

Bridging the Gap: Analyzing the History of U.S.-Russian Relations Throughout History and the
Actions that Would Improve Them

Coleman P. Anderson

A Senior Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for graduation
in the Honors Program
Liberty University
Spring 2021

Acceptance of Senior Honors Thesis

This Senior Honors Thesis is accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation from the Honors Program of Liberty University.

Edna Udobong, LL.M.
Thesis Chair

Mary Prentice, Ph.D.
Committee Member

James H. Nutter, D.A.
Honors Director

Date

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	4
<i>Introduction</i>	5
<i>History</i>	7
Pre-Medieval Era (862-1440).....	7
Rule of the Tsars (1440-1682)	9
The Russian Empire (1682-1917)	10
The Rise of the Soviet Union (1917-1946).....	12
The Cold War (1946-1981).....	14
The End of the Cold War (1981-1991).....	15
The Putin Administration (1991-Present)	17
<i>Analysis of Russian Culture</i>	20
The Value of Suffering	21
Centralized Authority	24
Love for the “Motherland”	26
<i>Solution to Diplomacy with Russia</i>	30
<i>Conclusion</i>	33
<i>Bibliography</i>	34

Abstract

After the onset of communism in Russia, relations between the United States and Russia have been tense up to the modern day. Even the fall of the Soviet Union could not usher in a permanent peace between the two countries, with mistrust pouring over from both parties. Utilizing both primary sources and commentary from subject matter experts, this paper argues that in order to achieve a legitimate and sustainable policy of peace between the United States and Russia, policymakers need to first understand the history and culture of the people they are reaching out to. Using this knowledge, policymakers can infer the rationale behind Russian moves on the international stage and frame their foreign policy in a way that both demonstrates understanding of the Russian people while promoting the policy of the United States to a powerful potential ally.

**Bridging the Gap: Analyzing the History of U.S.-Russian Relations Throughout History
and the Actions that Would Improve Them**

Introduction

In its relatively short time on the world stage, the United States of America has had a massive impact on the international order. This relatively young country has worked alongside ancient nations such as Great Britain and Saudi Arabia to achieve peace in hostile regions, promote liberty and justice, and to deter aggression and evil acts by those who would move against these ideals. However, this type of global activism eventually results in tense relations with countries who do not necessarily see eye to eye with the United States. One of the more prominent nations to have strained relations with America is the Russian Federation, commonly known as Russia. Formerly the Soviet Union, Russia has recently begun pursuing courses of action that run contradictory to the aims of the United States and her allies, such as assisting the regimes of Iran in the Middle East and annexing the independent territory of Crimea for itself in 2014. America, in turn, has responded in a similar nature, placing sanctions on Russia and convincing the West of the serious threat Russia poses to the free world. Every movie and video game marketed to the American citizen seems to feature the Russians as tyrants hellbent on world domination and the elimination of everything good in the world, a state of mind that brings back memories of the Cold War in the midst of McCarthyism. However, this state of mind ignores not only the valuable contributions of some Russian people to democracy and the world throughout its history, such as Alexander I and contemporary Russian critics of Vladimir Putin,

but also the potential good a partnership with this powerful nature can have on today's climate.¹ Americans and Russians have worked together in the past, from forming the Allied Powers in World War II to combat the spread of Nazism, to the thawing of the Cold War brought on by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, to even the collaborations between the United States and Russia in their respective space programs.² The biggest obstacles that American policymakers face in making effective decisions to improve relations with the Russian Federation is a lack of historical and cultural understanding of the Russian people. Failure to understand a country's background and nature by American diplomats is often perceived as arrogance by critics of the United States and leads to unintended consequences when decisions are made insensitively.³ This can be seen in the decisions made by the United States throughout the Soviet era and after the fall of the communist regime that, while intended to bring the country's together and make the world a safer place, had the opposite effect of driving a wedge between the two superpowers.⁴ Russia, historically, is by no means an easy country to understand or reason with, but the effects a partnership between the United States and the Russian Federation will have on the world deserves careful consideration, nonetheless. Careful study of Russia's rich history and key aspects of Russian culture will allow policymakers

¹ Bazhanov, Yevgeny, "Russia and the West," *International Affairs (A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations)* 60, no. 1, (2014), 34–54.

² Logsdon, John M., and James R. Millar, "US-Russian Cooperation in Human Spaceflight: Assessing the Impacts." *Space Policy* 17, no. 3 (August 2001): 171. doi:10.1016/S0265-9646(01)00021-2.

³ Forsberg, T, "Explaining Russian foreign policy towards the EU through contrasts," *International Politics*, 56, no. 6, (May 2018), 762–777. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0166-9>

⁴ Beebe, George. "Our Wicked Russia Problem." *National Interest*, no. 163 (September 2019): 17–30. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=138273614&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

to interpret moves by Russia on the international stage through context that will better inform their decisions.

History

In order to get a better understanding of the relationship between the United States and Russia, one must first know the history of Russia, both before and after the Bolshevik Revolution. The history of Russia before the onset of the Soviet Union will serve as a backdrop for all subsequent relations and give policymakers an idea of where the Russian people and government was coming from before the onset of Soviet Rule. All history after the institution of communism throughout Russia, when the United States began to play a more prominent role in Russian affairs, will serve policymakers as a guide to the effects of this encounter had on the country of Russia both during the Soviet era and the modern day. This summary is by no means exhaustive and merely serves as a brief encapsulation of Russian history designed to aid those who wish to understand the complex nature of the Russian people.

Pre-Medieval Era (862-1440)

The nation of Russia first began to emerge after the fall of the Roman Empire, with the rule of the Vikings in 862.⁵ These Vikings were descended from Slavic tribes dating back to the Greek empire. These Viking tribes spent their time as pirates, pillaging and raiding Northern Europe for much of the first millennium. The first form of a nation state emerged under the

⁵ Мельников, А. В. “Первоначальные Историко-Географические Представления Древнерусских Книжников О Странах И Народах Запада По Данным «Повести Временных Лет».” *Belgorod State University Scientific Bulletin: History, Political Science, Economics, Information Technologies* 45, no. 3 (September 2018): 489–97. doi:10.18413/2075-4458-2018-45-3-489-497.

banner of “Rus””; an Eastern Slavic collection of tribes that united to form what would eventually be called Russia.⁶ These Slavs were heavily influenced by the Byzantine Empire, the superpower of that age, and adopted many of their traditions. This included Orthodox Christianity, which carried over into the modern day as the Russian Orthodox Church. This adoption of Orthodox Christianity was used by the Slavs as a means to bind the state to the church, tying religion and government together as a means to exert the will of the government over the people through the guise of religion. The primitive nation state of Rus’ eventually fragmented under the weight of the Mongol invasion in the early 1200s.⁷ Mongol influence quickly spread throughout Russia, as the invaders conquering cultural centers such as Kiev and passing down their military culture to their new subjects. The rule of the Mongols continued for much of the medieval period, with local Russian leadership allowed to remain as long as they acknowledged Mongol superiority. Oppression of the Russian people was not the only result of the Mongol occupation, as more modern advancements such as the postal system and infrastructure began to take root in the developing nation. Around this time, the city of Moscow began taking a more prominent role in medieval Russia, with its rulers slowly growing in power. The fall of the Mongol occupation occurred in 1380 at the Battle of Kulikovo, ending Mongol influence in Russia and establishing Moscow as the center of the nation state of Russia.

⁶ Curtis, Glen E., *Russia: A Country Study*, (Washington, DC : Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1999), 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

Rule of the Tsars (1440-1682)

Russia's future as a legitimate nation was secured under the rule of Ivan III, the Great, a ruler from Moscow. Born in 1440, Ivan ascended the throne of Moscow in 1462 and set about to make his nation great. Naming himself the "tsar" of Russia,⁸ Ivan united the various rulers of Russia under his authority and began to form a vast nation, forging a uniquely Russian national identity that remained largely independent of Western influence. Under his rule, Russia tripled its landholdings and laid the framework for the future Tsardom of Russia. Ivan IV, commonly known as "Ivan the Terrible," further strengthened the power of the Russian government by codifying laws put forth by his grandfather Ivan the Great and creating the first standing Russian army.⁹ After the death of Ivan, the Terrible, Russia soon fell on hard times in the early 1600s, plagued by invasions and famine that resulted in internal struggles. These difficult times, known as the "Times of Trouble,"¹⁰ remained etched on the Russian memory and served to forge a cold steel of perseverance and appreciation for overcoming suffering amongst the Russian people. This overcoming of hardship led to the establishment of the Romanov dynasty as the rulers of Russia, lasting for three centuries and pushing Russia onto the world stage. The first of the Romanovs, Michael, restored peace both within the nation and the adjoining countries of Sweden and Poland in the late 1610s. The Romanovs then set about reacquiring lost territories from

⁸ Curtis, *Russia*, 12.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

Ukraine and Poland,¹¹ taken during the invasions of the Times of Trouble. Romanov rule wasn't entirely peaceful, as heavy taxation and the forced serfdom of peasants led to series of riots throughout the mid 1600s that threatened to destabilize this new nation state. The uprisings were brutally put down by the Russian government in 1670, with the rebel leader Stenka Razin beheaded publicly a year later.¹² This paved the way for the ascent of Peter the Great, who is largely credited with creating a centralized system of authority within Russia and firmly cementing its place on the world stage.

The Russian Empire (1682-1917)

Peter the Great, who ruled from 1682 until his death in 1725, further added on territory to his country through alliances with Denmark and Poland that resulted in the acquisition of Finland, giving Russia access to the Atlantic Ocean. On the heels of his victory, Peter the Great did away with the Tsardom that had ruled Russia for centuries, adopting the Western model of imperial rule by crowning himself the first Emperor of Russia.¹³ The adoption of an imperial model marked the first Western influence on Russia, largely untouched by European ideals at this period. This marked the beginning of the Russian Empire, defined by its absolute rule by the emperor and a period of relative peace for Russia. Catherine the Great emerged as the next great ruler of Russia nearly forty years later, further exposing Russia to Western ideals by promoting

¹¹ McKinnon, Malcolm, "Russia and Poland -- the Long Sweep of History: Malcolm McKinnon Reviews Russo-Polish Relations and Expresses the Hope for a Fruitful and Enduring Rapprochement in Future." *New Zealand International Review* 45, no. 5 (September 2020): 11–13, <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=146136143&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

¹² Curtis, *Russia*, 18.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 22.

the ideals of the Enlightenment, which had taken hold in Europe during the 18th century. As a partial result of the influx of Western thought into the formerly isolated country, Russia became a prominent world power over the course of the 1700s under Catherine the Great,¹⁴ with Alexander I taking rule of Russia in 1801. During the first years of his rule, Alexander I recognized the tiny country of the United States of America in 1803, marking the first time the two countries would conduct diplomatic relations. However, America was not a primary concern for Alexander I, as the French ruler Napoleon began to rise in Europe. The tremendous growth brought on by the Russian Empire made it a target for Napoleon, who sought to bring all of Europe under his rule, with Russia standing as his final target for domination. Under the rule of Alexander I, Russia set about to defeat this challenge from the French, which culminated in Napoleon's ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812. This brutal campaign became one of the most significant military campaigns of Russia's history,¹⁵ as Alexander I fought back against a superior power that threatened to undermine centuries of work to make Russia a world power. The Russian army was initially forced into retreat by Napoleon's army, losing 1.5 million people to the French and practicing scorched earth tactics to prevent Napoleon from reaping the benefits of his early victories. However, Napoleon made the damning error of underestimating the brutal climate that Russians had grown accustomed to throughout their difficult existence, nearly losing his entire army to Russia's frigid winter and was forced into a retreat that resulted in the Russian capture of Paris in 1814. This dramatic reversal of fortunes immortalized Russia's military

¹⁴ Lukin, Vladimir. "Looking West from Russia." *National Interest*, no. 140 (November 2015): 59–65. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=110434621&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

¹⁵ Lievin, Dominic, "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian & Eurasian History* 7, no. 2 (May 8, 2006), 299. doi:10.1353/kri.2006.0020

reputation and allowed Alexander I to preside over the redistribution of Europe.¹⁶ The effects of Russia's victory over the French would soon fade as industrialization advanced through Europe, while Russia began to fall behind because of the Decembrist Revolts. These challenges to the imperial model of rule, born out of Russian officers seeking to replace the autocracy of old with more liberal ideals, caused Nicholas I, the new ruler of Russia, to revert back to a more orthodox platform of rule and eschew new European influences. The rallying cry of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and National Character"¹⁷ defined Russian domestic policy throughout the rest of the 1800s, building contempt between the ruling class and the working class as the former began to benefit exclusively at the cost of the latter. This discrepancy laid the groundwork for a revolution that would change not just Russia, but the world as a whole.

The Rise of the Soviet Union (1917-1946)

The United States and the nation of Russia has had a complex and often antagonistic relationship throughout their respective histories, with the practice of communism serving as the primer that would bring these countries together. The two countries initially had relatively peaceful relations under the Russian Empire, but the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 quickly put those relations on hold. The Bolshevik Revolution, built out of the immense conflict between the ruling class of Russia and the working class, opened the door for communism to take root. Under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, a radical Communist, the working class of Russia overthrew the ruling class in a lengthy civil war that felled the Russian government and resulted in the last

¹⁶ Curtis, *Russia*, 30.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 31

Tsar of Russia, Nicholas II, abdicating his rule and being executed by communist forces in 1918.¹⁸ With the country in chaos, Lenin established a communist government known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was at odds with everything the capitalist American government stood for, which had just emerged victorious from World War I and began to play a more prominent role in foreign affairs. President Woodrow Wilson suspended all interactions with the new Communist state, with diplomatic talks not resuming until 1933.¹⁹ Wilson refused to recognize the Soviet Union as a legitimate state, as he believed it was simply a revolutionary movement that would fade away. In turn, the Soviet Union, now under the rule of Josef Stalin, became frustrated with the United States' blatant refusal to recognize them as a sovereign nation. Stalin recognized the need to reassert Russia's influence in world affairs and began to implement industrialization across Russia while brutally eliminating all threats to his rule. Stalin's purges remain as one of the worst atrocities to face the world, with about 1 million people executed in what came to be known as "The Great Purge"²⁰ and as many as 23 million people being sent to Soviet gulags in Siberia to serve as labor for Stalin's growing war machine. While relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained tense, this tension was put on hold as Nazi Germany began to move across Europe. After being betrayed by Hitler, Stalin reached out to the Allied Powers to combat this challenge to Europe. The United States allied itself with the Soviet Union during the Second World War, in order to stop the spread of Nazi Germany's

¹⁸ Curtis, *Russia*, 64

¹⁹ "U.S. Relations with Russia," United States Department of State, last modified July, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-russia/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20long,promote%20foreign%20investment%20and%20trade>

²⁰ Ellman, Michael. "Soviet Repression Statistics: Some Comments." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no. 7 (2002), 1151-172. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/826310>

campaign against Europe and into the Soviet Union. The two nations were bound together only through their opposition to this wave of fascism. Over the course of World War II, the Soviet Union experienced catastrophic losses because of the conflict, with nearly 27 million Russian soldiers and civilians dying throughout the war.²¹ Horrific battles, such as the sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad, remained carved into the Russian memory and served as rallying cries for the Soviets to persevere to victory. Without the Soviet Union's victories over Germany in the East, the United States and the Allied Powers would have had much more difficulty defeating the Axis powers and winning the war in the process. This resulted in a rare partnership between the capitalist and communist countries, forging an alliance that eliminated the spread of Nazism and won peace throughout Europe.

The Cold War (1946-1981)

The partnership between the United States and the Soviet Union soon dissolved into a bitter rivalry that lasted throughout much of the later century.²² Russian influence was felt across the world, and the United States soon began to view the Soviet Union as their chief rival and opponent to world peace. Soviet influence began to spread over Eastern Europe and Vietnam, leading the United States to become increasingly concerned about the rise of Communism across the world. Similarly, the Soviet Union feared an aggressive move on their territories by the United States in the vein of the invasions by Poland and France, as well as the increased buildup in arms and interventions by the United States after the Second World War. This arms race led to

²¹ Ellman, Michael, and S. Maksudov. "Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note." *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 4 (1994), 671. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152934>

²² Ball, G. W., "Erosion of U.S. foreign relations," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 7 (August 1985): 110-113, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1985.11456012>

fears that both superpowers would use their weapons to wipe each other off the face of the earth, coining the term “Mutually Assured Destruction.”²³ These factors led to tense standoffs throughout the second half of the century, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961.²⁴ The rivalry between the two superpowers extended into outer space, as each nation vowed to prove their superiority by putting a man on the moon. The conflict between the United States and Russia temporarily cooled during the Nixon administration, as President Nixon began attempting to soothe the Soviet Union and extend an olive branch through treaties,²⁵ such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which forced both parties to eliminate vast quantities of their nuclear stockpiles.²⁶ These treaties were attempts to recognize the Soviet Union, not just as a sovereign nation, but as a possible future ally.

The End of the Cold War (1981-1991)

The effects of this move were short-lived, however, as the Reagan administration entered power. President Reagan viewed communism as the ultimate threat to peace and prosperity across the world, like his predecessors did in the 1950s and 1960s. Reagan began making significant moves against the Soviet Union and the spread of communism by providing aid to

²³ Jameson, Robert P. “Armageddon’s Shortening Fuse: How Advances in Nuclear Weapons Technology Pushed Strategists to Mutually Assured Destruction, 1945-1962.” *Air Power History* 60, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 40–53. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=87509450&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

²⁴ Naftali, Timothy, “Khrushchev and Kennedy.” *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 4 (September 2018): 532–35. doi:10.1093/dh/dhy045

²⁵ Heuterbize, Frédéric, “Eurocommunism and the Contradictions of Superpower Détente.” *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 4 (September 2017): 747–71. doi:10.1093/dh/dhx036

²⁶ “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance”, Arms Control Association, last modified August 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>

anti-communist groups, like the Taliban in Afghanistan.²⁷ What came to be known as the “Reagan Doctrine” played a substantial role in weakening the hold of the Soviet Union across Europe and South America. Reagan did not just use financial and military aid against the Soviet Union, but also sought to connect with their leadership on a personal level in order to form a relationship that would help him achieve his goals with stopping communism. This outreach eventually paid off when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as leader of the Soviet Union in 1985. Gorbachev was much more open to Reagan’s attempts at kinship, even leading to a ballistic missile treaty signed in 1987.²⁸ This treaty limited the amount of ballistic missile warheads each country could possess, effectively limiting each country’s response against the other and dismantling the concept of MAD as a result of foreign aggression. Gorbachev’s tenure as leader of the Soviet Union led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, as his economic and political reforms simply could not co-exist with the structure his communist predecessors set up.²⁹ Nations previously under Soviet influence rejected their communist past and reformed their own governments as sovereign states. These reforms, together with the loss of influence across the world and the utter collapse of the Soviet economy, led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991 and the end of the Soviet Union.

²⁷ “Rival or Partner? the tests for Russia in post-war Middle East,” *The Economist* 318, no. 7696 (March 1991), 15. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A10396299/BIC?u=vic_liberty&sid=BIC&xid=44e35172

²⁸ Wilson, James Graham, “Reagan and Gorbachev”, *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 4, (September 2018), 552–555, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhy056>

²⁹ Cox, Michael. “Learning from History? From Soviet Collapse to the ‘New’ Cold War.” *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (November 2014): 471. doi:10.1080/14682745.2014.950241.

The Putin Administration (1991-Present)

Throughout the 1990s, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton attempted to integrate Russia into European and global systems, as a means to include Russia into the decision-making processes of superpowers and align the new government with Western ideals.³⁰ The United States also provided significant aid to Russia, in an attempt to fix the country's economy. This arrangement worked for almost two decades, as the countries participated in trade and treaties throughout the early 2000s. Current Russian President Putin even expressed interest in joining NATO, a far cry from the days of the Warsaw Pact.³¹ However, the 1990s were not totally peaceful between the United States and Russia. With the ascension of Boris Yeltsin to the Russian presidency, the Russian nation began looking for the way forward in a post-Soviet world. At first glance, the United States made legitimate moves to reach a peaceful agreement regarding Russia's new role in the world. However, the administrations of Presidents Clinton and Bush, along with the rise of Vladimir Putin, would begin to sour U.S.-Russian relations once again. While Clinton and Yeltsin made several diplomatic moves towards a partnership, specifically in ratifying more arms treaties to take away the threat of nuclear war, missteps were made on both sides of the aisle. Yeltsin's advanced age and increasingly authoritarian policies began to create a bad image for the Russian people's desire for democracy. Conversely, the Clinton administration sought to expand NATO's jurisdiction into territory previously held by the Soviet Union, a move discouraged by the Russian government. The Russian government

³⁰ McFaul, Michael, "Russia as It Is: A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 4, (July/August 2018), 82-91.

³¹ McFaul, "Russia As It Is."

feared that this move, despite NATO's proven history of preventing abuses against other nations, was made to box Russia in and force them into subservience to Western powers.³² When the Clinton administration, along with other NATO allies, expanded anyways, the Russian government reluctantly agreed, filing this slight away for further use. The George W. Bush administration initially sought to soothe the hurt feelings of the Russian land, who had recently elected Vladimir Putin to the presidency. Putin's penchant for promoting law and order, compared to the tense administration of Yeltsin in the 1990s, greatly appealed to the American government, who sought a reset to the relationship that had taken a wrong turn. The year 2001 saw tremendous growth between the United States and Russia, as both powers rallied behind anti-terrorism agendas and Russian support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, along with improved relations between Russia and NATO. This goodwill came to a halt in 2003, due to several reasons. The invasion of Iraq, a historical ally of Russia, by the United States was widely denounced by major world powers, including Russia. However, the Bush administration brushed aside Russian criticism, seemingly resigning Putin to the corner of American foreign policy. Additionally, the Bush administration began setting up ballistic missile defense sites throughout Europe, flying in the face of numerous treaties made with Russia decades earlier. While these sites did not have the capability to inflict serious harm against Russia, Putin still regarded this as yet another bold offense against his country. While Putin had legitimate gripes against the United States, the Russian government's hands were not entirely clean either. Putin had inherited his predecessors' penchant for using authoritarian tactics to stamp out opposition to his rule. Killing

³² Savranskaya, Svetlana, "Yeltsin and Clinton." *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 4 (September 2018): 564–67. doi:10.1093/dh/dhy052.

and imprisoning journalists and other figures who opposed his tactics, Putin created his own negative image within the United States, provoking criticism of his untoward and autocratic tactics.³³ The United States intervention in Libya in 2011 under the Obama administration, combined with the revolts of the Arab Spring, caused Putin to reconsider a partnership with America. Russia felt slighted by the West and viewed the foreign aid and new inclusion as attempts by the United States to enforce its will and worldview on top of the Russian national identity. Putin interpreted the moves by America within Iraq, Europe, and Libya as an attempt to de-stabilize his authority and subsequently retreated from nearly all interactions with the United States. The solution to this perceived aggression was for Russia to re-embrace its national identity and begin flexing its own power in response. The clearest example of this position was Russia's annexation of Crimea, formerly a part of Ukraine, in 2014. This theft of Ukraine's sovereign land flew in the face of international law and led to world-wide condemnation of this brazen Russian aggression.³⁴ The relationship between the United States and Russia has only continued to deteriorate in recent years, with Russia keeping a presence in Syria and partnering with Iran to protect their interests in the area.³⁵

³³ Vershbow, Alexander & Fried, Daniel, "How the West should deal with Russia," Atlantic Council, last modified November 23, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russia-in-the-world/>

³⁴ United States Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Russia."

³⁵ Geranmayeh, Ellie, "The Newest Power Couple: Iran and Russia Band Together to Support Assad," *World Policy Journal* 33, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 84–88. doi:10.1215/07402775-3813075

Analysis of Russian Culture

In order to fully understand Russian decisions and policy moves throughout the history of their time on the world stage, it is first necessary to understand the culture of Russia itself. Similar to the United States and other world powers, Russia's cultural fabric and institutional beliefs have guided its decisions in regard to how the country manages affairs internally and internationally. Russian culture can be summed up in the following three tenets: the idealization of victory through suffering,³⁶ the need for a strong central figure of authority, and the necessity of a firm national identity. Using these three core beliefs of Russian culture can allow policymakers to not only predict future moves by Russia, but also the thinking behind those decisions and provide ways to provide mutual goals that would benefit both parties. Failure to understand Russian culture has resulted in numerous blunders on the part of the United States in attempts to empathize and befriend the Russian people, a crime of international relations all too common in United States foreign policy. This lack of cultural unawareness is not unique to relations with Russia but can be seen throughout most policy towards Middle Eastern countries and China post-World War II. Without a firm grasp of the culture of a country, any policymaker limits their ability to connect with and understand the party or country they are attempting to conduct diplomacy with. With a player as important and complex as Russia, a working knowledge of the culture is vital to success in diplomatic relations.

³⁶ "Russian Culture", Cultural Atlas, <https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/russian-culture/russian-culture-core-concepts>

The Value of Suffering

The first tenet of Russian culture policymakers need to understand is the value of suffering to the Russian people. The American people and government traditionally value comfort and safety in their culture, which can be seen in the decisions made in warfare and diplomacy. American warfare stresses the importance of having numerical and technical superiority in battle at all costs, with great care being taken to ensure that no American life is recklessly endangered, or no soldier left behind.³⁷ This is why American battles traditionally boast tremendous use of airpower and technology on the battlefield, as opposed to using manpower alone to achieve objectives. This philosophy is known to be uniquely American throughout the world and stands in stark contrast to other nations such as Russia. The Russian military, throughout history, has valued victory at all costs and has not shirked at the prospect of losing exceptional numbers of troops to achieve their goals.

While other campaigns and disasters highlight this uniquely Russian attribute, none come close to the battle for Stalingrad. The battle of Stalingrad, fought from the summer of 1942 through the winter of 1943, stands as a true testament to the indomitable Russian will. For those unfamiliar with the battle of Stalingrad, the Russian army was facing an invasion of their homeland, similar to the attempt made by the legendary Napoleon nearly a century before. After the Soviets broke ties with Nazi Germany, Hitler ordered an invasion of Russia, codenamed Operation Barbarossa,³⁸ to overpower and defeat his former allies in an attempt to remove the

³⁷ “Warrior Ethos,” US Army, last modified January 5, 2011, https://www.army.mil/article/50082/warrior_ethos

³⁸ Curtis, *Russia*, 78

Soviets from the international battlefield and cut off valuable assistance to the Allies, which had just received America as an ally after the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. This invasion was not merely personal for the Axis powers, as the Russian homeland boasts large oil reserves in the Caucasus and an immense workforce on the Homefront. The ultimate goal of the Axis invasion was to conquer the Soviet Union, repopulate it with Germans, and use the Russian people as labor to fuel the Nazi war machine, a kind of ethnic cleansing that held true to Hitler's anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic views.³⁹

Hitler's Russian campaign was largely successful initially, gaining large tracts of Soviet territory before reaching the city of Stalingrad. Stalingrad was not just important for its namesake, but also for its massive industrial capabilities that fueled the Red Army and its proximity to the oil fields of the Caucasus. When the German Army arrived at the city of Stalingrad, they expected to roll over the Soviet defenders with the same relative ease they had experienced in Poland and the initial skirmishes of Operation Barbarossa. This belief soon proved to be mistaken, as the Soviet Red Army began fighting a war of attrition that remains unmatched in modern military history. Stalin, knowing the crucial nature of the defense of Stalingrad, issued Order No. 227⁴⁰ on July 28, 1942, which ordered the Red Army to stand their ground in the city and forbade the evacuation of civilians caught in the crossfire. Knowing the value of suffering and perseverance, Stalin rationalized that the Red Army would fight not just

³⁹ Förster, Jürgen. "Barbarossa Revisited: Strategy and Ideology in the East." *Jewish Social Studies* 50, no. 1/2 (1988): 21. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4467404>

⁴⁰ Stalin, Joseph, *Order No. 227*, July 28, 1942, Manuscript, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1974. From Robert H. McNeal, ed. *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1943-2/the-nazi-tide-stops/no-one-steps-back/>

for its own survival, but for the lives of the citizens trapped with them and for the defense of the Motherland.

The months-long fight for the city devolved into hand-to-hand combat in the streets of Stalingrad, while German airpower firebombed the city from above. The Soviets, pushed up to banks of the Volga river that ran behind the city, seemed to in danger of collapse and retreat. However, the Soviets, under the command of Marshal Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, made a desperate counterattack that changed the course of the battle. Named Operation Uranus,⁴¹ this late November attack resulted in the Soviets rallying for one last grand move that resulted in the encirclement of the numerically and technologically superior Nazi army. Unable to cope with the brutal conditions of the Russian winter combined with this unanticipated rally of the Red Army, the German army found itself beat by the opponent they had initially pounded into submission only a month ago. Field Marshall Friedrich Paulus, the commander of the Nazi invasion, surrendered to the Soviet Army against the order of Hitler himself on January 31, 1943 and the Red Army lived to fight another day.

The Stalingrad campaign is widely known as one of the costliest battles of World War II, with the Soviets losing over 1,100,000⁴² soldiers over the course of the battle. Despite these catastrophic losses, the Russian army were able to rally and eventually destroy their previously superior foe through pure grit and determination. This theme of perseverance through trial and tribulation has been a hallmark of Russian history and throughout World War II especially, with

⁴¹ Kimball, Warren F. "Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices." *Journal of Military History* 60, no. 1 (January 1996): 100. doi:10.2307/2944450

⁴² Garner, Ian. "Living in History: Stalingrad at 75." *Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective* 11, no. 5 (February 2018): 1.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=30h&AN=132829212&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

the total cost of Operation Barbarossa resulting in nearly 5,000,000 Russian deaths and the near complete decimation of the Russian homeland. However, the Russian people do not see these deaths as merely a tragedy and consequence of war, as high casualty battles of the United States are often viewed. Instead, these trials are seen as triumphs of the Russian spirit, American army tends to be viewed. Instead, the Russian people view these costly battles as triumphs of the Russian spirit, with Stalingrad being named one of the twelve “Hero Cities” of the Soviet Union after the conclusion of World War II and still honored to this day in the modern nation of Russia. Stalingrad shows the value of victory through suffering to the Russian people and should be remembered as a moment in history where the true Russian spirit of victory at all costs was seen all across the world.

Centralized Authority

The second value of Russian culture that needs to be understood is strength through a central figure of authority. This concept dates back to the time of the Roman Empire, with the deification of the Emperor used as a rallying point for the populace and a centralization of power within the nation. Since then, many nations, including the United States, have structured their governmental structures to include a central figure of executive authority. Russia has experienced the full range of governmental structures throughout its long history, beginning with the autocratic rule of the Tsars of the 1500s-1700s and the Emperors of the 1700s-1900s. After the Bolshevik Revolution introduced Communism as the political structure of Russia in the early 1900s, the rule of Lenin and Stalin resembled more of a dictatorship that began to splinter following Stalin’s death and the progression of the Cold War. Upon Gorbachev’s dismantling of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the nation of Russia has adopted a similar structure to the United

States and Great Britain by creating a republican government⁴³ and electing a President and Prime Minister to govern the country. On initial examination, the Russian governmental structure does not appear to place unequal power in the hands of the President, as the Prime Minister is responsible for managing domestic issues, while the President deals mainly with foreign affairs.⁴⁴ However, upon closer a closer look, the power of the Russian government appears to be primarily vested in the President, as the President is capable of nominating the Prime Minister and is only bound by the Federal Assembly of Russia. Using these ties, the President could potentially manipulate domestic policy while also dictating their will for foreign policy, covering both spheres of influence in government. While whether the Russian government shows signs of corruption can be discussed later, it is clear that the President of Russia enjoys a very public position of power and is capable of exerting their will over the Russian people without much resistance. This strong central figure is not met with much resistance due to the Russian desire to project strength across the world stage. Autocracy runs through the veins of Russian history and can often be associated with the brighter moments of Russia's existence, such as the rule of the Tsars or the leadership of Alexander I against Napoleon. Under the skilled words of politicians, one could almost be tempted to ignore the various mistakes and controversies that these often-celebrated autocrats committed. After the humiliation of the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian people is more than willing to give great amounts of power to a central figure, so long as that figure displays Russian power to the countries that had once laid it low.

⁴³ "Constitution of the Russian Federation chapter I § article 1"

⁴⁴ Ibid. chapter VIII § article 80, section 4

Love for the “Motherland”

The third and final key aspect of Russian culture that must be noted by policymakers and diplomats is the intense love of the land of Russia, commonly known as “the motherland.” This appreciation of the Russian country can be seen in both political and economic lenses. Ever since the Soviet era, the Russian people have been instilled with an intense patriotism that rivals even the most rabid United States citizen on the Fourth of July. The design behind this was to create an intense patriotism amongst the Russian people, while also pairing the idea of the Russian land with the Soviet government that ruled it. Building upon the tremendous hardship the Russian people had faced through the times of the Tsars and Imperial era, the Soviets instilled a deep respect of the Russian tradition and the sacrifices made by the people of Russia. Additionally, this view of country would also be tied to the ideals of communism, fostering increased community and cooperation that plays into the communist ideology. Thus, the Russian people would become immensely attached to their communist government and community, viewing it as a love of country and appreciation for the hardships of the past, not the tolerance of tyranny that the modern Western citizen can easily identify.⁴⁵ Though the Soviet era of rule has ended, the intense patriotism that they sowed amongst the generations has remained to see the light of modern day. The Russian people still have an immense love of their country to this day, with many the population adopting a nationalist ideology. Additionally, the Russian people have a tremendous appreciation for the natural resources of their country. Russia plays an immense role in the energy industry of Europe, specializing in many different forms of fossil fuels, due to its

⁴⁵ Paul Goode, J, “Love for the Motherland: (Or Why Cheese Is More Patriotic than Crimea),” *Russian Politics* 1, no. 4, (December, 2016), 418–49. doi:10.1163/2451-8921-00104005

vast resources of oil and natural gas. As of 2018, Russia was the world's largest producer of crude oil and the second largest producer of natural gases, with an energy industry worth trillions of U.S. dollars.⁴⁶ This immense natural wealth has molded the Russian economy to become dependent on the resources found within the motherland. Fossil fuels and energy alone contribute to over one-third of the Russian budget, creating an immense appreciation and value of the natural resources acquired in Russia's homeland.

This benefits Russian leaders, such as Vladimir Putin, who run under a nationalist political platform. In the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin was able to bring the people of Russia together by invoking these Soviet-era maxims of the Motherland and the importance of staying united as a people. Wielding this rhetoric, Putin and other nationalist leaders have enjoyed immense popularity on the national level, frequently winning re-elections and the positive opinion of the public.⁴⁷ This is why the aid and partnerships offered from the United States after the Soviet Union's fall was not accepted as gratefully as anticipated: it was seen as a slap in the face by an arrogant victor and an attempt to replace the national identity of Russia with a Western ideology. In order for any attempt to negotiate or conduct diplomacy with Russia, one must take care not to impose their own worldview or lifestyle upon the country. The sting of the fall of the Soviet Union is still fresh in the Russian memory, even though the evils of the regime are now obvious. Understanding the Russian love of country is critical to understanding the mindset of the average civilian or the goals of Russian politicians. The civilian is intensely devoted to their country and to their fellow man, a byproduct of the Soviet campaign

⁴⁶ "Russia," United States Energy Information Administration, last modified October 31, 2017, <https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/RUS>

⁴⁷ Goode, "Love".

to instill loyalty and compliance into their subordinates. The politician, however, is concerned with the immense task of restoring Russia's prominence on the world stage and averting the fate of irrelevance or, worse, becoming a carbon copy of the United States and other Western powers.

Application of History and Culture

Armed with the knowledge of Russian history and a working understanding of the Russian worldview, policymakers can now interpret moves made by Russia on the international stage. A prime example would be the recent annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. When news of this invasion reached the world media, people were (rightly) outraged and stunned that such a bold move by the Russian Federation could be made. However, students of Russian history and culture would know better than to think this annexation came out of thin air. Those who know their history remember that Russia, at one point in its long history, owned the territory of modern-day Crimea. A result of Peter and Catherine's strengthening of the Russian nation, Crimea was one of many Eastern European taken and held under Russian rule before the fall of the Soviet Union. With the controlling body of the Soviet Union unable to maintain its land holdings, Crimea was returned to Ukraine, who allowed the territory to continue as a semi-autonomous body. However, the Russian memory has not grown old with age, and the modern Russian leadership began eyeing its former prize. The Chinese have practiced a similar method of taking back territories held by them at one point in time. Hong Kong's reassimilation into the People's Republic of China is a prime example. For centuries, Hong Kong was under the control

of the Chinese nation, until the First Opium War against the British Empire in 1842.⁴⁸ With a British victory came the acquisition of Hong Kong by the British Empire, lasting for over 100 years. The memory of the Chinese is similar to the Russians, as they never forgot who originally had the right to that territory.⁴⁹ After the British claim to Hong Kong had expired in 1984, the Chinese successfully petitioned for the right to own Hong Kong again, retaking Hong Kong under Chinese rule in 1997. Similar to the Chinese method of acquiring, or reacquiring, territories once held by the empire, Russia made a move to restore a piece of its former holdings, albeit a move made in force. In the Russian eye, Crimea, similar to Hong Kong, was always the property of Russia,⁵⁰ taken while the nation was on the verge of collapse seemingly right under their nose. Now, spited by the United States and other western powers attempting to conform Russia into a model not unique to them, the Russian government felt led to assert their power after a couple decades of being pandered to by those who had felled a once mighty empire. So, the Russian government decided to act in favor of its own interests, no longer being dictated to by the West, and annexed Crimea.

⁴⁸ Share, Michael. "Red Star Ascending, Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 15, no. 1 (March 2004): 58. doi:10.1080/09592290490438060.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁵⁰ Tipaldou, Sofia, and Phillipp Casula. "Russian Nationalism Shifting: The Role of Populism since the Annexation of Crimea." *Demokratizatsiya* 27, no. 3 (Summer 2019): 357–58.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=137298890&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

Solution to Diplomacy with Russia

Although students of history can sympathize with the Russian situation, it must be concluded that Russia acted in spite of international law and treaties signed at the fall of the Soviet Union. What, then, is the course of action to be taken by Western diplomats in order to resolve this situation as amicably as possible? The short answer is to approach Russia, not as the Soviet Union or as a boogeyman in the East, but as a nation secure in its identity and looking to enter back into the global stage on its own terms. This can be done through acknowledging Russia's potential, both for good and for evil, and taking steps to ensure that Russia will enter back onto the world stage as a positive influence. The Soviet Union has fallen, there is little to no danger of Russia reverting back to its communist past. Western policymakers need to recognize that fact and view Russia as a potential ally, not a threat.

Part of this view requires an acknowledgement that the Russian people are not eager to become an Eastern European United States. While the spread of democracy perpetuated by the United States has resulted in much good for the world over the last 80 years, American politicians have a tendency to superimpose their view of how a country is to be run onto nations they are attempting to help. Despite its power and influence, the United States is a relatively new nation and can come off as arrogant to older, more established nations such as Russia. The failure of United States relations with Iran stands as a testament to that fact. American attempts to replace the centuries-old Iranian government with one rooted in Western values,⁵¹ while potentially well-intentioned, resulted in a significant backlash that the Iranian people still have

⁵¹ Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush. "Death to the Shah." *History Today* 69, no. 4 (April 2019): 30.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=135190585&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

not forgotten. The cold truth is that not every nation was founded on the same principles that the United States was and has their own unique cultural identity that was in place long before the events of the American Revolution. Russia had already established its own identity before the United States even became a country in the late 1780s. Attempts to mold the Russian people into a miniature United States brings to mind the Decembrist Revolts to most Russians. Having already had their identity under attack before, Russia is not keen on revisiting that same set of conditions that paved the way for the Bolshevik Revolution and the eventually humbling of their once-great empire.

Instead, policymakers must learn to accept and work with Russia for what it is: an autocratic-leaning world power with an ancient heritage looking to salvage its reputation after the fall of the Soviet Union. This is not to say that the United States and western powers should just let Russia run free unchecked throughout the world. Justly or not, Russia has a grudge against the United States and the West for the supposed wrongs committed against her during the Clinton and Bush administrations. Letting Russia conduct its own policy with no accountability will result in more wrongdoings in the vein of the annexation of Crimea.

If Russia is going to enter onto the international stage, they must abide by the rules set forth by NATO and other international organizations. This includes respecting the rights of independent territories, even if those territories were once owned by the Russian empire. Russia cannot be allowed to take over and threaten nations that fall under its realm of influence, including the Baltic States and Eastern European countries. The Russian pattern of intimidation and violence has already been on display in Ukraine and Crimea, with other eastern nations experiencing Russian-backed disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks to promote Russian

ideals.⁵² Another aspect of this responsibility is allowing free speech and doing away with the borderline tyrannical suppression of criticism of the Russian government. These practices are reviled by most students of history, yet the Russian government has frequently jailed,⁵³ or even killed,⁵⁴ journalists who have spoken out against the regime.

What needs to happen is a blend of acknowledging the unique identity of Russia forged over centuries of hardship while also holding them accountable to the set of laws all countries who enter international politics. The administrations of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan are a testament to the success of this strategy. Both Nixon and Reagan were vocal critics of the Soviet regime in their day, willing to fight injustice and confront the Soviets whenever they committed acts against other sovereign nations. However, these two presidents also were unique in that they extended olive branches whenever possible to their counterparts in the East, whether it was weapons treaties or invitations to meet with the Russian leadership in a non-hostile environment. Reagan's interactions with Gorbachev, in particular, were crucial in the fall of communism in Russia, as Reagan approached Gorbachev in a spirit of cooperation, instead of a spirit of hostility. These men were not doormats to the Soviet Union, nor were they eager to take every opportunity to shut the Soviets out of the international stage. Current and future U.S. leaders need to recover from the errors of the Clinton and Bush administration to approach Russia on a firm, but fair stage.

⁵² Vershbow & Fried, "West."

⁵³ Kim, Lucian, "Kremlin Critic Navalny Sent To Prison On Old Conviction," *National Public Radio*, February 2, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/02/02/963160053/kremlin-critic-navalny-faces-court-hearing-could-see-3-5-years-in-prison>

⁵⁴ Walker, Shaun, "The murder that killed free media in Russia," *The Guardian*, October 5, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/ten-years-putin-press-kremlin-grip-russia-media-tightens>

Conclusion

The relationship between the United States and Russia has always been relatively tense since the Bolshevik Revolution. Conflict between the ideals of American capitalism and Soviet communism led to a deep divide that not even the alliance of World War 2 could permanently mend. It is only after the United States recognized the Russian need to feel in control and chart their own destiny that relations between the two nations began to improve. Now that the two countries are finding themselves at odds again, a similar strategy needs to be practiced addressing this potential conflict. If Western policymakers are to have any hope in communicating effectively with the Russian people, they must understand the rich history and culture forged over centuries of trials and perseverance. Understanding this will allow policymakers to understand the Russian way of thinking and communicate their objectives in a way that benefits both the United States and Russia. This should not be understood as taking a position of weakness, as Russia has made several immoral mistakes on the international stage, including the annexation of Crimea. Rather, the position that Western policymakers should take should be one of empathy, both understanding the Russian experience and holding them accountable for the wrongdoings they commit. Pairing this tough love with invitations to participate in the international process as an equal has proven effective before, and could potentially usher in a new era of global peace.

Bibliography

Arms Control Association. "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance."

Last modified August 2019. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>

Ball, G. W., "Erosion of U.S. foreign relations," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 7

(August 1985): 110-113, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1985.11456012>

Bazhanov, Yevgeny, "Russia and the West" *International Affairs (A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations)* 60, no. 1, (2014), 34–54.

Beebe, George. "Our Wicked Russia Problem." *National Interest*, no. 163 (September 2019): 17–30.

<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=138273614&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

Cox, Michael. "Learning from History? From Soviet Collapse to the 'New' Cold War." *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (November 2014): 461–85. doi:10.1080/14682745.2014.950241.

Cultural Atlas. "Russian Culture. <https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/russian-culture/russian-culture-core-concepts>

Curtis, Glen E., *Russia: A Country Study*, Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1999.

Ellman, Michael. "Soviet Repression Statistics: Some Comments." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no. 7 (2002), 1151-172. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/826310>

Ellman, Michael, and S. Maksudov. "Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note." *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 4 (1994), 671-80. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152934>

- Forsberg, T, "Explaining Russian foreign policy towards the EU through contrasts," *International Politics*, 56, no. 6, (May 2018), 762–777. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0166-9>
- Förster, Jürgen. "Barbarossa Revisited: Strategy and Ideology in the East." *Jewish Social Studies* 50, no. 1/2 (1988): 21-36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4467404>
- Garner, Ian. "Living in History: Stalingrad at 75." *Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective* 11, no. 5 (February 2018): 1–8.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=30h&AN=132829212&site=ehost-live&scope=site>
- Garrels, Anne, *Putin Country: A Journey Into the Real Russia*, London: Picador, 2016.
- Geranmayeh, Ellie, "The Newest Power Couple: Iran and Russia Band Together to Support Assad," *World Policy Journal* 33, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 84–88,
<https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-3813075>
- Goode, J Paul, "Love for the Motherland: (Or Why Cheese Is More Patriotic than Crimea)," *Russian Politics* 1, no. 4, (December 2016), 418–49. doi:10.1163/2451-8921-00104005
- Heurtebize, Frédéric, "Eurocommunism and the Contradictions of Superpower Détente." *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 4 (September 2017): 747–71. doi:10.1093/dh/dhx036.
- Jameson, Robert P. "Armageddon's Shortening Fuse: How Advances in Nuclear Weapons Technology Pushed Strategists to Mutually Assured Destruction, 1945-1962." *Air Power History* 60, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 40–53.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=87509450&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

- Kim, Lucian. "Kremlin Critic Navalny Sent To Prison On Old Conviction." *National Public Radio*, February 2, 2021. <https://www.npr.org/2021/02/02/963160053/kremlin-critic-navalny-faces-court-hearing-could-see-3-5-years-in-prison>
- Kimball, Warren F. "Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices." *Journal of Military History* 60, no. 1 (January 1996): 89–114. doi:10.2307/2944450
- Lievin, Dominic, "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian & Eurasian History* 7, no. 2 (May 8, 2006), 283-308. doi:10.1353/kri.2006.0020
- Logsdon, John M., and James R. Millar, "US-Russian Cooperation in Human Spaceflight: Assessing the Impacts." *Space Policy* 17, no. 3 (August 2001): 171. doi:10.1016/S0265-9646(01)00021-2
- Lukin, Vladimir. "Looking West from Russia." *National Interest*, no. 140 (November 2015): 59–65.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=110434621&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.
- Main, S. J., "'You Cannot Generate Ideas by Orders': The Continuing Importance of Studying Soviet Military History—G. S. Isserson and Russia's Current Geo-Political Stance," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 29, no. 1, (February 2016): 48–72.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2016.1129866>
- McFaul, Michael, "Russia as It Is: A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 4, (July/August 2018): 82-91.
- McKinnon, Malcolm, "Russia and Poland -- the Long Sweep of History: Malcolm McKinnon Reviews Russo-Polish Relations and Expresses the Hope for a Fruitful and Enduring

- Rapprochement in Future.” *New Zealand International Review* 45, no. 5 (September 2020): 11–13,
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=146136143&site=ehost-live&scope=site>
- Мельников, А. В. “Первоначальные Историко-Географические Представления Древнерусских Книжников О Странах И Народах Запада По Данным «Повести Временных Лет».” *Belgorod State University Scientific Bulletin: History, Political Science, Economics, Information Technologies* 45, no. 3 (September 2018): 489–97.
doi:10.18413/2075-4458-2018-45-3-489-497.
- Melville, Andrei. “A Neoconservative Consensus in Russia? Main Components, Factors of Stability, Potential of Erosion,” *Russian Social Science Review* 61, no. 3-4, (July 2020) 220–235. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2020.1778403>
- Menon, R. (2020). Puncturing the Myth of Putin’s Genius. *Foreign Policy*, 235, 7–9.
- Naftali, Timothy, “Khrushchev and Kennedy.” *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 4 (September 2018): 532–35. doi:10.1093/dh/dhy045
- Ozerov, O. “Russia and the Future of the Middle East.” *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 62, no. 3 (May 2016): 47–59.
doi:10.21557/IAF.46827281
- Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush. ““Death to the Shah.”” *History Today* 69, no. 4 (April 2019): 28–45.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=135190585&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

“Rival or Partner? the tests for Russia in post-war Middle East,” *The Economist* 318, no. 7696 (March 1991), 15.

https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A10396299/BIC?u=vic_liberty&sid=BIC&xid=44e35172

Share, Michael. “Red Star Ascending, Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong.” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 15, no. 1 (March 2004): 57–78.

doi:10.1080/09592290490438060.

Shulman, Marshall D. “Four Decades of Irrationality: U.S.-Soviet Relations. (Cover Story).”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43, no. 9 (November 1987): 15–25.

doi:10.1080/00963402.1987.11459599.

Simes, Dimitri K. “Delusions About Russia.” *National Interest*, no. 163 (September 2019): 5–16.

<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=138273613&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

Sokolov, Boris V. “Soviet Economy: Truth and Myth.” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27, no.

4 (October 2014): 653–60. doi:10.1080/13518046.2014.963436.

Stalin, Joseph, *Order No. 227, July 28, 1942*, Manuscript, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1974.

From Robert H. McNeal, ed. *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the*

Soviet Union, <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1943-2/the-nazi-tide-stops/no-one-steps-back/>

Stoner, Kathryn, and Michael McFaul. “Who Lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin.”

Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (May 2015): 167–87.

doi:10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064716.

Savranskaya, Svetlana. “Yeltsin and Clinton.” *Diplomatic History* 42, no. 4 (September 2018):

564–67. doi:10.1093/dh/dhy052.

Tipaldou, Sofia, and Phillipp Casula. “Russian Nationalism Shifting: The Role of Populism since the Annexation of Crimea.” *Demokratizatsiya* 27, no. 3 (Summer 2019): 349–70.

<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=137298890&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

United States Army, “Warrior Ethos,” last modified January 5, 2011,

https://www.army.mil/article/50082/warrior_ethos

United States Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Russia,” last modified July 2020,

<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-russia/>

United States Energy Information Administration. “Russia.” Last modified October 31, 2017.

<https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/RUS>

Vershbow, Alexander & Fried, Daniel. “How the West should deal with Russia.” Atlantic

Council. Last modified November 23, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russia-in-the-world/>

Walker, Shaun. “The murder that killed free media in Russia.” *The Guardian*, October 5, 2016.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/ten-years-putin-press-kremlin-grip-russia-media-tightens>

Wilson, James Graham, “Reagan and Gorbachev”, *Diplomatic History* 42, Issue 4, (September

2018), 552–555, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhy056>