Conflict and Crisis:
U.S. Interventionism and Aid in the Middle East

Timothy A. Effrem

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Abstract

This thesis proposes that United States’ intervention in the Middle East since World War II has led to counterproductive military policy decisions and proposes a greater focus on private humanitarian aid which engages the Middle Eastern culture more effectively than public funding entities.

Conflict within the Middle East has escalated. To understand the nature of Middle Eastern political affairs, one must understand power politics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Shi’a-Sunni split, U.S. relations, and Just War Theory. The U.S. has played a prominent role in the region, and this thesis concludes that the amount of aid currently allocated between military and humanitarian needs are disproportionately directed toward governmental policies despite the greater effectiveness of solely private aid initiatives.
U.S. Interventionism and Aid in the Middle East

The policy posture of the U.S. toward the Middle East has fluctuated since the end of World War II, and has incited regime change and various military conflicts which have irrevocably altered the landscape of a region already destabilized. The general public’s misunderstanding and the press’s consistent misinformation about US policy objectives has led to further confusion, including the definitions of terms frequently used to characterize the region. The Middle East consists of nation-states and territories first identified as the Near East by some modern geographers, comprises Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Jordan. Also included are the states of the Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates or UAE, in addition to the African states of Egypt, Sudan, and Libya. The U.S. State Department still officially recognizes much of this territory as the Near East, while the territory of the Middle East has expanded to include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have received special attention, due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and their boundaries, though contested, are generally included in the geographical region of the Middle East.

U.S. presence in the region has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, and this has led to numerous questions as to whether that intervention met the standards of Just War Theory. The U.S. also provides billions of dollars in aid each year to Middle Eastern nations through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The reasons for and nature of public aid, and whether or not private humanitarian aid is more efficient and effective in meeting U.S. objectives, will be investigated, as well as the use of war powers by the U.S. and their nature.

2 Ibid.
U.S. Regional Politics

Following World War II, the United States had several main goals for the Middle East, which required a careful balancing of power. According to Thomas Juneau, “Power corresponds to the possession by a state of assets it can leverage to shape events in international politics in pursuit of its national interests.” The characteristics of power generally exceed merely the use of military force. Power is frequently ideologically or economically driven, and almost always exists relative to that of other nations. For instance, while the nation-state of Iran may be more powerful than Cyprus, Iran is not more powerful than the United States. Traditional U.S. objectives in the Middle East have remained broader than mere military conquests, and since World War II, they have been regarded primarily as a desire, in varying degrees, to promote regional democracy, oil commerce, the regulation of the region’s waterways, and the military support and defense of Israel and other nations with policies perceived as pro-American. According to Thomas Juneau, the projection of U.S. power in the Middle East falls under three categories: military/geo-political, economic, and ideological.

The Current State of Military Power in the Middle East

Military aid from the U.S. appears to be dominant over economic aid for a number of Middle Eastern countries. According to the USAID “Foreign Aid Explorer” dashboard, economic aid directly from USAID to Egypt has gone from over $500 million to $191 million in the period from 2005 to 2015, the last full year of reporting, a 65% decrease in a decade. In contrast, military aid from the U.S. Department of Defense stayed relatively stable with nearly

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 40-41, 45.
6 Ibid., 40-41.
$1.6 billion of military aid given in 2005 and $1.3 billion in 2015, only a 14% decrease. It should be noted, however, that military aid from the U.S. to Egypt briefly plummeted to around $275,000 in 2014 over the time of the nation’s military coup.

The United States intends to remain the dominant military power in the Middle East, and in part, to pursue its interests by leveraging its global superpower status. The U.S. has an extensive network of bases throughout many Arabian Peninsula nations including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, including a significant presence in Cyprus, Jordan, and Turkey. Besides the more than 35,000 troops stationed at these bases, the U.S. continues to maintain its powerful presence in Iraq and Egypt, while remaining Israel’s preeminent ally.

The U.S. provides $250 million annually to Egypt for economic assistance, but this is dwarfed by an incredible $1.3 billion in military aid. The economics of war play a large factor in U.S. aid. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, including most of the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) have all been armed with American weapons and funding, with $75 billion in U.S. arms sales over less than a decade.

Despite the different postures of the Bush and Obama administrations toward Israel, military aid from the U.S. increased substantially over that same time period of 2005-2015. Israel received nearly $2.7 billion in military aid in 2005 and nearly $3.3 billion in 2015, a 22% increase. The same is not true for economic aid however. USAID assistance to Israel plummeted 99% from $495 million in 2005 to a mere $2.3 million in 2015.

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8 “Foreign Aid Explorer: Trends,” USAID.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.,” 41-42.
12 Ibid., 42.
13 Ibid., 41-42.
14 “Foreign Aid Explorer: Trends,” USAID.
15 Ibid.
Strategically, the U.S. position appears extremely favorable relative to the overall balance of power, though its military partners in the region are dependent on such aid, and are far from being fully autonomous states. U.S. rivals in the region, primarily Iran and Syria, have experienced recent power imbalances and regime changes. However, the U.S. also competes with Russian and Chinese strategic interests and partnerships in the region.

**Iran and the Gulf States**

Thomas R. Mattair, executive director of the Middle East Policy Council in Washington D.C., explains that Iran is currently isolated from the Gulf States, and is experiencing internal conflict between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims which is escalating toward a civil war. The Gulf States are also frustrated by U.S. intervention in Iraq, and despite most of the Peninsula States refusing to interact with Iran in general diplomatic measures, they continue to criticize the U.S. posture against Iran. While Gulf States request U.S. protection from Shi’a controlled Iran, they demand any limitations placed on Iran, should be imposed upon India, Pakistan, and Israel. The contrasting diplomatic dynamics between Iraq, Iran, and the U.S. is referred to as a triadic relationship. The same is true of Iran, the U.S. and a Gulf State. Much information can be ascertained regarding the nature of Middle Eastern conflicts from studying these relationships.

**The Triadic Dynamic**

In “Triads in International Relations,” Alex Mintz and Uk Heo inventory and compartmentalize the triadic relationships in the Middle East. Notwithstanding the dyadic relationships between nations, they propose that triadic relations offer better insight into regional

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16 Juneau, “U.S. Power in the Middle East,” 44.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 45.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 11.
conflict, particularly when one nation is a superpower.\textsuperscript{22} When that superpower tends to maintain involvement through arms, aid, or trade, the dynamics of conflict and cooperation grant greater insight into much Middle Eastern conflict. U.S. aid to Egypt and Israel has affected dyadic relationships since the Camp David Accords in 1978, which has reduced the likelihood of militarized conflict between them,\textsuperscript{23} as have similar aid packages dispersed to Israel and Jordan. Conversely, U.S. aid to Israel which neglects Lebanon, Syria, or the Palestinian Authority, may increase the likelihood of conflict between these countries.\textsuperscript{24}

**Declining U.S. Influence – Soft Power**

Mintz’s and Heo’s study relies upon the “pliers analogy,” which contends that the influence of a third party holds significant sway upon the actions of a dyad.\textsuperscript{25} Superpower aid such as the United States provides, significantly affects the potential for dyadic conflict. The nation in a dyadic relationship which receives the most aid will be less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes, while the member which receives less aid, will not be significantly affected either way.\textsuperscript{26} The recent economic decline in the U.S. has decreased the desire for another costly ground war in the Middle East, and trade relations, even in light of the region’s oil exports, are not viewed as significant enough to justify another war.\textsuperscript{27} The U.S. imported less than ten percent of its total oil consumption from the entire Persian Gulf in 2012, and total trade with the Middle East accounted for less than five percent of U.S. trade the year prior, and seventy percent of that trade was oil.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 442-443.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 443.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 445.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Juneau, “U.S. Power in the Middle East,” 45.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 45-46.
U.S. ideological power, known as “soft power,” is the ability to influence through cultural and ideological appeal. Those seeking an enhanced U.S. influence in the Middle East have realized the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and an ever-growing ideological divide in the region, have depleted U.S. soft power. Even President Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech promising a new era of relations did little to change the status quo long-term. U.S. soft power has a slight advantage compared to Russia’s, but Iran has had ideological success in the region, and Syria’s most recent appeal to radical Islamists around the globe has gained significant traction, which is Dr. Juneau’s hypothesis. As recently as 2014, the future of soft power was believed to stem from a “moderate version of political Islam that rejects violence and is willing to participate in mainstream politics,” yet organizations labeled moderate, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, vehemently oppose the U.S. Dr. Juneau has claimed that the main U.S. rivals in the region, Syria and Iran, would remain isolated and weak, opposite of current trends. His theory on relative power in terms of the U.S. maintaining regional influence above China and Russia appears correct thus far, but the power relations in the region are extremely volatile, and the future role of the U.S. is being debated. However, in order to understand what the U.S. ought to do in the future, a review of its policy actions and past mistakes is vital, as is acquaintance with a region and culture dominated by Islam.

A Brief History of Islam in the Middle East

Mohammed (570-632 A.D.), gave the name Islam to his doctrine and faith in the Koran, and his writings and collected works is Islamism. A believer can be known as a Moslem or Mussulman, while a community can be Moslemim, Moslems, or Mussulmans, but never

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29 Juneau, “U.S. Power in the Middle East,” 47.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 48-49.
32 Ibid., 48.
33 Ibid., 51.
Mussulmen. Mohammed did not appoint a successor, but Ali, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law, was chosen as his khalif, which means substitute or successor, even though he was unable to take this position until after the non-familial succession which began with Mohammed’s closest adviser Abu-Beker, then his companion Omar, and followed by the merchant Othman.

In A.D. 634, Syria was invaded by Mohammed’s successors, Damascus fell, and the last vestige of the Greco-Roman empire was forced out of the banks of Yermouk, which flows into the sea of Tiberias. Three years later in A.D. 637, Jerusalem fell to the Moslems, and except for ninety years during the Crusades, remained in their control until the 20th century. Omar’s mosque was built on the site of Solomon’s temple, and in A.D. 638, Aleppo was taken by Decimes. Antioch was then overcome, which forced the Emperor of the Byzantine Empire, Heraclius, to flee to Constantinople.

Sophronius, the patriarch of Jerusalem at the time, surrendered Jerusalem in April of 637, after a four-month siege. Upon the advice of Mohammed’s eventual successor, Ali, Omar set up the terms for co-existing with the Christians within the terms for the treatment of non-Moslems (or Dhimmis). These include: heavy tribute and taxation; prohibition against using the same dress, names, servants of Moslems, or Arabic words on their seals; and selling wine, ringing bells, and displaying Christian symbols (notably the cross) in the open. Ockley’s history of the Saracens called this a “Heavier yoke than ever it had borne before, and… now it

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35 Ibid., 110-111.
36 Ibid., 112.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 112-113.
39 Ibid., 113-115.
40 Ibid., 114-115.
41 Ibid.
fell, as it were, once for all, into the hands of the most mortal enemies of the Christian religion.”

Khaled, who had conquered Syria in 634, died of ill health, and was succeeded by Amrou who conquered Persia for Omar before Firuz assassinated Amrou in the mosque of Medina. Othman then succeeded Amrou in 644 and through Abdullah, his general, and Zobeid, his leader, conquered Northern Africa eastward as far as Tripoli. Othman was also murdered and Ali, the son-in-law of Mohammed, succeeded to power twenty-two years after Othman’s death. However, Ali was also killed by an assassin in A.D. 660 at the age of sixty-three. The death of Ali led to what has become commonly known as the Sunni-Shi’a split; the Sunnis believe in the authority for all Imams, whereas Shi’as believe in the familial line of Mohammed and Ali as having the blessing of Allah, and comprising one of twelve leaders at most.

A History of U.S. Relations in the Middle East

Until the mid-twentieth century, Middle Eastern sentiment toward the United States was largely positive. However, another narrative has been constructed around U.S. alignment with Israel, coupled with a focus upon the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has resulted in frequent opposition to the U.S. pro-Israeli stance. Noam Chomsky delivered his analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian debate in a political speech at the University of Tromsø in 2012, where he declared the U.S. the cause of the region’s problems and asserted any action taken by the U.S. to defend

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43 Ibid., 116.
44 Ibid., 117.
45 Ibid.
Israel is tantamount to terrorism. Chomsky is far from the only voice equating U.S. support for Israel with terrorism. Anwar Al Darkazally, the legal advisor to the Negotiations Support Unit of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, claims that Israeli occupation of Palestine is an act of terror, and any aid from the U.S. is supporting an inhumane regime. While support of Israel has not caused most of the conflict in the region and is only one of many nations the U.S. supports, the majority-Moslem nations stand avidly opposed to such support. However, it is not simply a collection of authors and scholars who believe that the U.S. is causing terror through support of the nation-state of Israel. The United Nations Development Program cites Anti-Zionist propaganda, that American support of Israel has “adversely influenced human development in the region.” The report claims to be “an authentic reflection of the views and analysis of many of the most thoughtful reform-minded intellectual figures in the Arab region.” Counteracting what can appear scholarly and factual becomes increasingly difficult when recognized global agencies, such as the United Nations, make any action by Israel suspect, and in numerous cases, the U.N. has even refused to recognize Israel as a nation-state.

Changing Posture in the Middle East

U.S. military intervention in the Middle East has fluctuated since World War II, resulting in confusion over U.S. regional concerns. The Middle East doctrines of Presidents Eisenhower (1953-1961) and Carter (1977-1981) are of particular interest in regards to policy.

50 Ibid., 38.
pronouncements without proper planning; their doctrines were created without nuanced policy
details, and divorced from the input of allies and regional governments, and devoid of U.S.
military capability or preparedness. Those doctrines, though decades apart, have had eerily
similar policy implications, and scholarly comparisons conclude insights into U.S. missteps in
the Middle East.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

President Eisenhower’s desire to prevent and deter Soviet influence in the Middle East
leveraged increased U.S. power in the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine was an outgrowth of
the President’s address before a Joint Session of Congress in January, 1957. He requested
Congressional authorization to utilize U.S. armed forces, deployed in Lebanon the following
year, “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations,
requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International
Communism.” While the House of Representatives quickly approved the “Middle East
Resolution,” the Senate took more than two months of deliberation before doing so. Senators
were rightly concerned with the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and the President’s seemingly
vague request. Senator J. William Fulbright claimed the executive was requesting, “a blank grant
of power, for a blank length of time, under blank conditions with respect to blank nations in a
blank area.”

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Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly126, no. 3 (2011): 490-491, accessed May 4, 2016,
A270730576&sid=summon&v=2.1&u=vic_liberty&it=r&p=GRGM&sw=w&asid=326b6f9ca7144f58214e6ce1e3b
bd4d3.
52 Ibid., 471.
53 Ibid., 472-473.
54 Ibid., 473.
55 Ibid.
The language of the Joint Resolution maintained a near identical spirit to the manner in which the Eisenhower Doctrine was expressed before the Joint Session of Congress. In order to promote peace and stability, President Eisenhower was granted high levels of authorization in both aid and military deployment in the region. The first section of the Joint Resolution offers broad approval in terms of Middle Eastern aid declaring, “That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.”56 It is also relevant to note that interested parties were not consulted, and the resolution was never clearly articulated.

U.S. allies, U.S. government sectors responsible for its implementation, and regional nations potentially impacted by it, were all left to determine its meaning as part of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Pakistan understood it to mean she would be protected if attacked by India, Saudi Arabia requested a clearer definition of just who those controlled by international communism were, and Israeli officials demanded to know if the doctrine applied if they were attacked by an Arab state.57 While clear answers were never articulated, the State Department was tasked with building regional support for the doctrine, the CIA was required to combat its potential subversion, and the U.S. military was authorized to prepare for deployment to enforce it.58 The Eisenhower Doctrine was as unclearly applied as it was ill-defined.

In Lebanon and Jordan, where a lower risk of escalating tensions with the Soviet Union was perceived, the United States was willing to intervene militarily. While the U.S. had created potential plans to intervene in other nations of the Middle East, obstacles such as troop

58 Ibid., 477.
placements and proper air support remained relevant factors in the full implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine.\(^{59}\) In both Syria and Iraq, where military coups had occurred, and the possibility of Soviet intervention was strongest, the U.S. refused to intervene.\(^{60}\) Even though this posture directly contradicted the spirit of the Eisenhower Doctrine, fear of the Soviets, coupled with U.S. military constraints and Syrian disdain for U.S. aid, were enough to keep the U.S. from maintaining its hardline policy against the international communist threat.\(^{61}\)

**The Carter Doctrine**

Thirty-three years later, in January of 1980, the Carter Doctrine retained similar policy sentiments and lack of clarity. In his State of the Union Address before Congress, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed, “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force.”\(^{62}\) The doctrine stated nothing revolutionary as to the importance of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, or any attempt to compromise those interests.\(^{63}\) The doctrine was supposed to denote resolve in the wake of recent U.S. regional failures, particularly in the nation of Iran, and strengthen Carter’s upcoming re-election campaign. Interestingly, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski preferred the Carter Doctrine be based upon the Truman Doctrine instead of the similar Eisenhower Doctrine.\(^{64}\) Brzezinski writes, “On a number of occasions I had drawn the President’s attention to the significance of that [Truman] doctrine, and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I urged him explicitly to emulate President Truman’s historic act.”\(^{65}\) Nevertheless, the Carter Doctrine

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 478-480.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., 478-479.
\(^{62}\) Ibid., 481.
\(^{63}\) Ibid., 481-482.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., 482-483.
\(^{65}\) Ibid., 483.
did have the distinction of fundamentally altering the political perception of U.S. attitudes toward the Persian Gulf and was invoked in the military intervention of Kuwait in 1991 under President George Herbert Walker Bush. However, despite the apparent determination of the Carter Administration to protect vital Middle Eastern interests, the overthrow of the Iranian Shah in January of 1979 did not lead to any significant military action.66

Changing U.S. Interests

In 2008, Bradley Bowman, a former professor at West Point and a fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations, claimed that a successful U.S. military posture in the Middle East should focus on the nation’s interests: namely Persian Gulf oil, counter-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and counterterrorism.67 His position opposing the fight against al Qaeda and the “Global War on Terror” under former President George W. Bush, held that without an understanding of the need for, and consequences of a U.S. military presence, Moslem populations in the region will be antagonized, and consequently, the current Global War on Terror will be lengthened.68

Bowman summarizes the historical presence of U.S. troops in the Middle East to evidence his concerns. The U.S. deployed troops in Lebanon in 1958, then continued with international peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and the Sinai in the early ‘80s, with their continued U.S. troop presence through 2008.69 Until 1989, the United States had fewer than seven hundred troops in the Gulf States of Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates combined.70 However, following the Reagan Administration’s limited U.S. troop

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68 Ibid.,” 77-78.
69 Ibid., 78.
70 Ibid., 79-80.
presence, deployment was greatly enhanced and intensified under the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations. When Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait (August 2, 1990), the U.S. placed half a million soldiers in Saudi Arabia and refused to significantly decrease its presence there or in Kuwait, despite numerous demands by both nations to do so. When Saddam Hussein was overthrown in Iraq in 2003, the U.S. significantly reduced its military personnel to approximately 220,000 in Iraq and all the Gulf States combined.

Overwhelming U.S. military presence in the Middle East resulted in a radicalizing effect on Moslem populations in the region, which Al Qaeda used to form a declaration of Jihad in 1996, which stated, “The greatest disaster to befall the Moslems since the death of the Prophet Muhammad—is the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which is the cornerstone of the Islamic world… Despite this, it was occupied by the armies of the Christians, the Americans, and their allies.”

The relatively positive perception by most Moslems of the U.S. presence shifted to an extremely negative outlook. In 1998, a declaration by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and the leaders of Bangladesh, Egypt, and Pakistan exhorted Moslems to wage jihad against the U.S. military and civilian populations, because of continued U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia.

Jihad Against the U.S.

The call for jihad was based upon U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, and the continuing perceived threat it posed. The justification for the jihad which was spearheaded by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and leaders of Bangladesh, Egypt, and Pakistan declares, “Firstly, for over seven years America has occupied the holiest part of the Islamic lands, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its wealth, dictating to its leaders, humiliating its people,

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 84.
74 Ibid.
terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases there into a spearhead with which to fight the neighboring Moslem peoples.”75 Al Qaeda’s motivation for the 9/11 terrorist attacks becomes painstakingly clear when these pronouncements are taken into account; fifteen of the nineteen terrorist attackers were from Saudi Arabia, and ninety-five percent of Saudi Moslems objected to U.S. forces in the region.76 The following further substantiates a correlation between U.S. military presence and Moslem terrorism. Of the seventy-one al Qaeda members who committed suicide terrorist attacks between 1995 and 2003, over 90 percent were from a country with a U.S. military presence, and over 95 percent of those were from countries that harbored radical Islamists.77

**Just War Theory and Justification for Intervention**

Just War Theory should be emphasized relative to U.S. presence in the Middle East. The concept of Just War Theory can be first traced to St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354 - 430 A.D.), who believed justice could only be found through the “ethical conduct of statecraft.”78 According to Augustine, a just war must be led by rulers of nations who are, by their role, charged with keeping peace and avenging wrongs or righting injustices, but never for perpetrating wonton violence.79 Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 AD) clarified the three conditions necessary for a just war: “legitimate authority must be received from the sovereign; a just cause for the attack must be present; and a rightful intention should guide the proceedings, so that the advancement of good is the sole purpose of going to war.”80

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76 Ibid., 84.
77 Ibid., 85.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 231.
Aquinas places the justifications for war within a cosmic framework, and his writings expound upon the three conditions. Any private form of warfare is not to be condoned, and because the care of the state is left to those in authority, he believes, “The prince beareth not the sword in vain for he is the minister of God to execute His vengeance against him who doeth evil.” Aquinas also severely limits the just causes of war to three general categories which he proposes as, “Defined as those which avenge injuries, when the nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it.” A rightful intention is the third condition, and the one which Aquinas expresses most spiritually. “With the true servants of God wars themselves are pacific, not being undertaken through cupidity or cruelty, but through the love of peace, with the object of repressing the wicked and encouraging the good.” The belief in war as an object of peace and the repression of the wicked creates a moral foreground to act as a prerequisite in the justification of conflict. Augustine expresses just war as a similar quest for peace in *City of God* where he contends, “Even when men are plotting to disturb the peace, it is merely to fashion a new peace nearer to the heart’s desire... It is not that they love peace less, but that they love their kind of peace more.”

While the origins for limited warfare and its requirements can be found much earlier in writings such as Plato’s *Republic* (381 B.C.) and the Old Testament, Augustine and Aquinas are considered the main authorities relative to Just War Theory. Just War Theory has been divided

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
85 Butler, “U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis,” 232; Deuteronomy 2; Psalm 46.
into two components, *jus ad bellum*, or the proper initiation of war, and *jus in bello*, the proper conduct within it.\(^{86}\)

The five guiding principles for *jus ad bellum* are the presence of just cause, competent authority to act, right intentions for action, reasonable hope of success, and overall good ends desired.\(^{87}\) The most commonly attributed just causes are defense of the innocent against wrongful attack, reclamation of persons or things which have been wrongly taken, and punishment of fundamentally “evil” acts.\(^{88}\) Competent authority is defined as military action “clearly sanctioned by a duly authorized representative of some sovereign political authority.”\(^{89}\) Right intentions may be understood as actions against nations for territorial acquisition, intimidation, coercion, cruelty, or vengeance, or those which promote peace or justice-building efforts.\(^{90}\) While the research of Michael J. Butler revealed that the U.S. was justified in nearly all of its military interventions during the Cold War period (1945-1994), the definitions of just cause and right intentions were expanded, and the criteria of competent authority and a proper control framework were admittedly lacking.\(^{91}\)

Since the U.S. entrance into World War II, Congress has yet to issue a formal declaration of war, and numerous U.S. Presidents have entered into conflicts without congressional approval.\(^{92}\) The lack of proper congressional authorization coupled with presidential control over a sustained military deployment is evidenced in U.S. interventions in the Gulf War and Afghanistan, and while Congress authorized military action to begin the War in Iraq, there was...

\(^{87}\) Ibid.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., 233.
\(^{89}\) Ibid.
\(^{90}\) Ibid.
\(^{91}\) Ibid., 246.
never a formal declaration of war.\textsuperscript{93} The U.S. Constitution clearly enumerates that the authority to declare war is found in the legislative rather than the executive branch, and disregard for the Constitution violates the tenet of Just War Theory requiring competent authority to act.\textsuperscript{94} Even though the U.S. engaged in these conflicts without a formal declaration of war, other tenets of Just War Theory may be argued in favor of the interventions. For instance, the Gulf War contained a reasonable hope of success. However, U.S. intervention in the Middle East has not been merely of a military nature but also an economic one, entailing foreign aid assistance, which has produced other conflicts.

\textbf{Providing Aid in the Middle East}

\textbf{Principles of Aid}

The encouragement of economic growth in a nation is a proper function of government.\textsuperscript{95} The creation of opportunities through economic growth is based in a moral imperative, but not necessarily a legal one.\textsuperscript{96} However, a need for economic growth in another country only begs the question: To what degree should government, particularly a foreign government such as the United States, be involved in other nations’ economic affairs?

For a country to successfully emerge from poverty, it must continually produce more goods and services than is in demand. Nevertheless, certain laws, economic structures, cultural values and traditions of a nation must be established for such production to occur.\textsuperscript{97} Temporary wealth can be provided through foreign aid in situations such as disaster relief, but proper long-term aid seeks to establish economic stability, and recognizes the legal, cultural, and economic

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{94}U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{95}Wayne A. Grudem. \textit{Politics According to the Bible: A Comprehensive Resource for Understanding Modern Political Issues in Light of Scripture} (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2010), 269.
\item \textsuperscript{96}Ibid., 270-271.
\item \textsuperscript{97}Ibid., 48-49.
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barriers that prevent this. However, foreign aid is oftentimes used to change the cultural and political landscape of a nation.\textsuperscript{98} In this regard, foreign aid operates as foreign policy.

**Civil Society Redefined**

This new definition of civil society provided by Challand, was intended to better understand the consequences of non-governmental aid organizations operating in the Middle East, specifically in Palestine.\textsuperscript{99} His argument focuses on the failures of foreign aid in the promotion of democracy, revealing a rather myopic understanding of civil society, especially in the Arab world where democracy has not flourished.\textsuperscript{100} Democracy-promotion via foreign aid, most notably the United States through USAID, has constricted NGOs from defining priorities for civil society.\textsuperscript{101} Challand claims such aid is paternalistic in nature, and is the cause of many of the problems in Middle East.\textsuperscript{102}

The systemic problem of democracy promotion in the Middle East does not solely rest in a restricted definition of civil society or in a paternalistic framework; rather, the broader culture of the Middle East does not remain open to democracy. Foreign influence in this regard has largely been resisted, and increased amounts of foreign aid have not altered Middle Eastern political attitudes. Foreign aid to Palestine peaked at $500 million after the Oslo Accords in 1993, and yet, little, if any, nation-building occurred.\textsuperscript{103} Challand noted that when U.S. and other foreign aid increased in Palestine, aid from regional sources declined and local NGOs played smaller aid roles.\textsuperscript{104} Also, following the Camp David Accords (September 17, 1978) and the

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 411-412.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 411.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 411-412.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 408, 411.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 408-409.
Jordanian Development Plan (1987), increases in U.S. aid were viewed by Palestinians as “camouflage for the imposition of U.S.-initiated solutions.”

P.T. Bauer studies the progression of aid in his text *Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion*. Between the drafting of the U.N. Charter in 1945 to the approval of the U.N. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Order in 1974 a significant transformation of the methods in global aid took place. As aid shifted from disaster assistance to a right of request for any underdeveloped country, the transition from small private aid organizations to a bureaucratic conglomerate ruled by special interests, such as within the U.N., began to occur.

**Aid as Influence**

The leveraging of power from governmental and commercial interests leaves the needs of local communities secondary. Bauer describes aid agencies and staff members as, “union organizers for the Third World,” favoring state-controlled economies and collective bargaining from Third World nations. The commercial interests in aid and development include the exporters from donor countries who receive subsidies from the provision of goods and services to any nation receiving aid. Competitive industries such as those in textiles or agriculture desire a guaranteed market and the government contracts and subsidies which come from being a part of aid distribution.

The impact of economic aid and assistance provided by the U.S., the U.K., France, and Russia to numerous countries in the Middle East is useful for understanding military disputes in

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105 Challand, “The Evolution of Western Aid,” 410.
107 Ibid., 138-139.
108 Ibid., 144.
109 Ibid., 146-147.
110 Ibid., 147.
the region since World War II.¹¹¹ The findings, with the exception of Russia, (formerly the Soviet Union), showed a decrease in the frequency of militarized disputes between dyads in the Middle East when foreign aid was provided, and U.S. aid in particular.¹¹² The study found that foreign aid to Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria tended to reduce dyadic conflict in the Middle East, such as that between Iraq and Iran.¹¹³ Nevertheless, the study did not reveal the effectiveness of the aid in reducing larger-scale regional or sectarian conflicts or negative attitudes toward those powers extending assistance.

Aid to Promote Democracy

The United States oftentimes merges its military interventions and humanitarian aid packages, and uses economic policy to advance its political objectives. The utilization of USAID, part of the U.S. State Department, was designed to foster democratic values following military interventions, such as occurred in both Iraq and Afghanistan.¹¹⁴ USAID even worked to empower women and promote values of gender equality.¹¹⁵ However, its methods entailed spending millions to train women as filmmakers to create documentaries in Afghanistan, and salvaging a bankrupt Worldcom Inc., to create a wireless telephone network in Iraq.¹¹⁶ Instead of utilizing USAID to foster democracy through radio in Afghanistan, or telecommunications in Iraq and Palestine, a more productive approach would have entailed understanding and engaging the culture through private, localized aid organizations which adapt more effectively and efficiently to cultural needs.¹¹⁷

¹¹² Mintz and Heo, “Triads in International Relations,” 450, 456.
¹¹³ Ibid., 446.
¹¹⁵ Ibid.
¹¹⁶ Ibid., 492-493.
¹¹⁷ Ibid., 492-494.
Benoît Challand argues that U.S. desire for democracy in the region, and the continued monetary support of foreign powers to promote a restructured Middle East, has actually backfired, and instead, fueled anti-democratic sentiment and structures. The greatest problem, according to Challand, is that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are subjected to the demands of outside backers, including the pressures from receiving money from both private and government funds. Even though a NGO is by definition, non-governmental, it is allowed and often receives funding from the government to act as a contractor in enacting policy aims. Similar to non-profits, NGOs have the ability to receive donations as well as governmental assistance without losing its status. This potential conflict of interest is what Challand repeatedly critiques. His redefined concept of civil society is an opened space with no influence from outside interests, though such a society has not yet been fully realized. Challand argues civil society must have space for local actors to have autonomy, recognize the variety of forms and contents of civil society, instill a participatory element, and “take the evolution of the forms and contents of local civil society into consideration.”

Aid as Idol

Foreign aid cannot create a productive national economy within a recipient nation, though it effectively curries international favor. Bringing a nation out of poverty may only be established through the internal creation of goods and services. “Earned success,” as defined as the individual creation of value, is what empowers economically.

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118 Challand, “The Evolution of Western Aid,” 397.
119 Ibid., 397-398.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 398-399.
122 Ibid., 402.
124 Ibid., 33-35, 48.
125 Ibid., 74-75.
Herbert Schlossberg in his book *Idols for Destruction*, identifies several idols positioned as gods, and sought after as saviors. When the state becomes an idol, it is expected to provide a variety of assistance to the needy and helpless.\(^\text{126}\) Oftentimes intentions are noble, nevertheless resentment occurs on the part of those who have less toward those who have more, with the added assumption that wealthier nations are responsible for those less wealthy.\(^\text{127}\) Successfully relieving a nation’s poverty is similar in methodology to assisting individuals. Aid and development economist P.T. Bauer’s assessment of economic development in poorer countries found that the attitudes and institutions of a nation are changed due to rewards for hard work, and such rewards discourage resentment and envy.\(^\text{128}\)

A Growing Divide

The divide relative to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to grow, and with advancing propaganda, the truth can often be lost in the process. Joan Peters, in her book *From Time Immemorial*, concludes, relative to her research regarding the plight of the Palestinian refugees (for which she intended to heighten awareness), that the British Balfour Declaration creating Israel did not cause the displacement of 430-650 thousand individuals.\(^\text{129}\) Rather, the thirty prolonged years of a refugee crisis resulted from the refusal to allow Arabs to return to their host countries, or their associated cultures.\(^\text{130}\) Iraq and Syria were seen as ideal locations for placement, and Iraq alone could have absorbed three-quarters of a million refugees.\(^\text{131}\) Even as Syria required workers, and Egypt demanded a “return” of their refugees, each country refused to


\(^{127}\) Ibid., 70-71.

\(^{128}\) Ibid., 71-73.


\(^{130}\) Ibid., 19.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 19-20.
accept refugees until the nation of Israel was destroyed.\textsuperscript{132} This is where the real problem arose. In this respect, the issue was less about struggling refugees finding placement, but rather their host countries and their nations of origin refusing to accept them back, all the while demanding the rights of Israel be completely rescinded, and every Jew in the land removed or exterminated.\textsuperscript{133} This has certainly resulted in one of the largest humanitarian crises in the region, and humanitarian efforts must take into account such history to effectively offer economic assistance.

\textbf{Conclusion}

U.S. policy increasingly focuses upon interventionism for the sake of democracy and nation-building, but apart from an understanding of the history of Middle Eastern conflicts, any foreign aid will continue to fall short of its objectives. When the United States involves itself militarily, it should only do so within the context of Just War Theory, fulfilling concrete policy objectives. Unfortunately, the U.S. has rarely followed this model, as both the Eisenhower and Carter Doctrines demonstrate. Additionally, a formal declaration of war approved by Congress is a constitutional prerequisite for any war in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{134} The United States has played a significant, albeit declining, role in the region, and relations between Middle Eastern nations are being fundamentally reoriented through its influence within triads. Long before the purported Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Islam had experienced frequent internal splits and wars, and other relational dynamics necessary to understand before engaging. Rather than emphasizing governmental funding, which has been found to be largely ineffective and wasteful, private organizations are best positioned to understand the culture, and they can provide aid to

\textsuperscript{132} Peters, \textit{From Time Immemorial}, 21-22. \\
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 22-23. \\
individuals in ways which allow for relationships, and promote economic growth in a conflicted and often-times misrepresented region.
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