 or Lee in Pennsylvania* (Dayton, OH: W. J. Shuey Publisher, 1887), 600.

significantly expanded the scope of the conflict and consequently the impact felt by civilians, by intentionally targeting private property for destruction.

While many Confederates often spoke of wrongs perpetrated by Federal armies throughout the South prior to the Gettysburg Campaign, as Benjamin Farinholt's summation illustrated, including Lee, who within his General Orders No. 73 contrasted their own conduct in Pennsylvania with that of the enemy and stressed their leniency for not retaliating, the scale and strategic intent of the destruction evident during Sheridan's Valley Campaign shocked many Southerners and Northerners alike, as they bore witness to a general escalation of the conflict.

Within Sheridan's Valley Campaign, the impacts of conventional warfare were especially evident in areas which did not witness the burnings, that is, the northern portions of the Lower Valley. Southern civilians made little note of the impact of conventional warfare in the areas which suffered from the burning, though its effects were still felt, as the wholesale destruction of the areas agricultural capabilities overshadowed more conventional damages which Southern civilians had largely become accustomed to.

Even though Sheridan's destruction of civilian property in Virginia went significantly further than Lee's collection of supplies in Pennsylvania, neither campaign however degenerated into a conflict which intentionally targeted noncombatants themselves, except for instances of perceived abuses to the rules of warfare. While the implementation of a "hard war" policy certainly veered outside of the accepted limits of nineteenth century warfare, the actions undertaken were still considerably different than the total wars of the twentieth century. Moreover, modifying factors, including most prominently that of a shared Christian faith, influenced conduct so as to limit excess abuses.

Despite the similarities between the campaigns, claims stating that Lee's Gettysburg Campaign was conducted "no better or worse than the Union armies that marched through various parts of the South at different times during the war"³ or that Confederate actions during the Gettysburg Campaign were "not all that different than Union marches through the South,"⁴ fail to account for a number of vital differences between the only major Confederate campaign in Northern territory and Sheridan's Valley Campaign, the culminating Federal military operation in the Shenandoah Valley. Such an argument fails to address the changing nature of the war itself, at least in the east, an attritional escalatory conflict that shifted from being one principally fought between armed combatants on the battlefield to one intentionally including non-combatants in the conflict by targeting civilian property. Because of this escalation, not only did Lee's Gettysburg Campaign differ with Sheridan's Valley Campaign, but also with another Confederate raid into Pennsylvania the following year, that of McCausland's raid, which culminated in the burning of Chambersburg. Additionally, not only did Sheridan's Valley Campaign differ with Lee's Gettysburg Campaign, but also with other Federal campaigns up the Valley in 1862 and in the early portions of 1864. As such, similar comparative studies, in relation to the conduct exhibited toward civilians and private property by the contending armies, during campaigns along the border within enemy territory, for instance, between Federal forces in the Valley in 1862 and Confederate troopers in Pennsylvania in 1864, or even between campaigns waged by the same side in the early and later portions of the war, may wield similar conclusions, concerning the varied conduct of the armies toward civilians.

³ Steven E. Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2008), 27.

⁴ Jason Mann Frawley, "Marching Through Pennsylvania: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians During the Gettysburg Campaign," Ph.D. Thesis, Texas Christian University, May 2008, 19.

Furthermore, the policy goals of the United and Confederate states and the strategies implemented to achieve those goals by Lee and Sheridan also contrasted sharply. In pursuit of sustaining Southern independence, Lee advanced northward into Pennsylvania, in part, to sustain his army in order to continue military operations, and ultimately, so as to achieve an abandonment of Federal war efforts to subdue the South. The destruction of civilian property would have been contrary to his strategic purposes of acquiring food and supplies and growing the Northern peace party. In pursuit of preserving the Union, Sheridan operated in the Valley, implementing his orders of destruction against the Valley's agricultural capabilities, so as to effectually make it a no-man's land, in order to prevent Confederate raids north of the Potomac, exhaust the Confederacy's material resources, and demoralize Southern morale, with the ultimate goal of forcing the submission of the Southern states and people to Federal authority.

In execution of their strategies, Lee and Sheridan implemented polarized policies toward civilians. Lee desired to take what was necessary for his military operations, making payment or providing vouchers as necessary, but leave enough sustenance for the civilian populace, whereas Sheridan desired to decimate the agricultural capabilities of the Valley and then relocate loyal Unionists and neutral pacifists to the North, forcing the same relocation southward for avowed secessionists. While many Pennsylvania civilians returned to their farms after Lee's departure from the state, many Valley residents did not return to their farms after Sheridan's withdrawal down the Valley, having very little to return home to. Indeed, many of the pacifists who refugeed northward in 1864 never returned to the Valley ever again.

The impacts of these polarized policies were no doubt observed by civilians themselves. During the destructive periods of Sheridan's Valley Campaign, there existed an absence of notions held by Northern civilians during the Gettysburg Campaign. Some Pennsylvanians

suggested better treatment exhibited toward them by the enemy than their own troops, holding the latter to a higher standard of conduct. Such sentiments were absent from the Valley's residents during the burning. Furthermore, many Pennsylvanians expected worse actions from the Confederates than that which actually occurred. This sentiment was not apparent from Southerners in Virginia during the burning, as civilians in the Valley and within Mosby's Confederacy experienced unprecedented devastation to their homesteads. While many prominent Northerners spoke well of Confederate actions in Pennsylvania during the summer of 1863, in addition to highlighting specific abuses, including Colonel A. K. McClure, the merchant Jacob Hoke, the arch abolitionist Thaddeus Stevens, various newspaper correspondents, and many other Pennsylvania civilians, in general, similar writings expressing the good conduct of the Sheridan's forces by civilians of the Valley during the autumn of 1864 are lacking.

Indeed, the orders of Lee and Grant and the corresponding conduct of the armies during the campaigns present entirely different conceptions of warfare. A dichotomy is often apparent between the just causes for which a war is waged and the justness of the ways in which the war is conducted, since there exists a tendency to decrease the limits of the latter in pursuit of the former, a philosophy of the ends justifying the means. Throughout history, limited and unlimited wars are apparent. When *jus in bello* actions are strictly respected one may see more wars, though of less devastation, and when *jus ad bellum* requirements are heightened one may see less wars, but of those that do occur, they bring forth more destruction. The Just War theorist, Michael Walzer accordingly reflected, "The dualism of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* is at the heart of all that is most problematic in the moral reality of war."⁵ Unjust wars not only

⁵ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 21.

encompass wars waged for an unjust cause and fought in an unjust manner. They may also include those waged for an unjust cause and fought in a just manner as well as those waged for a just cause and fought in an unjust manner. A just war requires not only a just cause, but additionally, that in pursuit of such an end, the conduct of the war is in accordance with justified means. To put it succinctly, the justness in war rests fully independent of the justness of war.

Lee's conception of war emphasized the import of proper *jus in bello* actions, entirely independent from *jus ad bellum* ones, even though he also considered the Confederate cause of sustaining their independence as just. He stressed the importance of noncombatant immunity, in that they make "war only upon armed men," and dismissed a policy of retaliation, despite calls for its implementation north of the Potomac. Furthermore, Lee believed such a policy respecting private property, including within the enemy's territory, was an obligation imposed upon them "by civilization and Christianity."⁶ Sheridan, and other Federal advocates of "hard war," on the contrary, espoused that a just cause pursued necessitated harsher measures to ensure its fruition. They further considered that in a war between democratic societies, rather than between monarchs, as the field armies were supported by civilians on the home front, the destruction of civilian property was now an acceptable target, in order to isolate civilian support from the men in uniform. Such a conception of war, in effect, subordinated the rules of warfare to winning the war itself.

The destruction wrought by Sheridan during the burnings in the Shenandoah Valley and east of the Blue Ridge wielded both strategic import, to the final result of the war, and a moral one, in relation to the impact upon civilians as noncombatants. Sheridan, as commander of the

⁶ OR, vol. 27 (3): 942 - 943

Middle Military Division, including most prominently the Army of the Valley, was very successful militarily, but from the moral perspective of Just War Theory such success was achieved through the wrong means, that of directly targeting civilian property, thus diminishing the import of non-combatant immunity.

Sheridan boasted of his destruction in his October 7th report to Grant, detailing that he had destroyed over two thousand barns, “filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements,” over seventy miles, “filled with flour and wheat,” as well as appropriating or killing more than seven thousand animals.⁷ He considered this destruction of the Valley’s agricultural capabilities as paramount to the success of his campaign and the war as a whole, thus prioritizing the end over the means, that is, of victory over the moral necessity of adhering to the rules of warfare. Lee, on the other hand, never boasted of the food and supplies he acquired in Pennsylvania, though certainly a successful component of his campaign. He emphasized in his General Orders No. 73 that the proper means by which they conducted the war, especially while in enemy territory, was an end in of itself, stipulating that there was “no greater disgrace,” than violating the rules of warfare.

As there often exists a dichotomy between the justice of war and justice in war, within the latter, a similar inverse relationship subsists between noncombatant immunity and military necessity. During Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign, some actions violating the foremost principle within the just conduct of warfare, that of noncombatant immunity, were justified according to military necessity because the actions were incidental to the achievement of military objectives. During Sheridan’s Valley Campaign, military necessity did not override the principle of

⁷ OR, vol. 43 (1): 30.

noncombatant immunity, due to the intentional targeting of civilian property as an objective in of itself.

Because of time differences and the contrasting conceptions of warfare, various commanders advocated and implemented quite different forms of warfare. Lee and George B. McClellan advocated a type of warfare which emphasized fighting armed combatants on the battlefield and a conciliatory policy toward enemy civilians. The policies implemented by David Hunter and Jubal A. Early brought forth a retaliatory period of the conflict, in the spring and summer of 1864. Along with a retaliatory form of warfare, similar to Hunter and Early, Sheridan also implemented a policy of strategic destruction, which further blurred the lines of the accepted *jus in bello* rules of war, by intentionally targeting civilian property, incurring unnecessary hardships upon noncombatants.

Within General Order No. 100, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, Francis Lieber strove to justify a vigorous prosecution of the war, which included means that would accomplish a “speedier subjection of the enemy.”⁸ He specified, “The more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”⁹ However, he also articulated that such a desire for a quick peace, and military measures to bring that to fruition, did not diminish the necessity of an adherence to *jus in bello* principles. Noncombatant immunity remained the rule and disturbances to such protection, the exception.¹⁰ While Sheridan certainly applied Lieber’s prescription for a vigorous prosecution of the war, and hoped to shorten the war in the process, his actions toward Virginian civilians in the Shenandoah Valley

⁸ Francis Lieber, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field or General Order No. 100* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863), 7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

and Northern Virginia, ultimately veered away from Lieber's own instructions, regarding the rules and exceptions to the rules of warfare.

Captain George Hillyer, of the 9th Georgia, a participant in the Gettysburg campaign, later spoke of the general observable difference between the two campaigns.

During our occupancy of Pennsylvania territory, private rights were universally respected. . . . There is no prouder tribute to the manhood and chivalry of Southern character, than the contrast which imperishable history will draw, between the conduct of Southern soldiers in Pennsylvania, and the vandalism which too often disgraced the Federal flag under Sheridan in the valley, and under Sherman in his march to the sea.¹¹

While some may attribute such sentiment expressed by a Confederate officer years after the conflict as merely a product of the Lost Cause, it is certainly evident that observational differences between the campaigns, with the benefit of hindsight and reflective thought by historians and theorists, in addition to those differences actually observed by participants, cannot be simply explained away as a matter of Lost Cause mythology.

Additionally, notable criticisms of Lee's Gettysburg Campaign fail to distinguish it as campaign waged, as a whole, abusive of the rules of war. While exceptions to the generally good conduct of the Army of Northern Virginia towards Pennsylvania civilians no doubt occurred, as an elimination of abuses in any large body of men operating in enemy territory may not have been possible, Lee's orders were explicitly designed to limit abuses to private property. In following those orders, Confederate soldiers acted exceptionally well toward Pennsylvania civilians.

¹¹ George Hillyer, Battle of Gettysburg: Address Before the Walton County Georgia Confederate Veterans, August 2nd, 1904, Georgia: 9th Infantry Regiment File, Box 8, Robert L. Brake Collection, United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Quoted in Jason Frawley, "Marching Through Pennsylvania," 11-12.

Despite the inflated value of Confederate money, stemming in part from the introduction of a new currency in the midst of war, a discrepancy understood by Pennsylvania civilians and Southern soldiers, often leading to an adjustment in their transactions, the worth of the currency ultimately depended upon the outcome of the campaign, in particular, and of the war, as a whole. As a commander of an army, rather than wielding control over the Confederacy's fiscal policies, Lee did what was required of him according to the rules of war, that is, make payment for supplies requisitioned for their military operations.

The capture of contraband slaves, or free African Americans for that matter, was in no way a central component to Lee's Gettysburg Campaign, but rather an incident of the campaign itself, due to Confederate laws permitting the ownership of slaves, as it was under the laws of the United States beforehand. Lee issued no positive orders for the capture of contrabands, let alone for free African Americans, and many Confederate officers certainly distinguished between the two, permitting the former and taking corrective actions to remedy abuses to the latter. As a strong adherent of the submission of military authority to that of political authority, Lee did think his position, as an army commander rather than political leader, warranted an ability to contravene Confederate law.

Within Sheridan's Valley Campaign, in comparison, abuses to private property became widespread, as such actions became the rule instead of the exception, taking and destroying without payment or reimbursement. Furthermore, while many abolitionists exhibited immediate concern for the individual freedom of slaves, Grant ordered the positive capture of African Americans, not so much with their freedom in mind, but rather as a war measure so as to eliminate the labor force in the Valley, thereby reducing the areas agricultural capabilities.

In totality, the historical evidence suggests that in consideration of *jus in bello* actions, Lee's Gettysburg Campaign was conducted substantially better than Sheridan's Valley Campaign, and vice versa, Sheridan's Valley Campaign was conducted significantly worse than Lee's Gettysburg Campaign.

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