

The Impact of Political Culture on Political Reactions: A Case Study of EU Sanctions on Russia

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### **Abstract**

The political impact of European Union (EU) sanctions on Russia is complicated by the political culture of the Russian state and the economic interdependencies of the EU bloc and the Russian Federation. This study explores the impacts of European Union sanctions on Russian politics, using economic interdependence and the political culture of Russia to help explain both the political effects of the sanctions on Russia and the overall Russian political reaction to the scenario that is unfolding. The foundations of government, political society, and political norms within Russia can be found throughout the different bases of Russian political culture which is narrowed down by the usage of the Cross-Cultural Competency (3Cs) Theorem: Russian Orthodox Christianity, geography, autocracy, and economic development. As a whole, the development of the Russian political state has been heavily impacted by its geographical location. However, upon closer examination, it becomes evident that Russia's governments have additionally been influenced by the development of the Russian Orthodox Church, economy, and government, all of which form a large part of the Russian political cultural identity. The development of Russian politics could, therefore, along with the economic interdependence of the two blocs, aid in determining the Russian political reaction to sanctions. Using this case study, it will be investigated how political culture can affect the overall political reactions to external pressure, particularly economic sanctions, and suggest ways to possibly improve the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

*Keywords:* Economic Sanctions, Russia, European Union (EU), Autocracy, Russian Orthodox Christianity, Geography, Economic Development, Cross-Cultural Competency, Economic Interdependence, Political Culture

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### **Introduction**

The question of the political impact of economic sanctions is marred by multiple factors, and in many cases, as discussed further in this paper, is regarded as ineffective by some scholars. Sanctions are often implemented to express displeasure with the developments of nations, in particular regarding aggression or human rights violations (Masters 2019). In order to understand political reactions and why some regimes do not react like others, I argue, it is important to understand the political culture of a nation. This case study will explore how the political culture of Russia was and still is able to predict and impact how the current Russian regime responded to the European Union sanctions. From this case study, we can draw conclusions and lessons that will hopefully be used by others to create better sanctions and policy choices.

### **Methodology**

The methodology and design of the research for the problem at hand will be a single in-depth case study, focusing on the political effects of European Union sanctions on Russia, with a particular concentration of these effects through the lenses of political culture and economic interdependency. A single in-depth case study is defined by Gay as “the systematic collection and objective evaluation of data related to past occurrences in order to test hypotheses concerning causes, effects or trends of these events that may help to explain present events and anticipate future events” (University of Leicester, 2020). This case study will be objectively focusing on how political culture and economic interdependency impact the overall political effects of these economic sanctions. In particular, this study will attempt to decipher how political culture could help create such strong support for President Putin directly after, and during the majority of the sanctions, despite an economic downturn that faced the Russian nation

during this time (2014-2016). With this in mind, the focus of political culture will be reliant on the on what I will call the 3Cs: Cross-Cultural Competence theorem.

Cross-Cultural Competence is a theorem that has several definitions, however the one selected for this case study is best noted by, Leiba-O'Sullivan. It is not a true definition, as she states that it is instead the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes categorized as "stable" or "dynamic" competencies (Rodman, 2015, p. 17). Tools created to study and increase cross-cultural competence are also diverse, however, the one which will be applied within this paper is Intercultural Intensity Factors in which elements of language, ethno-centrism, cultural differences, cultural isolation, power and control, expectations, visibility and invisibility play a key role in political culture and political development (Rodman, 2015, pp. 19-20). The application of this theorem will help to gain a better insight into how Russian political culture is at its roots, and use these roots to better explain the Russian political reaction to European sanctions.

Within this study, another study of and a countenance of the effects of complex economic interdependency on the sanctions will be conducted. By reviewing various studies and evidence of the different levels of interdependence between the economies in question, one can better comprehend how the interdependencies of economies may both affect the implementation of sanctions and the politics of the nations that are targeted by them. The qualitative approach to this case study will allow for an objective implementation that aids in identifying the effectiveness of sanctions and suggest how to improve them via the study of political culture and other factors for policymakers in today's foreign policy realm.

### **Economic Sanctions and Political Change**

To begin this paper without a discussion of the basics of economic sanctions would be negligent, as economic sanctions form the foundation of this case study. As a concept, sanctions are considered to be an effective system at ensuring there is a way for nations to express their displeasure at other governments' actions. This is a frequent action commonly exemplified by both the European Union and the United States, but sanctions can also be implemented to further advocate for human rights and democracy. Economic sanctions, for the purpose of this case study, is "defined as the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign-and security-policy purposes" (Masters, 2019, p. 1).

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the utilization of sanctions has become significantly larger, with some nations and leaders viewing it as a way "to appear to be taking action while there is no expectation of success" (Hart, 200, p. 277). Much scholarship has been conducted regarding the emplacement and usage of economic sanctions, finding them to be impracticable, weak, and ineffective, as particularly noted in the studies by Robert A. Pope and Gian Luca Burci. However, there are several ways of measuring the success of sanctions, as many target different individuals, populaces, cultures, economies, and nations. Some researchers, such as Har, utilize a points-based system created by Hufbaeur et al. which grants points based on whether or not the policy result was achieved and what the sanction contribution was (Hart, 2000, p. 277). Other scholars use a method of statistical research, such as that of T. Clifton Morgan et al., whose method utilizes statistics regarding outcomes and other variables to measure sanction effectiveness and provide a statistical outlook on the overall effectiveness of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are the source of much political-economic research,

particularly in the cases of regime change, which will be explored in the next section in order to provide further background into the effects of sanctions on political systems.

### **Results of Political Change Sanctions**

Often sanctions are emplaced upon nations to cause or force conformity towards a certain viewpoint that better suits the nation emplacing the sanctions. In some cases, sanctions, like the ones placed on Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Russia, South Africa, and previously Iraq, are possibly the more infamous of the political change sanctions stories, with varied results. Much study has been conducted revolving the effectiveness of sanctions that target regime or policy change, with plenty of research indicating these sanctions to be overall failures. There are some studies that have found evidence that economic sanctions can further the change of governmental policies or create regime change.

A study that supports the impact of economic sanctions on the position of political change is one by Christian von Soest and Michael Wahman (2014), which studies the effect economic sanctions have on governments; particularly, how sanctions influence a government towards democratization. Utilizing a new data set that was created specifically by the authors, they recorded all sanctions enacted by the European Union, United Nations, and United States. Using this new data set, and cross-referencing this with another data set by Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman, the authors weeded out sanctions on democratic-styled regimes and focused on sanctions targeting what they termed as “non-democratic” regimes (von Soest & Wahman, 2014). Using previous research by Rotberg (2007) and Wintrobe (1998) on the nature of authoritarian regimes, the researchers stated that non-democratic regimes often rely upon the usage of co-optation and repression (von Soest & Wahman, 2014). The authors stipulate that sanctions cut off the financial resources these regimes need to conduct co-optation of persons in

their nation, and therefore, use increased oppression to maintain the regime (von Soest & Wahman, 2014). At the beginning of sanctions, autocratic regimes often react by increasing their repression of civilians; however, as the authors note, repression is often worse in the long-term stabilization of the regime (von Soest & Wahman, 2014). Repression wears off long-term as it often disguises the positive effects of sanctions on the democratization of society, making it temporarily effective. Sanctions make it more difficult for a regime to fund its efforts to stay in power, serving in the eventual downturn of a non-democratic regime. Utilizing the data set on non-democratic nations affected, the Freedom House data set, and statistical analysis, the authors found that sanctions did not affect democratization or the spread of democracy in the countries targeted. Their evidence was in complete contradiction to that of a previous study by Peksen and Dury (2010). The authors, emphasized that to find the effectiveness of sanctions in supporting democratization, it was important to focus on sanctions whose goal was specifically geared towards encouraging democratization (von Soest & Wahman, 2014). The authors also found that the practice of specifically democratized sanctions was more effective than overall sanctions, increasing the likeliness of institutional change, government reform, and democracy.

Scholarship, such as the article *Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?* by Nikolay Marinov, supports the use of sanctions in its influence to destabilize country leaders. While not necessarily regime change, the destabilization of countries' leaders is an important step towards the rise of regime and policy change. Marinov theorizes that average sanctions, according to his statistical analysis, should destabilize national leaders; more so, that those sanctions causing the most damage to the stability of regime leaders will not pass beyond a designated threat stage. Sanctions should have a destabilizing effect on countries which choose to either initially or eventually concede to the demands of the sanctions' senders (Marinov, 2005,

p. 568). Utilizing a data set on the implementation and events of sanctions, Marinov sets forth to investigate the overall destabilizing impacts of sanctions to prove his hypotheses. Using both this data and a substantive regression model, Marinov found that in some cases, the implementation and execution of sanctions caused a twenty-eight percent higher likelihood that a national leader would be replaced when targeted. Marinov concludes that in many cases, sanctions or the threat of sanctions generally achieves the objectives they seek to achieve in particular, those that target leadership. Furthermore, he goes on to state that the most well-known of sanctions, such as those imposed on Cuba and Iran, are long-running atypical examples which may contribute to skewed viewpoints and statistics on the effectiveness of sanctions and their ability to cause regime destabilization.

Other studies, however, have not been as positive in their assessment of the regime change effects of sanctions. A study by Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph Wright examines the relationship between international sanctions and discusses whether or not these sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. Escriba-Folch and Wright found in their study that sanctions often forced authoritarian regimes to create larger co-optation programs instead of launching heavier repression tactics due to the effects of sanctions on primarily the economic and political elite within the country. As a result, these sanctions often increase an authoritarian regimes' practice of co-optation tactics (Escriba-Folch & Wright, 2010, p. 343). Under the authors' statistics, they hypothesized that regimes relying more heavily on that of personality-based authoritarians were more vulnerable to sanctions than single-party dictatorships and military juntas (Escriba-Folch & Wright, 2010, p. 345). This hypothesis, they state, is supported by evidence that personality-based regimes are less able to resort to repression when their funds dry up due to economic sanctions; and, they are unable to actively promote the co-optation programs

their regime relied on to survive (Escriba-Folch & Wright, 2010, p. 347). Overall, the authors state that while sanctions may destabilize some dictators, there is evidence that it will not work on most dictatorships, particularly those of single-party or military regimes.

Robert M. Woods' study, on the other hand, analyzed the relationship between sanctions and the repression of human rights in regimes targeted. The author created seven hypotheses based on previously observed evidence of regime reactions to the implementation of sanctions: sanctions increase the amount of state-sponsored repression within a state, United States' sanctions contribute to an increase in state-sponsored physical repression, multilateral United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions contribute to increased physical state-repression, multilateral United Nations imposed sanctions contribute to greater physical state-repression compared to the United States imposed sanctions, and lastly, that more severe United States sanctions contribute to greater physical repression in states compared with less severe sanctions, more severe UN-imposed sanctions contribute to greater physical repression in target states compared with less severe sanctions, and lastly, sanctions are less likely to increase repression in democratic regimes in comparison to undemocratic regimes (Woods, 2008, pp. 497-498). Woods' research led him to discover that the implementation of sanctions, collectively, increases the practice of repression in the targeted states as an attempt to resist regime change. The author argues that new methods of coercive diplomacy are needed, to ensure that citizens do not suffer from repression due to the effects of sanctions. The failure of these sanctions is depicted with the sanctions the European Union placed on Belarus, which were implemented to promote democracy and encourage progress on human rights (Rankin 2016). However, due to the lack of progress in regards to human rights, and the supposed ineffectiveness of these sanctions, the European Union decided to lift these sanctions in the hopes of better relations with both Belarus and Russia (Rankin

2016). A study performed by Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury also explores the negative effects that sanctions may have in relation to the issue of democratization within nations targeted by sanctions. The authors used cross-national data sets recording data from 1972 to the year 2000, particularly regarding sanctions and democratization progress.

Peksen and Drury hypothesized that sanctions and the limiting of funds to regimes often resulted in the consolidation of power, rather than the denigration of it (Peksen & Drury, 2010). In the end, the data's findings suggested evidence that sanctions had a strong negative impact on democracy and democratization. Working from these statistics and estimation of sanction impacts on democratization and economics on targeted nations, the authors found evidence that the negative impacts on democracy were long-lasting (Peksen & Drury, 2010). The authors argue that due to their evidence suggesting a negative impact of sanctions on democratization, sanctions overtly and unintentionally affect elites and other parties who have the ability create a positive impact, nations should pursue other methods that use alternative policies that provide an incentive for regimes to change such as foreign aid that is contingent on certain regime reforms (Peksen & Drury, 2010).

### **European Union (EU) and Russian Economic Interdependence**

Russian and European economic and political relations are largely determined by the two blocs' closeness geographically speaking, as is often suggested by the of geographic continuity. Geopolitical theorist, Harvey Starr, believes that states or other political units geographically close or next to one another other often interact and communicate with each other more often and more effectively (Harvey Starr, 2013). This idea is represented well within European Union nations that have borders closer to that of Russia, such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and more. These nations often have a larger trade share with Russia than that of nations in the more

western parts of the European Union (Simola, 2019, pp. 133-134). While the interdependencies of the European Union and Russian is a much-discussed topic, Heli Simola's that the situation could be "characterized more by asymmetry than by interdependence" (Simola, 2019, pp. 123). Trade between the European Union and Russia has been largely based on complementary economic structures and traditional comparative advantage, as Russia, primarily exports raw materials, gas, and oil, while the European Union often exports manufactured goods, services, and investments (Simola, 2019, p. 125). The overall trade percentages and percentages of goods each nation exports and imports are key to understanding the interdependence of trade between the two nations as reflected in Table 1 (Simola, 2019, p. 132).

**Table 1**

*Shares of European Union (EU) and Russian Exports and Imports*

	EU share of Russian exports	Russian share of EU imports	EU share of Russian imports	Russian share of EU exports
Total	46.2	7.5	38.3	4.3
Oil & gas	59.5	28.8	n.a.	n.a.
Total, excl. oil & gas	26.2	3.0	n.a.	n.a.
Food	11.1	1.4	22.4	4.4
Chemicals	30.5	2.7	57.2	5.2
Wood & paper	23.2	8.2	61.8	4.8
Metals	44.5	9.9	34.0	3.8
Machinery & equipment	20.4	0.3	38.8	4.9
Vehicles	17.0	0.7	41.4	3.5

*Note.* Percentages of exports and imports between Russia and the European Union. Adapted from "Limited Interdependence in EU-Russia Trade," by H. Simola, in K. Rain and A. Racz (Eds), *Post-Crimea Shift in EU-Russian Relations: From Fostering Interdependence to Managing Vulnerabilities* (p. 132), 2019.

([https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/EURUS\\_book\\_EVI\\_May\\_2019-web.pdf](https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/EURUS_book_EVI_May_2019-web.pdf)).

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Most of Russia's trade with the European Union is involved with, or is a part of the oil and gas markets, making up roughly 59.5% of Russia's trade with the European Union, as Table 1 shows. This is noted by Heli Simola, who found that Russian gas and oil exports to the European Union makes up roughly 28.8% of the European Union's energy resources importation (Simola, 2019, p. 132).

Table 1 indicates Russia's imports of wood and paper, chemicals, vehicles, and machinery are each heavily dependent on European Union exports, as are most manufactured and finished goods. This view of complimentary economies is supported by Vecchi, and quoted by Simionov, whose study concludes that the European Union and Russian economies are complimentary on almost all levels based on economic research of the two blocs (Simionov, 2017, p. 182). This asymmetry is most exposed by the fact that trade, in other sectors other than oil/energy, is often ignored in regards to the interdependence between Russia and the European Union (as seen by Stephen Padgett's focus on oil and energy, as well as Heli Simola's statement that interdependence prevails in the oil and gas trade) (Simola, 2019, p. 129). The main framework behind the interdependence, or even the normal trade relations between both Russia and the European Union, is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (Simola, 2019, p. 126). Both parties, however, have been unable to agree on a new framework since its expiration in 2007 (Simola, 2019, p. 126). Despite the difficulties and the pursuance of the domestication of Russian economics (European Union, 2020), the European Union considers the Russian Federation a natural trade and political partner (European Union, 2020). However, as the European Union admits, the situation in Ukraine alongside the overall ban of agricultural imports, the political situation, and investment difficulties has led to a trade decrease in the last eight years (European Union, 2020). Simionov's study provides a clearer understanding of this

limited interdependence, depicting the lessening interdependence each state has when moving farther away (geographically) from Russia. The scholar's findings illustrated Hungary, Finland, Lithuania, and Slovakia as the nations with the most energetic dependencies, while the least vulnerable were those in the more western European part of the European Union such as, but not limited to, Ireland, Portugal, Malta, Germany, and Spain (Simionov, 2017, p. 188). Russia, however, provides an overall 29% of all crude oil, 43% of all oil products, and 33% of natural gas for the European Union according to economic measures (Simola, 2019, p. 129). In return, Simionov points out that, according to the Central Bank of Russia, three-quarters of Foreign Direct Investments in Russia come from the European Union (Simionov, 2017, p. 184). As a result, economic links between the two blocs are very strong, though they are fragile for many nations in the European Union, particularly those closest to Russia; and, to Russia itself due to reliance on European investments.

### **Background of European Union (EU) Sanctions on Russia**

European Union sanctions on Russia were caused by the Russian occupation of the Crimea and the support of pro-Russian rebels in eastern regions of the nation of Ukraine. It's important to note that the situation was caused even before the occupation, as it primarily began months before the Euromaidan Revolution protests. The protests were caused by two primary factors: the presidential results that stated Victor Yanukovych, the Pro-Russia candidate, had won the elections in Ukraine, and Ukraine's deviation from closer ties with the European Union (The Economist, 2013, p. 53). Diverging from the signing of a European trade deal (which was contingent on governmental and legal reforms within Ukraine) seemed to indicate the influence and control Russia could exert upon the Ukrainian state (Marples & Mills, 2015, p. 9). The Euromaidan protests were primarily held in cities and areas within Western and Central Ukraine,

particularly areas solidly inhabited with ethnic and cultural Ukrainians, unlike the majority Russian populated Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. The Euromaidan protests would overthrow the pro-Russian and the more autocratic regime that was in Ukraine at the time, betraying Russian confidence and foreign policy goals (The Economist, 2013). It was with the ousting of the more Russian-styled autocratic regime that provoked Russia to act, with the country seizing the Crimea under the pretense of a Crimean referendum in favor of Russian annexation (Pifer, 2019). While this may be true, Russia's intervention is still debated amongst experts, with some believing it was in response to the perceived expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty, while others argue that the intervention was propagated by a fear of Putin losing support at home (Masters, 2020). It could also be inferred that the overthrow of a Russian-styled regime betrayed the political culture of the Russians. After the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, Russia would go on to support breakaway eastern provinces of Ukraine which would eventually be met with American and European Union sanctions (Gutterman & Grojec, 2018).

### **European Union (EU) Sanctions on Russia**


The European Union sanctions were emplaced on Russia after the Russian invasion and occupation of the Crimean Peninsula (a territory recognized internationally as a part of the nation of Ukraine) and the Russian support of rebels in the Donetsk oblast of Ukraine. There has been a fairly limited amount of research in respect to the sanctions emplaced on the Russian Federation and its impacts on the nation.

Prior to the institution of sanctions, Russia had been experiencing an economic slowdown, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth lessening from 4.5% in 2010, to 1.755% in 2013 (World Bank, 2020). European Union trade with Russia (before the institution) totaled around \$114.8 billion in exports and \$199 billion in imports during 2013, the year before

sanctions were initialized (Eurostat 2020). After sanctions were implemented, the exports to Russia would fall to \$99 billion in 2014, and \$70.5 billion in 2015; meanwhile, imports from Russia would fall to \$174.7 billion in 2014 and \$113.4 billion in 2015. The number of imports and exports between Russia and the European Union would continually rise from 2015 onwards, but would remain relatively lower than the years prior to the sanctions, with European Union imports from Russia falling about €25 billion in 2014 and about €100 billion in 2016 from their previous years (Figure 1).

**Figure 1**

*Imports, Exports and Trade Balance Between the European Union (EU) and Russia*



*Note.* Changes in billions of dollars every year imports and exports between Russian and European Union between 2009 to 2019 From *Eurostat*, 2020.

([https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Russia-EU\\_%E2%80%93\\_international\\_trade\\_in\\_goods\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Russia-EU_%E2%80%93_international_trade_in_goods_statistics)). In the public domain.

A study by Iikka Korhonen focuses heavily on the effects these sanctions have on the Russian economy. The initial wave of sanctions lacked many punishable methods within its measure, as the majority of the sanctions were comprised of a political standpoint rather than an economic one. Nonetheless, months later, the European Union passed sanctions that forbade

European Union banks from providing long-term financing for Russian firms. This long-term financing ban would affect any financing that was longer than thirty days in length; and, as a result, damaged many of Russia's largest firms (Korhonen, 2019, p. 20) since many Russian firms relied heavily on European financings. As Korhonen acknowledged, the Russian economy was already stalling before the implementation of sanctions, causing many scholars and researchers to argue that the sanctions only had the potential effect of marginally worsening the Russian economic stagnation. Korhonen concluded that while the implementation of sanctions had caused a rather decent impact on the Russian economy, the larger impact of sanctions caused for the decreased integration between Russia and its largest trading partner, the European Union; and the effects of economic sanctions were found to have a negative effect of 1.5% on Russian GDP growth (Korhonen, 2019, p. 22).

These findings were partially supported by a study of European Union sanctions on Russia conducted by Wan Wang. Her findings reiterated the fact that the first three rounds of sanctions provided little impact on either participant. The major effects became noticeable after the European Union launched a further two rounds of sanctions that restricted European and American firms from involvement in the Russian energy, financial, and defense sectors (Wang, 2015, p. 2). Unlike Korhonen's study, Wang's study found the impact from the European sanctions and Russian countersanctions caused a significant impact on the Russian economy (Wang, 2015, p. 3). It was during the implementation of these sanctions that the value of the Russian ruble and oil price dropped (in which the price per barrel of oil dropped from around \$105 per barrel to less than \$60 per barrel) (Baffes et Al., 2015, p. 10). As a result, the Russian economy would contract by 19.73% in 2014, with growth only partially returning to 0.194% in 2015, and 1.82% in 2016 (World Bank, 2020). Wang noted that the sanctions had, up to this point

(in 2015), been a damaging element to Russia's economic growth; and, despite the economic situation, had an extremely limited impact on the domestic politics of Russia that had not changed Russia's stance on expansion and occupation (Wang, 2015, pp. 3-4). Wang concludes that Russian diplomacy and stances will not change as the nation would neither gain nor lose influence in Ukraine, which had (by then) become a Western ally. Moreover, the sanctions would only serve to intensify antagonism between the West and Russia. In the end, she further states that the sanctions served to form a new wedge between the European Union and Russia, forcing Russia closer to the interests of other eastern nations, such as those of China and India.

Yan Dong and Chunding Li's study revolves around the simulation of the effects of sanctions and counter-sanctions between the United States, Russia, and European Union. Much of the research regarding the effects of sanctions on Russia are purely analytical, with a stress on how their analysis is a simulation of the effects on all three participants, rather than a pure analysis of the current effects. The authors created a three-round sequential simulation game that explored game equilibriums and the possibilities of the impacts of sanctions (Dong & Li, 2018). From these sanction games, the authors concluded that all three members of the sanction implementers would experience increased harm by more extensive sanctions and counter-sanctions. In the end, Dong and Li concluded that Russia would be more heavily affected by these sanctions, particularly due to the economic value of trade between the Russian Federation and the European Union (Dong & Li, 2018).

### **The Russian Response to European Union Sanctions**

The Russian reaction towards the economic sanctions emplaced by the European Union has generally been one of defiance, mostly by the government. In 2014, Putin's regime reacted to the European Union sanctions by instituting a regime of counter-sanctions, primarily targeting

the agricultural sector of European Union exports to Russia (Reuters 2018). The products covered by these counter-sanctions primarily comprised of agricultural products which constitutes around 35% of Russia's food imports, valued at around \$15.2 billion (Fritz et Al., 2017, p. 15). To make the ban on imports more symbolic, the Russian government used the situation to highlight their resolve, bulldozing Western-imported foodstuffs and expensive cheese in 2015 (BBC 2015), destroying smuggled goods, and threatening to expand their import bans on Ukraine and more Western nations whilst extending the ban length (BBC 2015). Russia's counter-sanctions have had a particularly large effect on European agricultural exports to Russia. In 2013 European agricultural exports to the Russian Federation were valued at around \$15.5 billion which then decreased to around \$6 billion in 2016 after the announcement of the Russian agricultural ban on certain products (Fritz et Al., 2017, p. 17) In Table 2, the significance of the impact of the Russian counter sanctions can be seen, as the total amount of imports from the European Union by Russia decreased by around 48.7% from July 2014 to July 2016.

**Table 2***Change in Overall Russian Imports of Counter Sanctioned Goods*

	Imports from the World % change July 2014-July 2016 (decrease in \$ mil)	Imports from the EU28 % change July 2014-July 2016 (decrease in \$ mil)	Value of imports from the world July 2016 (\$ mil)
Total imports	-43.9% (-12,028.4)	-48.7% (-5,528.7)	15,400.5
All categories subject to counter-sanctions	- 56.5% (1015.4)	-96.8% (419.5)	781
<i>Meat (02)</i>	-68.3% (-424.6)	-97.7% (-37.6)	197.0
<i>Fish (03)</i>	-54.6% (-118.3)	-97.6% (-11.6)	98.4
<i>Dairy (04)</i>	-48.9% (-171.9)	-92.5% (152.9)	179.4
<i>Vegetables (07)</i>	-65.4% (-104.4)	-99.7% (-53.6)	55.2
<i>Fruits (08)</i>	-43.9% (-196.1)	-100.0% (-164.0)	250.9

*Note.* The table highlights the change in percentages of agricultural imports from both the World in general and the European Union in to Russia from July 2014 - July 2016. From *Revisiting Sanctions on Russia and Counter-Sanctions on the EU: The economic impact three years later*, by Gros and Di Salvo, 2017. (<https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/revisiting-sanctions-russia-and-counter-sanctions-eu-economic-impact-three-years-later/>). In the public domain.

The Russian agricultural importation ban has specifically been extended to December 31, 2020, and may be renewed by Presidential decree (European Commission 2020). In Russia, the results of the counter-sanctions have forced the Russian Federation to search for new agricultural trade partners (Fritz et Al., 2017, p. 26) and have been noted by some economists to have cost Russian consumers \$70 per person each year, in total costing the Russian people around \$10 billion per year. Russia has also maintained its support of separatist rebels in Donetsk, placing pressure on the already precarious economic situation in Ukraine since 2014 (Veebel & Markus, 2015, p. 173). The Russian Federation would go on to implement sanctions targeting leading

European Union figures, and issue new legal and economic measures to integrate the Crimea into the Russian Federation (Veebel & Markus, 2015, pp. 173-174).

### **Russian Political Culture**

Political culture is an ambiguous term that comprises various factors such as, but not limited to, political institutions, external and historical-cultural influences; and, history in the subject(s) of governance, civil and human rights, or politics. Posnard states that political culture consists of the fundamental beliefs and values determining the context of a political action (Posnard, 2007, p. 44). Stephen White states, “Political culture may be defined as the attitudinal and behavioral matrix within which the political system is located” (White, 1979, p. 1).

Russian political culture is heavily influenced by its past regime and political institutions. Understanding the roots of Russian political culture requires an investigation of religion, geography, and modernity. Geographically speaking, Russia is a vast, but vulnerable nation, whose experiences have assisted in building a political culture favoring those who can help protect it and its identity. Geoffrey Hosking repeatedly writes within his book, *Russia and the Russians*, that Russia’s geography made it vulnerable to its enemies and other nations (Hosking, 2011). Religion also played (and is still playing) a large role in the development of Russian political culture. Religion, as Lionel Posnard would note, was originally used as a consciousness for the nations’ rulers, but would eventually evolve into a tool for later regimes to justify their causes (Posnard, 2007, p. 49).

Nationality provides a clear picture within Russia, separating cultural responses from other national political cultures. This is due to the fact that Russian political culture relies on its vast and unique historical development of governmental practices. As Jeffrey W. Hahn notes in his research of Russian political culture, “the development of ‘patrimonial’ rule – allegedly

distinctive to Russia among European nations – which culminated by 1881 in an absolutist political regime that survived unchanged, if not actually strengthened, under the Bolsheviks” (Hahn, 1991, p. 397). It is important to note that this time period does not account for the years prior to 1881, in which Russia had been ruled by other autocratic regimes. These regimes established a highly autocratic political culture within Russian society that prizes power over the establishment of the proper rule of law which is prevalent in modern Russia. This is exemplified by the state of Muscovy, the grand duchy of Moscow, which “always stood out among early modern states in its degrees of centralism and the lack of legal or customary restraints on the despotic power of its tsar” (Daniels, 1987, p. 168). This point is also highlighted in a study by L.A. Sedov, in which he states, “The social system of Russia has always been a society characterized by an exaggerated subsystem of power and an atrophied system of the rule of law” (Sedov, 2007, p. 48).

The concentration of power in a single-center is acknowledged and described to be a part of Russian ideology and culture by Vladislav Surkov, in his article describing Russian political culture from the viewpoint of a Russian intellectual (Surkov, 2008, pp. 11-12). Surkov describes this centralization of power in one area of government to be a part of a Russian cultural push that views every Russian as a whole or mass, and believes a centralized government is best equipped to help secure Russian interests (Surkov, 2008, p. 12). Russian writer, Yuri Glazov, once suggested, “Russia needs a strong autocrat” (Daniels, 1987, p. 168). Even as Russian political culture is dominated by an autocratic political culture, it does carry with it a democratic subculture (Posnard, 2007, p. 55). Russian political culture, according to Posnard, is a mixture of autocracy and democratic influences; yet, always leans more towards that of an autocracy due to historical influences and experience from previously created regimes (Posnard, 2007, p. 52).

Posnard's view clashes with the general sentiment that Russian political culture favors a primarily autocratic form of governance. He argues that these two political cultures currently coexist in Russia, as there are elections and protected democratic rights; but, there is a presidential office that controls and accumulates the majority of the power within the political system (Posnard, 2007, p. 56). Posnard's case is supported by his example of Russia's 1993 constitution under Boris Yeltsin, whose constitution allowed for political diversity and pluralism, all while providing for increased executive branch power, particularly that of the presidential power, creating what he termed "a super-presidential system" (Posnard, 2007, pp. 56-58). This created a blend of both autocratic and democratic systems, in line with the general Russian political culture.

### **Geography**

Geography heavily affects the thoughts, culture, and perceptions of different nations and peoples, offering another dimension and principal in which to find a source of political culture. This was incredibly foretelling for the political culture of Russia in three ways: it helped spur the development of a more autocratic and centralized, it created a political culture of mistrust in outsiders with an emphasis on community, and developed a sense of vulnerability. Russia's size, as Geoffrey Hosking would note, created the need for the structure of an autocratic state but, in practice, could not fully implement such a state due to the territorial extent and economic difficulties (Hosking, 2011, p. 5).

The authoritarian culture was further aided by Russian expansion, due to the ever expanding nature of the Russian national borders which required a strong centralized government in order to respond to security threats quickly. For example, the Russians often had to create political and administrative structures swiftly, (resulting in the neglect of the endurance of

laws or institutions), often shifting more focus on personal power relationships within the areas needing governance (Hosking, 2011, p. 5).

Russia's political culture is largely composed of a communal sense, one that is influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church, an environment the Russians would model their civilization after. Geopolitically in a vulnerable geographic arena and on the margins of agriculturally viable soil, Russians would have to create a communal foundation in order to survive politically and socially, often relying on each other for food and protection (Hosking, 2011, p. 15). The same expansiveness of the Russian frontier, however, would formulate the idea that Russia as a country is both blessed and cursed. The country is blessed in the sense that it has vast land with a tremendous amount of resources, but cursed due to its exposed frontiers to both friend and foe. Russia's situation has placed the country in a unique predicament as a world power, one in which Russia is capable of invading, but susceptible to invaders, constantly having to seek its own safety (Hosking, 2011, p. 3). Russia's border situation has wavered between volatile and friendly, etching a sense of paranoia, distrust, and vulnerability within Russian political culture. Thrice has Russia been invaded via its western borders (by France once, and by Germany twice), and once via its easternmost borders (by the Mongolian Empire) (Hosking, 2011, pp. 3-4). Two of these invasions would help alter Russia's character, particularly that of the Mongolian Empire. This would lead to the creation of a political culture that would always be aware of its strategical vulnerability and strengths, often making Russia a more aggressive and active member regarding its expansive borders, than other nations. This inherent aggression and its vast landmass would justify Russia's view of itself as a first-rate power that others would need to acknowledge (Giles, 2019, pp. 14-15). From Russia's vast land and geographical attributes, stems another political cultural trait of Russian political culture: Autocracy.

### **Autocracy**

Russian political culture has been geared and developed towards the governmental style of autocracy since the foundation of the state of Novgorod (around 862 A.D.) after a decision by Slavic tribes to invite those whom they named the Rus (Vikings) to rule over their tribal confederation (Parmele, 2018, p. 11). The newly created state of Novgorod would expand to include a multitude of previously Slavic controlled regions, including one of the largest cities at the time, Kyiv, establishing the state of Kievan Rus (Parmele, 2018, p. 12). The political structure of such states was built in a way that generally favored autocratic rule. The structure was supported by an establishment made up of a communal advisory committee known as the veche, which was subservient to the Princes of the Kievan Rus, but had limited power, as most of the power belonged in the hands of the monarchs and their subservient vassals (Hosking, 2011, pp. 34-40).

The Rurikids (the previous rulers of then Kievan Rus, Novgorod, and its successor states) would go on to rule a multitude of various successor states in the Russian-European heartland. Their political development would be further pushed towards autocracy due the influence of Mongolian invasion in the form of what would eventually be known as the Golden Horde (Hosking, 2011, pp. 49-65). The influence of the Mongols would be felt through the subjugation of Russian states as tributaries rather than full vassal states, keeping the rulers of the various Russian states in power to ensure the effective collection of subjugating taxes (Hosking, 2011, pp. 49-65). During the weakening of the Golden Horde, the Rurikid dynasty in charge of the Principality of Moscow would rise and eventually unite the separate Russian states, creating an autocratic tsarist Russian state from the Grand Principality of Moscow (Hosking, 2011, pp. 66-70). The autocratic Rurikid dynasty would go on to rule a more united Russia until the death of

Fedor Ivanovich in 1598 (Hosking, 2011, p.133) resulting in the time period known as the Time of Troubles. This time period lasting from 1598 to 1613 was one of extreme uncertainty, filled with multiple pretenders seizing power, peasant revolts, and foreign occupation (Hosking, 2011, p. 140). The Time of Troubles would help convince many that Russia was in need of an autocratic ruler due to the state institutions' revolvment around the tsar's power and association with the Church (Hosking, 2011, pp. 133-140). The Time of Troubles would end sometime after Mikhail Romanov was elected to the Russian throne, thus ushering the rule of the Romanov dynasty (Hosking, 2011, p. 140). As recognized by Hosking, although there was an election by nobles to choose a new tsar, the power of the tsar was never questioned, nor was there any effort to restrict the authority of the tsar (Hosking, 2011, p. 141), resulting in further cementation of autocratic rule within the country of Russia. Indeed, the centralized power of the tsar was often emphasized as essential by religious, historical, and political scholars during the reign of Ivan the Terrible.

Conversely, some, such as scholar and soldier Ivan Peretsov, argued against the limiting of the power of an autocrat by a group of nobles or advisors. Peretsov claimed that autocratic rule was restrained by advisors or others, further arguing that these restraints are what contributed to the demise of the Byzantine Empire (Pipes, 2007, pp. 42-43). Peretsov suggested that the tsar centralize the realm and rule alone, doing away with those that could rival, steal, or curtail the his power (Pipes, 2007, pp. 42-43). This idea was encapsulated in Tsar Ivan the Terrible's reign as the tsar with him forming an evermore centralized rule, justified partially by the Russian Orthodox Church, and would create an absolutist monarchy within Russia. The power of the autocratic tsar would be solidified during the reign of Peter the Great, with the subordination of the Orthodox Church under tsarist power (Warhola, 1993, p. 25).

The influence of outside writings and political thought would also influence the justification of Russian autocratic governance. In particular during the reign of Catherine the Great, the empress came under the influence of political theorist, Montesquieu, picking and choosing the lessons from his writings that best fit with the autocratic traditions of the tsars. In particular, Montesquieu's writings regarding the government's need to take on the forms of governance that replicate its nation's culture and need to adapt to its expansiveness presented the tsarina with two lessons (Pipes, 2007, p. 69). First of the lessons was that democracy and a regular monarchy could not rule over such a vast land as that of Russia, and secondly, a country as vast as Russia should be ruled by despotism (Pipes, 2007, p. 69). This thought served to further entrench the over-bearing power of the monarch in Russian governance, justifying the tsarist utilization of despotic powers in order to administer and control such a vast region.

The rule of the Romanov dynasty and its autocratic system would last until the Russian Revolution during and after the First World War, during which time a civil war would take place. The eventual victors were the Russian Communist Party, thereby establishing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Hosking, 2011, pp. 388- 429). This new governmental system, however, would further institute the overwhelming power of the country's executive, solidifying the idea of autocracy within the nature of Russian political culture. Autocratic rule reached its highest point in the time of Joseph Stalin's control over the Russian nation, whose power was consolidated around the Head of the Government (Soviet Premier or Chair of the Communist Party) (Hosking, 2011, pp. 459-469).

During this period, Russians would be subjected to differing types of autocratic regimes, ranging from the dictatorial, suppressive regime of Joseph Stalin to the reformist, moderately liberalized Communist autocracy of Khrushchev to the status-quo, fiefdom-esque regime of

Leonid Brezhnev, or the collapse of the Soviet Union under the liberalizing reforms of Gorbachev. Stalin's regime over the USSR mirrored some of the more absolutist tsars, a regime assembled by absolute power of the individual leader, with minimalistic restraints on power, if any. This contributed to the terror and control Stalin would exert over the Soviet Union for years to come. Hosking noted how a "unified rhetoric became compulsory," a statement supported by the following acts of Stalin: a purging of defiant voices in the Communist Party (which used the secret police, bypassing previous party rules enacted to curtail power), show trials to eradicate "disloyal members," forced deportation of different nationalities/ethnicities, forced labor camps, and the overall oppression of its citizens (Hosking, 2011, pp. 464-469). Stalin's absolutist reign over Russia would last from the 1920s to 1952, during which he would attempt to create a new type of Russian/Soviet culture, emphasizing the Soviet Man (an archetype of the perfect Soviet citizen) and the ideals of Marxist-Leninism. The result was a state in which there was no legitimate counter-balance to Stalin's authority, with only the apparatus of the All-Union Communist Party, which at that point was thoroughly under Stalin's control, as the counter-balance to his authority.

Despite with the Communistic attempt to create a visually different regime from the past autocratic Russian monarchs, much remained the same; in particular, their autocratic styles, especially in regards to the ruling/upper classes of society. This was reinforced as a result of the USSR's participation in the Second World War, in which Hosking notably stated, "A generation of military commanders and of central and local party-state cadres, relatively green and untried in 1941, had survived an initiation in 1941 of fearful dimensions . . . the war generated a self-confident and authoritarian ruling class" (Hosking, 2011, p. 521). The Stalinist polity was one which "emphasized unquestioning loyalty of the leader and the effective fulfillment of policies

and targets” (Hoffman, 1984, p. 4), a despotic, authoritarian regime disguised as a fulfillment of Communism.

This would partially change with the death of Stalin and the ascendance of Khrushchev as the leader of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s regime over the Soviet Union instituted a political thaw, where political expression, national resurgences, and freedom of speech would be somewhat tolerated, only really tolerated internally within the Party (Petro, 1995, pp. 125-127). Khrushchev would attempt to revitalize the role of the Communist Party in relation to ruling the Soviet Union, delegating authority to a variety of bureaucratic components of the Soviet governmental structure (Hoffman, 1984, p. 6). However, as noted by Hoffman, Khrushchev’s attempts to reform the overall system of government and offer government flexibility were met with limited success, mostly due to Khrushchev’s Stalinist trait of expecting people to accomplish goals without question (Hoffman, 1984, p. 6). On the other hand, this was not possible as Khrushchev had previously condemned Stalin’s regime of terror and had pledged reforms (Hoffman, 1984, p. 6). Though he had tried to reform and provide a sense of liberalism to the Soviet elites and bureaucrats, he also attempted to solidify the power of the top leadership position, which he possessed (Hoffman, 1984, p. 7). In the end, Khrushchev was ousted for his obstinate refusal of offering more flexibility to his party’s leaders in other bureaucratic portions of the Soviet party apparatus (Hoffman, 1984, p. 7), a sign of weakening autocratic tendencies in the USSR. Brezhnev’s control over the Soviet Union would be similar to Khrushchev’s, despite a few key differences. Brezhnev’s overall goals of the state were the same, yet his approach differed as he would control the overall apparatus of the USSR, with more distinctions built within the party and the separation of departments in the USSR (Hoffman, 1984, p. 8). There was

a greater emphasis on Soviet elites becoming and/or using specialists in their fields to help aid in the decision-making process, unlike under Khrushchev and Stalin's regimes.

Brezhnev allowed leeway for others to make decisions and governmental choices that could help the USSR. Though Brezhnev encouraged wider flexibility within the government, elite circles, and technical experts, criticism and freedom of speech were still heavily suppressed (Hoffman, 1984, p. 8). What would stem from Brezhnev's control over the Soviet Union would remarkably resemble the rule of the early tsars, such as the control over certain departments or provinces (in the case of the Soviet Union, these were Soviet Republics), allowing for more freedom and power amongst local party governmental officials (Petro, 1995, p. 30). These officials would rule over sections of the Soviet Union like the Boyars of old, affirming their loyalty to Brezhnev, who would support their control of the regimes in return for their governmental expertise and support within the party (Petro, 1995, p. 30).

The last General Secretary of the USSR would be Mikhail Gorbachev, whose Glasnost and Perestroika reforms helped reform the USSR; yet, in terms of the economy and governmental structure, would ultimately cause the demise of the Soviet Union and help to establish a democratic Russia in its wake. It's important to note that Russia's democracy has been shaky, as illustrated with the violent reaction to Boris Yeltsin's attempt to dissolve the legislature in 1993. Nevertheless, the deployment of military troops successfully suppressed the political coup (Hosking, 2011, p. 592). The transition of Yeltsin to Putin (both President and Prime Minister of Russia since 2000) is viewed by Hosking as a "patrimonial fashion" (Hosking, 2011, p. 621). Hosking elaborates with mentions of the current Russian constitution and how it has given the Prime Minister and President an overriding position in Russian governance by bringing back: tones of autocratic regimes, weakly developed political institutions to keep the Presidential

office in check, and patrimonial political actions (Hosking, 2011, pp. 620-621). It seems, for now, that Russia will continue to spiral towards a more autocratic government once more, with Putin's government controlling more of the media, restricting freedom of speech, utilizing Russian Orthodoxy to enhance his position, and the creation of a personality cult much like many other autocrats before him.

*Offspring of Autocracy: Individual Sovereignty*

Russia's autocratic political culture provided an important trait that would serve as an additional, fundamental component of Russian political culture: the idea of individual sovereignty in a domestic nature and international sphere. Individual sovereignty is often utilized, extending to domestic and international spheres in Russian political culture (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 113). Within the country, the central government (typically in Russian political culture) is the only point of reference, source of legitimacy and legality within the country (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 113). In the Russian domestic sense, the trait of individual sovereignty as part of Russian political culture is born out of an autocratic government tradition and the overall centralization of power surrounding the individual ruler. As Robert Nalbandov states, "Individual sovereignty for rulers means that their people should accept whatever the government is giving them from above and whatever outputs are thrown down for public consumption" (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 113). Additionally, the populace should be content with the current conditions and not hope to change the order of things within the nation (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 113). The overall effectiveness of the Russian regime's individual sovereignty relies heavily on the strength of the autocracy in power, their coercive power, and the protection of the population from detrimental outside influences. Any move or transition against the sovereignty of the regime is the work of traitors, extremists, or "fifth columnists" who have been influenced by exterior forces

(Nalbandov, 2016, p. 113). Indeed, many times the rulers of Russia have been vested the power of individual sovereignty, representing and embodying the people of the nation of Russia.

This trait and the autocratic nature of the Russian government contributes to the current Russian foreign policy position of the international sphere's definition of individual sovereignty. Current Russian foreign policy heavily emphasizes this point: a nation's sovereignty should be respected and the government of that nation should be allowed to do what it deems is necessary in the governance of its country. It allows a nation to undertake unilateral actions without regards to the opinion of peers, the local context, or the geopolitical situation. In this case, the legitimacy of a state's actions is created by a singular state and solely defined by its ruler (Nalbandov, 2011, p. 113). It advocates for the flexibility of individual state actions in accordance with national interest; in this case, a by-product of Russia's geographical and autocratic political cultures. Instead of collective sovereignty or collective solutions, Russia would rather work alone for its own political interests, foreign policy, and protection of its territory.

### **Russian Christian Orthodoxy**

Russian Orthodox Christianity has played a major role in the development of a uniquely Russian political culture. As James W. Warhola would say in the introduction to his study of Russian Orthodox and its influence on the past and present of Russian political culture: "Russian Orthodox Christianity has served as a major, if not, principal taproot of Russian culture" (Warhola, 1993, p. 1). It was noted by the scholar, Nicolas Zernov, that in many ways, the Orthodox Church permeated every side of Russian life (personal, familial, social, and national); more so, the majority of Russians prior to the establishment of communism or the modern state of Russia would often not identify themselves as Russian, rather they would consider themselves members of the Church (Warhola, 1993, p. 13). Robert Tucker, as quoted in Warhola's work,

“would also note that in early development, Russian was the persons’ language, Orthodoxy his identity” (Warhola, 1993, p. 14). Warhola identifies three pieces of Russian political culture that are “primarily rooted by the influence of Russian Orthodox Christianity: communal identity, the encouragement of a ‘non-civic’ political culture, and the subordination of ecclesiastical power to the state power that directly shaped the character of the state, church, and the larger society” (Warhola, 1993, p. 13). First, communal identity usually resulted from the work of the Orthodox Church as the need for community efforts was necessary in order to survive and thrive in the Russian geographical landscape (Warhola, 1993, p. 15). However, the importance of religion as an identity would change under the rigorous oppression implemented by Stalin. This would result in a modern orientation of community that is more akin to nationalism and a more grouped political psychology (Warhola, 1993, p. 15).

Secondly, the Orthodox religion presented a non-civic orientation, one that did not foster a sense of political efficacy in comparison to the religions of its Western counterparts (Warhola, 1993, p. 15), a viewpoint reinforced by Richard Pipes’ study on Russian political culture. The main effect, as both Warhola and Pipes note, would be to help reinforce autocratic tendencies. Although, to what degree has yet to be empirically determined, but it can be assumed to have been substantial given some writings by Orthodox scholars during the early years of the tsardom. The third main influence on Russian political culture was the subordination of Orthodoxy to that of the central authority or state’s power. Though this was not the only effect, historians such as Szetzel would note that as the Orthodox Church and the Russian state strongly emphasized the religious and mystical qualities of the tsar, a centralization and subordination of church authority that would last until the Revolution of 1917 when the tsar was overthrown.

This was, however, not the first way that the Russian Orthodox Church would support the creation of an autocratic tradition within Russian political culture. As in the Byzantine Empire, the Church and State operated on the principles of Justinian's code which noted that the Church and state were to be in harmony, with the state (in the Russian case, the tsar) serving as the vice regent of the Church and ensuring the Church's defense, while the Church was responsible for the country's religious purity (Pipes, 2007, pp. 34-35). This would morph into a more subservient Church structure sometime in the 1500s, with the head of the Orthodox Church, Joseph Volotsky stating after a Church Council in 1503 (borrowing from the Greek scholar Agapetos), "the monarch, in his being like other men, in his authority he resembles God Almighty." (Pipes, 2007, p. 35) As such, a monarch must be unconditionally obeyed, with obedience to the Monarch being compared to as obedience to God, and within this thinking, the Church was not exempt from this duty (Pipes, 2007, p. 35). While this relationship was partially due to the power of the monarch, Joseph's goal was also to ensure the safety of Church land and property, all of which had been targets of commoner anger due to the abuses of Priests and the Church during the times of the Mongolian dominance. To safeguard these Church properties and the monopoly on religious observances, the Orthodox establishment would offer full and unconditional support to autocratic authority (Pipes, 2007, p. 36).

This position was further entrenched when a figure Daniil, was elevated to Metropolitan, the highest religious post in Russia (Pipes, 2007, p. 37). Daniil would work feverously to enforce the work of his predecessor (the aforementioned Joseph), support the Russian autocracy through a conflict with the Orthodox Church, and afterwards conduct a purge of clergymen who were not supportive of the autocratic regime (Pipes, 2007, pp. 37-39). Autocratic power, provided by the Church would be enhanced even further with the crowning of the Russian ruler as the tsar. This

was a position which would be reinforced through the recognition of the Church in Constantinople, making the tsars of Russia the “one true Christian Emperors,” highlighting both the new-found power of the tsars, and the reinforcement of Church subservience to the state. (Pipes, 2007, pp. 38-40).

The subordination of the church to the state’s power is one of the chief influences in Russian political culture, in which its subordination would serve as a unifier and nationalistic encourager behind autocratic elements of the country’s political culture. This subordination would help promote one of the tenets of the Russian Orthodox ideology, which was the idea that the purpose of human life was to reflect God’s image in the personal, social, and cultural spheres – hence submission of one to God and to duly ordained civil authority (Warhola, 1993, p. 19). As Pipes would note, “The church, the second most important institution in the realm, was fully subordinated to the state. The rulers of Moscow appointed its highest dignitaries and removed them at will without consulting anyone.” (Pipes, 2007, p. 42) The subordination of the Church by the state would often link the church so closely to the state after the time of Tsar Peter the Great, that Stephen White noted, “it has often been termed a department of the government” (Warhola, 1993, p. 25).

### **Economic Development**

The effects of economic development impacts and heavily influences political and overall culture within a nation. In the case of Russia, the economic development of the nation at the beginning of the nation’s roots and in modern times has heavily affected the political culture of the state. Hosking explains at the start of his book that, without a lack of effort, the economy of the Russian empire remain underdeveloped due the sheer size of the nation and other limitations, such as the natural handicaps.

Also, the historical tendency to ignore development and focus on defense needs due to vulnerability and poverty serves as another limitation (Hosking, 2011, p. 4). In many ways, the economic development of Russia was slowed by institutional practices and the historical events that would damage Russian governance, such as that of the Mongolian invasion (Baykov, 1954, p. 138). This was heavily reinforced by the belief that since the Tsar was the Russian sovereign, and acted as the protector of the Russian people and the Russian Orthodox Church; everything in Russia belonged to him (Giles, 2019, p. 89). The idea that the Russian sovereign or autocratic ruler owns most, if not all, the economic interests and land of Russia extends to this day, primarily due to the aforementioned belief that as protector of the Russian people and the Russian Orthodox Church. The liberalization of the Russian economy and society was counteracted by the state's tendency to interact and intervene in the economy, both Hosking and Baykov have noted. The state's unwilling tendency to relinquish control of economic and land developments was also found by Thorton Anderson, who reasoned that the "economic backwardness of Russia" was an occurrence of two main issues: the early grand princes of the early Russian state were extremely ambitious to centralize land and power under their own rule, and a strong discouragement by autocratic Russian governments in regards to the land development and economic development by local leaders (Anderson, 1967, p. 363). The final blow to individual influence of economic development within Russia (under the Tsars) was overseen by Ivan the Terrible, when he would effectively create land-leases and take much power away from individual nobles who could have possibly developed their land before then (Anderson, 1967, p. 363). A delayed switch from a serfdom-agricultural based economy towards one that was liberalized, came too late to create meaningful economic reform before the end of the 1800s, and would end up dooming the Russian Empire later (Baykov, 1954, p. 138).

It was there that the development of land and the economy rested in the hands of the central government, a situation that was reinforced and made more extreme after the Russian Revolution of 1918. The Russian communist state would take control of every element of Russian economics, in particular the overall development of the Russian nation. This centralization of economic development would particularly take a new shape under Joseph Stalin's regime, whose industrial plans and collective agricultural plans would reshape the economy of the Soviet Union. Stalin implemented multiple 5-year industrial and agricultural plans that would modernize and industrialize the Soviet Union, despite the collectivization of farms instituting a new kind of serfdom for Russian peasantry (Hosking, 2011, p. 471). As Hosking would note, the first 5-year plans would succeed in increasing industrial output and development, partially due to the massive mobilization of the population that Stalin's regime was able to achieve (through various methods) (Hosking, 2011, p. 476).

These leaps forward in the overall economic development would continue up until the Second World War; however, after an initial recovery for the Russian industrial development, it would stagnate under the Soviet Union's control (Hosking, 2011, p. 525). Despite the government's ability to amass huge amounts of resources and manpower, it was unable to create an effective market, with production quotas being set at numbers that do not accurately reflect reality (Hosking, 2011, p. 526). Combined with a lack of state investment in the modernization of agricultural and industrial technologies meant that the overall development of the Soviet Union and Russian economy would stall until the end of the Communist regime (Hosking, 2011, pp. 526-585). Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms to update and create more free-market economy would help spur the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and would result in the next

issue of Russian economic development: the consolidation of economic power in the hands of a few oligarchs.

While the institutional issues hampered the development of Russia's economy, its geographical nature played a major role in the country's slower development than that of its more-developed European counterparts (Baykov, 1954, p. 141). Even until the late 1800's, the Russian Empire struggled to thoroughly, economically develop due to the challenges presented by the geography and vast expanses of the country. The Soviet regime over Russia would dramatically alter Russian economic development, rapidly increasing the industrial development of Russia, while creating a slowdown of agricultural development within the country (Baykov, 1954, p. 144). The autocratic communist state from 1918 to 1991 would control and delegate all aspects of the economy until Gorbachev's partially successful and partially failed Glasnost reforms.

The fall of the Soviet Union caused a painful economic transition for Russia, with the once considered great power, now performing in a middle-income nation range with high foreign debt levels (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005, p. 152). The transition to a free-market economy was so difficult that "as much as 70 percent of transactions among industrial enterprises in Russia avoid the use of money. Similarly, offsets, barter, and the like account for 80-90 percent of tax payments by these major industrial enterprises" (Gaddy 1999). This is an economic situation that usually does not bode well for democratic governments. Much like now, the Russian economy relied heavily on oil and natural gas exports (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005, p. 153) and struggled to grow during an economic downturn in the late 1990s.

The Russian economy recovered its growth in the early 2000s and had experienced steady growth until the 2008 market crash. Russia then continued its growth until 2014, when oil

prices fell again, and sanctions were emplaced. Since then, economic growth and development has slowed for various reasons, primarily due to lower oil prices (The Moscow Times, 2019). In terms of economic development indicators, since 1988 (the earliest recordings of data on the World Bank data tables), the Russian economy has grown from a Gross Domestic Product of \$554.713 billion to \$1.7 trillion in 2017 (however, this is still down from 2013's \$2.292 trillion). Its life expectancy has grown from 69 years in 1988 to 72 years in 2017. The Gross National Income per capita has grown from \$3,440 in 1991 to 11,260 in 2019 (World Bank 2020).

In regards to economic freedom, the Heritage Foundation ranked the Russian Federation at 94<sup>th</sup> in the world, with the Heritage Foundation noting that while in the past few years government control over the economy has reduced slightly, it is still heavily reliant on the government, something that may increase due to the country's nationalist, statist agenda (Heritage Foundation 2020). The Heritage Foundation also noted that economic development is hindered by a corrupt government, a subjugated judiciary, government links to corruption, and a reduction of investments (Heritage Foundation 2020). Russian economic development carries one major theme in its political culture: the reliance on an extensive, autocratic leaning government. This can be interpreted to mean that the heavy reliance on governmental investment and control over the development of the economy and its resources would either solidify the Russian autocratic tradition or would become another cause for the creation of an autocratic government in Russia. Other indicators are the relatively moderate development of the economy found by some scholars, with many nations in this category, often falling under two different governmental structures: a troubled democracy or an autocracy. The lack of reliable institutions, corruption, and lack of a separate judiciary all point towards an autocratic political outlook.

### **Russia's Current Governmental and Political Identity**

The current government of Russia is a semi-presidential government (CIA 2020), classified as an authoritarian/autocratic regime under the current President, Vladimir Putin, by the Central Intelligence Agency. President Putin, since appointment as Premier under President Boris Yeltsin, has pursued the restoration of order within the country, often pursuing these with authoritarian means (BBC 2014). Putin's rise has been spurred on by the creation of a government that feeds off managed elections, and populist or nationalist messaging in a country which, in the early stages of Boris Yeltsin's and Putin's regimes, increasingly felt, according to Nalbandov, "that it lacked a definitive national identity" (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 29).

Increasingly, we see that the ghost of the past still holds strength and influence within Russia itself, particularly the era of the Soviet Union, in which Russians remember their former strength and power. The ghost of the USSR, as Robert Nalbandov calls it, serves as a starting point for the new Russian identity that is currently in the making (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 33). The collapse of the old Communist regime has also reinvigorated the Russian Orthodox Church, which has played an increasingly powerful role in regards to Russian culture and politics, forming an intrinsic part of the new Russian national identity (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 35), serving as a unifier of Russians now as it did in the Tsarist Russia of old. Increasingly, the Kremlin has allied itself with the Russian Orthodox Church, an essential component of the past Russian political culture; and, with it, now serves as a centerpiece of the regime's nationalist rhetoric. Examples of this include the frequent praise of religious festivals and events by Russian political leaders and the attendance of Russian leaders (such as Putin) to said events (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 36). Putin's support and elevation of the Russian Orthodox Church has yielded the overwhelming

support of the Church, which has now aided the Kremlin's nationalist messaging, including the support in creating a new Russian modern identity (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 36).

In search of a national identity, Russian's, particularly Putin's government, have adopted a founder of a new Russian modern identity: Joseph Stalin (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 37). The ghost of Stalin looms heavily over the current political identity of Russia, with data gathered in 2006 showing that a quarter of Russians that year would vote for Stalin had he been running in the election (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 37). A poll by the Levada Center in 2019 indicated that the approval of Stalin and his role within Russian history reached an approval of 70% among the populace that was polled (The Moscow Times 2019). Putin's regime has actively encouraged the application of Stalin as an identifying/unifying figure for Russian nationalism, even though Stalin as a leader was heavily opposed to Russian self-rule and nationalism (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 38). The use of Stalin as a figure correlates with the rosy retrospection of dark periods in Russian history and the amount of life lost in the defense of and/or the pursuit of Soviet ideals (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 39).

There remains a part of Russian political culture in which there is a lack of recognition of individual human lives, instead there is an emphasis on the collective good or betterment of the nation. Moreover, there is a veneration for the victories that cost massive amounts of human lives, and overall approval of other regimes, such as that of the tsars and Joseph Stalin, that both repressed and murdered so many Russian and other nations' citizens (Nalbandov, 2016, pp. 39-40). Putin's government has instituted laws that target the veneration of regimes that opposed Russia, primarily targeting Nazi symbols; but, as Nalbandov has found, these tactics are taken to cultivate a sense of triumph and identity as the victor among the new generations (Kurilla 2016)(Nalbandov, 2016, p. 41). Russia's political identity has been built around a modernizing

past, one that is heavily influenced by autocratic figureheads and its overall revelry for the Russian Orthodox Church (a key part of Russian political culture), an increasing recognition of what constitutes a Russian, and a pursuit for the designation of a world superpower once again.

The aforementioned identity constructs have now played a role into how the current Russian government views its role and importance on the world stage. Much of this is influenced by Russia's own political culture, pursuing the protection and expansion of Russian influence in every facet. The political identity tenet of Russia needing to be a world power exists due to the precarious situation in which Russia had found itself in the past, with threats everywhere along its borders; yet, it is now a manifestation of Putin's government's attempt to provide a new Russian political identity (Nalbandov, 2016, pp. 42-46). This is partially the reason why Putin's government takes such offense over being considered a regional power. However, the concept of a "Great Russia" is one that is heavily accepted by both Putin's government and the Russian populace. In fact, Russia's geography is finally on its side after such a long-time as it faces no great powers that can threaten its borders, except for the People's Republic of China (although they seem to generally be on friendly terms, as its border conflicts are with smaller, lesser nations).

We must not forget nor diminish the effect the Soviet experience has had over the current political identity and political culture of the current Russian nation, particularly the latter years of the Soviet regimes. Many Russians, particularly older Russians, thoroughly remember the times of the Soviet Union, as time in which the Russians dominated the political and military of the Soviet Union, and in turn were heavily in charge of the actions and experiences of a superpower nation (Giles, 2019, p. 14). While many would be turned off by the totalitarian nature of the regime of these times, (something which Putin had denounced multiple times) (Kurilla 2016), the

collapse of the Soviet Union would result in a worse fate for Russians: the loss of great power status and the loss of security, prestige, and respect for Russia (Giles, 2019, p. 60). As Nalbandov observes in his writings, it was within the Soviet Union that the Russians felt a veneration on a daily basis by other Soviet nationalities, a feeling that would be abruptly shattered by the fall of the Soviet Union (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 33). The Soviet Union provides the most recent, historically accessible Russian experiences as it is still within collective living memory. As a memory, the Soviet Union serves a role in the remembrance and the overall longing of Russians to become a superpower again, representing a time of security for most Russians. Moves to resuscitate the feeling of greatness in Russia would result in the need for the Russian imperial coat of arms and the tricolor flag. Indeed, the teaching of Russian history, and in some cases, the rehabilitation of Soviet leaders as icons for the new Russian nation would serve as great strides in developing a new Russian identity.

Putin's government represents the return to an autocratic Russian regime of the past. Albeit the methods of the new Russian government are much more gentle and less violent than of those past, they represent the Russian tradition of having a stronger, more centralized rule. Part of the movement to an autocratic rule represents the nature of Russia's geographical past and present, a past in which the country was vulnerable to invasion from others with no natural barriers for defense, and present day, the vast size of the nation. As Robert Nalbandov states, "the citizens, in a way, fear that they will be left without a single potent ruler who is capable of protecting them from external threats" (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 63). Putin's regime represents a newer advent in the stage of Russian autocratic traditions, one which provides itself legitimacy through managed elections and slightly relaxed, but controlled, media and provides a firm, effective domestic government. The new Russia has begun to see itself as an extension of its

great periods in history when it was a world superpower (Giles, 2016, p. 14), and hopes to use its tsarist past and other historical figures to recreate a new, power, and stable Russia (Giles, 2016, pp. 14-16).

### **How Does National Identity Correlate with Political Culture?**

National identity is built much in the same way as the totality of political culture: it relies on the anchoring of a political system and belief in facets that allow for the effective governance, overall pride of a nation, political reactions to exterior forces and events, and determines the type of government best suited for a nation. While it is similar to political culture, some scholars, such as Stephen Welch argue that it is an increasingly important part of political culture (Welch, 20, p. 118). This, I argue is due to its accumulation of the many tenets of political culture, and reflects the political culture of a nation in a current setting. Political identity, in this case, is a method upon which we can determine the route the current political culture of the populace is heading toward, especially with the Russian nation yearning for finding of an overall identity. We can see that while the new Russian political identity is still being formed, it carries on the tradition of parts of Russia's overall political culture: autocracy, Russian Orthodox Christianity, and geography.

The current Russian political identity beckons forth the overall autocratic past of Russian political culture, due to its reverence paid towards Stalin and the tsars, by the government, church, and ordinary Russians. Putin's government has become increasingly autocratic, particularly in recent years (primarily since his re-election in 2012), but developed into a more gentle and less violent one than past regimes.

The irony presented by Putin's government, which has been considered to "manage elections" by the Central Intelligence Agency, is also adhered to by his rhetoric in many ways. As

one Russian opposition politician put it after Putin's 2004 re-election speech, before Putin's increasingly strong grasp on power was extended, "This was the perfect Putin moment: he talks the talk of a democrat, but he walks the walk of an autocrat" (Talbot 2016). This depicts the emerging structure of the Russian government once more: an overall autocratic government, with power centralized around a single individual. However, it would be moot to discount the development of Russian political identity without recognizing the overall significance of an allowed multi-party, even if such progress is marred mainly by the lack of power over other parts the government has in comparison to that of the presidency in Russia, and the overall coercion of these parties to stick to the status-quo Putin has instituted in Russia.

In terms of religion, and Russian Orthodoxy being a core tenet of the Russian political culture, Putin's regime seems to have picked up where the Tsars left off: protecting the Russian Orthodox Church, winning its overall support, and using it for nationalistic/unifying purposes (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 36). As mentioned earlier, Russians have often thought of themselves as Russian Orthodox Christians first as their identity, and Russian as their language and nationality (Warhola, 1993, p. 13) Geographically speaking, the threat towards Russia has faded over the years, primarily due to the creation of weaker states next to the country, largely influencing the new Russian regime and political identity. From the Russians' point of view, their geographic situation plays to their advantage in the efforts of becoming a world-power, of which the ideal is primarily fixed upon the concept of larger borders as land is power (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 48).

### **Intercultural Intensity Factors: Russia**

In the case of Russia, geography as a part of the Intercultural Intensity Factors (henceforth referred to as IIF) in political culture plays a key role in the overall cultural differences, cultural isolation, ethno-centrism, language, power and control factors in Russian

political culture. These factors are a guide on which political cultural traits are relevant and make-up the overall theorem of Cross-Cultural Competency. The authoritarian and Russian Orthodox provide for variables of power and control in Russian politics, as well as ethnocentrism in Russian society (of which serve as large influences in the construction of the Russian political culture). In the economic development, the IIF element of power and control would exist evermore, whereas there would be a mixture of all the different factors, particularly power and control, combined into this sector of the Russian political culture.

### **Projected Russian Reactions Based on Political Culture**

Authors Richard E. B. Simeon and David J. Elkins have stated, while the overall impact of political culture cannot be deterministic of the overall effects on the decisions of a country, it is able to be used to make assumptions and predict the actions that could be taken by political leaders (Simeon & Elkins, 1979, pp. 132-133). Political culture helps determine how national governments react to external pressures, such as European Union sanctions on Russia as a result of the of the Crimean Crisis. Russians have seemingly made it a habit to react to crises with utter determination and defiance, seen again and again, from Napoleon's Invasion of Russia to the "Great Patriotic War" during World War II. Political culture may well affect how a country reacts politically to crises, providing a blueprint not just of governance, but of what binds a nation politically together.

In a previous section, we covered how Russia reacted to the imposed sanctions by the European Union on the Russian nation. Russian history is bursting with the history of autocratic regimes, from past tsars to the more recently (around 30 years now) deceased Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Each regime furthers the political cultural facet of autocracy in Russia, whilst spurring on further autocratic traditions. Russian political culture can be determined to

react towards outside influence with either suspicion or defiance, due to multiple factors, such as Russia's early geography, early economic development, political experiences, and religiosity.

Through the practice of two of the four tenets of Russian political culture, Russian Orthodox Christianity and geography, we can determine how Russians would react to exterior pressures, particularly from a political standpoint. In regards to this, we must remember the overall impact of geography on the social and political development of Russia. Russian geography largely facilitated a more communal spirit amongst those who settled and would create the nation of Russia, largely due to the country's vast expanse and the overall lack of transportation in early Russian development (Hosking, 2011, p. 11) (Warhola, 1993, p. 15). Moreover, Russian foreign policy has often been influenced by the Russian lack of security along its borders since the creation of Russia. Today, Russian foreign policy is comprised of two ulterior motives. The first is the concept of land equals power, a policy and idea that tsarist Russia's policies had heavily pursued; and, secondly, Russia should be a superpower based off its landmass and historical importance (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 42-63).

Russian Orthodox Christianity has often played a key role in regular Russian life and in its political activities, with the Orthodox Church supporting Russian tsars with a nationalist agenda (Pipes, 2015, pp. 40-45). Present-day, the Church is seen supporting Putin's government and increasingly advocating for a more nationalistic Russian identity. Russia's reconstruction, under a government that has embraced the Russian Orthodox Church as a key piece of what is would the government would categorize as key piece of the Russian national identity and as a part of the overall governance of Russia, harping back to the times of Russia under the Tsars. Much of what we can see as nationalist fervor in both Russian and Putin's rhetoric is centered around the language of the Russian Orthodox Church, a symbol of Russian culture and an

important part of their political culture. We should remember that during the tsardom of Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church willingly gave up power in exchange for protection and would become a nationalist and unifying ideal for the Russian peoples (Pipes, 2007, p. 36).

The other two factors within Russian political culture, autocracy and economic development, could further help determine how a nation reacts to exterior pressure. In Russia, autocracy has a long history as the primary form of government within the nation, from the founding of Rus civilization, up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some even foreshadow Russia's future by suggesting that the current governance of Russia is heading towards another form of an autocratic government once again. To emphasize this point of consistent autocratic governance, the Russians' view on political governance is often shaped by the crises they have faced. In the case of the current government, many citizens found the democracy provided to them was one that lacked, with not enough being done to help ordinary citizens (who had taken the brunt of the economic downturn and transition from Communism to Free Market economies) (Sakwa, 2008, pp. 880-882). The Russian populace thought that too much of governmental and economic power was held by oligarchs, and that there was overall lack of a strong leadership (Sakwa, 2008, pp. 880-882). Much like the reactions, albeit situations much more violent, Russians chose to react and rally behind a leader that offered strength, unity, and a promotion of traditional Russian values (Sakwa, 2008, p. 881).

The economic development in Russian political culture contributed to the formulation of the current political situation. Previously, the overall economic development of Russia had long been stifled by two main factors: the overall expanse of Russia, and the state control over economic resources. The issue with state control of economic resources was quantified by the Soviet Regime's economic control, of which the first regime (Stalin's), did much to develop the

industrial and agricultural capabilities of the nation during that time. Conversely, as Hosking would note, the Soviet Union economic development would stall in its efficiency and effectiveness over the next few regimes (Hosking, 2011, p. 585) These issues in economic development have heavily influenced the current Russian economy, creating a reliance on oil export revenues to drive economic growth (about 63.8% of Russia's exports were from oil and other energy products) (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2020, p. 1). This method forces the Russian economy into a situation much like during the Soviet Union: acquiring technology, industrial techniques, and capital from the West, but in this case, in exchange for oil and energy resources. Due to this lack of overall economic development, there remained, and still remains, a limited economic interdependency between the European Union and the Russian Federation.

Russia's political culture provides a clearer picture on how the overall political structure and populace reacts to crises, external pressure, and uncertainty of politics as Russia prefers to create a sense of continuous regime, preferring to seek the safety of a strong leader over a situation of uncertainty or perceived corruption (Nalbandov, 2016, pp. 62-65). Components of Russian political culture such as its geographic and Orthodox nature play a massive role in the current Russian government and populace's political reaction to the external pressure of European economic sanctions. It should be noted that the spark of the situation that caused the start of European sanctions was squarely in line with the current Russian political identity and with Russian political culture in a religious, geographic, and autocratic nature. Initially, Russian autocracy, Russian Orthodoxy, and the geographic tenets of Russian political culture favor and benefit from the seizure of territory, particularly due Russian ideological viewpoint that often translates land into power (Giles, 2019, p. 88). In the face of adversity and exterior pressure,

Russians often react with defiance, influenced heavily in this case by the animosity and differences inherent in their politics, cultures, and religiosity (this was depicted in multiple instances, but is particularly evident in the overall result of Marxism in the creation of the Soviet Union) (Anderson, 1967, p. 369).

Under economic sanctions, in regards to the Russian takeover of the Crimea from Ukraine, Russian political culture allows us to paint an overall picture as to how the Russian government and people would react politically to the exterior pressure. Subsequently, one must focus on the similarities of the current Russian government, and what Russian political, cultural traits it has inherited. In many ways, the current Russian government is a continuation of the Russian autocratic tradition, with alterations that have made it slightly less encompassing than of those in the past. However, it continually uses propaganda and news censoring from the Soviet regimes and modern tsarist states. Many high-ranking officials who are members of Putin's government are those with a similar background as his: ex-KGB and ex-Soviet Union officials (Talbot 2004). One must remember the effects of geography on the Russian political culture as it has affected its seeking of land for power, the general Russian tendency to seek out ways to create a more secure nation via either buffer states or more territory, and a territory that is overall best controlled by a more centralized government. In regards to Russian Orthodoxy, this part of Russian political culture has re-obtained its significance under Putin's regime, rendering it an influential force in Russian politics once again, spearheading and supporting much of Putin's nationalistic maneuvers. The economic development of Russia, while lagging behind generally that of Europe (and partially reliant on European importation of Russian energy goods and financing), is gradually being developed by Putin's government.

The key towards remembering how the nation of Russia will react politically against the European sanctions is to recall autocracy's political culture, with all parts of the Russian political culture funneling into the autocratic elements of Russian political culture. Therefore, we can stipulate that much of the political reaction will be determined primarily by how Putin interprets the actions of the European Union, how he wishes to alleviate concerns of his citizenry, and what potential options he believes he has available to strengthen his position. We can also predict that Russia's geography and the nationalistic influence of the Russian Orthodox Church will help spread the views of Putin's regime. Putin's government has reflected various ironies, attempting to espouse traditional Russian values, while also attempting to modernize and Europeanize his country (Sakwa, 2008, pp. 880-881). These influences, paired with Putin's belief in Russian patriotism, combines to help the creation of a Russian state that can effectively secure and influence the Russian country and people as whole under Putin as president (Sakwa, 2008, pp. 881-882). In many ways, Putin's regime represents a reaction to the unrest and economic failings in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise, as well as the characterized weak leadership as the first democratic president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin (Sakwa, 2008, pp. 880-882). In essence, with Putin's reactionary, autocratic government in charge of Russia, it represents a steady fallback onto the traditional political culture of Russia, through which we can moderately predict the way Russia will politically react to the enforcement of sanctions on the Russian Federation.

One can predict the Russian political reaction to European Union sanctions via the past experiences and outlooks gained from the country's autocratic tradition within its political culture. Furthermore, upon examination of the control that Putin is creating over the Russian government and society, one can assume as to how Russia would react, with the influences of

Russia's autocratic political culture possibly playing a key role. Judging by the overall nature of the autocratic political culture in Russia, the general Russian political reaction will probably heavily depend on the autocrat in charge; but, they are likely to appeal to the Russian political culture's roots as well as the Russian Orthodox Church for support as it is the organization and political culture traits best create a feeling of a Russian community. The Russian political culture trait of geography is also a large determinant in the way that a Russian political regime would politically react to the institution of economic sanctions, primarily in regards to the seizure of land that the Russians consider to be a part of their nation, or in the interest of their national security (Giles, 2019, p. 35). The Russian experience has been ridden with large invasions of the Russian heartland, and is therefore, aggressive in securing its borders, whether this entails the annexation/obtainment of land, or the creation of a dominion nation next door an essential idea in Russian foreign policy and national security thinking (Giles, 2019, pp.13-20). Due to Russia's geography, one may begin to understand why Russia seized the Crimea and how they would rather face economic pain than give up a piece of land they consider theirs and is an interest to their security (Giles, 2019, pp. 35-40).

The Russian Orthodox Church supports Russian political culture through its three key traits: it is unifying, nationalistic, and often autocratic. An old part of the Russian identity and political culture, gaining renewed prominence due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Orthodox Church is a unifying element of Russian political culture, one which Nalbandov calls its "national anchor" (Nalbandov, 2016, pp. 34-36). Assuming that the Russian Orthodox Church is in support of the Russian regime as well as the nation's actions in relation to the Crimea (it is highly likely as they are a key force in Russian nationalist movements), this political cultural trait would likely raise the support of the autocratic regime, with many viewing

the action as a move to benefit Russian security, and would possibly assist with the increased support for the regime.

In regards to economic development, as previously discussed, Russian political culture has a tradition in which the state controls much of Russia's economic development, with the land and people under the tsars being a part of the sovereign's personal property so to speak. Under the governance of the Soviet Union, the state control of the economy and its development was even more extensive than before; however, Russian industry would be highly developed (with a modernized economy), but heavily inefficient, and thus ultimately reliant on state control. In this new Russia, Giles notes that not much has changed in regards to Russian economic development, with the overall feeling of the economy related to the time of the tsars: companies and consortiums are granted to loyal Russian businessman, but these are still considered property of leader's regime (Giles, 2019, pp. 88-90) and can be taken away quickly if dissent is sensed or if the individual fell out of favor (Giles, 2019, p. 89). The Russian economic development gives insight into how the political reaction in this particular area would be heavily calculated and depend largely on the focus of the regime. If the regime is heavily focused on defense and security, it is unlikely that the Russian government would respond in a large way, economically speaking. Conversely, the current structure of the Russian regime is less autocratic than before, therefore, it is possible that the Russian political reaction would attempt to cover the economic pain caused by sanctions or other factors by way of retaliation and propaganda. It is perfectly plausible that the regime may move faster to counteract the possible economic damages sanctions could impose, making the government react faster to solve the issues as any economic problem is primarily reliant on the government to solve it.

### **Political Culture Prediction vs. Reality in Russia**

Russia's reaction, however much is influenced by historical texts and his own interests, represents Vladimir Putin's reaction towards retaining a base of support for his autocratic regime and the solidification of said regime in Russia. Alongside this, it must be emphasized that the political cultural traits of autocratic rule and the Russian Orthodox Church has influenced Putin's and Russia's political reaction in general. Putin's regime has stepped up the repression of individual political activists and initiatives, something that has high approval ratings amongst Russian citizenry who agree that in order to ensure state security, they must have some personal freedoms curtailed (Giles, 2019, p. 88). Furthermore, Putin has issued retaliatory measures that emphasize the Russian resolve, in particular targeting the European Union economy. Putin's reaction is a calculated risk, seeing that their economy is heavily reliant on European capital and oil exports to Europe. This calculated risk has been effective in a couple different ways as it primarily shows his resolve, provides an example as to how he appeals to his base of supporters, and demonstrates his strength as a Russian leader (primarily through his non-compromising attitude with Western nations).

The Russian populace has responded in kind, seeing a surge in nationalistic fervor and support for Putin's presidency as reported in the NEORUSS Survey, showing Putin's preference jump from 40% to 68.2% in regards to nationalist leaders (Kolsto & Blakkisrud, 2016, p. 199). Kolesnikov believes that Putin's usage of propaganda and the overall limiting of opposing voices and parties has allowed for the overall messaging of the Crimean seizure to be spun positively as a matter of Russian security and power (Kolesnikov 2016). Seizing upon this nationalistic fervor, Putin, Sergei Lavrov (Russia's Foreign Minister), and others in the regime utilized historical Russian figures as both rallying points for the government and as a justification for the new

change in Russian foreign policy (Kurilla 2016). Kurilla notes that the use of historical figures and descriptions increased in the wake of the Crimean Crisis in 2014 to mobilize the population in support of the regime's decisions (Kurilla 2016). In order to secure his power further and increase nationalism within Russia, Putin's regime attempted to rely on Russian history, with an increase in veneration of Stalin (though this seems less emphasized by Putin now) as well as a focus on pre-World War I tsarist politics, making references to the glory days of the Russian Empire (Kurilla 2016). The moves made by Putin's regime is a part of Russian autocratic and Russian Orthodox Christian political culture, which has sought the utilization of unifying persons and images to increase nationalism and support for the autocratic regime in power. Putin's shifts and use of these icons further increases the likeliness that Russia's response would be a stubborn and hostile reaction towards European sanctions, as he is solidifying the support of his regime and justifying these actions referencing nationalistic and historical figures of the past to gain credibility for his decisions.

Further evidence supporting the political reaction of Putin against European sanctions as a part of Russian political culture is based off of geographical experiences and the identities that come with it. Russia is a massive country, spanning two different continents, and with that geography come both benefits and dangers that have affected the political development of the nation. In many ways, Putin's overall nationalistic foreign policy is built much like the tsarist foreign policy at the start of 1914 (Giles, 2019, p. 14).

However, Putin's government is not a Slavophil regime like that of 1914, instead its relevance is closer in geographical terms as it calls for lands, dominions and subjugated or like-minded allies in order to provide security for its frontiers and to project its great power status (Giles, 2019, pp. 14-15). Through this one can generally spot a tendency that seemingly

reiterates between regimes in Russia: the need to have secure borders, more land or friendly dominions next to these borders in order to create more security and guarantee Russia's status as a great power (Giles, 2019, pp. 14-16). Likewise, many Russians, and possibly Putin, consider the Crimean Peninsula to be a part of the "empire," serving as a geographically and culturally key part of the country (Kolesnikov, 2016). Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the Russian government would concede or backdown in a case of seizing territory, especially in the face of economic sanctions. Most importantly, Russia would rather take short-term losses in the economy than to make concessions regarding its status as a world power and its own regional security. In applying the geographic element of Russian political culture, one can predict reactions, primarily in regards to conflicts over territory and land; because, land and dominions are thought to be the ways in which Russia can secure its own national security and its vision of becoming a superpower.

Overall, the economic development as part of Russian political culture serves as a major influence upon the Russian political reaction to European sanctions. This is due to the nature at which the Russian economy operates in sync with its government as a result of political cultural tradition that is influenced by Russia's geography and autocratic cultures. As a part of the methodology of Intercultural Intensity Factors, the examination of Russian economic development as part of Russian political culture provides multiple insights, in particular, regarding power and control, as well as cultural differences. The understanding of the Russian economy is that it is typically considered a more backwards capitalistic economy, with a lack of rule of law and sufficient property rights (Heritage Foundation 2020). However, a lack of property rights has been an essential part in Russia's economic development and its autocratic traditions. As a part of Russian economic tradition, the entire nation has often been considered as

the property and extension of the ruler (Giles, 2019, p. 89). It is therefore that Andrei Piontkovsky would observe that the current economic structure of the Russian Federation is not one of capitalism, but one in which those that are in charge of the economy are granted their places, much like those in the day of tsars, creating personal fiefdoms while ensuring that loyal members of the regime would be in charge of much of the economy (Giles, 2019, p. 89). The outlook of the Russian economic development supports two ideas: the practice of sanctions on specific individuals and companies that are closer to Putin or his governmental ministers and that the political regime of the Russian people will react quicker to either de-escalate the issue, or be hastier to repudiate the sanctions and escalate the conflict. It could mean that if Putin senses dissent within his circle of advisors and oligarch supporters, he could easily strip away that person's influence and power.

### **Effects of Economic Interdependency**

The effects of economic interdependence on political decision making should not be underplayed in the case of Russian political reactions to European Union sanctions. In this case, the Russian and European Union economies are only partially economically interdependent (as previously mentioned) with Europe being Russia's largest foreign investor and buyer of energy products, with Russia approximately providing an overall 29% of all crude oil, 43% of all oil products, and 33% of natural gas to the European Union (Simola, 2019, p. 129).

On the opposite side of this relationship, Russia relies on European technology, manufactured goods, and foreign investments, with the European Union economy providing around 75% (€276.8 billion) (European Commission 2020) of all foreign direct investments. Russian and European leaders have realized their interdependent economies are vulnerable to sanctions from either side. On the other hand, the European Union has been moving away from

interdependence with Russia primarily through its efforts to de-carbonize its economy (Dominguez-Jimenez & Poitiers, 2020, p. 1). Despite these actions, the European Union still heavily relies on Russian oil and gas imports to fulfill its energy needs. Coming to terms with this and realizing what actions may help in the short or long term often relies on one's economic development, projected development, and ability of the nation to find other sources of funding or products to replace lost sources.

In the case of Russian and European economic interdependency, I would argue that this interdependence is much like what Heli Simola describes as limited interdependence, where each economy heavily relies on one another, primarily due to energy resources and investments, bringing a halt to the interdependence amongst these two areas (Simola, 2019, p. 25). European investments in Russia mirror the Russian economy itself: reliant on Russian oil prices and exports (Dominguez-Jimenez & Poitiers, 2020, p. 3). Rather than becoming interdependent economies, it is more feasible, particularly for the European community (generally the more western, richer nations), to be willing and able to punish the Russian Federation through economic sanctions. European sanctions targeted specific Russian individuals responsible for violence in the Crimea, limited Russian banks from accessing primary and secondary capital markets, banned arms purchases and exports to Russia, and curtailed access to certain technologies and services that Russia could have used for oil production and exploration (European Commission 2020). The limitation of Russian banks to access European capital and the curtailing of Russian access to European technology and services in regards to energy products, point to areas of significant economic importance for the Russians. Although these two blocs are heavily reliant on each other for different purposes, it does not diminish the fact that these two economies are in the stage of complimentary economics, through which they both

complement one another and provide each other goods they need in exchange for goods the other needs. For example, Russia primarily sends raw goods and exports to the European Union while the European Union sends capital, finished goods, luxury goods, and services to the Russian Federation's economy (Simola, 2019, p. 129). As a result, one can predict a decrease in the economic strength between the two nations in response to the sanctions. Additionally, one can moderately predict the type of political reaction the Russian regime will take when taking into consideration the diverse ranges of economic interests between the Russian and European Union economies, particularly in the energy and financial sectors.

The Russian political reaction, as predicted earlier, would carry two different mannerisms: one based off of the overall authoritarianist and nationalist parts of the Russian identity and political culture, and another based upon the idea that while not fully interdependent, both economies rely on each other for a large amount of trade and other economic factors. Russian actions in regards to the economics and interdependencies between the two nations, particularly due to its status as large trade partners (the European Union is Russia's largest trade partner; Russia is the European Union's fifth largest trade partner), will force a fine balance between aggressive response to the sanctions that inspires confidence in the Russian populace, in addition to maintaining critical trade, financial, and business contacts to limit the economic damage of sanctions, however major or minor the effects may be.

In response to European sanctions, Putin's regime decided to institute its own form of political sanctions on the European economy such as a ban on the importation of agricultural goods from the European Union (RadioFreeEurope 2020). These goods were banned from Russia following security concerns to the Russian Federation, according to the European Commission. The ban covers a wide range of agricultural and food products such as fruits,

vegetables, dairy products, meat, and fish from the countries within the European Union which had implemented the sanctions against the Russian Federation. Russia represents an important market for European Union agricultural goods, with approximately 10% of all European agri-food exports heading to the Russian Federation, second only to the United States. The ban has cost farmers within the European Union about €5.5 billion a year in lost export income.

While a retaliation or resistance to European imposed sanctions was expected, there is evidence to believe that in some ways, both parties are attempting to limit the economic damage, which is likely the result of the limited interdependencies between the two economies. The economic interdependency between the European Union and Russia could help predict that both blocs begrudgingly need each other; Russia needs Europe for its technology and finances and Europe needs Russia's energy products. It can therefore be surmised that although there might be sanctions emplaced on each economy, they will most likely steer towards figurative actions, rather than ones that would be more damaging to either the populace or the majority of the two differing blocs' political regimes. The overall effectiveness of the sanctions emplaced by either bloc depends on the sanctions' targets, which in the case of European Union sanctions, did not target the general Russian populace (Ptasnyk 2019). Instead, it attempted to target regime figures or those they considered to be closer to the Russian regime; and, banned imports, finances, and trade to and from the Crimea (European Commission 2020). Both blocs attempted to punish each other in regards to their sanctions, however, they were reticent to target the economic areas of which they were more interdependent, seemingly attempting to cooperate in these economic interests instead, as evidenced by the continuation of German and Russian states in the building of Nordstream-2 oil pipeline (RadioFreeEurope 2020). The greatest lesson from this case is that it might be a good idea to sanction a nation, but it's important to remember that while the more

reliant a nation is on trade and financial capital from a country, the more damaging sanctions are likely to be. If countries are more interdependent, even if these nations are nominally interdependent, the impact will hit both blocs with greater force; therefore, these nations either suffer the consequences or target areas of limited impact such as the case of the Russians and Europeans.

### **Lessons of Political Culture in Russia**

There are several lessons that can be drawn from political culture and the European Union sanctions emplaced on the Russian Federation due to the Crimean Crisis. Firstly, from the studies and research of Russian political culture, one could predict the Russian political reaction to the European Union sanctions. This is due to the various political cultural factors that influence the overall thought processes of both society and political leaders, including those of the highest office or rank, such as President Vladimir Putin. Based on Russian political culture, one can determine that geography plays a large role in the construction of political systems, political beliefs, national security beliefs, power identity, and the economic development of a country. The historical importance of the development of certain governmental types has also been extremely important in dictating Russian responses, primarily due to the historical governmental structures, communal preference, overall idea of individual sovereignty of the country's leader, and often almost unchecked power for the sovereign (in order to provide security and stability rather than the creation of societal rights and development). The Russian Orthodox Church played an extensive role in the development of Russian political culture, acting as a unifier of the Russian people, a supporter of unchecked autocratic power, Russian nationalism, and Russia's communal identity. Moreover, the economic development is also telling of Russian political culture, where the overall economy of Russia lags behind that of more

Western nations due to the expansive geography of the nation, which until now, was difficult to cross effectively. Lastly, but important to note, is the nature of Russian economics, in which there is a history of autocratic regimes overseeing and controlling land and economic development, making the economic development of the country heavily dependent on the actions of the state. These political cultural developments aided in the prediction that the Russian political regime would react to economic sanctions. Actions taken in the overall interest of Russian security, particularly in the possession of land to extend a security blanket for the country or the domineering of a nation, are often heavily supported as a result of past political culture. The regime would create a clash with the European Union by exerting the Russian viewpoint in many conflicts with Western nations: a fight between good (Russian) and evil (the West in this scenario), in which Russian security and values were threatened.

From this case study one is able to draw conclusions. To begin, geography is and will most likely always remain an important part of Russian political culture, due to its influence on the development of government and economic development. Much of a nation's character is heavily reliant on its geographical situation. Political culture is made up of several factors, but one of the main ones it is comprised of is geography. Russia would likely not have developed such an autocratic tradition had it been geographically in a less precarious or less expansive position. Russia would also likely have adopted a much less aggressive national security policy and foreign policy than it does now, in particular in regards to its viewpoints of more land means more power, and the usage of more land to ensure the security of the country. Religion is another large factor making up the definition of political culture, with examples being compared between Western European nations whose Catholic and Protestant roots helped form democratic cultures,

versus the Eastern Orthodox influence which, as mentioned in the Russian Orthodoxy section of this research, was often referred to as a supporter of autocratic regimes in Russia.

While the Russian political culture trait of autocracy served as a part of this case study, the overall impact on the political reactions of regimes is varying and based upon the legacies, political traditions, and historical governance of previous governments, with the power of decision left up to the individual at the highest level, meaning that reactions in the regime are heavily based on the autocrat's decisions. Lastly, economic development as a part of political culture allows for the investigation of the governmental control over economics and the general development of the economy either through private or governmental means. In Russia's case, economic development largely rests upon the central government's ability in mobilizing the necessary manpower and finances to further the overall development of the Russian economy, primarily due to the nation's vast size and in many cases, the limited freedom of economic and societal ability to create change.

Ultimately, there are four key lessons that can be taken from this case study in order to be able to predict political reactions to external pressure, and help to ensure better effectiveness from economic sanctions. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the political culture of a nation before determining the kind of sanctions needed to change a country's actions. Secondly, geography plays a huge role in the political character, culture, and attitudes a country has. Thirdly, economic development plays a role in what parts or people should be targeted in regards to sanctions. Finally, that economic interdependencies of nations determines the effectiveness, and also the damage of economic sanctions.

### **Findings and Further Applications**

The impact of political culture helps shape the overall outlook a nation has on governance, foreign policy, economics, and societal development. In this case study, we focused on the overall impact that political culture may have over the political reactions of a government and its peoples to external political or economic pressure. The focus of the case study being on the political culture of Russian, and how the political reaction to these sanctions were affected by political culture, allows for an insight into how political culture can affect political reactions and the general decision making of a nation. While anyone can make assumptions based on the overall impact that political culture embeds within the political character of individuals and their government, you ultimately cannot determine how a nation may react to external pressure purely based on political culture, but you can help to predict the way a nation will respond.

Initially, the findings show that the political reaction to the implementation of sanctions to change government policy or cause regime change is unlikely to work if the country has a long political cultural trait of autocracy; particularly one in which there is the ideal of individual sovereignty. As previously mentioned, it is best to study the political culture of a nation prior to determining the best course of action. In the aforementioned case study of Russia, the likeliness of the economic sanctions changing the Russian regime's policies is extremely limited in any scenario, but with action against it seen as a national threat, Russia is prepared to dig-in, negating the hoped positive effects from the European Union sanctions.

Furthermore, when considering sanctions, it is important to investigate the overall economic development of the nation being targeted. This is in part due to the Russian political culture trait of economic development being primarily dictated by the state; and, while it may seem to benefit smart sanctions that target certain individuals who are close to the regime, it also

means that the regime could more effectively respond to opposition in economic ranks and possibly react faster to economic issues caused by said sanctions.

Next, it is an important lesson to learn the geographic trait of political culture, as the overall actions taken in foreign policy are often motivated by the limits and history of a nation's geography. As a result, actions in a certain geographical area could be interpreted as an essential part of national security and thus the institution of sanctions could further alienate the nation. Last but not least, it is imperative that economic sanctions help determine which sanctions would be most effective against a nation based upon the ideas of economic interdependence. If the blocs are heavily interdependent, economic sanctions could be particularly harmful for both sides, however if one side is more reliant than the other in regards to trade between the two blocs, then the sanctions employed by the less reliant side will be much more effective, and there will be less risk of implementation. In the case study between the European Union and Russia, both blocs are dependent on each other in a limited area. This area of energy and oil products for Europe is considered a security issue, while Russia's dependence on money and investments gained from the oil and energy industry makes it difficult for Russia to respond in an expansive way.

The applications of using political culture to predict the reaction of political regimes and populaces of other nations is invaluable in regards to foreign policy. Political culture aids in the prediction of the overall political reaction to external pressure caused by nation-states and other characters in the international field. While, these predictions may provide only a template based upon past actions and the traits of nations' political regimes, these predictions could help nations determine how effective their actions will be in influencing the actions of governments and the punishment of nations deemed to be a threat or infringing on international law. Ultimately, it is useful for diplomatic corps to consider and/or study the effect political culture may have on the

effectiveness of sanctions and how to structure them for maximum effectiveness against other nations.

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## Tables

Table 1

*Shares of European Union (EU) and Russian Exports and Imports*

	EU share of Russian exports	Russian share of EU imports	EU share of Russian imports	Russian share of EU exports
Total	46.2	7.5	38.3	4.3
Oil & gas	59.5	28.8	n.a.	n.a.
Total, excl. oil & gas	26.2	3.0	n.a.	n.a.
Food	11.1	1.4	22.4	4.4
Chemicals	30.5	2.7	57.2	5.2
Wood & paper	23.2	8.2	61.8	4.8
Metals	44.5	9.9	34.0	3.8
Machinery & equipment	20.4	0.3	38.8	4.9
Vehicles	17.0	0.7	41.4	3.5

*Note.* Percentages of exports and imports between Russia and the European Union. Adapted from “Limited Interdependence in EU-Russia Trade,” by H. Simola, in K. Rain and A. Racz (Eds), *Post-Crimea Shift in EU-Russian Relations: From Fostering Interdependence to Managing Vulnerabilities* (p. 132), 2019.

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Table 2

*Change in Overall Russian Imports of Counter Sanctioned Goods*


	Imports from the World % change July 2014-July 2016 (decrease in \$ mil)	Imports from the EU28 % change July 2014-July 2016 (decrease in \$ mil)	Value of imports from the world July 2016 (\$ mil)
<b>Total imports</b>	-43.9% (-12,028.4)	-48.7% (-5,528.7)	15,400.5
<b>All categories subject to counter-sanctions</b>	- 56.5% (1015.4)	-96.8% (419.5)	781
<i>Meat (02)</i>	-68.3% (-424.6)	-97.7% (-37.6)	197.0
<i>Fish (03)</i>	-54.6% (-118.3)	-97.6% (-11.6)	98.4
<i>Dairy (04)</i>	-48.9% (-171.9)	-92.5% (152.9)	179.4
<i>Vegetables (07)</i>	-65.4% (-104.4)	-99.7% (-53.6)	55.2
<i>Fruits (08)</i>	-43.9% (-196.1)	-100.0% (-164.0)	250.9

*Note.* The table highlights the change in percentages of agricultural imports from both the World in general and the European Union in to Russia from July 2014 - July 2016. From *Revisiting Sanctions on Russia and Counter-Sanctions on the EU: The economic impact three years later*, by Gros and Di Salvo, 2017. (<https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/revisiting-sanctions-russia-and-counter-sanctions-eu-economic-impact-three-years-later/>). In the public domain.

**Figures**

Figure 1

*Imports, Exports and Trade Balance Between the European Union (EU) and Russia*



.)Note. Changes in billions of dollars every year imports and exports between Russian and European Union between 2009 to 2019 From *Eurostat*, 2020.

([https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Russia-](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Russia-EU)

[EU %E2%80%93 international trade in goods statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Russia-EU)). In the public domain.