LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
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The Shawnee and the Long Knives:
Loyalty and Land in Lord Dunmore’s War

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the completion of
Master of Arts in History

by

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March 8, 2022
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Introduction

Lord Dunmore’s War, or simply Dunmore’s War, is typically known as the last Indian War of the colonial period. In isolation, the events of this conflict appear to be unimportant in the grand scheme of American history, yet they had far reaching impact. The tribes of the Ohio River Valley saw these events as a threat to their future. The Lenape had already lost their ancestral lands, being pushed westward by the force of European settlers. The Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee wished to prevent such an occurrence. The families along the Virginia frontier looked to their future as well, having moved to the area in search of a better life. Another group of Virginians, the eastern elites, looked to the same lands as potential sources of profit. This thesis will show the negative impact of these factors on the loyalty of Virginians and American Indians of the Ohio River Valley towards Great Britain.

In 1720, an ocean apart, two boys were born who would later face each other in battle during Lord Dunmore’s War. Andrew Lewis was born in Ireland of Huguenot and Scottish ancestry. His family made their way to America and settled in Staunton, Virginia when Andrew was about twelve years old. He was one of four boys and quickly acclimated to the frontier. He accompanied his father in 1751 as they explored what would be called the Greenbrier River, so named by his father when he “entangled himself in a bunch of green briers on the river.” During the French and Indian War, Andrew sustained multiple injuries and was imprisoned for a time by

1 During the colonial period, the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) who had moved into the Ohio area were often called the “Mingo.” This appears to have been a derogatory term, so they are called the Ohio Haudenosaunee in this thesis. Likewise, sources often refer to the “Delaware” tribe, but here they are called the Lenape. Though the term “frontier” is also problematic, it has been retained for this thesis because it is so widely understood and there is not an ideal replacement for it.

2 The exact date of Cornstalk’s birth is unknown, but historians have estimated the year as 1720.

3 John Stuart, Memoir of Indian Wars and Other Occurrences (Richmond, VA: The Society, 1833; Sabin Americana: History of the Americas, 1500-1926), 39. That area is now a part of West Virginia.
the French. Afterwards he became county-lieutenant for Augusta County and a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses. He was over six feet tall and of stern countenance. It was said that in 1768 the governor of New York commented, “The earth seemed to tremble under him as he walked along.”

Andrew Lewis’s reserved demeanor garnered him respect, though not the widespread love given to his younger brother and fellow soldier, Charles.

In North America, the other boy was named Colesquou of the Mekoche (Maquachake) division of Shawnee. He would be known to the English as Cornstalk. His Mekoche kin were the peacemakers of the Shawnee people, and Cornstalk became a military leader among them. He fought against the English in the French and Indian War, and later led a raid on the Muddy Creek settlement in Greenbrier during Pontiac’s War. When Colonel Henry Bouquet required hostages as part of the peace treaty that ended that war, Cornstalk was one of them. He understood the value of both peace and war, and has been described as “a large man, of commanding appearance, oratorical ability, and intellectual grasp.”

Events leading up to the Battle of Point Pleasant, often referred to as the only battle of the war, seem a natural enough cause for conflict. However, the men involved later felt, and some stated, that it was brought about by the machinations of a duplicitous royal governor. To these men, both European and American Indian, Lord Dunmore’s War came to be intrinsically connected to the American Revolution and their futures. However, even if the Battle of Point

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4 Stuart, *Indian Wars*, 54.


Pleasant had been the only battle, it is not sufficient to simply look to this altercation for explanation of historical significance. The difficulties that led to this conflict had been festering since, at the very least, the conclusion of the French and Indian War. Questions of boundary lines provided the foundation for it. Thus, critical assessments must first be made of the treaties that had repeatedly redrawn the boundary through this land, and those people who had consented to them. Some wars may be inevitable, and eventually the matter of land needed to be settled – but this war, at this time, was not.7

There are many lingering questions about Dunmore’s War. Why did John Connolly, Dunmore’s representative at what is now Pittsburgh, circulate a letter claiming an Indian War was imminent when others on the frontier saw no such inevitability? Why is Point Pleasant typically listed as the only battle when, also at Dunmore’s order, there was an expedition against the Shawnee town of Wakatomika? What was Dunmore’s motivation when he promised his support to the Lenape in exchange for Captain White Eyes’s assistance? Why are Connolly’s Virginians and Lewis’s Virginians looked at as the same? Most importantly, how did these events shape the actions and loyalties of these men in its aftermath?

The frontier militia at Point Pleasant went from one theater of war to another, and it was Andrew Lewis who helped drive Dunmore from Virginia during the American Revolution. After Point Pleasant, the division under Lord Dunmore drafted the Fort Gower Resolves before even reaching home. Then Andrew Lewis’s division, upon reaching their homes in Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle counties, proceeded to draft fiery declarations against Great Britain.

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7 Claims of the war’s inevitability have been made by historians in the past. One example is Jacob Richards Dodge, Red Men of the Ohio Valley (Springfield, OH: Ruralist Publishing Company, 1860), 139. However, this was disputed even in 1774. While Connolly was declaring the Shawnee at the brink of war, the Indian agents John Stuart and Guy Johnson “were sure that the crisis could be managed without war.” John W. Shy, “Dunmore, the Upper Ohio Valley, and the American Revolution,” in Thomas H. Smith, ed., Ohio in the American Revolution: A Conference to Commemorate the 200th Anniversary of the Ft. Gower Resolves (Columbus, OH: Ohio Historical Society, 1976), 15.
Cornstalk put his life on the line attempting to maintain peace between the Shawnee and American colonists. In isolation, these things are merely interesting. In conjunction, they are significant.

It is difficult to trace the evolving perspectives of historians on Lord Dunmore’s War. Most have focused solely on the Battle of Point Pleasant, which was not the first or last military action that took place. Such myopic views misconstrue events. Often, oversimplified portrayals bear no resemblance to what actually occurred, and additional research has been little and far between. Overall, there has been a gradual progression of opinion.

One of the first accounts of Lord Dunmore’s War was in Burk’s *The History of Virginia: From its First Settlement to the Present Day* (1805), which described John Connolly as “a fit instrument for executing plans of division and blood,” taking a view that the Indian War was planned by Dunmore.\(^8\) This narrative, along with others from the period, was imbued with the nationalist undertones that were so common after achieving American Independence. Many historians from this period were particularly interested in Dunmore’s potential treachery, likely due to his status as representative of the crown. This includes Samuel Kercheval’s *History of the Valley of Virginia* (1833) and Charles Campbell’s *Introduction to the History of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Virginia* (1847).

Brantz Mayer elaborated further on these theories in *Tah-gah-jute; Or, Logan and Cresap* (1851), where he suggested that Dunmore had acted against the Shawnee in order to cause “enmity and disaffection betwixt Virginians and Pennsylvanians” who disagreed on the border of their colonies, thereby weakening colonial resolve to work together against the crown.\(^9\)

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Meanwhile, Alexander Scott Withers’s *Chronicles of Border Warfare* (1831) stands out among the nineteenth century histories. Withers listed the various theories that had been put forward by his contemporaries, but was the first to blame increased white settlement rather than American Indian aggression. Importantly, he argued against the popular idea that it was initiated by the Captina and Yellow Creek murders which many have attributed it to.

*The History of the United States of America* (1849) by Richard Hildreth explained the war through a comparison of Virginia and Pennsylvania. When word arrived of hostilities with the American Indians, the former promoted war while the latter sought a peaceful resolution. He says, “Conolly and others in the Virginia interest were bent on war, in which they were fully supported by Governor Dunmore.”¹⁰ Not long after, George Bancroft wrote in his *History of the United States* (1858) that Dunmore “called out the militia” with the support of other Virginians “to restrain the backwoodsmen and end the miseries which distracted the frontier, and to look after his own interests and his agents.”¹¹ The word “distracted” seems to be key in the minds of historians from this period. In Theodore Roosevelt’s *The Winning of the West* (1889), he suggested that Lord Dunmore believed he could distract the Virginians from their problems with the crown if he could, as royal governor, protect them along the frontier.

In the shadow of the Imperial school, West Virginian historian Virgil A. Lewis wrote about Lord Dunmore’s War in multiple works. In *History of West Virginia* (1889), he unequivocally stated that the British government’s emissaries were urging the Ohio Indians to attack the frontier, thus causing the conflict. He addresses this again in *History of the Battle of*

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*Point Pleasant* (1909), where Lewis stated that the immediate causes of the war “were the hostilities on the border in the early spring of the year 1774,” without any mention of British emissaries contributing to the problem.\(^\text{12}\) The cause of his shift in thinking is not immediately clear, though it may be a reaction to the work of another West Virginian historian from the same year. Livia Nye Simpson-Poffenbarger’s *The Battle of Point Pleasant* (1909) specifies that Dunmore had planned the attack to discourage colonists from “further agitation” on account of the strained relationship between colonies and crown.\(^\text{13}\) Since she sees these events as being connected to the impending revolution, she considers the Battle of Point Pleasant to be the actual first battle of the American Revolution. This battle predates the Battles of Lexington and Concord by six months. While some other historians have made a similar connection between Dunmore’s War and the political climate in the colonies, it is Simpson-Poffenbarger who goes the farthest with this theory, and she may be part of the reason Lewis pulled back on the idea in his own narrative.

Following the work of Lewis and Simpson-Poffenbarger, who were local historians, interest in Lord Dunmore’s War seemed to decline for many years. One of the only references to this war from broader histories is from a volume of *The American Nation: A History* (1905). Despite covering the war in only a paragraph and leaving out any explanation of what caused it, George Elliott Howard labels the Battle of Point Pleasant as being “of the greatest national importance,” echoing some earlier historians’s claims that if not for the Point Pleasant victory

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\(^{13}\) Simpson-Poffenbarger, *Point Pleasant*, 3.
“the treaty of 1783 might have fixed the western boundary of the United States at the Alleghanies.”\textsuperscript{14}

There are many examples of works where this conflict could have been listed, but was not. Frederick Jackson Turner, famous for his “Frontier Thesis,” completely ignored Dunmore’s War in his \textit{The Frontier in American History} (1921). Years later, interest began to slowly increase again. Randolph Downes wrote an article titled “Dunmore’s War: An Interpretation” (1934), as well as a later book, \textit{Council Fires on the Upper Ohio} (1968), with Alex Ross. In both he maintained that the Shawnee were driven to war by the aggressive behavior of the frontiersmen. In fact, this seems to be around the time that opinions shifted away from Virginians as victims of Dunmore’s machinations and towards Lord Dunmore’s War being a simple Indian War brought about by greedy Virginians looking to steal Shawnee land. However, this is not universal. Jack M. Sosin, in \textit{Whitehall and the Wilderness} (1966), refers to Dunmore’s War as “the coup Dunmore and his agent Connolly had carried out.”\textsuperscript{15} Further research seems to have confirmed this opinion as Sosin uses similar language in a later work, \textit{The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783} (1967).

By the end of the twentieth century, the shift in thought was complete. Although historians at this time lacked interest in Dunmore’s War, it is still addressed in the context of other historical topics, and there is a marked desire to recognize the struggles of the Shawnee and other Ohio Valley tribes. Michael N. McConnell, in \textit{A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples, 1724-1774} (1992), stated this war might more accurately be called the


\textsuperscript{15} Jack M. Sosin, \textit{Whitehall and the Wilderness} (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 229.
“Connolly-Dunmore War” given their determination to orchestrate the conflict.\textsuperscript{16} McConnell is one example of historians who continue to indicate fault on the part of Lord Dunmore despite their shifting focus to the plight of American Indians.

In the context of the American Indian struggle for survival in the face of European colonization, Lord Dunmore’s War is repeatedly listed as one of the many instances of white colonizers preying on the native people. Gregory Evans Dowd’s \textit{A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815} (1993), suggests that the war was caused by the slaughter of Logan’s “wife and children.”\textsuperscript{17} However, this negates the decades of struggle that predated this incident. Colin G. Calloway, in \textit{The American Revolution in Indian Country} (1995), also cited the murder of Logan’s relations as a key cause of the war. In \textit{Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, & the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia} (1999), Woody Holton asserted that Dunmore’s War was a conflict devised by the Virginians to justify an assault on the Shawnee to obtain Kentucky.

In recent decades, Lord Dunmore’s War continues to be discussed primarily in the context of other concerns. In \textit{The Appalachian Frontier: America’s First Surge Westward} (2003), John Caruso discussed many of the frontier conflicts that prompted the war, but of the war itself stressed, “Most historians have greatly exaggerated the importance of the single-battle conflict known as Lord Dunmore’s War.”\textsuperscript{18} Michael J. Mullin, writing on Lord Dunmore’s War in \textit{American Indian History} (2003), saw things differently. He said, “For both the American


\textsuperscript{17} Gregory Evans Dowd, \textit{A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815} (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 45. Accounts of the Yellow Creek Massacre usually list Logan’s losses as a sister, brother, and potentially his mother.

\textsuperscript{18} John Anthony Caruso, \textit{The Appalachian Frontier: America’s First Surge Westward} (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2003), 138.
Indians and the colonists, the war carried important ramifications,” pointing to the majority of the Shawnee having to move further southwest in its aftermath. In *Dominion of War* (2005), Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton believed that Connolly and Dunmore worked together to cause the Indian War. Their assessment is that, by privately starting and openly squashing an American Indian uprising, Dunmore believed he could increase British imperial influence and control in Virginia.

In “Anarchy and Enterprise on the Imperial Frontier: Washington, Dunmore, Logan, and Land in the Eighteenth-Century Ohio Valley” (2006), Barbara Rasmussen addressed the land speculation issue and asserted Lord Dunmore’s War occurred because “Cresap answered to John Connolly, who answered to Dunmore, who increasingly answered to no one.” This seems to be a frequent theme in the accounts of historians from the twenty-first century. Recent accounts have been more attentive to the perspective of the Shawnee while still acknowledging, as did Patrick Griffin in *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier* (2007), that “Dunmore used the chaos and violence of the region to his own advantage.” Then, in *Frontier Country: The Politics of War in Early Pennsylvania* (2016), Patrick Spero put forward a far more unique theory. Dunmore and Connolly again take the roles of instigators, but for a different purpose. Spero theorized that it was intended merely as justification for stronger Virginia militia presence around Fort Pitt, now Pittsburgh, which would in turn strengthen the colony’s claim to the area being within Virginia’s borders. This may have simply been the mistaken belief of

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Pennsylvanians who thought Virginia would go to any lengths to obtain the land, but it
nevertheless introduces a new element to consider.

The most comprehensive work to date is Glenn F. Williams’s *Dunmore’s War: The Last
Conflict of America’s Colonial Era* (2018). Written from the perspective of a military historian,
Williams provided extensive detail regarding frontier disputes and the military tactics of Lord
Dunmore’s War. While Williams rightly pointed out that many historians have oversimplified
these events and their causes, there remains work to be done. He refers to an understanding of
the treaties of Fort Stanwix, Hard Labor, and Lochaber as important to understand events. This is
true, but those treaties are not where the conflict begins. To better understand Lord Dunmore’s
War in a new light, this thesis will look at the war from a social history perspective.

Chapter one will examine those treaties, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the culture
of localism that set the area west of the Blue Ridge apart from the rest of Virginia. The American
Indian tribes and the colonists along the frontier often had, at best, an uneasy peace. It ebbed and
flowed in an often predictable manner. Governor Dunmore’s decision to install Captain John
Connolly at Fort Pitt offered a significant interruption to this predictability. Finally, chapter one
will examine the two incidents most frequently cited as instigating the war: the murder of Daniel
Boone’s son and the Yellow Creek Massacre.

The behavior and motivations of two separate groups of Virginians are examined in
chapter two. The preparations of the southern division, led by Colonel Andrew Lewis, were
fraught with supply difficulties and a population often unhappy to leave their homes and
harvests. Conversely, the men of McDonald’s Expedition made an early and direct assault on
Shawnee towns. These men would later become part of Dunmore’s northern division. Their
attack on the town of Wakatomika is the actual first battle of the war.
Chapter three is the story of the Battle of Point Pleasant and Camp Charlotte agreement. Though the southern division under Andrew Lewis were the only Virginians present at Point Pleasant, Dunmore would also dispatch his own men under Captain William Crawford to subjugate the Ohio Haudenosaunee. Finally, chapter four explores the Fort Gower Resolves and the instructions provided by Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle counties for their representatives to the Virginia Convention. These documents demonstrate the concerns of the men who had been involved in Lord Dunmore’s War and how these concerns fit with their loyalty to King George III. With the eruption of the American Revolution in Massachusetts, more and more Virginians believed their royal governor had been setting the Virginians up for failure at Point Pleasant.
Chapter 1: “Beyond the Boundary of Virginia”

In many respects, the Virginia frontier was a world of its own. In 1731 James Logan, the provincial secretary of Pennsylvania, had written to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, often called the Board of Trade. He requested that they “encourage the Government of Virginia to extend their settlements beyond the mountains” for the purpose of protecting British claims in America.\(^1\) Such was the prevailing attitude for a time. Virginia settlements spread down the Shenandoah Valley and then to the western waters along the New River.\(^2\) Virginia’s frontier settlements were legitimized, at least in their eyes, by the Treaty of Lancaster in 1744 where the Haudenosaunee ceded “all the Land in the said Colony of Virginia.”\(^3\) While it would not be the first or the last time the Haudenosaunee, also called the Six Nations, would cede land that did not belong to them, it was precedent for the British government to recognize their supposed authority to do so. When these settlers built homes as far as Virginia’s western waters, they did so with the understanding that their actions were acceptable, never expecting they would later be told to give up decades of work and move east. As long as there was a French threat to the west, the government had motivation to use settlers as a human barrier against attack.

When the French and Indian War arrived, some settlers fled east while others steadfastly remained. Those who stayed formed a fort chain along the frontier to protect against American Indian attacks. By this time there was already a notable culture of localism which frustrated

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\(^2\) The area is called “western waters” because the waters flow west towards the Mississippi River rather than east to the Atlantic Ocean. The term expresses how far west the area is, and became an important distinction once the Royal Proclamation of 1763 took effect.

\(^3\) “The Treaty of Lancaster, 1744,” *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 13, no. 2 (1905): 42.
much of the eastern elite. The frontiersmen wished to do things their own way, in their own time, and their individual families were their priorities. There was a downside to their tenacity. The area became so dangerous during the war that deputy sheriffs refused to even travel there to execute warrants. The trauma of warfare and fear of American Indian attacks created a complex culture. They were influenced by their European backgrounds as well as American Indian cultures they had been exposed to. Many on the frontier had spent time as the captive of a tribe, only to retain parts of that tribe’s culture and knowledge after their return from captivity.

The tribes of the Ohio River Valley came to call Virginians the “Long Knife” or “Big Knife.” Likewise, American Indians were known to attack and kill people they called “Virgini ans,” which had become the catch-all term for land-hungry whites entering the country that ‘belonged’ to them.” Just as the term was a catch-all in the past, it remains one in modern historical interpretations. However, Virginia was a big colony. The settlers of the Shenandoah Valley and further southwest to the New River were quite separate from the settlers who would later settle near Fort Pitt, though prejudice against American Indians was prevalent across the frontier. It is important to distinguish between these groups when discussing their actions.

The possibility of new opportunities was the appeal of the New World for Europeans, and colonists were accustomed to the idea that they could obtain more and more land as part of these

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6 For the background on this term, see Alexander Scott Withers, Chronicles of Border Warfare (Cincinnati, OH: Stewart & Kidd Company, 1920), 79 n. 1.

7 Griffin, American Leviathan, 69.
opportunities. When the British government failed to continue supporting this expansion, it did so for multiple reasons. First, the government wished to avoid further Indian Wars. It was a lofty goal, but the Board of Trade believed that “due obedience” to their edicts would have resulted in peace.\textsuperscript{8} Second, they wished to use the western land as a means of generating revenue. Providing grants to settlers undermined their bottom line, and they had acquired considerable debt in the French and Indian War.

Not only did this new land require a plan for distribution, but also required the formation of new colonial governments to control it. The plan was written by the Board of Trade, approved by the king, and official as of October 7, 1763. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 created a boundary line protecting “any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantick Ocean from the West and North-West, or upon any Lands whatever, which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.”\textsuperscript{9} This is the description by which the Proclamation Line was drawn. Royal governors were prohibited from granting lands beyond that line, and any colonist who had settled beyond it was to move back east. After decades of using frontier settlers for protection, the government’s priorities had changed. The effect this would have on frontier loyalty to the crown was something the government failed to foresee.

However, the Board of Trade’s intention was far more complex than it seems at first glance. In a report on Indian affairs in 1768, they referred to this potential line as “mere provisional arrangements” to placate the American Indians until they chose to sell, or otherwise


cede, further territory. Plans had been made under the leadership of William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, who then retired from the Board of Trade on September 2, 1763. His successor was left to create a final document based on the deliberations which had already occurred. That document was finalized just a month later. Though extensive consideration had gone into its planning, the final form condensed a wealth of imperial policy into a brief proclamation lacking the nuance of those deliberations.

A report from the Board of Trade to the king in 1763 discussed their deliberations in far more detail than the final proclamation, as well as specifying one very important exception they envisioned. They wrote, “On the other hand some settlements have actually been made under the Government of Virginia; beyond the great mountains in the forks of the Ohio, between the main branch of that river and the great Conoway river, which do not yet interfere with any claims of the Indians and which it would be equally unjust and impolitic to break up and destroy.” If this accurately expresses the true intention of the proclamation line, that may explain why there was not more done to enforce it along the Virginia frontier. Unfortunately, it is not clear what they intended to excuse by this logic. Instead, it became a gray area. Virginians found themselves waiting for years to see if land grants promised to French and Indian War veterans by this very same proclamation would be fulfilled.


11 Humphreys, “Lord Shelburne,” 260. The full text of the report is included as an appendix at the end of Humphreys’s article, and footnotes state that it contains the handwriting of Lord Shelburne as well as that of John Pownall, the secretary of the Board of Trade.

12 The British government eventually clarified that the grants promised in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 only applied to British regulars. However, the original wording was not clear and many, including the militia, had believed anyone who fought would be eligible. See James Corbett David, Dunmore’s New World (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 74.
It is notable that the line did not recognize the western land as belonging to the American Indian tribes, nor did it recognize the tribes’s right to self-government. Instead, it was land set aside for their use for so long as the king permitted it. The king considered these tribes his subjects, even if they did not see themselves as such. Accordingly, the proclamation specified the British right to establish forts and trading posts west of the line without requiring American Indian permission. Licensed traders were also permitted to cross, with the requirement that they not trade in alcohol or weapons. This is a requirement that was frequently ignored.

There was also a social cost to this boundary line. In spite of the cost in lives, the earlier wars between American Indian tribes and English colonies had formed new relationships which were then torn apart. Former captives who had been adopted into tribes found themselves in between societies. This was true whether it meant giving up relationships with adopted families or attempting to readjust to cultural norms they no longer found satisfactory. There are documented examples of this difficulty being felt by both sides, including an Ohio Haudenosaunee man risking death to see his Virginian wife safely to her relatives after Bouquet’s expedition forced the tribe to return all captives. This was among the terms of many treaties, and captives did not have the option of staying with those they had grown to appreciate. Some captives would return to find their original family gone, resulting in having lost two families and arguably little benefit for having been returned.  

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13 Elizabeth Hornor, “Intimate Enemies: Captivity and Colonial Fear of Indians in the Mid-Eighteenth Century Wars,” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 82, no. 2 (2015): 179-182. The issue of these adopted white captives is just one potential outcome of the complex experiences of captives. Some others died in captivity, took an earlier opportunity to escape, or were redeemed by other means without having integrated into American Indian society. All of these experiences are important, though that of adopted whites is the focus in this context. Experiences also varied based on location and which tribe had taken the captive. To read more about the varied experiences of captives in the Allegheny, see Ian K. Steele’s *Setting All the Captives Free: Capture, Adjustment, and Recollection in Allegheny Country* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013).
There were fewer cases where the adopted captives were not returned, and the British government eventually gave up trying to enforce the terms on every last one. The complexity of their situations is unlikely to have been understood by the Board of Trade, and indeed it could be suggested that the strict separation of cultures demanded by the Proclamation Line resulted in solidifying stereotypes of American Indians as “other” and ruining any chance the cultures may have had to learn to live with each other in peace. This othering made it only too easy to continue justifying land theft. After all, many of the types of white people who would ignore the boundary would also ignore the other rules of the proclamation. The policies of the crown left those settlers increasingly feeling like it was up to them to carve out the future they desired.

It had not been a question of if further treaties would seek to adjust the boundary line, but when. Officially, the subsequent Treaty of Fort Stanwix was orchestrated by Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of the Northern Indian Department. He had the help of others like George Croghan, Pennsylvanian trader and Indian agent. Negotiations occurred at Fort Stanwix in 1768. Part of the land to be discussed was that area of Virginia which Royal Proclamation deliberations had implied was already acceptable for settlement, but the final document had failed to include. This was that land south of the Ohio River and east of the Kanawha River, land that is now the state of West Virginia. Of the twenty-seven chiefs listed in official documents as in attendance at Fort Stanwix, twenty-four were Haudenosaunee. The other affected tribes were represented only by Benevissica of the Shawnee and Killbuck and Turtleheart of the Lenape.14

The king’s instructions had permitted Johnson to negotiate a new boundary line, but the resulting deed from the Fort Stanwix negotiations extended this farther than planned. It was signed on November 5, 1768, but none of the Shawnee or Lenape chiefs present are listed as

having signed.\textsuperscript{15} This is typically understood to be both because they did not agree to the cession, as well as their signatures being unnecessary under the Covenant Chain arrangement. The British government recognized Haudenosaunee claims of having authority over the other tribes and the ability to speak for them. Though Johnson had written to the government with explanation of this changed boundary, stating that the Haudenosaunee insisted they had a right to the land farther south and were offended by the idea it was not in their power to cede it, the king objected. In the Earl of Hillsborough’s response to Sir William Johnson from January 4, 1769, he expressed the king’s wishes. Johnson was to re-approach “the Six Nations as to make them understand that His Majesty declines to accept of the large additional cession they wish to make to Him out of His paternal tenderness and affection to them and their posterity and not from any doubt he entertains of their right to the lands.”\textsuperscript{16}

On April 25, 1769, the Board of Trade made a report to the king based on the Fort Stanwix and Hard Labor treaties that had recently concluded. This report suggested the king was fully supportive of moving the boundary farther west for the purpose of “allow[ing] Settlement to be made by your Subjects.”\textsuperscript{17} However, they found that Captain John Stuart, Superintendent of Indian affairs for the Southern Department, was the only one faithful to the instructions he had received from the crown in his execution of the Treaty of Hard Labor. The line he negotiated went, as desired, to Chiswell’s lead mines in Virginia and up the New River to the Kanawha River. If both superintendents had stuck to their instructions, this is where the two treaty boundaries would have merged. In regard to Johnson’s Treaty of Fort Stanwix, they wrote:

\textsuperscript{15} O’Callaghan, \textit{New York}, 137. Deed determining the Boundary Line between the Whites and Indians, deed, November 5, 1768.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 145. Earl of Hillsborough to Sir William Johnson, January 4, 1769.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 158. Lords of Trade to the King, report, April 25, 1769.
Had the like attention to the real object of Negotiation been shewn by your Majesty’s Superintendent for the Northern District and the same discretion used by him in treating upon it with the Northern Indians, this difficult and embarrassing business would have been, we humbly conceive, brought to a happy Issue, the Jealousies and suspicions of the Indians, which have produced constant enmity and hostility, would have been removed.¹⁸

The difficulty caused by these conflicting treaties was specific to the boundary of Virginia, and the Board’s resulting recommendation was a renegotiation with the Cherokee in pursuit of a line that would pick up where the North Carolina line had been designated, then west to where said line met the Holston River, and from there in a straight line to the junction of the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers. This was meant to be a compromise that might keep all tribes happy, but came with the requirement that the colony of Virginia pay for the additional land purchase since it was Virginia that would benefit from it. This requirement was met, though the royal government continued to drag out the granting of further lands even after the colony had accepted the expense. As a further confirmation of the British government’s intention to extend Virginia’s settlements westward, another letter from the Earl of Hillsborough specified, “It is not however His Majesty’s Intention that the Settlements of His Subjects should be carried beyond the Boundary of Virginia, as proposed to be fixed near the Kanawa River.”¹⁹

There was a legitimate reason for the British government, or at the very least the government of Virginia, to control land cessions. Otherwise, “land jobbers” were known to obtain land deeds by convincing two or three Indians to place their mark upon a deed in exchange for alcohol, arms, or small gifts.²⁰ Unscrupulous colonists did not care that a couple

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¹⁸ O’Callaghan, New York, 162.

¹⁹ Ibid., 166. Earl of Hillsborough to Sir William Johnson, May 13, 1769. This compromise was the Treaty of Lochaber. Though Virginia paid for the additional property, it remained difficult to obtain grants for the land they had purchased. A couple years later the line would be moved westward again by the Cherokee Grant, a cession intended to clarify borders with the use of easily identifiable landmarks.

²⁰ Griffin, American Leviathan, 61.
members of a tribe could hardly surrender land on behalf of all. Regardless of who controlled the grants, the Shawnee soon made their dissatisfaction with the recent treaties known. While the Shawnee towns were north of the Ohio River, they considered the area south of the river to be their hunting grounds. They felt no loyalty towards the Haudenosaunee that would require their cooperation with the cession.

However, these treaties were only the most recent to draw a line west of this area. In the much earlier Treaty of Logg’s Town, made in 1752, the Shawnee, Lenape, and Haudenosaunee had ceded “the southern or eastern Parts of the River Ohio, called otherwise the Allagany.” The Board of Trade rejected Virginia’s claims on the basis of this treaty, saying it was “vague and void of precision.” This is a prime example of the problems with treaties between colonists and American Indians, even though it was supported by the local government. The Shawnee were present at Logg’s Town, but there is no evidence they agreed to the treaty’s terms on that occasion either. More than likely, the Haudenosaunee again consented under the guise of the Covenant Chain. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the colonists they had what they believed to be a perfectly valid claim to the land already. When Sir William Johnson was forced to explain himself to the Board of Trade regarding the Shawnee objections to the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, he referred to their “fallacious pretences” and their “never having any right of soil.”

As a response to these land claims, the Shawnee began to make peace with other tribes in an attempt to form a confederacy against the whites. After all, surely the tribes owed more loyalty to one another than they did to the European colonizers, even if they had previous

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disagreements with one another. This began in 1769. While rumors of such a confederacy were concerning to the British, they amounted to nothing. There are two interpretations of why this danger did not come to pass. One version is that the Indian agents of the British Indian Department worked diligently to avert disaster and were successful. This interpretation is championed by Jack M. Sosin’s “The British Indian Department and Dunmore’s War.” However, the version closer to the truth may be what is explained by Sami Lakomäki’s *Gathering Together: The Shawnee People*: “While the Shawnee diplomacy united likeminded militants from many communities, it bred divisions within those communities between militant and accommodationist factions.”

Throughout the 1760s, small scale skirmishes and raids along the frontier had been common place. Those who lived along the frontier had accepted this as a part of life, and word of such events was not sufficient to result in war. Histories of Lord Dunmore’s War often list the skirmishes of 1774 as the reason for the Indian War, but what made them any different from those of years previous? That is something those histories never adequately explain.

The location of the current city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on the forks of the Ohio, was previously the location of Fort Duquesne. When it was captured by the English, they renamed it Fort Pitt. It had been exceptionally strategic during the French and Indian War, but General Thomas Gage removed the troops stationed there in October 1772. The removal of British forces from an area claimed by the conflicting charters of two colonies, Virginia and Pennsylvania, created a power vacuum just waiting for someone to take charge. George Washington, a part of the eastern elite with aspirations of wealth through land speculation, had sought to direct Lord Dunmore’s attention towards the possibilities of this area. As typical of the period, the new royal

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governor had his own hopes of acquiring wealth while holding a position in the colonies, and he took it upon himself to tour the area. This had been his intention as royal governor of New York as well, and he had been furious when his promotion to Virginia interrupted those plans.25

There were colonists living in the area around the fort, potentially ten thousand in number.26 This meant settlement extremely close to the Ohio River and the tribes on the other side. This makes a stark contrast to the frontier further south, where Virginians and American Indians were separated by large expanses of hunting ground. Pennsylvania had done little to reinforce their claims, while Virginia had acted to defend the area with royal permission at the beginning of the French and Indian War. When Dunmore toured the area, these factors must have stood out to him. Subsequently, he declared the area part of Augusta County, Virginia, and he instituted John Connolly, a Pennsylvanian, as his agent at the fort on behalf of Virginia.

Connolly renamed the place Fort Dunmore, though not everyone along the frontier bothered going by this new moniker.27 The actions of Connolly exacerbated tensions between Virginia and Pennsylvania, and he is likely the cause of heightened aggression towards the American Indians as well. The local militia, under his command and likely influenced by him, began to behave with undisguised aggression towards their American Indian neighbors. During drills, these militia men were known to aim their rifles across the river at friendly American Indians.

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26 David, *Dunmore’s New World*, 65.

Indians. Some would fire, though none of the rounds caused physical injury. The psychological toll on the nearby American Indian settlements would have been another matter.²⁸

In the course of the various frontier skirmishes blamed for the war, the story of Daniel Boone’s son is one of the most common. The families of Daniel Boone and Captain William Russell made an attempt to settle Kentucky in 1773. On the journey their sons, James Boone and Henry Russell, were traveling in a separate group and were attacked by a party including at least one American Indian of their acquaintance. That was Big Jim, who Daniel Boone believed to be Shawnee. Big Jim was frequently seen in the Watauga area, which was Cherokee territory.²⁹ A letter from January 1774 referred to questions of “what Indians they were” and “whether the Massacre is supposed to be owing to the Indians Jelousy of our settling near them, or to a private Quarrel.”³⁰ Settlers were concerned regarding whether this event might be connected to the Shawnee attempts at a confederacy, but even among the settlers of southwestern Virginia it was not a matter deemed an imminent threat. In fact, Captain William Russell explicitly urged scouts to “avoide acting toward [the Cherokee] in a Hostile manner.”³¹

This was not the only event which might have caused concern with the Cherokee. There was also the murder of an American Indian known as Cherokee Billy in June 1774 at the Watauga settlement in present day Tennessee. The murderer was Isaac Crabtree, a man who had narrowly escaped the attack that killed James Boone and Henry Russell. He may have acted from

²⁸ Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 147.


³¹ Ibid., 6. Instructions by Capt. William Russell to scouts. The scouts were being sent to determine where the boundary was between the Cherokee and settlers.
the trauma of that experience. A connection between Watauga and Virginia is questionable. The settlement was west of North Carolina and many of its residents were likewise North Carolinian. However, Virginians knew that “Virginian” was a catch-all term and anyone along the frontier might suffer reprisals for Cherokee Billy’s death. Major Arthur Campbell, justice of the peace for Virginia’s Fincastle County, wrote to Colonel William Preston of this concern. In his letter, he specified that “a Letter from Col. Lewis […] would be of service at this time.”\(^{32}\) Indeed, Andrew Lewis was a logical person to ask for help. Despite that solemn disposition, he was known to the Cherokee and had acted to get justice on their behalf after a group of Cherokee travellers had been murdered by the Augusta Boys in 1765.\(^{33}\)

Though their concerns were legitimate, the matter was settled without further conflict. On July 9, Major Arthur Campbell wrote again to report that the principle chiefs of the Cherokee had met and denied having any part in the murder of James Boone and Henry Russell, or any culpability in similar events of concern. They reported, though, that “the Raven with four others had gone to the Shawanese early in the Spring, without the approbation of the Nation; and that they expected he was killed as the Shawanese had killed one of their men lately in sight of their Town.”\(^{34}\) Word came in October that the Cherokee chiefs had apprehended two guilty in the


\(^{33}\) John Pendleton Kennedy, ed. *Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1761-1765* (Richmond, VA: The Colonial Press, 1907), xx-xxiv. Andrew Lewis was not able to effectively penalize the murders, but he did make substantial efforts based on the fact the Augusta Boys offered a £1000 bounty for his arrest as retribution. By 1774 Andrew Lewis had moved and was county-lieutenant of Botetourt County (rather than Augusta County).

The relationship between the Cherokee and white settlers was peaceful, at least for the moment, and did not contribute to Dunmore’s War.

There had been recent conflicts along the Ohio River in the spring of 1774, just as there had been for years on the frontier. Then an event occurred which shocked even Virginians with its brutality. On April 30, 1774, a group of Ohio Haudenosaunee from a town by the junction of Yellow Creek and the Ohio River went across the river to Joshua Baker’s. Baker sold alcohol to some of the group, as apparently he had done many times before, thoroughly violating the Royal Proclamation of 1763’s prohibition on alcohol sales. Once several were drunk, a group of whites led by Daniel Greathouse massacred them. Some more Ohio Haudenosaunee came across the river to check on the first group, and they were killed as well. The twelve slain Ohio Haudenosaunee included the brother and sister of Captain John Logan. The only survivor was a baby, the child of Logan’s sister and John Gibson, a Pennsylvanian trader. One of the men involved later wrote of the massacre at Joshua Baker’s, also called the Yellow Creek Massacre, that “I was of the first and last of the active Officers who bore the Weight of that War.”

He clearly believed, as have many, that the actions of Daniel Greathouse and his party were the spark that lit the flame of Dunmore’s War. This is the truth, but not the whole truth. By this point, the white frontiersmen were acting based Connolly’s claims of American Indian hostilities.

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36 General George Rogers Clark to Dr. Samuel Brown, June 17, 1798, in Brantz Mayer, Tah-gah-jute, 149.

37 Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 10-17; Withers, Border Warfare, 148-149.
Captain John Logan, often called Chief Logan, was the son of a French father (who was adopted into the Oneida tribe as a child) and a Cayuga mother. Logan had always been friendly with white people and had stayed neutral during the French and Indian War. One account says that, after hearing a white mother lament her inability to buy shoes for her young daughter, Logan made the young girl a pair of moccasins. After years of such friendly and kind interactions with the white people, he felt understandably betrayed and infuriated by the loss of his family. He led a mourning war against the white settlers to exact revenge. Mistakenly believing the leader of the Yellow Creek Massacre to be Michael Cresap rather than Daniel Greathouse, Logan said in a letter from July 21, 1774 that “white People killed my kin at Coneestoga a great while ago, & I though[t nothing of that.] But you killed my kin again on Yellow Creek, and took m[yy cousin prisoner] then I thought I must kill too; and I have been three time[s to war since but] the Indians is not Angry only myself.”

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38 Logan was named after James Logan, secretary of Pennsylvania, who his father had respected. His other name was Tachnechdorus. Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., *Documentary History*, 305-306; Brantz Mayer, *Tah-gah-jute*, 48-56. Though numerous historical sources refer to Logan as a chief, this has been challenged. Richard White states that, “Kayashuta and White Mingo were the Mingo chiefs. Logan was merely a war leader, the Indian equivalent of Cresap.” See Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 358. However, the structure of American Indian tribes was not equivalent to the structure of white society. The Ohio Haudenosaunee social structure was divided into sachems, warriors, and women. Principal chiefs would be sachems, and they were the leaders in times of peace. War leaders were referred to as “Captain,” and the principle captain was what could be called a “war chief.” This principle captain would lead the tribe in time of war. To compare Logan to Cresap implies that Logan held a subservient position. White refers to Captain George White Eyes of the Lenape as a chief, though he was actually a war leader as well. As Logan referred to himself as “Captain,” that is what is used here. Many tribes had a similar structure, but for more information on the social structure of the Haudenosaunee, see Lewis H. Morgan and Elizabeth Tooker, “The Structure of the Iroquois League: Lewis H. Morgan’s Research and Observations,” *Ethnohistory* 30, 3 (Summer 1983): 141-154; Donald S. Lutz, “The Iroquois Confederation Constitution: An Analysis,” *Publius* 28, 2 (Spring 1998): 99-127.

39 Logan’s mourning war was personal, and he was not acting on behalf of all Haudenosaunee. Mourning wars were a method of warfare which sought to exact revenge or recompense equal to the loss which had been suffered, without necessarily causing a larger scale war. See Anderson and Cayton, *Dominion of War*, 26.

40 Maj. Arthur Campbell to Col. William Preston, October 12, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Documentary History*, 246-247. Logan’s letter was left for the colonists and included in the letter from Campbell to Preston.
There are many sources who claim Logan was at the Battle of Point Pleasant and actively involved in Lord Dunmore’s War, but this is unlikely. Logan engaged in his mourning war, then he went home. This is part of why Logan refused when Dunmore later invited him to join the peace talks at Camp Charlotte. His quarrel had been a private one, and he had dealt with it in accordance to American Indian custom. Though Logan dealt with his grief in his own way, these events enraged fellow Ohio Haudenosaunee warriors, contributing to their willingness to join the Shawnee at Point Pleasant. Even so, the larger conflict that became Dunmore’s War still could have been averted. What happened next, happened at Governor Dunmore’s orders.
Chapter 2: “Friend or Foe:” The Battle of Wakatomika

Throughout 1774, John Connolly used his position as Captain of Fort Pitt to solidify his control and undermine his enemies. A June 14 report detailed his abuses of whites and American Indians alike, from the theft of gunpowder from settlers to sending militia after friendly American Indians. The only thing these American Indians had done wrong was to aid Pennsylvanian traders. Trade was an important element of this conflict, as Connolly and Dunmore repeatedly took steps to sever the trade between American Indians and Pennsylvanians, attempting to present the Virginians at Fort Pitt as the only option for trade. It was one more way they attempted to exert control over the area. Lord Dunmore granted the “exclusive privilege” of Indian trade to three men, one of whom was Captain John Connolly.1 How did Connolly’s actions propel inhabitants towards war? His efforts entailed abuse of inhabitants, spreading claims of American Indian hostility, and a determination to attack American Indian towns.

Æneas Mackay, a magistrate of Pennsylvania’s Westmoreland County, recounted the destruction of his property at Connelly’s order. He explained that they were “Robbed, Insulted and Dragooned by Connelly and his militia.”2 The Pennsylvanians feared the American Indians would retaliate against any white people, not limiting their revenge to the Virginians. Some of Connolly’s actions were in response to attacks against colonists, but closer examination of these events shows colonists were the original aggressors. Often, these initial acts of aggression are tied to the claims of danger purported by Connolly himself. Men like Captain Michael Cresap,

1 “From Pittsburg, June 14, 1774,” Pennsylvania Journal, July 13, 1774; Arthur St. Clair to Governor Penn, July 17, 1774, in William Smith and Arthur St. Clair, eds., The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair, Soldier of the Revolutionary War, President of the Continental Congress, and Governor of the North-Western Territory, with His Correspondence and Other Papers, vol. 1 (Cincinnati, OH: R. Clarke, 1882), 326.

one of the earliest colonists to attack the American Indians in 1774, directly attributed their actions to a circular letter from Captain Connolly that led them to believe they were already at war with the Shawnee.³

At first, the reaction of Pennsylvanian officials to Connolly’s claimed authority had been cautious. Pennsylvania Governor John Penn wrote, “I am much inclined to conclude that Mr. Conolly hath, on this occasion, assumed powers which Lord Dunmore never gave him.”⁴ The following months were a power struggle between representatives of Pennsylvania and Captain Connolly. When Connolly insisted war was coming, others in the area were hopeful there could be a peaceful resolution. Another Westmoreland County magistrate, Arthur St. Clair, claimed, “Eight or nine people are killed; but whether it is only designed as revenge, or is really the beginning of a war, we cannot yet judge.”⁵ Their fears of war were emphatically connected to Connolly’s actions. Appealing to Lord Dunmore in Virginia, Penn cautioned that Connolly’s behavior “may have a dangerous tendency to involve the Colonies in general in an Indian War.”⁶ Whether enjoying his power too much, or acting under explicit instructions from Dunmore, the actions of Connolly and his militia could not be interpreted as anything but provoking.

In June, over a month after the Yellow Creek Massacre, messengers arrived in Pennsylvania with intelligence. Not only had the Shawnee taken steps to keep all white traders among them safe in the violence’s wake, but “their Chiefs have been strong enough to prevail

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⁴ Governor Penn to Arthur St. Clair, January 20, 1774, in Smith and St. Clair, St. Clair Papers, 276.

⁵ Arthur St. Clair to Governor Penn, June 8, 1774, in Force, American Archives, vol. 1, 465.

⁶ Ibid., 462. Governor Penn to Lord Dunmore, June 28, 1774.
over their rash and foolish men who wanted to take revenge upon the white people for their loss.” Two small parties, friends of those who had been killed, partook in raids along the frontier. This includes a small number of Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee from Wakatomika who had joined Logan’s party. As explained by Alexander McKee, the Deputy Indian Agent, the Shawnee’s actions demonstrated their desire to maintain peace, showing more restraint “than those who ought to have been more rational.” McKee’s opinion, similar to that of many Pennsylvanians, was that there were better ways of dealing with matters than instigating war. Of all the reports of Connolly’s behavior, the one which best summarizes his determination to foment conflict was the assertion that Connolly gave orders to “fall on every Indian they meet, without respecting friend or foe.”

In his memoir, Captain John Stuart recounted how a claim of the “hostile appearance” of the Shawnee had arrived in Williamsburg while Andrew Lewis and his brother, Charles Lewis, were in town fulfilling their duties in the House of Burgesses. This included claims that the traders, presumably those who had been among the Shawnee, had been killed. Though this later proved false, the brothers met with Governor Dunmore in the interim to discuss plans for defense of the frontier, and an expedition against the Shawnee in retaliation. It was determined that Andrew Lewis would lead the southern division of men from Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle counties. Lord Dunmore would command a northern division of men from Frederick County,

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7 Indian Intelligence, Report, June 5, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 464. This account is also supported by multiple letters. See Ibid., 469. Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774; Ibid., 474. Arthur St. Clair to Governor Penn, June 22, 1774.

8 Ibid., 466. Extract of a letter from Alexander McKee, Esq., Agent for Indian Affairs at Fort Pitt, June 10, 1774.

9 Ibid., 467. Arthur St. Clair to Governor Penn, June 12, 1774.

10 Stuart, Indian Wars, 41.
Shenandoah County, and the settlements around Fort Pitt. At that time, Andrew Lewis had command of the militia in Botetourt County, and Charles Lewis that of Augusta County. Both men sent messages home, “requesting them to put themselves in a posture of defense.”\textsuperscript{11} However, the potential threat must not have been convincing, as the House of Burgesses found themselves more concerned about the Boston Port Bill than the supposed threat at their own borders.

Among historians, there is a misconception regarding Virginian support of Dunmore’s War. Walter H. Mohr contended, “Although Dunmore was at this time on bad terms with his legislature, yet so great was the interest of Virginia in land northwest of the Ohio that it loyally supported the Governor’s Indian War.”\textsuperscript{12} Much evidence counters this assertion. On June 10, Governor Dunmore dispatched a circular letter to the county-lieutenants along the frontier. He condemned the Virginia House of Burgesses for their failure to act regarding these events, an assembly he had already dissolved for taking a stand against that Boston Port Bill. He took it upon himself to order that the militia should be called up for the defense of the frontier. While Connolly and Dunmore cried war, the men further south questioned matters.

Although Virginia’s Fincastle County was clearly beyond the Proclamation Line, the inhabitants had benefitted from the later treaties. The House of Burgesses created Fincastle County in 1772, a measure approved by Governor Dunmore. Colonel William Christian, who represented Fincastle in the assembly, and Colonel William Preston, the county-lieutenant, fulfilled their legal duties publically and expressed their misgivings privately. “So desirous are some of them for an Indian War,” wrote Christian, “tho I cant help fearing that it is the most

\textsuperscript{11} Stuart, \textit{Indian Wars}, 41.

worthless and the men least to be depended on.” Preston had apparently written his fears already, for Christian continued: “You seem to signify that you don’t think yourself warrantable in ordering out the Militia unless we are actually invaded, that may be so, but I think you could safely encourage men to rise and go out without expressly ordering them to do so.”

More than a month later, after repeated communications from Lord Dunmore, or from others relaying Dunmore’s most recent wishes, Preston was instructed to raise at least 250 men for an expedition. Preston obediently penned a circular letter that seems calculated for a positive response. He used persuasive language, highlighting the potential benefits of an expedition, and promised pay for their service and potential valuable plunder. He reiterated that “it will be the only Method of Settling a lasting Peace with all the Indians Tribes Around us.” Finally, he framed it as an “Opportunity we hav So long wished for.” Whether this opportunity meant lasting peace or valuable land and plunder is unclear. The eastern elite, land speculators long frustrated by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, may have wished for such an excuse, but it is questionable whether the colonists along the frontier agreed. Historian Woody Holton cites Preston’s claims of an opportunity and reiterates that Fincastle County, Preston’s home, “was west of the Proclamation Line.” This is true, yet has nothing to do with the hostilities near Fort Pitt. Draper’s Meadows, that part of Fincastle County where Preston lived, was colonized before the French and Indian War. It is likely that this was one of the settlements the Board of Trade


14 Ibid., 44.


16 Ibid., 93.

17 Holton, Forced Founders, 34.
had referred to when stating it would be unjust to destroy certain established communities. Draper’s Meadows was not very far past that initial Proclamation Line. His home was not in Kentucky, and it was not some new encroachment that can thus be blamed for the heightened tensions.

Though it would be months before they marched, the leaders of southwest Virginia already had many concerns. In May, Captain Daniel Smith of Fincastle County had reported the “great scarcity of Powder and Lead,” so scarce that “one half the people Could not raise five Charges of Powder.”18 Even faced with the threat of fines for being so ill prepared, the colonists on this part of the western waters simply answered that they did not know where it could be found available to purchase. These concerns continued throughout the year. Colonel Christian had offered to advance the money for the powder, lead, and meat necessary to support an expedition to the Ohio, but that required finding powder for sale. Major Arthur Campbell wrote, “Want of Powder for the Forts is a general cry, indeed I dont know what [the] Men, that goes out will do for want of it.”19 Major James Robertson expressed this again by saying, “I should be Sorry to Urge but there is no Possibility of Defending our Selves or doing any good Without Amunition.”20 These concerns were raised by others as well and continued into the fall. On September 8, Colonel Andrew Lewis cautioned Colonel Preston that any additional men Preston might send would need to be sent with powder.21


20 Ibid., 105. Maj. James Robertson to Col. William Preston, August 1, 1774.

21 Ibid., 192. Col. Andrew Lewis to Col. William Preston, September 8, 1774.
The attention of these southwest Virginia leaders was not solely on an expedition against the Shawnee. It was equally on their defense. Colonel Preston issued orders in July for the construction of at least one fort, urging strict discipline among the men protecting their homes.\

While the men understood the need to protect the area, they also understood their families would need food the following year. Major James Robertson explained to Preston that he was having to work around the grain harvest, and only days later warned that there would be a war amongst themselves, “without that of the Indians,” if he did not receive fresh reinforcements.

Captain John Stuart later described Colonel Andrew Lewis’s army as having “consisted chiefly of young volunteers,” but getting volunteers was no easier than keeping their local forts manned. Throughout the summer, reports had continued to spread of further attacks along the frontier. It was not clear at the time that most, if not all, were likely connected to Logan’s retaliation. In August, Andrew Lewis wrote to Preston of his concern they might need to draft men for lack of volunteers, a prospect he seemed to disdain. It was hardly his only worry. Lewis had voiced concerns that Governor Dunmore “has taken it for granted that we would fit out an Expedition,” and worried their preparations might not be up to par with Dunmore’s expectations. Given these concerns, besides other worries, it is hard to believe that these men

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22 Instructions of William Preston to Major James Robertson, July 22, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 95-96.

23 Ibid., 95. Major James Robertson to Colonel William Preston, July 20, 1774; Ibid., 99. Major James Robertson to Colonel William Preston, July 26, 1774. Robertson’s concerns were echoed by a letter from Captain William Russel to Colonel William Preston, dated August 16, 1774.

24 Stuart, Indian Wars, 49.

25 Col. Andrew Lewis to Col. William Preston, August 14, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 149.

were enthusiastically seeking war. Lewis did later think Dunmore would be pleasantly surprised by them, but the men of the southern division did not know what they would be up against.

The plans of Dunmore and Connolly did not wait for Lewis’s army. Connolly had intended to lead approximately four hundred men to attack the Shawnee towns, but circumstances kept delaying his departure. In July, it was decided that Major Angus McDonald would lead the four hundred militia against the Upper Shawnee towns on the Muskingum River. These Virginians were recruited from around the Fort Pitt area and counties nearby, despite appearances that the tribes wished for peace. John Connolly expressed, “I am determined no longer to be a dupe to [American Indians’s] amicable professions, but, on the contrary, shall pursue every measure to offend them.” Major McDonald had marched first to Wheeling, where Fort Fincastle was built under the direction of McDonald and Captain William Crawford, a Pennsylvanian who took a commission under Dunmore. With that well under way, McDonald departed with his men, marching down the Ohio River to the mouth of Fish Creek, then west to the Upper Shawnee towns on the Muskingum River.

One of these towns, Wakatomika, was settled in 1758 after the inhabitants fled from the Wyoming Valley in what is now Pennsylvania. In the decade leading up to Dunmore’s War, this area had grown to include additional, smaller towns comprising both Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee. The choice of Wakatomika was a highly strategic one. Reports suggested it was the inhabitants of these towns who were most disposed towards war, as opposed to the lower Shawnee towns on the Scioto River. However, approximately the same time that McDonald was en route to Wheeling, the Lenape Captain White Eyes reported the Shawnee had abandoned

27 Angus McDonald had fought with the Jacobites during the Battle of Culloden, immigrating to the colonies afterwards and fighting in the French and Indian War. David, Dunmore’s New World, 84.

28 John Connolly to Arthur St. Clair, July 19, 1774, in Smith and St. Clair, St. Clair Papers, 327.
Wakatomika and moved to the lower towns, possibly to escape the recent violence. It is possible that McDonald did not receive this news, as his demands upon reaching Wakatomika suggest he believed the inhabitants to be in residence there.\(^{29}\) One historian claims that the Wakatomika Shawnee had tired of waiting for attack and returned to their homes, rather than remaining on the Scioto as White Eyes’s report had suggested.\(^{30}\) This may be true, but no published contemporary document states this, nor did McDonald report seeing any women and children during his expedition.

On August 2, McDonald’s forces encountered a group of about fifty American Indians near Wakatomika who “had made blinds on the path side to waylay the party who they expected to be coming against them.”\(^{31}\) After exchanging fire, McDonald regrouped his forces, left twenty-five men to guard the wounded, and then pursued the American Indians who had fled. The colonists followed them five miles towards the nearby Snakes’s Town. After spotting more American Indians concealed on the other side of the river bank, they called over and invited them to come talk. These were Lenape, a tribe that had remained friendly to the white people and McDonald was instructed to spare so long as they continued their friendly behavior. The accounts are not entirely clear here, as they had claimed “we observed the Indians posted on the

\(^{29}\) Consul Willshire Butterfield, ed., *Washington-Crawford Letters* (Cincinnati: OH: Robert Clarke & Co., 1877), 96 n. 1; Lakomäki, *Gathering Together*, 77, 92; White Eyes’ Speech, July 13, 1774, in Smith and St. Clair, *St. Clair Papers*, 332. McDonald’s forces were originally comprised of about seven hundred men, but part stayed at Fort Fincastle and on his expedition to the Shawnee towns he took only the four hundred previously mentioned. Alternate spellings of Wakatomika include Wagetomica and Wakatomica.

\(^{30}\) Thwaites and Kellogg, *Documentary History*, 153 n. 6.

\(^{31}\) Extracts from a letter from Major McDonald an officer in one of the Virginia Militia regiments to Major Connolly, an officer acting under the Earl of Dunmore at Pittsburgh, August 9, 1774, in William Oxenham Hewlett, ed., *The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth*, Vol. 2 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887), 359. One author estimates the number of American Indians at fifty to sixty. See Withers, *Border Warfare*, 154. The estimate is thirty in Colonel William Christian to Colonel William Preston, September 7, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Documentary History*, 186. McDonald’s report does not provide a number. It is likely these were a mix of Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee, but accounts do not specify.
bank, intending to dispute our passage.”32 This presents multiple possibilities. Perhaps some of the Lenape had defended Wakatomika with the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee, or McDonald’s forces assumed every American Indian they saw was aggressive without evidence.

The Lenape men brought an Ohio Haudenosaunee man with whom McDonald’s force had fought earlier in the day, and McDonald gave the man his demand that the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee surrender their two white hostages from frontier raids. Glenn F. Williams’s *Dunmore’s War* states that McDonald sent an Ohio Haudenosaunee with a message he would spare their homes if they complied, and that friendly Lenape went ahead of the army and warned Shawnee to evacuate their towns, protecting their women and children. Alexander Scott Withers’s *Chronicles of Border Warfare* asserts that McDonald had allowed a warrior to go to the towns to collect the chiefs who they claimed could authorize a peace, and, when he failed to return, they assumed duplicity. It was at this point McDonald advanced, he says, only burning the towns “to punish this duplicity and to render peace really desireable.”33

While McDonald undoubtably wished to secure the hostages’s safety as soon as possible, the inference that McDonald was willing to let matters go after obtaining them is never explicitly stated in any contemporary accounts. The goal of his expedition was not the recovery of two hostages; it was the subjugation of the upper Shawnee towns. Dunmore’s directions were explicit:

> I would recommend it to all officers going out on parties to make as many prisoners as they can of women and children; and should you be so fortunate as to reduce those savages to sue for peace, I would not grant it to them on any terms, till they were

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32 Extract of a letter from a gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774, in Force, *American Archives*, vol. 1, 722.

33 Williams, *Dunmore’s War*, 190; Withers, *Border Warfare*, 154.
effectually chastised for their insolence, and then on no terms, without bringing in six of their heads as hostages for their future good behaviour.\textsuperscript{34} Those towns attacked included Wakatomika and Snakes’s Town. At one point, McDonald’s men entered a town to see the scalps of their men “hung up like Colours but the Town evacuated.”\textsuperscript{35} They burned all the homes, seventy acres of cornfields, and three hundred to four hundred bushels of preserved corn. Governor Dunmore reported this to Lord Dartmouth by saying that McDonald’s men “destroyed their Town and totally erased their plantations.”\textsuperscript{36} Afterwards, ironically low in food themselves, and seeing no further American Indians, McDonald’s men marched back to Wheeling.\textsuperscript{37} 

What is clear about these events is that a group of American Indians, presumably Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee, intentionally lay in wait to ambush the approaching army. Whether to buy time for the people to evacuate again, as some historians imply, or merely to make a stand rather than let the enemy burn their homes without challenge, these were not men who unexpectedly found themselves in a battle. The Battle of Wakatomika marks the largest known group of American Indians to challenge the colonists by this point during the hostilities of 1774.\textsuperscript{38} Also in the context of Dunmore’s War, it was the first organized offensive by the colonists with the intent of widespread destruction. Logan’s party got revenge during the spring

\textsuperscript{34} Lord Dunmore to Captain John Connolly, June 20, 1774, Force, American Archives, vol. 1, 473.

\textsuperscript{35} Colonel William Christian to Colonel William Preston, September 7, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 186.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 150. Lord Dunmore to Lord Dartmouth, August 14, 1774.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 151-154, 156, n. 1. Extracts from a letter from Maj. Angus McDonald to Maj. John Connolly; Williams, Dunmore’s War, 189-193; Withers, Border Warfare, 153-155; Extract of a letter from a gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774, in Force, American Archives, vol. 1, 728-29.

\textsuperscript{38} These events at Wakatomika have not been labeled a battle by previous historians. However, the circumstances of the attack, including the behavior of both American Indians and Virginians, is consistent with a battle and it deserves to be named as such.
and summer of 1774, but this revenge did not include a confederacy to fight the Virginians en masse. The Battle of Wakatomika did not improve relations on the frontier or encourage the tribes to make peace. Instead, attacks along the frontier increased after giving the American Indians even more to be angry about.

On August 7, days after the Battle of Wakatomika, Logan’s party had found a new target at Sinking Creek, just off the New River in Virginia. The property of Balthazar and Catherine Lybrook also held a blockhouse, and in light of the recent threats several neighbors had joined them there. On that Sunday morning, all the children were playing in the river outside when the four warriors saw their opportunity. They murdered seven children, ranging in age from infant to fourteen, and three were taken captive. A couple of days later, two of the captured boys, Jacob Snidow and Thomas McGriff, took their chance to escape during the night. They found a place to hide until morning and foraged edible plants until finding scouts from Fort Byrd who could help them.39

Throughout the summer, accounts circulated along the Virginia frontier of further raids. The inhabitants did not know what accounts to take seriously, or when they might expect the full power of the Shawnee at their doorstep. At the same time the men of Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle counties prepared to march under Andrew Lewis, they looked for ways to keep their homes safe. Colonel William Preston lived near the Sinking Creek Massacre, and he responded to the event by “demand[ing] 100 Men with proper Officers” from Pittsylvania County, their neighbors to the east, to defend the frontier in their stead.40 Preston wrote to George Washington that “[about] ten days ago, a small party killed five persons, mostly children, & took three

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39 Williams, *Dunmore’s War*, 201-204; James Robertson to Col. William Preston, August 12, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Documentary History*, 140.

prisoners about 15 miles from this place, which is greatly exposed. I began yesterday to build a fort about my house for the defence of my family.”

Colonel William Christian agreed there would be greater danger in their absence, urging Preston to be sure he left “a considerable body of men” to protect Fincastle County. Though they would discuss the danger between themselves, it was another matter to watch their wives and children worry. Colonel William Fleming wrote to his wife, the sister of Christian, reassuring her that there were only two groups of American Indians raiding along the frontier, with only three or four men in each group. He urged her to “give no Attention to any Reports you hear that may Allarm You.”

The Virginians were not the only ones fearing what might come. Although the Lenape had, throughout 1774, proven themselves the friends of white people, the color of their skin made them an easy target as well. In May, a Lenape named Joseph Wipey was murdered. This particular murder was personal, but circumstances made it easier for the perpetrators to get away with it. Arthur St. Clair had heard of the premeditated plans of John Hinkson and James Cooper to commit the murder, and, in his capacity as magistrate of Westmoreland County, wrote Hinkson a warning that he would be prosecuted if he went through with it. The perpetrators were Pennsylvanians, as Dunmore later felt compelled to point out to Lord Dartmouth, but they shared the same mentality as many from the Fort Pitt area. Wipey’s body was first dumped in water and covered by rocks. When Wipey was found, and St. Clair called for the coroner, the body vanished once more and was not found again. St. Clair found his hands tied by the lack of


43 Ibid., 182. William Fleming to his wife, September 4, 1774.
evidence, though Governor Penn issued a proclamation offering a reward for Hinkson and Cooper’s capture. Though Dunmore used this situation as supposed evidence that the Pennsylvanians had problems too, Governor Penn attempted to bring in the murderers and reached out to the Lenape chiefs to let them know the measures he was taking. Meanwhile, John Hinkson became one of multiple men from neighboring colonies who signed up to serve in Dunmore’s northern division.\textsuperscript{44}

In September, Virginia militia in the Fort Pitt area fired on three Lenape men who had been traveling to Croghan’s home. None of the three were armed, and only one survived. Major McDonald, the same officer who had led the attack on Wakatomika, offered £50 for the capture of the guilty militiamen, but it was hard to do anything about the “lawless vagabonds” with “the most infamous and abandoned characters” that were Connolly’s men.\textsuperscript{45} Though the Lenape, influenced by their war chief, Captain George White Eyes, remained peaceful and even aided the Virginians, it should be acknowledged this was a highly strategic decision. They had lost lives as well, and had friends among the tribes that had lost more. White Eyes spent his entire summer traveling back and forth to the Shawnee, doing everything in his power to maintain the peace. He had concluded what many of the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee did not yet realize, that their losses in outright battle against the Long Knives would be far worse.

By the end of August, Lord Dunmore was on his way to Fort Pitt. There he met with Deputy Indian Agent Alexander McKee and representatives of the Haudenosaunee, the Shawnee, and the Lenape. Though he offered gifts to cover the graves of the deceased American Indians,


he then listed what he saw as the many crimes of the Shawnee.\textsuperscript{46} This list went back to their agreement with Colonel Bouquet, when they failed to return all white prisoners. Dunmore claimed they never “truly buried the hatchet.”\textsuperscript{47} This one sided list was disingenuous, for he overlooked the times over those same years that Virginians had committed crimes against the Shawnee. Not that Virginians were the only guilty parties. In 1768, German settlers Frederick Stump and John Ironcutter had plied their American Indian guests with alcohol, then murdered them. Pennsylvania had avoided an Indian War afterwards, even though the events were eerily similar to the Yellow Creek Massacre.\textsuperscript{48}

There was only so much the Shawnee could say in reply, but they denied Dunmore’s assertion that they had never embraced peace. “It is true some foolish young people may have found [a tomahawk] out of our sight, hid in the grass, and may have made use of it,” they said, “but that tomahawk which we formerly held, has been long since buried, and we have not since raised it.”\textsuperscript{49} What they did not say openly in this council, and felt unable to say publicly, was that the Shawnee leadership had felt the Ohio Haudenosaunee, as a part of the Six Nations, had misled their people and were responsible for everything that had occurred that year. However, as

\textsuperscript{46} Covering the graves is the process of giving gifts to atone for their losses, so that revenge will not be necessary.

\textsuperscript{47} Council Between Lord Dunmore and the Indians, n.d., in Force, \textit{American Archives}, vol. 1, 873. Phrases like this are particularly symbolic in the context of starting or ending a war. Dunmore’s words accuse the Shawnee of never actually making peace with the white people. His argument for war with the Shawnee hinges on this claim.

\textsuperscript{48} Griffin, \textit{American Leviathan}, 82. The Shawnee did retain “at least fifty” of the captives they had adopted into the tribe despite their promises to Bouquet. This seems to have been captives who did not wish to return and the tribe did not force it. Though the Indian Agents were aware of this, they eventually chose to overlook it. Also see Lakomaki, \textit{Gathering Together}, 81-84.

the Shawnee explained to two American Indians who had visited them from the Moravian mission town, they were afraid to openly order the Ohio Haudenosaunee to leave.\footnote{Hermann Wellenreuther and Carola Wessel, eds., \textit{The Moravian Mission Diaries of David Zeisberger} (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 227.}

It is unlikely this information would have mattered to Lord Dunmore. He and Connolly had spent the summer persuading everyone that the Shawnee were the enemy, overlooking the role of the Ohio Haudenosaunee, and he had no reason to change his tune at this late juncture. He continued to insist the Shawnee, as a group, wished to harm Virginians. He closed the council by extending an invitation to the Shawnee to speak with him at Fort Fincastle, or anywhere else along the path he would soon take down the Ohio River. He expressed his desire, “to convince you how ready the Big Knife is to do justice, at all times, even to their greatest enemies.”\footnote{Council Between Lord Dunmore and the Indians, n.d., in Force, \textit{American Archives}, vol. 1, 876.}

The Shawnee had their own list of complaints. They maintained their hunting ground had been stolen by treaties they did not consent to, and they objected to the continued presence of white people on their land. Despite this, the Shawnee chiefs had spent the summer working towards peace, even when their upper Shawnee towns had been destroyed by McDonald’s forces. These attempts did not prevent Dunmore and Connolly from achieving their objectives. They had convinced Virginians of their claims of Shawnee hostility and impending war.
Chapter 3: “Push On, Boys”: The Battle of Point Pleasant

At the beginning of September 1774, the southern division of the Virginia militia assembled at Camp Union. This is now known as Lewisburg, West Virginia, but for them it was the edge of Virginia’s settlements on the western waters. They were ordered to march up the Kanawha River and rendezvous with the northern division under the command of Governor Dunmore. This southern division, under Colonel Andrew Lewis, included approximately 1,300 men. They were primarily from Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle counties. Additionally, they were joined by individual companies from Culpeper, Dunmore (now Shenandoah), and Bedford counties, as well as Captain Harrod’s Kentucky Volunteers. The officers had spent all summer cajoling their men in one fashion or another, trying to assemble adequate men and supplies for a successful expedition.¹ The Battle of Point Pleasant was important, not due to the scale of the battle alone, but because it had the most significant influence on the loyalties of the Virginians and the determination of the Shawnee.

The militia were not strangers to one another. They were brothers, sons, and neighbors. Colonel Andrew Lewis’s youngest brother, Charles, led the Augusta County men. Colonel Charles Lewis was well known for his experience fighting American Indians along the frontier. During Pontiac’s War, Charles Lewis “pursued, overtook, and defeated” an American Indian raiding party.² While Andrew was known for his stoic and impressive demeanor, Charles was friendly and loved by all. Doctor William Fleming, who served as a colonel in the Botetourt

¹ Colonel Preston even accepted the offer of additional men from North Carolina, for fear they would be unable to raise an adequate number of men. See Williams, *Dunmore’s War*, 207. Between the northern and southern divisions, the colonists who fought in Dunmore’s War included men from Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.

² Thwaites and Kellogg, *Documentary History*, 75 n. 21. Andrew and Charles also had another brother, John Lewis, who was in the southern division as well. Three of Andrew’s sons were also present. The eldest, John, was captain of a company. These are just a few examples of how closely connected many in the southern division were.
County militia, had graduated from the University of Edinburgh and served as a surgeon for the British Navy. Both in their forties, Charles Lewis and William Fleming were among the most experienced officers in the southern division, except perhaps for Andrew Lewis himself.

While McDonald’s Expedition had set out with the clear intention of destroying Shawnee towns, Andrew Lewis’s division was subject to the evolving desires of Governor Dunmore. Their immediate orders were to build a fort at the junction of the Kanawha and Ohio Rivers (now Point Pleasant, West Virginia). Forts were permitted under multiple treaties and the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but were likely to further complicate relations with the Shawnee.3 There was also speculation the men might march across the river against the Shawnee afterwards. On August 30, Andrew Lewis received a letter from Dunmore requesting he alter the southern division’s route. Dunmore proposed they instead meet the northern division at the mouth of the Little Kanawha River (now Parkersburg, West Virginia). This new destination was approximately 42 miles northeast of the initial destination, and Lewis replied that “it was not in [his] Power to alter [their] rout[e].”4

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3 This idea was voiced by multiple people. Most influential may have been John Connolly, who seems to have had a significant influence on Dunmore’s plans. Connolly wrote multiple letters stating that a fort at the junction of the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers was “absolutely necessary.” See John Connolly to George Washington, May 28, 1774, in The Papers of George Washington Digital Edition (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008); Ibid. John Connolly to George Washington, June 7, 1774. It was also suggested by Kiashuta that Dunmore should order a fort built at the mouth of the Kanawha River. George Croghan to Sir William Johnson, May 4, 1774, in Milton W. Hamilton, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vol. 12 (Albany, NY: University of the State of New York, 1957), 1099.

4 Col. Andrew Lewis to Col. William Preston, September 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 191. The distance between the mouth of the Kanawha River compared to the Little Kanawha River was measured using a tool within the Google Earth website. This measurement is a straight line between the two locations, not following the winding path of the Ohio River. Though Andrew Lewis does not specify in his letter to Preston what his reasoning was for refusing Dunmore’s suggested location, a logical reason would be the geography of the present state of West Virginia. From Camp Union, the southern division could march along the Greenbrier River to the New River, and from there to the Kanawha River. This would have been a reliable route to avoid getting lost or lacking water for the men and livestock, especially for an army largely unfamiliar with the terrain.
After their departure from Camp Union, the southern division stuck with the original plan to travel up the New River, to the Kanawha River, and from there to its junction with the Ohio River. Through the wilderness, land the Shawnee had reserved for hunting, the militia drove cattle for fresh meat and pack-horses with other necessary supplies. Captain John Stuart wrote that “few white men had ever seen the place.”

Captain Matthew Arbuckle of Botetourt County had explored the Kanawha River in his youth, one of the few white settlers who had done so, and was appointed as the primary guide for Lewis’s army. They had to be constantly on their guard, meeting some resistance along the way. Letters from Andrew Lewis and William Christian describe altercations along the march, where at least one of the militia was killed and another wounded by American Indians watching their progress. Lewis predicted, “They will be picking about us all [the] March.”

The southern division arrived at the mouth of the Kanawha River on October 6. They immediately began fortifying the area. Colonel Christian and his men from Fincastle County were several days behind, and no one was certain what Governor Dunmore’s latest plan entailed. Over the next four days, messages were sent between Colonel Andrew Lewis’s southern division and Governor Dunmore. They had expected, after Lewis replied they could not change routes, to be joined there by the Dunmore’s army as the initial plan had specified. Instead of going down the Ohio River from Fort Gower, Dunmore would change course and march on the Shawnee towns directly, leaving the southern division without the expected reinforcements.

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5 Stuart, *Indian Wars*, 44.

6 Col. Andrew Lewis to Col. William Preston, September 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Documentary History*, 192; Ibid., 206. Col. William Christian to Mrs. William Fleming, September 18, 1774. It is unknown what tribe(s) were watching them, but most likely would have been Shawnee and/or Ohio Haudenosaunee.
On October 9, the messengers from Dunmore included trader William McCulloch. He had previously met Captain Stuart in Philadelphia and, assuming Stuart would be with the Virginia militia, sought him out. Their exchange was one that would stand out in Stuart’s mind for years to come. McCulloch described how he had “left the Shawanee towns and gone to the Governor’s camp,” prompting Stuart to ask his opinion of whether there might be a battle.\(^7\) Though McCulloch did not mention seeing any warriors during his journey from Dunmore to Lewis, he instead replied, “Aye, they will give you grinders, and that before long.”\(^8\)

On the other side of the Ohio River, Cornstalk was leading a group of American Indian warriors intent on attacking the Virginians before they could unite with Dunmore’s army. Though primarily Shawnee, his force was said to include men from the Lenape, Ohio Haudenosaunee, Ottawa, and other nations.\(^9\) Cornstalk had previously attempted to maintain peace, believing it the safest course for his people. On that night of October 9, Cornstalk offered to cross the river and discuss peace with the southern division of Virginians. His men refused, so the American Indian force crossed the river during the night. Whether or not the Shawnee had buried the hatchet previously, they wanted to settle matters now. Captain White Eyes warned Dunmore that “700 warriors were gon[e] to the South, to speak with the Army there, & that they had been followed by another Nation, that they would begin with them, in the morning and their

\(^7\) Stuart, _Indian Wars_, 45.

\(^8\) Ibid.

\(^9\) Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, _Documentary History_, 273. Though men from multiple nations were present to fight against the Virginians, this does not necessarily reflect the position of the rest of their tribe. The Lenape, for example, had worked to maintain peace with the colonists all summer. However, it is entirely possible that a number of their men disagreed and decided to fight alongside the Shawnee.
business would be over by Breakfast time, and then they would speak with his Lordship.”

It does not appear Andrew Lewis’s camp received any warning.

Before dawn on October 10, two small hunting parties left camp to supplement their diet with wild game. Joseph Hughey and James Mooney traveled northeast along the course of the Ohio River. Rather than deer, what they found two or three miles from camp was Cornstalk’s army making last minute preparations for battle. The American Indians fired on the two men immediately. Hughey was killed, but Mooney escaped. He made it back to the camp just before dawn and hurriedly warned everyone of the approaching enemy. He claimed there had been “above five acres of land covered with Indians, as thick as they could stand beside another.”

Despite this report, Colonel Andrew Lewis and his officers did not expect they would encounter so substantial a force as Cornstalk’s army turned out to be. Small groups of American Indians had watched their progress since they left Camp Union, and they thought it was another such group. To investigate the threat, Andrew Lewis sent out two detachments under Colonel Charles Lewis, with 150 Augusta men, and Colonel William Fleming, with 150 Botetourt men. Captain John Stuart explained the decision by writing, “These were composed of the companies commanded by the oldest captains; and the junior captains were ordered to stay in camp, to aid the others as occasion would require.” Andrew Lewis did not send all the troops under the same officers they had traveled under, but he was working with a force that had been caught by surprise. This was a decision that he later faced heavy criticism for.

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13 Stuart, *Indian Wars*, 46.
The number of men in either army is debateable. Historians, and even contemporary accounts, have given varied estimates. Based on Colonel Fleming’s records, Colonel Andrew Lewis would have had approximately one thousand men at Point Pleasant when Cornstalk’s force attacked, not all of whom were fit for duty.\textsuperscript{14} Colonel Christian had an additional three hundred men, yet they had not arrived. A number for Cornstalk’s force is more difficult. The most accurate number may be Captain White Eyes’s warning of seven hundred men, or perhaps a little higher. During the battle, American Indians used taunts as a military tactic, including claims of having 1,100 men with more on the way.\textsuperscript{15} They also hid their dead, concealing bodies under bushes or by throwing them in the river. Fighting began at dawn and continued until sunset, with Lewis dispatching reinforcements as needed. Though most of his army may have fought that day, there was never more than four hundred Virginians engaged in fighting at one time. The officers also had difficulty with some men refusing to go near the fighting, or refusing to fight under anyone but their own officers.\textsuperscript{16} Sami Lakomäki claims the Shawnee were “badly outnumbered” at Point Pleasant.\textsuperscript{17} It is likely Lewis’s army outnumbered Cornstalk’s overall, but “badly” is subjective.

The question of numbers does not detract from the valor of Cornstalk or his men during this engagement. Cornstalk clearly impressed the Virginians, with many mentioning him in their accounts afterwards. Though he preferred the idea of peace, there is no doubt he served his men

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\textsuperscript{14} There have been many estimates of Lewis’s force during the Battle of Point Pleasant. The number provided here is based on information in Colonel Fleming’s Orderly Book. Since the number of men not fit for duty likely varied somewhat on October 10, the total has been listed as approximate. See Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Documentary History}, 331.

\textsuperscript{15} Stuart, \textit{Indian Wars}, 56.


\textsuperscript{17} Lakomäki, \textit{Gathering Together}, 100.
admirably as a war leader. Those in the battle could hear Cornstalk shouting encouragement to all the American Indians fighting with him, and it was said he killed one of his own who attempted to retreat “in a cowardly manner.”

His actions, wholeheartedly leading the American Indian force despite his personal misgivings, showed his loyalty was to his men first and foremost. As Stuart explained, “None will suppose that we had a contemptible enemy to do with, who has any knowledge of the exploits performed by them.”

Neither of the veteran officers that Andrew Lewis sent into the field escaped without injury. Charles Lewis had been known for years as a fighter with great success against American Indians, but his luck did not hold at Point Pleasant. He was shot on the battlefield, caught in the open while speaking to his men. Though a mortal injury, he calmly left the field and made his own way back to camp. Colonel William Christian wrote, “He turned and handed his gun to a man and walked to Camp telling the men as he passed along ‘I am wounded, but go you on and be brave.’” Charles resigned himself to his impending death by saying that he had at least killed one of the enemy first. Another account notes his final words as, “Push on, boys. Don’t mind me.” Colonel Fleming was shot three times, twice in his left arm and once in the left side of his chest. The chest wound exposed part of his left lung and it had to be pushed back inside his body, a wound so gruesome that many expected him to die. Despite the intensity of his

18 Stuart, Indian Wars, 48.

19 Ibid.


21 Ibid., 75.
injuries, he also returned to camp with a cool and collected disposition. He encouraged those men he passed, saying “not to mind him but to go up and fight.”  

Shots slowed in the afternoon, but the battle continued until Cornstalk led his men in an orderly retreat around sunset. Colonel Andrew Lewis had sent a message for Colonel Christian’s men to hurry, but they did not arrive until nearly midnight. It would have been a somber mood as the southern division cared for their wounded and surveyed the dead. Of the Virginians, seventy-five were dead and 140 wounded. Their losses also extended beyond their own army. As they checked the American Indian bodies on the battlefield, Virginian Thomas Collet found a body he recognized. His brother, George Collet, had been taken as a child and adopted by American Indians, choosing to fight with Cornstalk and dying in battle. Not that George was the only such instance. Records show Tavenor Ross and John Ward, others who had been taken as children, also fought on the side of their American Indian families. Clearly, blood was not all that mattered when determining their loyalty.

At the time, no one was certain what losses Cornstalk’s army had sustained. In the months afterwards, Cornstalk requested permission to return to the battlefield and bury any remaining dead who had served under him. He was accompanied by Captain William Russell, with whom Cornstalk spoke about the battle. Based on Russell’s information, the American Indians lost eighty men in the battle, with another twenty dying soon after of their injuries, and “a great number” wounded. The Battle of Point Pleasant had the highest casualties of Lord Dunmore’s War, often making it the only battle remembered by historians.

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Colonel Andrew Lewis and his men spent the next week fortifying their position at Point Pleasant and caring for their wounded. Colonel Fleming was expected to die of his chest wound, but he survived a day, and then another day, and continued to improve. On October 13, a message came from Governor Dunmore ordering Andrew Lewis to march towards the Shawnee towns and join the northern division. The southern division wanted revenge for their losses at Point Pleasant, but it was more important to care for their own first. It was not until October 17 that Andrew Lewis obeyed Dunmore and crossed the Ohio River.

Following their retreat, Cornstalk called a council of the Shawnee. He had led his men into battle despite his misgivings, and now it was time to make a hard decision. “The Big Knife is coming on us,” he warned, “and we shall all be killed.”

He presented his people with two options. Either the men should kill their women and children, fighting the Virginians until every Shawnee man was dead, or they should immediately make peace. Considering the outcome of the Battle of Point Pleasant, his warriors now agreed. It would be peace, on whatever terms the Virginians were willing to offer.

Governor Dunmore had departed Fort Gower on October 11 with 1,200 men, marching straight for the Shawnee towns. Those who accompanied him included Captain White Eyes and Captain John Gibson. Gibson was a trader and his wife, Logan’s sister, was murdered in the Yellow Creek Massacre. He was leading men from West Augusta County and served as an interpreter during negotiations. Once they found a good place to camp near the Shawnee and

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24 Stuart, Indian Wars, 62.

25 West Augusta was not officially a separate county, but refers to the area near Fort Pitt that Dunmore claimed as part of Virginia. Rather than marching with Colonel Charles Lewis of Augusta County, these men marched with Dunmore. That Gibson chose to serve under Dunmore shows the complexity of this situation, given that his wife had been killed by colonists because of Connolly’s insistence a war was coming.
Ohio Haudenosaunee towns, Dunmore named it Camp Charlotte.26 By Dunmore’s account, he was unaware of the Battle of Point Pleasant when he departed Fort Gower. Captain Stuart later disputed this, having heard claims to the contrary. He wrote that, on the day of the Battle of Point Pleasant, Governor Dunmore was walking with Captain Connolly and some other officers when he “observed to the gentlemen that he expected by that time Colonel Lewis had hot work.”27

Regardless, the men of the southern division were in good spirits when they crossed the Ohio River to join Governor Dunmore. They had taken the time to mourn their dead and tend their wounded. Now they were ready to follow Dunmore’s orders, hoping to get revenge for their losses along the way. Colonel Andrew Lewis had with him approximately 1,150 men, having left behind very few able-bodied men with the wounded at Point Pleasant.28 Once they had gotten close to the Shawnee towns and Camp Charlotte, Lewis received a message from Dunmore stating that the governor was close to negotiating a peace with the Shawnee. This message invited only Colonel Lewis, with his choice of officers, to meet with Dunmore at Camp Charlotte. However that was interpreted, Lewis continued forward with all of his men. This alarmed the Shawnee who were watching their progress, and they doubted Dunmore could control the Virginians. A few hours later Lewis received another dispatch. He was now explicitly ordered to halt his army.

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26 This area is also known as the Pickaway Plains. Sources disagree on whether the camp was named after Queen Charlotte or Dunmore’s wife, Lady Charlotte. Governor Dunmore’s later report to the Earl of Dartmouth asserts that some of his northern division men were ambushed by American Indians on the march to Camp Charlotte. He claims his men “killed Six or eight and took Sixteen Prisoners.” See Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, official report, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 384. Given that this ambush is not mentioned in any other accounts, and that the numbers are almost identical to the outcome of Captain Crawford’s later raid on the Ohio Haudenosaunee town of Seekonk, it seems likely that Dunmore was misconstruing events for the sake of his official report and that no such ambush took place on his march. For details on the raid on Seekonk, see page 56 of this thesis.

27 Stuart, Indian Wars, 56.

28 Col. William Christian to Col. William Preston, November 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 301. This number may have been closer to 1,000 based on the recorded militia returns.
The difficulty, according to Lewis, was that the place where they received this order was a bad place to make camp, so he marched on long enough to reach water before following orders. The Shawnee interpreted this as an intention to attack their towns despite the negotiations. Lewis and his men, on the other hand, claimed they had not intended to end up so close to the towns. Dunmore had traders familiar with the area as his guides, but Lewis did not. It may be impossible to say whether their direction was intentional. Certainly, the men were frustrated by Dunmore’s order after having fought a battle and marching all that way. One of Andrew Lewis’s sons later recounted, “All the army almost had lost relations, [Andrew Lewis] a favorite brother. They could not be stopped.”

Governor Dunmore, accompanied by White Fish, Captain Gibson, and fifty men, visited the southern division at their camp to prevent further problems. To keep the peace, Lewis had to post additional guards around his tent to protect Dunmore from the army’s frustrations.

Now Dunmore announced that the entire southern division was a “hindrance” to the peace he was negotiating, and ordered Lewis to take the entirety of his army back to Point Pleasant. Not even Andrew Lewis, or any of his officers, were permitted at the negotiations now. When considering the loyalty of the Virginians, their exclusion matters. They had fought a battle without expected reinforcements, losing men they loved, and never received an explanation of why Dunmore changed the plan. They then crossed the Ohio River, as ordered, and now that seemed for nothing.

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29 Colonel Andrew Lewis to Dr. Samul Campbell, n.d., in William Maxwell, ed., *The Virginia Historical Register and Literary Advertiser*, Vol. 1 (Richmond, VA: MacFarlane & Fergusson, 1848), 32. This was written by Andrew Lewis’s son of the same name, who went on to say Cornstalk’s army organized on the banks of the Scioto River just in case Dunmore was unable to restrain the southern division. However, this letter was written sixty-six years after the fact, and he seems to be mistaken on some details.

30 Ibid.

Back at Camp Charlotte, Governor Dunmore discovered not all the American Indians were as amenable to peace as the Shawnee. He had repeatedly labeled the Shawnee as warmongers, and yet they alone were agreeing to all his terms. The terms were recorded in very few places, but Major William Crawford of the northern division was present for the negotiations and later shared the terms in a letter to George Washington. The first term was a requirement that the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee return all people, white or black, and all horses stolen from Virginians since Pontiac’s War. In accordance with earlier treaties, no American Indian was to go south of the Ohio River to hunt, and no whites were to go north of the Ohio River. As a guarantee that they would return all people and property, the Shawnee were required to provide “four chief men” as hostages.\(^{32}\) These may sound like considerable concessions, but they were not. What Dunmore was really asking was that they abide by the terms offered at the end of Bouquet’s Expedition and the land cessions of prior treaties that were authorized by the Haudenosaunee. None of the terms penalized the tribes for recent events, which was a pleasant surprise for the Shawnee. The hostages would be treated well and returned as soon as the other terms were met.

Although the Haudenosaunee had consented to the Fort Stanwix treaty granting Virginians the disputed land, it was the Ohio Haudenosaunee who were now determined against this new treaty. Captain Logan, weary of his grief, had consented to peace and to return the prisoners he had taken. He refused to join the peace talks, but sent a message through Captain Gibson, his brother-in-law and Dunmore’s interpreter. This message captivated Virginians, including Thomas Jefferson, who were impressed by the emotional speech. Logan reminded them he had always been a friend of white people, forgiving previous wrongs, but said the

Yellow Creek Massacre had been too much for him to bear. “This called on me for revenge,” he said, “I have sought it: I have killed many: I have fully glutted my vengeance. For my country, I rejoice at the beams of peace.”

Though he wanted peace for his people, the rest of the Ohio Haudenosaunee disagreed. They decided to sneak away, taking their plunder and moving north to Lake Erie where they hoped to be outside the reach of Lord Dunmore. John Montour, who was part Haudenosaunee, warned Dunmore of their plan. In response, Dunmore ordered Captain William Crawford to pursue them with 240 men. Crawford departed under the pretense of returning to Fort Gower for additional supplies. They were instead heading north, to where Montour said the Ohio Haudenosaunee planned to meet one another for the journey. When they reached Seekonk, also called Salt Lick Town, they encountered an Ohio Haudenosaunee man and killed him. This action allowed many to get away, but not before Captain Crawford’s men killed six and took fourteen prisoner. More importantly, they freed colonists who had been prisoners. During this raid, Captain Crawford destroyed the town.

Once prevented from leaving, the Ohio Haudenosaunee had no choice but to consent to the treaty as well. Very little would change. The land south of the Ohio River had already, supposedly, been ceded to Virginia. Colonists, unless they were traders, were already supposed to stay on the south side. The only new term was the requirement to provide hostages, and perhaps the ability to control the tribes through hostages is what Governor Dunmore wanted all


34 Major William Crawford to George Washington, November 14, 1774, in Butterfield, Washington-Crawford Letters, 55-56; Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 303 n. 17. This is referred to as a raid rather than a battle because, unlike with Wakatomica, the Ohio Haudenosaunee did not mount an intentional defense to the approaching threat. Where McDonald had led an expedition with the intention of destruction to dishearten the enemy, Crawford’s actions were intended as a quick strike to recover prisoners and prevent the Ohio Haudenosaunee departure before the treaty was complete. He also took £400 in plunder.
along. It was something he had encouraged prior to McDonald’s Expedition as well. In addition to the four Shawnee hostages required by the Camp Charlotte agreement, Dunmore kept eleven or twelve of the Ohio Haudenosaunee prisoners Captain Crawford had taken.35

All hostages were to be held until their tribes complied with the details of the Camp Charlotte agreement. They took the Ohio Haudenosaunee prisoners to Fort Pitt. The identities of these prisoners are unknown. The Shawnee hostages were chosen by their tribe and were taken to Williamsburg. They were Cuttemwha (the Wolf), Genusa (the Judge), Wissescapoway (Captain Morgan), and Newau.36 “They are tall, manly, well-shaped men,” observed Nicholas Cresswell, “of a Copper colour with black hair, quick piercing eyes, and good features.”37 They were imposing, dressed in a mixture of white and Shawnee clothing, and their bodies were decorated with silver and vermillion. In their time as hostages, they would witness the chaos of the governor fleeing and a revolution beginning.

The Camp Charlotte agreement was not a finalized treaty. It was an interim agreement, with the understanding that Dunmore and the chiefs would meet at Fort Pitt in the spring to finalize matters. Instead, the northern and southern divisions returned home to find that relations between the colonies and Great Britain had worsened in their absence. While Dunmore’s War and the American Revolution are separate conflicts, the events that had transpired during this Indian War would influence the loyalty of American colonists and American Indians alike.


36 The names of these four Shawnee men are spelled differently depending on the source, and some vary widely. The Virginia Gazette states: “Three of them are Warriors, viz. Imcatewhaywa, or the Black Wolf; Wissescapoway, or Captain Morgan; Genusa, or the Judge; and the other is a young Man called Neawah, who is the Snake’s Son, a principal Warrior of that Nation.” Purdie and Dixon, Virginia Gazette, December 22, 1774, 2. Calloway states that Wissescapoway was “a son of Cornstalk whom Dunmore later set free.” Calloway, American Revolution, 162.

Chapter 4: “Of Liberty and Loyalty”: The Aftermath of Dunmore’s War

Lord Dunmore’s War was not over once the armies marched home. The peace agreement was temporary, and it took time for the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee to comply with Dunmore’s terms. There were also additional factors to be considered. Nothing had been done to settle the land conflict between Virginia and Pennsylvania. Nothing had been determined about whether the king would allow Virginians to settle land south of the Ohio River. The Virginia militia had wanted to protect their homes against the threat Connolly had claimed existed, but they had more on their minds. Many of the veterans would spend the rest of their lives considering Dunmore’s War and the American Revolution intertwined.

After Camp Charlotte, the northern division began their march home by way of Fort Gower. While present, the officers of the northern division addressed the growing political instability in the colonies. The political climate had been growing steadily worse, especially since the Boston Port Act from the spring of that year. Having dealt with one perceived threat, they believed that their time at Fort Gower was ideal for stating their loyalties. Not only did they believe war with Britain might be on the horizon, but they had been involved in a dispute related to Pennsylvania and Virginia’s conflicting land claims. How could they support Boston if it appeared they were snubbing Pennsylvania’s sovereignty?

The officers noted it had been three months since they had received any news of events at Boston or the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, though it appears they may have heard rumors along the frontier.¹ Since the northern division had joined the fight under a royal governor, the officers drafted the document to clarify their position and loyalty for the benefit of

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¹ Though it does not match the wording of the Fort Gower Resolves, Daniel Morgan later wrote that they heard rumors “that hostilities were offered to our brethren, the people of Boston.” North Callahan, Daniel Morgan: Ranger of the Revolution (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 43.
their fellow Americans. It was approved unanimously. They claimed allegiance to King George III and respect for Lord Dunmore, but referred to themselves as a “free People.”² Most importantly, they asserted, “We resolve that we will exert every Power within us for the Defence of American Liberty, and for the Support of her just Rights and Privileges; not in any precipitate, riotous, or tumultuous Manner, but when regularly called forth by the unanimous Voice of our Countrymen.”³

Lieutenant Colonel Angus McDonald, promoted since the Battle of Wakatomika, delivered a copy of the Fort Gower Resolves to the Virginia Gazette. He traveled to Williamsburg along with the Shawnee hostages. They arrived in Williamsburg on December 17, 1774. From there, newspapers reprinted the Fort Gower Resolves in Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina by the end of January 1775.⁴ Parliament was scandalized by the resolves when word reached them in March. They had received no warning from Lord Dunmore and instead discovered the document in a copy of the Virginia Gazette. The Marquis of Rockingham said that “a military league” of Dunmore’s own officers “pledg[ing] themselves to defend American Liberty with the sword” was “truly alarming.”⁵ In fact, Rockingham’s words go to the heart of what made the Fort Gower agreement

² Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), December 22, 1774, 2. A transcript of the Fort Gower Resolves can be found in Appendix A.

³ Ibid.


so different from what had or would be published by individual counties. That they spoke as a military body rather than as citizens sets their statement apart.

The southern division waited until they got home to their respective counties before addressing the topic. Colonel Preston had borrowed men from Pittsylvania County to help guard southwest Virginia in their absence, men that wanted to get home to their own families. Some frontier families had gone east for safety and needed to travel home once their loved ones returned from Point Pleasant. This gave them the benefit of hearing the latest news from Philadelphia before choosing their words. Tradition calls them resolutions or resolves. Although at Fort Gower the officers did write resolves, the writings of the individual counties were responses to the resolves of the first Continental Congress. They served primarily to give instructions to representatives from their individual counties for a Virginia convention.

Of the counties west of the Blue Ridge, the first to put their thoughts into words was Fincastle County. The Fincastle Resolutions were dated January 20, 1775 and were published in the *Virginia Gazette* on February 10. This document also differs from the Fort Gower Resolves by listing the names of everyone on the committee who drafted it. These men explained that their response would have been earlier had they not been fighting an Indian War. They claimed the war was intended “to chastise those cruel and savage people for the many murders and depredations they have committed amongst us.” It was this area that had experienced many of the raids over the summer, including the murder of seven children at Sinking Creek by Logan’s party. The crux of their document stated, “We declare, that we are deliberately and resolutely

6 Colonel William Christian’s wife, Anne, had gone to stay with her brother, Patrick Henry, while her husband was away fighting. No doubt the western colonies would have heard the results of the first Continental Congress through other means, but additionally through the personal account of Patrick Henry. Jim Glanville, “The Fincastle Resolutions,” *The Smithfield Review* 14 (2010): 88.

7 *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), February 10, 1775, 3. See Appendix B for a transcript of the Fincastle Resolutions.
determined never to surrender [our liberty] to any power upon earth, but at the expense of our lives.”

These, Fincastle County claimed, were their “unpolished sentiments, of liberty and loyalty.”

The Augusta Resolves were published on March 16, 1775. They asserted they would not “surrender” their freedoms “to any minister, to any parliament, or any body of men upon the earth, by whom we are not represented.” They stated their willingness to sacrifice their lives to protect their rights. Additionally, Augusta County recommended that the colony encourage the manufacture of “salt, steel, wool cards, paper, and gunpowder.” This list holds more meaning when the reader considers that Augusta’s militia officers had spent the last year encountering difficulties procuring supplies. Those supplies had been for an Indian War, but now they knew what to expect when preparing for a revolution.

Published on March 11, 1775, the Botetourt Resolutions were likely the most shocking. They contain language far more inflammatory than anything produced by Fort Gower, Augusta, or Fincastle. Addressed to their chosen representatives, Colonel Andrew Lewis and Mr. John Bowyer, they echoed the Fort Gower Resolves by stating that it was the king’s councils, not King George III, who they distrusted. “When the honest man of Boston, who has broke no law, has his property wrested from him,” they said, “the hunter on the Allegany must take the alarm.” As the tomahawk had been symbolic of war in Dunmore’s talks with the American

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8 *Virginia Gazette* (Purdie), February 10, 1775, 3.

9 Ibid.

10 *Virginia Gazette* (Pinkney), March 16, 1775, 2. See Appendix C for a transcript of the Augusta Resolves.

11 Ibid.

12 *Virginia Gazette* (Dixon and Hunter), March 11, 1775, 3. See Appendix D for a transcript of the Botetourt Resolutions.
Indians, so too the men of the frontier saw it as symbolic for themselves. This was one of many ways they had been shaped by their lives west of the Blue Ridge. Botetourt County was willing to sacrifice their guns, tomahawks, and lives for king and country, but not their liberty. The men of this area may have defined their liberty differently than men in Boston or Williamsburg. They explained, “To range these woods on the same terms my father has done is not mine to give up; it was not purchased by me, and purchased it was; it is entailed on my son, and the tenure is sacred.” What others alluded to, the Virginians of Botetourt County said outright. They warned, if their liberty was threatened, “The original purchase was blood, and mine shall seal the surrender.”

In the characterizations of Governor Dunmore, accounts usually accept one of two extremes. Either he was a likeable man who attempted to help Virginia, or he was a manipulator seeking to undermine the colonists. Likely, he was both. Virginians’s praises of Dunmore at Fort Gower and afterwards may have been sincere or formality. Nevertheless, he had certainly earned the northern division’s respect on their journey. He had a sense of humor, marching on foot, enduring any hardships alongside the militia. Once he returned to Williamsburg, there was more to do than simply catching up on any administrative matters he had missed. He returned to communication from Lord Dartmouth, challenging Dunmore’s motivations and behavior regarding the recent conflict with the Shawnee. Dartmouth questioned the actions of Captain Connolly, and what Connolly had been permitted to do in Dunmore’s name. Not the least of the

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13 Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), March 11, 1775, 3.
14 Ibid.
charges against Dunmore were that Connolly’s militia had attacked friendly American Indians. Dartmouth notes, “My Intelligence through a variety of other Channels, confirms these facts.”16

In response to the Earl of Dartmouth’s letters, Dunmore’s explanation attempted to shift blame. It was the fault of the American Indians, he said. If it was not really their fault, then it was the frontier Virginians. Failing that, it was the fault of Pennsylvanians attempting to drive a wedge between the Virginians and the American Indians. “But My Lord,” he pleaded, “I have learnt from experience that the established Authority of any government in America, and the policy of Government at home, are both insufficient to restrain the Americans.”17 He was not wrong. The colonists certainly had minds of their own, as recent events in Boston had shown. Their culpability in Dunmore’s War is a different question. Yet in his response to Dartmouth, it was under no circumstances that he, Lord Dunmore, was to blame. It did not matter that he commissioned Connolly to go take charge of Fort Pitt, or that Connolly encouraged panic over the supposed disposition of the Shawnee.18

It especially did not matter that Dunmore had seen the Fort Pitt area as holding potential for his land aspirations. In fact, he brought up the accusations that he was conspiring with land jobbers to Lord Dartmouth. Although he had denied other accusations at length, he does not specifically deny this one. Thomas H. Smith implied Dunmore’s support for Virginia’s land claims was proof that he was a true friend of the colony. Smith said, “No one who owed his position to an imperialistic government could have more vigorously defended a colony’s

16 Earl Dartmouth to Gov. Dunmore, September 8, 1774, in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 577-78.


18 Years later, George Rogers Clark stated that Connolly’s message had inspired Michael Cresap’s declaration of war against the Shawnee right before the Yellow Creek Massacre in 1774. Dunmore proceeded to give Cresap a captain’s commission in Dunmore’s War. David, Dunmore’s New World, 77-85.
claims.”¹⁹ It should be considered whether Dunmore was defending the colony’s claims, or defending his own hopes while in that colony.

In the aftermath of Dunmore’s War, rumors circulated that left the men of the Virginia frontier sceptical of Dunmore’s motivations. They found it suspicious that, as some claimed, there were American Indians meeting with Dunmore one day, and joining Cornstalk’s attack on Lewis’s army the next.²⁰ Many believed Dunmore had encouraged the Shawnee to attack. Captain John Stuart reflected on these suspicions in his memoirs. He found the words of William McCulloch the night before the Battle of Point Pleasant odd, still thinking about them years later. He also mentioned a book author who claimed to be present on their expedition, but whose name was not familiar to him. Stuart suspected the person was “in cog, and a creature of Lord Dunmore.”²¹ After all, many of the colonists who were part of Dunmore’s War had marched already intent on revolution. Colonel Adam Stephen of the northern division was to attend the first Continental Congress, but found matters on the frontier more pressing. It would be logical that they would suspect Dunmore of having more than one thing on his mind as well. Lieutenant James Trabue served in Dunmore’s northern division and later told his brother, “The Governor was certain of a war with Britain and there was nothing else talked about scarcely but the War.”²²

Another claim that can be found multiple times in the Virginia Gazette is that Dunmore marched the northern division with “less than a gill of powder a man.”²³ This is an unusual way of measuring powder, but it got the point across. It would have been enough to fire

¹⁹ Smith, American Revolution, 4.

²⁰ Virginia Gazette (Purdie), October 27, 1775, 2.

²¹ Stuart, Indian Wars, 56.


²³ Virginia Gazette (Purdie), October 27, 1775, 2.
approximately 20-25 rounds. Yet the claims were that Dunmore had purchased over three pounds of powder per man, at least twelve times as much. The theory was that Dunmore would not have marched with so little powder if he had any intention of being involved in a proper battle. In the meantime, where was the rest of this scarce commodity that had been purchased for the expedition? It is possible their suspicions were based on evidence, or they may have been influenced by the Gunpowder Incident.24

The Gunpowder Incident occurred on April 21, 1775. The Battles of Lexington and Concord had taken place on April 19. Two days later, in the early morning hours, Dunmore ordered Virginia’s gunpowder stores removed from the powder magazine in Williamsburg.25 He claimed there were rumors of a nearby slave uprising. The Virginians were incensed, not believing his excuse. Meanwhile, Dunmore was writing to Dartmouth with a request for additional arms. With more weapons, he said, he could control Virginia using “Indians, Negroes, and other persons.”26 This was ironic given the excuse he had used for taking the gunpowder.

These events made it impossible for Governor Dunmore to travel to Fort Pitt to conclude a formal treaty with the American Indians as previously planned. As early as February 1775, reports had arrived from the frontier that the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenesaunee were eager to

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24 A “gill” is typically for measuring liquids, usually equal to one fourth an Imperial pint. Timothy S. Davis, a living historian and flintlock rifle builder with 25 years experience, estimated this would work out to about ¼ pound of powder or half a powder horn full. He stated that this would be enough to fire 20-25 rounds from a musket, or perhaps a bit more if the shooter was carrying a smaller caliber rifle. However, he noted that most would be carrying a musket or fowler, not a rifle. Though it is hard to say based on the Virginia Gazette article, Mr. Davis theorized that, with a gill being about the same as a tea cup, it would have been a unit of measurement familiar to readers at the time. James A. H. Murray and Henry Bradley, eds., A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles: Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by the Philological Society, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 163; Timothy S. Davis, Facebook message to author, January 22, 2022; Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), December 9, 1775, 2.

25 According to reports, 20 barrels of gunpowder were taken by marines and loaded onto a British Navy ship, the Magdalen. Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), April 22, 1775, 2.

26 David, Dunmore’s New World, 106.
conclude a peace. Some said the Pennsylvanians were stirring up trouble, telling the tribes that the Virginians would return with another army.\textsuperscript{27} Whether or not that was true, there was reason enough to be anxious when there were still hostages in the hands of Virginians. To buy himself time and “quiet the minds of his countrymen,” Dunmore sent one hostage back to the Shawnee under the care of Colonel Christian.\textsuperscript{28} In the months afterwards, Dunmore still made no meaningful arrangements for the treaty. Captain Connolly and Virginia’s House of Burgesses both noted the delay.

The timing is uncertain, but at some point Connolly wrote to Dunmore and asked what he was to do with the Haudenosaunee prisoners at Fort Pitt. Dunmore authorized Connolly to convene a meeting of the Shawnee and Ohio Haudenosaunee to devise a treaty, return the prisoners, and “endeavour to incline them to espouse the royal cause.”\textsuperscript{29} This may have been around June 1775, as Connolly notes that Virginia’s assembly appointed their own representatives to review his “conduct” and work towards a treaty.\textsuperscript{30} On June 24, 1775, the \textit{Virginia Gazette} reported the House of Burgesses had passed a resolution to placate the concerned tribes and colonists along the Virginia frontier. They cited it as a necessity given “no steps having been pursued by his Lordship for carrying on the said treaty, or delivering up the Indian hostages, agreeable to the terms of said treaty.”\textsuperscript{31} Among the names put forward to act as

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Virginia Gazette} (Pinkney), February 16, 1775, 3.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Virginia Gazette} (Purdie), February 10, 1775, 4. It would have been Wissecapoway (Captain Morgan) who was released in the care of Colonel Christian, though his name is not provided.

\textsuperscript{29} John Connolly, “A Narrative of the Transactions, Imprisonment, and Sufferings of John Connolly, an American Loyalist and Lieut. Col. in His Majesty’s Service,” \textit{The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography} 12, 3 (October 1888), 315.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Virginia Gazette} (Purdie), June 23, 1774, 3.
commissioners were George Washington and Andrew Lewis. The assembly also set aside up to two thousand pounds to cover the expenses of a treaty.

As part of Virginia’s efforts to maintain peace along the frontier, Captain James Wood visited the Ohio tribes and invited them to Fort Pitt for the treaty. This conference was to occur on September 10, 1775, almost a year after the Camp Charlotte agreement. Wood found that the Shawnee, as well as sixteen other tribes, had received wampum from the British at Detroit. The British were recruiting support from the American Indian tribes with which to attack the colonists from the west. The Shawnee reassured Wood that “whatever they had received from Fort Detroit they had buried in the ground, never more to rise.”

Despite their commitment to peace, the Shawnee had reason for concern. Genusa (the Judge) had arrived back at that town just a day before Wood arrived. He came with a story that did not add up with the one Wood told. Genusa believed that the Virginians’s preparations for war were aimed at the Shawnee, and that the only white man on their side was Governor Dunmore. He had “escaped” after learning the Virginians intended to make him a slave and send him to another country, believing at least one of the other hostages had been killed. What he had not realized, was that after he ran the Virginians sent letters “directing all our People to treat him kindley and to let him Pass.”

Captain Wood immediately asked to share the Virginians’s side of Genusa’s story. Though Genusa spent two months believing himself to have been on the run for his life, Wood assured all the Shawnee that was not the case. He explained the dispute between the American colonists and Great Britain, the actual dispute Genusa had witnessed them preparing for. The Virginians had no plans to make the Shawnee hostages into slaves. Wood promised that

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32 Force, American Archives, vol. 1, 76.

33 Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., The Revolution on Upper Ohio, 1775-1777 (Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908), 42. Genusa is spelled “Chenusaw” in some sources.
Imcatewhaywa and Neawah were well. They were traveling to Fort Pitt with the Virginians, to be returned at the same time everyone met for the treaty. They were even bringing Genusa’s clothes and other belongings that he had left behind in his haste. After hearing Wood’s explanation, the Shawnee replied, “We are fully satisfied with what you have told us, and hope you will not think hard of us for his bad behaviour.” It seemed Genusa had misunderstood the situation because he did not speak English, or at least not fluently.

On September 26, Cornstalk and Andrew Lewis met once more. They were both among those gathered at Fort Pitt to negotiate a formal peace. Over the following days, more representatives arrived. Lord Dunmore negotiated the Camp Charlotte agreement that this would be based on, but things had changed. As part of the proceedings, the commissioners explained they now spoke on behalf of the “United Colonies.” Captain White Eyes also took the initiative to speak, announcing that the Lenape, Wyandot, Shawnee, and Ottawa had joined together. This was a significant move, stating their autonomy from the Haudenosaunee after years of the Covenant Chain serving as consent for every treaty.

A point of contention was the return of captives among the Shawnee. It had been a requirement of the Camp Charlotte agreement, and Cornstalk had made several trips to return people and property, but everyone knew there were more among the Shawnee. This had been a problem since Pontiac’s War, when the British Indian Agents had eventually just turned a blind


35 Thwaites and Kellogg, Upper Ohio, 60.

36 In addition to Andrew Lewis, the other commissioners from Virginia were Thomas Walker, James Wood, and Adam Stephen. Also present was Lewis Morris of New York, recently appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs by Congress, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania. The American Indian headmen known to be present were: Kiashuta, White Mingo and Flying Crow of the Ohio Haudenosaunee; the Half-King of the Wyandot, Shaganaba, son of Pontiac, of the Ottawa; and Custaloga, Captain Pipe, and Captain White Eyes of the Lenape.

37 Ibid., 84.
eye. Cornstalk explained that some were unwilling to return to the white people, and it was especially difficult for the Shawnee to surrender black people, or the children of black and American Indian parents, who would be slaves among the Virginians. He also refused to give hostages as he had the year before, since he had returned many people and horses in good faith. The Shawnee admitted their young men had recently attacked south of the Ohio River, but word came to the commissioners that the damage was worse than the Shawnee had acknowledged.

Doctor Thomas Walker replied, “If you will Continue to do us Mischief you must not Expect to be treated with such Lenity as you were in the Year 1764 by [Colonel Bouquet] and by Lord Dunmore last fall.”38 The Shawnee offered to allow representatives of the Virginians to go into the Shawnee towns to look for any people or property yet to be returned, but the Virginians felt they would have a hard time locating anything in towns they were unfamiliar with. To keep the peace, Kiashuta of the Ohio Haudenosaunee tried to broker a compromise. He said that he believed the Virginians had demanded “nothing more of [the Shawnee] than what you’ve a right to ask of them.”39 He offered to send men into the Shawnee towns to make sure they returned all people and property. However, White Eyes spoke up and stated, “I for my part do not love to speak lies my young Men may go to the Towns but I am sure they will bring nothing back with them as I have not heard my Grand Children the Shawanese promise their bretheren to deliver up what belonged to them.”40 In the end, it was Nimwha, not Cornstalk, who promised on behalf of

38 Thwaites and Kellogg, *Upper Ohio*, 118.

39 Ibid., 119.

40 Ibid., 121.
the Shawnee to relinquish anyone or anything belonging to Virginia. The Treaty of Fort Pitt was completed on October 21, 1775.

Meanwhile, Dunmore promoted John Connolly to the rank of Major. Major Connolly had traveled to meet with General Gage regarding the plan to use American Indians and African slaves to their advantage. For his work on the American Indian aspect of their plan, Connolly made a significant error. He assumed the loyalty of John Gibson. The trader who had been married to Logan’s sister and later joined the northern division under Dunmore now stood with the revolutionaries. When Gibson received a letter from Connolly, asking that he take the enclosed copy of Dunmore’s speech to White Eyes, he immediately turned the documents over to the West Augusta Committee of Safety. In the written speech, Dunmore acknowledged a belt of wampum that Captain White Eyes had sent for King George III. White Eyes had been strategically working to protect his people from further loss of land. Dunmore gave his assurances that the king would protect the Lenape from the American colonists and asked that White Eyes relay the same message to the Shawnee and Haudenosaunee. It was the letter Connolly wrote to Gibson that was far more provocative. He warned Gibson about “what is now

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41 Thwaites and Kellogg, *Upper Ohio*, 126-27. Nimwha and Cornstalk were brothers. Those appointed to inspect the Shawnee towns for further people or property were: John Gibson and another white man for Virginia; Kightoi and Kenightie for the Haudenosaunee; Tetepuska, Winganum, and Joseph Pepy for the Lenape; and Allanawissica and Wewelatimiha for the Shawnee. They were accompanied by headmen Kiashuta of the Ohio Haudenosaunee and Captain Pipe of the Lenape.

42 This plan may have begun when Captain White Eyes was helping Dunmore in the fall of 1774. There was a plan in place for Connolly, White Eyes, and some other Lenape headmen to travel to England and request a permanent land grant for the tribe from King George III. The request was hinged on the idea that the Lenape had converted to Christianity, adopting a lifestyle more like that of the English. Historian James O'Donnell referred to this adoption of Christianity as “cultural suicide,” because it required the Lenape to sacrifice everything about their culture. Connolly’s arrest and other events of the American Revolution seemed to interfere with this plan, and Captain White Eyes later allied with the American colonists. It is possible that Dunmore’s offer of assistance to the Lenape was one more way to assert Virginian control over the area. Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Shippen, Jr., July 12, 1775, in Smith and St. Clair, *St. Clair Papers*, 358; James O'Donnell, “Who is There to Mourn for Logan? No One! The Native American Crisis in the Ohio Country, 1774-1783,” in Smith, *American Revolution*, 19; Hermann Wellenreuther, “White Eyes and the Delawares’ Vision of an Indian State,” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 68, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 146.
so ridiculously called patriotick spirit.” Word spread and Connolly and his companions were arrested. In reflecting upon his arrest and imprisonment, Connolly lamented Gibson’s “dishonourable act.” Another letter, published in December, confessed, “I have, by direction from his excellency lord Dunmore, prepared the Ohio Indians to act in concert with me against his majesty’s enemies in that quarter.”

Back in Virginia, Dunmore worked on the plan to turn African slaves into a fighting force. On November 7, 1775, Dunmore signed a proclamation offering freedom to any “indentured servants, negroes, or others (appertaining to rebels)” who joined the British army. Lord Dartmouth had approved of Dunmore’s plans to use these individuals, as well as the American Indians, as a fighting force. Dunmore’s Ethiopian Regiment numbered between two hundred and three hundred men within weeks of the proclamation. Between the Ethiopian Regiment and attempts to turn American Indians against the American colonists, this led to the Declaration of Independence’s accusation regarding domestic insurrections.

While this thesis has treated Lord Dunmore’s War as a separate engagement from the American Revolution, it is necessary to address why so many have considered them linked. The colonies were already in a state of alarm in 1774, and it would be easy to feel every potential source of danger to be connected. In retrospect, men who fought in both wars might easily

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43 Virginia Gazette (Purdie), November 10, 1775, 3.


45 Virginia Gazette (Purdie), December 22, 1775, 1.

46 Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), November 23, 1775, 2.

47 David, Dunmore’s New World, 104-07; Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 147. Maier lists the charge as referencing “slaves and Loyalists,” but Congress was equally aware of British efforts to use American Indians.
believe Governor Dunmore had set them up in the Indian War. As John W. Shy expressed, “The long-term causes of both Dunmore’s war and the American Revolution are tightly-intertwined.” ⁴⁸ In both, the British government’s attempts to control westward expansion contributed to colonists’s frustrations. There was also the idea that representatives of the king believed an Indian War might distract the colonists enough to avert a rebellion, or that sowing discontent between Virginia and Pennsylvania might prevent the colonies from uniting against Britain. Otis K. Rice proposed such beliefs were “those of ultra-patriotic veterans, or of historians and antiquarians who read their history of the Revolution backwards.” ⁴⁹ This is quite possible, though it does not change the similarities.

For the American Indians, these two wars are even more connected. Warren Hofstra wrote that the events of Dunmore’s War “were soon overshadowed by the American Revolution and largely lost to the larger narrative of American history.” ⁵⁰ However, “a turning point” was from 1774 to 1775 for these tribes and their ongoing efforts to protect their lands and way of life. ⁵¹ The part of Dunmore’s War that was between Virginia and Pennsylvania was about which white people would control the Forks of the Ohio and, in turn, the land farther west. For the tribes farther away from the colonies, like the Wyandot and Ottawa, siding with the British seemed an easy way of trying to protect their lands. For the Shawnee and Lenape, it was a harder decision. Their lands were closer to the colonies, and a wrong decision could have a higher cost. Their hesitation bought the United Colonies time to improve their western defenses. Importantly,


⁵⁰ Hofstra, New Virginia, 327.

⁵¹ Ibid.
victory in Dunmore’s War played a role in the eventual boundary lines when the American Revolution concluded. Otherwise, that boundary likely would have been set at the Alleghanies.\footnote{Robert B. Boehm, “Fort Gower,” in Smith, American Revolution, 27; Ibid., 6-7. Otis K. Rice, “The Ohio Valley in the American Revolution: A General View”; Howard, American Nation, 241.}
Conclusion

Woody Holton wrote, “An army of two thousand Virginians attacked the Shawnee and Mingo towns on the Muskingum River, a northern tributary of the Ohio, and forced headmen to deed all the land east of the Ohio River, including all of Kentucky, to Virginia.”¹ This is similar to the accounts given by many modern historians. In reality, approximately four hundred men, primarily from the Fort Pitt area, marched on the upper Shawnee towns along the Muskingum River. These Virginians were the inhabitants of disputed territory and influenced by Captain John Connolly. The Battle of Wakatomika only served to infuriate the American Indians, doing nothing to force a peace. In a later battle at Point Pleasant, approximately one thousand Virginians fought against what was most likely seven hundred American Indians. The full army of Virginians never fought or even marched together. The peace terms, asking the Shawnee to cede land that the Haudenosaunee had ceded in previous treaties, was the work of the royal governor, Lord Dunmore. Though the men of the southern division had no part in the peace, Dunmore did not request any new cessions from the American Indians.

Despite the lack of research on Lord Dunmore’s War, it had important ramifications. As B. Scott Crawford said, it was “a culmination of twenty years of frontier warfare.”² It shaped the strategies used by the Lenape, Ohio Haudenosaunee, and Shawnee tribes to deal with the ongoing expansion of white settlements. They attempted to work with the American colonists towards peace, allowing those colonists to focus on their war with Great Britain. Once the American Revolution concluded, the boundaries outlined by the Treaty of Paris resulted in a larger United States than would have been probable without Dunmore’s War.

¹ Holton, Forged Founders, 34.

² B. Scott Crawford, “A Frontier of Fear,” 27.
Certainly, this extension of the boundaries was an important outcome for the families of the Virginia frontier. Following Dunmore’s War, more colonists chose to move into what is now West Virginia and Kentucky. George Washington recommended to the Continental Congress that they appoint Andrew Lewis as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army. However, rumors about poor leadership at Point Pleasant prevented the appointment. Andrew Lewis did help lead the Virginia militia forces that eventually drove Governor Dunmore from Virginia and was promoted to brigadier general during the American Revolution. He also attended a later treaty with the American Indians at Fort Pitt in 1778. General Andrew Lewis died September 25, 1781 on his way home to Botetourt County.3

Colonel William Fleming was unable to fight in the American Revolution after his injuries at Point Pleasant, but he did recover and served as acting governor of Virginia in 1781.4 However, many others did fight. One of many examples was Captain William Campbell of Fincastle County. He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and was one of the officers that led patriot forces to victory at the Battle of King’s Mountain. He was also known for being particularly harsh towards loyalists.5

There were divisions within the Shawnee following Camp Charlotte. In November 1777, Cornstalk visited Fort Randolph at Point Pleasant. During the visit, Cornstalk explained that it had become much harder to convince the rest of the Shawnee to maintain neutrality. Captain Matthew Arbuckle imprisoned him within the fort. It is possible he doubted Cornstalk’s loyalty, or believed by taking some Shawnee hostage he could force the rest of the tribe to maintain their

3 Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History, 427.
4 Ibid., 429.
5 Tillson, Gentry and Common Folk, 114-115.
neutrality. Cornstalk’s son, Elinipsico, and some companions were detained as well when they came looking for Cornstalk. A few days later some Ohio Haudenosaunee attacked nearby. Men within Fort Randolph reacted by killing the four Shawnee before Captain Arbuckle could stop them. This cost the Virginians a loyal and honest ally. Another valuable ally was lost in 1778. Captain White Eyes of the Lenape died while guiding some colonists toward hostile American Indian towns. He had been hesitant to abandon neutrality, but was a willing guide. It was said he died of smallpox, but there is evidence this may have been a cover up for his murder. He was likely killed by American militiamen, the same men he was attempting to help.

Lord Dunmore’s War was about land and loyalty. Decades of land disputes came to a head at a time when the American colonies were poised for revolution. These disputes could have been settled at any time, but were pushed to the forefront by the insistence of Governor Dunmore and Captain John Connolly. Dunmore knew the loyalty of the Virginians was in question, but it is unlikely he thought his own expedition would become one of the many reasons colonists distrusted the British government. After Camp Charlotte, he endeavoured to turn the American Indians against the United Colonies. Instead, the Indian War bought colonists more time to prepare themselves for war with Great Britain.

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Appendix A:

Fort Gower Resolves

At a Meeting of the Officers under the Command of his Excellency the Right Honourable the EARL of DUNMORE, convened at Fort Gower, November 5, 1774, for the Purpose of considering the Grievances of BRITISH AMERICA, an Officer present addressed the Meeting in the following Words:

GENTLEMEN,

Having now concluded the Campaign, by the Assistance of Providence, with Honour and Advantage to the Colony, and ourselves, it only remains that we should give our Country the strongest Assurance that we are ready, at all Times, to the utmost of our Power, to maintain and defend her just Rights and Privileges. We have lived about three Months in the Woods, without any intelligence from Boston, or from the Delegates at Philadelphia. It is possible, from the groundless Reports of designing Men, that our Countrymen may be jealous of the Use such a Body would make of Arms in their Hands at this critical Juncture. That we are a respectable Body is certain, when it is considered that we can live Weeks without Bread or Salt, that we can sleep in the open Air without any Covering but that of the Canopy of Heaven, and that our Men can march and shoot with any in the known World. Blessed with these Talents, let us solemnly engage to one another, and our Country in particular, that we will use them to no Purpose but for the Honour and Advantage of America in general, and of Virginia in particular. It behoves us then, for the Satisfaction of our Country, that we should give them our real Sentiments, by Way of Resolves, at this very alarming Crisis.

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1 Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), December 22, 1774, 1-2. The newspaper used long-s (ſ) throughout. These have been changed to a short-s (s).
Whereupon the Meeting made Choice of a Committee to draw up and prepare Resolves for their Consideration, who immediately withdrew; and after some Time spent therein, reported, that they had agreed to and prepared the following Resolves, which were read, maturely considered, and agreed to, *nemine contradicente*, by the Meeting, and ordered to be published in the Virginia Gazette.

Resolved, that we will bear the most faithful Allegiance to his Majesty King George III., whilst his Majesty delights to reign over a brave and free People; that we will, at the Expense of Life, and every Thing dear and valuable, exert ourselves in Support of the Honour of his Crown and the Dignity of the British Empire. But, as the Love of Liberty, and Attachment to the real Interests and just Rights of America outweigh every other Consideration, we resolve, that we will exert every Power within us for the Defence of American Liberty, and for the Support of her just Rights and Privileges; not in any precipitate, riotous, or tumultous Manner, but when regularly called forth by the unanimous Voice of our Countrymen.

Resolved, that we entertain the greate[st] Respect for his Excellency the Right Honourable Lord [DU]NMORE, who commanded the Expedition against the Shawanese; and who, we are confident, underwent the great Fatigue of this singular Campaign from no other Motive than the true interest of this Country.

Signed by Order, and in Behalf of the whole Corps.

BENJAMIN ASHBY, Clerk
Appendix B:

Fincastle Resolutions

FINCASTLE, Jan. 20, 1775.

In obedience to the resolves of the Continental Congress, a meeting of the freeholders of this county was held this day, who, after approving of the association framed by that august body in behalf of all the colonies, and subscribing thereto, proceeded to the election of a committee, to see the same carried punctually into execution, when the following Gentlemen were nominated: Reverend Charles Cummings, Colonel William Preston, Colonel William Christian, Captain Stephen Trigg, Major Arthur Campbell, Major William Inglis, Captain Walter Crockett, Captain John Montgomery, Captain James M’Gavock, Captain William Campbell, Captain Thomas Madison, Captain Daniel Smith, Captain William Russell, Captain Evan Shelby, and Lieutenant William Edmondson.

After the election, the committee made choice of Colonel WILLIAM CHRISTIAN for their chairman, and appointed Mr. David Campbell to be clerk.

The following address was then unanimously agreed to by the people of the county, and is as follows:

To the Honourable Peyton Randolph, Esq; Richard Henry Lee, George Washington, Patrick Henry, junior, Richard Bland, Benjamin Harrison, and Edmund Pendleton, Esquires, the Delegates from this colony who attended the Continental Congress held at Philadelphia.

Gentlemen,

Had it not been for our remote situation, and the Indian war which we were lately engaged in, to chastise those cruel and savage people for the many murders and depredations

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1 Virginia Gazette (Purdie), February 10, 1775, 3. The newspaper used long-s (ſ) throughout. These have been changed to a short-s (s).
they have committed amongst us (now happily terminated, under the auspices of our present
worthy Governour, his Excellency the Right Honourable the Earl of Dunmore) we should before
this time have made known to you our thankfulness for the very important services you have
rendered to your country, in conjunction with the worthy Delegates from the other provinces.
Your noble efforts for reconciling the Mother Country and the Colonies, on rational and
constitutional principles, and your pacifick, steady, and uniform conduct in that arduous work,
entitle you to the esteem of all British America, and will immortalize you in the annals of your
country. We heartily concur in your resolutions, and shall, in every instance, strictly and
invariably adhere thereto.

We assure you, Gentlemen, and all our countrymen, that we are a people whose hearts
overflow with love and duty to our lawful sovereign George III. whose illustrious house, for
several successive reigns, have been the guardians of the civil and religious rights and liberties of
British subjects, as settled at the glorious Revolution; that we are willing to risk our lives in the
service of his Majesty, for the support of the Protestant religion, and the rights and liberties of his
subjects, as they have been established by compact, law, and ancient charters.

We are heartily grieved at the differences which now subsist between the parent state and
the colonies, and most ardently wish to see harmony restored, on an equitable basis, and by the
most lenient measures that can be devised by the heart of man.

Many of us, and our forefathers, left our native land, considering it as a kingdom
subjected to inordinate power, and greatly abridged of its liberties. We crossed the Atlantick, and
explored this then uncultivated wilderness, bordering on many nations of savages, and
surrounded by mountains almost inaccessible to any but those very savages, who have
incessantly been committing barbarities and depredations on us since our first seating the
country. These fatigues and dangers were patiently encountered, supported by the pleasing hope of enjoying those rights and liberties which had been granted to Virginians and were denied us in our native country, and of transmitting them inviolate to our posterity. But even to these remote regions the hand of unlimited and unconstitutional power hath pursued us, to strip us of the liberty and property with which God, nature, and the rights of humanity, have vested us. We are ready and willing to contribute all in our power for the support of his Majesty’s government, if applied to constitutionally, and when the grants are made by our own representatives; but cannot think of submitting our liberty or property to the power of a venal British parliament, or to the will of a corrupt ministry.

We by no means desire to shake off our duty or allegiance to our lawful sovereign, but on the contrary shall ever glory in being the loyal subjects of a Protestant prince, descended from such illustrious progenitors, so long as we can enjoy the free exercise of our religion, as Protestants, and our liberties and properties, as British subjects.

But if no pacifick measures shall be proposed or adopted by Great Britain, and our enemies will attempt to dragoon us out of those inestimable privileges which we are entiteld to as subjects, and to reduce us to a state of slavery, we declare, that we are deliberately and resolutely determined never to surrender them to any power upon earth, but at the expense of our lives.

These are our real, though unpolished sentiments, of liberty and loyalty, and in them we are resolved to live and die.

We are, Gentlemen, with the most perfect esteem and regard, your most obedient servants.
Appendix C:

Augusta Resolves\(^1\)

MR. PINKNEY,

YOU are requested to give the following a place in your paper as soon as you possibly can: In doing so you will oblige your customers in Augusta county.

After due notice given to the freeholders of Augusta county, to meet in Staunton for the purpose of electing delegates to represent them in colony convention at the town of Richmond, on the 20th day of this instant March, the freeholders of said county thought proper to refer the choice of their delegates to the judgment of the committee, who, thus authorized by the general voice of the people, met at the courthouse on the 22d day of February, and unanimously chose Mr. Thomas Lewis and captain Samuel McDowell to represent them in the ensuing convention.

Instructions were then ordered to be drawn up by the reverent Alexander Balmain, Mr. Samson Matthews, captain Alexander MClenachan, Mr. Michael Bowyer, Mr. William Lewis, and captain George Matthews, or any three of them, and delivered to the delegates thus chosen, which are as follow:

To Mr. Thomas Lewis and captain Samuel McDowell.

The committee of Augusta county, pursuant to the trust reposed in a colony convention, proposed to be held in Richmond on the 20\(^{th}\) of March instant. They desire that you may consider the people of Augusta county as impressed with just sentiments of loyalty and allegiance to his majesty king George, whose title to the imperial crown of Great Britain rests on no other foundation than the liberty, and whose glory is inseparable from the happiness, of all his subjects. We have also a respect for the parent state, which respect is founded on religion, on

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\(^1\) Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), March 16, 1775, 2. The newspaper used long-s (ſ) throughout. These have been changed to a short-s (s).
law, and the genuine principles of the constitution. On these principles do we earnestly desire to see harmony and a good understanding restored between Great Britain and America. Many of us and our forefathers left their native land, and explored this once savage wilderness, to enjoy the free exercise of the rights of conscience, and of human nature: These rights we are fully resolved, with our lives and fortunes, inviolably to preserve, nor will we surrender such inestimable blessings, the purchase of toil and danger, to any minister, to any parliament, or any body of men upon earth, by whom we are not represented, and in whose decisions therefore we have no voice.

We desire you to tender, in the most respectful terms, our grateful acknowledgements to the late worthy delgates of this colony, for their wise, spirited, and patriotic exertions, in the general congress, and to assure them that we will uniformly and religiously adhere to their resolutions, prudently and generously formed for their country’s good.

Fully convinced that the safety and happiness of America depend, next to the blessing of Almighty God, on the unanimity and wisdom of her councils, we doubt not you will, on your parts, comply with the recommendation of the late continental congress, appointing delegates form this colony to meet in Philadelphia on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of May next, unless American grievances be redressed before that time; and as we are determined to maintain unimpaired that liberty which is the gift of Heaven to the subjects of Britain’s empire, we will most cordially join our countrymen in such measures as may be deemed wise and necessary to secure and perpetuate the ancient, just, and legal rights of this colony, and all British America.

As the state of this colony greatly demands that manufactures should be encouraged by every possible means, we desire you to use your endeavours that bounties may be proposed by the convention for the making of salt, steel, wool cards, paper, and gunpowder, and that, in the mean time, a supply of ammunition be provided for the militia of this colony. We entirely agree
in opinion with the gentlemen of Fairfax county, that a well regulated militia is the natural
strength, and staple security, of a free government, and therefore wish it might be recommended
by the convention to the officers and men of each county in Virginia to make themselves masters
of the military exercise, published by order of his majesty in the year 1764.

Placing our ultimate trust in the supreme disposer of every event, without whose gracious
interposition the wisest schemes may fail of success, we desire you to move the convention, that
some, which may appear to them most convenient, be set apart for imploring the blessing of
Almighty God in such plans as human wisdom and integrity may think necessary to adopt for
preserving AMERICA happy, virtous, and free.
Appendix D:

Botetourt Resolutions ¹

To Col. ANDREW LEWIS, and Mr. JOHN BOWYER.

GENTLEMEN,

For your past service, you have our thanks, and we presume it is all the reward ye desire. And as we have again committed you the greatest trust we can confer (that of appearing for us in the great Council of the colony) we think it expedient ye hear our sentiments at this important juncture. And first, we require you to represent us with hearts replete with the most grateful and loyal veneration for the race of Brunswick, for they have been truly our fathers; and at the same time the most dutiful affection for our Sovereign, of whose honest heart we cannot entertain any diffidence; but sorry we are to add, that in his councils we can no longer confide: A set of miscreants, unworthy to administer the laws of Britain’s empire, have been permitted impiously to sway. How unjustly, cruelly, and tyrannically, they have invaded our rights, we need not now put you in mind. We only say, and we assert it with pride, that the subjects of Britain are ONE; and when the honest man of Boston, who has broke no law, has his property wrested from him, the hunter on the Allegany must take the alarm, and, as a FREEMAN of America, he will fly to his Representatives and thus instruct them: Gentlemen, my gun, my tomahawk, my life, I desire you to tender to the honour of my King and country; but my LIBERTY, to range these woods on the same terms my father has done is not mine to give up; it was not purchased by me, and purchased it was; it is entailed on my son, and the tenure is sacred. Watch over it, Gentlemen, for to him it must descend unviolated, if my arm can defend it; but if not, if wicked power is

¹ Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), March 11, 1775, 3. The newspaper used long-s (ſ) throughout. These have been changed to a short-s (s).
permitted to prevail against me, the original purchase was blood, and mine shall seal the surrender.

That our countrymen, and the world, may know our disposition, we choose that this be published. And we have one request to add, that is, that the SONS of WORTH and FREEDOM who appeared for us at Philadelphia will accept our most ardent, grateful acknowledgments; and we hereby plight them our faith, that we will religiously observe their resolutions, and obey their instructions, in contempt of our power, and temporary interest; and should the measures they have wisely calculated for our relief fail, we will stand prepared for every Contingency. We are Gentlemen, your dutiful, &c.

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Map Resources

