Robert D. Kaplan: Asia's Cauldron

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ROBERT D. KAPLAN: ASIA’S CAULDRON
STUDY GUIDE, 2016
Steven Alan Samson

PROLOGUE: THE RUINS OF CHAMPA

Outline

A. TWO VIETNAMS (xv-xvii)
   1. My Son
      a. Half-destroyed statues
   2. Temple Groups B & C
      a. American helicopter-borne destruction
   3. Narcissism of Small Differences Beget the Fiercest Nationalisms
      a. Khmer [Cambodian] and Indian Heritage
      b. Champa
      c. Cham Pirates
   4. Indian Ocean
      a. Chola Empire of the Tamils
      b. Dai Viet
      c. Khmer Empire and Champa
   5. Tonkin and Cochin China

B. CHAMPA AND KHMER SCULPTURES (xvii-xx)
   1. Jean-Francois Hubert
      a. The art of Champa
         1) Sanskrit culture
         2) Hindu-Buddhist syncretism
      b. Conquered Hindu world provides Vietnam with its uniquely non-Chinese cultural identity
   2. Da Nang
   3. Museum of Cham Sculpture
      a. Henri Parmentier and Charles Carp
      b. Photographs
      c. Indian world deifies dance
   4. Artifacts
      a. Gajasimha
      b. Shiva
      c. Vishnu
      d. Brahma
      e. Other gods
      f. Walter Benjamin
   5. History Museum of Saigon
      a. Struggle against China
      b. Influence of the Indian Subcontinent
      c. Caves of Ellora
   6. Khmer Sculptures

C. GEOPOLITICAL STUDY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (xx-xxi)
   1. Vividness of India’s Presence in This Part of the World
   2. China’s Rise
   3. Champa Offers a Lesson in Humility
   4. Bipolar Rivalry vs. Multi-Polar Future
      a. Unified Vietnamese state
CHAPTER ONE: THE HUMANIST DILEMMA

Outline

A. STOPPING POWER OF WATER (5-8)
   1. Europe is a Landscape; East Asia is a Seascape
      a. Eastern and western borders of Germany
      b. Axis has shifted to East Asia
         1) Maritime spaces
      c. A naval century
   2. Shattered Array of Coastlines and Archipelagoes
      a. Sea acts as a barrier to aggression
      b. Clearly defined borders
      c. Slowness of warships reduces the chance of miscalculation
   3. Great Military Conflagrations
      a. Russo-Japanese War
      b. Chinese Civil War
      c. Imperial Japan
      d. Korean War
      e. Indochinese wars
      f. Each was organic to the formation of a state or empire
      g. Age of national consolidation in East Asia is behind us
   4. Japanese Militarism
      a. Seas offered no defense
      b. China is far less aggressive than Japan after the Meiji Restoration
      c. Geography of East Asia will foster the growth of navies not armies
   5. John J. Mearsheimer
      a. Stopping power of water
      b. More difficult to land an army on a hostile shore
   6. Taiwan Strait
      a. Difficulty of occupying Taiwan
      b. Maritime distances separating the major rivals
      c. Likelihood of naval competition

B. SOUTH CHINA SEA (8-14)
   1. Two General Areas of East Asia
      a. Northeast Asia dominated by the Korean Peninsula
         1) It pivots on the destiny of North Korea
      b. Prospective humanitarian interventions
      c. Cold War phase not over
   2. Southeast Asia Is Deep into a Post-Cold War Phase of History
      a. Vietnam dominates the western shore of the South China Sea
         1) Once the preeminent foreign symbol of domestic turmoil inside America
         2) Now a capitalist dynamo seeking closer military ties to America
      b. China consolidated as a dynastic state by Mao Zedong
      c. Indonesia
      d. Singapore and Malaysia
      e. Outward collective push
      f. Demographic cockpit of the globe
3. Throat of the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans
   a. Heart of Eurasia’s navigable rimland
      1) Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits
      2) More than half of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points [strategic passages than can be easily closed]

4. Proven Oil and Gas Reserves
   a. Second Persian Gulf
   b. Chinese oil reserves
   c. Chinese oil consumption

5. Territorial Disputes in an Area of Critical Geostrategic Importance
   a. Specks of land
   b. Oil and natural gas
   c. Conflicting claims
   d. China’s claim to the “cow’s tongue”
   e. All the littoral states are arrayed against China
   f. Division of seabed and subsoil resources

6. A Product of Globalization: Heightened Maritime Awareness
   a. Everything becomes fraught with competition
   b. These were not issues in the days of the British Empire
      1) British emphasis on free trade and freedom of navigation

7. Anonymous High Official of a Littoral State
   a. China’s Middle Kingdom mentality [China seeks to assert hegemony]
   b. Too many claimants to the waters
   c. Hainan Island’s underground submarine base
   d. Disputes are being internationalized
   e. Plan B is the U.S. Navy

8. South China Sea Has Become an Armed Camp
   a. Scramble for reefs is mostly over
      1) Facts have been created on the ground

9. Spratlys
   a. China has built concrete helipads on seven reefs
   b. Mischief Reef
   c. Johnson Reef
   d. Taiwan occupies Itu Aba
   e. Vietnam
   f. Malaysia
   g. Philippines

10. America’s Position vis-à-vis the Caribbean Sea
    a. Spanish-American War
       1) Closure of the American frontier [Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis]
    b. Effective Control of the Western Hemisphere

11. End Run around Taiwanese Sovereignty

12. South China Sea
    a. Antechamber to the Indian Ocean
    b. Part of the main sea lines of communication

C. TRADITIONAL NATIONALISM DRIVES POLITICS IN ASIA (14-18)

1. Domination of the Navigable Rimland
   a. It is becoming the most contested body of water in the world

2. Current Domination by the U.S. Navy
   a. Its shrinkage
   b. Dramatic growth of the Chinese Navy
   c. Submarine fleets

3. Multipolarity in a Military Sense
   a. Military front line of the Cold War
   b. Military front line of the coming decades of the South China Sea
4. Lack of Humanist Appeal: No Philosophical Enemy to Confront
   a. Absence of a moral struggle
   b. East Asia is about trade and business
5. Chinese Regime: A Low-Calorie Version of Authoritarianism
   a. China is likely to become more open
   b. Leaders are not the decadent, calcified leaders of the Arab world
   c. Old-fashioned nationalism
6. 19C European Nationalism
   a. Moral community against imperial rule
      1) Today intellectuals and journalists aspire to a universal community and regard nationalism as reactionary
   b. Media attracted to international organizations
   c. Traditional nationalism mainly drives politics
   d. It is leading to the modernization of militaries
7. Balance of Power
   a. Military engagements on land
      1) Occupation of civilian populations
   b. Application of Sea Power is Purely Military
8. Separation of Geopolitics from Human Rights Issues
   a. Realm of policy and defense analysts
   b. Realism will triumph
   c. Humanist dilemma
9. Environment
   a. Occasional humanitarian disasters
   b. Navies will need to respond
      1) U.S. soft power augmented its hard power
   c. Humanitarian assistance led to resumed ties to the Indonesian military
   d. There is little moral drama to interest the media
10. Austere Power Politics
    a. Revised version of Thucydides’s Melian Dialogue [Athens sent representatives to Melo to demand that the Melians ally with Athens against Sparta; they refused to give up their liberty; the Athenians replied that the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must; the Melians still refused and were slaughtered. Thucydides followed this episode with the disastrous Athenian defeat in the Sicilian Expedition, as if to say: Hubris is followed by Nemesis]
    b. China’s undeclared strategy
    c. Weaker countries may seek to bandwagon with the United States [The “bandwagon effect” is an exception to the usual rule that countries will not seek to place themselves under a powerful country]
11. Different Form of Conflict
    a. We have been traumatized by massive land engagements and dirty irregular small wars
       1) Colossal civilian casualties
    b. Machiavelli’s Discourses: Controlled conflict may lead to progress
D. CAN CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA BE PROPERLY CONTROLLED? (18-21)
1. What Ifs
   a. Increased defense budgets
   b. Spending is on naval and air platforms
   c. US distracted by Middle East land wars
   d. Military power shifting from Europe to Asia
2. China’s Desire for Hegemony [Leadership]
   a. Obsession with territoriality
3. Northern Boundary of the South China Sea
   a. Guangzhou
   b. Hainan
      1) Largest Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
4. Half of China’s Seaboard is Oriented Southward
   a. Weak neighbors
      1) Analogy to the Caribbean
   b. Obvious arena for the projection of power by a continent-sized nation
   c. Great area of concern for China
   d. China’s gateway to the entire arc of Islam
      1) Threatened by piracy and terrorism linked to the Philippines and Indonesia
   e. Key to China’s geostrategic future

5. Deeper Motivation
   a. China’s partial breakup by the Western Powers

6. 19C Qing Dynasty: Sick Man of East Asia
   a. Territorial losses to Europe and Japan
   b. Japanese takeovers
   c. Humiliation of the extraterritoriality agreements [Westerners enjoyed legal immunity with the Franchises: the areas that they controlled]
      1) Treaty Ports
      2) Fragmentation of China
   d. Fear of a return to a Warring States period situation
   e. Pressing outward to guard its sea lines of communication (SLORCs)

E. HELPING TO MANAGE CHINA’S RISE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (22-28)
1. Vietnam War
   a. Comparison with Thucydides’s analysis of the Sicilian Expedition
2. Athens Paralyzed by Pessimism and Recriminations
   a. America also suffered a serious crisis of confidence, standing by as the Soviets and their allies threatened American allies and toppled regimes
3. Vietnam’s Renewed Appeal for America’s Help
   a. America wanted as a balance
4. Cost of Air and Naval Platforms is Becoming Prohibitive
   a. Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier
   b. Zumwalt-class Destroyer
   c. F-22 Raptor
   d. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
   e. Imperial fatigue
   f. Iraq War

5. Cold War Kept the United States Engaged in the World
   a. Threat is now far more ambiguous
      1) Piers Brendon
      2) John Mearsheimer: Anarchic system
      3) Pursuit of regional hegemony
6. Control of the South China Sea Allows Regional Hegemony to Be Realized
   a. Challenge and response
      1) Tense and contradictory relationship
   b. The cost of a U.S. decline or a partial withdrawal from its forward bases
7. The U.S. Keeps the Peace and Guard of the Global Commons
   a. Without the U.S. Navy and Air Force globalization as we know it would be impossible
      1) U.S. global security umbrella
   b. Existence of Israel and Georgia
   c. Deployment of American air and naval platforms
8. The United States Keeps China Honest
   a. U.S. classified reconnaissance activities
      1) What the U.S. provides is less the fact of democratic virtue than the fact of its raw power
   b. Balance of power between the United States and China
      1) Within that space of freedom regionalism can emerge
c. The tense ongoing standoff might yet shift in China’s favor

9. Andrew Krepinevich: Western Pacific nations are being “Finlandized” [Finland, which had won its independence after the Tsarist regime, were under the Soviet shadow during the Cold War as the price for remaining free]
   a. PLA sees **U.S. battle networks**, which are dependent on satellites and Internet, as its Achilles’ heel
      1) Antisatellite Missile
      2) **Cyber-attacks**
      3) Ballistic and cruise missiles
   b. Mark Helprin
      1) Capability of hitting American aircraft carriers
   c. Objective loss of U.S. military credibility

10. China: Beneficiary of the Military Multi-Polarity
    a. Chinese dominance would be more overwhelming than the American variety

11. What a Balance of Power Requires
    a. America’s clear-cut advantage in key areas over the Chinese military

12. Multipolarity Is Fine in a Diplomatic and Economic Sense
    a. Only by enmeshing itself in the region’s trade will the U.S. guard the SLORCs in its own interest
    b. It is fine for China to be first among equals if the U.S. is there as a balancing power

F. POWER SHIFT (28-30)
1. Hugh White
   a. Australia described as the quintessential status quo country
   b. Asia cannot change economically without changing politically and strategically

2. Remarkable Piece of Strategic Diplomacy
   a. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger
      1) The deal with Mao Zedong

3. China’s Repudiation of Marxist Economics Began under Deng Xiaoping

4. New Style Empire
   a. Problem with this model is Japan
   b. Concert of Europe model
      1) American dominance might henceforth mean instability for Asia

5. America’s Intellectual and Journalist Class May Care Too Much about the Internal Nature of the Chinese Regime
   a. Detestable behavior at home
   b. China could act responsibly abroad
      1) Alienation of humanists
   c. America’s aim should be balance not dominance
   d. Everyone may need to build up arms

G. MORALITY AND POWER (30-31)
1. What Is Naval Power For?
   a. End of Middle East land wars
   b. Cutting back on the Navy

2. Behind All Questions of Morality Lie Questions of Power
   a. **Humanitarian intervention** in the Balkans, but not Chechnya
   b. Morality may mean giving up some of our most cherished ideals for the sake of stability
   c. Balance of power is often the best preserver of freedom

Review

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CHAPTER TWO: CHINA’S CARIBBEAN

Outline

A. SECURING THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION (32-40)

1. Capitalist Prosperity Leads to Military Acquisitions
   a. Economic rise of post-Civil War America led to building a great navy
   b. Culmination of European industrial development led to an arms race
   c. Europe “free rides” on SLORCs provided by US military power [The free rider phenomenon results when a service is provided free of cost: an aspect of what Garrett Hardin called the tragedy of the commons]
   d. Europe is sick and tired of modern nationalism
   e. Power politics reigns in Asia

2. Steepness of Asia’s Economic Rise Causes Its Leaders to Pound Their Chests Militarily
   a. China doubled its per capita income in the first decade after takeoff
   b. Asia’s sevenfold per capita income rise in six decades

3. Asia’s Military Rise
   a. Doubling of defense outlays from the late 80s to 90s
   b. Share of arms imports
   c. China’s defense budget

4. Heated Arms Race

5. Greater Likelihood of Miscalculation

6. Feverish Acquisition of Submarines
   a. Undersea intelligence gathering factories
   b. Prestige of aircraft carriers
   c. Submarines are about sheer aggression

7. China is for Outbuilding the U.S. in New Submarines
   a. Latest Yuan-class diesel-electric models are quieter than America’s nuclear ones
   b. China will have more warships than the U.S. Pacific Fleet by the late 2020s

8. Smaller States are Acquiring More Subs
   a. Malaysia’s defense spending
   b. Singapore
   c. Australia
   d. 111 subs expected to be purchased by 2030

9. South Korea and Japan

10. Asian Navies are currently dwarfed by that of the U.S.
    a. Military multi-polarity
    b. China’s first aircraft carrier

11. Uncertainty of Future Projections
    a. China’s desire for power projection
       1) 071 amphibious assault vehicles
       2) 056 stealthy littoral combat frigates
    b. World’s largest shipbuilder

12. China Has Not Yet Developed a System of Systems Necessary for Fleet Operations
    a. Deterrence can rely on swarm tactics
    b. Combination punches

13. China Is in Better Shape to Increase its Military Budget
14. J-20 Stealth Fighter  
a. Fourth-Generation Aircraft  
1) Top-of-the-line items that will mesh with other systems

15. Land-Based Antiship Ballistic Missiles

16. Paul Bracken: China’s “Anti-Navy” Navy  
a. Drones and smart mines  
b. **Anti-Access Strategy**  
c. Introduction of new risks into the American decision making calculus

17. Six of Eleven U.S. Aircraft Carrier Strike Groups Are Focused on the Pacific and Indian Ocean  
a. U.S. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
b. The Pacific Air Forces  
c. Focus on balancing against China

18. China’s Sheer Size and Presence Make It a Potential Threat  
a. China is enveloping Asia  
b. Avoidance of Finlandization requires reliance on the consistency of U.S. power

B. **“BLUE NATIONAL SOIL” (40-43)**  

1. Two Sectors  
a. Northeast Asia’s rough balance of power  
b. China is much greater threat in the South China Sea  
1) Everyone is arming to the teeth

2. Most Critical Juncture of the Non-Western World: the South China Sea  
a. It is as central to Asia as the Mediterranean is to Europe

3. South China Sea is a Natural Shield for China’s Security in the South  
a. Strategic hinterland  
b. A strong foothold helps China’s navy break through the straitjacket of the American-dominated **First Island Chain**  
c. Thousand oil wells

4. China’s Blue National Soil

5. Claim: Discovery of Islands during the Han Dynasty  
a. Paracels and Spratlys

6. Historic Claim: **Nine-Dashed Line**  
b. Gulf of Tonkin

7. Military Movement  
a. SSN nuclear attack subs at Yulin  
b. Signal stations built on disputed islands  
c. Existing regional maritime control incrementally  
d. Aerial refueling program  
e. Naval base at Yalong Bay

C. GREAT POWER POLITICS (43-44)  

1. China is Not Being Unusually Aggressive  
a. John Mearsheimer  
b. Need to make serious accommodation with a rising Chinese military power

2. What Would Be the Larger Strategic Effect of Chinese Military Dominance?

D. HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN (44-49)  

1. The **Greater Caribbean**  
a. Opposite visual effect on the map

2. **Sugar Revolution**  
a. Waning of the slave trade  
1) Shift toward interest in the temperate lands  
b. Emergence of the United States as an imperial force  
c. **Monroe Doctrine**  
d. Joint effort with the Royal Navy to end the slave trade

3. The British Did Not Challenge the Americans
a. British had the world’s greatest navy
b. By 1917 U.S. economic influence over the Caribbean surpassed that of Britain
c. The American Mediterranean

4. Modernism Transformed the World
a. Modernism led to **gunboat diplomacy** to protect new economic interests; postmodernism leads to a cyber-warfare buildup
b. Isthmian Canal

5. **Spanish-American War**
a. American military unification
b. Death of America’s nonhegemonic exceptionalism
c. Theodore Roosevelt
d. Eliminating Europe from the New World was the cornerstone of Roosevelt’s foreign policy

6. **Roosevelt Corollary** to the Monroe Doctrine
a. **Elihu Root**
b. Financial crises of the Dominican Republic and Venezuela
c. Coups and breakdowns
d. Threat of Germany’s navy [the United States seized the Danish Virgin Islands during the war to prevent Germany from doing so]
e. America’s security vulnerability
f. Panama Canal

7. Economic Hegemony
a. Dollar diplomacy
   1) **Gold production**
b. Oil production
c. Occupation of Haiti
d. **Theodore Roosevelt’s three goals**
   1) Europe ejected from the Caribbean
   2) Closer political ties to Europe
   3) Understand Latin American sensitivities
e. What Chinese grand strategists can learn

8. Limits of the Comparison
a. Rickety Caribbean states and statelets
b. Formidable Asian entities
c. Mayhem of Great Caribbean political life is barely a factor in the South China Sea

9. **Glowingly Obvious Similarity**
a. Marginal seas that are extensions of continent-sized nations
   1) Nicholas J. Spykman
   2) Southern cone
   3) Domination of the American Mediterranean gave America domination of The Western Hemisphere

10. Likewise With China in the Asian Mediterranean
a. The South China Sea is now a principal node of global power politics

E. **SHARP OUTLINES OF THE CARTOGRAPHY (50)**

1. More prosperous and Militarizing Asia
a. Essence of Capitalistic Dynamism

**Review**

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CHAPTER THREE: THE FATE OF VIETNAM

Outline

A. HANOI (51-53)
   1. Process of History
      a. History Museum
         1) Vietnamese resistance to Chinese empires
   2. Intensity of the Vietnamese Historical Imagination
      a. Temple of Literature
      b. Ngoc Son Temple
      c. Ho Chi Minh
         1) Gilded statues
         2) Mausoleum
      d. Battle of Dien Bien Phu
   3. Vietnam Dominated Indochina
      a. Thai and Khmer forces periodically cooperated with China to resist
      b. Unified Vietnam is a far greater threat to China
   4. Pulsating Business District
      a. Pre-chain store capitalism
   5. City of Nervous Political Calculations
      a. Vietnam Is SE Asia’s principal protagonist in the South China Sea dispute

B. HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES (53-61)
   1. Critical Year: 1995
      a. Normalized relations with the U.S.
      b. Joined ASEAN
      c. Framework agreement with the E.U.
   2. Cambodia
      a. 1978 invasion
         1) Liberation from the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot
         2) Vast and profoundly positive humanitarian effect
      b. Embargo by a pro-Chinese coalition
         1) Soviet failure to aid
      c. Chinese invasion
      d. Diplomatic isolation
      e. Insufferable leadership
         1) Lee Kuan Yew: Prussians of SE Asia
      f. Severe shortages
      g. Pull-out from Cambodia
   3. American War
      a. Uninhabitability of 20% of the country due to unexploded American ordnance
      b. Agent Orange: Herbicide using dioxin that defoliated over 1/6 of the territory of South Vietnam
   4. Diplomatic Academy
      a. Criticism that America had not intervened into the islands disputes
      b. U.S. power is necessary for security
      c. Pax Sinica
   5. Common Interest
   6. The Vietnamese Liked Americans
   7. Absence of Cynicism
      a. Common search for freedom
   8. Chinese Influence Is Concentrated in Northern Vietnam
      a. Prolonged chaos allowed for an independent Vietnamese state to take shape
b. Emphasis on Vietnam’s resistance
c. Fear of domination: Defensiveness about Vietnamese identity
d. Vietnam cannot escape China’s embrace

9. Seventeen Chinese Invasions
10. This Historical Hostility Is, in Part, Artificially Constructed
   a. Centuries of close emulation

11. Vietnamese Identity
   a. Vietnam began as a southern outpost of Sinic culture
   b. Incorporated into the Han Empire, 111 B.C.
   c. Independence, A.D. 939
   d. Ming occupation, 1407-27

12. Chinese Contributions to Vietnam
   a. Names and language
   b. Artistic and literary styles
   c. Mon-Khmer and Thai origins combined with Chinese origins
   d. Peasant culture retained its uniqueness
   e. Contact with the Chams and Khmers in the south
      1) Narcissism of small differences

13. Military Victories Helped Forge a National Identity
   a. Chinese colluded with the French in 1946
   b. Deng Xiaoping entangled Vietnam in a guerrilla war in Cambodia
   c. Conflicting claims to the South China Sea
   d. Vietnam has a victor’s view of the United States

14. Ground Wars Stemm, in Part, from Decolonization
   a. Nationalist competition has extended to the maritime domain

15. Nguyen Duy Chien, National Boundary Commission

16. Land Border Dispute
   a. Demarcation work was completed by 2008
   b. Continental shelf
      1) Marine sector consists of 50% of GDP
      2) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs): Defined by the Law of the Sea (LOST)
   c. Gulf of Tonkin

17. “Cow’s Tongue” Is Unacceptable

18. No Chinese Earlier Claims to the Paracels and Spratlys
   a. French troops sent in 1933
   b. 1850 manuscript
   c. Future oil concessions

19. Competing Claims to the East Sea
   a. China’s 1974 takeover of the western Paracels from Saigon

20. Crossroads of Global Maritime Commerce

C. FRAUGHT RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA (61-66)

1. Purchase of Six Kilo-Class Submarines from Russia
   a. Sticker shock
   b. Prestige items
   c. Submarine base at Hainan Island

2. Cam Ranh Bay Refurbished
   a. Desire for strengthened defense ties with U.S.
   b. Pentagon’s places not bases strategy
   c. U.S. presence needed for a free maritime climate

3. De Facto American-Vietnamese Strategic Partnership
   a. Clinton: maritime claims should be based on land features

4. No Country Is as Threatened by China’s Rise as Vietnam
   a. Nationalism prevents the strengthening of ASEAN
   b. Chinese grand strategy is to postpone all multilateral discussions
1) Instead, it seeks to extract concessions through bilateral negotiations

5. Interconnectedness with China
   a. Imports
   b. Cheap goods impede the growth of local manufacturing
   c. Chinese bauxite mining of the Central Highlands

6. Distrust of the United States
   a. Its fixation on the Middle East
   b. **Fear of being sold out** to China
   c. Democracy and human rights
   d. Thailand, Uzbekistan, Nepal, and Burma as object lessons

7. Communist Party's Nationalist Credentials
   a. A reason for its survival in fact of rampant capitalism
   b. Ho Chi Minh: a homegrown leader
   c. Nationalism builds out from Confucianism
   d. "Absolutism": Underlying, determinative moral order
   e. **Chinh nghĩa**: Obligation to one’s family and solidarity group

8. Substance of Communism Is Slipping Away
   a. Implicit social contract

9. GDP Growth of 7% Annually
   a. Faceless **triumvirate** (three-man rule) of leaders: party chairman, state president, prime minister
   b. Impressive records of poverty alleviation
   c. People not robbed of their dignity
   d. Corruption
   e. Specter of the 1989 student uprising in China
   f. Admiration for Singapore

D. SINGAPORE MODEL (66-69)

1. Vietnam-Singapore Park
   a. Saigon
   b. 240 manufacturing firms

2. Other Industrial Parks
   a. Megacities cannot be wholly reborn
   b. The future is new cities that will relieve demographic pressure on the old ones

3. Economic and Cultural Unification
   a. Global standard of production
   b. Increasing integration into a future, more robust ASEAN

4. The New Saigon
   a. Dang Thanh Tam, Saigon Invest Group
      1) City is now devoted completely to business combined with a more responsive government and a higher birthrate
   b. Future is decentralization

5. Keys to Making Vietnam a Middle-Level Power
   a. **Transparency and accountability** [Transparency International uses a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to measure progress toward transparency]
   b. Need for legal reform

6. Everything Is on a Bigger Scale than in Hanoi
   a. Continental Hotel
      1) Graham Greene

7. Saigon Has One-Third of the Country's GDP
   a. New city center being planned
   b. New subway
   c. Zoning

8. Greater Saigon Becoming a Clone of Singapore

E. CAPACITY OF AMERICAN POWER PROJECTION (69-70)

1. Economic Crisis
   a. Further progress requires deep reforms and political liberalization
2. Tight Political Control Used to Maintain the State's Feisty Independence from China
   a. Wariness of any formal treaty arrangement with the United States

Review

Ho Chi Minh Cambodia Vietnamese identity
decolonization EEZs Cam Ranh Bay
fear of being sold out triumvirate transparency and accountability
Saigon

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCERT OF CIVILIZATIONS?

Outline

A. MALLS OF KUALA LUMPUR (71-74)
   1. Boom Town of Oil and Gas Revenue
      a. Comic book futurism
      b. Tin and rubber
      c. Muddy confluence
      d. Once an archipelago of trading posts
         1) W. Somerset Maugham
      e. Oppressive fecundity
   2. Upscale Malls Dedicated to Fashion and Fetish
      a. Consumerism raised to the status of an ideology
      b. Petronas Towers
   3. Philosophical Observers
      a. Thorstein Veblen
         1) Conspicuous consumption
      b. V. S. Naipaul
         1) Casualness of the Malays
         2) Energy of the Chinese
      c. Ernest Gellner
         1) Islam born outside two empires
         2) It made its own empire
         3) Unarguable blueprint for a social order
   4. Clifford Geertz
      a. Basic unity of mankind
      b. Naked materialism
   5. Blending or Clash of Civilizations
      a. Mutual suspicion and hostility
      b. Samuel Huntington
   6. Modernization Can Lead to Ethnic Conflict
      a. Intercommunal riots
   7. Malaysia's Position at the Heart of the World's Trading Networks
      a. Funnel for shipping routes
      b. Malacca
         1) Confluence of two great monsoonal systems
      c. Relative decline in the power of the West

B. ETHNIC COMMUNITIES (74-81)
   1. Successor to Malacca, Queen of Entrepôts
      a. Muslim Malays
      b. Bumiputras
      c. Ethnic Chinese, mainly Hokkien from Fujian
      d. Indians, mainly Tamils
14

e. Affluence

2. Wealth Translates into Urbanization and *Embourgeoisement*
   a. **Consumerism** and a negotiated tension between the races
   b. Global Islam drives Muslim Malays apart

3. Lack of Nationalism
   a. Too communally varied to be psychologically cohesive
   b. Chinese-dominated island city of Penang
   c. Veritable Islamic state of Kelantan
   d. **Bumiputras**
   e. Absence of anti-Chinese sentiment

4. Escape from the China Problem
   a. Majority Malays orient themselves to a wider Arab-Muslim world

5. Lack of Unity under the British
   a. Federated Malay States
   b. Identity centered around the village and town
   c. Only the British-led military response to a communist guerrilla insurgency centralized the state

6. Heart of the Malaysian Story Is the Move to the Cities
   a. Classic patronage system of the rural era
      1) **Affirmative action** for Malays
   c. Subsequent urbanization
   d. Middle class

7. Malay Ideal
   a. **Kampung**
   b. Anthony Milner
   c. Fragmented and fluid region
   d. Not burdened by the accumulation of a hydraulic, material culture as in Java

8. Malayu Is Only Used When Confronted by a Distinct Other
   a. Otherwise Malays are associated only with a specific locale
   b. Common Malay identity formed by a pattern of interaction
   c. **Malay identity** was indistinct, flexible, and ripe for integration with Islam

9. Introduction of Islam by Indian Muslim Traders
   a. **Masuk melayu**
   b. Seafaring trade that Malay Aceh conducted with Islamic realms

10. **Global Islam** as a Refuge from Western Liberal Ideas
    a. Dress
    b. **Dakwah** movement
    c. **Islam Hadari**: Civilizational Islam

11. Higher Education

12. Model Country in the Muslim World
    a. Regular elections since 1957
       1) **UMNO**
    b. Ahmet Davutoglu

13. Organic Ties to the Middle East
    a. Medieval cultural unity
    b. Steamships intensified pan-Islamism
    c. al-Afghani and Abdur’s Islamic modernism

14. Malaysia’s **Chinese Community**
    a. Authenticity and diversity
    b. **Peranakan**
    c. Commercial-minded middle-man minority

15. Rarity of Hosting Muslims in Chinese Homes

16. Tensions Kept in Check

17. Comparatively Successful Postcolonial Experience

C. **MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD** (81-86)
1. Background
   a. Alor Setar
   b. Socioeconomic challenges
   c. Japanese cruelty
     1) Malay backwardness and incompetence
   d. Intercommunal riots in 1969
2. Dispossession of the Bumiputra in Their Own Land
   a. The Malay Dilemma
   b. Tyranny of the majority
   c. Constructive protection [affirmative action]
3. Mahathir Transformed Malay Culture
   a. Slothfulness
   b. Kemal Ataturk
   c. Islamization
   d. Cronyism and corruption rooted out
4. Malaysian Patriotism Buttressed with Islam
   a. Contrasted with Lee Kuan Yew
   b. Defined moderate Islam
5. Militant Islamist Foreign Policy
   a. Palestinians
   b. Bosnia
   c. Iraq
6. Sweeping Agenda
   a. Heroes
     1) Ataturk
     2) Peter the Great
     3) Park Chung Hee
   b. Transportation and communications infrastructure
   c. Social peace and sustained economic growth
   d. Traditional authoritarian ruling style
7. Combined an Attention to Detail with Elements of the Grandiose
   a. Spot checks
   b. Mega-airport
   c. Putrajaya
   d. Petronas Twin Towers
8. Character
   a. Cult of personality
   b. Character assassination
   c. Attacks on ethnic Chinese
   d. Stoked ethnic rivalries
9. Pettiness
   a. Carcosa Seri Negara
10. No Unity of Goodness
D. MIXED, AMBIGUOUS REGIME (86-89)
1. Stable Political Order
   a. More repressive and more responsive
   b. Electoral system favored the government
   c. Reduction of poverty
   d. Middle class but no democracy
2. Politically Unstable Federalized System
   a. Ever-present possibility of violence
   b. Nine sultanates
   c. Straits Settlements
   d. Sabah and Sarawak
3. Malaysia Is the Ultimate Postmodern Society
   a. Beyond nationalism without having ever experienced it
b. Private schools
4. Military Modernization
   a. Keeping up with Singapore
5. Armed Services
6. American Warship Visits
   a. Bilateral military ties
7. Presence in the Spratlys
8. Nationalism within Defense and Security Ranks
9. Sprawling, Archipelagic Malay Community
   a. Nation-state is a recent phenomenon
   b. Islam has partially replaced nationalism
10. Internal Weaknesses
    a. No longer possible to run the country paternalistically
    b. UMNO vs. PAS
E. PENANG (90-91)
1. Negotiated Tensions
   a. Sea routes
   b. Financing tin mines
2. Old Quarter
   a. White clock tower
   b. Fort Cornwallis
   c. Distant high-rises
   d. Risk of extremism

Review

Thorstein Veblen conspicuous consumption V. S. Naipaul
Ernest Gellner consumerism affirmative action
Malay identity global Islam Chinese community
Mahathir bin Mohamad The Malay Dilemma constructive protection
Malay culture Putrajaya federalized system
nationalism

CHAPTER FIVE: THE GOOD AUTOCRAT

Outline

A. SINGAPORE (92-93)
1. Asian Civilizations Museum
   a. Statue to Deng Xiaoping
   b. A ruthless authoritarian
   c. Tommy Koh: Singapore has raised pragmatism to the level of a philosophy
2. Downtown Singapore
   a. Corporate park
   b. Contrast with the Indianized Malay mind
3. Somnolence of the End of History

B. STRATEGIC SITUATION (93-95)
1. Strait of Malacca
   a. Most important maritime choke point
   b. Piracy
2.Thrown out of the Malay-Dominated Federation
   a. Insistence on a multiethnic meritocracy
   b. Hostile neighborhood
      1) Israel
c. Soft power is only relevant after you have developed hard power
3. Balance of Power as Freedom
4. No Sovereign Waters
   a. Need for independent and secure SLORCs
5. China Threat
6. U.S. Quasi-Isolationism after Vietnam
7. Attitude toward the Filipinos
C. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC POWER (95-97)
1. Outsized Air Force
   a. Ships and submarines
2. Training Abroad
   a. Conscript military
3. American Hard Power Seen as Benign
4. Changi Naval Base
5. Diplomacy
   a. ASEAN
6. Senior Civil Servants Accompanied by Younger Colleagues
   a. Philosophical principle seems to be erasing ethnic differences
   b. Comparison with the Protestant Creed of the United States
   c. Singaporean version of Plato’s Republic
7. Singapore’s Reigning Philosopher King
   a. Deng Xiaoping
D. LEE KUAN YEW ON THE SINGAPORE STORY (97-)
1. From Malarial Hellhole to Global Economic Dynamo
   a. Beginner’s Asia
   b. Harry Lee
2. Greatest Minor Man of the 20C
   a. Journalists and intellectuals disliked him
   b. Need for moral compromise in the face of implacable, violent forces
3. His Political Philosophy
   a. Owen Harries
   b. Japanese occupation
      1) Severe punishment and total obedience
   c. Cambridge
4. Two Volumes of Memoirs
   a. Comparison with Plutarch
   b. Meritocratic quasi-autocracy
5. He Is a More Worthy Model of Leadership than Mahathir Mohamad
6. Singapore’s Situation in the Early 1950s
   a. People’s Action Party
   b. Fear of the future at the heart of the British Empire
   c. City’s founding in 1819
   d. Ethnic Chinese majority
7. Chinese Community
   a. Local Communist Party was the dominant political force
      1) Strategy of provoking confrontation with the British
   b. Cronyism
   c. Sukarno
8. Ethnic Chinese Pride in Mao Zedong’s Red China
   a. Colonialism despised
   b. Chronic unemployment inspired trade unionism
   c. Tunku Abdul Rahman
9. British Were Desperate to Hand Power to Western-Oriented Local Rulers
   a. Democracy would likely have brought communism to power
   b. Lee’s ability to fight back
10. Lee’s Drive, Energy, and Life Force
a. Hokkien Chinese

11. First Strategic Move
   a. Identification with independence through merger with Malaya
   b. Malaya provided Singapore with an economic base
      1) It needed to control Singapore for a tighter grip on communism
   c. But adding Singapore
   d. Sabah and Sarawak annexed

12. Threats from Indonesia and the Philippines
   a. Sukarno wanted a communist axis
   b. Populist blood-and-soil appeals to Malays
   c. Tunku advanced ethnic Malay privileges

13. Ethnic Rivalries
   a. Sukarno toppled in 1967
   b. Tense negotiations between Tunku and Lee

14. Lee Was a Thatcherite and Reaganite before Their Time

15. Lee Could Not Make the New Malaysia Work
   a. Insufficient autonomy for Singapore
   b. Intercommunal riots
   c. Mahathir bin Mohamad

16. Amicable Divorce

17. Lee's Sense of Let-Down

E. LEE KUAN YEW: FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST (104-07)

1. Learning to Survive
2. Determination to Forge a Hard People
3. Like the Israelis, Lee Decided to "Leapfrog the Region"
   a. MNCs welcomed
      1) Condemned by the dependency school of economists
      2) Tax-free status in return for imparting Western technical skills
      3) Attractive ambiance for a professional class
   b. Corruption attacked
   c. Birth of Singapore, Inc.

4. Manic and Meticulous
   a. Nanny state
   b. Western media's cynicism about authority

5. Lee's Feistiness
   a. Caning
   b. Tough love

6. Improved Relations with Malaysia
   a. Protecting the Strait of Malacca as an international waterway
   b. Nonalignment was a luxury paid for by Americans
   c. View of the Vietnam War
      1) Failed Communist coup in Indonesia
      2) America's action enabled SE Asia to put its house in order

7. Enlightened Authoritarianism

F. LIBERAL THINKING ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (107-109)

1. John Stuart Mill
   a. Need to prevent harm to others

2. Marcus Aurelius as an Example of Humanism
   a. Yet he persecuted Christians

3. Mill's Opposition to Persecution

4. Shortcomings of Democracy
   a. Tyranny of the majority
   b. Authority has to be created before it can be limited
   c. Order is a prerequisite of Progress

5. A Fearful Void in the Absence of Authority

6. Isaiah Berlin
a. *Four Essays on Liberty*
b. “Two Concepts of Liberty”
c. No necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic rule
d. Need to kindle a desire for good institutions
7. Lee Stepped down as Prime Minister in 1990

G. REMOVAL OF TYRANTS (109-12)

1. Arab Spring
   a. Half century of epochal transformation
      1) Political lag
   b. The reigning model was sterile and decadent national security regimes
      1) Nepotism
   c. There is no *otherness* to Arab and Muslim civilization
   d. No good autocrats were overthrown
2. At What Point Is It Right or Practical to Get Rid of Autocrats?
   a. Soft-landings are usually preferable
   a. Saddam Hussein
   b. A bad dictator eviscerates intermediary institutions
   c. A good dictator makes society more complex
      1) And prepares for representative government
   d. Mill: first lesson of civilization is obedience
4. Mill Denies the Moral Right of Tyranny
   a. But admits the need for obedience

H. AUTOCRACY (112-16)

1. Monarchy and Political Legitimacy in the Middle East
   a. Modernizing dictatorships
2. Mubarak and Ben Ali
   a. Stability
   b. Corruption
3. King Mohammed and Sultan Qaboos
4. Benevolent Autocracy Has Struck Deep and Systematic Roots in Asia
   a. Economic miracles produced by good dictators have led to personal freedoms
   b. Mixed regimes
5. Confucianism
   a. Traditional authority
   b. Morality
   c. American suspicion of power vs. Asian worry about disorder
6. Morally Vexing Realization
   a. Deng Xiaoping
      1) Unforeseen explosion of personal freedoms
   b. Deng’s successors
      1) Deals with despots for resources
      2) Collegial and technocratic rule
7. Possibility That Democracy May Not Be the Last Word in Human Development
   a. Lee Kuan Yew’s hybrid regime
      1) Quasi-authoritarian setting
8. Singapore’s Lack of a Hinterland
   a. Absence of different local conditions
   b. Political Confucianism is messier elsewhere in Asia
9. The Dilemma
   a. Nature of the social contract
   b. Desire for political freedoms
   c. Authoritarianism capitalism may be just a phase
10. Progress and Order
    a. Mill
    b. Leo Strauss on Xenophon’s *Hiero*
1) The tyrant

c. A description of Middle East despots but not Lee and Mahathir

d. Mill: Best despotisms are only good if they are temporary

e. Final legacies for a generation of enlightened despots

Review

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<td>tough love</td>
<td>John Stuart Mill</td>
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<td>Leo Strauss</td>
<td>tyrant</td>
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CHAPTER SIX: AMERICA’S COLONIAL BURDEN

Outline

A. UNDER DEVELOPMENT (117-20)

1. Henri Matisse
   a. The Manila Shawl

2. Spanish Colonialism
   a. Imprint of Mexican Colonizers

3. Cityscape of Manila
   a. Aesthetic and material devastation

4. Near-Total Lack of an Identifying Aesthetic
   a. Amateurish, just-put-together feel
   b. Somnolent and purposeless demeanor

5. Borrowed Culture
   a. Security guards
   b. Government buildings
   c. Shopping centers and chain restaurants
   d. Luxury, gated communities

6. Asian Dynamism
   a. Philippines bypassed

7. Bad Latin American Economy
   a. Population growth
   b. 76.5% of GDP growth went to the 40 wealthiest families

8. Contrast with the Asian Tiger Economies
   a. Exports account for only 25% of economic activity
   b. Corruption

9. Improvements
   a. Global competitiveness
   b. But unfavorable for foreign investment

10. U.S. Investment Has Made Little Difference

B. LEGACY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (120-24)

1. Commodore George Dewey
   a. Spain’s repression of Cuba

2. Military Nightmare

3. Filipino Insurgency
   a. Emilio Aguinaldo [first president of the Philippines, who also led the subsequent insurgency]
   b. Full-scale war developed

4. Death Toll
   a. America’s idealism and naiveté led it on a path of destruction and brutality

5. American Rule
a. A model of enlightenment

6. American Reforms
   a. Infrastructure
   b. Health and education

7. Effect on the Destiny of America
   a. William Howard Taft
   b. Douglas MacArthur
   c. Dwight D. Eisenhower
   d. Bataan Death March
   e. Battle of Leyte Gulf

8. American Aid and Advice
   a. Ferdinand Marcos

9. America as an Imperial Power
   a. White baronial U.S. embassy
   b. Hill stations
   c. West Point
   d. Douglas MacArthur

10. American Colony Is All but Name
11. What the Filipinos Say about the Trajectory of American Power
12. Gambling Republic
   a. Africa-like slums
   b. Latin America-style fatalism and class divides
   c. Politicians “hold power without virtue”

C. LEGACY OF FERDINAND MARCOS (124-25)
1. Bribery, Cronyism, and Ruin
   a. Inverse of Lee Kuan Yew
   b. Not enriched by Confucian values
   c. Crime and political decay
   d. Contrast with Lee, Mahathir, and Chiang
   e. Marco’s world was one of self-delusion
   f. Stanley Karnow

2. Theft of Billions of Dollars
   a. Marcos represented the worst of Spain’s pre-Reformation legacy of absolutism and fatalism

3. Directionless Malaise of the Post-Marcos Era
   a. Big dreams
   b. Democratized corruption
   c. Lack of discipline

4. Change Requires Exceptional Leadership

D. GEOGRAPHICAL DILEMMA (126-27)
1. Philippine Archipelago Consists of Three Island Groups
   a. Luzon and its Tagalog speakers
   b. Mindanao and the Moros [a Spanish effort to suppress the Moros in 1662 was thwarted by Koxinga’s threat to invade the Philippines from Taiwan]
      1) Islamic terrorism and insurgency
   c. Visayas
   d. Ramshackle empire ruled Manila

2. Closure of American Bases in 1992
   a. Chinese occupation of the Spratlys, 1994
   b. China’s increasing geopolitical sway

3. Prickly Nationalism
   a. An expression of its geographic vulnerability
   b. All oil imported by sea
   c. National security nightmare: Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal

4. Effort to Resurrect the American Strategic Platform

E. SCARBOROUGH SHOAL AFFAIR (127-28)
1. Chinese Maritime Enforcement Vessels
   a. State-of-the-art coast guard cutters
   b. Gregorio del Pilar
   c. Chinese condescension

F. RAISING THE STAKES (128-31)
1. Invitation Back to Subic Bay
2. Benigno Simeon Aquino III
3. Post-9/11 Relationship
   a. Islamic terror networks
   b. Counterinsurgency strategy
   c. Moro Islamic Liberation Front
   d. Sulu archipelago
4. Limited Air and Sea Forces
   a. Need for a minimum-credible-defense
   b. Italian frigates
   c. Increased defense expenditures
5. American Naval Visits
   a. Upgrade of harbor repair facilities
   b. Idea was to keep the Philippines from becoming ripe for violation
   c. Ulugan Bay
6. Chinese Plans to Build a Runway on Subi Reef
   a. Bullying the Philippines as pushback against the United States
   b. How Washington was upping the ante

G. DEFENSE ISSUES (131-35)
1. Defiant Arguments Demonstrated Filipino Weakness
   a. The law protects the weak by being impartial
   b. Hobbesian international system: no Leviathan to punish the Unjust
2. Creeping Expansion of Chinese Naval Power
   a. Henry Bensurto
      1) Chinese probing
      2) Manipulation of tensions
   b. Philippine geography as a nightmare
3. Continental Shelf
   a. Gilberto Asuque
   b. Little oil and gas
   c. Energy exploitation blocks
4. Edilberto Adan
   a. Deterioration of American-Philippines military relations
   b. 1999 status of forces agreement
   c. Agreement with Australia
   d. Mischief Reef
   e. Nationalism runs deep
5. Manila Warned Against Naval Brinkmanship
   a. Benjamin Defensor
6. Siege Mentality
7. Cultural Intractability
   a. Carolina Hernandez
      1) Little strategic thinking

H. PALAWAN (135-38)
1. Puerto Princesa
   a. Richard Spratly
   b. Kalayaan: Freedomland
   c. Tomás Cloma
2. Mayor of Kalayaan
   a. Pagasa
3. Western Command
4. Juancho Sabban
5. Paranoia Mixed with Humiliation
   a. Chinese Sansha
6. Ulugan Bay
   a. Massive and sheltered body of water
7. Potential Expense of Dredging and Port Development
8. China Is the Wild Card

Review

Asian Tiger economies George Dewey Emilio Aguinaldo
Douglas MacArthur Ferdinand Marcos Moros
Scarborough Shoal Sulu archipelago Henry Bensuto
Carolina Hernandez

CHAPTER SEVEN: ASIA’S BERLIN

Outline

A. THE PRATAS (139-42)
   1. Joseph Conrad
      a. China's narrow seas
   2. Pratas Islands
      a. Dongsha
   3. Chinese Claim
      a. Emperor Wu
      b. Jin dynasty
      c. Cow's tongue was a Guomindang [Kuomintang] concept
      d. Kuan-Hsiung Wang
   4. Taiwanese Administration
   5. Author's Visit
      a. Tropical abundance
   6. Tour
      a. Da Wang temple
   7. Runway
   8. Coastguard Runs the Island
      a. Itu Aba
   9. Patriotic Symbols
      a. Spratlys
      b. Scarborough Shoal

B. TAIWAN: STUBBORN, INCONVENIENT FACT (142-43)
   1. Western Pacific's Most Elemental Conflict
      a. Taiwan's vibrant democracy and civil society
   2. Cork in the Bottle of the South China Sea
      a. Paul Wolfowitz: Asia's Berlin
      b. Bellwether for the Western Pacific
   3. Taiwan's Feistiness

C. HISTORY (143-49)
   1. High-Speed Rail Train to the South
      a. Consumerism and efficiency
   2. Shopping Malls and Submarines
   3. Large-Scale War Here Would Be Horrific
   4. Formosa
      a. Portuguese
b. Dutch colonists
c. Ethnic Malay
d. Linchpin and organizing principle of the Western Pacific
5. China's Contacts with Taiwan Were Intermittent
   a. Pirates and fisherman
   b. Zheng He
c. Cheng Chih-lung [Zheng Zhilong, Nicholas Iquan Garpard]: Ming warlord who fought the Manchus who seized Beijing in 1644 and established the Qing Dynasty; he defected in 1646, leaving the passes unprotected, became quite wealthy, but was executed in 1661 when his son continued to resist]
   a. Came from the Fujian coast
   b. Invasion of 1661: Siege of Zeelandia and expulsion of Dutch [many of the Dutch were hunted down and beheaded; the Formosan aborigines were headhunters]
c. Ideal Chinese prince
7. Cheng Ching
   a. Succession battle
   b. Taiwan became a backwater of the Qing Empire
8. Annexation by Japan, 1895
   a. Highly educated people
9. Chiang Kai-shek
   a. Korean and Vietnam wars
   b. U.S. economic aid
c. Taiwanization
d. Rise of Minnan and the fading of Mandarin
10. 1996 Presidential Election
    a. Mock Chinese invasion
    b. Two U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups
c. Beijing’s massive defense buildup
d. Shift of U.S. naval forces
11. China Will Not Budge
12. Fort Zeelandia
   a. Question of Taiwanese identity
D. THE GREATEST STRATEGY IS NEVER HAVING TO FIGHT (149-52)
1. Henry C. K. Liu
   a. Buying time and playing a weak hand well
   b. Sun Tzu
2. Question of American Reliability
   a. Middle East
   b. March of Chinese military power
      1) Potential anti-access bubble
   c. Three quiet and predictable decades followed by political turmoil on the mainland
3. Szu-yin Ho
   a. Loosening of central control could unleash unruly nationalistic forces
      1) Factions trying to outbid each other
4. Healthy Competition Provided by the Taiwanese Economic Model
5. Danger of Finlandization by China
   a. Lack of a land border
   b. Taiwan Strait diminishes the danger
c. John Mearsheimer: Stopping power of water
d. Problem of occupying the island
6. Taiwan's Advantage of Political Symbolism
   a. Specific nation-building myth
      1) Guomindang’s [Kuomintang: the ruling Nationalist party founded by Sun Yat-sen] building of a dynamic society
7. Taiwan Survived Through Feverish, Innovative Diplomacy
8. Melian Dialogue
   a. Taiwan is not alone and therefore not as vulnerable

E. DEFENSE (152-54)
  1. Andrew Yang
     a. Tough, inflexible, steely edge to Taiwanese policy
     b. Surveillance
  2. 2009 RAND Study
     a. North Korea factor
        1) This saved Taiwan from invasion in the early 1950s
  3. Other Scenarios
     a. Vertical launch F-35Bs
  4. Difficulties with Arms Purchases
     a. 430 fighter jets
  5. Naval Deterrence
  6. Could the Chinese in the Future Exercise an Invisible Veto Power?

F. NATIONAL PALACE MUSEUM (154-55)
  1. Removal of Rare Books and Artifacts, 1948-49
     a. Inventory
  2. Tourists from the Mainland
  3. Timeline of Chinese Dynasties
  4. Museum Is a Political Statement

G. LEGACY OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK (156-57)
  1. Massive Transfer of China's Material Cultural Inheritance
  2. Memorial Hall
     a. Role of Chiang Ching-kuo in transforming Taiwan into a prosperous democracy
  3. Totemic Figure
     a. Chiang’s improved image

H. HISTORICAL REVISIONS (157-62)
  1. Jonathan Fenby
     a. 1936 kidnapping
  2. Jay Taylor
     a. The Generalissimo
     b. Gen. Joseph Stilwell
  3. Theodore H. White
     a. Every blunder blamed on Chiang
     b. Honan famine in 1943
     c. Zhou Enlai
     d. Meeting Mao
  4. Chain's Confucianist Worldview
  5. Influence of Japan on Chiang
     a. Need to fight corruption
        1) Fierce resistance
     b. Craftiness and suspicion
     c. Exceptional military commander
     d. Divide-and-rule tactics against the warlords
  6. Power and Authority of the Central Government Established
     a. Reduction of illiteracy among the troops
     b. Modernization
     c. Pro-Japanese elements kept in check
     d. Call to resist after Nanjing’s fall
  7. Stilwell’s Influence
     a. Burma campaign
     b. Chiang’s troops suffered high casualties
     c. Mao’s troops avoid the fight
        1) Praised as agrarian democrats
d. Mao’s talent for creating a mass organization

8. Mao’s Forces
   a. More communistic than the Russian communists
   b. Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
   c. Barbara Tuchman: Chiang was a master of plots who governed for survival

9. Kuomintang’s Incoherent and Fractious System

I. NATIONALIST TRANSFORMATION OF TAIWAN (162-63)
   1. Enlightened Authoritarianism
      a. Repression of indigenous Taiwanese
      b. Centralization of finances
      c. Land reform
      d. Political support in the United States
      e. Death toll from Mao’s revolutionary land confiscations
   2. Saved by the Korean War
   3. Path toward Prosperity and Eventual Democracy

Review

Pratas Formosa Cheng Chih-lung
Koxinga Zeelandia Chiang Kai-shek
John Mearsheimer Guomindang Andrew Yang
Chiang Ching-kuo Jay Taylor Joseph Stilwell
Theodore H. White

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE STATE OF NATURE

Outline

A. BEIJING (164-68)
   1. Traditional Tea House
      a. Meeting with members of a foreign policy institute in Beijing
      b. U.S.-Chinese relations are richly developed
   2. Tacky New Hotel
      a. Dinner with two members of a Communist Party foreign policy think tank
      b. Nine-dashed line [what the Vietnamese call the cow’s tongue line]: Earlier it was
         an eleven- or a ten-dashed line]
   3. Two Great Powers with Competing Interests
      a. Experts at Beijing’s universities and institutes are part of the global elite but not in
         power
      b. Beijing is rich in differences of opinion
      c. South China Sea regarded as a domestic issue: Blue-water extension of China’s
         territoriality]
      d. Issue of U.S. hegemony
   4. Middle Kingdom Mentality
      a. U.S. must be deterred
      b. Chinese tribute system
   5. Different Worldviews
   6. Containment
      a. China’s power must be hedged against
      b. Nine-dashed line
      c. Prefecture of 200 islets
   7. Nationalism
   8. China’s State of Continued Upheaval
      a. A more complex society has resulted
      b. Internal debate on Mao is yet to come
   9. King of Java, 1754
B. FADING OF THE OLD ORDER OF AMERICAN MILITARY UNIPOLARITY (168-69)

1. Aristotle: Conflicts Arise from Small Things
   a. China’s Sung and Vietnam’s Nguyen archives
      1) Claims to the Spratlys
   b. Kenneth Waltz: war is normal
      1) Interdependence can mean more war
      2) No such thing as an unjust war in a state of nature

2. A New Security Order Is Required to Alleviate the State of Nature
   a. Machiavelli: difficulty of founding a new order
   b. Law of the Sea (LOST)
      1) The United States is not a signatory
      2) China demands a regional order

C. OVERLAPPING CLAIMS (170-74)

1. Map of the South China Sea
   a. Classic document of geopolitics
      1) Space dense with ships and sea lanes
   b. Names of wrecked ships
   c. 150 features of the Spratlys
   d. Numerous and overlapping claims
      1) Malampaya and Camago gas fields
      2) Frozen methane near the Paracels

2. Importance of These Hydrocarbons Should Not Be Overestimated
   a. Energy importers
   b. Importance of the increased imports through the sea lanes

3. Fish Stocks
   a. 1/10 of global landed catch
   b. Fishing in disputed waters

4. Some Basic Facts Stand Out

5. Historic Claims to the Archipelagoes
   a. Pratas
      1) China and Taiwan
   b. Paracels
      1) China vs. Vietnam
      2) Disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin have been resolved

6. Spratlys
   a. Philippines claim
      1) Kalayaan Island Group
      2) Reed Bank
   b. China keeps its aggression in check
   c. Vietnam and Malaysia
      1) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under LOST
      2) Coastline and continental shelf
      3) China cut out of the Spratlys

7. Cow’s Tongue Has Little Legal Meaning Under LOST

8. China’s Spratly Island Claims

9. U.S. Involvement
   a. Expanding submarine base at Hainan Island
   b. Threat to American power projection
   c. “Pivot” to the Pacific

10. Possibility of Cutting Deals
    a. Role of domestic politics
    b. Aristotle: law is intellect without appetite

D. IMPORTANCE OF U.S. NAVAL DOMINANCE (174-78)

1. Peace Must Be Maintained by Balance of Power

2. Asian States Should Help Balance Against the Rising Chinese Military Power
   a. Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) is ascending
1) Gradually pulling together
2) $1.7 trillion GDP

3. United States-China Relationship
   a. Not as tense and fraught as with the USSR
   b. Chances of conflict are somewhat diminished

4. Risk of Naval Incidents

5. Webwork of Bilateral Relationships among Asian Nations
   a. 19 new defense agreements

6. Lack of Operational Capacity to Mount a Serious Challenge to the Chinese Military
   a. Exceptions: South Korea, Japan, and Australia

7. Danger of a Weaker American Commitment to the Region
   a. States on China’s periphery might lose heart and bandwagon with China [The bandwagon was a fixture of the 19C temperance movement; jumping on the bandwagon is a signal of allegiance; falling off the wagon is a sign of “backsliding”]
   b. Accepting a Chinese imperium [hegemony] would be irresponsible

8. Danger of Countries in the Region Becoming More Aggressive with Each Other
   a. Negative impact on world financial markets
   b. Robert Kagan: the world America made

9. Aircraft Carrier Strike Groups
   a. U.S. naval domination
      1) Twelve guided missile cruisers
      2) 29 guided missile destroyers
   b. China is catching up in subsurface warfare
   c. Conventional diesel-electric submarines
   d. China’s civilian fleet is an adjunct to its military one

10. China’s Ultimate Tactical Goal: Dissuade the U.S. Navy from Entering the Taiwan Strait in Event of War
    a. Will China be able to undermine the aura of U.S. dominance?

11. China Is Deploying an Oceanic, Blue-Water Navy
    a. John Mearsheimer

12. China Can Wait and Not Use Force

E. SCENARIO OF A CHINESE POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC MELTDOWN (178-80)
1. Prospect of a Downward Trend in Growth
2. Berlin Wall Collapse Shook the European Continental Order
3. Impact of Stalled Chinese Defense Budgets
   a. Japan’s air force and navy
   b. Korea
4. Impact on Taiwan
5. What If It Does Not Seriously Affect Its Defense Acquisitions?
   a. Finlandization of China’s neighbors in the event of large-scale U.S. defense cuts
   b. Alternatively, stronger neighbors could be emboldened
6. Opportunity for India
   a. India’s quiet great game
      1) Burma

F. SITUATION AT THE TIME OF THE AUTHOR’S WRITING (180-83)
1. Thucydides Real Cause of the Peloponnesian War
   a. Rise of Athenian sea power and the alarm it inspired in Sparta
   b. Risk of disturbing the status quo
   c. Altering the regional balance of power is destabilizing
2. A Grand and Protracted Bargaining Process
   a. James Kurth
      1) System of mutual deterrence
3. Pivot to Asia
   a. Strengthening of U.S. air and sea forces
   b. New littoral combat ships in Singapore
c. Uniting the southern Eurasian rimland
d. Indo-Pacific
e. Set of concentric triangles
f. Emerging Asia power web

4. Global Demographic Heartland
   a. Greater Indian Ocean: maritime organizing principle
   b. South China Sea: The Mitteleuropa [Central Europe in the fin-de-siecle leading to 1914, where a Pan-German, state-centric imperium arose] of the 21C

5. Nervous World
   a. Incessant war games
   b. Sea denial is cheaper and easier than sea control
   c. U.S. must safeguard a maritime system of international legal norms
   d. Era of simple American dominance is passing

Review
	nine-dashed line       Middle Kingdom mentality       Chinese tribute system
Law of the Sea         Paracels                               EEZs
Hainan Island          ASEAN                                 bandwagon
James Kurth

EPILOGUE: THE SLUMS OF BORNEO

Outline

A. A WATER VILLAGE (185-88)
   1. Kota Kinabalu
      a. Jesselton
      b. Capital of Sabah
   2. Naval Base
   3. Kampung Air or Water Village near Gaya
      a. Vast slum city on stilts
   4. Illegal Muslim Filipino Immigrants
      a. Insurgencies caused by the failure of a weak and corrupt Roman Catholic power structure
   5. Land Bridge between the Philippines and Malaysia
   6. The Water Village Is a Window onto a World of Disease, Piracy, and Smuggling
      a. Coast guards deal with a Back to the Future 19C world before the modern state
   7. Global Islam Is Undoing the Nation-State of Malaysia in Borneo
   8. Illegals as the Mother of All Problems
      a. Anger and bitterness
   9. Threat of Political and Demographic Islamization

B. SABAH (188-89)
   1. Challenges of Postcolonialism
   2. Philippines Has a Latent Claim to Sabah
      a. Kampungs as a challenge to legitimacy
      b. Creation of Malaysia had been ad hoc from the start
   3. Ethnic Groups and Races, but Not yet a State Composed of Citizens
      a. Oppression by Mahathir’s Islamic state
   4. Globalization Could Encourage the Emergence of Distinct Micro-Regions
   5. Sabah Spoke of the Possible Reemergence of a Medieval World

C. SARAWAK’S PATERNALISTIC RULE (189-90)
   1. Borneo Is a Throwback
      a. Abdul Taib Mahmud, chief minister of Sarawak
      b. World of cronyism and kickbacks
c. **Kuching**
   1) Somnolent capital
   2) State assembly building

2. **James Brooke**
   a. Series of white rajahs
   b. Taib as a brown raja

D. **BORNEO** (190-91)
   1. Window on a More Chaotic World
      a. Navies and air forces manifest successful modern development and strong
         institutions
      b. But there is also a different reality
   2. Strong States vs. a **New Medievalism** Born of Weak Central Government and Global
      Islam
      a. Perhaps a combination of both
   3. A Period Piece

**Review**

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<td>Abdul Taib Mahmud</td>
<td>Kuching</td>
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<td>new medievalism</td>
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