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On Natural Evil: Augustine, Plantinga, and Hick

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by

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Contents

Chapter One: Introduction

"Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?".[1] David Hume's well-known question brings the problem of evil into clear view and puts both Christian and critical scholars to the test in answering the dilemma presented. The discussion found in this paper will address Hume's questions and his argument, but it is necessary to define the parameters of this discussion as the problem of evil is a broad problem and contains various components. The following two distinctions must be made that will set the parameters for the discussion at hand:

1. This discussion will center around the *philosophical* problem of evil, not the *emotional* problem of evil.
2. This discussion will primarily come into focus surrounding the issues of *natural* evil, not the issues of *moral* evil.

The first distinction is critical to make for practical reasons both within the writing of this paper and outside of it. When questions about the problem of evil are posed, they can easily be confused for the philosophical problem of evil when they are questions, not of the mind, but of the heart. It is not the intention of this discussion to answer directly the questions pressing on the heart of the one who suffers at the hand of natural evil. Instead, it is the goal of this study to offer suggestions of the possible answers to the matters dealt with in the mind. The writing found here is a continuation of study and dialogue that has occurred for thousands of years surrounding this topic and is designed to continue that conversation in a meaningful way that may add to the

[1] David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 88.

philosophical part of the problem. Consider two practical examples that showcase the difference between the philosophical problem and the emotional problem of evil.

If, sitting by campfire with coffee in hand, a colleague asked the question, “where is God?,” it may be assumed well that she is referring to the location of God in the universe. She is asking a question that falls within a philosophical discussion. If, by contrast, a grieving widow asks by the casket of their deceased spouse, “where is God?,” one would be wise not to delve into philosophical discourse. It would be wise to recognize that the question in this setting, is a question regarding the emotional problem of evil. The discussion to be had here is designed to answer questions of the first type, the questions regarding the philosophical considerations of the problem of evil. It is entirely possible that the work and study completed here and read later may help someone struggling with the emotional problem of evil, but that is not the design of this work. Instead, this discussion will center around the *philosophical* problem of evil.

The second distinction to make is also important because the problem of evil is not separated only into the philosophical component and the emotional component. It is segmented also into *moral* evil and *natural* evil. The difference between these two types of evil will be evaluated further in this study, but it is important to share the initial distinction from the beginning. Some philosophers and thinkers have different responses to moral evil and natural evil, while others believe both moral evil and natural evil can be answered in the same way. Whether both types of evil can or cannot be answered in the same way is not currently of importance; however, it is necessary to briefly share the difference between the two types of evil.

Consider the following example to illustrate the different questions asked when considering the various components of moral and natural evil. First, concerning moral evil, one may ask, “why would God allow that person to commit that evil on their neighbor?” This

question puts focus on God's decision to allow an individual the free will to make a decision and God's decision to not intervene once the decision is made by the individual. Second, regarding natural evil, one may ask, "why would God allow the tree to fall during the storm and injure the child?" This question puts the focus on God's decision to allow a storm to occur and God's decision to not intervene when it caused natural evil. There is further study that reveals the more subtle nuances between moral and natural evil and, in some cases, how what appears to be an instance of natural evil is truly an instance of moral evil. Again, this discussion will primarily come into focus surrounding the issues of *natural* evil.

Now that the two relevant parameters have been shared, it is time to briefly share the roadmap for this discussion. Attention will first be turned to the work of Alvin Plantinga and his contributions to the discussion surrounding both moral and natural evil. His argument will function as a foundation of study as it considers the role of humanity's free will in the existence of evil, possible reasons God may have to permit evil to exist, and God's ability to create possible worlds containing certain characteristics. Next, the discussion will shift focus directly to the problem of natural evil beginning by defining what natural evil is. Plantinga's argument will then be evaluated in terms of its relevance to specifically to the problem of natural evil. Following this evaluation, several Christian defenses will be shared beginning with the work of Augustine of Hippo, John Feinberg, John Hick, and a fourth defense inspired by George Schlesinger who put God's greater purpose for humanity into clear view. Finally, the discussion will make a final turn beginning with an analysis of the G.E. Moore Shift, followed by the main suggestion proposed in this discussion which will be referred to as the "Evil Defeated Defense." This defense works alongside Moore, William Rowe, Stephen Wykstra, and others to offer a defense of Christianity in light of the discussion at hand regarding the philosophical problem of

natural evil. It makes use of a similar ‘shift’ as the one suggested in the G.E. Moore Shift. Now that relevant parameters have been set and the roadmap for discussion is in clear view, it is time to turn to the first step, which is the philosophical problem of evil and Alvin Plantinga.

Chapter 2: Moral Evil

Plantinga's Free-Will Defense

Alvin Plantinga shares an effective defense of Christianity in light of the issue of moral evil. Plantinga first reminds his audience that many people believe that the existence of evil creates a problem for a theist. Specifically, "many believe that the existence of evil makes belief in God unreasonable or rationally unacceptable".[2] Recall how David Hume phrases the problem: "Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?".[3] It is vital to understand Hume's presupposition in order to see how one may respond to this series of questions. Hume presupposes that if God is both able and willing to eradicate all evil, or to never allow it in the first place, then He would have done so. Is it possible, contrary to what Hume's presupposition suggests, that God does have a reason to permit evil? If it is possible that He has a reason to permit evil, then Hume is not considering all of the possibilities at hand. In short, Hume's understanding of how God works can be understood in the following way:

1. If God is able and willing to eradicate evil, then evil does not exist.
2. God is able and willing.
3. Therefore, evil does not exist.

It is self-evident, however, that premise 3 is not true. One can identify occurrences of evil through the observable world around them. According to Hume, this must mean that premise 2 is not true or that God does not exist. John Mackie also points out Hume's presupposition by adding what he calls "additional principles". Mackie writes, "these additional principles are that

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[2] Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 7.

[3] Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 88.

good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do".[4] As Mackie clarifies, Hume believes that if God is good, able, and willing then He would eliminate evil as far as He can, and He has no limits because He is omnipotent.

Mackie's additional principles create two points to consider. First, does God eliminate evil as far as He can? This first point is similar to Hume's assertion. The second point, to be discussed later, is if there are limits to what God can do as an omnipotent being. The dilemma that Hume presents can be solved by allowing for the possibility that God may have reasons to permit evil. Restating Hume's argument with this possibility in mind would produce the following argument:

1. If God is able and willing to eradicate all evil, then evil does not exist *unless God has a reason to permit the evil that exists.*
2. God is able and willing to eradicate all evil.
3. Some evil exists.
4. Therefore, God has a reason to permit the evil that exists.

The difficultly that this argument presents the theist is not whether God has a reason to permit evil, but the difficulty is found in deciding what exactly that reason is. Plantinga points out that "the theist would rather know what God's reason is for permitting evil rather than simply knowing that it's possible that He has a good one".[5] It is important at this point to recognize the significance of this dilemma. If the theist cannot produce a reason for why God would permit evil, let alone *the* reason that God permits evil, it does not necessarily follow that God does not

[4] John Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," *Mind* 64, no. 254, (1955): 200.

[5] Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil*, 28.

have a reason to permit evil. It does not necessarily follow that it is no longer rational to believe in God. The only conclusion that follows from the theist's inability to produce the reason is that perhaps the theist is not wise enough to know the reason or that God has not chosen to reveal the reason to the theist.

Due to this conclusion, Plantinga challenges the atheist to do more than simply point out that the theist does not know the reason that God permits evil. He challenges them to "show that it is impossible or anyhow unlikely that God should have a reason for permitting evil".[6] The core of Plantinga's free-will defense is that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. He suggests the following two ideas:

1. It is likely that God cannot eliminate one evil without "bringing about a greater evil".[7]
2. "It is *possible* that God could not have created a universe containing moral good without creating one that also contained moral evil".[8]

To demonstrate the truth of the first statement, Plantinga shares a simple yet convincing example of someone rock climbing who scrapes and bruises one of their knees. This person goes to a friend who is also a doctor and is told that the scrapes and bruises will heal in a couple of days, and there is nothing they can do to eliminate the pain of the scrapes and bruises other than amputating the leg. Plantinga uses this example to show that the scrapes and bruises are an evil state of affairs, and it would be preferable if the scrapes and bruises were not there. The doctor has power to eliminate the evil state of affairs, but in doing so, would create an even worse evil. Plantinga illustrates through this hypothetical situation that "it is entirely possible that a good person can fail to eliminate an evil state of affairs that he knows about and can eliminate. This

[6] Ibid., 11.

[7] Ibid., 19.

[8] Ibid., 31.

would take place if he couldn't eliminate the evil without bringing about a *greater* evil".[9] Similarly, God may not eliminate an evil state of affairs that He both knows about and can eliminate in order to not bring about an even greater evil.

What significance does this example and conclusion have? It does not show, necessarily, that God finds Himself in this position. It does show, however, that it is entirely rational to believe that God could be in this position. It is rational to believe that there is evil that God cannot eliminate without bringing about an even greater evil. For example, Plantinga shares what this greater evil could be in the second idea that he suggests: "It is *possible* that God could not have created a universe containing moral good without creating one that also contained moral evil".[10] If God were to eliminate all evil by not creating a universe containing free moral beings, then an even greater evil would result because such a universe would not exist. The critic may respond at this point arguing that if God is all-powerful, then certainly He must be able to eliminate any evil without bringing about an even greater evil. If God is all-powerful, then certainly He must be able to create a world with no moral evil and only moral good. These questions are raised naturally by both the believer and non-believer alike, and it presses a significant question that should be thoughtfully considered. Is it logical to believe that God could create a world with no moral evil and only moral good? Plantinga approaches this question by discussing what it means for human beings to have free-will.

Significantly Free Beings

Plantinga's definition and understanding of human's free-will is a vital component to his defense. He describes free-will as being "free with respect to an action. If a person is free with

[9] Ibid., 19.

[10] Ibid., 31.

respect to a given action, then he is free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won't".[11] This definition puts the following two guiding principles into clear view:

1. A person is free, with respect to any given action, to do something or to refrain from doing it, given that no antecedent conditions or causal laws determine that the person will perform the action.[12]
2. A person's choice to either do or to refrain from doing is not previously determined by a particular set of conditions or causal laws.

Plantinga further suggests that not only are human beings free with respect to any given action, but they are also "significantly free", which means that they are also free with respect to any given *morally significant* action. The understanding of human freedom described by Plantinga is vital in understanding if it is logical to believe that God could have created a world with no moral evil and only moral good. Consider the following example.

A school-aged child is presented with a morally significant choice while in a grocery store with his parents. At the register, he sees his favorite candy. He also sees that his parents are preoccupied with unloading their cart and paying for the groceries. He can either slide the candy into his pocket and steal it, or he can refrain from doing so by choosing to not take the candy or by asking his parents if they will purchase it for him. At the given moment, he is free to choose to steal or to refrain from stealing. The choice belongs to the child because he is significantly free with respect to this moral action. This example sheds light on the simplicity of how free will functions in a human being's life. The boy has the option, however, to refrain from stealing the

[11] Ibid., 29.

[12] Ibid.

candy. If the boy chooses to refrain from stealing, a neutral state of affairs results. The key point to understand is that it is entirely up to the boy which option he chooses.

How, then, could God create the world in such a way that this boy never chooses wrong and evil does not exist? It seems that God *could* create a world in which evil does not exist, but the means to achieve such a world are not as appealing as one may like. What potential options does God have if He desired to create a world with no evil? His first option was to not create anything or anyone in the first place. Without the existence of morally free beings, there is no one to act in an evil way. The difficulty with this first option is that if God wished to create a world and wished to create morally free beings, then not creating a world and morally free beings would also result in bringing about an even greater evil. His second option, considering that He did choose to create the world, is to eliminate humanity. If the boy does not exist, then he is not in the position to choose the wrong choice and create an evil state of affairs. If God chose to create a world without humanity, then He certainly would have created a world without humanity's influence in creating evil states of affairs through their free will. Does this create a situation, however, similar to what Plantinga described as eliminating evil through bringing about an even greater evil? It seems self-evident that it is better to exist than to not exist. Therefore, God could eliminate the evil of state of affairs caused by humans choosing evil only by bringing about an even greater evil of creating a world in which human beings do not exist.

The third option God has is to remove humanity's free-will instead of eliminating humanity. God *could* force the boy to refrain from stealing, and He *could* force every human to choose the morally right action every time. The problem with this option is that removing free-will also eliminates one evil only through bringing about an even worse evil. If human beings do not have free-will, then they cannot choose God, who is the greatest good. Furthermore, they

cannot choose anything good. They cannot freely choose to participate in charity, acts of sacrifice, generosity, or even choose to love someone. It seems self-evident that it is better to be significantly free than to be forced into every decision even if some decisions that humans make bring undesirable consequences.

To conclude this section, it is entirely possible that God *could* have created a world with no moral evil. However, He could only do so by either eliminating humanity or by removing humanity's free-will, but both options would be bringing about an even worse evil. Plantinga summarizes by saying that it "is possible that God could not have created a universe containing moral good without creating one that also contained moral evil. And if so, then it is possible that God has a good reason for creating a world containing evil".[13] Plantinga's conclusion can be stated in the following way:

1. If moral good is to exist, then humanity must be free to choose morally good actions.
2. If humanity is free to choose morally good actions, then they are also free to choose morally evil actions.[14]
3. It is empirically true that humanity will choose both morally good and morally evil actions.
4. Therefore, humanity's choices will result in moral good and moral evil.

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[13] Ibid., 31.

[14] Morally free beings may still be free to choose morally good and morally evil actions even in heaven, although the likelihood of choosing a morally evil action is slim to none. In heaven, where sin ultimately loses its appeal when compared to the holiness of the Father, it seems that nearly all free beings recognize the worthlessness and foolishness of sinful actions and therefore do not participate in evil actions. However, Ezekiel 28:12-17 describes the fall of Lucifer who exercised his free will to choose a morally evil action while in heaven. God, being omniscient, foreknew that Lucifer would do so. At least two further points should be made. First, if God foreknew that Lucifer would fall and God still chose to create the world as He did, then He decided it preferable to create the world as He did even though Lucifer would ultimately fall. The second point to raise is whether God's foreknowledge of this event, or any event, necessitates that God also caused this event to happen. Admittedly, this topic deserves a full discussion, but for purposes here, the view held in this work is that although God has foreknowledge of every event, both actual and possible, it does not necessarily mean that God also predestined that event to occur. Morally free agents still have a real ability to choose morally good and morally evil actions.

If God were to decide to eliminate either humanity or humanity's free-will, He would be removing the opportunity for relationship between humanity and Himself. It is entirely likely that God's choice to allow for relationship with Him and for evil to also exist is not preferred by some humans, but it does nothing to say that it is irrational to believe that God exists because evil exists. It only shows that the preferences of some humans are different than what God prefers. Ultimately, God's gift of free-will to humanity is what allows for both moral good and moral evil to exist. The opponent of the free-will defense may go one step further and argue that God, if all-powerful, could create a world in which only moral good exists and evil does not exist because there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do. As it has been shown, however, humanity's free-will results in both moral good and moral evil. Therefore, it is not logically possible for God to create a world in which only moral good exists. This conclusion leads to the next question facing the theist: can God do the logically impossible?

Logical "Euthyphro Dilemma"

If, as it has been shown, in order to create a world in which human beings are significantly free with respect to moral actions, God must give human beings a free will, then the existence of evil is a result of God's choice to give human beings a free will and humanity's choice to leverage their free will for evil. The critic may then argue that God could have created a world in which human beings are significantly free with respect to moral actions *and* evil does not exist. Plantinga would argue convincingly that such a state of affairs is not logically possible because of an idea he calls "transworld depravity." In short, he argues that people "go wrong with respect to at least one action in any world God could have actualized and in which they are free with respect to morally significant actions."[15] It is worth considering the question further.

[15] Ibid., 48-49.

Could God have created a world in which human beings are significantly free and an evil state of affairs is not subsequently created? Is the existence of such a world logically possible? The argument presented in this section holds that the existence of such a world cannot logically exist.

In order for humans to be significantly free, they must have a real ability to choose one way or another, one action or the next at any given time. Their choices and actions, then, either contribute to the good in the world or contribute to the evil in the world. The critic's response to the theory that God could have created a world in which human beings are significantly free and an evil state of affairs is not subsequently created fails because the critic is not taking into account the broad failure of humanity to choose good in every specific situation, even though humans choose good in many specific situations. Therefore, creating a world where both humans are significantly free and an evil state of affairs is not subsequently created is not logically possible. Does this conclusion mean that God cannot do the logically impossible? If He cannot, is He not omnipotent?

The question of God's ability, or lack thereof, to do the logically impossible, can be understood through a rephrasing of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro Dilemma is presented in a Platonic dialogue in which Socrates and Euthyphro discuss and search for the nature of morality. Socrates asks Euthyphro the following question and creates what is called the Euthyphro Dilemma: "The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods."[16] David Baggett presents the dilemma in a more modern way by asking, "Is something moral because God commands it or does God command it because it is moral?".[17] What results from answering

[16] Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett. Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito. Written 380 B.C.E.
[17] David Baggett, "Dr. Baggett on the Euthyphro Dilemma," *Moral Apologetics Podcast*, November 2, 2014, audio, 8:08, https://canvas.liberty.edu/courses/216011/modules/items/23276011.

that something is moral because God commands it? Morality becomes arbitrary. Morality is merely what God chooses one day and the next day. What results from answering that God commands something because it is moral? God is no longer needed for morality. He merely identifies what is already moral, and morality preexists God. So, either morality is arbitrary and does not have a true standard or God is not needed for morality. Either conclusion is dangerous for the theist.

The proposed solution to this dilemma is that something is *obligatory* because God commands it, and He commands some things because they are reflective of His own nature. Since God is unchanging, morality is unchanging and is not arbitrary. Additionally, He does not command some things because they are moral, but He commands some things because they are reflective of His own nature, which is the standard for morality. This dilemma and proposed solution can be rephrased to consider the source and standard of logic.

Is something logical because God acts in a certain way, or does God act in a certain way because it is logical? What results if the answer is that something is logical because God acts in a certain way? Similarly, to the dilemma about morality, logic would become arbitrary. The logical would change day by day as the actions of God changed. What results if the answer is that God acts in a certain way because it is logical? God is no longer needed for logic. Logic would preexist God, and God would be bound by it. The atheist may argue that God, indeed, is bound by logic. He cannot do the logically impossible, so logic must preexist God.

Consider the following solution to this logical "Euthyphro Dilemma." God acts in a certain way because it works harmoniously with the way He has created the world, and what is logical is logical because it is reflective of His very nature. As God is the standard of morality, so God is the standard of logic. By not doing the logically impossible, God is not losing any rightful

claim to omnipotence. Instead, He is only acting in a certain way that works together with nature that He has created to reflect His own nature. God cannot behave in an unloving way because He *is* love. He cannot behave in an immoral way because He is the standard for morality. He cannot behave in an illogical way because He *is* logic.

At this point, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the word "logical". One may say that it is not logical that Jesus would be raised from the dead. The resurrection is an example of something that is not *naturally* possible. One may say that it is not logical for God, who is perfectly holy, to become man and to sacrifice His life for sinners. The incarnation and willful death of Jesus is not *rational* perhaps, but it is entirely logical. An example of something that is not logical would be if a married man claimed that he is a bachelor. By definition of what it means to be a bachelor, he cannot be one because he is married. Another example would be if that married man had a daughter, and his daughter came home from school and exclaimed, "Daddy, I learned how to draw a squared circle today!". He may rightly think that his daughter learned how to draw both a square *and* a circle, but she did not learn how to draw a squared circle since such a shape cannot logically exist. A final and more relevant example would be if God can create a world in which He does not exist. Perhaps He could create a world in which He is not present just as an artist can create a work in which they are not present. If an artist created a work, he or she is a necessary component of that work. Similarly, if God created a world, then He is a necessary component of that world. These examples show what is meant by the word "logical" in this sense.[18] The solution to the logical "Euthyphro dilemma" shows that the following two premises hold true:

[18] It is worth mentioning that although some may believe that God *could* create a world in which a squared circle is not illogical, this would require that God change the very rules of logic. However, He is the standard and source of logic, and He is unchanging. Therefore, since a squared circle is illogical in the actual world, it is illogical in every possible world.

1. God could not have created a world in which human beings are significantly free *and* evil does not exist.
2. God is omnipotent even though He cannot do the logically impossible.

It is worth recalling the contributions of G.W. Leibniz as it relates to this discussion. Leibniz shares his solution to the problem of evil by arguing that God chose the best of all possible worlds. In short, God, in all of His wisdom, could see all possible worlds that He could have created, and He chose the one with the *least* amount of evil and the *most* good. This argument is best understood considering that Leibniz is working under the presupposition that the best possible world is also a world containing human freedom, and because of this freedom, evil necessarily exists. Plantinga would disagree with Leibniz' theory.

Plantinga would argue that the very idea of a "best" possible world may not actually exist, outside of heaven. For example, a world containing moral good, human freedom, and no moral evil would be an example of the best possible world; however, any world containing human freedom will also contain moral evil.[19] Therefore, this version of the "best possible world" does not actually exist. Another example with more minor differences would be a world containing just one more person who is enjoying the best that life has to offer. A final example is offered by Nick Trakakis. He wonders, "why would God decide to create a world containing both humans and horrific natural evil rather than a world that lacks any such evil and is inhabited by creatures who can have lives that are just as meaningful as any human life?"[20] Plantinga's response to these "best possible worlds" would be to say that "God, though omnipotent, could

[19] "Any world" in this context excludes heaven because in heaven, human freedom does not necessarily result in the creation of morally evil state of affairs.

[20]Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis, "Confronting the Horror of Natural Evil: An Exchange between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis," *Sophia* 45, no. 2 (2006): 14.

not have actualized just any possible world He pleased".[21] Although it is possible to imagine a world that is better than the actual world, it is perhaps not possible to create a world that is better than the actual world. Consider Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God as it relates to this discussion.

In his argument, Anselm shows that anything that exists is greater than anything that does not exist. His argument can be understood through the following six statements:

1. God, as we have defined him to be in the generally accepted view, possibly exists.
2. If God possibly exists, then he must actually exist because if God does not exist, then any being that *actually* exists would be greater than God.
3. If God only existed in our imagination, then a real being that existed would be greater than Him.
4. Thus, a being greater than God would exist.
5. This is logically incoherent, however, because by definition, God is the greatest being.
6. Therefore, God must exist.

To better understand Anselm's argument in a practical way, imagine that a new coffee was marketed to the public. This new coffee adapted its flavor regularly to meet the particular tastes of the consumer, it did not cause an accelerated heartrate, it never caused someone's hands to shake after drinking it, and it was also a first-class multi-vitamin supplement. After hearing about this new coffee, consumers rush to go purchase the coffee. What would happen, though, if they were then told that this coffee only existed in the imagination? Would they still choose this seemingly perfect coffee although it does not actually exist, or would they choose any inferior coffee that *actually* exists? Of course, the consumers would choose the coffee that *actually* exists

[21] Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil*, 34.

even though the imagined coffee would be preferable if it were to exist. This example shows that something that exists is better than something that only exists in the imagination, even if the something in the imagination would be better if it did actually exist. In the same way, a world containing moral good, human freedom, and no moral evil may exist in the imagination, but since it does not actually exist, the actual world is greater than the world in the imagination, since such a world can *only* exist in the imagination.

Conclusion

An adequate response to the problem of moral evil is now in clear view. As shown by restating the argument of David Hume, if God is able and willing to eradicate evil, then evil does not exist *unless God has a reason to permit evil*. To claim that evil cannot coexist with a good and all-powerful God is to exclude the possibility that a good and all-powerful God may have a reason to permit evil in the world. A possible reason that God could have to permit moral evil in the world has also been presented. In short, it has been discovered that in order to eliminate all evil, God would have the following two choices: to eliminate humanity or to eliminate human freedom. God chose neither of these options, however. He decided it preferable to create a world in which humans existed *and* they are significantly free in respect to any given action. This freedom allows them to choose good and evil. While it is entirely possible that due to the existence of evil, a god one *prefers*[22] does not exist, the existence of evil is not a proof that God

[22] Using the phrase "a god that one prefers" could certainly create a wide variety of definitions. For the context of this discussion, "a god that one prefers" is a god that *would* eliminate evil as far as it could, falling under the understanding that David Hume holds. Hume's view is constructed in such a way that shows that he either does not consider the possibility that God could have a reason to permit evil, or Hume actually believes that God could not have such a reason. It is worth noting again the consequences that the "god that one prefers" would have for humanity. The first consequence is that humanity would not exist. As it has been shown, it is greater to exist than to not exist. The second consequence is that, if humanity did exist, they would not enjoy human freedom. The same freedom that allows humans to choose evil is the same freedom that allows them to choose to love those around them.

does not exist. William Lane Craig supports this conclusion writing that the "two premises: '1. Evil exists and 2. God exists' are not logically contradictory".[23]

The philosophical problem of evil, however, is two-fold. It may be entirely rational to believe that God and moral evil coexist. Reasons for why God would permit moral evil are readily available. Does the same apply to natural evil? Is it rational to believe that God and *natural* evil coexist? Are there reasons for why God would permit *natural* evil? If God permits moral evil in the world in order to preserve humanity's existence and their freedom, what would God be losing if He were to eliminate *natural* evil as far as He could? Does God have reasons to permit natural evil in the world in the same way that He has reasons to permit moral evil? Could God have created a world where moral evil exists, but natural evil does not exist without losing some greater good? These are the questions that press on in the discussion at hand. John Feinberg writes that it is natural evil that "atheists complain about most and theists find most difficult to justify".[24] It is now time to turn attention to the philosophical problem of *natural* evil.

[23] William Lane Craig, *On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision* (Colorado Springs, CO: David C. Cook, 2010), 174.

[24] John S. Feinberg, *The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil* (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2004), 191.

Chapter Three: Natural Evil

Various Definitions of Natural Evil

Before approaching the problem of natural evil and the questions that arise concerning it, it will be helpful to define what natural evil is and how it differs from moral evil. Glenn Siniscalchi writes that natural evil is "a failure, defect, or absence in the structure or process of a thing".[25] Siniscalchi's definition provides a way to identify a particular instance of natural evil, but it does not explain where it may come from. Charles Darwin, by contrast, provides a specific example of natural evil and shares his thoughts concerning the cause of natural evil. He writes, "I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their larvae feeding within the bodies of living caterpillars".[26] C.S. Lewis writes that "Christianity creates the problem of pain, for pain would be no problem unless, side by side with our daily experience of this painful world, we had received what we think a good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and loving".[27] Lewis also notes that the answer for human pain "cannot be extended to animal pain".[28] Another commonly used way to refer to natural evil is to call it "physical evil".

Each of these definitions can prove to be helpful for their own reasons, but an alternative definition will be used here for the discussion at hand. Since moral evil can be understood as evil that exists due to humanity's freedom and their choice to choose evil, natural evil can be defined

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[25] G.N. Siniscalchi, "Thomas Aquinas, Natural Evil, and 'Outside the Church, No Salvation'," *Heythrop Journal* 56, no.1 (2015): 77.

[26] James P. Sterba, "Solving Darwin's Problem of Natural Evil," *Sophia* 59, no. 3 (2020): 501.

[27] C.S. Lewis, *The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics: The Problem of Pain*, (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2017), 558.

[28] Ibid., 628.

as "evil that *cannot* be attributed to the free actions of human beings".[29] Nick Trakakis suggests a very similar definition of natural evil. He defines natural evil as "evil that results from the operation of natural processes in such a way that no human being can be held morally accountable for the resultant evil."[30] Common examples of occurrences of natural evil may be suffering due to earthquakes or tsunamis, disease, and birth defects. John S. Mill puts the problem of natural evil into perspective writing that, "Everything which the worst men commit either against life or property is perpetrated on a larger scale by natural agents".[31] While the story of one man killing another will make the news because of how horrific murder is, many more people die every day due to natural evil found in nature. The philosophical problem of natural evil presents a unique dilemma for the theist since culpability for moral evil can fall on humanity, whereas culpability for natural evil is not as clear. Where does this culpability fall then? Who is at fault for the existence of natural evil? Critics would argue that culpability would fall on God since He is the creator of the world.

In the sections that follow, the goal is to show that it is reasonable and rational to believe in God despite the existence of natural evil in the world. Does He have reasons to permit natural evil that are not visible to humanity? Is it possible that natural evil may be caused by a non-human act of freedom? Is it possible that a key element of creation would be lost if God were to eliminate natural evil as far as He could? Finally, is it possible that God may have an ultimate

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[29] It should be noted that some specific occurrences of what may be labeled as natural evil are actually caused by the free actions of human beings. John S. Feinberg shares the example of a birth defect that is caused by free actions of the mother during pregnancy. As the use of drugs and alcohol during pregnancy can lead to an irregularly developed baby, birth defects in this case, although at first glance appear to be examples of natural evil, were actually caused by moral evil. The natural evil discussed here are not caused by the specific cases of the free actions of human beings.

[30] Coghlan and Trakakis, "Confronting the Horror of Natural Evil: An Exchange between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis," 7-8.

[31] John Stuart Mill, *Nature and Utility of Religion* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), 20-21.

answer to natural evil that justifies its existence in the world? Several theistic defenses will be shared and evaluated before examining one final defense that sets the problem of evil within a wider perspective. Before turning to these ideas, it is time to return to Plantinga's defense. Specifically, how does Plantinga's free-will defense answer, or fail to answer, the problem of *natural* evil?

Limitations of Plantinga's Defense

Alvin Plantinga's Free-Will Defense thoroughly answers the question of moral evil. He shifts directly to the issues surrounding specifically natural evil, and he recalls the work of St. Augustine who attributes natural evil to the free actions of nonhuman beings. For this reason, Plantinga puts moral evil and natural evil into a larger category together calling both types of evil "broadly moral evil".[32] He specifies that broadly moral evil can be understood as evil caused by the free actions of human *and* nonhuman beings. Therefore, both moral evil and natural evil are caused by the free actions of human and nonhuman beings.

Plantinga succeeds by accomplishing what he set out to do.[33] His defense cannot reasonably be used to respond to the issues of natural evil because his purpose was to respond to J.L. Mackie specifically. The difficulty with natural evil in the world is that the reason that God has to permit natural evil is not as easily seen or understood as it is with moral evil. As shown previously, if God were to eliminate all moral evil, He would have the following two options: to eliminate humanity or to take away humanity's free-will. God must prefer a world where humanity exists and is actually free to choose because it is in such a world that humanity can choose to have relationship with Him. With this understanding in mind, God's choice to give

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[32] Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil*, 59.

[33] Plantinga's defense was written in response to an article written by J.L. Mackie in 1955.

humanity free will can be easily understood. In short, if God removed humanity's free will, they could not choose to have relationship with Him. If God removed humanity's free will, He would be losing an essential part of the world He desired to create. What would be lost if God eliminated *natural* evil? What reason does He have to permit it in the world? The answer to these questions is what Plantinga did not intend to answer in his discourse, and the lack of such answers reveals the limitations of his defense.

Plantinga does offer one potential reason why God would permit natural evil. He writes, "it is conceivable that some natural evils and some persons are so related that the persons would have produced *less* moral good if the evils had been absent".[34] This theory is certainly possible and can be demonstrated in various ways. A person can do moral good by lending a hand to a neighbor who has lost their home to a natural disaster. If the natural disaster had not taken place, the person would not have had the opportunity to display charity and compassion. In other words, if natural evil did not exist then less moral good would exist in the world. While this explanation is entirely likely and difficult to disprove, counterarguments exist that take away some of the apparent success of this defense. As will be discussed later, Stanley Kane makes the argument that evil is not necessary to do moral good in the world. For example, why would a person need the excuse of a natural disaster to show charity and compassion on their neighbor? Could they not display such traits in a moment when an occurrence of natural evil is not in clear view?

Plantinga's free will defense succeeds in showing the direct relationship between humanity's free will and the moral evil that exists in the world. He also succeeds in giving reasons why God would want humans to have free will even if it ultimately resulted in the

[34] Ibid., 57.

existence of evil in the world as well. His defense was not intended to offer reasons why God would not stop natural evil, however. Now that the success and limitations of Plantinga's defense is in clear view, it is time to turn attention to several defenses of Christianity in light of the problem of evil that may offer solutions to the problem of natural evil specifically and reasons that God would permit it in the world. The first defense to consider will be Augustine's theodicy.

Several Defenses

Augustine's Theodicy

Augustine's theodicy carries some similarities with Plantinga's free-will defense, but differences remain. There are three points that are central to understanding Augustine's beliefs on the problem of natural evil. First, Augustine famously defines evil as the "privation of good".[35] If everything that God created is good, and evil is not good, then God did not create evil. If God created everything, but God did not create evil, then evil must not be a substance. By this logic, Augustine argues that evil is not a substance, that there is no such thing as evil, but evil is the privation of good. It is not a substance in of itself, but it the absence of something in a substance. As Augustine clearly states, "there is no such entity as 'evil'; 'evil' is merely a name for the privation of good."[36] The reason for the creation of the universe is found in God's ultimate purpose which is to create good. God, being perfect, only created good. Augustine argues that evil, then, is the absence of good in a substance.

He shares two examples that illustrate the relationship between good and evil. Augustine explains, "We are familiar with darkness and silence, and we can only be aware of them by means of eyes and ears, but this is not by perception but by absence of perception".[37] He argues

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[35] Augustine, *City of God, The POE, A Reader* (New York: Image Books, 2014), 56.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., 60.

that greed, lust, boasting, and pride are not evil. Instead, evil is pursuing riches and leaving justice for riches. Evil is chasing after pleasures and leaving self-control for pleasure. Evil is prioritizing praise over righteousness. Evil is loving one's own power and forgetting the power of the all-powerful.[38] These examples show that God did not create evil, but humanity's free actions concerning created things is what creates the privation of good things. Evil is the privation of good.

The second point central to Augustine's theodicy is that moral and natural evil are the consequence of the abuse of free will. Similarly to Plantinga's defense, Augustine attributes moral evil to the free actions of human beings who choose to go wrong. The result of such decisions brings the consequences of moral and natural evil. God allows these consequences to follow because He gives humans true freedom. If moral and natural evil are caused by humanity's free choices, then God is not held responsible for the existence of evil in the world. Rather, God is justified in allowing humanity to have the consequences of their actions. By his view, natural evil is also a result of humanity's free will and their choice to use it for evil.

The third point central to Augustine's theodicy is that natural evil is the result of free actions of human *and* nonhuman persons. This point, although similar to the second, deserves its own discussion because of how it separates Augustine's theodicy from Plantinga's defense. Recall that Plantinga attributed natural evil to the free actions of nonhuman persons. Augustine attributes natural evil to the free actions of both human *and* nonhuman persons.

John Feinberg supports this thinking by pointing to the narrative in Genesis 3:17c-19 and Paul's teaching found in Romans 8:18-22. Genesis 3:17c-19 says, "Cursed is the ground for your sake; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life. Both thorns and thistles it shall bring forth

[38] Ibid.

for you, and you shall eat the herb of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread til you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; for dust you are, and to dust you shall return".[39] This passage is spoken in response to humanity's decision to sin and go against what God asked of them. The curse described in Genesis 3 falls into the category of natural evil even though it was caused by free actions of human beings. This example supports a key difference between Augustine and Plantinga's thinking. While Plantinga attributes natural evil to the free actions of nonhuman beings, Augustine shows that natural evil can also be caused by the free actions of human beings. The passage from Genesis 3 serves as a clear response to critics who believe that humanity cannot be held responsible for specific acts of natural evil.

Romans 8:20-22 says, "For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of Him who subjected it in hope; because the creation itself also will be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groans and labors with birth pangs together until now". Paul's teaching in Romans reveals that nature was subject to changes due to the fall in Genesis 3. Free actions of humanity caused natural evil in this case. Feinberg writes concerning this passage in Romans, "The whole creation groans and suffers in anticipation of a new order God will eventually institute that will overcome sin and all its effects".[40] Feinberg believes that humanity's sin altered nature in such a way that caused natural evil to exist. He explains this belief further by writing, "Had sin not entered the world, I take it that biblical teaching implies that natural processes wouldn't function in ways that contribute to or cause death".[41] He argues that Adam and Eve knew that they would die if they sinned, and they did sin. Therefore, something must take their

[39] Unless otherwise noted, all references to scripture are from the NKJV.

[40] Feinberg, *About the Many Faces of Evil*, 195.

[41] Ibid.

life. If mankind must die because of their choice to use their freedom for evil, they must die of something. Could it be that the fall of man is the cause of disease, earthquakes, miscarriages, and other examples of natural evil that cause humans to die? If so, the existence of natural evil can, at least partly, be attributed to the free actions of human persons, as Augustine argues.

Lastly, Feinberg offers the suggestion that "it is only a matter of His grace that we don't suffer more of these natural evils and die sooner".[42] If Adam and Eve knew they would die if they disobeyed God, it could have likely been a surprise to them when they did not die immediately. It is God's grace that allowed them to continue living despite their disobedience. In sum, Augustine's theodicy contains the following three key points:

1. Evil is the privation of good. The reason for the creation of the universe was God's ultimate purpose which is to create good.
2. Moral and natural evil are the natural consequences of the abuse of free-will.
3. Natural evil is the result of free actions of human *and* nonhuman persons.

Augustine's theodicy contributes to the problem of natural evil by showing the connection between humanity's actions and the natural evil that exists in the world. While some argue that mankind is responsible for only moral evil, Augustine's theodicy gives a clear understanding that mankind can also be culpable for the existence of natural evil.

Augustine also attributes natural evil to a broader type of moral evil caused by the free will of human and nonhuman beings. In this way, Plantinga's free-will defense is further supported in its attempt to answer to problem of natural evil by Augustine. As it has been shown, God chose to give free-will to humanity because if He were to remove this free will, He would be removing humanity's ability to choose relationship with Him. This same free will is what

[42] Ibid., 196.

allows humanity to go against God and cause both moral and natural evil in the world. Although Plantinga and Augustine generally agree on their explanation of the cause of natural evil, defenses of their type are not the only response to this problem. Some thinkers have questioned the very foundation of the problem of evil. John Hick, for example, believes that the purpose of creation should be considered to better understand the situation at hand. He would argue, as it will be shown, that the purpose of creation is "soul-building", and it is through this understanding that creation should be evaluated and the problem of evil should be discussed.

Hick's Soul-building Theodicy

John Hick first recognizes the difference between the emotional problem and the philosophical problem. He writes that, "the intellectual problem, which invites rational reflection, is distinct from the experienced mystery, which must be faced in the actual business of living".[43] Hick relies on "the actual business of living" to respond to the issues of natural evil.

As previously noted, Hick considers the very foundation of the problem of evil in his discussion to create a type of foundation by which he can work on. He calls for a new perspective on humanity. Instead of viewing humanity as a completed work, he views humanity as a piece of creation that is still in process.[44] Hick refers to Genesis 1:26 to clarify his point. Genesis 1:26 says, "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness'…".[45] The key point to understand here is one that Irenaeus made clear. He suggests that man was made in God's *image* but is being continuously formed into God's *likeness*. Although mankind is made in the image of God, they are being formed day to day into His likeness.[46] This continual formation

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[43] Mark Larrimore, *The Problem of Evil*: *Hick, The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy*, (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2001), 355.

[44] Ibid., 356.

[45] Unless otherwise noted, all references to scripture are from the English Standard Version

[46] Hick, *The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy*, p. 356.

of humanity is what Hick refers to as "soul-building" and it serves as the foundation of his theodicy.

As discussed previously, if God were to eliminate humanity's free will, He would be eliminating their opportunity to have relationship with Him. Hick agrees with this conclusion, but he draws two other conclusions as well.[47] In all, Hick believes that there are primarily three things that would be lost if God did not give humanity free will:

1. Man could not have genuine relationship with God.
2. Man could not be free, as He is free.[48]
3. Man could not be perfected.[49]

Hick views human freedom as the vehicle for man's formation into the likeness of God. He writes that, "man is in process of becoming the perfected being whom God is seeking to create through a hazardous adventure of individual freedom".[50] Hick's view is that humanity is being perfected through the practice of free-will and the consequences that follow. One of these consequences, of course, is the existence of evil in the world. It is important to note that the words "image" and "likeness" found in Genesis 1:26 are not universally recognized as an intentional choice to show that humanity is made in the image of God and is being continually formed into the His likeness. In Exodus 20, similar words are used in the giving of the 10 Commandments. Exodus 20:4 says, "You shall not make for yourself a carved *image,* or any *likeness* of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth". It is possible that the word choice of "image" and "likeness" were used

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[47] Ibid., 357.

[48] In other words, man would not be created in His *image*.

[49] In other words, man would not be able to be formed into His *likeness*.

[50] Hick, *The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy*, p. 357.

intentionally to teach against the use of idols which were prevalent at the time of the original audience of the readers of Genesis and Exodus. Although this interpretation can be supported, Hick's argument does not necessarily need the text in Genesis 1:26 to support his claim that God is forming mankind after His likeness.[51] His theodicy enjoys support throughout scripture.

Returning to Hick's line of thinking, he suggests that the world should not be evaluated based on its fitness to offer the maximum amount of pleasure for humanity and the least amount of pain. Instead, the world should be evaluated in terms of if "this is the kind of world that God might make as an environment in which moral beings may be fashioned, through their own free insights and responses, into 'children of God'".[52] Stated differently, the way humanity understands the purpose of the world impacts what question is asked about creation. Any tool is judged according to its purpose. A hammer is judged by its usefulness is driving a nail into wood. Similarly, Hick teaches that the world should be judged by its usefulness in the process of soul-building.[53] With this new perspective in mind, the existence of evil, both moral and natural evil, is justified by its role in the process of soul-building. In other words, a possible reason that God has to permit natural evil in the world is soul-building.

Hick concludes his argument by pointing to the result of soul-building. He looks to the future.[54] He writes that, "Instead of looking to the past for its clue to the mystery of evil, it looks to the future, and indeed to that ultimate future to which only faith can look…the good that outshines all ill is not a paradise long since lost, but a kingdom which is yet to come in its full

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[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid., 359.

[53] Ibid.,

[54] Hick's perspective appears to assume consequentialism, as he looks to the ultimate goal of soul-building to justify the process of soul-building.

glory and permanence".[55] The kingdom which is yet to come is the reward for those who embrace the process of soul-building and are formed into the likeness of God. The Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, calls upon similar thinking. Romans 8:18 says, "I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy with the glory that is to be revealed to us."

To summarize Hick's theodicy, He presupposes that both theists and atheists have an understanding of what they believe to be the purpose of the world, and this purpose informs how they evaluate the problem of evil. As mankind's free will causes both moral and natural evil in the world, opportunity is presented for humans to grow and be formed into the likeness of God. While critics of Christianity who offer arguments against Christianity from the problem of evil presuppose that the purpose of the world is to maximize happiness, Hick presupposes that the purpose of the world is soul-building. The argument of the opponent of Christianity frames the problem of evil in the following way:

1. God's purpose for the world must be to maximize happiness of humanity.
2. The existence of evil in the world does not maximize happiness of humanity.
3. Therefore, God must either not exist or not be good.

By contrast, Hick's soul-building theodicy can be understood through the following premises:

1. The purpose of the world is primarily soul-building.
2. Evil creates opportunity for soul-building.
3. Therefore, the goal of soul-building justifies the existence of evil in the world.

Stanley Kane offers a critique of Hick's theodicy that should now be considered. Kane understands that Hick teaches that, "soul-making requires the development of such traits as

[55] Hick, *The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy*, p. 361.

fortitude, courage, compassion. This justifies the existence of many evils, since these evils are a logically necessary condition for the development of such traits".[56] Kane disagrees by pointing out that the development of these traits does not *require* evil, but they can be developed through other situations not involving the existence of evil at all.[57]

Consider the courage displayed by a man who competes and finishes in an Iron Man event after taking a decade off from competing. Consider the strength developed in a woman who perseveres through graduate school while raising a newborn child. Consider the compassion displayed in the friend who cheers on the man competing in the Iron Man or the compassion displayed in the man who supports his wife in her graduate school. None of these examples include any evidence of the existence of evil, yet courage, strength, and compassion are developed.[58] Kane uses examples similar to these to argue that God does not need evil to develop these traits, so soul-building is not an adequate explanation to the existence of evil. Further, Kane shares examples of soul-building in the presence of evil and wonders why this is how the process of soul-building must take place.[59] Why does courage have to be displayed in a five-year old girl who has lost her mother to cancer? Why does compassion have to be displayed in caring for a boy who, stricken with the grief of his mother leaving him and his siblings, has lost the ability to speak? Why does strength have to be grown through rebuilding a community after being crippled by a natural disaster?

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[56] G Stanley Kane, "The Failure of Soul-making Theodicy," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 6, no. 1 (1975): 2.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Pain, itself, may be viewed as an evil state of affairs. However, pain serves a good purpose in the lives of humans. It provides a service by signaling to the brain when something is hurting the body. Without pain, an even greater evil state of affairs may exist, i.e. a medical condition that ultimately takes the life of a human when they do not receive treatment for a condition that they were unaware of and a sense of pain could have signaled to them. Although pain may not be pleasurable, it serves a good purpose.

[59] Kane, "The Failure of Soul-making Theodicy," 2-3.

While these examples and other examples offered by Kane certainly point out that a trait may be displayed without the apparent existence of evil, two things must be kept in mind. First, human freedom, as has been shown previously, is the cause of evil in the world. Without human freedom, there would be no evil in the world, so there would be no actual opportunity to display courage or compassion in the first place. Although examples can be given of a human displaying a positive trait in the absence of evil, the reality is that the world is not absent of evil because humanity is free to choose. Second, Kane's assessment of the problem says little about the actual existence of evil in the world. He does not offer an argument that shows that it is irrational to believe in God in the midst of evil existing in the world. He merely points out that traits like courage and compassion could be developed without evil.[60]

Kane's second critique of Hick's theodicy questions his theodicy in terms of how it fits within Hick's own worldview. He argues that the process of soul-building is "pointlessly absurd when set within the context of Hick's total worldview".[61] In light of how Hick concludes his argument looking to the future kingdom that will be established, Kane points out that this future kingdom is one without evil.[62] Kane concludes that Hick's theodicy is self-defeating because "it seems pointless to want or to have the quality of courage if there would never be any call for the show of courageous action".[63] Interestingly, it seems that Kane's own thinking solves the dilemma he presents Hick. Recall that Kane pointed out strongly that there are situations where

[60] Ibid., 2.

[61] Ibid., 8.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

traits like courage and compassion can be displayed without the presence of evil.[64] Stated plainly, Kane argues the following two things:

1. Evil is not necessary to display courage and compassion.
2. Without evil, no one could display courage or compassion.

Unfortunately for Kane, his argument against Hick is self-defeating. The merit in Kane's critique of Hick's theodicy is found in the purpose of evil in the process of soul-making. If the existence of evil is justified by its role in soul-building, what can be made of the lack of evil when the future kingdom is established? Will humanity no longer be in the process of being formed into His likeness in this new kingdom? It seems that Hick's response could be that although evil can be a tool for soul-building, it is not the *only* tool to accomplish soul-building. Another defense that is similar to Hick's soul-building theodicy, is what will be referred to as the Divine Purpose of Happiness argument.

Divine Purpose of Happiness

Like Hick's soul-building argument, the Divine Purpose of Happiness argument questions the foundation of the problem of evil by examining the purpose of creation. Hick writes that "anti-theistic writers almost invariably assume a conception of the divine purpose which is contrary to the Christian conception. They assume that the purpose of a loving God must be to create a hedonistic paradise".[65] This presupposition about the divine purpose of God is vital in understanding the lens that an anti-theistic writer may have while discussing the topic of evil. If their view of the world is that God has attempted to create a paradise with no evil, pain, or suffering, then it may be very reasonable to assume that God is either not loving enough to

[64] Ibid., 2.

[65] Hick, *The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy*, p. 358.

actualize such a world or He is not powerful enough to create it. Hick argues, as discussed previously, the purpose of creation is soul-building and bringing of many sons to glory.[66] The Divine Purpose of Happiness argument, influenced greatly by George Schlesinger, holds that it was not God's purpose in creation to create a hedonistic paradise as some anti-theistic writers assume.

George Schlesinger points out the irrationality of the idea that God would create the world with the purpose to maximize happiness of humanity.[67] He shares an analogy of a human parent raising a child to illustrate his point. He gives two options. In the first option, the goal of the parent is to keep the child happy. The parents keep the child in their room and do not allow them access to the outside world which will reveal pain, suffering, failure and the like. They focus only on giving the child what she wants and satisfying her wants. They do not give her an instrument to learn to play because she may experience failure in learning to play. Likewise, she may never learn to overcome and the joy that comes with overcoming. They do not introduce her to neighbors because new friends may leave and cause pain in a relationship ending. Likewise, she may never learn the joys of friendship. In the second option, the goal of the parent is to grow the child into being a kind of person that is preferable to be. The parent allows the child to gain intelligence and experience by accessing the outside world. They care about satisfying their child's wants, but they also prioritize growing qualities and characteristics that will cause the child to grow into a person that one would desire to be like. They introduce her to a piano, so she can learn both the struggle of learning and the joy of overcoming a struggle. They introduce her to new neighbors, so she learns both the pain of losing a friend and the joys of friendship.

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[66] Ibid., 357.

[67] G.N. Schlesinger, "The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Injustice," *Tradition* 13, no. 2 (1972): 44-45.

Schlesinger writes on a topic he refers to as the "degree of desirability of a state". He writes, "apparently the degree of desirability of a state is not a simple function of a single factor—namely the degree to which one's wants are satisfied—but it is also dependent on the kind of being one is".[68] He believes that the child in the first option, although happier, is far less intelligent and has not developed characteristics and qualities that are desirable. The child in the second example, although slightly less happy because she has experienced hardships, is better off because she has become a person that someone would want to be.[69] To put the point clearly, consider which is better: to keep a child in a state where they know neither joy nor suffering, triumph nor falling short, excitement nor boredom; or to put the child in a position to obtain characteristics and qualities that are desirable even if difficulty and hardships must be experienced in order to obtain them? If human parents can understand the importance of not simply prioritizing happiness in raising a child, would God not also have the wisdom to know that the goal of humanity is more than being happy?

While anti-theistic writers assume that the purpose of the world is to maximum happiness, Schlesinger and Hick show that the purpose of the world is more than offering happiness to humanity. This new lens that Schlesinger and Hick offer allows someone to view the existence of evil in the world in a different light. Instead of seeing the existence of evil as proof that God is either not loving enough or not powerful enough to actualize the world He desires to create, one may view the existence of evil in the world as a result of human and nonhuman actions, like Augustine and Plantinga show. Furthermore, the existence of evil can offer opportunity to develop qualities and characteristics that are desirable to have.

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[68] Ibid., 45.

[69] Ibid.

The understanding of the purpose of creation is of vital importance in interpreting the existence of evil in the world. One's purpose drives their actions. To offer one final example, a father's purpose in his relationship with his son has never been to make his son happy. His purpose, instead, is to love him in every moment. Due to this purpose, there are times where the father's love suspends his son's happiness temporarily in order to love him through a mistake and help his son grow. Similarly, God's purpose is not to maximize happiness and maintain humanity's happiness in the world. Instead, He may very well be satisfied in temporarily suspending a human's happiness in order to aid in the process of soul-building and bringing many sons to glory.

The G.E. Moore Shift

Now that several arguments have been shared in defense of Christianity in light of the problem of natural evil, one final defense will be described with the goal to further support the fact that it is entirely rational to believe in the Christian God although natural evil exists in the world. The final defense to share will be referred to as the "Evil Defeated" defense of Christianity. Before discussing this defense, it will prove helpful to first look at the G.E. Moore shift as a similar 'shift' is relied upon in the Evil Defeated defense of Christianity.

In an essay written by William L. Rowe, Rowe attempts to build an argument from evil that will support someone being an atheist. He then shares what he believes to be the best defense that a Christian could offer in light of this argument. Rowe's evidential argument relies on 'gratuitous evils'. 'Gratuitous evils' can be defined as occurrences of evil that do not aid in furthering any greater purpose or stop the occurrences of an even greater evil. The term 'gratuitous evil' will be used later in this discussion, but for now attention is turned to Rowe's

argument which he believes rationalizes the atheistic view of evil. Rowe's argument can be understood through the following three statements:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[70]

By Rowe's understanding, if any one occurrence of evil could be proven to be gratuitous then it follows that either God does not exist or He is not omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good. Most notably, Rowe shares the example of a fawn who suffers and dies alone in the forest due to an occurrence of natural evil. This example of the fawn who suffers and dies alone offers an occurrence of evil that certainly appears to be gratuitous. At the very least, how could a theist show that there is a greater good served by the fawn's death or that a greater evil was avoided through the fawn's death? The theist does not have the knowledge to show that either could be true. Therefore, this occurrence of evil must be gratuitous and, according to Rowe's evidential argument, God does not exist.

The G.E. Moore shift rephrases Rowe's argument to put the burden of proof back on the atheist. If Rowe's argument can be seen as "p,q, then r.", Moore shifts the argument to "not-r,q, then not-p". Rephrased, Moore shifts the argument to the following three statements:

[70] William L. Rowe, Marilyn Adams and Robert Adams, *The Problem of Evil: "*The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 127.

1. There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. It is not the case that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. [71]

This shift shows that just as the theist will not always have access to the knowledge to determine what specific good comes from an occurrence of evil, the atheist also will not always have access to the knowledge that some good absolutely does not come from an occurrence of evil. In this way, Rowe's evidential argument only proves that both the theist and the atheist are limited in knowledge. A similar shift in argument like the one that Moore proposes will be utilized in the Evil Defeated defense of Christianity.

[71] Ibid., 134.

Chapter Four: A New Alternative: The Evil Defeated Defense

Returning to Rowe's evidential argument, he makes the case that any occurrence of gratuitous evil is evidence that the theistic God does not exist. Successful counterarguments to Rowe's evidential argument make specific use of how Rowe uses the word 'appears'. He argues that occurrences of evil that *appear* to be gratuitous are examples of evil that God did not have to permit in order to bring about a greater good. Since the suffering and death of the fawn *appears* to be gratuitous, then that particular occurrence of evil questions why God would permit this particular occurrence of evil because it does not bring about a greater good. Marilyn Adams and Robert Adams write concerning this point of the argument saying, "the crux of his argument is that much suffering 'does not appear to serve any outweighing good"[72]. Although the fawn's suffering certainly *appears* to be gratuitous, it does not follow that it is *necessarily* gratuitous.

At this point, it will prove helpful to make the distinction between gratuitous evils and *apparently* gratuitous evils. The working definition for apparently gratuitous evils can be "any occurrence of evil that does not *appear* to aid in furthering any greater purpose or stop the occurrence of an even worse evil, yet upon further analysis or a wider perspective, it is shown that the occurrence of evil did, indeed, aid in furthering a greater purpose or stop the occurrence of an even worse evil". Consider the following three examples of evil occurring.

1. A man cuts a child open.
2. A woman cries out in pain.
3. A farmer's field is burnt.

Each of these three examples reveal occurrences of evil that could support the argument from evil against Christianity. If God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient, why

[72] Ibid., 138.

would He allow a child to be cut open, a woman to experience pain, or a farmer's field to burn down? Why would He not step in to stop such occurrences of evil? From this perspective, the problem of evil against Christianity presses on. Do the results of these three examples justify the means? Consider, however, the same three examples with additional context:

1. A man cuts a child open *in order to provide life-saving surgery*.
2. A woman cries out in pain *necessary to deliver a baby*.
3. A farmer's field is burnt *in order to improve the health of the ground*.

Without the context of the life-saving surgery, the cutting open of the child is an excellent example of moral evil. The case can still be made that the cutting itself is intrinsically evil, however, the explanation of why this evil is permitted is entirely rational. Without the context of birthing a baby, the pain of the mother is an example of apparently gratuitous evil. Her pain is validated by the reward of the child. Again, her pain may still be intrinsically evil, but the reason that God permits this specific evil is in clear view. Additionally, as previously noted, it is possible that some occurrences of natural evil are the result of humanity's free will and decision to choose evil over good. Recall that Genesis 3:16 points to such an occurrence of natural evil. The pain of the mother in childbirth provides an example of natural evil caused by the free will of humanity and its consequences that follow. Without the context of the reason that the farmer burnt his field, the burning of the field would be an example of gratuitous evil in nature. Another way to determine how someone can decide if any evil is actually gratuitous is by using a tool shared by Stephen Wykstra.

Wykstra responds to Rowe's argument claiming that Rowe does not have reasonable epistemic access to know what he claims to know. How, asks Wkystra, could Rowe know absolutely that the fawn's suffering is actually gratuitous? Does Rowe have the knowledge

necessary to make such a statement? Wykstra refers to this necessary knowledge as 'epistemic access'. Wykstra writes in his response, "it is reasonable to think one has 'epistemic access' to the truth of 'p through s.' Let us call this 'the Condition Of Reasonable Epistemic Access', or—for short—CORNEA."[73] Stated differently, does Rowe have reasonable epistemic access to make his claim? More broadly, does someone have epistemic access to reasonably claim that any particular occurrence of evil is *actually* gratuitous? Wykstra answers the question concerning Rowe's epistemic access specifically regarding the fawn's suffering by saying that Rowe does not have such epistemic access. In order for Rowe to have justification in his claim that the fawn's suffering is *actually* gratuitous, Rowe would either need to be omniscient or he would need access to learn from someone who is omniscient. Wykstra argues that Rowe's argument fails because he cannot prove that the fawn's suffering is *actually* gratuitous; he can only reasonably argue that the fawn's suffering is an example of *apparently* gratuitous evil.

The difference between gratuitous evil and apparently gratuitous evil serves as a foundation to the Evil Defeated Defense. Two terms must be defined before outlining this defense of Christianity in light of the problem of natural evil. First, evils that 'are yet undefeated' are "occurrences of evil that have not been defeated by any greater purpose or greater good". These occurrences of evil, to Rowe's point, are gratuitous in nature but will one day be defeated. An 'defeated evil' is "any occurrence of evil that may not *appear* to be defeated by any greater purpose or greater good, yet upon further analysis or a wider perspective, it is shown that the occurrence of evil was, indeed, defeated by a greater purpose or greater good".

The Evil Defeated Defense is rooted in the difference that perspective makes when analyzing any occurrence of evil. Specifically, the present perspective that humanity has is

[73] Ibid., 151.

limited when determining whether any specific occurrence of evil is yet undefeated or a defeated evil. The Evil Defeated Defense can be understood through the following three premises and the shift that follows shortly after:

1. If there are evils left undefeated, then the problem of evil persists.
2. There are evils left undefeated.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil persists.

It is evident that there exist occurrences of evil that have not been defeated. Therefore, the problem of evil persists. However, will there always be specific occurrences of evil that are not defeated? The Evil Defeated Defense shows that through the epistemic access required to decide if any evil is undefeated or only not *yet* defeated, it can be shown that the problem of evil will not always persist. Unfortunately for the present time, humanity does not have the epistemic access to know how exactly each occurrence of evil will be overcome in the future. In broad terms, however, the very foundations of evil will be defeated, and each particular occurrence of evil will also be defeated. The very foundations of evil will be defeated, and each particular occurrence will also be defeated through the work of Jesus on the cross. Romans 8:25 says that Jesus was "delivered up for our trespasses and raised for our justification."

By His death and resurrection, the sin of humanity has been paid for, and humanity has been justified in the eyes of God. Perhaps the most daring response to the problem of evil is the response that God has toward it. He did not elect to refrain from creating anything in the first place in order to not face evil. He did not choose to eliminate humanity in order to eliminate the consequences of evil in the world. He did not decide to eliminate humanity's free will. He made the choice to face evil directly. God willingly became acquainted with grief and suffering, became a man of sorrows, a victim of injustice, and was made subject to evil. He did so because

He knew has victory over grief, suffering, sorrow, injustice, and evil. As Isaiah 53:3 says, "He was despised and rejected by men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, and as one from whom men hide their faces he was despised, and we esteemed him not." Although humanity rejected Him, He faced evil and emerged victorious on humanity's behalf. The Evil Defeated Defense is rooted in the fact that God took humanity's place, paid their price for sin, and defeated evil so they may be free from it.

David Baggett and Jerry Walls observe that the problem facing the critic is that "God himself is working to overcome with his plan of salvation and redemption at the end of the world when all evil will be decisively defeated. Death itself will be overcome having already received a mortal blow in the resurrection of Jesus".[74] In other words, no evil will be left undefeated. All evil will be defeated by the greatest good. Fyodor Dostoevsky shares his view on the ultimate solution to evil. Dostoevsky, like Paul highlights in Romans 8:18, points to the future as justification for the evil that occurs. Dostoevsky writes the following:

> I believe like a child that suffering will be healed and made up for, that all the humiliating absurdity of human contradictions will vanish like a pitiful mirage, like the despicable fabrication of the impotent and infinitely small Euclidean mind of man, that in the world's finale, at the moment of eternal harmony, something so precious will come to pass that it will suffice for all hearts, for the comforting of all resentments, for the atonement of all the crimes of humanity, of all the blood they've shed; that it will make it not only possible to forgive but to justify all that has happened.[75]

The Evil Defeated Argument can be rephrased as the following three statements:

1. If all evil will be defeated, then the problem of evil will no longer persist.
2. The only evils that exist today are evils that are 'yet defeated'.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil will no longer persist.

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[74] Baggett and Walls, *God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 81-82.

[75] Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 259.

How would an opponent of the Evil Defeated Defense respond to this argument? They would likely counter premise 2, that no evil will be left undefeated. They would do this because premise 1 is self-evident as discussions of this sort are still taking place regularly. The third premise follows logically from premise 1 and 2, so this argument hinges upon the truth of the second premise, that no evil will be left undefeated. In order to counter the second premise, an opponent of the Evil Defeated Defense would have to show that it is likely that any particular occurrence of evil cannot be defeated. The difficulty with such an assertion is that the opponent of the Evil Defeated Defense would be in a similar spot to that of William Rowe when he makes the claim that a particular occurrence of evil is *actually* gratuitous without having access to the knowledge required to make such a claim. As Rowe cannot actually determine the truth of his claim, an opponent of the Evil Defeated Defense cannot actually show that an occurrence of evil cannot be defeated. Such knowledge is beyond their grasp. Therefore, they cannot show that premise 2 is likely untrue. It is at least *possible* that premise 2 is true, and the Evil Defeated Defense stands as follows:

1. If all evil will be defeated, then the problem of evil will no longer persist.
2. The only evils that exist today are evils that are 'yet defeated'.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil will no longer persist.

The Implications of a Past Victory and Future Hope on Present Evil

The arguments and defenses shared previously show that God does have reason to permit natural evil in the world, and the truth of evil being defeated will resolve the ultimate problem of evil. His reasons include allowing humanity to enjoy free will and the consequences that follow necessarily for their freedom to be true freedom. Another reason He may have is the purpose of soul-building, as suggested by Hick. However, both of these victories fail to answer the question

of the present evil and the sufferer who is struggling through an occurrence of evil today. The understanding that God has good reasons to permit evil certainly aids in the philosophical discussion of God's existence, but it does little to contribute to the questions that a present sufferer has. The promise that all evil will be defeated is certainly a welcomed truth regarding the future state of humanity, but again, it does not answer the dilemma that a human is facing today in the face of natural evil. The final question to answer in this discussion is the following: What implications does a past victory and a future hope have on present-day natural evil?

The past victory to consider carefully is the work of Jesus on the cross and His resurrection. He is a victor over both suffering, evil, and death. The unique part of His victory is that His victory over suffering, evil, and death was a victory on humanity's behalf. The results of this victory extend to present suffering. To illustrate this victory on humanity's behalf, consider the following story.

There was a camp counselor who heard one of the boys in his group cry out in pain when he fell and broke his leg in two places. While they waited for medical help to arrive, the counselor held the boy's hand as he cried out in pain. The counselor thought to himself, "I wish I could change places with him and take the burden of this pain". This wish, in reality, is not one that can come true because the camp counselor is limited by what he can physically do. The camp counselor cannot *actually* switch places with the boy who is in pain. If, however, the counselor's wish could come true, it is likely that he may decide to not switch places with the boy after all when presented with the option to actually do it.

This example illustrates the uniqueness of what Jesus accomplished on behalf of humanity. When presented with the opportunity to *actually* take humanity's place in facing evil, suffering and death, Jesus chose to do so. C.S. Lewis explains the position that God was in when

making this substitution. Observe Lewis' writing as He writes from God's perspective, "You cannot, and you dare not. I could and dared"[76]. Jesus took the place of humanity in both suffering and death. Furthermore, He is "the Father of mercies and God of all comfort"[77]. He comforts humanity in their present sufferings. The past victory of Jesus is beneficial to humanity today when they face evil of all kinds because He identifies with humanity's suffering and comforts them through it.

The future hope to consider now is the return of Jesus and the judgement that will come. The problem of evil as it is faced now is in a unique time in history because although Christ has defeated suffering, evil, and death, there is still work yet to be done. The problem of evil is still a present reality although, as it has been shown, evil will be defeated, and the problem of evil will no longer be a problem at all. The Christian hope of the future is in Christ's return and judgment on all. In His righteous judgement, every wrong will be made right. The result of this impending judgment is detailed clearly in Revelation 21. Verse 3 shows that God's dwelling place is with humanity and they will be His people. Furthermore, God will "wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away".[78] This future hope points to a judgement that will resolve evil that has occurred in the past.

Revelation 21 points to a second result of this coming judgment. Verse 8 shows that, "for the cowardly, the faithless, the detestable, for the murders, the sexually immoral, sorcerers, idolaters, and the liars, their portion will be in the lake that burns with fire and sulfur, which is the second death". In other words, God will judge moral evildoers. The coming judgment may be

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[76] C.S. Lewis, *A Grief Observed* (HarperSan Francisco, 1994), 56.

[77] 2 Corinthians 1:3 ESV

[78] Revelation 21:4 ESV

welcomed by Nick Trakakis, who views theistic philosophers as people who wear "rose-colored glasses."[79] He asserts that the general theistic response to the problem of evil is overly optimistic when theists declare that God will one day overcome all evil in such a way that "any victims would not wish that the course of their lives would have taken a less evil-strewn path."[80] Although victims of evil may gain this perspective, God will not merely "sweep evil under the rug" or simply overlook wrongdoing and injustice in the world. He faced evil directly by surrendering to the cross, but there is still work to do. He will return and judge moral evildoers.

More than this, there will be a new heaven and a new earth, for "the first heaven and the first earth had passed away".[81] God will make all things new. The result of humanity's sin and natural evil in the world will no longer have its effect as God makes all things new. This future hope has specific implications for the issue of natural evil because those who have put their faith in Christ will inhabit this new creation that Christ has for them, and natural evil will no longer impact humanity. N.T. Wright affirms this idea agreeing that the "ultimate answer to the problem of evil is to be found in God's creation of a new world, new heavens and new earth, with redeemed, renewed human beings ruling over it and bringing it to God's wise, healing order".[82] Although the world is currently full of evils that are 'yet defeated', the problem of evil will ultimately be resolved when Christ returns.

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[79] Nick Trakakis, "Absolute Idealism and the Problem of Evil," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 82, no. 1 (2017): 57.

[80] Ibid., 56.

[81] Revelation 21:1 ESV

[82] N.T Wright., *Evil and the Justice of God* (Westmont: InterVarsity Press, 2014), 95.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

It is now in clear view that it is rational to believe in God despite the existence of natural evil in the world. Furthermore, several possible reasons that God may have to permit specific occurrences of natural evil have been shared. As some scholars argue, a response to broadly moral evil, both moral and natural evil, can be shared to respond to natural evil. Plantinga, one of such scholars, displays the role of significantly free beings in the existence of evil in the world, both moral and natural evil. Plantinga also shares one of the reasons that God would permit evil to occur which is allowing free beings to experience the consequences from their free decisions.[83] A response to a critical question was shared in regard to the possibility or the logical possibility that God could create any world that He desired. It was shown that it is not logically possible for God to create a world with significantly free beings and no natural evil since human beings would go wrong in regard to at least one action.

Natural evil can be defined as "evil that *cannot* be attributed to the free actions of human beings". Plantinga's free-will defense was found to be helpful but not intended to respond to natural evil. Although his defense is limited in answering specifically the issues of *natural* evil, other writers have helpful contributions to the topic. To begin, Augustine of Hippo emphasized that natural evil is the result of free actions of human *and* nonhuman persons.[84] John Hick returns to the foundational question of the purpose of the world in discussing the existence of natural evil. He encourages people to ask what God's purpose is for the world, and he answers this question by sharing that the primary purpose of the world is soul-building.[85] In his view, natural evil should not be discussed assuming that the primary purpose of the world is human happiness.

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[83] Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil*, 28.

[84] Augustine, *City of God, The POE, A Reader*, 57.

[85] Hick, *The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy*, p. 359.

Rather, natural evil should be discussed understanding the true purpose of the world which is soul-building, and due to this, the occurrence of natural evil in the world is justified.[86] Another similar argument is offered by George Schlesinger who affirms Hick's theodicy, putting God's greater purpose for humanity into clear view.[87] Unlike the common misunderstanding that God desired to create a hedonistic paradise for human beings, Schlesinger argues that the development of desirable characteristics is preferable to living a somewhat happier life.[88] His argument gives a rational defense of the occurrence of natural evil in the world.

The final argument shared in this discussion is the Evil Defeated Defense, which puts the problem of natural evil into a framework requiring a different perspective than the present perspective. As there are specific occurrences of evil that have not been defeated, the dilemma of the problem of evil persists presently. However, if every occurrence of evil will be defeated, then the problem of evil will no longer persist. Revelation 21 and Romans 8 both point to this impending defeat of evil and a new creation that humanity will enjoy. Every wrong will be made right, all evil will be made untrue, the old will pass away, and there will be a new creation without pain, suffering, and evil in the world. In all, it is rational to believe in the existence of God despite the existence of natural evil in the world. Furthermore, it is rational to put one's faith in God because it is through Him alone that evil will be defeated. The following representation of the Evil Defeated Defense can be reasonably upheld:

1. If all evil will be defeated, then the problem of evil will no longer persist.
2. The only evils that exist today are evils that are 'yet defeated'.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil will no longer persist.

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[86] Ibid.

[87] Schlesinger, "The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Injustice," 44-45.

[88] Ibid., 45.

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