“Lead Us Not”
Linguistic and Exegetical Considerations for Translating the Sixth Petition of the Lord’s Prayer

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A POPE, A PRAYER, AND A PROBLEM

And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil: For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen. – Matthew 6:13, KJV

Blessed is the man that endureth temptation: for when he is tried, he shall receive the crown of life, which the Lord hath promised to them that love him. – James 1:13, KJV

A Pope and a Prayer

When news broke in the summer of 2019 that Pope Francis was approving a change to the Lord’s Prayer’s temptation petition, sensational headlines reported the story as if the pontiff had proposed a radical shift in Christian doctrine. Parties from all sides had already taken issue with his comments on climate change, economics, and abortion, but news outlets now suggested that the head of the world’s largest Christian denomination was reshaping one of the faith’s most foundational texts. The matter, of course, was far more mundane: since the 2008 edition of the Conferenza Episcopale Italiana Bible (CEI) had been published, a discrepancy existed between the biblical text officially endorsed by the Italian Episcopate and the version of the prayer recited as part of the Missal. The Missal had retained the Matthean version of the Lord’s Prayer from the 1974 edition of the CEI, so in order to conform the liturgy to the text that Italian Catholics were reading in their own personal Bibles, the recited Lord’s Prayer was changed.

And although this change was over a decade old by the time it appeared in the Missal, it was nevertheless met with controversy. The traditional Italian reading of the temptation petition, “non ci indurre in tentazione,” is roughly equivalent to the English counterpart popularized by the King James Version, “lead us not into temptation.” Both readings reflect a formalistic
approach to the text that attempts to preserve the words and grammar of the source while offering little to no mediation or interpretation. The 2008 edition of the CEI largely retained this formalism; however, its revision to the temptation petition deviated from its stated philosophy of translation. The revised petition, “non abbandonarci alla tentazione,” could be translated into English as “do not abandon us to temptation” and corrects, as Pope Francis would explain, an inferred implication of the traditional reading, that God is the normative agent of enticement to wrongdoing. Drawing upon such scripture as James 1:12-15, Pope Francis and the Italian Episcopal Conference claimed that God “tempts no one”; therefore, the traditional reading of the Matthean and Lukan text, even if it more accurately accounts for the linguistic data, had to be discarded, should it appear that God tempts individuals to evil.

A Problem in Plain Sight

Though it is beyond the scope of this research to judge the accuracy of the CEI’s newest rendering of the temptation petition, the controversy surrounding the modification of the Roman Missal has drawn new attention to a predicament that has existed since the church was in its infancy. Even before the canon was formed, early Christian sources attest a Greek version of the Lord’s Prayer whose temptation petition, καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν, in its appeal that God not bring his people into a place of temptation, suggests that God is normally a key agent behind one’s enticements to sin. Since the earliest days of the church, scholars and other religious figures have pondered the phrasing of the petition, parsing out the words and attempting to reconcile the passage with Christ’s other teachings. When examining the passage at a linguistic level, one might find the grammar to be fairly straightforward: an aorist subjunctive functioning as a prohibition places “God” as the petitioned party, and the petitioners—the accusative “us”—wish to avoid being brought “into” the object of the preposition, either
“temptation” proper or perhaps some place where temptation occurs. None of the words present are hapax legomena or otherwise bizarre vocabulary; instead, the problem comes from the straightforward reading of the text presenting either a troublesome view of God or a strange view of prayer.

If the popular reading of the text is correct, then the theological implication is that God is the party who normally tempts his faithful toward wrongdoing, and he does this even as he informs his followers that it is appropriate to not desire to be tempted. Many throughout church history have tried to make sense of this surface reading—of why Yahweh would tempt his elect. But rationalizing this reading only exacerbates the problem, for if God has a legitimate and beneficent purpose that exonerates him from malicious action, then the believer would not be commended for asking that God refrain from tempting. Christ would certainly not place such a request in his model prayer! Other attempts to translate the text have focused on broadening the definition of πειρασμός, the word translated with “temptation” in the KJV. This broadening usually opts for a definition more widely attested in nonbiblical literature, like “trials”; some scholars understand the trials in question to be a “test” of quality or purpose while others simply see the prayer as having “bad times” in view. But these interpretations of πειρασμός likewise fall into contradiction even as they try to justify, for, again, if God intends a beneficial end when he performs these trials and tribulations, then what reason has the supplicant for desiring exemption?

Another possible solution would be to argue that the verse does not imply that God is the normative agent of temptation. Were this the case, however, the petition would lose its motivation. Presumably, Christ would avoid commanding that his followers ask for God’s refrainment from an action he already categorically refrains from performing. To assume that
Christ would do otherwise creates an odd theology of prayer, for why would the faithful ask that God refrain from doing something that is simply not part of his character? Why would believers ask that God not do something that he already does not do?

An added difficulty with the Lord’s Prayer’s temptation petition is its context, or lack thereof. Even though the petition exists within both the Matthean and Lukan versions of the Lord’s Prayer in exactly the same form, neither version provides further comment on the petition within its own discourse. The more stylized rendition of Matthew’s prayer elevates parallelism through such clauses as “on earth as it is in heaven” and “as we forgive our debtors,” and in a similar vein, this version also provides a parallel petition to the temptation clause, “but deliver us from (the) evil (one).” The conjunction “but,” translated from Greek ἀλλὰ, places this petition in a coordinate position with the temptation petition, leading to this small, additional clause being the closest limiter of the temptation petition’s meaning. Yet, the deliverance petition faces its own hermeneutical problems, primarily rooted in how best to interpret “the evil” alluded to. Because of these problems, the deliverance petition has provided little aid in resolving the issue of the temptation petition.

A tension exists, then, between the apparent linguistic data, the theological implications of that data, and the function of that data within its broader discourse. The implication of the verse, that God is the primary agent within the act of temptation, directly contradicts James’ teachings on the subject; attempts to justify temptation so that God can engage in it while maintaining his beneficence appear logically incompatible with the instruction to pray for exemption; and situating the petition’s claims in its own discourses—both the Sermon on the Mount and the Prayer itself—seemingly causes further internal contradiction.
And as if these tensions in interpretation were not problem enough, there also stands the matter of translation. Since the beginning of the Christian era, the Way has been a translating faith, rendering the words of the gospel into different grammars and disparate cultural milieus in order to bring the good news of salvation to the world. The words of scripture, after all, are only useful insofar as one can understand them. As in many things, Christians have disagreed on how best to render the source text among these different linguistic and cultural contexts, so along with the necessary discussion of unraveling the Lord’s Prayer interpretive quandaries must come a look into the early church’s translation practices, how these practices shaped the reception of the temptation petition, and how a resolution to the prayer’s hermeneutical dilemmas might be made apparent in a translation’s text.

**Outlining the Way Forward**

The following two chapters will investigate historical approaches to interpreting the temptation petition. The first of these will focus on early patristic attempts to parse out the clause’s meaning, beginning with Marcion’s supposed interpretation of it and progressing to that of Augustine, and the latter will move onward to more contemporary attempts, sampling commentaries and other scholarly works that exemplify different interpretive camps. After surveying the relevant literature, this research will then closely examine the grammatical and syntactic function of each of the words in the petition. Only after reviewing the multiple interpretive dilemmas that each word presents will this study, in its final chapter, work toward hypotheses for resolving the hermeneutical and translational predicaments that the temptation petition poses. These final hypotheses, which soften the action of the clause while reframing the target of the “temptation” in view, result in a workable translation that characterizes God as a sought-after intervener in the act of temptation instead of as the primary operator behind it.
TRANSLATION TRADITION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE PETITION

Indeed, I not only admit, but freely proclaim that in translation from the Greek – except in the case of Sacred Scripture, where the very order of the words is a mystery – I render not word for word, but sense for sense. – Jerome

Cicero and Pre-Christian Translation

For most of human history, translation was something done rather than discussed. The earliest surviving act of literary translation, the translation of The Epic of Gilgamesh from Sumerian into Akkadian, dates to the eighteenth century BC, with oral translation dating even earlier, to the point when two languages first became mutually unintelligible. Yet despite the long-term, ongoing practice of translation in the ancient world, the first extended treatise on translation, Jerome’s fifty-seventh letter, was not composed until the end of the fourth century AD, over two thousand years after Gilgamesh’s translation.

Now, some have quipped that all of western philosophy is a footnote to Plato, and while many scholars would debate that claim, an analogous one could be made with Jerome and translation studies. Jerome was the first, so all of contemporary translation studies is a footnote to his work. But everyone who translates operates under a theory even if that theory is not formulated and expressed in a treatise, and that was the case with Jerome’s predecessors. Jerome himself was a fond reader of earlier Latin writers, most of whom were pagan. One can imagine him being enthralled by the many orators and rhetoricians, such as Cicero, whom he cites in his letter. But Roman culture was not fundamentally Roman. In the same way that American culture could be considered the product of multiple non-American influences, so too was imperial
Roman culture the byproduct of non-Roman cultures. For America, the dominant influential culture would be England’s; after all, America seceded from the British Empire. For Rome, however, the Greeks were the dominant influence. Roman culture, then, was the product of translation in the etymological sense: Greek culture was “borne across” the Mediterranean to the Italic Peninsula.

But Roman literary culture was also the product of translation in the typical sense, for much of Rome’s pre-Christian literary tradition was comprised of rehashed and Latinized Greek narratives. And these texts were indeed “rehashed” and “Latinized.” Though modern theories of translation often envision the act as transforming one source text into the “same” thing in another language, Roman translation maintained no pretense of faithfulness. A poem of Sappho’s, for example, might be copied into Latin with an extra stanza not belonging to the original, or The Odyssey might be pillaged for its fun, juicy morsels in order to have those “good” bits stirred into a lean, one-book epic. In fact, both of these “translations” do exist, and they illustrate how Roman translation differed from both contemporary methods and even the methods that Jerome would come to adopt. As Siobhán McElduff, the author of Roman Theories of Translation: Surpassing the Source, explains, “Roman literary translation, as a general rule, dismembered a Greek text and scattered it within a larger work. As a result, in Rome there was rarely anything we would call faithful translation. The overriding concern of Roman translation was not fidelity or free translation, but control” (10).

One motivator of this loose approach to the sources was that most of any translator’s audience was already acquainted with the source tongue: “elites frequently translated for other elites who could read the original in Greek if they so wished” (11). The elite audience, then, delighted not in a classic being comprehensible for the first time, but in spotting the innovations
of structure, voice, and content supplied by the translator. Translation in this sense finds greater kinship with contemporary adaptation than in modern translation studies. A similar delight reveals itself in our present fascination with superhero films. Most individuals are aware of Batman’s origins in Crime Alley and Superman’s exodus from Krypton. The variations on the mythos are what sell tickets. And just as some fans argue that these films can only be appreciated if one knows the originals, so too did some Roman authors argue that one “could only really translate for those who already knew Greek” (11). Yet, again, Roman translation differs even from contemporary practices of adaptation, for even though manipulation of the source is understood and expected when transitioning between media, in Roman culture, manipulation was expected even whenever the source and target media were the same. Such is why Cicero argues that a source’s author ought not to be imitated too closely, for if one opted for literal translation, then the opportunity to creatively manipulate the original—that is, the opportunity to imprint oneself upon the source—was lost. “Literal translation,” Cicero would have argued, “makes you a slave to the original text [and] suppresses your own literary personality in favor of another’s” (108-109).

Now, this is not to say that close, formal translations did not exist in Rome; interpreters did provide word-for-word translations in the transmission of legal documents and in relaying the content of speech. Cicero alludes to this tendency when, writing about the work of an interpreter, he explains that this interpreter was “exceptionally and almost incredibly faithful, self-restrained, and unassuming,” suggesting that these traits were the ideal for a man in this occupation (27). But, despite the trend toward syntactic faithfulness in the translation of legal documents, the prevailing aesthetic philosophy was to move beyond the mere work of the interpreter. The preferred translation practice was not the rigid translation of the interpreter, but
the fluid, manipulative translation of the orator. Cicero alludes to the orator’s role as translator in one of his earliest works, *On Invention*. In the beginning of the work, Cicero depicts primitive man’s conversion into an enlightened being through the rhetorical power of the orator, yet the vocabulary of his description parallels the vocabulary employed when discussing translation. When Cicero states that “someone—who was surely great and wise—understood what *material* lay in men’s minds and that it was capable of achieving great things if someone could *entice it out* and use their instruction to *render* it into something better,” he is speaking of man’s translation from unlearned brute to competent thinker. As McElruff explains, “This is a ‘scene of translation,’ where human beings, rather than texts, are controlled and translated by the power of the orator. The orator alone is capable of seeing below the surface of things (men in this situation, texts in others) in order to change them from one status to another” (98). Through perceiving the potential hidden in both the minds of men and the foreign words of source texts, the good orator, according to Cicero’s claim, has the power to control and convert these minds and texts into loyal, active supporters of the Roman cause. In the case of man, the orator exploits argument and rhetoric to remold thoughts, and in the case of a foreign text, the orator reshapes the work—fashioning it anew with not only a new language, but also new content, a new structure, and a new voice—in order to annex it into the Roman canon.

**Jerome and a Christian Translation Tradition**

The remnants of imperial Rome’s intellectual climate were what Jerome was writing into when he composed his fifty-seventh letter, addressed to one Pammachius. This document, being a personal correspondence, was not intended by its author to be an extensive treatment on the art of translation; rather, like the epistles of the New Testament, Jerome’s letter was a document composed in reaction to personal circumstance. Indeed, Jerome actually wrote the letter in
defense of an accusation: “[Y]our educated ears,” Jerome says to Pammachius, “will hear my answer to a foolish tongue that slings allegations of ignorance or deceit at me, claiming that either I was unable or I refused to translate a letter accurately from Greek. Now of these, the first is an error, the second a crime” (21). From his own point of view, the discrepancies between the source and his translation were laughably minute. As he explains, his enemies among “the uneducated crowd […] claim[ed] that [he] did not translate word for word, but wrote ‘dearest one’ for ‘honorable one,’ and that […] through a malicious interpretation [he] chose not to carry over the title αἰδεσιμωτατον [most reverend] for Bishop John. These, and trivialities of this sort, [were his] crimes” (22). Functioning as an interpreter for a formal correspondence, Jerome apparently adopted a translation philosophy akin to that of the literary Roman orators, manipulating the source and reshaping it as he saw fit. Now, these “manipulations” were slight; they might have easily been mistakes brought about by a hurried process. But from these mistakes, Jerome gives a defense of his entire translation philosophy, one that, as many scholars have pointed out, is nothing but contradictory.

If one were to read Jerome’s letter backwards—to begin with his arguments for his position and then move to his initial claim—one would find the support for Jerome’s position to be entirely misguided. This support evinces wide reading: along with the expected citations (the Septuagint translators and the New Testament authors), Jerome also cites a preface to Athanasius’ Life of St. Anthony as well as Cicero’s work on Plato’s Protagoras and Xenophon’s Oeconomicus. The examples he procures from these sources illustrate the more fluid sense-for-sense style of translation akin to the Roman orators, and Jerome explains that these translations, despite their style, are indeed proper. Cicero, for instance, changes and adds to Protagoras and Oeconomicus “in order to display the properties of another language through the properties of his
own”; likewise, the orator argues that he “follow[s] the wording [of the original] only so long as it does not conflict with [the Latin] idiom” (23). Despite Latin and Greek’s Indo-European similarity, the two languages also have radical differences. Often, the preservation of syntactic and/or morphological forms could result in different meanings between the two languages. Jerome argues that this fact justifies an abandonment of the interpreters’ word-for-word rigidity, and he even mocks these interpreters by calling their “truthfulness in translation” ἐκκακοζηλία, or “overzealousness” (24). As further support for his claims, he draws upon the preface to The Life of St. Anthony, which states that “[a] translation expressed word for word from one language into another conceals the sense just as an overabundant pasture strangles the crops” (24). From this parabolic saying, Jerome dives into the scriptures, discussing the evangelists’ propensity for supposedly mistranslating both the Old Testament and Jesus’s Aramaic sayings. Mark 5:41, for example, wherein Jesus calls out “Talitha cumi,” provides the translation of the phrase as “young woman, I say to you, arise.” Jerome notes, however, that if his detractors maintain their preference for form, they will have to admit that an error in translation exists in canonized scripture. “The Evangelist,” he retorts, “might be denounced for deceit in adding ‘I say to you,’ when the Hebrew had merely ‘young woman, arise.’ Yet to make it ἔμφατικωτέρον [more emphatic] and to express the sense of calling and commanding, he added ‘I say to you’” (25). Though the syntax might have changed between the Aramaic and the Greek, the sense of the original has been preserved and, as Jerome notes, has been more emphatically restated. The goal of the evangelists was not rigid conformity to the guidelines of the source tongue; instead, the evangelists freely took liberties with the original grammar “so long as the truth lay open to understanding” (28).
And yet, these arguments follow a thesis that has confounded scholars of translation studies for years. After providing Pammachius the initial background for the accusations against him, Jerome tells his letter’s recipient, “I not only admit, but freely proclaim that in translation from the Greek—except in the case of Sacred Scripture, where the very order of the words is a mystery—I render not word for word, but sense for sense” (23). Without the letter’s following support, such a claim is reasonable. Surely a monk who believes in the divine authorship of scripture will also believe that the word order of that scripture preserves relevant data. But with Jerome’s added support, this thesis cannot stand. Jerome calls upon inspired authors’ translations of holy scripture to ground his preference for sense-for-sense translation. Thus, this exception clause does not simply toe the nonsensical; it wallows in it. David Bellos, a translator and professor at Princeton University, makes the problem overwhelmingly clear in his Is That a Fish in Your Ear?: “[T]he exception clause drives a cart and horses through the main claim, because what Jerome did throughout his long life was translate sacred scripture, more than half of which he translated from Greek” (104).

Perhaps Jerome’s “thesis” can be understood in light of his polemical style. After all, as Lawrence Venuti notes in his preface to The Translation Studies Reader, Jerome explicitly states by the end of his letter that “in Scripture one must consider not the words, but the sense” (15). The exceptional clause in the thesis could be understood as a rhetorical device designed to mock his contemporaries, since the translations of Jerome’s day erred toward preserving scripture’s form. This interpretation finds support in the manner in which Jerome concludes his letter: by decrying the literal translation practices of language instructors. “All this is not the fault of my accusers,” he writes, “who are like actors playing roles in a tragedy, but of their teachers, who for a high price have taught them to know nothing” (29). Unlike Jerome, who had attained the
skill of the orator and rhetorician in his translation habits, the laymen who accused him still struggled to maintain the faithfulness of an interpreter. Perhaps it is the case that these interpreters who aspired for faithfulness justified their actions by claiming a “mystery” in the syntax—that they were democratically passing on the mysteries of the faith by transferring the source grammar into a target language.

Or perhaps Jerome genuinely believed that the grammatical data of scripture was worth preserving. Such a genuine belief does in fact appear to be the case, for in his commentary on Ephesians, Jerome states that his rendering of 3:5-7 “makes an indecorous Latin sentence,” and yet, despite that fact, he still chooses to render it in his chosen manner “because it is so in the Greek text, and individual words, syllables, tittles, and punctuation marks in the divine Scriptures are full of meaning” (147). Jerome also appears to preserve the original word and sentence structure even when the result is an ambiguous sentence, strengthening the probability of a theological motivation for his adherence to the source. His comment on Ephesians 4:13-15 betrays this habit: “You should know,” he says to his reader, “that this passage is clearer in Greek, but because I have translated it word for word into Latin the complicated meanings of the words make what is said obscure” (179). A sense-for-sense translator of the original text would presumably choose a wording that is as unambiguous as the original; however, Jerome, in his choice of translation, creates ambiguity. This obscurity in the translation most likely stems from a hope to preserve the syntactic mystery as much as possible.

But in all likelihood, Jerome’s methodology was probably neither entirely word-for-word nor sense-for sense. Though he preferred word-for-word renderings and tended toward preserving the mystery of the syntax where possible, he understood that sometimes two languages cannot convey the same information through similar morpho-syntactic structures. In
spite of his comments on word-for-word constructions in his commentary on Ephesians, a plethora of other comments exemplify sense-for-sense choices as well. Regarding Ephesians 1:4, Jerome laments the inability of the Latin language to capture the Greek καταβολής, saying, "[B]ecause of the poverty of the Latin language and the novelty of the things discussed and, as someone said, because the language of the Greeks is more extensive and is a more fertile speech, we will attempt to translate not so much word for word, which is impossible, as to explain somewhat periphrastically the force of the word" (84). Jerome, even if he understood the ideal scriptural rendering to be one that captured the mystery of the original, was a pragmatist.

Observant scholar that he was, he understood languages’ anisomorphic quality—their imperfect correspondence. Each language, being unique in form and structure, also displays its own unique methods of communicating a common idea. As he explains in his comments on 1:14, “there are many words which are incapable of being translated from Greek into Latin, or from Hebrew into Greek, or conversely, from Latin into Greek or from Greek into Hebrew” (104). When a translator comes across a word that cannot be clearly communicated with a one-to-one counterpart in the target language, that translator must employ periphrastic means to achieve the same idea—or at the very least, a similar one.

Jerome’s relevance to Christian translation theory, as well as to the problem of the sixth petition of the Lord’s prayer, cannot be understated. The Jewish message of salvation, at least partially taught in Aramaic, was to spread to the ends of the earth, and the events of Pentecost depicted in Acts illustrate that that goal could only be achieved through translating this Jewish message into all the languages of the earth. Jerome’s thoughts on how best to approach the necessary task of translation exemplified the tension between the orator and the interpreter, the sense-for-sense translator and his word-for-word counterpart. Even if Jerome preferred to stand
alongside his pagan hero, Cicero, his words, particularly his scriptural exception clause, reflected and perhaps influenced the prevailing translation theories of his day. As Venuti notes in his “Genealogies of Translation Theory: Jerome,” “Jerome’s statement in effect rehabilitates the word-for-word strategy, so maligned in Roman commentary, by reserving for it the hallowed task of communicating divine revelation” (490).

And Jerome’s fellow Christians did indeed deploy word-for-word tactics in translating the biblical text into other languages. The most notable example could be the earliest recovered writing from a Germanic language, the Gothic Bible. This Bible, composed by the Bishop Wulfila in the fourth century, is perhaps the most extreme manifestation of word-for-word translation practice, for Wulfila preserves the source’s word order to a fault. As Carla Falluomini notes in her study on The Gothic Version of the Gospels and Pauline Epistles, “every word of the Greek text, except the definite article, is normally represented in the Gothic, even particles like μεν, δε, [and] ἀν,” which, because of their more specialized role as discourse markers, are often omitted by other translations (80). An example of Wulfila’s one-to-one rendering is evident in Christ’s explanation of the Parable of the Sower. The Greek and Gothic bibles give these words to Jesus in his discussion of those seeds which took root among the rocks:

```
kai ou-τοι rιξ-αν oυκ ex-οναιν, oι προς καιρ-αν
and DEM-NOM.M.PL root-ACC.F.SG not have-PRES.ACT.IND.3PL REL.NOM.M.PL for time-ACC.M.SG
'these do not have a root, who for a time'

πιστευ-οναιν και εν καιρ-δο πειρασμ-οδ άφιστ-ανται.
believe-PRES.ACT.IND.3PL and in time-DAT.M.SG testing-GEN.M.SG fall.away-PRES.MID.IND.3PL
believe, and in a time of testing, fall away.'
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Yah pai waurt-ins ni hab-and; paiei du mel-a
And DEM,NOM,M,PL root-ACC,F,PL not have-PRES.ACT.IND.3PL REL.NOM,M,PL for time-DAT,N,SG
'these do not have roots, who for a time'
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ga-laub-yand, yah in mel-a fraistub-yos afstand-and.
COMPL-believe-PRES.ACT.IND.3PL and in time-DAT(?).N.SG testing-GEN.F.SG fall.away-PRES.ACT.IND.3PL
believe, and in a time of testing, fall away.’
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Even without a cursory knowledge of Greek or Gothic, the layman can notice some key similarities between the two renderings of the text. Both versions, for instance, have exactly fourteen words, and those words which are repeated in the verse are in the exact same order between both versions. The reader, then, even without the appended gloss, will be able to deduce that the Gothic *yah* correlates to Greek καὶ and that the Gothic *mela* is probably the same word as the Greek καιρος. The addition of the interlinear illustrates a near-perfect correspondence in the sentences’ respective structures.

But a basic understanding of both languages yields an even more striking parallel between the two. Wulfila “usually took care—when possible—to render the various derivatives of a single Greek stem by derivatives of a single Gothic stem, [and he] render[ed] Greek compound verbs with prepositional elements by analogous formations” (Falluomini 80-81). Wulfila demonstrates this propensity in the previous example of the Parable of the Sower by translating ἀφιστημι (leave/draw away) with the Gothic afstandan. Both verbs, Wulfila’s translation and the Greek original, are compounds. The Greek ἀφιστημι derives from the verb ἵστημι (stand) and the preposition ἀπo (from), and the Gothic afstandan derives from standan (stand) and af (of). Now, Koiné Greek exhibited a proclivity for duplicating prepositions as prefixes to verbal stems, and Wulfila, formal to a fault, paralleled these Greek constructions in his own translation. Although Germanic grammar does also support the prefixing of prepositional elements, so rigid was Wulfila’s conformity to the source text that most scholars believe his translation to be a bad source for ascertaining Gothic’s inherent grammar and vocabulary. The syntax of the text is decidedly Greek, and the high degree of correspondence between the Greek compounds and their Gothic counterparts evinces that the Bishop translator himself probably coined multiple neologisms in order to “accurately” represent the source text.
Wulfila’s translation, a manifestation of Jerome’s claim that a mystery exists within the syntax of Holy Writ, exemplifies a problem that has persisted from the early church until today: namely, how can native speakers comprehend the meaning of their translations if one must be acquainted with the grammar of an ancient tongue in order to read the scriptures fluently? By converting “good” Greek into “bad” Latin and “atrocious” Gothic, the preservation of these “mysteries” only creates a greater mystery for the reader. How can he or she know whether a sentence’s syntax is representing that of the target language or conveying the grammar of the source tongue?

This problem is central to the troubled history of the Lord’s Prayer’s sixth petition, as the formalistic translation of the prayer into other languages led to confusion concerning how best to interpret the petition. Often, the standardized, liturgical form of the text of the Lord’s Prayer would preserve the Greek syntax, but commentators would employ verbose periphrases to explain away the difficulties present in the word-for-word rendering.

**Patristic Exegesis of the Temptation Petition**

The first dispute over the sixth petition arose early in the church’s history, before the New Testament had become fully canonized as sacred text. Marcion of Sinope, a heretic who lived from the end of the first century to the middle of the second century, was the cause of the dispute. A proponent of dualism, Marcion believed that two gods existed. The first, which he understood to be the creator god and the Yahweh of the Old Testament, was an evil demiurge. The second, on the other hand, was a morally righteous god who sent Jesus Christ to be the savior of mankind. In order to support his claims, Marcion formed his own canon of scriptures, which differed greatly from the New Testament of orthodoxy. Marcion’s canon consisted of eleven books, ten of which were Pauline epistles. His final book was an edited derivative of the
Gospel of Luke. If the testimony of Tertullian can be trusted, this gospel presents the earliest periphrastic interpretation of the Lord’s Prayer’s temptation petition. No copies of Marcion’s Gospel survive, however, so evidence of its readings comes not from his own hand, but from the quotes and paraphrases of his orthodox enemies.

Tertullian’s *Adversus Marcionem* presents one of the orthodox rebuttals to Marcion’s position; Tertullian’s text, however, only hints at the contents of Marcion’s edited edition. Though Tertullian supposedly worked from Marcion’s version of Luke, he was producing a work in Latin when Marcion’s text would have been written in Greek. And if that did not obscure the source enough, Tertullian inverts the prayer’s petitions, making them questions rather than the imperatives of a supplicant. Rather than “And lead us not into temptation,” Tertullian provides, “Who shall suffer us not to be led into temptation?” Yet, despite the difficulty these changes pose, some scholars have tried to sift through the data and produce a reconstruction of Marcion’s text (Roth 47-48). The only relevant data that can be extracted with any certainty, though, is that Marcion employed πειρασμός (temptation) and a passive form of the verb εἰσφέρω (to lead into). And while this latter point should be an important one, as it exonerates Marcion’s good deity from tempting his supplicants, the situation is more complex.

Recent scholarship has suggested that the passive version of the Lord’s Prayer was not Marcion’s invention, but Tertullian’s, for in his own treatise *On Prayer*, Tertullian, after quoting the verse in its active form, interprets the text by stating that it means “do not allow us to be led by the one that tempts” (48). Tertullian’s version, of course, unlike Marcion’s, remains orthodox in its implications. As he explains, “This is laid down so that we should not only request the forgiveness of wrongdoing but that we should avoid it entirely. Far be it that the Lord should seem to tempt, as though he were either ignorant of the faith of each of us, or sought to dethrone
it, for weakness and malice are of the devil” (48). From this statement, he goes on to cite the gospels’ account of Jesus’ being tempted in the wilderness: “[God] was himself tested by the devil, so demonstrating who the leader and worker of temptation is” (48). Along with this passage, Tertullian references the disciples’ “entering into temptation” in the garden of Gethsemane, seen in Matthew 26:41 and its parallels. Yet, even if Tertullian follows the correct threads, his excursus on the temptation petition provides no linguistic explanation for the nonpassive rendering present in the prayer; rather, he takes the passive interpretation for granted. Such a fact illustrates that the passive view of the petition was not the product of a heretic’s manipulation of the source but was the genuine interpretation of early Christian orthodoxy.

In fact, Tertullian is not alone in elaborating away the inherent difficulty in the temptation petition. Cyprian of Carthage, a contemporary of Tertullian, actually presents his peer’s paraphrase of the Lord’s Prayer, “do not allow us to be led into temptation,” as the scriptural version. “We are shown in this clause,” he explains, “that the adversary can do nothing against us unless God allows it beforehand. Thus all our fear and our devotion and our heedfulness should be directed toward God, so that when we are in temptation he allows no power to the evil one apart that which he grants” (84). Notable in Cyprian’s explanation is the assumption that believers will be in temptation. His understanding of being “delivered from the evil one” revolves around God restricting Satan’s powers while the believer is undergoing the act of temptation. This explanation appears incompatible with the original Greek: its verbiage, whether interpreted as coming into contact with temptation or entering into the boundaries of temptation, appear to be too little too late if the petitioner is already in temptation.

After this explanation, Cyprian cites Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonian empire’s invasion of Jerusalem as an example of his next point, that the “power against [believers] is
given to the evil one in proportion to [their] sins” (84). Because of Israel’s neglect of the poor and downtrodden, its adoption of foreign deities, and its child sacrifices, God gave power to Satan through the Babylonian empire in order to enact justice upon it. Likewise, Cyprian notes, when Solomon sinned against God and fell away from his instructions and ways, the scriptures state that “the Lord stirred up Satan against Solomon” (1 Kings 11:14). The Lord allocated power to Satan in order to judge wrongdoers and to return his chosen to their covenant. Power was given against God’s chosen people for the sake of retribution.

Yet, if God mounts evil forces against the elect for the sake of correction, then should not believers desire that they be brought into temptation? Either they will come to see the error in their ways, or a false branch of the tree will be cut off; regardless, good will come from the temptation. Why, then, does Jesus teach his followers that they not desire to be led into temptation? Cyprian does not delve into this question; rather, he concludes his excursus on the petition by simply acknowledging that “when we asks that we should not come into temptation we are reminded of our frailty and weakness even as we are making the request” (85). The supplicant’s request to avoid the discipline of God, Cyprian believes, reminds that supplicant of both his or her inability to endure and God’s ultimate sovereignty over evil forces.

Of the Anti-Nicene Fathers, it is Origen who provides the most extensive treatment of the temptation petition, for a large section of his text On Prayer provides an exegesis of Christ’s model supplication. Origen is also the only native speaker of Greek among the Anti-Nicene Fathers who wrote on the Lord’s Prayer; therefore, even though his speech was separated from the Koiné of the New Testament by a few hundred years, he provides the most valuable insight into how a Greek speaker might inherently understand the clause.
Origen, of course, also gives one of the more interesting takes on the prayer’s text. From his exegetical notes, one can ascertain that instead of understanding πειρασμός to mean “temptation,” Origen had a broader definition of the term in his mind, a definition best represented with the English “testing” (193). Now, Origen does anticipate that interpreting the term in this way will inevitably cause confusion, but the confusion he anticipates is not that which a modern believer would expect. “Assuming that the Savior is not charging us to pray for the impossible,” he writes, “it seems to me to be worthwhile to explore how it is that we are ordered to request that we enter not into testing when the whole of human life is a time of testing” (193). For Origen, to ask that one not be led into πειρασμόν is paradoxical—if not nonsensical—for “while [man is] on earth, [he is] in testing, as [he is] surrounded with the flesh, which is at war against the spirit, whose mind is hostile to God [and will in] no way [be] able to be subject to the law of God” (193). Though such an approach to life might be foreign to contemporary Christians, Origen does provide scriptural support for his stance. From the book of Job, for example, he quotes the titular patriarch’s complaint, “Has not man a hard service on earth” (7:1)? Although the English obfuscates the connection, the Septuagint reading of the verse renders “hard service” with πειρατηρίον, which derives from the same root as the temptation petition’s πειρασμός. Origen further bolsters his position of life being an incessant test by quoting Paul: the apostle “likewise, writing to the Corinthians, says that God does not grant that we escape testing, but that we should not be tested beyond our limits” (193). Fortunately, unlike Cyprian before him, Origen grasps that his theological assumptions concerning God’s methods of testing present a problem for exegeting the temptation petition: to be delivered from testing would be synonymous with being delivered from one’s “flesh,” which Origen appears to
understand as meaning one’s corporeal life, and Christians are not meant to express suicidal desires.

But Origen does not simply acknowledge this problem; he establishes the strongest possible version of it. After quoting Acts 14:22, which reads, “To enter the Kingdom of God we must pass through many afflictions,” Origen lists the many trials and tribulations of Christ’s apostles. Despite knowing and reciting the model prayer by heart, the apostles suffered some of the greatest tests that any believer could imagine enduring, and all—save John—sacrificed their lives for the kingdom. With these facts outlined, Origen then raises a question which any interpreter adhering to the broader definition of πειρασμός must grapple with: “If the apostles did not obtain what they sought when they prayed, what hope is there for their inferiors to be heard by God when they pray?” (194). If the greatest in the faith had to endure trials and tribulations despite their petitions to the contrary, then how can the lesser in the faith hope to be delivered?

Origen’s solution to this question, as well as to the broader dilemma of being delivered from testing in an existence consisting entirely of tests, is to further define what “entering into testing” means. “Let us pray, therefore,” he writes, “that we be delivered from testing, not so that we should not be tested (for this is impossible, in particular for those who are on earth), but so that we should not be overcome when we are tested. I understand somebody who is overcome when tested as entering ‘into’ testing, becoming entangled in its nets” (196). Thus, according to Origen’s interpretation, to be led into testing is to succumb to temptation, yet this succumbing is not entirely the fault of the one who enters into testing but is also the working of God. To expound on this point, Origen cites Paul’s words in Romans 1 describing the downfall of those sinners who were handed over to their desires. It is this handing over, he supposes, that exemplifies what it means to be trapped in the nets and snares of testing.
Now, why a good God would allow individuals to multiply their heinous desires requires explanation. To elaborate on and smooth out his proposition, Origen relates people’s sins to a disease that is at risk of being contracted again after being healed. In order to prevent this second contraction from occurring, God might “reasonably allow the evil to increase, allowing it so to augment within [the sinners] as to be incurable, so that wallowing in the evil for a long time and being surfeited with the sin after which they longed, they may be sated and be made aware of the harm they have done to themselves, and so learn to hate what formerly they had welcomed” (199). This hatred of the disease, sin itself, will lead to a greater appreciation for the newfound health provided with salvation, preventing the convert from succumbing once more to his or her former behavior.

As a test case for this position, Origen retells the story of the mixed throng among the children of Israel who grew tired of eating manna day after day and who therefore sought to eat meat instead. So great was their desire that they began to question their covenant with Yahweh and hungered to return to Egypt. God, of course, punished the Israelites, having them consume meat for a month straight so that it was “coming out of their nostrils.” Origen argues that, by doing this, God sought to satisfy the Israelites’ pleas in such a way that they would “be pure from all desires” (200). Thus, in receiving “a beneficial purification of the evils [which] in their error they had contracted alongside the love of pleasure,” the sinful Israelites, like the idolaters of Romans 1, are “set free from the filth and the blood in which they were mired and defiled so that, being so close to destruction, they could not even consider salvation” (201). By undergoing the unnatural fulfillment of their wrongful desires, both sinful groups are rescued from the lake of fire and are capable once more of receiving salvation, for rather than living deceived, like
those who believe themselves to be right with God, they “perceive [their] own evil” as it has been “made manifest” through this just fulfillment (203).

As a kind of summative statement, Origen provides an exhortation for his reader: “[L]et us pray,” he says, “that we should do nothing that would make us worthy of being led into testing through God’s just judgment. For everyone who is handed over to impurity by God in the desires of his own heart is so led, as is everyone who is handed over to the passions of dishonor” (202). Such a statement reads as a nice, conclusive bow atop Origen’s well-packaged argument, for it connects his idea of the judicial fulfillment of one’s unholy desires to the concept of being led into testing. All who are given over to unnatural and dishonorable passions have been led into the snares of testing, for it is their being ensnared that warrants their subsequent and necessary purgation. And even though Origen, who uses two passive renderings of εἰσφέρω here, the infinitive εἰσενέχθηναι and the participle εἰσφερομένου, does not provide a linguistic reasoning for the original active verbiage of the Lord’s Prayer, his interpretation does not need one. Despite the passive version of εἰσφέρω, Origen still has “God” as the entity performing the action (or, at the very least, “God’s just judgment”). Though he reaches his conclusion in a roundabout manner, Origen sees the temptation petition as one seeking divine intervention against the possibility of the believer doing anything that will warrant punishment. By praying through the temptation petition, the believer is fortifying him- or herself against the possibility of succumbing to the evils of the world. Rather than following in the footsteps of such figures as Eve, Cain, and Esau, the believer will be able to resist sin in the same manner that Joseph shielded himself from the seductions of Potiphar’s wife.
Augustine, Tradition, and Other Interpretations

Augustine of Hippo, a near contemporary of Jerome’s, expresses a similar understanding of the Lord’s Prayer to Origen’s. Penning his commentaries nearly a century after the Greek scholar, Augustine thus illustrates a sort of “levelling out” in exegetical approaches to the text. But along with this interpretation, Augustine’s commentary *On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount* also relays relevant comments concerning the transmission of the text and its subsequent translation, information that Origen’s commentary lacked.

To begin his notes on the sixth petition, Augustine points out a discrepancy between two different versions of the Lord’s Prayer. In the Latin manuscripts, two different active verbs appear: *inferas*, which is equivalent to English “bring,” and *inducas*, which is equivalent to “lead.” In the face of this apparent discrepancy, Augustine explains that he “regard[s] these words as exactly equivalent; for they are both translated from the same Greek word, which is [εἰσενέγκῃς]” (138). Augustine himself settles on *inferas* in his own version; however, Jerome’s Vulgate would choose and popularize *inducas*. And while this variant is, in fact, interesting, for it illustrates the difficulty that translators faced as they attempted to faithfully represent the original text in Latin, a more significant point arises in an addendum to Augustine’s point on *inducas*. In this addendum, Augustine explains that “in making this application [that is, the sixth petition], many persons say: ‘Suffer us not to be led into temptation.’ And in this way they clearly show the intended meaning of the word, lead” (138). Here, once again, arises the passive construction first attested in Tertullian and Marcion’s writings. As in Tertullian’s defense, this passive construction is regarded as an authoritative interpretation, if not a proper translation, for Augustine comprehends the passive variant to accurately convey the meaning of *inducas*. He continues by explaining that “God does not of Himself lead a man into temptation, but He suffers
a man to be led into temptation when—through one’s just deserts and in accordance with a most hidden disposition—He leaves him bereft of divine aid” (138).

After this remark, Augustine’s explanation becomes one roughly akin to Origen’s. Although Augustine does not equate all of human life to one never-ceasing test, the interpreter does once more home in on “into” as the operative word in the petition and even makes a distinction between contact with something and being led into that something. “[T]he import of the petition,” he explains, “is not that we be not tried, but that we be not brought into temptation. It is as though a man who has to undergo trial by fire would pray, not that he be not touched by the fire, but that he be not consumed by it” (139-140). In this imagery, one can see a comparison generally analogous to Origen’s net. Where Origen saw one’s succumbing to temptation as falling into a snare which one could not escape, Augustine understands the phrasing as reflecting the manner in which fire “tests” a vessel, for “the furnace tries the potter’s vessels, and the trial of tribulation just men” (140). Like Origen before him, Augustine cites the tempting of Joseph as an exemplary account. By coming into contact with the fires of temptation, Joseph’s virtue was demonstrated; however, should he have succumbed to Potiphar’s wife, he would have been consumed or, in other words, would have been led into temptation. Temptation makes known to the individual undergoing it where they stand; thus, temptation does hold merit, and God has motive to permit it.

But Augustine, like those before him, also distances God from the actual act of temptation. “Temptations,” Augustine explains, “occur through Satan, but they occur through God’s permission and not by virtue of Satan’s power. And they occur for the purpose either of punishing men for their sins or of proving and exercising them in accordance with the mercy of the Lord” (141). This latter point, that of exercising one’s sins through the power of temptation,
forms another bridge between Origen’s writings and Augustine’s. Though God himself is not the one enacting the punishment of temptation, another motive for his permitting it might be his desire to save. Here, Augustine is surely drawing upon the same line of thinking that inspired Origen to quote the Israelites’ falling away in the wilderness and the idolaters’ being handed over to unnatural desires. But Augustine does not comment further on this topic; instead, he proceeds to discuss another form of temptation: the temptation common to every man.

That variety of temptation, though possibly capitalized on by the devil, arises primarily from human nature itself. As he begins to explicate how such a kind of temptation relates to the sixth petition, Augustine quotes from 1 Corinthians 10:13. “In that pronouncement,” he argues, “[the Apostle Paul] clearly shows that we ought not to pray to be free from temptation, but that we ought to pray not to be led into temptation, for we are led into temptation if we encounter such temptations as we are unable to bear” (143). Thus, if by either the bounties of prosperity or the necessities of poverty one is tempted by the flesh, for human nature will inevitably lead to one being tempted in this manner, this petition, Augustine explains, serves as a cry to avoid succumbing to that temptation. Such a reading might bend the language of the text, for again, the active verb affirms the notion that God is the agent who permits one’s succumbing, but nevertheless, it is the reading that Augustine settles on. All men are tempted by the flesh, and although Satan might capitalize on that temptation, God is ultimately the one who grants power to Satan to tempt the faithful.

**Between Grammar and Meaning**

The first five centuries of the Christian movement illustrate shifting trends in the practice of translation. Although the translations of the literati in antiquity almost unanimously exercised manipulation and control in their adaptation of the source, legal texts opted instead to preserve
the syntax as much as possible. Yet, as the holy scriptures began to spread across the Mediterranean, and as it became necessary to bear the message of the gospel across disparate cultures and linguistic boundaries, the translators of that message were faced with a choice: would they conform the syntax and wording of the text to the phrasing of the source tongue? Or would they rather lose the “mystery” of the syntax to more effectively transport the nuances of the original into their own tongue? Jerome’s philosophy of translation, if it did not dictate the practices of its day, at the very least petrified them. The church had decided to preserve morphology and syntax as much as possible as it took the gospel to the world.

And as the church became an institution of greater influence and power, the opinions of its intelligentsia began to usurp the older, pagan ways. A telling detail of this shift is Augustine’s remark about the periphrastic passive construction of the sixth petition. Although he recognized two different second-person imperative constructions, inferas and inducas, as possible representations of the source word into the target tongue, he understood the passive rendering of the verse as an interpretation, not a translation. Though the scholars of earlier ages would do far worse to their source texts, Augustine’s assumption was that the Greek’s grammar would be reflected in the Latin as well. This fact is particularly startling whenever one considers that Augustine understands the paraphrase as reflecting the “intended meaning” of the verse (138). From this single note in his commentary, Augustine appears to imply that translation is for grammar whereas interpretation is for meaning.

A counterpoint to this claim, of course, can be seen in the portion of the church, including Cyprian, who adopted the periphrastic passive as their standard translation. Surely those who used this version also understood it as a translation of the source! The emergence of this paraphrase, however, is an exceptional one, for the surface reading being paraphrased appears to
contradict established doctrine. If this paraphrase was taken to be a translation proper by those who employed it in their prayers, then they might have come to this conclusion because of their perceiving the source itself to be in error. In other words, it is possible that they understood the paraphrase to be a more accurate syntactic representation of the original, since the version presented to them appeared incorrect. Thus, Augustine’s underlying opinions on translation, which were founded on an accurate assessment of the Greek’s original phrasing, are to be preferred.

Though we lack his own thoughts on the prayer, it is interesting that Augustine’s contemporary, Jerome, likewise employed an active verb when translating for the Vulgate. Jerome, more than Augustine, was willing to grant that languages, anisomorphic by nature, required the occasional periphrastic construction if they were to be translated accurately. Jerome’s preservation of the active verb, then, could reflect his condoning of the surface reading. A more likely explanation, though, might be the same one which motivates the English-speaking church’s enduring fondness for the King James: tradition tends toward conservatism. Considering the Lord’s Prayer’s place as a liturgical text, Jerome might have wished to preserve it in the form recited in mass. Therefore, even if he comprehended the difficulty present in the Old Latin version of the text, he might have retained the original wording.

Although theologians, commentators, and translators continue to rely on patristic sources as guidance, many also disagree with their forebearers when it comes to interpreting the Lord’s Prayer. Some present-day scholars regard Origen and Augustine’s solution, that the “into” refers not to encountering temptation, but to succumbing to it, as convincing; however, countless others, weary of the holes in these Church Fathers’ interpretive frameworks, have attempted to formulate new approaches to the passage. But, as the next chapter will show, many of these
solutions are as uncompelling as those which came before, and the problem of the petition remains largely unsolved. Despite their best efforts to the contrary, contemporary scholars and theologians have not produced a viable interpretation of the text that properly situates it amid Christ’s other teachings.
THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM AND CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS

What is the logic of praying for exemption? – C.F.D. Moule

C.F.D. Moule and the “Unsolved Problem”

In 1974, the Lady Margaret’s Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge, C.F.D. Moule, published an article in *The Reformed Theological Review* concerning the task of interpreting the sixth petition of the Lord’s Prayer. The text, “An Unsolved Problem in the Temptation Clause in the Lord’s Prayer,” was not dedicated to postulating a new method of interpretation; rather, the article and its author aimed at providing a brief, cogent outline of the problems that the temptation petition posed, for the petition, as Moule notes, seems to be a contradiction. “[N]owhere else in the New Testament is there any quite so unqualified an injunction to pray for escape from temptation,” he explains, “since temptation is inevitable, the prayer is usually turned by those who use it into a prayer, rather, for escape from succumbing to temptation” (65). In a similar vein to Origen and Augustine, the laymen and scholars that Moule observes redefined the potentially ambiguous language of the prayer so that it asks for deliverance from the snares of temptations and the passionate fires that consume, and although Moule is not outright hostile to such a reading of the verse, he recognizes that the individual who maintains this stance must answer a necessary question: “why was this prayer ever recorded in this apparently illogical form” (65)?

But before he lists any possible solutions, Moule sets the limits of his analysis. A shortcoming of his article remains his brushing off half the clause in question. Though he recognizes that “[f]rom very early days […] Christians have been puzzled by the logic of ‘lead us
not’—as though it were likely that God would deliberately lead anyone into temptation,” he nevertheless fails to provide a syntactical explanation for the active second-person aorist subjunctive, simply stating, “I, for my part, am not concerned to dispute that, if the words be not too literalistically pressed, ‘lead’ (or, more accurately, ‘bring’) ‘us not into’ need mean no more than ‘do not let us be brought into,’ on the analogy of the ‘deliver us from evil (or the evil one)’ of the clause which, in the Matthean though not the Lucan version, is parallel to this clause” (65-66). Of course, this argument is not entirely unwarranted. Condensing language in order to render it pithier and more memorable could result in introduced ambiguity, but one must wonder how the early Christian community failed to notice the apparently heretical verbiage resulting from such condensing. Moule’s explanation also requires an absent appeal to source criticism, for despite the parallel clause being present in only Matthew’s text, the same conjugation of εἰσφέρω exists verbatim between both of the gospels in question. If both pulled from a source that preserved the seventh petition, then one must wonder why Luke decided to redact it, and if the two pulled from different traditions—one containing the “deliverance” petition and one not containing it—then the appeal to “deliver us from the evil one” loses its explanatory force.

Instead of exerting his energy in discussing the verb of the clause, Moule occupies himself with dissecting the phrase “into temptation,” attempting to parse out how the New Testament and the Lord’s Prayer employ words of the πειραζεῖν word group. The two most common interpretations that he outlines are that the πειρασμός in the Lord’s Prayer refers to either an internal draw to sin or a cataclysmic, eschatological trial, and he connects both of these interpretations to faults in translation: “The Vulgate tentatio and the English ‘temptation’ suggest, to most modern readers, some kind of enticement to sin. But [πειρασμός] (like tentamentum in Latin) strictly means ‘testing’ rather than ‘enticement’” (66). Part of the
predicament of interpreting the petition comes from employing terms with Latinate roots equivalent to those of the Vulgate even when those terms do not capture what the original Greek dictated. Likewise, some translations have opted to make πειρασμός arthrous, transforming the passage so that it refers to “the test.” Moule indicates that these translations reflect scholarship that has linked the πειρασμός of the petition to the “messianic woes” that some in the Jewish community supposedly expected to befall the world at the climax of history.

But, as many will continue to do after him, Moule finds neither of these conclusions convincing. Regarding the eschatological interpretation of the temptation petition, he correctly points out that “if the ultimate climax has been intended, one would have expected the definite article” (66). The fact that translators wishing to convey this notion in their English renderings foist an article upon the anarthrous πειρασμός only confirms this point, even if both English and Greek utilize articles to somewhat different grammatical effects. And although some scholars draw upon Revelation 3:10 as an example of πειρασμός meaning the very thing that Moule refutes, Moule claims that this verse is, in fact, the exception that proves the rule, for πειρασμός cannot stand alone in this passage without further definition. When πειρασμός does appear in Rev. 3:10, it is itself a modifier amid a long string of fellow modifiers specifying a particular “hour.” The verse requires not just that πειρασμός be articulated to relate the concept in question, but that the text also specify which hour of testing is in view, the hour “which is about to come upon the whole world, to test those who dwell on the earth” (NASB). Upon laying out the numerous adjectival elements required by the author of Revelation to get πειρασμός to bear its proper weight, Moule concludes by stating that the verse “is no evidence that [πειρασμός] by itself was a recognizable technical term for the ultimate crisis of apocalyptic expectation. On the
contrary, it only shows how carefully it is defined and given the definite article when it has to mean this” (67).

After refuting the cataclysmic interpretation of the sixth petition, Moule turns to addressing the possibility of interpreting the petition “with reference to external circumstances—testing times—rather than to inward, psychological enticement—temptation in the commonly accepted sense of the word” (67). However, as he pivots to discussing a less-specific definition of “temptation,” he also raises the matter of “how much difference ultimately exists between the one [that is, external circumstance] and the other [internal enticement]. External testing circumstances, no less that inward lusting, may constitute an inducement to sin, even when not deliberately directed to that end” (67). Therefore, Moule decides not to foreground the internal and/or external nature of the testing in his discussion; instead, he delves into intent. What, he asks, is the purpose of the testing? In some circumstances, God’s desire that his faithful be tested can be interpreted as benign: “Without intent to harm, [πειρασμός] may be applied as a purely experimental testing, like the assaying of a metal, to ascertain its quality—as when God ‘tested’ Abraham’s loyalty or allowed the Satan to test Job’s. Or it may be applied as a refining process, which not only tests so as to show up what is genuine but positively frees the precious metal from the dross” (67-68). Of course, Moule tempers this comment by recognizing that words of the πειραζεῖν family are not used in this circumstance, even though the denotations are similar. The close synonyms of the δοκιμαζεῖν word group are employed when the context demands “assaying.” The most common contemporary translations, however, tend to connote not the assaying of a metal, but “the deliberate intention to cause ruin or moral downfall—‘temptation’ in the ordinarily accepted sense” (68).
From these musings, Moule outlines “two sets of distinctions” that one must sort through prior to settling upon a meaning of πειρασμός and the temptation petition proper. The first set of distinctions consists of that between “external circumstances and inwards lust,” which Moule decides is ultimately fruitless to sift through, due to both being able to achieve the same ends; the second set, on the other hands, consists of πειρασμός “as experiment, refining process, [and] attempt to pervert” (68). Though laying out these motivations in a sterile, abstracted way could lead one to conclude that an act of testing or temptation has only a singular intention, Moule recognizes that a single event could come about through manifold intentions from multiple agents. An example of this fact is witnessed in the temptations of Jesus. Regarding Jesus’s time in the wilderness, Moule explains that “[t]he devil may apply the pressure (external or inward) with intent to pervert; but God may use it as a test and a refinement, or may enable the sufferer to use it. […] [T]he fact that the devil is the one who applies the test [in the temptation narratives] means that enticement to evil is intended; but Jesus emerges like refined metal, authenticated” (68-69). Like a fire seeking to consume the very thing that its heat is forging, the devil’s work, permitted by God, could lead to a result contrary to the devil’s motives but conforming to God’s. Thus, like the internal/external means of testing, the distinction between motives begins to cave under scrutiny. Πειρασμός could possibly contain both motives within its definition.

The problem of defining πειρασμός grows more complicated as Moule considers the fact that “the word [πειρασμός] itself does not normally mean enticement to sin or ruin” (67). Indeed, from Moule’s point of view, the implementing of πειρασμός in circumstances of internal enticement is a New Testament innovation. Instead, ancient literature confines the term and other words sharing its lexeme to the neutral definition of “test” or “testing,” and although the Septuagint “describes God testing man and men testing God,” Moule says that the tests in
question are “perhaps never explicitly actual enticement to sin” (69). The most frequent usage of πειρασμός in the Old Testament arises in reference to the incident at Massah, and that event proves exemplary of the term’s inability to convey “enticement to sin.” In explaining the sin that occurred during this episode, the Pentateuch claims that it was the Israelites who tested God, and although one could possibly read “enticement to sin” into the Israelite’s actions against God, it would be nonsensical to try to entice an all-powerful entity into committing an act that is, by definition, against his will. Furthermore, an interpreter would bump into the same problem he or she encounters in the temptation petition if he or she intended to read “enticement to sin” into the later incident at Marah, an incident which also employs terminology in the περιαζειν word group. God’s “enticing to sin” in this incident would result in not only a contradiction in scripture but also a crisis of God’s goodness.

To explain the New Testament’s innovation on the definition, then, Moule returns to the prototypical πειρασμός depicted in the New Testament, the temptations of Christ in the wilderness. “With the paradigm of Jesus’ temptations in their traditions,” Moule explains, “New Testament writers are able, even without resort to the usual metaphors of bait and enticement, to indicate that the struggle with temptation is part of the constant test of loyalty to which, as warriors of God, they are subjected” (70). This results in a belief that “the pressures and strains of life [are part of] the unremitting warfare against evil […] [T]he ‘psychological’ temptation to which all are subject is recognized as part of the ‘objective’ warfare in which all are involved” (70). The collapsing of the internal/external distinction results in a πειρασμός that, like the Satan’s testing of Jesus, occurs in the external realm while causing a tension in the psychological, subjective experience.
But the apparent inevitability of this internal/external temptation does not resolve the conflict within the Lord’s Prayer; in fact, it multiplies that conflict, and Moule is not unaware of that fact. Upon further reflection of his “psychological” model for temptation, he asks, “If one knows that testing and temptation are inevitable; [or] if […] one knows that testing can be salutary and that the Lord himself has pioneered the way through it to spiritual effectiveness—then what is the logic of praying for exemption” (71)? Instead of contenting himself with a shrug of the shoulders and an acceptance of the fact that there exists no logical solution, Moule innovates on those who came before by positing an illogical solution. After mulling over the alternatives, Moule concludes with an intellectually humbling question: “Have we, perhaps, reached a position where we are confronted by a logical inconsequence, but one which expresses a psychological insight […] Is it, then, true humility not to intellectualize, not to be over-logical, but, realizing one’s weakness, to pray for escape even from what seems inevitable, while, at the same time, offering one’s obedience” (75)? Such a reading of prayer is not without precedent, for Jesus’s own prayer in Gethsemane likewise asks that the Messiah be delivered from tribulation while in the same breath submitting to the will of the Lord. Yet such a reading renders the Lord’s Prayer unique among New Testament teachings, for Christ’s other teachings fail to mention petitioning for escape and even imply the inevitability of trials.

Though Moule ends his “Unsolved Problem” with a non-solution, his article does list most of the threads that contemporary scholars pursue when seeking to resolve the exegetical problem that is the temptation petition. For example, it addresses the eschatological reading which, though panned by most scholars and commentators, is still upheld in some circles. The most notable proponent of this reading might be Anglican bishop and Oxford research fellow NT Wright, who conforms to Moule’s representation of the eschatological reading and sees the
temptation petition as alluding the “Great Πειρασμός” of Revelation 3. Moule likewise alludes to the “trial” reading of the petition when he delves into the history of πειρασμός as a more neutral term, and the entire article aims to address the viability of the typical “temptation” reading. Indeed, Moule even connects his “Unsolved Problem” to a more obscure solution, though he does not recognize it as such. In his reference to the Old Testament usage of πειρασμός as a testing of God, the scholar never ponders the possibility of God being the object of the “testing” in question. And yet, some scholars have pursued this line of reasoning to provide a more novel reading of the temptation petition.

Thus, following in the footsteps of Moule, contemporary scholars will fall into one of these four camps. They might retain an eschatological view, broaden πειρασμός to refer to mere hard times, stick to the traditional reading of “temptation,” or question which entity is being tested, but most will settle for one of these four conclusions and adjust their translations accordingly.

**Contemporary Commentaries**

Since the Lord’s Prayer is a rare text that exists across multiple books of the Bible, many commentary series, due to their parceling out different books to disparate scholars who themselves hold a myriad of varying opinions concerning theology and source criticism, contain similarly varied approaches to interpreting the sixth petition of the prayer. One such commentary series is *The New International Greek Testament Commentary* (NIGTC). I. Howard Marshall’s *Gospel of Luke* and John Nolland’s *Gospel of Matthew*, though part of the same series, are separated by nearly three decades of scholarship, and the two scholars differ drastically on how they approach the temptation petition. The earlier of the two, Marshall simultaneously distances God from the act of tempting while still holding internal enticement as one of the possible means
by which “temptation” occurs. Nolland, on the other hand, identifies God as the active agent of
the action in question while labelling that action as something other than “temptation.”

Marshall begins his discussion of the Lucan Lord’s Prayer by weighing different textual
critical approaches to the text, pondering how the two divergent texts arose in early Christian
tradition. For the purposes of interpreting the temptation petition, a cohesive theory of the
Matthean and Lucan texts’ origins is necessary, for if the two texts developed from two separate
traditions, then interpretations dependent upon the seventh petition—the “deliverance” petition—
prove far more problematic. Marshall, for his part, provides multiple statements concerning the
texts’ origins without giving many arguments to support his convictions. “It is not difficult,” he
explains, “to see that the differences in wording between Lk. and Mt. can be largely explained in
terms of editorial modifications, mostly on the part of Luke. It is, however, unlikely that Luke
[…] would have omitted clauses from a prayer taught by Jesus, and the attempts […] to explain
Luke’s prayer as a redaction […] are unconvincing” (455). Although Marshall does not provide
any reasoning for these convictions, he does assert that Luke must have been the evangelist to
amend the wording of the source, and yet he also states that even though Luke might have edited
the wording, it is not likely that he curtailed the prayer from either a Matthean or Q source. Such
statements lead to the puzzling question of how Marshall can suppose that Luke was the more
likely candidate to edit the source if he is uncertain of that source. Ultimately, Marshall settles on
the stances that either “the prayer existed […] in two forms […], or else the longer form of Mt. is
due to additions to the basic form attested by Luke” (455). These additions, he postulates, were
not the work of the singular evangelist, but likely represent the liturgical version of the text:
“More probably, Matthew has substituted the form of the prayer familiar to him for that which he
found in Q” (455). Again, Marshall hedges his position, as he also recognizes the possibility that
Matthew might have been working from a recension of Q that had the liturgical version substituted in by a different, anonymous author. Either way, Matthew’s version represents a communal prayer text where Luke’s reflects a more original, Q-derived recension. This Lucan priority, therefore, requires an explanation of the temptation petition that is independent of the deliverance petition.

Marshall’s exegesis on the petition proper is largely dependent on the work of Jean Carmignac, a scholar who conjectured that the Lord’s Prayer derived from a Hebrew, rather than Aramaic, original. Moule, upon surveying Carmignac’s work in his “Unsolved Problem,” ultimately found the proposition of a Hebrew origin to be unconvincing, but Marshall’s exegesis rests on Carmignac’s argument. After asserting the improbability of πειρασμός’s being either a “reference to tempting or testing God” or “a reference to the final, great tribulation,” he states that the word “refers rather to inward temptations and sections [as well as] to outward tribulations and trials which test faith” (461). Here, Marshall, like Moule, collapses the internal/external distinction and regards it as an inconsequence, since both can be utilized to lead one to sin. Marshall, however, does not see God as the agent of this temptation, though he is the one addressed by the second-person aorist subjunctive in the verse. Citing Carmignac, Marshall claims that “…to enter temptation” means not ‘to be tempted’ but ‘to yield to temptation’, that the verb reflects a Hebrew causative, and that the negative qualifies the idea of entry, so that the thought is not ‘do not cause us to succumb to temptation’, but rather ‘cause us not to succumb to temptation’” (461-462). The placement of the “not,” of course, redeems God’s agency in the temptation petition, as this “Hebrew-derived” version of the prayer no longer connotes that God is the primary actor in temptation, but that he is the agent responsible for preventing one’s capitulation to the power of temptation.
Yet when Marshall’s peer Nolland published his own comments on the Lord’s Prayer, he came to quite a different understanding of the text. From his first introductory remarks on Matthew’s composition, Nolland appears to be tearing down many of the assumptions presupposed in the earlier edition of the NIGTC. For example, in addressing remarks made by Papias and Irenaeus concerning the supposed Semitic origin of Matthew’s gospel, Nolland states that “the Greek Gospel of Matthew shows not the slightest sign of having been translated from a Semitic language. […] Matthew not only seems to have been written in Greek but also to have drawn on sources which were at least predominantly in Greek” (3). Unlike his predecessor, Nolland does not see a Semitic source as warranted, and more importantly, he recognizes that an appeal to a nonextant edition of the Lord’s Prayer, an edition that might not have been represented in the gospels’ autographs, causes an issue with the doctrine of inspiration. “Various attempts,” he says, “have been made to spare God the responsibility for where we find ourselves. A Semitic original may have been ambiguous, but our Greek text is not” (290). The implication of this comment is that the preserved Greek text holds priority over any supposed source; interpreters of the Bible ought to grapple with what is before them, not with what might lay behind the surviving sources. Nolland himself does not see God’s agency in testing problematic, however, citing how “[t]he OT is quite comfortable with the idea that God puts his people to the test” (290). Interestingly, though Nolland refers to the Septuagint’s usage of πειρασμός to support this claim, he makes no mention of the Old Testament’s most frequent use of the term: to reference the incident at Massah. Unlike Marshall before him, when Nolland dismisses unsatisfactory interpretations of the sixth petition, he does not even consider the testing of God as a possibility.
What Nolland does consider, however, is the largely defunct eschatological reading. Like Moule and Marshall before him, Nolland understands that connecting the temptation petition with the “messianic woes” is to stretch the text beyond its limits, for “nothing thus far in the prayer has encouraged us to focus on eschatology at this point” (292). This straining to connect the text is evident in the distinct imagery that Revelation 3:10 and the temptation petition respectively deploy: “in Revelation the πειρασμός is coming on the whole world, but Christian disciples are offered the possibility of being kept out of it; Mt. 6:12 […] has nothing of this expectation of a comprehensive πειρασμός, but simply the possibility of being brought into a place where there is πειρασμός. The lack of a definite article […] suggests the same thing” (292). Since the πειρασμός of the temptation petition lacks the specificity that a definite article would deliver, and since the preposition employed implies movement into rather than exemption from, Nolland views an eschatological interpretation as an unlikely primary reading.

Nolland himself lands on broadening the definition of “temptation” to something akin to the English word “trial.” Instead of seeing the term as referencing a “test” proper, where something is determined by the performance of the object tested, Nolland argues that “πειρασμός has developed a usage that emphasizes the pressure and difficulty of trial but has lost the element of something to be determined by the trial. [Thus,] the prayer reflects a sense of one’s own frailty and limitation, one’s vulnerability to situations in which one ‘is placed’” (292). Here, Nolland channels Moule, for like Moule, Nolland understands the prayer as reflecting a psychological reality present in the supplicant instead of a theological possibility that might come to fruition. His comments on the contrasting agents between the temptation petition and its deliverance counterpart betray a belief that the biblical documents might maintain contradictory truth claims, for the two petitions display a “characteristically biblical flexibility […] about the nature of
God’s control over events: prior to the event people looked to him as the most significant agent; but in relation to an existing situation [...] they are ready to appeal to him to intervene and change it (with a background assumption that the situation is not necessarily now as he would wish it)” (291-292). Oddly enough, Nolland assumes a contradictory theology is present in the words on the page instead of questioning his own interpretation of those very words. That interpretation leaves uninterrogated not only the belief that the supplicant is the object of the “πειρασμός” in question, but also the assumption that the “deliverance” of the following petition can only occur during a moment of evil, not before it. Regardless of the veracity of these beliefs, the proposition that Matthew—or the early Christian community, should this be an interpolated liturgical text—redefined within the span of a single verse God’s agency as it pertained to a particular category of worldly affairs, whether that category refers to matters of enticement or simply “hard times” in general, seems unlikely. One would think that interpretations should presuppose a coherence in the text, but Nolland’s asserts that two incompatible representations of God sit juxtaposed within a pair of correlative clauses supposedly spoken by God himself. Obviously, this interpretation fails to satisfy. The most valid approach to the Lord’s Prayer—and the Bible in general—ought to be one that preserves a logical coherence within the text itself.

Unlike Nolland, many of the other scholars penning commentaries on the Lord’s Prayer are more circumspect, grounding interpretations within a supposed coherence rather than presupposing inconsistencies. Donald A. Hagner, for example, who authored the Word Biblical Commentary’s volume on Matthew 1-13, builds his interpretation upon the context provided within the prayer itself. After addressing the now stale fact that πειρασμός, depending upon the situation wherein it is employed, can be rendered as either “temptation” or “testing,” Hagner continues, arguing that “the latter is to be preferred because God does not lead into temptation;
he does, however, allow his people to be tested. ‘To be tempted’ is to be enticed to sin; ‘to be tested’ is to be brought into difficult circumstances that try one’s faithfulness. The two are similar, since sin can result in either case; yet […] the former has a negative purpose, the latter a positive one” (151). Although Hagner delves into the matter of purpose and motivation, unlike Moule, he simplifies his discussion on the subject to exclusively addressing God’s motivations. Nowhere present is the possibility that what God intended as a “test,” Satan utilizes as a “temptation.” But nevertheless, Hagner admirably grounds his reading of the temptation petition within the following deliverance petition: his understanding that “the disciple […] prays not to be led into […] a testing in which his or her faith will not be able to survive […] is allowable because of the next petition, which is connected with the present petition and which implies that some testing is inevitable (151). Hagner’s reading, then, qualifies the πειρασμός by limiting its breadth. Instead of the πειρασμός denoting any form of testing, it only alludes to the testing that one might succumb to. Again, a reading akin to Augustine’s and Origen’s surfaces, though Hagner provides no linguistic explanation for it.

In place of this, the scholar gives the reader an expanded, explanatory paraphrase of the Lord’s Prayer’s two final petitions, a paraphrase that clearly cements his exegetical arguments into the text. The paraphrase is as follows: “Do not lead us into a testing of our faith that is beyond our endurance, but when testing does come, deliver us from the Evil One and his purposes” (151-152).

In his own commentary on the first seven chapters of Matthew, Swiss theologian Ulrich Luz innovates by drawing upon early Jewish sources and models for the Lord’s Prayer, for like Carmignac, he supposes a Semitic original to the prayer. But unlike Carmignac, Luz supposes that the original language of the Lord’s Prayer is Aramaic. Indeed, his preliminary comments on
the Lord’s Prayer appear to be directly targeted at Carmignac’s own argument. “[T]here is no indication,” Luz writes, “that [Hebrew is the original language,] except for the indisputable fact that most of the prayers in contemporary Judaism that we still have were written in Hebrew” (311). In building his own positive case for an Aramaic original, Luz cites the Lucan πατερ, claiming that this might be a stand in for Aramaic אבא. Likewise, he views the metaphorical use of Greek’s ὀφειλημα as another indicator: “ὀφειλημα means only ‘monetary debt’; the metaphorical usage […] is understandable only on the basis of the Aramaic חובא which can mean both ‘monetary debt’ and ‘sin’” (311). Of course, it might also be the case that Semitic authors, due to the influence of their mother tongue, expanded the usage of the Greek noun. But regardless, even with his apparent support for an Aramaic original, Luz himself also presents the possibility of the Matthean petition’s existing solely in Greek, for “‘As… also’ (ὡς… καὶ) is a common expression in Koine. Whether it can be translated literally into Aramaic is debated” (311). Should the Matthean petitions be unique to the Greek version of the prayer, then one of the arguments for an Aramaic original, the use of ὀφειλημα, would be brought into question. ὀφειλημα exists alongside a uniquely Koine feature of the prayer; therefore, other theories, such as the non-native speaker’s expansion of ὀφειλημα’s usage or an anonymous hand’s editing of the text from an earlier source, could more plausibly explain the evidence. But despite these claims to the contrary, Luz’s argument is strengthened by the parallels he acknowledges between the structure of the Lord’s Prayer and the structure of the Jewish Kaddish prayer, which was also written in Aramaic; therefore, the remainder of his commentary presupposes an Aramaic original throughout its exegesis on the Lord’s Prayer.

This supposition is significant, for although he disagrees on the language of origin, Luz, like Marshall and Carmignac, appeals to an Aramaic original to justify the verbiage of “μη
εἰσενέγκης.” As he explains, “Both older and more recent interpreters have wrestled with the question whether it is God himself who leads into temptation, [but the] Aramaic causative that may lie behind μη εἰσενέγκης can mean both active action as well as permissive consent” (322-323). With a causative stem instead of an active verb, the subject can be understood not as the intermediate agent participating in the denoted action, but as an ultimate cause either commanding or condoning an action’s occurrence. Yet, as Luz recognizes, the Greek translator of the supposed Aramaic original either was unaware of the causative nuance or saw no problem in describing God’s actions in a manner that grants him immediate agency. Though “it may be possible to shield an Aramaic original from the idea that God alone is responsible, […] the Greek translator, who appears to speak in his translation of something that God actively does, obviously does not worry about such things” (323). Luz’s exegesis, therefore, implies that one should not press upon the language too much, and Moule recommends the same in his aside on “lead us not.” But Luz’s conclusion on the temptation petition, as well as on the Lord’s Prayer as a whole, is an intriguing one, for although “[t]he petition does not presume to pass judgment on the question of who causes [the] evil” that supplicants encounter in their lives, the prayer does appear to presume that “people pray for something that they influence with their behavior” (323). Far from comprehending the believer’s prayer to be a communication with God that elicits divine action exclusively, Luz suggests that there exists not only within the Lord’s Prayer, but within Jewish thinking as a whole, a unity between God’s action and the actions of his followers. In his earlier statements on the petition that the Lord’s “will be done,” Luz goes beyond the negative assertion that “prayer and human action are not mutually exclusive” and argues outright that “an alternative between God’s action and the action of the person who is praying is impossible” (319). Thus, even if the Greek of the text assumes God to be an active agent in one’s
encountering temptation, this prayer does not diminish the fact that it is the individual’s responsibility to resist the wiles of the world. In fact, in praying to God, the supplicant is also shaping his or her own conduct.

The “Unsolved Problem” and the Testing of God

Another scholar who also emphasizes the agency of the supplicant is one Jeffrey B. Gibson, an Oxford alumnus and the author of *The Disciples’ Prayer: The Prayer Jesus Taught in Its Historical Setting*. Though most of Gibson’s book summarizes and aims at popularizing the ongoing hermeneutical discussions surrounding the prayer, his chapter on “The ‘Temptation’ Petition” proposes its own reinterpretation and rehabilitates a stance frequently written off by contemporaries.

Before postulating his own position, however, Gibson reviews and refutes the competition. He begins with addressing the oft-maligned eschatological reading, explaining that advocates for this approach comprehend the prayer as asking that the supplicant be preserved “either (1) from ever experiencing the woes of the great ‘end-time’ tribulation that Jews in Jesus’ day expected to beset the people of God at the dawning of the long-awaited age of salvation, or (2) from showing themselves faithless should they be plunged into these woes” (135). Like Moule and many others, Gibson provides myriad reasons for not subscribing to this interpretation. But instead of contenting himself with a close reading of Revelation 3:10, Gibson provides further evidence from first-century Jewish culture. Citing Richard Horsley, a distinguished alumnus from Harvard and a former professor at the University of Massachusetts Boston, Gibson states that “[t]here is no reference to a special time of tribulation or suffering in any of the second-temple apocalyptic texts, except for the brief statement in Daniel 12:2b” (qtd. in Gibson 137). The very concept of the “messianic woes,” therefore, ought to be held in
question. This understanding of a particular pre-messianic tribulation—pervasive in New Testament studies—has most likely arisen from “an overly literal reading, and misunderstanding of the nature, of ‘apocalyptic’ texts” (138). Given the dearth of evidence supporting the historical reality of the “messianic woes,” as well as the numerous qualifiers required for Revelation 3:10’s πειρασμός to adequately convey the notion of “final, eschatological testing,” Gibson provides several alternatives that would have been more likely if the evangelists had wished for their readers to understand Jesus as connoting some form of end-times event. These alternatives include “ἡ ἡμέρα θλίψιν [...] καιρός θλίψιν, [...] and] simply θλίψις” (141), “the day of tribulation,” “a time of tribulation,” and “tribulation” respectively.

Gibson further argues, through drawing upon multiple biblical and rabbinical sources, that most non-eschatological readings of πειρασμός, such as readings that understand the “test” in question as the testing of believers’ faithfulness, are equally unfounded. Like Origen, Augustine, and most other commentators of scripture, Gibson points out that “the ‘testing’ of believers’ faithfulness was known to be unavoidable” (142). Thus, an interpretation that both understands the disciples as the object of πειρασμός and also posits εἰς πειρασμόν as meaning “encountering testing” is inevitably flawed. For indeed, to be tested as a “son of the covenant [...] was even thought to be a desideratum” (142), which correlates well with James’ stance on the subject, to “consider it joy” when encountering trials. Gibson, then, returns to the dilemma laid out by Moule in his “Unsolved Problem,” namely, why would one seek exemption from the test if that test was understood as being both inevitable and salutary by its nature? Gibson’s answer, of course, is that there is no reason, and the transmission tradition of the Lord’s Prayer bears witness to this. Since most of the variants either include “a qualification of the nature of the πειρασμός in view or [...] a transmutation of the plainly causative force of the petition into one
that is permissive,” many who transcribed the text must have understood the original wording as an error that necessitated correction (146). This difficulty in interpretation, then, leads to Gibson’s diagnosis of the “Unsolved Problem,” that it arises from a misapprehension of πειρασμός’s target.

And if this is the cause of the “Unsolved Problem,” then the problem’s resolution can be found in reinterpreting who the object of the temptation is. Instead of assuming that the supplicant is the one undergoing the test, Gibson argues that the one being tested is God himself: “[T]he ‘temptation’ spoken of here is, according to Jesus, one the disciples might aim at God. That is, in telling his disciples to pray ‘and do not lead us into temptation,’ Jesus was telling them to pray, ‘prevent us, God, from testing your faithfulness’” (146). Gibson comes to this conclusion because the terminology used in the prayer “evokes themes at the core of the biblical ‘Massah’ tradition” (148). This tradition alludes to the Old Testament event wherein the people of Israel, at the beginning of their wilderness wanderings, demanded that Moses give them water to drink. This event, outlined in Exodus 17:1-7, Numbers 14, and Deuteronomy 6-8, is central to Gibson’s interpretive framework because when it was recorded, the Massah incident was clearly described as a moment where God’s covenant partners tested him. In fact, the name “Massah” is translated with πειρασμός in the Septuagint, and when πειρασμός appears in the LXX, it is most often being employed to describe and reflect upon Massah.

But the use of a single word is not data enough to justify a reading not humored for most of church history. So Gibson connects the word choice of the entire Lord’s Prayer to the Massah tradition. For example, citing Deuteronomy 6:10-19, Gibson argues that the “exhortation to hallow God’s name and to see that God’s will is done is explicated specifically in terms of an obligation on the part of those who consent to revere God’s name to do so by avoiding putting
him to the test” (149). After God, through Moses, gives the Shema, a prayer that simultaneously hallows the Lord’s name and commands that his will be done among his chosen, Moses continues, “You shall not put the Lord your God to the test [ἐκπειράσεις], as you tested [ἐξεπειράσασθε] him at Massah [Πειρασμῷ].” The threefold repetition of the stem reinforces the point that the Israelites, if they are to hallow the name of the Lord and fulfill his will, can only do so as covenant partners who do not test that partnership. The letter to the Hebrews, in its third chapter, illustrates the continuing significance of maintaining covenant loyalty by not testing God. In fact, Gibson views this passage as an example of how “seeking God’s help to avoid engaging in πειρασμός against him is both a perfectly acceptable thing to pray for and something that God would be willing to grant” (150). Thus, it would not be beyond the realm of possibility that Jesus, in his model prayer for his disciples, might be advising them to petition the Lord to aid them in not testing his covenant loyalty.

Such a reading of the text also leads to an allegorical bonding between the temptation petition and the petition for “daily bread.” Considering that the Israelites were and have always been an “Exodus people,” one can see how the request for “daily bread” alludes to the manna of Israel’s wilderness wanderings. The rejection of this sustaining bread, after all, led to the elect’s “testing God in their hearts.” Therefore, should the Massah-oriented reading be correct, then the prayer would typologically insert the supplicant into the congregation of Israel. But where the first Israel could not resist the urge to test God, the followers of Christ petition for aid in submitting themselves to the reception of grace on God’s terms. They are not to test him as their forebears did.

When discussing counterpoints to his reading, Gibson notes that many detractors cite Jesus’ words to the disciples when he is praying in Gethsemane—“προσεύχεσθε, ἵνα μὴ ἔλθητε
εἰς πειρασμόν”—as the imperatival form of the invocation. From the context, where Jesus clearly has the disciples’ weak bodies in view, these detractors state that an embodied desire—in this case, a temptation to sleep—fits the passage better than a testing of God. Gibson, however, claims that interpreting Jesus’ words as the imperative form of the temptation petition lends greater strength to his own reading. This repercussion follows because of “the often overlooked fact that in biblical usage, when the construction μὴ, a form of ἐρχεσθαι, [and] εἰς is used in a command, as it is in Mark 14:38, with an object other than a place, the resultant phrase does not mean ‘do not encounter or succumb to [something]’ but ‘do not commit or engage in [something]’” (153). Therefore, an acceptable, if not clunky, reading of this passage would be, “do not engage in testing.” And Mark does indeed use sleep terminology in the context of a covenant partner staying loyal to his or her commitment. Parallel language to Jesus’ imperative in Gethsemane is also used by Mark in 13:33-37. This passage, where Jesus explains that the day and the hour of the eschaton is unknown, features Christ commanding his disciples to “stay awake” and “keep watch.” Christ’s insisting that his followers be vigilant and not sleep, then, is not a disqualification of the testing-of-God reading, according to Gibson. The relative proximity of this passage to Gethsemane could even color the interpretation of the latter, for Jesus, prior to entering into the garden, had already insisted that his disciples not shirk their responsibilities for rest.

**Four Unsuccessful Solutions**

Since Moule published his outline of the “Unsolved Problem” present within the Lord’s Prayer, the intellectual climate surrounding said problem has remained largely unchanged. Many “popular scholars” such as N.T. Wright have continued to hoist the eschatological reading upon believing laymen, but this approach to the text has failed to receive further support from new
studies; rather, its momentum as the “default” or “traditional” reading has led to its ongoing popularity.

Another popular reading is that championed by Nolland, that is, the broadening of πειρασμός to simply denote “trials” or “hard times” in general. Given the evidence presented by Moule, that πειρασμός traditionally held the more generic definition of “a test” or “testing,” one can reasonably understand the logic in such an interpretation, and the New Testament itself bears witness to this definition, as the beginning of James shows.

Marshall and Luz’s resolution, that the problem can be settled through understanding the second person prohibition to be a translation of a Semitic causative, might also hold merit; however, both invocations, whether to a Hebrew or Aramaic original, present problems to the doctrine of inspiration. Since the doctrine tends to invoke the “autographs” as the inspired text, therefore bypassing the variations introduced via transmission, an invocation to a version of the text antecedent to the autographs, such as an oral performance of a sermon, proves problematic. If an earlier but extrabiblical Aramaic version of the prayer did surface, theologians would be forced to ask the question of whether this nonbiblical text can supersede one’s reading of the scriptures proper. But the invoked versions cited by biblical scholars are back-translations into the original languages, not originals outright. They reflect a possibility, not reality. Though a Semitic original could distance God from the act of tempting and/or testing, evidence for such a claim remains nonexistent. Of course, it is the case that, even without a Semitic causative, many believers, upon hearing the traditional, KJV translation of “lead us not into temptation,” intuit a causative or permissive role on God’s part. Such a reading would largely be akin to the passive versions of Tertullian and Cyprian and would hold the direct agent of temptation to be the “Evil One” of the final petition.
The last of the major readings, Gibson’s reinterpretation of the object of πειρασμός, could possibly be the much-anticipated solution. Unfortunately, the novelty of Gibson’s work, as well as its slim to nonexistent reception among the scholarly community, means that it must still face further scrutiny before being accepted as the “correct” reading. But of these four solutions, reinterpreting God as the one who is tested in πειρασμός corrects the most interpretive problems while drawing upon and forming connections to the most elements of the first-century Jewish intellectual climate. This interpretation, bolstered by a viable justification of the causative, could prove to be one that rectifies both the petitioner’s plea and God’s role in responding to it.
And when you pray, do not heap up empty phrases…— Matthew 6:7

In Every Word, a Choice

Before delving into a probable interpretation of the Lord’s Prayer’s temptation petition, as well as a serviceable translation, perhaps it would be beneficial to rehash and expand upon the work of Moule’s “Unsolved Problem,” to exhaustively state the major hermeneutical considerations that each word in the clause might require. This chapter aims to present those decisions, but with a caveat: it will only focus on the words that effect possible translations. Of the traditional six words of the King James Version, four—“lead,” “not,” “into,” and “temptation”—stand to be drastically altered in a revised translation. Two, “and” and “us,” do not.

That is not to say that these two words do not require interpretive decisions. “And” (καὶ), for instance, is a small conjunction that establishes a connection between the temptation petition and what comes before, and one could question what manner of connection that is. Perhaps the connection is so strong that “forgive us our sins” and “lead us not into temptation” are in fact two phrases describing the same action, à la “stand and fight.” But, then again, maybe the connection is weaker, and the only overlap between the two clauses is that they are both addressed in the same moment to the same individual. In the same vein, an interpreter could question who Jesus has in mind when he says “us” (ἡμᾶς). Of course, the answer seems unproblematic, for the “us” has to be the same party that the “you” refers to before the prayer’s beginning, but nevertheless, one could feasibly question if the “you” marks the passage as one that is only pertinent to its
original audience, instead of being relevant to all believers. Would this be a good interpretation? Certainly not, but individuals have posited worse misreadings.

But even if an interpreter attempted to create and resolve some hermeneutical dilemmas revolving around these two words, they would face difficulty advocating for a different translation. Καί is a conjunction that, in most circumstances, correlates to English’s “and,” and ἡμᾶς is the accusative form of Greek’s first-person pronoun; the translation for that can only be English’s “us,” excepting the few situations where the accusative functions as the subject of an infinitive. So even if one posits a radical new reading of the temptation petition, that individual will probably still settle for the same English renderings.

“Lead”: Εἰσενέγκης

The finite verb of the temptation petition is a second-person, active, aorist subjunctive form of εἰσφέρω, often translated as “to bear into/lead into.” In Koiné Greek, it had become common among speakers to duplicate prepositions as prefixes appended to the verbs they modified, and this prefixing generally played one of three functions. The first of these was the addition of the basic, locative meaning of the preposition to the verb. This function, a common one when the prefixed prepositions were appended to verbs of motion, resulted in a plethora of words derived from verbs like ἐρχομαι, “to go/come,” which can bear nearly every proper Greek preposition as a prefix. A bizarre feature of the first-century Koiné was that the grammatical preposition was still required by the syntax even when the prefix was added to the verb in question; this idiosyncrasy of the grammar led to the prefix becoming a redundant morpheme.

Prepositions could also be redeployed as prefixes in situations where the writer or speaker wished to emphasize or increase the intensity of a verb. One of the more common examples of this derivational function is ἔσθω and its derived form κατεσθω. While the
unmodified form denotes the unmarked action of “eating,” placing κατα- prior to the lexeme makes the action more ravenous, leading to the second, derived form often being translated with “devour” or “eat up.” Unlike with the previous function, the syntax of an utterance did not require the preposition to appear twice in a sentence, for it was not needed to communicate an object’s movement.

The third function of prefixed prepositions was to act as a fully realized derivational morpheme, that is, a component, such as an affix, employed to change the meaning of the source word. One of the more common examples of prepositions as derivational morphemes in the New Testament is ἀναγινώσκω. The non-prefixed version of the verb, γινώσκω, bears the same meaning as its English cognate, “to know.” With the introduction of the Greek preposition ἀνα-, however, the resulting word receives the new definition of “to read.” Like the emphatic usage of prepositional prefixes, though, this derivational usage does not require a second occurrence of the preposition in the sentence. This small detail, along with the general rule of verbs of motion taking prefixed prepositions, results in the first function being the most likely cause of the εἰσ- prefix’s appearance in the temptation petition. Verbs of motion simply favor the prefix, and this clause exemplifies that favor.

Other details concerning the finite verb are informative but unextraordinary. Though the imperative would be the expected mood, for the speaker is trying to encourage the second person “you” to not perform an action, Koiné makes use of the subjunctive in unmarked, aorist prohibitions. The choice of the aorist tense, then, dictates the subjunctive mood (Wallace 469). This aorist subjunctive inflection could also be communicating an ingressive nuance, that the action being petitioned against, God’s “leading” or “bearing,” has not yet commenced, for the present imperative inflection is generally utilized when one wishes the cessation of an ongoing or
recurring activity; however, this division between present and aorist prohibitions is not as precise as some would have it seem, and to call this ingressive nuance of the aorist prohibitive its essential idea is incorrect (717).

Linguistically, then, the main verb of the clause appears straightforward. The tense is a product of the request being a prohibition; the second-person inflection means that the addressee, God, is the one who would perform the action if the petition were unsuccessful; and the prefix and root combined result in an easily understandable definition, the concept of “leading into” or “carrying into” something. Therefore, unless the Greek is nonstandard or reflecting a translation, no justification exists for assuming a permissive notion to the petition. Translators that render the prayer in such a manner probably presuppose, like Carmignac and Luz, an earlier version of the text exerting influence on the surviving Greek.

“Not”: Μῆ

The negative particle that precedes εἰσενέγκης is one of two present in Koiné Greek, and these two particles’ distinctive usages can broadly be distinguished on the grounds of mood. Οὐ, one of the negators, is most often used to negate verbs conjugated in the indicative mood while μῆ, the temptation petition’s negator, appears with the irrealis moods, the optative, subjunctive, and imperative. Its clause-initial placement, only following the conjunction καὶ, illustrates that the term is functioning alongside the aorist verb to express a prohibition: the supplicant is asking that the action modified be not performed. Though the function of this particle appears simple enough, the extent to which a clause featuring μῆ is being negated—that is, the “scope” of the clause’s negation—requires further clarification. In his essay on “Greek Prohibitions,” Michael G. Aubrey outlines three different scopes of negation present in Greek syntax: the negation of the nuclear predicate, which is the negation of the verb itself; the negation of the core predication,
which includes the verb and its arguments; and the negation of the clusal proposition, wherein
the entire clause is negated (356-357). Which scope a particular usage of μὴ falls in depends
upon both the aspect of the clause’s finite verb and the context of the prohibition being
examined. When a clause’s verb bears perfective aspect, as the aorist subjunctive of the
temptation petition does, “clause scope negation and core scope negation are possible options,
but nuclear scope negation is only possible with derivational morphology—the a-privative
prefix, for example” (382). No derivational morphemes expressing negation are present in
eἰσενέγκῃς; therefore, either the negation of the entire clause or the negation of just the predicate
and its argument, ἡμᾶς, must be in view. Little difference manifests between these two
interpretations, but the latter suggests that the supplicant might be wishing for God to lead
someone else into πειρασμόν, should the locus of negation be ἡμᾶς. Such an interpretation,
though, does not fit well within the Matthean version of the Lord’s prayer, since its parallel
clauses and their contrasting verbs imply that the negation’s locus falls upon ἐισενέγκῃς. The
entire clause, then, is negated by the simple inclusion of μὴ.

This stands in contrast with how laymen sometimes comprehend the traditional reading
of the Lord’s Prayer when it meets their ears. English, when forming negative statements, places
its negator after a clause’s tense-bearing verb. In contemporary English, this inclusion of the
negator also occurs alongside do-insertion, often resulting in the contracted form “don’t.” In
more archaic forms of English, however, do-insertion is not observed, and without “do” to bear
the tense of the verb phrase, “not” follows the only remaining verb available. The end result,
“lead us not into temptation,” is unfamiliar to the natural grammar of native English speakers,
and some might reinterpret the negator not as cancelling out the action of “lead,” but as negating
the prepositional phrase “into temptation.” To a hearer reinterpreting the passage in this manner,
the clause would be asking that God “lead us, but not into temptation.” Regardless of whether this reinterpretation is a viable reading of the English translation, this understanding of the petition is not supported by the underlying Greek. Μὴ, working alongside the aorist subjunctive, negates the entirety of the clause and the entirety of the action. A translator, therefore, ought to ensure that their placement of “not” similarly negates the clause as a whole.

“Into”: Εἰς

The Greek original for the preposition “into” is a small word that, like its English counterpart, primarily denotes a locative idea. Appearing 1727 times in the New Testament and another 5470 times in the LXX, εἰς conveys the notion of penetrating a boundary throughout most of its appearances; however, this little preposition can bear a plethora of other meanings depending on the context in which it is used. Along with denoting this idea of passing through, represented with the English “into,” the term can also mean “to,” or one’s arriving at a boundary. In Matthew, for instance, Jesus commands his disciples to enter “into” their inner rooms whenever they pray, the active image here being that the disciples should pass over the threshold of the room and perform their action within it. Likewise, when Jesus informs his disciples that they should meditate on aspects of nature and how these aspects reflect the character of God, he states that the grass of the field is thrown “into” the oven, the image again being that the grass passes through the oven’s opening to be consumed by fire. But in Mark 11:1, εἰς appears to be better interpreted as “to” instead of as “into.” Although other instances of coming “to” Jerusalem could be reinterpreted as Jesus’ entering “into” the city, Mark 11:1 clarifies by stating that Jesus was not entering “into” Jerusalem, but simply coming near “to” it, arriving in Bethpage and Bethany instead. Jesus, then, remains outside of the city in this verse, but even when Jesus is not entering into Jerusalem, Mark still opts for “εἰς” as his preferred preposition.
This is a significant nuance, for even if an interpreter understands the temptation petition to be conveying locative imagery to describe the petitioners’ “approaching” an immaterial noun, that interpreter must still ascertain whether that imagery is picturing a contact with a boundary or a penetration of that boundary. Origen grapples with the same nuance in his own exegesis on the text. Of course, under the possible influence of his own ascetic sensibilities, Origen views every believer as being in contact with, or at the threshold of, testing, for every man and woman encounters testing in his or her life. Since one cannot come to a boundary that one has already arrived at, Origen takes the εἰς of the temptation petition as signifying the penetration of the boundary of testing. Once someone is within or inside this boundary, that individual has “succumbed” to the test, to use Origen’s language.

But εἰς has other definitions as well. The word can also be employed in constructions that denote an action’s being “for the purpose of” another thing, or to perform a task “in order to” achieve something. In these situations, εἰς functions in the same manner that English infinitives can. For rather than employ “in order to” in sentences that require one’s purpose be explained, English speakers often use the monosyllabic infinitive marker “to” as a simpler alternative. This usage typically manifests when the object of the preposition is a noun defining a verbal idea, as in Matthew 25:1, where the ten virgins must go out “to” meet the bridegroom. In Greek, ὑπάντησις, the word often translated as “meet,” is actually a noun describing the act of meeting someone. Therefore, the usual locative definitions, of penetrating or approaching a boundary, must be set aside, for one cannot literally penetrate or approach an action. Along with nouns denoting a verbal idea, this purpose usage of εἰς frequently occurs with arthrous infinitives, and although it is a favorite of Paul’s, the evangelists were not opposed to using it, as seen in
Matthew 26:2, where Jesus is explaining to his disciples how the Son of Man must be given over
“εἰς το σταυρωθῆναι,” “in order to be crucified.”

Though it would not be impossible for εἰς to bear its “purpose” meaning in the context of
the Lord’s Prayer, it is highly unlikely. Πειρασμός is not an arthrous infinitive, and even though
it is a verbal noun, the duplication of the preposition as a prefix to the clause’s finite verb,
εἰσφέρω, nearly disqualifies this reading, as the preposition tends to be duplicated in situations
where a locative denotation is intended.

Εἰς, though, can also have a benefactive sense. Such a sense would be akin to using
English’s “for the sake of” in reference to a person (e.g., “for my sake”). An example of this
usage comes shortly after Jesus explains to the disciples that he must be crucified. When Mary
anoints Jesus for his burial, Jesus explains in Matthew 26:10 that Mary has done a good deed
“for” him. Obviously, this passage cannot be read as stating that Jesus was the purpose of the
action, and neither can it be stating that the action encountered or entered into the threshold that
is Jesus. And although it can be understood as meaning that the action was performed “toward”
Jesus—yet another possible rendering of εἰς into English—a benefactive reading fits the context
better, as Jesus explains to those around him why the act in question is beneficial: Mary has
prepared him for his coming death and burial.

Other, more idiomatic readings of εἰς are possible as well, such as the
“engaging/participating in” reading Gibson mentions in his exegesis on the temptation petition.
As Professor Kenneth Grayston outlines in his “The Decline of Temptation—and the Lord’s
Prayer,” when employed with εἰσέλθειν and an immaterial noun, εἰς can denote one’s “engaging
in” or “sharing in” something (292). In Grayston’s understanding, these are two separate
denotations; however, the line between “sharing in” and “engaging in” is a blurry one, the only
difference seeming to be the agency of the one “entering into” the noun in question. With “engaging in,” the one “entering into” is an active participant in the action situated as the object of the preposition; with “sharing in,” on the other hand, the one “entering into” the thing in question is either a mutual agent with another or a passive receiver of the action. In the New Testament, the clearest usage of εἰς in his manner is in Matthew 25:21 and 23. At the conclusion of the Parable of the Talents, the master commends his servants who invested their talents wisely, saying, “Εὖ, δοῦλε ἄγαθε καὶ πιστέ, [...] εἰςελθε εἰς τὴν χαράν τοῦ κυρίου σου,” “Well done, good and faithful servant [...] enter into the joy of your master.” Now, the joy of the master is an immaterial substance, so the passage cannot literally be an imperative to the servant to “enter into” the master’s emotion; likewise, a benefactive or purpose-oriented reading of the passage would be unlikely, for then one would have to explain the duplication of the preposition as the imperative’s prefix. Instead, the context implies that whatever “entering into joy” means, it must be a reward for the servants’ actions. Thus, a reading that comprehends the phrase to be the servants’ sharing and participating in the joy of the master proves the most likely.

Hebrews 3:11 and 18, themselves quotes of Ps. 95:11, also relay this notion of participating and sharing. When discussing the topic of hardening one’s heart through the deceitfulness of sin, both the Psalmist and the author of Hebrews invoke the wilderness generation’s disobedience, proclaiming of that generation, “Εἰ εἰσελθονται εἰς τὴν κατάπαυσιν μου,” “They shall not enter my rest.” The Hebrew source for both of these Greek references, rather than denoting an immaterial noun, actually has a “place of rest” in view, the promised land of Canaan; however, the Greek translation κατάπαυσις is a verbal action, the “act of resting” proper, meaning that once again εἰς cannot have a locative nuance. Like the Parable of the Talents, benefactive and purpose readings fail to account for the prefixed preposition, resulting
in the most viable reading being one that has the wilderness generation failing to become active engagers or mutual sharers in the rest of Yahweh.

Yet a problem even exists with this final reading of εἰς, for scholars have only noted it operating with the verb εἰσέλθειν. The Lord’s Prayer, however, employs the term εἰσφέρω. For this reading to be tenable, then, one must either find compelling reasons for εἰς to bear the definition of “engaging in” without the presence of εἰσέλθειν or create an airtight case for εἰσφέρω to be read as some form of “inflected” version of εἰσέλθειν.

“Temptation”: Πειρασμόν

Though translating πειρασμός with a word like “temptation” would lead one to believe that the term normally references one’s enticement to wrongdoing, words of the πειρα- stem are actually fairly generic terms akin to English’s “try.” One can try to perform a task, be tried for murder, try one’s mettle, or endure trying times, and each of these scenarios would have “try” occur in situations like those in which πειρα- stem words appear. When Plato discusses the numerous methods of a city-state’s governance in his Republic, for example, he has Socrates say, “[we will] try [πειρασόμεθα] to make ourselves competent judges” (Shorey 545c). Socrates, here, does not mean that he is tempted to be a good judge of the question placed before him; rather, he is making an attempt at being a good judge. Likewise, in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, the titular character proclaims that he will “endeavor [πειρασόμεθα] to avert the mischief of the disease” (Smyth 850). Again, the force of the verb in this context is not an internal allurement to sin. Instead, Agamemnon is trying not to perform an action that to him is undesirable.

The nominalized form of the πειρα- stem that manifests in the temptation petition, πειρασμός, arose from affixing the derivational morpheme -μος to the verb form πειραζω. Though Greek has multiple suffixes that it could employ to derive new words, -μος in particular
denotes the occurrence of an action rather than the abstract name of it (Metzger 42). Within the Septuagint, a text more familiar to the New Testament authors than the dialogues of Plato or the plays of Aeschylus, the derived form πειρασμός appears eight times. One of those appearances is in Ecclesiastes, where Qoheleth tells of the many “trials” that come in dreams; three more of the appearances denote the “wonders” that God performed on Egypt when he was liberating the Israelites; and the final four appearances are allusions to the incident at Massah, where God was “tried” or “tested” by Israel. Like the Classical Greek examples, none of these instances offer a clear internal inducement to sin.

The New Testament is the first extant instance in Greek literature of πειρα- stem vocabulary denoting one’s being allured to commit wrongdoing, and the only unambiguous instance of internal enticement is in James 1:12-15. In this passage, the verb πειραζω is clarified with δελεαζω, which means “to lure”; thus, the verses clearly have one’s desiring to do ill in mind. But even in the same chapter, when James writes of “considering it all joy” when the believing body encounters various “trials,” πειρασμός is being employed with a broader denotation of “trying times” or “tests,” for in this introductory statement, James is probably remarking on the “misfortune” and “sickness” of those whom he is writing to (cf. James 5:13-14).

So, as with the eschatological reading of the temptation petition, where πειρασμός must be qualified by multiple words to convey the notion of an eschatological trial, so too must James provide verbiage defining enticement to clarify to his audience that an internal allurement is his aim. “Temptation,” then, is an expanded definition of πειρασμός that does not align with either its own usage or the usage of other πειρα- stem words. While it is still possible that πειρασμός means “temptation” in the Lord’s Prayer, the burden of proof ought to be on the interpreter who
opts for that reading, not on the translator who deviates from it, for that translator is simply giving the word its better attested definition.

**Towards Interpreting the Petition**

Of course, one can understand the grammar and definitions of every word on the page and still not comprehend what those words mean together, and that is the situation that the interpreters and translators of the temptation petition have often found themselves in. Even if an interpreter takes the πειρασμός that one is being led into as “trying times” in general, does the prohibitive imply that God would normally lead his disciples into hard times, were the petition not raised? And what could it possibly mean for one to “engage” or “share in” this πειρασμός, if εἰς is reflecting a more idiomatic usage?

Some scholars have noted that the Sermon on the Mount of Matthew’s Gospel takes the structure of one large chiasm, and the block of text situated at the center of that chiastic structure is the model prayer. A teaching elevated to such a status by the evangelist holds considerable sway over the believing body’s theology, so any interpretation of the text will probably shape theology as much as it is shaped by it. The following and concluding chapter will wade into this interpretive quagmire and propose some novel hypotheses to resolve the tension present in this fundamental passage.
TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS AND POSSIBLE TRANSLATIONS

You shall not put the Lord your God to the test, as you tested him at Massah.

– Deuteronomy 6:16, ESV

Two Paths to Resolution

If historical interpretations of the temptation petition have fallen into four categories—the eschatological reading, a broadened πειρασμός, the traditional πειρασμός, and the testing of God—solutions to and justifications of these readings have taken one of two approaches, either redefining the nature of εἰσφέρω or redefining the phrase εἰς πειρασμόν. Indeed, some resolutions have even opted to redefine both. In light of these traditions—and since there seems to be no other manner of rectifying the petition’s words outside of addressing these two turns of phrase—this chapter will propose two mutually exclusive hypotheses that, taken together, result in workable translations and interpretations of the confusing petition. The first of these, and perhaps the more tenuous of the two, links εἰσφέρω to εἰσέρχομαι and aims to establish a strong link between the two words through the Septuagint’s usage of them as respective translations of the Hiphil and Qal forms of the same Hebrew verb. With this link established, the temptation petition could be understood as a slightly mangled version of the μη εἰσελθεῖν εἰς idiom—a mangled version that aims to accommodate Semitic grammar in a language that does not support it. The second hypothesis, on the other hand, is that πειρασμός, rather than referring to the testing of an individual, instead denotes the supplicant’s testing of Yahweh. This latter hypothesis leans on the Massah tradition of the Old Testament but does not require the Lord’s Prayer to be
making a direct allusion to the event, and if this latter hypothesis proves correct, then this proposal will also allow for newly viable translations of the deliverance petition as well.

**Εἰσφέρω as Εἰσέρχομαι and the Case for a Greek Causative**

In their respective excurses on the temptation petition, both Luz and Carmignac considered the possibility that the received Lord’s Prayer is an artifact derived from a Semitic original. This supposition would allow for the finite verb of the petition to be parsed as a causative and would ultimately free God of any accusations of tempting a believer to evil. Unfortunately, the authors’ manner of argumentation creates issues with the doctrine of inspiration, for the hypothetical Aramaic or Hebrew original, possibly only an oral text, would have precedence over the gospel manuscript.

An appeal to the Semitic languages, though, does not have to end in reshaping doctrine; rather, one could appeal to the Semitic languages’ influence on the Koiné dialect of first century Palestine. One of the causes of this influence, as well as one of the best pieces of evidence for it, is the Septuagint. Though composed two-hundred years prior to the events documented in the New Testament, the Septuagint displays how Greek translators engaged with the anisomorphic qualities of the Semitic languages, such as “untranslatable” inflections and Hebrew idioms. The two relevant anisomorphic features are the Hiphil and Hophal verb stems, the active and passive causative stems respectively. Greek, unlike Hebrew, Aramaic, and other Semitic languages, does not have a morphologically derived causative construction; therefore, translators were faced with a choice regarding how best to represent the causative in their native tongue.

The results of this choice, however, were fairly uninspired. The causative displays multiple nuances throughout the Hebrew scriptures, from the true causative, wherein the subject directly forces the object to either change states or perform an action, to the tolerative or
permissive causative, wherein the subject either grants a request or allows an action by refraining from interference. When Jacob, disguised as Esau, “brings” wine to his father in Genesis 27:25, the Hebrew says that he is “causing [the wine] to go in,” that is, the construction is a Hiphil stem of the verb “to go.” Since Jacob is forcing the wine to perform an action—to enter into his father’s abode—this passage would be an example of a true causative. But in Numbers 22:33, when the angel tells Balaam that he would have “let [Balaam’s donkey] live,” a causative construction is also used. Because Balaam’s donkey is already alive when the angel appears, this wording cannot imply that the angel is going to create life; instead, the Hiphil construction must denote a tolerative causative: the angel permits the donkey’s living by not engaging in a contrary action.

To render these particular examples into Greek, the Septuagint authors deemed it necessary to deviate from the typical lexemes used to translate the source words. In Numbers, for instance, the Hebrew word for “let live” is translated with περιποιέω, “to preserve,” and the narrative of Jacob’s incident employs the now familiar εἰσφέρω for the act of “causing to go in.” For both passages, the word chosen is different from that most frequently used to render the unmarked Qal stem. The Hebrew word for “to live” is most frequently translated with the Greek ζω, which denotes the same, and the Hebrew word meaning “to go in” is translated with either ἔρχομαι or the derived εἰσέρχομαι. This propensity for swapping lexemes when interpreting the Hiphil is what establishes the strong link between εἰσέρχομαι and εἰσφέρω in Palestinian Greek, for in the vast majority of times εἰσφέρω appears in the Septuagint, the word is standing in as a causative alternative to εἰσέρχομαι.

But Jacob’s bringing in wine does not alone salvage God’s goodness during the act of tempting, for that example denotes a true causative and not a tolerative. This leads to the other
method in which the Septuagint translators would express the Semitic causative in Greek, namely, *not* expressing the causative at all. It is rather unfortunate that the one time in which רָכַב is probably both tolerative in force and translated with εἰσφέρω, the Septuagint translators flatten the term. In Song of Solomon 1:4, the narrator proclaims to her beloved, “let us run,” and “let us be joyful,” two imperatival clauses with a jussive force, but between those two jussives is situated a Hiphil רָכַב. With the imperatival context, that Hiphil would best be interpreted as a tolerative expressing the king’s granting of the narrator’s wishes. Many English translations get closer to this tolerative force by employing the subjunctive “may,” as in “May the king bring me into his chambers,” but this reading makes the translation “bring” redundant, as a tolerative’s action belongs not to the subject, but to the object. Thus, a better translation might be, “May the king *let* me into his chambers.” Regardless, the Septuagint opts for a consistent, but perhaps less accurate, rendering, taking the Hiphil as a true causative and putting the king’s action into the aorist indicative. And while this approach is not a nonviable one, in the end, the result is too formalistic.

A more explicit example of a flattening of the Semitic causative is evident in Psalm 141:4, where the Psalmist asks that Yahweh not let his heart incline toward performing an evil action. As with the Lord’s Prayer, most English translations have God be the agent of the action, resulting in a plea that supposes that God is the one who would normally direct the petitioner’s heart to evil; however, a permissive, tolerative understanding of the verb translated “lead” makes the most sense within the context of the psalm. As Jeffrey H. Tigay, an Emeritus Professor at the University of Pennsylvania notes in his study “On the Tolerative/Permissive *Hiph*’il,” “a [true] causative translation [of this passage] implies that God might cause people to sin, and the psalmists ask Him not to. The tolerative translation implies that God can prevent people from
sinning, and the psalmists ask Him to do so—to take away their freedom to sin” (410). This idea of God’s preventive force in temptation is evident in the verses surrounding the one in view, as the Psalmist unambiguously petitions for Yahweh to “set a guard” over his mouth and to “watch over” the door of his lips. Indeed, the text would present a peculiar theology if the Psalmist was asking for God to guard him against an act that God himself normally provokes. This, of course, is a similar predicament to the one presented in the Lord’s Prayer, as the prayer appears to ask God to not do something that other scriptures state he already and categorically does not do.

But this passage has an even closer tie to the Lord’s Prayer: it nearly perfectly parallels the temptation petition’s syntax. Like the temptation petition, the Septuagint version of Psalm 141:4 begins with an active, second-person subjunctive functioning as a prohibitive. That prohibitive verb is then followed by an accusative noun phrase, as well as an adverbial phrase beginning with the preposition εἰς. Although the lexemes in question are separate from those in the Lord’s Prayer—the finite verb is ἐκκλινω instead of εἰσφέρω; the accusative phrase is τὴν καρδιαν μου instead of ἡμας; and the object of εἰς is λογους πονηριας instead of πειρασμόν—the fact that almost the exact same construction is employed for a Greek translation of a negative tolerative petition is suggestive. Since the Septuagint was one of the more commonly available editions of the scriptures within the first century, the poor “translation Greek” of that version might very well have influenced the Palestinian Koiné of Jewish communities. In lieu of the causative of their mother tongue, the members of the Jewish speech community might have produced new innovations in their Greek usage.

And other such innovations have already been recognized within the New Testament scriptures. The “attributive genitive,” for example, is a feasible but rare construction in Greek that’s employed quite frequently throughout the New Testament scriptures. This construction has
an abstract noun in the genitive case impart itself to the head noun as an inherent quality of that head. Normally, Greek would use an adjective to fulfill the same end. Hebrew and other Semitic languages, though, frequently used nouns in such a way through their construct chain. The New Testament authors, probably under the influence of the Semitic languages that they both spoke and were exposed to, used this construction more frequently than their non-Semitic counterparts. Indeed, grammars have even given the names “Hebraic” and “Semitic” to the attributive genitive because of the influence. One example of this genitive appears in the eighteenth chapter of Luke’s gospel. In the parable of the persistent widow, Jesus describes a judge who fails to fear God and enact his justice, and in verse six, Jesus calls that judge “ὁ κριτὴς τῆς ἀδικίας,” literally, “the judge of the unrighteousness.” Given the context of the passage, one cannot read this construction as the intuitive objective genitive, for this judge does not judge unrighteousness. Instead, the unrighteousness is an intrinsic quality of the judge; he is unrighteous. Constructions such as this one are evidence of Semitic influence in the Greek of the evangelists; their familiarity with the construct chain leads them to employ it even in their second language.

Likewise, the idiom εἰσῆλθεν εἰς is a product of Semitic influence. The use of “entering into” something to denote one’s participation or sharing in that thing is originally a Hebrew idea. Psalm 143:2, as an example, features a prohibition against “entering into judgment” with one’s servant. The Hebrew for this passage, “אַל־תָּבֹא בְּמִשְפָּט,” features the primary verb for entering into something, בָּא, in its unmarked Qal stem, along with the inseparable preposition ב, meaning “in” or “into,” which is prefixed to the word for judgment, מִשְפָּט. The result is a construction that perfectly mirrors the Septuagint’s Greek, καὶ μὴ εἰσῆλθεν εἰς κρίσιν. For whatever reason, the translators of this Psalm deemed it fit to copy verbatim the Hebrew phrasing into the Greek text, and the result is that future Greek speakers, influenced by both the Septuagint’s praxis and
similar usages of the idiom in other Semitic dialects, adopted the turn of phrase into their own common parlance. Such is why Jesus, at the end of his teaching of the talents, can speak of a servant “entering into” the joy of his master.

The temptation petition’s finite verb, then, could be a product of Semitic influences and Septuagint precedent. The ubiquity of the Old Greek translation must have had a lasting impact upon the speech and writing of the faithful, and this impact could have resulted in the idiosyncrasies of bad “translation Greek” becoming codified into normative practice. In such a multilingual and diverse society as first-century Palestine, speakers probably adopted common methods of transferring their ideas from one tongue to the next. The Septuagint’s usual means of translating the Hiphil, through changing the lexeme and/or flattening the tolerative nuance of the original, could be evidence for how first-century Semitic speakers mediated between two drastically different languages. Even if Jesus himself taught in Greek, his Greek would have been shaped by these same cultural influences, meaning that an Aramaic source is not necessary.

If the temptation petition is a product of such influences, then μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς εἰς could be read as a causative form with a tolerative nuance. Under the influence of the Septuagint’s lexeme-shifting, the evangelist opted to communicate a causative construction of the idiom εἰσελθεῖν εἰς by deploying a φερω stem instead of an ἐρχομαι; the context, as it does in Psalm 141, would allow a supplicant to understand that a tolerative notion is being expressed. This results in two interpretive takeaways. The first is that the petitioner, rather than pleading with God to cease a normative action, such as leading one into temptation, is instead seeking divine aid in prevention; God, rather than stopping his normal practice, is intervening on behalf of his people. The second significant takeaway is that the supplicant is asking to not engage, participate, or share in the πειρασμός that functions as the object of the petition’s preposition.
Though the traditional reading of the prayer has understood the petitioner as a passive receiver of his or her fate, this interpretation recasts that petitioner as an active agent of, or at least, a mutual participant in, the πειρασμός alluded to.

Πειρασμός and the Testing of God Revisited

Of the multiple different competing interpretations of πειρασμός, only two appear to be viable, the semantically-broadened πειρασμός that denotes a “hard time” in general and the refocused πειρασμός that has God as its object. A reading that has the prayer’s petitioners as the receiver of the πειρασμός, if that πειρασμός is understood as either an internal allurement toward wrongdoing or a test of one’s faithfulness to God, results in a nonsensical petition. The former, of course, contradicts James’ teaching that God does not tempt an individual to evil, and the latter could only be seen as beneficial: if the supplicants endure the test, then their faith is vindicated and strengthened; if they fail the test, then they either are rightfully removed from the congregation or correct themselves after being made aware of their shortcomings. To ask that God not engage in a beneficent act would be an odd inclusion in Jesus’ model prayer; therefore, these readings can be dismissed.

The broadened “trial” reading of πειρασμός, though one commonly maintained by contemporary translations, would also be oddly situated in Jesus’ model prayer. Many of Jesus’ teachings draw attention to the inevitable suffering that one must undergo as a Christ-follower, and while Christians in relatively tolerant western societies might often pray to avoid hardship, for the first-generation disciples, hardship and “trials” were a persistent reality. Such is why Paul explains to Timothy that “all who desire to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will be persecuted” (2 Timothy 3:12, ESV). In fact, facing suffering was understood as a blessing among these early faith communities. As Romans says, believers ought to “rejoice in [their] sufferings, knowing
that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope” (5:3-5, ESV). One of the original Christian teachings expressing the blessed, joyous status of the sufferer even sits alongside the Lord’s Prayer in Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount. Among the Beatitudes, Jesus proclaims, “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when others revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on my account. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, for so they persecuted the prophets who were before you” (Matthew 5:10-12, ESV). If hard times brought about by the hatred of nonbelievers garnered someone the status of “blessed” from the lips of God himself, it would be bizarre for a believer to likewise pray that he or she might avoid hardships altogether. A more reasonable petition would be for endurance and empowerment through persecution, yet interpreting πειρασμός as a “trial” or “hard time” cannot lead to a reading of the prayer that comports with Jesus’ other teachings.

Reframing πειρασμός as the testing of a different individual, though, would not only comport with Jesus’ teachings, but would also fit with Jesus’ actions as they are depicted in the gospels. Gibson, in his own reading of the text, makes much of the Massah tradition of the Old Testament, and while this is a necessary interpretive framework for the Lord’s Prayer, it only becomes so because of its relevance to an event that happens in the chapter immediately preceding the Sermon on the Mount: Jesus’ testing in the wilderness. When the adversary tests Jesus, Jesus is partaking in a sort of theological roleplay demonstrating his role as a new Israel. For each test that the devil places before him, Jesus provides a theological justification of his actions: he does not need to break his fast, for “[m]an shall not live by bread alone,” and he will not bow to the adversary because one should “worship the Lord […] only” (Matthew 4:4, 10, ESV). The fact that these are justifications of his actions is significant, for the final test, that
Jesus cast himself off the temple spire, has Jesus assert that man “shall not put the Lord […] to the test” (Matthew 4:7, ESV). Given the context of Jesus’ previous two quotations, one should find it improbable that Jesus is rebuking the devil for testing him; rather, a better reading would be that Jesus, playing the role of Israel, is succeeding where the chosen people failed, and where that chosen people failed is seen in the unabridged verse that Jesus quoted, Deuteronomy 6:16: “You shall not put the Lord your God to the test, as you tested him at Massah.”

But what would Jesus and the Israelites be testing in their respective wilderness endeavors? The answer is Yahweh’s covenant loyalty. In the Massah account, the Israelites fail to trust God’s loyalty because he led them to a place that appeared to not have any sustenance for them. Since Rephidim in the wilderness of Sin appeared to have no water, they assumed that Yahweh had brought them to that place for the sole purpose of killing them. Because they did not trust him, they forced his hand, requiring that God give them water from the rock of Horeb. Likewise, if Jesus leaped off the spire of the temple, he would, in effect, be requiring that God prove himself, testing him by forcing his hand. The means of the test are different, but the end result is the same: requiring that God prove his loyalty instead of simply trusting in that loyalty.

Again, this reading does not require that the finite verb of the temptation petition be a remnant of some Semitic idiom. Upon the analogy of such phrases as “into repentance,” εἰς μετάνοιαν, “into testing” could be understood as the disciples’ testing of God, for when the Bible tells of God wishing for all “to come to repentance,” those who are coming into the abstract noun are the ones performing the action denoted by that abstract noun (2 Peter 3:9). God is not repenting; people are repenting. Likewise, God is not the one testing when individuals come into this abstract action; people are the ones who are performing the testing.
Under this interpretation, the petition is one that asks for God’s divine prevention of the supplicant’s committing wrongdoings that test Yahweh’s faithfulness as a covenant partner. These wrongdoings, born out of an individual’s unbelief, are an evil that require that God prove himself to his partner. And these wrongdoings are truly an evil; in fact, this reading gains further support from the parallel petition in Matthew’s version of the Lord’s Prayer. If the temptation petition is actually a petition concerning one’s testing God, then the deliverance petition finds an explanation for the enigmatic definite article preceding “evil.” Many have seen the article as hinting that the phrase “του πονηρου” is an epithet for the “evil one,” the Satan; after all, similar arthrous usages are interpreted as such in 1 John 5:18, where ὁ πονηρος is described as “not touching” the person born of God. But research into second temple Jewish sources has revealed that arthrous πονηρος was not an epithet attributed to the shadowy adversary, though one rabbinic prayer asks for deliverance from “the destructive Accuser.” Another common translation has been to take the article as a general article, marking the evil in question as the abstract concept of evil, or “all kinds” of evil. But should the πειρασμός itself be a kind of evil that the supplicant is perpetrating against God, then the article could be taken as an anaphoric article, an article pointing to a previous referent in the discourse. This would result in the deliverance petition being the parallel, positive version of the same request. The supplicant asks not only that God not tolerate one’s participating in a sinful test, but that he also actively partake in delivering that individual from the evil act of testing.

Towards a Faithful Translation

In the preface to his recent translation of the Hebrew Scriptures, Robert Altar makes much of what he calls the “heresy of explanation,” which he defines as the propensity for scholars to use translation “as a vehicle for explaining the Bible instead of representing it in
another language” (xv). This “heresy” represents a valid concern, and in its most extreme varieties, it echoes Augustine’s supposition that translation is for grammar where interpretation is for meaning; however, in a society where the printing press has democratized canonical texts, another “heresy” must stand opposite the “heresy of explanation”: the “heresy of misrepresentation.” This heresy errs to the opposite extreme, but its result is the same; it is when one’s faithfulness to the source language’s grammar results in an inaccurate representation of that source’s original meaning. Though the heresy of explanation results in the translator “explaining away” the source text, with his or her product being a sanitized, untextured, and neutered substitute, the heresy of misrepresentation leads to an opaque, incomprehensible translation that is really nothing of the sort. Both obscure the source, the one through excessive mediation and the other through the absence of mediation.

All translators should find their place between these two heresies, and they must find their place on a verse-by-verse, word-by-word basis. Unfortunately, many translators have leaned more toward the heresy of misrepresentation when rendering the Lord’s Prayer into English, possibly even “committing” the heresy. While it is noble to preserve a source’s phrasing in the target language, translators ought to act like Jerome and mediate their translations when preserving the source grammar could result in an inaccurate view of what the original communicates.

With that in mind, a translation of the temptation petition that operates within the boundaries of these two heresies while representing the two hypotheses outlined would be, “And let us not engage in testing, but deliver us from that evil.” This rendering, though “less literal” than the traditional reading, for the locative imagery is partially lost, clarifies the source text without sanding away its texture. In fact, aside from the necessary insertion of “engage,” the
syntax remains consistent with the King James Version, which itself followed the Greek’s word order with every word except “not.” “Not,” of course, must follow the tense-bearing verb in English, but it precedes that verb in Greek’s grammar. “Let us not engage in testing,” then, serves as an unobtrusive alternative that corrects the theological misconceptions that the traditional reading fosters. Changing “lead us not” to “let us not engage” incorporates the Greek causative hypothesis, modifying God’s action from the traditional reading’s normative provocation to a less problematic, petitioned intervention. In this translation, as the original would seem to communicate, God intercedes on behalf of his loved ones and prevents them from committing heinous acts that would jeopardize the covenant relationship. Likewise, opting for “testing” instead of “temptation” incorporates a reading of πειρασμός more in line with its usage in other contexts while also conveying the force of locative imagery as it often manifests when applied to abstract, verbal nouns. “Temptation,” if it is a viable reading of πειρασμός, is certainly a New Testament innovation, and when one “comes into” another abstract, verbal noun, such as “repentance,” the one coming into the action is the one performing the action. If these hypotheses are correct, then this resulting translation can effectively communicate the relevant interpretive ramifications to the believing layman and relieve God of his implied role as arch-tempter.

But even if these hypotheses are not correct, the temptation petition cannot be left in its traditional, “King James” state, and those who modify it in their own translations, including the Italian Episcopate, probably understand why. Language changes, and language contact through the act of translation can be a driving force of the shifting of usage. Often, what is defined in any given utterance’s grammar is not what is communicated to a listener. That is why English speakers can say, “I could care less,” while actually communicating the opposite. In a similar
manner, the translations and mistranslations of the King James have permanently shifted English usage to the point that “lead us not into temptation” has become normative English parlance denoting not what the grammar outlines, but what the believing body, through its theological assumptions, has inferred. To say “lead us not into temptation” in English is to say “let us not be led into temptation.”

Regardless of the accuracy of these two hypotheses, a new method for interpreting the Lord’s Prayer is needed. Currently, the model prayer, one of the central texts of the Christian faith, stands at odds with much of the remaining canon, and even if the present rendering recited by many on a daily basis does grammatically convey the correct reading of the prayer, the ubiquity of the translation has led most hearers and users of it to infer a different meaning. Reinterpreting the petition in order to place God as both the petitioned intervener and the wronged party of the πειρασμός results in a supplication that asks for protection against betraying one’s covenant loyalty, requests aid in following Christ’s own footsteps, and pleads that God not permit his people to test the extent of his loving faithfulness.
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