

Liberty University

**The Failure of Westphalia:
A Constructivist Examination of Western and Middle Eastern Relations**

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Master of Arts

by
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To my mother, the woman who taught me to write;
My father, the man who instilled in me drive and work ethic;
And my loving wife, the compassionate soul who stood by me during this endeavor

We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.

–Samuel Huntington

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Preface

In full disclosure, this thesis is not intended to be a dogmatic or pedantic endorsement of any one religion, ethic, or culture. To the contrary, it is my intent to examine a number of competing ideas, philosophies, and belief systems in order to extrapolate their geopolitical implications and to pursue them to their logical (albeit sometimes inevitable) conclusions. Too often, any number of presuppositions at work within a given situation go overlooked and subsequently skew geopolitical analysis and resulting policy decisions. This thesis seeks to transcend mere opinion or speculation and achieve instead a framework for pragmatic comprehension and understanding. In short, this thesis seeks to defend the notion that ideas matter in geopolitics and that sound analysis must account for the ideas esteemed by both the entities being observed (e.g. states, peoples, etc.) and the analyst(s) themselves.

That said, I would be remiss in this section if I neglected to acknowledge those who helped make this work come to fruition. My parents, who sacrificed constantly to educate me at home and set me upon the proverbial “straight and narrow” from the beginning. My wife, who “held down the fort” during extensive research periods and provided fresh eyes to proofread and edit. My advisor, Dr. Parke, who provided critical perspective and encouragement during this entire endeavor. My brothers in arms – Pete, TCN, Winder, Meat, Goat, Tug, Cowboy, and Mikey-V –who have mentored me and helped me to become who I am today. And my selfless friends – Ali, Nate, Scout, and Shannon – who gave of their time to read, critique, and ultimately make this thesis a reality.

Introduction

At the core of the epistemological question (“How does one know?”) lies an even more fundamental question: What is truth? For without something to know, the methodology of epistemological inquiry is little more than a systematic exercise in futility. Webster’s defines truth as “the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality.”¹ Yet with such a succinct definition, one might expect that the term possesses axiomatic properties and delineating it any further would be completely unnecessary, effectively rendering the question moot (not to mention eliminating the cliché of beginning a sentence with “Webster’s defines...”). Nonetheless, the question remains: What is truth?

Philosophers throughout history have wrestled with understanding, interpreting, and explaining the metaphysical properties of life. Plato postulated a cave in which people are imprisoned and subjected to living vicariously by interacting with “shadows” as proxies for the objects that cast them.² However Plato was only one of many Greeks who questioned and sought to comprehend the deeper essence and meanings of things. As wealth and intellectual yearnings flourished throughout the Aegean (especially Athens), there was also the popularization of an Ionian speculation about the physical world – a speculation that influenced Protagoras work and his assertion that “Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are that they are and of the things that are not that they are not.”³ Similarly, Pyrrho of Elis

1. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “truth,” accessed November 01, 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/truth>.

2. Plato, *The Republic (Book VII)*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.8.vii.html>.

3. C.C.W. Taylor and Mi-Kyoung Lee, “The Sophists,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2015 ed., accessed November 8, 2015, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists>.

contended that those who desire to be wise must suspend judgment and abstain from the controversial position that knowledge could exist with absolute certainty while remaining empirically neutral and analyzing things as they appear.⁴ It is this restless intellectual curiosity that stands as the hallmark of Pyrrhonian skepticism, for while others cease inquiring (either due to an internal conviction that they possess definitive answers or succumbing to an epistemological hopelessness that they are asking unanswerable questions), “the skeptic alone remains engaged with the world and open to the possibility of truth – though he no longer stakes his happiness on its attainment.”⁵

Thus, through these men and many of their Ancient Grecian contemporaries (e.g. Socrates, Aristotle, etc.), Philosophy was born. Through the use of reason, philosophers not only devised theories regarding the metaphysical essence of the universe but subsequently built upon said theories in order to resolve other issues pertaining to everyday life, such as the question of origin (Ontology), the question of morality and value (Axiology), and the question of the best institutions and methodologies for governance (Political Philosophy). Yet what sometimes goes without notice is the interplay of how the answer to each of these aforementioned questions has a causal and/or correlational relationship with the answers to the others. When the answers to these questions are systematically organized, the resulting “worldviews” are manifestations of philosophical thought as they attempt to answer life’s most important questions. Thus, any attempt to understand human behavior, geopolitics and international relations theory included, must consider worldview (see Figure 1).

4. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. “Pyrrhonism,” accessed November 8, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Pyrrhonism>.

5. Jessica Berry, “Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition,” (National Endowment for the Humanities grant proposal, Georgia State University), 2, accessed November 8, 2015, http://www.neh.gov/files/grants/philosophy_nietzsche_and_the_ancient_skeptical_tradition.pdf.

Figure 1. Worldview Implications⁶

	<u>Christianity</u>	<u>Islam</u>	<u>Secular Humanism</u>	<u>Marxism-Leninism</u>	<u>Postmodernism</u>
Creed	The Bible (Old & New Testaments)	Koran, Hadith, & Sunnah	Humanist Manifesto I, II, & III	Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao	Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Rorty
Theology	Trinitarian Theism (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit)	Unitarian Theism (Allah)	Atheism	Atheism	Atheism
Philosophy	Supernaturalism (Faith & Reason working in harmony)	Supernaturalism (Faith & Reason working in harmony)	Naturalism (Reason without Faith)	Dialectical Materialism (“The way things are” and the corresponding antithesis/revolution)	Anti-realism (no objective reality and instead reality is defined subjectively via thought)
Ethics	Moral absolutes exist and are established by God as lawgiver and supreme being	Moral absolutes exist and are established by Allah as lawgiver and supreme being	Moral absolutes do not exist and instead morality is established by society (Moral Relativism)	Moral absolutes do not exist and instead ethics stem from Communism (Proletariat Morality)	Moral absolutes do not exist and instead morality is established culturally (Cultural Relativism)
Biology	Intelligent Design (Creationism)	Intelligent Design (Creationism)	Darwinian Evolution and Natural Selection	Punctuated Evolution (Natural Selection plus bursts of change over short periods of time)	Modified Punctuated Evolution (emphasis on chance and discontinuity)
Sociology	Traditional family and distinct institutions of Church and State	Polygamy and interconnected Mosques and an Islamic State	Non-traditional family and an unwavering separation between Church and State	The State eliminates the need for Church and Family by perfecting mankind	Social Egalitarianism (level playing field by exalting those previously on social fringe)
Law	Divine law stemming from the essence of the Creator	Divine law stemming from the essence of Allah	Law is established by society and that which is legal is lawful/moral (Legal Positivism)	Law evolves with man and ultimately serves the cause of Communism (Proletariat Law)	Law is made subjective, challenging objective & transcendent principles (Critical Legal Studies)
Politics	Government is ordained by God and should ensure liberty, justice, and order	Global Islamic theocracy and implementation of Sharia worldwide	Secular/Liberal world government as the apex of human evolution	Communist world government as the apex of human evolution (Statism)	Politics serve the purpose of social justice and identity politics
Economics	Private property is to be protected (Free Enterprise)	Private property is generally protected except for that of some infidels/groups	A centrally planned & perfected economy as the apex of human evolution	A Socialist economy as the apex of human evolution	Government intervention in the market to eliminate human suffering

6. Derived from “Worldview Chart,” Summit Ministries, 2008, accessed May 28, 2016, <http://www.summit.org/resources/worldview-chart>, and supplemented with research and analysis stemming from the entirety of this thesis. Reproduced with permission.

However, it is paramount that during the analytical quest of acquiring understanding the analyst must suspend judgment with regards to veracity. As seen in Figure 1, the mutually exclusive nature of different worldviews necessitate the acquiescence to the reality that they cannot be simultaneously true despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of people adamantly align themselves within one of the aforementioned (or other worldviews not listed). Therefore, it is the request of the Masters Candidate that the reader attempt to understand mankind's behavior through a framework reminiscent of Cicero and the Academic Skeptics (i.e. man "is limited to opinions of that which is more or less probable" and consequently embracing philosophy as a way of life is superior to endorsing any one school of thought).⁷ Put another way, man is best understood as described by Thomas Aquinas:

There is a threefold order to be found in man. The first is that which derives from the rule of reason: in so far as all our actions and experiences should be commensurate with the guidance of reason. The second arises from comparison with the rule of divine law, which should be our guide in all things. And if man were actually a solitary animal, this double order would suffice: but because man is naturally a social and political animal, as is proved [by Aristotle] in I. *Politics*, chap. 2, it is necessary that there should be a third order, regulating the conduct of man to his fellows with whom he has to live.⁸

For it is this threefold order that accounts for the three distinct entities – the individual, the Church, and the State – that have fluctuated between harmony and dissonance for centuries as peoples with differing philosophical foundations attempt to establish functioning societies.

In short, it is the intent of the Master's Candidate to demonstrate that people rather than nation states are the fundamental actor within international relations – effectively challenging the notion that the Treaty of Westphalia and the resulting nation-state system represent the

7. James E. Holton, "Marcus Tullius Cicero," in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 156.

8. Thomas Aquinas, "Summae Theologica," in *Aquinas: Selected Political Writings*, ed. A. P. D'entreves, trans. J. G. Dawson (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959), 109.

universalization of certain geopolitical principles. Consequently, instances of heightened tensions and outright conflicts are often multifaceted and rarely find their beginning, sustainment, or termination in a singular issue. Any geopolitical inquiry that attempts to reduce wars and rivalries to a single cause (and its corresponding antithesis) run the risk of oversimplifying the situation and subsequently generating superficial or incomplete analysis. Furthermore, it is also the intent of the Master's Candidate to demonstrate that sound geopolitical analysis must balance two competing analytical aides – the law of parsimony more commonly referred to as Occam's Razor (preferring the simplest of two or more competing theories; "plurality should not be posited without necessity"⁹) and the concept of Irreducible Complexity.¹⁰ In order to do so, this thesis will first establish constructivism as a sound interpretative paradigm within the practice of international relations (Part 1); second, employ said paradigm to examine the development of the modern "Western World" by reflecting upon the development and evolution of the United States of America (Part 2); third, employ the same paradigm to examine the modern Middle East by utilizing Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, and transnational terrorism as "case studies" (Part 3); and finally, seek to reconcile the overarching findings of Part 2 and Part 3 in order to extrapolate the implications for policy and strategy development while also validating the effectiveness of constructivism (Part 4).

9. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. "Occam's Razor," accessed January 31, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Occams-razor>.

10. Michael J. Behe, "Irreducible Complexity: Obstacle to Darwinian Evolution," Lehigh University, last modified October 28, 2015, accessed February 1, 2016, http://www.lehigh.edu/bio/Faculty/Behe/PDF/Behe_chapter.pdf, 2. Originally coined as a counterargument to Darwinian Evolution, the conceptual framework is no less applicable to the field of geopolitics. Behe defines an irreducibly complex system as: "a single system which is necessarily composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, and where the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning."

Part 1

A Constructivist Paradigm

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them.

–Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*

Modern nation-states are not “indigenous” actors in geopolitics but rather find their origin in the conclusion of the Thirty Years War. As the war endured, the rulers and their armies were left with three options: total annihilation of those who opposed them, assimilation of those who believed differently (especially with regards to the religious component of the conflict), or devise a methodology for peaceful coexistence. Considering that decades of war claimed millions of lives, ravaged the continent, and burdened the economies of all involved – sheer exhaustion eventually identified that the first two options were untenable and that the powers at be should agree to cease and desist a forcible imposition of faith and/or other interests upon one another.¹¹ It was this realization that reshaped the political and religious map of Europe and set the stage for the centralized Roman Catholic empire to succumb to a community of sovereign states.¹²

Deriving its name from the northwestern portion of Germany, the Peace of Westphalia

11. P. C. “What Happened in the Thirty Years War?,” *The Economist*, January 17, 2016, accessed January 23, 2016, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/01/economist-explains-5>.

12. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, eds., *The Reader’s Companion to Military History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), accessed February 9, 2016, <http://www.history.com/topics/thirty-years-war>.

stemmed from a series of treaties and is credited with establishing the modern nation-state system. More specifically, many scholars regard the Westphalian model as the codification of “sovereignty” as a two-fold organization of political life based on the principles of “territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures.”¹³ As demonstrated in the Treaty of Westphalia’s opening article, the ultimate desire was “that thus on all sides they may see this Peace and Friendship in the Roman Empire, and the Kingdom of France flourish, by entertaining a good and faithful Neighbourhood.”¹⁴ This “good and faithful Neighbourhood” endeavored to stabilize and sustain a mutually beneficial environment for all, independent of ethnicity, creed, or political affinities, as described in Article 64:

To prevent for the future any Differences arising in the Politick State, all and every one of the Electors, Princes and States of the Roman Empire, are so establish'd and confirm'd in their antient Rights, Prerogatives, Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial Right, as well Ecclesiastick, as Politick Lordships, Regales, by virtue of this present Transaction: that they never can or ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence.

Yet it is important to maintain the distinction that this was not a religious peace. Key word choices and clauses throughout the documents constitute “without any doubt a complete triumph of secular politics, which for the first time in centuries had broken away explicitly from ecclesiastical guardianship” (i.e. the Church and State became two independent realms, coexisting on two parallel paths never to intersect).¹⁵ It was this unique component that formed

13. Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 20, accessed February 11, 2016, Google Books.

14. “Treaty of Westphalia,” The Avalon Project, accessed February 10, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp.

15. Benjamin Straumann, “The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution,” *Constellations* 15, no. 2 (June 2008): 180, accessed February 13, 2016, <http://www.iilj.org/aboutus/documents/Straumann.Westphalia.pdf>. Article 123 of the Treaty of Westphalia states: “That nevertheless the concluded Peace shall remain in force, and all Partys in this Transaction

the bedrock of the Westphalian order. For by secularizing international politics through the divorcing of any religious footing (anchoring instead on national interest and reasons of state), the doctrine of sovereignty (i.e. no higher authority than the state except that to which the state voluntarily yields itself) was promoted and it led to the acceptance of an international society based on the inherent legal equality of its members.¹⁶

However, this also serves to demonstrate that the modern state is an umbrella term sheltering multiple social dynamics – religion, as it determined politics up until this time on the basis that communities were apprehensive to tolerate any form of belief displeasing to God or counterproductive towards salvation; governmental, as kingdoms possessed the tendency to fragment in some ways but become unified in others (i.e. absolutism, or the centralization of monarchical power, buttressed the concept of sovereignty thereby quelling certain conflicts while simultaneously propagating the precarious balance between rule of law and the dictatorial ambitions of tyrants which is nothing short of the precursor to civil war); ideological, as the philosophical works of individuals such as Hobbes and Locke competed in the marketplace of ideas while rulers employed censorship and control of the press to control, in some degree, the availability of ideas to both their subjects and the emerging political class vying for personal gain in the fledgling bureaucratic environment; and social pragmatism, as “the heterogeneity of an individualistic society, combined with the problem of keeping order in a large state by abstract

shall be oblig'd to defend and protect all and every Article of this Peace against any one, without distinction of Religion; and if it happens any point shall be violated, the Offended shall before all things exhort the Offender not to come to any Hostility, submitting the Cause to a friendly Composition, or the ordinary Proceedings of Justice.”

16. Michael Vaughan, “After Westphalia, Whither the Nation State, its People and its Governmental Institutions?” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Brisbane, Australia, September 29, 2011), 5-6, accessed February 13, 2016, <https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:266787/AfterWestphalia.pdf>.

laws, generated ‘the new politics’ [of the modern state].”¹⁷ More succinctly, the Thirty Years War’s amalgamated beginning also explains the diverse states that sprung from its end.

The war was a product of problems which arose from patterns of conflict and the nature of the leaders who controlled the governments of the time. It grew out of a number of deep-seated and well established domestic and international conflicts which were old by 1618 These conflicts represented differences between the recognized loci of power in Europe, and the national and international realities which would have placed that power elsewhere.¹⁸

The key takeaway from this is simple yet critical to any examination of geopolitics: “The territorial state has not always existed in the past, so it need not necessarily exist in the future.”¹⁹

Liberalism versus Realism: The Birth of International Relations Theory

In the same way that the nation-state system was socially constructed during a specific set of circumstances, so to was the formal study of international relations. By the end of WWI, the European continent was in shambles. With the desolation perpetuated by its infamous trench warfare, the first of the World Wars claimed at least nine million lives and excised considerable strain on the political and economic capital of the nations and empires involved.²⁰ In the war’s aftermath, as the victorious prepared to usher in the post-war political paradigm, they took time

17. Kenneth Minogue, *Politics: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 34-41.

18. Myron P. Gutmann, “The Origins of the Thirty Years’ War,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 750, accessed February 2, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/204823>.

19. Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed. (New York: Longman, 2009), 257.

20. Jasper Copping, “WW1 Dead and Shell Shock Figures ‘Significantly Underestimated,’” *The Telegraph*, January 16, 2014, accessed February 20, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/10577200/WW1-dead-and-shell-shock-figures-significantly-underestimated.html>. No precise death toll for WWI has ever formally been established, other sources attribute more than 15 million deaths to the conflict (see Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 71).

to reflect on what they believed to be the root causes of WWI. Consolidating their analysis to one overarching finding, they ultimately concluded that the war could be attributed to the “balance of power.” At the forefront of this cause was President Woodrow Wilson, a progressive who was thoroughly convinced that the balance of power concept “was an evil principle because it encouraged statesmen to treat nations like cheeses to be cut up for political convenience regardless of the concerns of their people.”²¹ Steadfast in his conviction that U.S. foreign policy was a tool to be used for the progressive fulfillment of God’s will for the world, he embraced the Social Gospel within American Christianity and championed a new community of nations that would rest on the foundation of collective security and thereby redeem the Old World from the system of alliances that flowed directly from the discredited balance of power construct.²² It was this mentality that led to the formation of the League of Nations (a failed venture that is regarded as “ahead of its time,” but did serve as the conceptual predecessor of the United Nations) and caused World War I to be awarded the moniker of “The War to End all Wars” (although this mantra would quickly prove to be a misappropriated delusion of grandeur).

During the interwar period, the geopolitical environment experienced considerable evolution and became increasingly complex. The international security underwritten by the French and British empires began to wane due to the first visible symptoms of, in the words of historian Paul Kennedy, “imperial overstretch;”²³ the United States and Japan would continue to

21. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 60.

22. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1991), 3.

23. Jeff Janaro, “The Danger of Imperial Overstretch,” *Foreign Policy Journal*, July 15, 2014, accessed February 21, 2016, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/15/the-danger-of-imperial-overstretch>. Imperial overstretch is defined here as “the overextension either geographically, economically, or militarily that inevitably leads to the exhaustion of vital

grow and expand their respective levels of influence upon the world stage; and Russia would become the Soviet Union and so too increase its influence and power. Given this dynamic and ever-changing environment, “the War to End all Wars” and the new liberal order proved of questionable legitimacy in its quest to preemptively diffuse conflict, causing some to consider alternative analytical frameworks. Thus, through foundational texts such as E. H. Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (published in 1939, prior to the outbreak of WWII) and Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* (published in 1948), the formal study of international relations emerged as a theoretical discipline – Carr and Morgenthau’s “realism” countering the liberal “belief that the struggle for power could be tamed by international law and the idea that the pursuit of self-interest could be replaced by the shared objective of promoting security for all.”²⁴ Ironically, just as the liberal viewpoint contended that the balance of power was to be blamed for the onset of WWI, the realist perspective maintained that the liberal internationalist ideas were largely responsible for the crisis during the interwar years.²⁵

Considering that these two schools of thought are mutually exclusive in terms of their respective abilities to provide an accurate and comprehensive interpretative framework, the emergence of liberalism and realism as the initial components of international relations theory beg the question: Which is correct? Answering the question with a question, it depends on how one conceptually answers the question “What is truth?” – the same question with which this treatise began. For how one conceptually understands and defines truth (or attributes the status

domestic resources, decline, and fall.”

24. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, “Introduction,” in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1, accessed February 21, 2016, <http://gondayumitro.staff.umm.ac.id/files/2014/09/Theories-of-IR.pdf>.

25. Ibid.

of being “true”) will directly correlate and influence the way in which the state of being correct or incorrect is ascribed. Maintaining the argument philosophical ideas have tangible effects in the geopolitical arena, it is the belief of the Master’s Candidate that any attempt to answer the question “Which is correct?” dictates the two be evaluated philosophically and pragmatically.

Defining Liberalism

At the core of liberalism lay the “belief that the struggle for power could be tamed by international law and the idea that the pursuit of self-interest could be replaced by the shared objective of promoting security for all.”²⁶ It places a heavy emphasis on international organizations while also appealing to the collective spirit of the human race. The theory can be reduced to three assumptions. First, the nature of the actors implies that “globalization generates differentiated demands from societal individuals and groups with regard to international affairs” (i.e. globalization provides an incentive for societies to participate in world politics and leverage their differing interests in the geopolitical marketplace, thus advancing the community of nations towards mutually beneficial outcomes).²⁷ Second, the nature of the state implies that “states represent the demands of a subset of domestic individuals and social groups, on the basis of whose interests they define ‘state preferences’ and act instrumentally to manage globalization” (i.e. states wield foreign policy, which may or may not be derived from the interests of their constituents, to interact with one another and the differing desired end states will encourage compromise and stability).²⁸ Third, the nature of the international system implies that “the

26. Burchill and Linklater, “Introduction,” 1.

27. Andrew Moravcsik, “The New Liberalism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 236-37.

28. *Ibid.*, 237-39.

pattern of interdependence among state preferences shapes state behavior” (i.e. the “transaction costs” that naturally occur upon one another as states pursue their respective preferences cause the international system to work towards equilibrium, but international organizations can be utilized as mediators when given preferences are not compatible).²⁹ Put another way, liberalism can be described as the understanding that peace is secured through the propagation of democratic institutions around the world (because people do not cause wars but rather governments do), a concept underpinned by the belief in the so-called “natural harmony of interests” (point two above) and defended by collective security and resolving disputes through judicial processes since the rule of law is equally as applicable to states as it is individuals.³⁰

Philosophical Evaluation of Liberalism

Many regard John Locke as the foundation of liberalism. His works “offered far deeper critiques of divine right absolutism, reconceiving the moral purpose of the state, promoting the sovereignty of the ‘people,’ and advocating a legislative conception of procedural justice.”³¹ As he writes in his acclaimed *Two Treatises of Government*: “MEN being . . . by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.”³² He also describes men coming together to form “one

29. Moravcsik, “The New Liberalism,” 239-40.

30. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 305.

31. Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 99, accessed March, 3 2016, Google Books.

32. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A Millar et al., 1764), 95, accessed March 3, 2016, <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/222>.

community” and “one body politic.”³³ But liberalism is sustained by far more than Locke. It shares commonality with the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, particularly Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle (“not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it”³⁴) and Rene Descartes’s *morale par* provision (“the law that requires us to do all we can for the general welfare of mankind” and “each of us is bound to do what he can to procure the good of others, and someone who doesn’t help anyone else is strictly worthless”³⁵). In this same vein are also Sir Thomas Moore’s *Utopia* (“Nature inclines us to enter into society; for there is no man so much raised above the rest of mankind as to be the only favourite of nature”³⁶) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *On The Social Contract* (“Each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over which he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he

33. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 14.

34. John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in *John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays*, ed. John Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 142.

35. Rene Descartes, *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting one’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (1637), 24, 26, last modified June 27, 2015, accessed March 4, 2016, <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1637.pdf>. See also John Marshall, *Descartes’s Moral Theory* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 21, and Richard Kennington, “Rene Descartes,” in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 428: “This law, the only categorical obligation ever asserted by Descartes, is stated but once in his writings, and no argument is ever offered for it.”

36. Thomas Moore, *Utopia*, trans. Gilbert Burnet (Toronto: Prohyptikon Publishing, 2009), 55.

has³⁷). If surmised no other way, the philosophical roots of liberalism consist of Renaissance Humanism (i.e. the perfectibility of man through virtue and character, in and of itself an extension of the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenism) and an attempt to systematically actualize Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative: "Act only on a maxim by which you can will that it, at the same time, should become a general law."³⁸

Pragmatic Evaluation of Liberalism

The efficacy of liberalism has been and continues to be convoluted and inconsistent at best. The Wilsonian model that cleaved to "the war to end all wars," allowed another global conflict just two decades later. "The League of Nations embodied a paradox: it spoke the language of the brotherhood of man but existed as the result of a military victory. Like the older Concert of Europe, which it defined itself against, it was the instrument of a triumphant alliance of Great Powers and a means to preserve their domination of Europe – and their values – into the peace."³⁹ Moreover, as the liberal order encouraged national self-determination for the new standard of international politics, unbeknownst to its proponents doing so would prove "to open a Pandora's box of competing claims and turn minorities into a political problem."⁴⁰

This is not to say that liberalism has no redeeming traits. To the contrary, despite the failures of the interbellum period (particularly the League of Nations), liberal theorists responded

37. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: Dover Publications, 2003), 9.

38. Immanuel Kant, "The Good Will and the Categorical Imperative," in *The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche*, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley (New York: Random House, 1992), 473.

39. Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 154-55.

40. *Ibid.*, 155-56.

to events and shifted its substantive focus of investigation to address changing realities after WWII and ignited an even broader effort for the construction of international organizations – resulting in the solidification of international law and the development of the United Nations, the World Bank (originally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and the International Monetary Fund.⁴¹ Additionally, the post-WWII

Emergence of European integration was especially momentous. On the Continent, where the state system had developed and which had been witness to centuries of great-power rivalry and war, states were combining aspects of governance in some new creation. The project of European unification has undergone fits and starts over the past half-century, but the very project itself implies some transcendence of the anarchic state of nature in which realists presume states find themselves.⁴²

But the key point is “European integration” (which in this context arguably includes the U.S.).

As Francis Fukuyama conveys in “The End of History?”: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”⁴³ Buried within this neo-Kantian position, as one commentator writes, is the assumption “that particular states, with liberal-democratic credentials, constitute an ideal which the rest of the world will

41. Arthur Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 202. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (an auxiliary portion of the Charter of the United Nations) outlines the primary sources of international law: “international conventions,” “international custom,” “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.”

42. *Ibid.*, 203.

43. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, accessed March 6 2016, <https://ps321.community.uaf.edu/files/2012/10/Fukuyama-End-of-history-article.pdf>.

emulate.”⁴⁴ Liberalism found a sustaining lacteal vein in the Western World, seemingly validating the paradigm and becoming codified in thoughts such as Democratic Peace Theory. Yet liberalism has struggled to successfully bridge the divide between the West and non-Western states in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The rise in transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy has also proven to be an “influential revolt against Western cultural authority.”⁴⁵ Simply put, as one critic contends, “History isn’t over and neither liberalism nor democracy is ascendant. The comfy Western consensus [Fukuyama] inspired is under threat in ways he never predicted” (ex. a resurgent Russia, China’s “Marxist capitalism,” the Islamic State, etc.).⁴⁶

Defining Realism

Any definition of realism would be remiss without returning to the source – E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. If reduced to a single point, realism revolves around the concept of power. Contending that the liberal “assumption of the elimination of power from politics could only result from a wholly uncritical attitude towards political problems,” Carr argues that power is international relations’ central tenant and can be classified in “theoretically separable” but “closely interdependent” categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.⁴⁷

44. Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 57, accessed February 21, 2016, <http://godayumitro.staff.umm.ac.id/files/2014/09/Theories-of-IR.pdf>.

45. Ibid. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 have caused Fukuyama to reexamine some of his original assertions but still asserts his “hypothesis remains correct”, see Francis Fukuyama, “Has History Started Again,” *Policy* 18, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 3, accessed March 18, 2016, <https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2015/04/images/stories/policy-magazine/2002-winter/2002-18-2-francis-fukuyama.pdf>.

46. Timothy Stanley and Alexander Lee, “It’s Still Not the End of History,” *The Atlantic*, September 1, 2014, accessed March 6, 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/its-still-not-the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyama/379394>.

47. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the*

Similarly, Morgenthau argued that

International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. They may also try to further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical co-operation with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.⁴⁸

In short, realism contends that combining anarchy (i.e. the natural state resulting from no international government), egoism (i.e. people, whether on their own or in groups, inclined to pursue their own self-interest), and groupism (i.e. politics occurs between and within groups) leads to “strong pressures to conflict-generating power politics.”⁴⁹ Such a position has theorists prioritize their weight of effort towards the groups that people identify themselves with (e.g. tribes, empires, nations, etc.), acknowledging the major influence they exert on human affairs and believing that it is analytically advantageous to focus on the most powerful.⁵⁰

Philosophical Evaluation of Realism

Considering that realism emerged as the antithesis of liberalism, one may errantly conclude that the philosophical foundation of realism must be antithetical to that of liberalism. This is not the case. Realists do not inherently reject the legitimacy of liberal ideas such as

Study of International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Perennial, 2001), 103-04, 108.

48. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), 29.

49. Jack Donnelly, “The Ethics of Realism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 150, 159.

50. William C. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 134.

human rights, self-determination of peoples, or the rule of law, just as they do not inherently reject the philosophical work of Locke, Kant, or Descartes. Instead, they reject the notion of the perfectibility of man through the universal appeal of liberal ideals and instead assume that human nature demonstrates that this is not feasible or realistic. Referring to the “utopian” stage of political science (i.e. the post-WWI liberal order), Carr asserts

The investigators will pay little attention to existing “facts” or to the analysis of cause and effect, but will devote themselves whole-heartedly to the elaboration of visionary projects for the attainment of the ends which they have in view – projects whose simplicity and perfection give them an easy and universal appeal. It is only when these projects break down, and wish or purpose is shewn to be incapable by itself of achieving the desired end, that the investigators will reluctantly call in the aid of analysis.⁵¹

Although Carr goes on to say that “Machiavelli is the first important political realist,”⁵² this perspective distorts the actual age of realism. “Political realism, *Realpolitik*, ‘power politics,’ is the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of international relations.”⁵³ It is at the core of the ancient Sanskrit proverb that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.”⁵⁴ More distinctly, the Athenian delegation (“Melian Dialogue”) in Thucydides’s *The History of the Peloponnesian War* arguably presents “the most radical, and probably best-known, realist rejection of ethics [or transcendent liberal norms] in international affairs.”⁵⁵ The Melians, as it implored the Athenians

51. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939*, 5.

52. *Ibid.*, 63.

53. Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 29, accessed February 21, 2016, <http://godayumitro.staff.umm.ac.id/files/2014/09/Theories-of-IR.pdf>.

54. Anthony Cordesman, “Iraq: The Enemy of My Enemy is Not My Friend,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 16, 2014, accessed March 6, 2016, <http://csis.org/publication/iraq-enemy-my-enemy-not-my-friend>.

55. Donnelly, “The Ethics of Realism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, 152-53.

to spare their lands, boldly stated that “right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”⁵⁶

Carr’s historicity notwithstanding, Machiavelli’s influence on realism cannot be disregarded. Machiavellianism lowers morality and makes it subservient (domestically and internationally) to power on the basis that “morality is nothing but fear-inspired peaceableness.”⁵⁷ The natural result, in Machiavelli’s own words, is the perspective that “Men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot.”⁵⁸ In fact, Carr & Morgenthau’s reaction to liberalism is not all that different from Machiavelli’s response to his philosophical peers who had idealistic tendencies. “The classics failed, according to Machiavelli, because they aimed too high. Because they based their political doctrines on considerations of man’s highest aspirations, the life of virtue and the society dedicated to the promotion of virtue, they rendered themselves ineffective; as [Francis] Bacon said, they made ‘imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths.’”⁵⁹ It was this same thought process that paved the way for Thomas Hobbes’s

56. Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (431 B.C.), accessed March 13, 2016, <http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.mb.txt>. In this world renown work of antiquity, Thucydides also offers what can be regarded as restatement of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” proverb when he states: “For you cannot become their auxiliary and remain our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict on them.”

57. Leo Strauss, “Niccolo Machiavelli,” in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 298.

58. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 13. See also page 19: “From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power.”

59. Laurence Berns, “Thomas Hobbes,” in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 396. The

notions that political schemes accounting for man's egotistical and megalomaniacal propensities possess far greater potential for realization than the utopian aspirations of the classics;⁶⁰ that the consolidation of power best addresses the State of Nature that plagues "the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."⁶¹

Pragmatic Evaluation of Realism

Realism, in the same manner as liberalism, does not have a flawless record. The proverb "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" has been egregiously consistent in that the "enemy of my enemy" was either an enemy in disguise or would become an enemy in the future.⁶² Similarly, "defenders of balance-of-power policies argue that they produce stability. However, peace and

reference to Francis Bacon, in context, reads as follows: "Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those which have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains" (See Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*, edited by Henry Morley, transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company Edition by David Price, last modified November 4, 2014, accessed March 15, 2016, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5500/5500-h/5500-h.htm>).

60. Strauss, "Niccolo Machiavelli," in *History of Political Philosophy*, 396-97.

61. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), last modified August 25, 2015, accessed March 5, 2016, <https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/chapter13.html>. The State of Nature was also addressed by Locke, only through liberal solutions: "I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature" (Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 14).

62. Cordesman, "Iraq: The Enemy of My Enemy is Not My Friend."

stability are not the same thing”⁶³ (e.g. the Cold War never ignited into total war, but those decades were far from stable; China’s unprecedented expansion into the South China Sea in conjunction with its military reforms and modernization have not precipitated conflict, but stability is not a word used to describe the region; etc.). It also fails to effectively answer the root cause(s) of the apparent validity of Democratic Peace Theory.

Nevertheless, realism does possess a level of legitimacy that has proven useful. For instance, returning to the Hobbesian framework,

Hobbes’s man emerges from his writings as a not-too-far distant relative of modern “economic man.” He is selfish, being concerned with his own welfare, and he is a rational-maximizer, being concerned in an uncertain world with achieving the greatest possible security. He is also more or less equal to his fellow men in power and in the capacity to secure his own welfare. From these facts, which Hobbes believed to be self-evident, a state of conflict between men is deduced: a “condition which is called Warre; and such warre, as is of every man, against every man.”⁶⁴

When this thought process is applied to states as rational actors, it does produce a model that has more consistent results. For example, the Cold War’s “Mutually Assured Destruction” provided a better deterrence than did the League of Nations and its collective security. In the same way, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has better addressed problems, when the use of force was deemed necessary, than many United Nations Peacekeeping Operations or actions conducted by the United Nations Security Council. More recently, the regional alliances beginning in the South China Sea (e.g. Vietnam, Philippines, Japan, etc.) are seemingly providing better deterrence than the liberal “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”⁶⁵ Yet

63. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 61.

64. John M. Orbell and Brent M. Rutherford, “Can Leviathan Make the Life of Man Less Solitary, Poor, Nasty, Brutish and Short?,” *British Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 4 (October 1973): 383, accessed March 16, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/193469>.

65. Ching Chang, “Examining the Flaws of a South China Sea Code of Conduct,” *The*

even with its success, as noted above the rise in transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy has not only proven to be an influential revolt against Western cultural authority (i.e. contra-liberalism), but the effervescent threat of terrorism against the United States (e.g. USS Cole, 9/11, etc.), England (ex. London Bus Bombings), France (ex. 2015 Paris Shootings), and around the world, in spite of their superior military power, the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, the more than a decade of sustained NATO operations in Afghanistan, and the ongoing coalition against the Islamic State, realism struggles to address many of the same issues as liberalism.

A Third Option?

Considering the abundance of other theories within the field of international relations (e.g. the English School, Institutionalism, Marxism, Neoconservatism, Neoliberalism, etc.), the question posed by the heading of this section may seem shortsighted, or worse – uninformed. However, it can be argued that these other schools of thought are essentially extensions of or modifications to liberalism or realism as opposed to the emergence of a fundamentally different theory. Others have taken this one step further by arguing

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the academic study of international relations is a debate about realism. Realism provides a foil against which many other schools of thought define themselves and their contributions. Take realism out of the picture and the identities of these other schools as well as the significance of their arguments become much less clear. The study of international politics thus is in an important sense inexplicable without a grounding in realism.⁶⁶

Thus the inquiry towards a so-called “third” option is entirely intentional.

At its core is an understanding of the purpose of modeling within international relations.

Diplomat, October 20, 2015, accessed March 16, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/examining-the-flaws-of-the-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct>. This agreement was signed on November 4, 2002 by all the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China.

66. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, 131.

Formal models “search for the nature of the logic of various situations such as conflict situations; they try to investigate the consequences of various sorts of assumptions being true; they also try to structure theories to make them amenable to empirical test by statistical means, something that is difficult unless some minimum degree of formality is allowed.”⁶⁷ The danger lies when models disproportionately allow “formality” to overpower analysis or have incomplete and/or imprecise “assumptions being true.” Albeit in different ways, both realism and liberalism concede the existence of the nation-state system as an established reality within international relations, without questioning how and why people choose to align themselves accordingly. More importantly, although Westphalian sovereignty plays a key role in realism (e.g. balance of power, a state’s inherent right to non-interference, etc.) and liberalism (e.g. self-determination of people, U.N. membership, etc.), neither accounts for how sovereignty is established or recognized without referring to it as an abstract concept (i.e. it simply exists).⁶⁸ In fact, when liberals and realists refer to sovereignty, it is often as if it were two different things. A realist, for example, might regard Westphalian sovereignty as important but not absolute or transcendent:

Recognized states have been dismembered and even absorbed. The conquest of any particular state extinguishes the sovereignty of that state (domestic, Westphalian, interdependence, and usually international legal), but conquest is not a challenge to Westphalian and international legal sovereignty as institutional forms. It reconfigures borders but does not create new principles and norms.⁶⁹

67. Michael Nicholson, “Formal Methods in International Relations,” in *Evaluating Methodology in International Studies*, ed. Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press), 24.

68. Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” *The International History Review* 21, no. 3 (September 1999): 570-71, accessed February 13, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109077>. Scholarship differs as to whether sovereignty is a “historically novel method of organization” that emerged in close proximity to the intellectual and cultural changes leading up to Westphalia or a historical fact that Westphalia recognized.

69. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, 20.

While a liberal may go so far as to claim “sovereignty has been central to our understanding of the states system and is the fundamental principle enunciated in the charter of the United Nations” all the while failing to (or choosing not to) realize the inherent contradiction that yielding to an international organization sometimes means forgoing one’s sovereignty.⁷⁰ It is these conflicting interpretations of sovereignty that point to constructivism as a “third option.”

Defining Constructivism

Constructivism is a subjective relativism. This is not to say that truth is relative, for as discussed previously truth exists independent of perception. Nevertheless what people perceive to be true, regardless of its veracity, does impact the way they behave. As noted in the field of psychology: “Human cognition and behavior are powerfully influenced by sets of beliefs and assumptions about life and reality.”⁷¹ Considering that autocratic regimes, nomadic tribes, nation states, and transnational organizations are all comprised of people that to some extent share any number of baseline commonalities in said “sets of beliefs and assumptions about life and reality,” it is only logical for geopolitical analysis to interpret the behavior of international actors within the context of the ideas they espouse. Thus constructivists

emphasize the importance of ideas and culture in shaping both the reality and the discourse of international politics. They stress the ultimate subjectivity of interests and their links to changing identities. . . . They believe that leaders and other people are motivated not only by material interests, but also by their sense of identity, morality, and what a society or culture considers appropriate. And such norms change over time.⁷²

Constructivism presents a distinct contrast to both the materialistic foundations of realism (e.g. power, vying for resources, etc.) and the transcendent rationalism to the liberal strains of thought

70. Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” 569.

71. M. Koltko-Rivera, “The Psychology of Worldviews,” *Review of General Psychology* 8, no. 1 (March 2004): 3, accessed October 5, 2015, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.8.1.3>.

72. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 7.

(e.g. the perfectibility of man, the supremacy of the West, etc.).⁷³ Rather than limit itself to theoretical, macro-level analysis and anthropomorphize institutions and structures, constructivism instead concedes a “constitutive relationship between agents [i.e. people] and structures,” thereby facilitating a framework for the study of international relations that rests on empirical analysis as opposed to analysis that only goes as far as the meta-theoretical level.⁷⁴

Yet, because constructivism is one of the newest interpretative paradigms within the study of international relations its scope and meaning still possess elements of fluidity (e.g. so-called Marxian constructivisms; modernist and postmodernist constructivisms; postcolonial constructivisms, etc.)⁷⁵ Thus, it is critical that the usage of the constructivist paradigm for the remainder of this thesis be defined and framed by identifying the fundamental assumptions:

- ❖ The ideas, beliefs, and convictions of people are the critical component to understanding international relations. Although the prevailing ideas, beliefs, and convictions within a given society are continually changing and evolving, they are the fundamental building block of identities (e.g. tribal, national, supranational, etc.).
- ❖ Accepting Thomas Dye’s postulation that ideas are combined with governmental action to formulate public policy,⁷⁶ it necessarily follows that understanding the origin of ideas

73. Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 299-300.

74. Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 188, 195, accessed February 21, 2016, <http://godayumitro.staff.umm.ac.id/files/2014/09/Theories-of-IR.pdf>.

75. Richard Price, “The Ethics of Constructivism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 320.

76. Shawn Akers, “‘Law’, ‘Policy’, and the ‘Middle East’: A Brief Discussion of Terms” (video of lecture, PPOG 640, Liberty University, 2014), accessed January 13, 2015,

(i.e. worldview) is key to understanding a government's policy (foreign and domestic).

- ❖ International organizations, political institutions, and domestic structures are not sentient and thus do not possess a will of their own. Analyzing organizations, institutions, and/or structures without examining the prevailing ideas (and antitheses, particularly in times of unrest) of the people that comprise them will inevitably be superficial and/or incomplete.
- ❖ In the end, constructivism examines international politics by reflecting upon who people believe themselves to be as opposed to superimposing the assumptions of a theoretical framework (e.g. realism, liberalism, etc.) upon them and struggling to reconcile deviations from said theory *post facto*.

Philosophical Evaluation of Constructivism

Constructivism is philosophically agnostic. This may seem counterintuitive to argue that the theory of international relations revolving around ideas is somehow indifferent towards the corporate enterprise of ideas (i.e. philosophy) – nothing could be further from the truth. As demonstrated in the section on liberalism and realism, these two theories have a philosophical foundation contributing to the assumptions of the theories themselves. Constructivism instead identifies the philosophical ideas of the actors involved and prudently allows them to play out.

This is not to say that philosophers do not speak of the interplay between ideas and behavior, therefore attesting to the validity of constructivism's premise. Aquinas took notice: "But since man's reason must be concerned not only with what is useful to man, but also with men themselves, in that it governs their, actions, it proceeds in both these cases from the simple to the complex."⁷⁷ Francis Bacon explained what can be considered one of the earliest

<http://www.apple.com/itunes>.

77. Thomas Aquinas, "Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle," in Aquinas: Selected

expressions of constructivism:

For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains.⁷⁸

John Stuart Mill made similar observations:

The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis, practiced on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed of light. But though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. All actions is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.⁷⁹

In short, correlating ideas, behavior, and governmental actions is not unique to constructivism.

But in the spirit of consistency with the previous sections, if there is any philosopher for constructivism it is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He conceptually separated the state and civil society, noting the intrinsic conflict in the transition from the family to the state; “the kind of ethical life found in the human micro-community in order to be itself contradicted and overcome by the macro-community of the politically independent, sovereign nation.”⁸⁰ For this reason, Hegel channels considerable attention towards the notion of the “real state” (i.e. the

Political Writings, ed. A. P. D’entreves, trans. J. G. Dawson (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959), 197.

78. Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*, edited by Henry Morley, transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company Edition by David Price, last modified November 4, 2014, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5500/5500-h/5500-h.htm>.

79. Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in *John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays*, 132.

80. Z. A. Pelczynski, *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1, accessed March 26, 2016, Google Books.

amalgamated views of the constituents, leaders, institutions, etc. – how the collective state as a multifaceted entity views itself and makes decisions). Consequently, Hegel’s political philosophy hinges its weight of effort towards understanding the role of history and dialectic.⁸¹ With regards to history, he speaks to the power of how a person or collective of people understand their past (to include when leaders, dictators, etc. strategically leverage revisionist history, censorship, and propaganda to facilitate public support for their desired objectives).

A history that aspires to traverse long periods of time, or to be universal, must indeed forego the attempt to give individual representations of the past as it actually existed. It must foreshorten its pictures by abstractions; and this involves not merely the omission of events and deeds, but whatever is implied in the fact that Thought is, after all, the most trenchant epitomist. A battle, a great victory, a siege, no longer maintains its original proportions, but is put off with a bare mention.⁸²

But his use of history is best understood as an offshoot of his dialectic, his belief that speculative knowledge consists “of the unity of opposites, or of the positive in the negative,”⁸³ and that “reason is spirit” which results in each singular perception or observation processed by an individual (“ego”) become part of the individual and is possessed “in its universal truth – it is self-contained essential reality. This character, still abstract, which constitutes the nature of absolute fact, of ‘fact itself,’ is to begin with ‘spiritual reality.’”⁸⁴ He writes:

81. Dialectic is defined as “the Hegelian process of change in which a concept or its realization passes over into and is preserved and fulfilled by its opposite; also: the critical investigation of this process,” see Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “dialectic,” accessed March 26, 2016, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dialectic>.

82. Georg W. F. Hegel, “Introduction to the Philosophy of History,” trans. J. Sibree, in *The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche*, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley (New York: Random House, 1992), 541.

83. Georg W. F. Hegel, “The Science of Logic,” trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, in *The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche*, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley (New York: Random House, 1992), 636.

84. Georg W. F. Hegel, “The Phenomenology of Spirit,” trans. J. B. Baillie, in *The*

The rational is actual; and the actual is rational. Upon this conviction rests all naïve consciousness, as does philosophy, and philosophy starts from it in considering the spiritual universe as well as the natural one. If reflections, sentiment or whatever form subjective consciousness may have, looks upon the present as something vain, transcends it and knows it better, such subjective consciousness is itself vanity, since it has reality only in the present. If correspondingly the idea is seen as merely just an idea, an opinionated notion, philosophy by contrast offers the insight that nothing is actual but the idea.⁸⁵

Thus, in the Hegelian paradigm, ideas and perceptions are the driving force behind human interactions. Translating this into the political arena, “Hegel must defend the rationality of the real state against the romantics who turn away from politics simply, but equally against the utopians and reformers who turn away from the real state in favor of an ideal state”⁸⁶

Pragmatic Evaluation of Constructivism

The majority of the pragmatic evaluation of constructivism will occur in the remaining chapters. That said there are a few theoretical evaluations that are appropriate to address prior to closing the current chapter. First, constructivism attests to the convoluted situation(s) leading up to the Thirty Years War and its resolution through Westphalia. Although the various parties fought for differing reasons, as exhaustion set in they resolved to end the conflict but enjoy a peace that enabled their respective beliefs, identities, and interests to coexist in geographic proximity – the nation-state system (“The fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty is that states exist in specific territories, within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters

European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley (New York: Random House, 1992), 636.

85. Georg W. F. Hegel, “The Philosophy of Right and Law,” trans. Cal J. Friedrich, in *The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche*, ed. Monroe C. Beardsley (New York: Random House, 1992), 635.

86. Pierre Hassner, “Georg W. F. Hegel,” trans. Allan Bloom, in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 733.

of legitimate behavior”⁸⁷).

Second, it also explains the emergence of international relations theory – competing ideas and beliefs pitting themselves against one another. Yet, in Hegelian fashion, constructivism effectively reconciles the opposites contained within the overarching points and accuracies of liberalism and realism. For instance, Fukuyama’s argument that history in the philosophical sense deviated from the expectations of the political left (ex. economic and political modernization did not lead to communism as the Marxists and Soviet Union had avowed) and instead culminated in “liberty elected governments, individual rights, an economic system in which capital and labor circulated with relatively modest state oversight.”⁸⁸ The apparent veracity of liberalism’s Democratic Peace Theory and the continued partnerships between the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia reinforce this position – but the alternative interpretation within the constructivist paradigm would argue that the socially constructed similarities form a symbiotic foundation for interoperability and have nothing to do with democracy but rather the shared values that led to the adoption of democracy within those nations in the first place. Likewise, the realists argue that the balance of power employed through NATO and the concepts of “Mutually Assured Destruction” that were critical to

87. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, 20. It is of note that such a sweeping qualitative evaluation is not without quantitative support. As demonstrated in a program conducted by Texas A&M University of Central Texas that compiled the results of 46 quantitative studies and more than 200 variables, the researcher struggled to find overarching trends that lead to civil war (something that’s arguably transferable to interstate war) but did observe possible linkages between war and ethnic dominance of a majority over a sizeable minority; social fractionalization; and a recent history of conflict (all data points that are defined socially within the warring societies. See Jeffrey Dixon, “What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings.” *International Studies Review* 11, no. 4 (December 2009), accessed March 28, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00892.x>.

88. Francis Fukuyama, “At the End of History Still Stands Democracy,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 6, 2014, accessed March 29, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661>.

preventing the Cold War from becoming total war serve as a validation of realism – yet the constructivist counter would posit that short-term “friends of necessity” are based on the commonly held national interest of survival but offer little continuity to adequately explain change over long periods of time in world politics (e.g. former Warsaw Pact countries that are now partnered with the West, Vietnam’s attempts to partner with the United States in the wake of Chinese encroachment within the South China Sea, etc.).⁸⁹

Finally, and most importantly, constructivism bridges the void where liberalism and realism fail to effectively interpret and explain certain geopolitical events. For example, realism does not comprehensively account for the reality that “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.”⁹⁰ Similarly, neither liberalism or realism answer the question of Islamic terrorism and its willingness to take on the strongest nations, even to the point that death is welcomed with open arms through the application of martyrdom. Yet the constructivist paradigm begins to account for these deficiencies as it takes into account the fact that “*national* interests and values . . . may also constrain a state’s foreign policy”⁹¹ and that “societal demands are a variable, shifting with factors such as technology, geography, and culture. . . . In nearly all social situations, shifts in control over material resources, authoritative values, and opportunities

89. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 7.

90. Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 73, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/hpschmitz/PSC124/PSC124Readings/WendtConstructivism.pdf>.

91. Donnelly, “The Ethics of Realism,” 156.

for social control have domestic and transnational distributional implications.”⁹²

The Way Ahead

Ideas matter. As demonstrated thus far, ideas have ramifications as they are acted upon and can effect individuals, groups, nations, and beyond. Thus, it is the conviction of the Master’s Candidate that an analytical model for international relations must not superimpose a mass of presuppositions upon the actors it seeks to understand but should instead seek to understand the presuppositions of the actors and allow them to explain why it is they do what they do. In the words of Samuel Huntington,

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them.⁹³

It is ideas, convictions, and beliefs (i.e. what people perceive as true), that cause tribes, nations, alliances, etc., to act or not act in a given situation because these entities are nothing less than collectives of people. Tribes, nations, and alliances are not sentient – they are comprised of people and analysis must be wary of attributing overgeneralized corporate essence to them without understanding their fundamental element – people. Therefore, accepting the psychological observation that “human cognition and behavior are powerfully influenced by sets of beliefs and assumptions about life and reality” and the political observation contained within Thomas Dye’s postulation that ideas are combined with governmental action to formulate public policy and it becomes increasingly difficult to refute that understanding people as individuals and how they align themselves in groups is critical to understanding international relations.

92. Moravcsik, “The New Liberalism,” 236-237.

93. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 21.

Part 2

Deconstructing the West

While our country remains untainted with the principles and manners which are now producing desolation in so many parts of the world; while she continues sincere, and incapable of insidious and impious policy, we shall have the strongest reason to rejoice in the local destination assigned us by Providence. But should the people of America once become capable of that deep simulation towards one another, and towards foreign nations, which assumes the language of justice and moderation while it is practising iniquity and extravagance, and displays in the most captivating manner the charming pictures of candor, frankness, and sincerity, while it is rioting in rapine and insolence, this country will be the most miserable habitation in the world; because we have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the strongest cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.

–John Adams, “To the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts, October 11, 1798”

There is an imprecise (and worse, inaccurate) tendency to conceptualize “the West” as monolithic – an unchanging constant that has neither waivered or evolved since the spirit of democracy was birthed from the womb of Ancient Greece. Yet from Athenian Democracy, to the Roman Republic, to the Christendom of the Byzantines, to the Westphalian nation states of Europe – the West has changed and will continue to change as prevailing identities and ideas shift with the ebb and flow of the societies carrying the mantle of “Western.” In fact, buzz words such as “freedom,” “liberty,” and “justice,” along with their respective antitheses (i.e. “oppression,” “tyranny,” and “injustice”) have specific meanings and connotations intrinsic to the development of the West and do not necessarily translate effectively to non-subscribers of the so-called “Western way of life.” Even as the West evolves and the prevailing worldviews and ideas shift, these concepts that form the bedrock of Western civilization are subsequently

redefined. To demonstrate this point, consider the development of the United States.

The Thirteen Colonies

The United States, prior to declaring independence in 1776 was a series of European colonies scattered along the eastern seaboard. Although they were founded in different areas, in general, they had one unifying force: Christianity. The “Virginia Charter,” a document granting authority from the crown to establish colonies in America, depicts a clear link between the Christian faith and the colonization of the New World. One section reads:

We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of, their Desires for the Furtherance of so noble a Work, which may, by the Providence of Almighty God, hereafter tend to the Glory of his Divine Majesty, in propagating of Christian Religion to such People, as yet live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true Knowledge and Worship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels and Savages, living in those parts, to human Civility, and to a settled and quiet Government: DO, by these our Letters Patents, graciously accept of, and agree to, their humble and well-intended Desires.⁹⁴

This charter, in addition to extending the rights of Englishmen to any new colonies that would be established, also committed America to a Christian purpose.⁹⁵ In similar fashion, the Plymouth Colony’s “Mayflower Compact” proudly declared:

IN THE NAME OF GOD, AMEN. We, whose names are underwritten, the Loyal Subjects of our dread Sovereign Lord King *James*, by the Grace of God, of *Great Britain, France, and Ireland*, King, *Defender of the Faith*, &c. Having undertaken for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the northern Parts of *Virginia*; Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick.⁹⁶

94. “The First Charter of Virginia; April 10, 1606,” The Avalon Project, accessed April 7, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va01.asp.

95. Stephen McDowell and Mark Beliles, *The American Dream: Jamestown and the Planting of the American Christian Republic* (Charlottesville, VA: Providence Foundation, 2007), 36.

96. “Mayflower Compact: 1620,” The Avalon Project, accessed April 7, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mayflower.asp.

As the colonies expanded and thrived, Christianity proved to be a solid foundation for growth. Over one hundred years later, the colonies' reputation for Christianity remained intact. In 1775, on the brink of war with England, "the great statesman Edmund Burke tried to warn the British Parliament that the Americans could not be subjugated: 'the people are Protestants, and of that kind which is the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion.'"⁹⁷ One year later, while renouncing their formal political ties to the crown, America found vindication in the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" and the belief that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights."⁹⁸ In short, the Revolutionary War itself was both fought under the banner of Christian premises and terminated in a Christian document ("In the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity") that recognized the Westphalian order ("His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States . . . to be free sovereign and independent states, that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs, and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety, and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof").⁹⁹

18th Century America

With its recently acquired independence, the newfound United States was forced to determine the way in which it would govern independent of the British crown. Its initial attempts in The Articles of Confederation did not effectively facilitate a stable domestic environment. The second attempt, however, proved more productive – but was not without its idiosyncrasies. Particularly, as noted by John Adams, "Our Constitution was made only for a

97. David B. Kopel, "The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," accessed April 7, 2016, <http://davekopel.org/Religion/Religious-Roots-of-the-American-Revolution.pdf>, 1.

98. US Declaration of Independence, para. 2.

99. "The Paris Peace Treaty of September 30, 1783," The Avalon Project, accessed April 8, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris.asp.

moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”¹⁰⁰ For without a baseline morality held in common by the general populace, a limited government paradigm would prove futile. At the same time, “recognizing that citizens have passionate and irreconcilable religious or ideological differences, the U.S. Constitution devolves decisions about these differences to an intermediate level of government-states, provinces, cantons, etc.”¹⁰¹

Yet America was faced with challenges other than remaining steadfast in its religious values. In the days of its infancy, the United States was forced to contemplate its position and role in the international arena. When the 56 American leaders affixed their signatures to the Declaration of Independence, they forfeited the protection of North American trading ventures that the British Navy had afforded them, especially against the Barbary Pirates in the Mediterranean. Thus, the Founding Fathers were given the monumental task of determining how to protect its own trade – hence a Constitution that authorizes the creation of a standing Navy and the punishment of “Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”¹⁰² But addressing the safety of American trade was not as simple as amassing a navy.

The overarching piracy problem was exacerbated by a longstanding tradition of European weakness during which tribute, ransoms, and bribes incentivized piracy and “promoted a growth industry of terrorism.”¹⁰³ America adopted this approach for years and began allocating

100. John Adams to the officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts, October 11, 1798, in *The Works of John Adams*, ed. C. F. Adams, vol. 9, 1799-1811 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1856), 229, accessed February 6, 2016, <http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2107>.

101. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., “Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism,” *Fordham Law Review* 75, no. 2 (2006): 770, accessed April 8, 2016, <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss2/16>.

102. US Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 10.

103. Robert F. Turner, “President Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates,” in *Piracy*

substantial resources for the purpose of bribing the Barbary States. However, the shame of paying tribute and the pragmatic failure of these investments to attain peace or safe passage for trading vessels in the Mediterranean led many, such as William Eaton, to assert: “There is but one language which can be held to these people and this is terror.”¹⁰⁴ Such convictions seemed all the more justified when juxtaposed with the outcome of the 1786 diplomatic meeting between Jefferson, Adams, and Tripolitan ambassador to Britain ‘Abd al-Rahman. Despite attempts by the American delegation to convince the Barbary leader of the United States’ affection for all nations, ‘Abd al-Rahman invoked Koranic writings and claimed that any nation’s failure to acknowledge Islamic authority is sinful and that it was the Muslims’ right and duty to wage war upon whoever they could.¹⁰⁵ Yet, despite these jihadi-style threats pushing foreign policy decision makers towards the use of force, the blood and treasure that would be required for another war weighed heavy on many in post-Revolutionary War America, leading even to attempted religious compromise in the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” which sought to dissuade the violence propagated by the Barbary States by avowing that the U.S. government “is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion.”¹⁰⁶ Although some historians argue that the Barbary Wars were “primarily about trade, not theology, and that rather than being holy wars, they were an extension of America’s War of Independence,”¹⁰⁷ the struggles inflicted by the

and Maritime Crime, ed. Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 157.

104. Michael Oren, *Power, Faith, & Fantasy* (New York: Norton & Company, 2011), 65.

105. *Ibid.*, 27.

106. “Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Signed at Tripoli November 4, 1796,” The Avalon Project, accessed April 9, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1796t.asp.

107. Frank Lambert, *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World*

Barbary Pirates nevertheless forced America in to wrestle with her fundamental identity.

Additionally, as the century came to a close, George Washington encouraged his successors to utilize caution and discretion with regards to American foreign policy in the days ahead. He urged his country to avoid becoming enslaved to over-involvement with overseas operations and foreign treaties that would strain America's resources and potentially jeopardize the country's ability to survive as a nation. Bidding his presidency farewell, he exhorted:

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.¹⁰⁸

Despite the abundance of theories regarding Washington's intent, regardless of whether the first president's sentiments are interpreted as full-fledged isolationism or simply avoiding "entangling alliances," it is an inarguable reality that he understood overseas involvement on any level posed a challenge, and a potential risk, to their sovereignty and survivability. He ultimately desired that the U.S. would focus on being Americans and concentrate on doing that which would bring about the best results for itself rather than suffer from possible political overstretch.

19th Century America

In 1803, the Louisiana Purchase acquired the Louisiana Territory from France at a price of fifteen million dollars, or four cents per acre, effectively doubling America's size and opening

(New York: Hill and Wang, 2011), 8.

108. "Washington's Farewell Address 1796," The Avalon Project, accessed April 8, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.

the continent to westward expansion.¹⁰⁹ Challenged once again by the British, a victory in the War of 1812 “confirmed American nationhood and secured a new respect for the infant republic among the powers of Europe.”¹¹⁰ Likewise, after deploying the United States Marine Corps “to the shores of Tripoli” and other operations in North Africa, America also secured economic power by demonstrating to the Barbary States that she was not to be taken lightly. Thus, with its place in the world affirmed, the American identity took root and continued to grow and evolve.

On December 2, 1823, President James Monroe delivered his seventh annual address to Congress. Within this speech, he expressed “doctrinal” concepts that would become embodied in American foreign policy for future generations and invigorate a fervent sense of pride and nationalism in the American people by communicating to foreign opposition that aggressive expansion would not be viewed passively. He said:

The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.¹¹¹

This Monroe Doctrine demanded that Europe respect the Western Hemisphere as the U.S. sphere of interest and warned that further colonization or puppet regimes would not be tolerated.¹¹²

109. “Primary Documents in American History: Louisiana Purchase,” Library of Congress, accessed April 9, 2016, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Louisiana.html>.

110. “The War of 1812: American Independence Confirmed,” National Park Service, accessed April 9, 2016, http://www.nps.gov/revwar/unfinished_revolution/war_of_1812.html.

111. James Monroe, “Monroe Doctrine; December 2 1823,” The Avalon Project, accessed April 9, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp.

112. The National Archives, *Our Documents: 100 Milestone Documents from the National Archives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 66.

However, if interpreted contextually with the milieu of a young United States, the significance of this doctrinal statement is the strong assertion of America as a nation. By openly defying any foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere, Monroe proudly conveyed America's intentions to attain prominence on the world stage and regional supremacy in North America. Thus, to be an American was to be a part of a nation that knew who it was and boldly declared to any potential interference that provocation or accosting behavior of any kind would come at a price. Even though Monroe's policy statements were widely ignored outside America, and the fact that this policy could not have been sustained militarily in 1823 without British Naval power deterring potential aggression in Latin America,¹¹³ it was still a blatant expression of America's newfound identity as the rising power in the region.

This fervent national spirit served as a driving force for the United States. Stemming from the same line of thought as the Monroe Doctrine, the notion of Manifest Destiny emerged during this same period of time. At its core was a "vision of a great and democratic nation, specifically favored by Providence, whose 'floor shall be a hemisphere.'"¹¹⁴ Thus, when President James Polk faced direct and indirect challenges to American sovereignty via European involvement in North America, particularly in the Oregon, California, and Texas territories, he did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine to justify a military response but rather "reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine in terms of the prevailing spirit of Manifest Destiny. Whereas Monroe had said only that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonialism, Polk now stated that European nations had better not interfere with projected territorial expansion by the

113. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. "Monroe Doctrine," accessed April 9, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/390243/Monroe-Doctrine>.

114. Julius W. Pratt, "The Origin of 'Manifest Destiny,'" *The American Historical Review* 32, no. 4 (July 1927): 797, accessed April 9, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1837859>.

United States.”¹¹⁵ Before a joint session of Congress, Polk asserted

The rapid extension of our settlements over our territories heretofore unoccupied, the addition of new States to our Confederacy, the expansion of free principles, and our rising greatness as a nation are attracting the attention of the powers of Europe, and lately the doctrine has been broached in some of them of a “balance of power” on this continent to check our advancement. The United States, sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good understanding with all nations, can not in silence permit any European interference on the North American continent, and should any such interference be attempted will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards.¹¹⁶

He went on to speak of the tumultuous environment in Europe leading up to Westphalia and how, even hundreds of years later, that still effected the way in which the sovereigns and nations of Europe conducted their affairs at home and abroad.

The American system of government is entirely different from that of Europe. Jealousy among the different sovereigns of Europe, lest any one of them might become too powerful for the rest, has caused them anxiously to desire the establishment of what they term the “balance of power.” It cannot be permitted to have any application on the North American continent, and especially to the United States. We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny.

Yet within this sentiment lies a critical distinction between the United States and the European powers. For as religion (among other societal forces) eventually led to the fragmenting of Europe through the Peace of Westphalia, the American system of government is entirely different from that of Europe because of the unifying nature of American Christianity.

Religion was such a fundamental component of the American identity that de Tocqueville linked it to “democratic instincts” and the “spirit of individual independence.”¹¹⁷ He writes:

It must never be forgotten that religion gave birth to Anglo-American society. In the

115. “James K. Polk: Reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine,” Encyclopaedia Britannica Profiles: The American Presidency, accessed April 9, 2016, <http://academic.eb.com/presidents/article-9116950>.

116. James K. Polk, “First Annual Message – December 2, 1845,” The American Presidency Project, accessed April 9, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29486>.

117. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 87.

United States, religion is therefore mingled with all the habits of the nation and all the feelings of patriotism, whence it derives a peculiar force. To this reason another of no less power may be added: in America, religion has, as it were, laid down its own limits. Religious institutions have remained wholly distinct from political institutions, so that former laws have been easily changed whilst former belief has remained unshaken. Christianity has therefore retained a strong hold on the public mind in America; and I would more particularly remark, that its sway is not only that of a philosophical doctrine which has been adopted upon inquiry, but of a religion which is believed without discussion.¹¹⁸

In light of this, it can be argued that faith, whether sacred or the civic derivative, played a seminal role in U.S. domestic and foreign policy during this period. For example, just as the First Great Awakening fueled colonial America's sense of its own "divine election,"¹¹⁹ the religious leaders of the Second Great Awakening shaped the worldview of the American body politic thereby influencing the formation of policy.¹²⁰ One of the core tenets of the Second Great Awakening was millennialism, or a belief in the impending Second Coming of Christ (Revelation 20). Due to this eschatological conviction, many at that time firmly believed that America had a "unique role to play" in spreading Christianity around the world and ushering in the Millennium.¹²¹ When such an idea fused with an interpretation of Manifest Destiny that ordained America "to disseminate its principles, both religious and secular, abroad," there came a time where support for Christian missionary efforts, particularly in the Middle East, stemmed from not only congregations across the country but also from the mainstream press, Congress,

118. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Richard Heffner (New York: Signet Classics, 2010), 165.

119. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 85.

120. Shawn Akers, "Zionism in the United States" (video of lecture, PPOG 641, Liberty University, 2013), accessed July 16, 2015, <http://www.apple.com/itunes>.

121. Geoffrey R. Stone, "The Second Great Awakening: A Christian Nation?," *Georgia State University Law Review* 26, no. 4 (Summer 2010): 1310, accessed April 9, 2016, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11059&context=journal_articles.

and the White House.¹²² As a result of this blending of religious ideas and foreign policy, military and diplomatic power began to serve the spread of American religion in the Middle East.¹²³ Middle Eastern governments proving inhospitable towards American missionaries in the region (who were not only proselytizing religiously but also making disciples of the civic faith through Western style academic institutions) would face diplomatic pressures or a brazen show of force from United States Navy warships dropping anchor off shore. Additionally, between the dispensational belief that Americans were morally obligated to assist the Jewish people in returning to Palestine (due to it being a prerequisite for the return of Christ)¹²⁴ and the State Department's notion that the Jews constituted a "natural link between Christian America and the Muslim Middle East,"¹²⁵ advocacy for and defense of the descendants of Abraham also became a policy concern of the United States. Simply put, the Manifest Destiny era was characterized as "the confluence of divinely ordained missions and state-sanctioned might."¹²⁶

This does not mean, however, that the sacred and/or civic faith(s) of America were never compromised or called into question. For instance the decision to withhold assistance from the Greeks rebelling under the oppression and authoritarianism of the Ottoman Empire served to highlight the internal philosophical struggle that the U.S. would seek to balance for years to come – pursuing its own national interests versus epitomizing and promoting Western values.

122. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 130-31.

123. *Ibid.*, 168.

124. William N. Dale, "The Impact of Christian Zionism on American Foreign Policy," *American Diplomacy*, April 2004, accessed April 9, 2016, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2004_04-06/dale_impact/dale_impact.html.

125. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 167.

126. *Ibid.*, 131.

Even though many Americans viewed Greece as their cultural birthplace, considered the Greeks' journey towards independence as synonymous with their own recent revolution, and regarded the Greeks as "latter-day crusaders" combatting the tyrannical Muslim barbarians, the pragmatic foreign policy objectives of the day (e.g. endeavoring towards a U.S.-Ottoman treaty, attempting to avoid provoking the European powers that considered the Middle East its sphere of influence, etc.) caused President Monroe to deny the Greek's request for assistance citing it as an "internal European affair."¹²⁷ However, the greatest moral threat to the American identity in the 19th Century would not stem from foreign policy but rather a domestic issue.

America's foundational claim that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" seemed nothing short of political rhetoric when placed in juxtaposition with the concept that a man, on the basis of his skin color, could be forced into servitude to his fellow man and regarded as nothing less than a piece of property to be treated in whatever manner deemed acceptable by the owner. The debate erupting from this inhumanity was met with differing and irreconcilable moral opinions. For the southern, slave-holding states, there was a passionate outcry because they saw their agrarian economies threatened by a possible loss of their labor force. Many of those opposed to the practice, responded with an organized and united front, the Abolitionist Movement being one such example. This contested issue, ultimately leading to the Civil War, jeopardized America's future identity in two key ways: "The survival of the United States as one nation was at risk, and on the outcome of the war depended the nation's ability to bring to reality the ideals of liberty, equality, human dignity, and justice."¹²⁸ The most tangible issue was the risk it presented of splitting the United States into two separate

127. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 108-11.

128. "Civil War and Reconstruction," Smithsonian Institute, accessed April 10, 2016, http://americanhistory.si.edu/presidency/timeline/pres_era/3_656.html.

countries: the United States and the Confederate States of America. With regards to “liberty, equality, human dignity, and justice,” it presented a potential shift in the American values paradigm. For America to proclaim that she is a land where “all” men are given the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” by God, yet also maintains that one man can arbitrarily own another is an unstable foundation for a country’s moral identity. Had the Union not been victorious the America known as the “leader of the free world” would most likely have never come into existence. Sadly, the resolve of the South adamantly defended the atrocious practice of human property to the point it took four years of war to determine the nation’s fate.

During the extensive reconstruction period after the Civil War, the damaged national infrastructure dictated that the forces of the North to occupy the South. Unfortunately, this did not cauterize the wounds inflicted by the war but instead allowed for a moral fissure to develop and further stifle the recovery efforts and the return to a collective American identity. In some cases, officers of the Union army confiscated Confederate land and placed them in the ownership of former slaves – “partly to punish rebels, partly to hinder the South economically, and partly because they had come to regard slavery as an immoral theft of the slave's labor.”¹²⁹ Thus, despite the surge in patriotism and national identity development during the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny era, from the reconstruction period to the early 1900s the American identity was in a state of maintenance and repair rather than acceleration and growth.

20th Century America

This century would contain the most defining series of events for the term “American.” Unfortunately, it would also contain the apex of growth for the identity of the United States and its subsequent degradation. “We are not used to seeing World War One as an ideological

129. “An Outline of the Reconstruction Era,” George Mason University, accessed April 10, 2016, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/122/recon/reconframe.html>.

struggle, a battle between democracy and autocracy. Yet that is in many respects exactly what it was.”¹³⁰ For this reason, the United States’ entry to the First World War initiated a chain of events that would eventually lead to the implosion of America’s identity.

Historians attribute the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary as the immediate catalyst for the initiation of WWI. Tension and anxiety amongst the European powers were elevated to the point that the assassination of a national figure in Sarajevo was enough to upset the precipitously balanced European theater. Once involved, the United States aligned itself with France and Britain, bastions of “Western values,” against the power grabs of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. Thus the Allied victory was not simply a victory of nations but also a symbolic victory for freedom and a certain way of life. Despite its late arrival to the conflict, it also placed America and President Woodrow Wilson in a position to lead the world from the ashes of war into a new era. Seizing the opportunity, Wilson leveraged his positional authority and progressive zeal to devise a plan for sanctions against Germany and the other defeated nations. The victors sought restitution and the reorganization of European structure in order to prevent another conflict. These two goals were merged into a single postwar effort: replacing balance of power with collective security. As Wilson pontificated: “the balance of power is the great game now forever discredited. It’s the old and evil order that prevailed before this war. The balance of power is a thing that we can do without in the future.”¹³¹

But as discussed previously, the collective security framework and “the war to end all wars” did not deter future conflicts. Ironically, the progressive belief that the balance of power

130. Gary Sheffield, “The Origins of World War One,” British Broadcasting Corporation, last modified March 8, 2011, accessed April 10, 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml.

131. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 88-89.

treated “nations like cheeses to be cut up for political convenience”¹³² actually became the *modus operandi* of those espousing collective security. For instance, the treaties of Versailles, Trianon, and Saint Germain imposed severe sanctions on Germany’s economy and territory; detached Austria and Hungary, formally dissolving the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and appropriated over two-thirds of Hungary’s land holdings to bordering nations. In short, WWI reshaped the European continent not only through its infamous trench warfare but also through the geopolitical gerrymandering of the victors. However borders were not only redrawn in Europe but also in the Middle East – a shift not only in the international landscape but yet another environment where socially defined national interests would drive foreign policy development.

As accounted for in Part 1, the progressive understanding of collective security and a liberal world order finds its sustainment in the philosophy of the West. Although it would be entirely inaccurate to portray the imperially focused British and French as benevolent and altruistic when they had undeniable economic aspirations for the region, particularly with regards to petroleum production, it would be equally inaccurate to disregard the role that Western ideas played during the aftermath of WWI. Generally speaking, the U.S. saw European imperialism as a force that would lead to positive change in the Middle East; many Americans in the late 1800s were looking to European nations (i.e. Christendom) to colonize the Middle East, thereby freeing the oppressed from the despotic rule of Islam and shaping the region to resemble the Western world¹³³ (ex. Woodrow Wilson’s belief that Providence had set aside a special place in history for America and that he as president was responsible for fulfilling enlightened democratic objectives – hence his embarkation upon a “crusade for democracy” against the Islamic Ottoman

132. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 60.

133. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 271, 285.

Empire and its allies¹³⁴). Simply put, American idealism and the commitment to the spread of its values globally underpinned much of pre-WWII foreign policy, to include the support for British and French administration of the Levant and modern day Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Although the borders of the post-WWI settlement “have proven remarkably resilient,” if the modern Middle East’s origin is to be understood comprehensively it must be acknowledged that the imperial powers of Europe imposed both the borders and systems of government for the majority of states in the region.¹³⁵ In other words, the Western powers made the East resemble the West through Westphalian borders and liberal concepts of government. More specifically, the post-war partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was the result of extensive Allied negotiations, with each partition agreement intertwined with a specific wartime context:

The Constantinople Agreement of 1915 when the Allies anticipated the quick conquest of Istanbul; the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence in 1915 and 1916 when the British needed a Muslim ally against the Ottoman jihad; the Balfour Declaration in 1917 when the British wanted to revise the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement to secure Palestine for British rule.¹³⁶

Yet not even these agreements (or more accurately, the people that brokered them) were immune to the power and influence of ideas.

For example, dispensational theology and the associated eschatological implications made British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour more receptive to the notion of establishing a Jewish home in the area known as Palestine.¹³⁷ That said, analysis of this key document is easily

134. Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897* (Lanham, MD: S.R. Books, 2001), 54-55.

135. Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 405-04.

136. *Ibid.*, 405.

137. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign*

oversimplified if one superficially concludes that it was predominately a state-sanctioned endorsement of religion. To the contrary, while the religious convictions of Balfour and others were undoubtedly influential, political and strategic concerns were also at work. “Balfour combined zealous religious beliefs with a firm sense of realpolitik” (i.e. the bequeathing of Palestine to the Jews would not only summon the Messiah but also further British imperial objectives); his plan to create a Jewish home in Palestine (regardless of whether it was administered by an international regime, Britain, or an Anglo-American partnership) afforded considerable protection to the Suez Canal and Britain’s economic interests in the region.¹³⁸ Additionally, appealing to the Western desire for freedom, the Russian pogroms and authoritarianism of the Ottoman Empire highlighted the pragmatic humanitarian need for a safe haven for Abraham’s descendants. Last but not least, the pro-Zionist constituencies in both the U.S. and Britain wielded considerable political influence over their respective governments, thereby influencing the foreign policy of both nations. Ultimately, these ideas and circumstances stirred in Balfour a conviction that the case for a Jewish home in Palestine was so uniquely exceptional that it overrode the inherent right of self-determination for the Arab population already residing there.¹³⁹ The resulting Balfour Declaration would serve as an *ad hoc* legal framework for Britain’s conquest of the Middle East from the document’s issuance until its inclusion in the mandate given to England during the 1920 San Remo Conference.¹⁴⁰ Its

Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 133.

138. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 348, 360.

139. Avi Shlaim, “The Declaration that Changed the World Forever,” *The Guardian*, June 27, 2009, accessed April 12, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/jun/28/balfour-and-weizmann-geoffrey-lewis>.

140. “Balfour Declaration,” *The Knesset Lexicon of Terms*, 2008, accessed April 12,

importance to the founding of a Jewish homeland and the development of Western foreign policy towards the Middle East notwithstanding, the impact of this document was arguably “one of miscalculation and unintended consequences.”¹⁴¹

Although the declaration was marketed to the British government as though President Wilson overtly supported it, the “official” U.S. approval of the pro-Zionist stance came from Supreme Court Justice Brandeis (a close friend and advisor to Wilson). It was not until the 1922 joint resolution of Congress endorsing the Balfour Declaration and the 1924 U.S. treaty recognizing the British Mandate that the Palestinian policy of the collective U.S. government would be set in motion.¹⁴² This left Britain to push for a Jewish homeland with little more than the verbal support from President Wilson that did not begin openly until almost a year after the Balfour Declaration was presented. As Great Britain sought to destabilize the remnants of the Ottoman Empire by assisting in the instigation of the Arab Revolt and the U.S. endeavored to abstain from a declared state of war with Turkey, England found itself in a politically tenuous position having promised land to both the Jews and the Arab nationalists – factions that by and large were regarded as mutually exclusive. Even though Balfour promised that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities,”¹⁴³ the Arab majority in Palestine believed that it could in no way be safeguarded by a Jewish

2016, http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/BalfourDeclaration_eng.htm.

141. James Renton, “Should Britain Apologize for the Balfour Declaration?,” *Haaretz*, April 29, 2013, accessed April 12, 2016, <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/should-britain-apologize-for-the-balfour-declaration.premium-1.518145>.

142. Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897*, 303.

143. Arthur Balfour, “Balfour Declaration 1917,” The Avalon Project, accessed April 12, 2016, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp.

movement that intended to dispossess them via immigration and land purchases.¹⁴⁴ As a result, the region would continue to be plagued by sectarian violence for decades to come.

Such was the geopolitical environment during the interwar years. The efforts of the League of Nations proved ahead of their time and the organization failed to stabilize the world. European nations were struggling to forge new identities within the borders freshly carved from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. German nationalism was rising and “it chafed against the punitive measures of the Versailles Treaty that had ended World War I.”¹⁴⁵ America’s idealistic endeavor to be a beacon of freedom and justice for the world continued, but this was an opportunity afforded by the underwritten security provided by the British and French. Yet as the size of these two imperial powers continued to expand around the globe – especially in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East – the extent of their imperial overstretch would prove irreconcilable.

But America was beginning to show symptoms of a societal shift in perceptions and beliefs; the influence of religion and the common belief in a God-given right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” was beginning to wane. One example was the Scopes Trial and the social culture surrounding it.

Who would dominate American culture--the modernists or the traditionalists? Journalists were looking for a showdown, and they found one in a Dayton, Tennessee courtroom in the summer of 1925. There a jury was to decide the fate of John Scopes, a high school biology teacher charged with illegally teaching the theory of evolution. The guilt or innocence of John Scopes, and even the constitutionality of Tennessee’s anti-evolution statute, mattered little. The meaning of the trial emerged through its interpretation as a conflict of social and intellectual values.¹⁴⁶

144. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 389.

145. Alan Taylor, “World War II: Before the War,” *The Atlantic*, June 19, 2011, accessed April 13, 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/06/world-war-ii-before-the-war/100089>.

146. Douglas O. Lindner, “State v. John Scopes (‘The Monkey Trial’),” University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2008, accessed April 13, 2016, <http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/evolut.htm>.

Challenging the permissibility of a public school teacher offering the theory of evolution as a scientifically viable option, this court case legitimized providing alternatives to religious theories for the origin of the universe. In other words, many Americans began seeking processes considered intellectual rather than faith-based. Another key example was the implementation of The New Deal in response to the Great Depression. Embracing the crisis, the Progressive movement justified governmental intervention into the economy through Social Security and unemployment programs, thereby introducing egalitarian redistribution policies contrary to the free enterprise and limited government concepts fundamental to the American way of life.

Thus the foreign and domestic policy arenas of the United States (and of the Western World in general) were in limbo at the outbreak of World War II. As with the First, the Second World War began as a war on the other side of the Atlantic. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt wavered between an obsession with domestic issues and Wilsonian internationalism, “between the pursuit of American ideals and a hardnosed realpolitik” (hence Herbert Hoover description of FDR as “a chameleon on plaid”).¹⁴⁷ Generally speaking, his first two terms were spent focused internally. Even as many of America’s potential adversaries became involved in the amassing of arms and forging of multilateral alliances, the U.S. was not only unprepared militarily to respond to a crisis but FDR foot stomped the 1940 campaign trail with the pledge: “I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”¹⁴⁸ Instead he pioneered the controversial legislation entitled “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States” (i.e. the Lend-Lease program), whereby the U.S. would outfit

147. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 429.

148. Kenneth S. Davis, “FDR: Into the Storm, 1937-1940. A History,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), accessed April 13, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1993-06-01/fdr-storm-1937-1940-history>.

Great Britain with materials for the war in Europe without risking American lives. Defending his proposal in a fireside chat in December of 1940, FDR attempted to assuage national apprehension and rally support by stating: “Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and our people.”¹⁴⁹

This changed, however, on December 7, 1941. Filled with an unshakeable determination, America’s entry to WWII and her wartime policies resulted in one of the most definitive displays of her national identity. America stood united against her newfound foe, the Japanese, and refused to be defeated at home or abroad. On December 7 and 8, Roosevelt signed orders empowering the FBI to arrest resident aliens that it deemed “dangerous to public peace or safety” (over 2,000 Japanese immigrants were incarcerated within the next four days alone).¹⁵⁰ Regardless of the constitutionality of such internment operations, the point that must be understood from this practice is the lengths that America was willing to go to in order to defend herself. This generation understood and embodied the principles contained within Huntington’s “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.”¹⁵¹ The fervency of the American resolve continued all the more when Germany became a recognized enemy. War bond sales skyrocketed; the female workforce, collectively symbolized in Rosie The Riveter, took to industry to support the war effort; and cultural icons, such as Captain America, emerged onto the scene as manifestations of all America represents. The nation stood united against the embodiment of tyranny that was the Axis powers but simultaneously struggled to balance its internal quest for freedom and justice with the moral

149. Jones, *Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897*, 170.

150. Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 75.

151. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 21.

compromise of decisions advantageous to domestic and global security.

As the war progressed, this delicate balance and the situation at hand eventually drove the Allies to partner with Joseph Stalin – not because of his human rights record but because he, having been recently double-crossed by Hitler, was a pragmatic partner of convenience to counter the Third Reich. This placed the Allies on treacherous philosophical ground, making it somewhat difficult to sustain the fundamentally moral argument fueling the war against Hitler.

Assigning to Hitler the label of absolute evil; that feeling was in the air during and after World War II. The historian, Ralph Raico, observed this emotional phenomenon: “A moral postulate of our time is that in pursuit of the destruction of Hitler, all things are permissible. Yet why is it self-evident that morality required a crusade against Hitler in 1939 and 1940, and not against Stalin? At that point Hitler had slain his thousands but Stalin had already slain millions.”¹⁵²

Nevertheless, the focus was Hitler as seen in Churchill’s sentiment: “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”¹⁵³ Thus, one must carefully consider the possibility that WWII was waged not as a human rights campaign but a liberation campaign countering power politics and territorial encroachment.

“In reading the records of FDR’s speeches about Nazi Germany before Pearl Harbor, one is struck by the absence of outrage on the issue of human rights; Roosevelt’s anger at Hitler is almost entirely directed at the Nazi chieftain’s foreign policy – his wars of conquest.”¹⁵⁴ This

152. Donald E. Schmidt, *The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy, 1898-2005* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 208, accessed April 15, 2016, Google Books.

153. Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917, 1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 47, accessed April 15, 2016, Google Books.

154. Schmidt, *The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy, 1898-2005*, 207-08. Schmitt quantifies this interpretation: “This is so partly because the ‘Final Solution’ was not established as policy until early in 1942, and the West was perhaps not aware of the extermination policy until later in the war. Thus America’s entrance into the war was largely unrelated to the human rights issue. IN addition, when Roosevelt was given opportunities to save the Jews, he declined. At no time did he seek revision of immigration laws to provide a refuge for the beleaguered

interpretation is consistent with other of Roosevelt's foreign policy decisions – his balancing of American idealism and internationalism. For example, FDR saw the Middle East as an arena of power politics, religious and inter-societal animosities, and a critical supplier for the increasing demand for oil, he crafted his foreign policy toward the region pragmatically and set America on course to assume the role as the leading superpower.¹⁵⁵ FDR's commitment to a liberal foreign economic policy that sought to reduce trade barriers and foster an economically interdependent world of prosperity found great compatibility with his convictions regarding the Middle East and America's role in the post-WWII community of nations.¹⁵⁶ He extended the principles of the Atlantic Charter to Middle Eastern nations (a sentiment not shared by Winston Churchill) and advocated for the universal rights of self-determination and self-government for all peoples.¹⁵⁷ In addition to exporting Western ideals abroad, there also existed a Westphalian belief that the establishment of nation states in the Middle East would further U.S. interests by fostering a stable region conducive to world trade and thereby reduce the need for military intervention. It was this vision that ultimately led FDR to meet with Ibn Saud and personally broker a deal in which the U.S. would provide support and military training for Saudi Arabia in exchange for

children of Abraham. When in the summer of 1939, the S.S. St. Louis, a mercy ship carrying 937 Europeans, mostly Jews, sought haven in the Caribbean, it was rejected. The ship's officers frantically cabled the White House and sent two individuals to personally petition the President for assistance. Roosevelt refused even to acknowledge their statements; the United States Coast Guard was ordered to prevent any escapees from leaving the ship.”

155. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 466.

156. Randall Woods, “F.D.R. and the Triumph of American Nationalism,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 567, accessed April 15, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574370>.

157. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 453.

petroleum and political support in the region.¹⁵⁸ Although this U.S.-Saudi partnership did involve the moral compromise of America not assisting the Jewish quest to return to Palestine (at least during FDR's administration), it established a key security partnership that continues even to this day. More importantly, it was FDR's struggle between isolationism and internationalism that progressively laid the foundation for America's role in the post-WWII era.

When FDR died on April 12, 1945, Harry Truman unexpectedly became the primary resident of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. He also inherited the responsibility of leading America's involvement in the conclusion of WWII. Convinced that the U.S. was the product of a divine appointment, Truman formulated his foreign policy around the belief that democracy and its civic principles constitute a God-given system he described as "a matter of faith – a faith in the soul of man, faith in human rights."¹⁵⁹ Stemming directly from this worldview, Truman later declared the 1947 doctrine bearing his name that firmly established America's resolve to provide military, political, and economic aid to all democracies threatened by internal or external authoritarian forces.¹⁶⁰ That said, as the allies emerged victorious from WWII, the alliance between the United States, Britain, and Russia no longer possessed a common enemy to hold it together. With Hitler defeated, the only bond holding them together were their differing views for the post-WWII world – differences that would set the stage for a 45-year ideological conflict and force the world to preemptively choose sides in the event the war ever went "hot." As the victors divided up the spoils of war, similar to the geographic demarcations taking place after

158. Adam Taylor, "The First Time a U.S. President Met a Saudi King," *The Washington Post*, January 27, 2015, accessed April 15, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/27/the-first-time-a-u-s-president-met-a-saudi-king>.

159. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 476.

160. U.S. Department of State, "The Truman Doctrine, 1947," Office of the Historian, accessed April 16, 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>.

WWI, it was decided that the Allied forces would occupy the territories their troops had liberated, installing democratic governments, while the areas liberated by Russia would be occupied by the Soviets with communist governments being established.¹⁶¹

This marked a key transition in modern world history. Up to this point, America was afforded the opportunity to cleave unto its ideals because its allies, namely Britain and France, were underwriting global security. However, WWII proved an irrecoverable fault line in both empires and demonstrated the extent of their respective imperial overstretch. The material hardships after WWII combined with the definitive ascendance of the two “anti-imperial” powers, the United States (e.g. extending the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Middle East, the Truman Doctrine, etc.) and the Soviet Union, and “with the increased maturity of nationalist elites throughout Africa and Asia to force a decided retrenchment of Europe overseas.”¹⁶² France and its constitutional understanding of law derived from the Roman Empire’s notion of *jus gentium* (“the law for all peoples, based on a set of principles given out from the hub of the empire and applicable to all within it”) were caught unprepared for the anti-colonialism of the post-1945 world and would see almost two decades of uprisings and turmoil within its holdings in the Middle East, Indochina, and Africa.¹⁶³ Similarly, the British would opt to reduce its overseas holdings as seen in the formulation of the Indian Independence Act that partitioned British India into the two independent nations of India and Pakistan in 1947 and,

161. Air University, *The Evolution of USAF Air and Space Power* (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2008), 201.

162. Tony Smith, “A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 1 (January 1978): 70, accessed April 16, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/178322>.

163. Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1-2, accessed April 16, 2016, Google Books.

exhausted by the fighting between Arabs and Jews and the perpetual opposition to the Mandatory government, terminating its administration of Palestine in 1948 almost three months earlier than the withdrawal deadline codified in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181.¹⁶⁴ In short, decolonization handed the proverbial “reins” to the U.S. as the leading superpower of the post-WWII community of nations.

Initially, Truman took to this newfound role moderately well. His influence and diplomatic maneuverings proved critical in navigating the post-WWII implosion of the Anglo-American-French-Soviet front that had so successfully countered Hitler’s advances in the Middle East.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the self-determination of the newly independent states enabled the U.S. to play the role of “offshore balancer” in the region (i.e. maintaining close security ties with several countries and actively preventing any one nation, particularly the U.S.S.R., from dominating the region reduced the likelihood of a unilateral halt of the oil supplied to international markets).¹⁶⁶ Despite their differing views regarding the Jews’ and Palestine, Truman continued nurturing the relationship with Ibn Saud that FDR had initiated just months prior to his death.¹⁶⁷ Last but not least, Truman’s Zionist beliefs fused with the humanitarian aftermath of the Holocaust (along with other geopolitical influences) and caused him to disregard the possibility of forfeiting America’s standing in the Arab world and recognize Israel’s *de facto* authority.

Unfortunately, over time this hybrid liberal balance of power approach undermined

164. Marcia Gelpe, *The Israeli Legal System* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2013), 28.

165. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 477-80.

166. Stephen M. Walt, “U.S. Middle East Strategy: Back to Balancing,” *Foreign Policy*, November 21, 2013, accessed April 16, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/21/u-s-middle-east-strategy-back-to-balancing>.

167. Taylor, “The First Time a U.S. President Met a Saudi King.”

America's promotion of freedom and justice as it has forced the U.S. to count amongst its allies some of the most abusive authoritarian regimes in the modern era (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc.). Additionally, the promotion of Western institutions, particularly democratic elections, in conjunction with encouraging self-determination lead to the empowerment of ideas and positions contrary to American ideals. In short, America assuming responsibility to underwrite security for the world would prove paradoxical, particularly when juxtaposed with the ideological essence of the Cold War. While America would seek to embody freedom and justice in contrast to the oppression and despotism of the U.S.S.R., the pragmatic decisions made behind the scenes to counter Soviet influence and facilitate security (ex. the Central Intelligence Agency's coup d'état in Iran) did not always align with its founding ideals.

In hindsight, the Cold War has been defined as an ideological war between democracy, along with its free enterprise economic counterpart, and the totalitarian model of communism, with its economic school of thought bearing the same name. America openly declared war on the ideology and the resulting foreign policy model was that of containment (ex. the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Bay of Pigs were instances of hard power employed to counter Moscow). Domestically, although never interred in a manner similar to the Japanese living in America, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies actively tracked American Communists.

Intelligence investigations dominated the FBI caseload and focused on monitoring radical activists and organizations and their efforts to influence public policy (specifically, their opposition to U.S. foreign policy and internal security initiatives). Although intended to weed out potentially disloyal government employees, these investigations extended to individuals employed in the private sector – notably, artists, writers, college and university professors, and news reports – targeted because they “might influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish financial aid to subversive elements.”¹⁶⁸

168. Athan G. Theoharis, ed., *The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1999), 24, accessed April 16, 2016, Google Books.

Put another way, security officials and political leaders understood that ideas influence behavior. Ironically, while the Cold War was yet another opportunity for American ideals to permeate throughout the world, these four decades proved to be the period of time where America would abandon the foundation of its original identity and begin exchanging it for a different one.

More specifically, the 1960s marked the turning point for the national identity of the United States.

The 60s were the age of youth, as 70 million children from the post-war baby boom became teenagers and young adults. The movement away from the conservative fifties continued and eventually resulted in revolutionary ways of thinking and real change in the cultural fabric of American life. No longer content to be images of the generation ahead of them, young people wanted change. The changes affected education, values, lifestyles, laws, and entertainment.¹⁶⁹

Desiring to be free of the perceived bondage placed on them by their parent's generation, the youth of the baby boom rallied to a cause all their own. The result was a decade characterized by free-spirited youth infatuated with drugs, alcohol, sexual liberation, and anti-war protests. This shift in thought processes was also arguably the initial precursor to postmodernism.¹⁷⁰

Consequently, there gradually emerged a proportional relationship with the advancement of the postmodern mindset and the increasing scrutiny and indifference levied against the traditional (and intrinsically religious) foundations of the American way of life.

By the end of the Cold War, the identities and ideological foundations of countless nations had been shaken to their very core. The self-determination of peoples endorsed by the

169. "The 60s," North Central University History & Film Project, 2006, accessed April 16, 2016, http://english.ncu.edu.tw/teachingforexcellence/filmhistory/YouthCulture/60s_Youth.html.

170. "A movement characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power," (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. "postmodernism" accessed April 16, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/postmodernism-philosophy>).

United States after WWII had left many countries to define themselves both based on internal preferences and which side they chose in the standoff between the U.S. and the Soviets. With the collapse of the U.S.S.R. the external influence vanished essentially overnight. Again,

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them.¹⁷¹

This presents a deeper level of analysis than those who argue that “without Christianity the Cold War would not have ended peacefully.”¹⁷² Without a doubt, there was an ideological component to the termination of the Cold War.

As [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn and the leaders of the Velvet Revolution saw with a clarity chiseled in courage, there were only two ways to bring down the might of Soviet tyranny. One was to trump Soviet force physically, which was impossible for a tiny handful of dissidents in a day of SS-20 missiles and the KGB. The other was to counter physical force with moral, staking their stand on the conviction that truth would outweigh lies and the whole machinery of propaganda, deception, and terror. They chose the latter.¹⁷³

Yet if Christianity and religion was the catalyst for the end of the Cold War, one would expect that a post-secular Europe would have emerged during the 1990s instead of a unipolar world “marching to the tune of the mostly secular values of the victor: freedom, pluralism and liberal democratic capitalism.”¹⁷⁴ Moreover, considering the abundance of structural reasons (e.g.

171. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 21.

172. Adrian Pabst, “Christianity Ended the Cold War Peacefully,” *The Guardian*, November 11, 2009, accessed April 16, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/nov/10/religion-christianity>.

173. Os Guinness, *Time For Truth: Living Free in a World of Lies, Hype & Spin* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2007), 10-11.

174. Antony Lerman, “Renewing 1989's Rejection of Totality,” *The Guardian*, November 6, 2009, accessed April 17, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/06/1989-anniversary-totality-rejection>. Although these so-called “secular values”

political, social, economic, etc.) and the reality that virtually no one foresaw the impending Soviet collapse,¹⁷⁵ any attempt to retroactively attribute a singular cause to the end of the War may be a mismanagement of the seam between Occam's Razor and irreducible complexity.

While the communist policies of Moscow had undeniable effects on the economic and social structures of the Soviet Union that contributed to its destabilization, a truly ideological victory would expectantly generate a world consistent with Fukuyama's predictions in "The End of History?." Although this utopian dream did not come to fruition, it does not mean that leaders at the time did not attempt to bring it about by combining liberal ideas with governmental action. One of the most noteworthy instances of this post-Cold War mentality was George H. W. Bush's response to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. Speaking before a joint session of Congress in the 1991 State of the Union, he argued: "What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children's future."¹⁷⁶

21st Century America

Politically speaking, America began the new millennium contentiously. For one, the presidential election would be decided by the United States Supreme Court in *Bush v. Gore*.

have their philosophical roots in Western Christendom, as demonstrated in the Introduction and Part 1, at the end of the Cold War and even to this day they are largely understood to be "secular" and are therefore treated as such here.

175. Leon Aron, "Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong," *Foreign Policy*, June 20, 2011, accessed April 17, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/everything-you-think-you-know-about-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union-is-wrong>.

176. George H. W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 1991, accessed April 6, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.

More significantly, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 thrust America into a new era of foreign policy and military strategy. Taking a pluralistic approach, President Bush convened a press conference to deny any linkage between the religion of Islam and the attack on the American homeland, saying: “Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. They represent evil and war”¹⁷⁷ (President Obama would hold a similar position in his National Security Strategy, in which he rejects “the lie that America and its allies are at war with Islam”¹⁷⁸). Additionally, taking up the “New World Order” charge laid down by his father, Bush rallied coalitions of nations to both topple the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and to disrupt the safe haven provided to Al Qaeda (and others) in Afghanistan. In short, the post-WWII leading superpower imposed a new geopolitical framework upon two different nations in the name of freedom, democracy, and security. However, considering that the implementation of these decisions is still on going (not to mention the unintended consequences that are still to be dealt with), this portion of the discussion will be completed in Parts 3 and 4.

177. George W. Bush, “‘Islam is Peace’ Says President,” Office of the Press Secretary, September, 17, 2001, accessed April 17, 2015, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html>.

178. Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy,” Office of the Press Secretary, February 6, 2015, accessed April 17, 2016, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, 9. The actions of both Bush and Obama with regards to Islamic terrorism are eerily reminiscent of the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” signed with the Barbary States that avowed the U.S. government “is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion.”

Part 3

Deconstructing the Middle East

Islam cannot fulfill its role except by taking concrete form in a society, rather, in a nation; for man does not listen, especially in this age, to an abstract theory which is not seen materialized in a living society. From this point of view, we can say that the Muslim community has been extinct for a few centuries, for this Muslim community does not denote the name of a land in which Islam resides, nor is it a people whose forefathers lived under the Islamic system at some earlier time. It is the name of a group of people whose manners, ideas, and concepts, rules and regulations, values and criteria, are all derived from the Islamic source. The Muslim community with these characteristics vanished at the moment the laws of God became suspended on earth.

–Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*

Historically and philosophically speaking, the nation state system is Western. Yet looking at modern geography one might erroneously conclude that the principles and ideas leading to the nation state system are universal, hence the nearly 200 “sovereign states” around the globe. To the contrary, as demonstrated in the aforementioned chapters the nation state system is nothing short of an export – a product marketed to (or forced upon) the world by the leadership of the Western World over the course of hundreds of years. With regards to the Middle East, the nations seen today are the result of World War I. Although the victorious powers seized the Ottoman Empire and divided much of its territory as spoils of war, the Western methodology of demarcation did not permeate the fabric of society and consequently the people and ideas they espouse remain Middle Eastern. Therefore, the intent of this chapter is not to survey the entire history of a nation as done in Part 2 but instead examine the prevailing worldviews and ideas within the “case studies” of Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, and Transnational Terrorism in order to later address sources of contention in the dealings between

the United States as the leading power in the West and the Middle East as a, in Huntington terminology, “Civilization” (Part 4. Reconciling the West and the Middle East).

Afghanistan

Appearing in a myriad of sources, there is a regularly occurring cliché that Afghanistan is “the graveyard of empires.”¹⁷⁹ Yet considering Alexander the Great (330 B.C.), the Arabs (667 A.D.), Genghis Khan (1220), the three Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-1842, 1878-1880, 1919), the Soviets (1979-1989), and arguably operations by the United States and its allies (2003-Present), the cliché is not without its apparent points of validity.¹⁸⁰ In fact, while a dogmatic “graveyard of empires” approach to Afghanistan would be an egregious oversimplification, the social forces and dynamics of the country that have caused difficulties for governments, both foreign and domestic, to maintain order and control must be understood when analyzing the country.

In 1928-1929, as a result of a bloody civil war involving Kabul being laid siege and tribal uprisings in Jalalabad, the British dispatched the Royal Air Force to evacuate its embassy personnel and expatriate community.¹⁸¹ With the meddling British expelled, Afghans began a period of time during which they controlled their own affairs with a reduced level of foreign interference. This period also coincided with the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933-1973). Despite the isolated and financially inhibited status of Afghanistan when he succeeded his slain

179. Christian Caryl, “Bury the Graveyard,” *Foreign Policy*, July 26, 2010, accessed April 21, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/26/bury-the-graveyard>.

180. “Afghanistan: A History of Occupation,” *The Telegraph*, November 26, 2010, accessed April 22, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8162559/Afghanistan-a-history-of-occupation.html>.

181. Simon Williams and Steve Wilmot, ed., “RAF ‘Heroes of Kabul’ – 80th Anniversary,” Royal Air Force, February 9, 2009, accessed April 22, 2016, <http://www.raf.mod.uk/news/archive.cfm?storyid=61000209-1143-EC82-2E0C0B370FF5975C>. See also “Afghanistan: A History of Occupation,” *The Telegraph*.

father and the reality that he would enjoy one of the longest stints on a world throne, Zahir's reign would be undermined by cousins and uncles exerting power politically and militarily.¹⁸² With regards to positives, his time in power would see the successful securement of developmental aid from both America and the Soviets, "a remarkable achievement during the Cold War struggle for influence at the strategic Asian crossroads."¹⁸³ However the significance of this individual's administration lies not in his geopolitical successes or even his failures but in "the eyebrow-raising things: allowing women, in 1959, to discard the veil if they wanted to, letting raunchy Western films into the country, permitting wine production and, from 1963, gently half-easing the cork from that potent brew called democracy."¹⁸⁴

Ultimately, attempts to liberalize Afghanistan all but stopped when Mohammed Daud Khan overthrew King Zahir via military coup and forced him into exile in 1973. Although he had served as prime minister under Zahir, even maliciously reducing the King to a mere figurehead, Daud's tenure was not welcomed by many – facing multiple coup attempts during his first years in power, continual challenges from the Muslim Brotherhood, and was eventually unseated and killed in 1978 by members of the Afghan Communist party and portions of the military loyal to the top air force general.¹⁸⁵ In 1979, the U.S.S.R. invaded.

182. Adam Bernstein, "Former Afghan King Mohammad Zahir Shah," *The Washington Post*, July 24, 2007, accessed April 24, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/23/AR2007072301824.html>.

183. Bernstein, "Former Afghan King Mohammad Zahir Shah." While some sources attribute this to Zahir himself, others claim that it was his cousin Daoud Shah (see "Afghanistan: A History of Occupation," *The Telegraph*, and "Mohammed Zahir Shah," *The Economist*, July 26, 2007, accessed April 22, 2016, <http://www.economist.com/node/9539910>).

184. "Mohammed Zahir Shah," *The Economist*.

185. Harris M. Lentz, *Heads of States and Governments Since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 15, 20, accessed April 24, 2016, Google Books.

The Soviets along with their Communist allies within Afghanistan would go on to decimate entire communities, devastate large swaths of the countryside, and send millions of refugees across the various borders through its systematic targeting of elites and traditional institutions.¹⁸⁶ These communist efforts to impose their utopian systems upon an extremely traditional society would launch what has been characterized as Afghanistan’s “first national insurgency” (i.e. previous rebellions and counter-foreign invasion movements had been confined within regions north and east of Kabul while the Soviet occupation encountered resistance from all ethnic groups and throughout the entire country).¹⁸⁷ At the center of this resistance movement was the mujahideen (“Arabic *mujāhidīn*, plural of *mujāhid*, literally, person who wages jihad”¹⁸⁸). Although this group of individuals was not in and of themselves capable of routing the quantitatively and technologically superior Red Army, suffering an estimated one million civilian, 90,000 Mujahideen, and 18,000 Afghan troops vis-à-vis the 14,500 Soviet losses during the 9-year conflict, they did serve as a formidable proxy for the United States (along with Iran, Pakistan, China, and others) to channel supplies and weapons in the overarching effort to contain Soviet expansionism.¹⁸⁹

This alliance of convenience proved useful as an impediment to the U.S.S.R. but did little for the health and longevity of Afghanistan, for as soon as the Russians retreated the unified

186. Caryl, “Bury the Graveyard.”

187. Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 321, accessed April 25, 2016, Google Books. See also Caryl, “Bury the Graveyard.”

188. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “mujahideen,” accessed April 26, 2016, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mujahideen>.

189. Alan Taylor, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989,” *The Atlantic*, August 4, 2014, accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786>.

insurgency fractured into warring factions vying for control in the post Cold War power vacuum. Despite the absence of direct U.S. involvement in the war, America did continue to exert influence through allies (particularly Pakistan) and more importantly accepted the reality that the Islamic warfighters that had been organized to combat the Soviets would govern Afghanistan.¹⁹⁰ Emerging victorious from the infighting in 1996 was a group known as the Taliban, a group who some argued only won on the basis that those outside the southern regions wanted their lands pacified but would be described by refugees as “they called themselves religious leaders. . . . They would swear on the Qur’an. But they weren’t Muslims. Dogs wouldn’t do what they did.”¹⁹¹ Nonetheless this group, consisting almost entirely from the ethnic Pushtun tribes straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the largest single tribe composing roughly half of the nation’s twenty-five million people, maintained *de facto* control of the country (changing the name from the Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan); provided a level of authoritarian domestic security (albeit one with no corresponding administrative capacity for support to society); secured some international recognition to the point of pseudo-embassy representation in Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and somewhere in Queens, New York.¹⁹² Regrettably, this organization and the environment it espoused also provided a safe haven for another group: Al-Qaeda.

Following the events of 9/11, the United States would find itself aligned against the very people that it utilized to counter the Soviets. Moreover, because the U.S. began Operation

190. George Friedman, “The 30-Year War in Afghanistan,” Stratfor, June 29, 2010, accessed April 27, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100628_30_year_war_afghanistan.

191. Sarah Chayes, *The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 37, 64.

192. Hugh Pope, *Dining with Al-Qaeda: Three Decades Exploring the Many Worlds of the Middle East* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010), 172-77.

ENDURING FREEDOM and the Global War on Terror with insufficient time for American forces to serve as the primary force (barely 30 days after the terrorist attacks), Washington had to make arrangements with those who opposed the Taliban – those defeated during the Afghan civil war (e.g. the Northern Alliance, a group who had continued close relations with the Russians; Shiite groups in western Afghanistan who found support in relations with Iran and India; and other various groups and subgroups throughout the country).¹⁹³ Even after the major NATO and American military offensives began, the tribes continued to play a pivotal role in waging the war in Afghanistan. General David Petraeus would eventually operationalize a 2009 academic paper “One Tribe at a Time” by Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant. Referring to him as the “Lawrence of Afghanistan,”¹⁹⁴ Petraeus agreed with Gant’s field observation that the tribes were apprehensive to trust symbols of the central government such as the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police (also the entities the U.S. was training and equipping) and subsequently authorized a paradigm shift in accordance with Gant’s postulation: “Why continue to work against the tribal structures and traditions already in place? Not only let the tribes protect themselves, but encourage it”¹⁹⁵ (a sentiment shared by many at the time, to include Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: “My worry is that the Afghans come to see us as part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution. And then we are lost”¹⁹⁶).

193. Friedman, “The 30-Year War in Afghanistan.”

194. Richard Sisk, “Report: Petraeus Hails ‘Lawrence of Afghanistan,’” *Military.com*, July 1, 2014, accessed April 29, 2016, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/07/01/report-petraeus-hails-lawrence-of-afghanistan.html>.

195. Jim Gant, *One Tribe At A Time: The Paper That Changed the War in Afghanistan* (New York: Black Irish Entertainment LLC, 2014), 91-92.

196. John Barry, Evan Thomas, Ron Moreau, and Sami Yousafzai, “Obama’s Vietnam,” *Newsweek* 153, no. 6 (February 2009): 14-21, accessed April 29, 2016, Ebsco Host.

But this model would prove unsustainable. As the counter-insurgency doctrine fell into disfavor at the Pentagon and White House, the price tags associated with nation-building and tribal engagement proved more costly than many were willing to pay (ex. President Obama stating in January 2012 that “we’re turning a page on a decade of war” and signing a new national defense strategy titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”).¹⁹⁷ Yet even as the NATO mandate expired, the U.S. ceased combat operations and began withdrawing forces, and the Afghans conducted the 2014 elections in which the nation would transfer power democratically for the first time, the tribes are still the building block of society. Analysis of candidates during Afghan presidential elections is contextualized by which tribes a given candidate polls well and/or poorly.¹⁹⁸ By late 2015, the Taliban as a “conservative Pashtun movement” was rallying support in southern and eastern Afghanistan, but the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara areas of the central, northern, and western regions align more so with current President Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul.¹⁹⁹ Even as the Islamic State continues to expand its sphere of influence throughout the Middle East, the caliphate’s attempts to secure a foothold in Afghanistan have proven somewhat unsuccessful on the basis that it lacks a tribal constituency “given that it’s pan-Islamic, religiously puritanical agenda does, in general, not mesh well with tribal traditions.”²⁰⁰ Ultimately, although the future of the country after Western intervention

197. Sisk, “Report: Petraeus Hails ‘Lawrence of Afghanistan.’”

198. “Afghan Elections: What is at Stake in Presidential Vote,” *BBC News*, July 7, 2014, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-26747496>.

199. Emile Simpson, “The Islamic State of Afghanistan,” *Foreign Policy*, December 22, 2015, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/22/america-needs-to-make-a-deal-with-the-devil-in-helmand>.

200. Franz J. Marty, “On the Trail of the Islamic State in Afghanistan,” *Foreign Policy*, April 5, 2016, accessed April 20, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/05/afghanistan-islamic>

toppled the Taliban is still to be determined, if history is any indication the tribal component of the Afghan way of life will remain intact.

Iraq

Residing in the Fertile Crescent, the territory of modern-day Iraq has been occupied for the extent of recorded history. Whether the Babylonians, Persians, or Macedonians, the land of Mesopotamia (“land between two rivers” – the Tigris and Euphrates) is one rich in history and culture. Of the more recent empires, Iraq was controlled by the Ottomans. After World War I it was occupied by Britain (an occupation retroactively sanctioned by the international community when the League of Nations declared it a British mandate in 1920). As with many of its holdings during this period, twilight cast a shadow over the empire on which the sun never set in the form of nationalist movements. Stemming from the influence of nationalist activities in Syria, agitation flowed first into northern Iraq and then into the tribal areas in the middle Euphrates and by the summer of 1920 revolts had spread to the entirety of the country with the exception of the large cities of Baghdad, Mosul, and Al-Basrah where British forces were garrisoned.²⁰¹ While the revolt was subdued by force, it necessitated that Iraq and Britain reconcile their differences, culminating in a 1921 conference chaired by Winston Churchill that decided to crown emir Faysal I (exiled from Syria by the French) king of Iraq, provided his “government shall be constitutional, representative and democratic” (e.g. respecting freedom of religion and missionary endeavors, recognizing the rights of foreigners within its borders, treating all states

-state-taliban. Further support to this position is seen in alleged links between ISIS and tribes such as the Orakzai that differ from other tribes as they are Pakistani in origin and therefore foreign to Afghanistan.

201. Laura Etheredge, ed., *Middle East Region in Transition: Iraq* (New York: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2011), 119.

equally, cooperating with the League of Nations, etc.).²⁰²

Faysal was crowned king on August 23, 1921, and on October 10, 1922 an Anglo-Iraq treaty was signed in order to lay the foundation for an Iraqi constitution (the League of Nations required Mandatories “to facilitate their ‘progressive development’ as independent states. Such a provision of course meant that the Mandatory was always under challenge to show that the mandated territory was not yet ready ‘to stand alone’”).²⁰³ This treaty did not, however, resolve the struggle between Britain and the nationalistic aspirations of many within Iraq. To the contrary, tensions remained exacerbated between the two until 1929 when England announced that the mandate would be dissolved in 1932 – an idea that came to fruition on October 3, 1932 when Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations.

Yet despite an independent hybrid monarchical-representative government, lasting stability did not result by default. Instead, the Hashimite monarch experienced uprisings, coup attempts, and protests in 1936, 1941, 1948, 1952, 1956, and would ultimately be overthrown on July 14, 1958 by a group of military officers. Baghdad Radio broadcasted that the Army had liberated the people from the oppression of the corrupt group put into office by “imperialism” and from that point on Iraq, as a republic, would instead “maintain ties with other Arab countries.”²⁰⁴ This revolution radically modified the social structures of Iraq: enhancing the lives and position of the middle class, peasants, and urban workers; reviving long-suppressed ethnic,

202. Etheredge, *Middle East Region in Transition: Iraq*, 119-21.

203. C. L. Mowat, *Cambridge Modern History Volume XII: The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898-1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 294, accessed April 30, 2016, Google Books.

204. “1958: Coup in Iraq sparks jitters in Middle East,” BBC On This Day, 2008, accessed April 30, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/14/newsid_3736000/3736391.stm.

tribal, and sectarian conflicts (especially between Shia and Sunni and between Arabs and Kurds); and plunging its leaders into internal dissention because they did not possess a coherent ideology or effective organizational structure.²⁰⁵ Though it was referred to as a “republic” the governance of Iraq would be conducted by a series of strongmen, the most notable of which being Saddam Hussein who consolidated the Ba’thist Party’s power via yet another Iraqi coup in 1968 (the Ba’thists had only briefly held power in 1963).²⁰⁶

Meaning “renaissance” in Arabic, the Ba’thist ideology is a pan-Arab secular nationalism that regards individual Arab states as provinces or regions within the larger Arab nation.²⁰⁷ As Saddam and the party solidified control over Iraqi affairs, this not only placed a Sunni-led regime to oppress the Kurdish and Shite populations but also bolstered pan-Arab nationalism – neither of which placed Iraq on good terms with its Shite and Persian neighbor, Iran. As a result of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the geopolitical tensions between the two would encounter a flashpoint. Saddam Hussein felt threatened by the ascendancy of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ayatollah saw Hussein as a Sunni despot oppressing his nation’s Shia majority, thus Saddam embarked upon a preemptive solution to the problem by invading Iran in 1980 so as “to overthrow the Khomeini regime before that regime could overthrow him.”²⁰⁸ The resulting Iran-

205. “Iraqi Revolution and Coups,” Global Security, last updated November 7, 2011, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iraq-coup.htm>.

206. “Iraq,” The World Factbook, last updated April 27, 2016, accessed April 30, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>. See also *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. “Ba’th Party,” accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Bath-Party>.

207. Tarik Kafala, “The Iraqi Baath Party,” BBC News, March 25, 2003, accessed May 1, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm.

208. Roger Hardy, “The Iran-Iraq War: 25 Years On,” BBC News, September 22, 2005, accessed May 1, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm.

Iraq War would last from 1980-1988 and evolved from a rudimentary conventional war between two states to an internationalized crisis, colloquially referred to in part as “The Tanker War” when Iraq began attempting to weaken Iran by neutralizing its capability of using tankers to export oil (it was the increased foreign presence in the Gulf and the corresponding steady escalation of maritime incidents that served as a major contributing factor in Iran agreeing to a ceasefire).²⁰⁹

After this war of attrition, Iraq was considerably weakened. Two years later, Saddam would find himself in another international incident after directing the invasion and occupation of neighboring Kuwait – only this time the Western powers would be aligned against him. The coalition decisively expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but the decision was made to leave Saddam in power and consequently the minority Sunni and Ba’thist regime continued to suppress the Shia majority and the Kurds and thereby contributed to the region experiencing a level of semi-stability. Over a decade after the fact, in 2002 Saddam apologized to Kuwait urging the emirate “to remain free and faithful by not allying yourself with the aggressors” and warned the Kuwaiti people that the U.S. would “steal your wealth and turn you into slaves working for them and turn your leaders into local agents for American oil companies.”²¹⁰ Little did he know that the same Americans he slandered would lead another coalition to overthrow him the following year.

Hindsight being of impeccable acuity, similar to the 1958 revolution that facilitated the

209. Anthony Cordesman, “XIV. The Tanker War and the Lessons of Naval Conflict,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, n.d., accessed May 1, 2016, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap14.pdf>.

210. Rym Brahimi and Walter Rodgers, “Kuwait Rejects Saddam’s Apology,” CNN, December 7, 2002, accessed May 1, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/12/07/sproject.irq.saddam.kuwait/index.html>.

post-monarchy power vacuum the 2003 toppling of the Ba’thist regime radically modified the social structures of Iraq. For instance, with the Sunni controlled government ousted, Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr and his militia group, the Mehdi Army, attained a level of prominence and galvanized anti-U.S. sentiment after the invasion.²¹¹ Similarly, in the absence Saddam’s loyal and effective security infrastructure the emergence of ISIS met little resistance from the fledgling post-2003 government. Exacerbating the Sunni-led Islamic State situation is the reality that the organization gained momentum and freedom of movement due to President Maliki’s “steady build-up of a new authoritarian regime within the cloak of democracy in Iraq, and his steady increase and violent repression of Sunnis since the 2010 election.”²¹² Moreover, the demographic shift from Sunni to Shia has begun to repair decades of animosity to the point that Tehran is providing ground troops and conducting air strikes to battle ISIS and support their “friends” – the Iraqi government.²¹³ Simply put, the Western intervention that altered the prevailing ideas and worldviews within Iraq has brought about second and third order effects domestically, regionally, and globally.

Egypt

Finding its lifeblood in the Nile Egypt stands as one of the world’s oldest civilizations, albeit not one consistently operating in accordance with its own autonomy. Whether the Greeks, Romans, or Ottomans, Egypt has often been a territorial holding or puppet state of an empire. Forming the only land bridge between Asia and Africa, Egypt has been of strategic value to

211. “Iraqi Shia Protesters Storm Baghdad Parliament,” BBC News, April 30, 2016, accessed May 1, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36176910>.

212. Cordesman, “Iraq: The Enemy of My Enemy is Not My Friend.”

213. Julian Borger, “Iran Air Strikes Against ISIS Requested by Iraqi Government, Says Tehran,” *The Guardian*, December 6, 2014, accessed May 1, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/05/iran-conducts-air-strikes-against-isis-exremists-iraq>.

foreign powers for millennia. In the late 19th Century, as the Suez Canal opened a maritime passage from the Indian Ocean into the Mediterranean, Egypt's value only continued to increase. In 1882, the domestic situation in Egypt was dire (e.g. a mutinous military, a bankrupt treasury, a dislocated governance and administration methodology, etc.) and thereby endangering the Canal to the point that Britain resolved to occupy the country in a situation described by the Earl of Cromer (Britain's first Viceroy of Egypt) as: "we don't really want the damned place but if we don't [take control] someone else will grab it and the whole balance of power will be mucked up."²¹⁴ Some historians and analysts contend that the "security of the canal" argument was a diversion attempting to make intervention palatable to certain government officials and the general populace while responding to the nationalist threat to either the "Anglo-French dictation of Egypt finances"²¹⁵ or the prestige of Britain being challenged not only in Egypt but also in India and "the East."²¹⁶ The key contextual takeaway is the foreign, particularly Western, interventionism in Egypt's recent history.

This interventionism continued well into the 20th Century as Britain converted its occupation of Egypt to a Protectorate in December of 1914. Egypt's value (or at least that of the Suez Canal) to the West only increased as the British and French expanded their holdings in Africa and the Middle East, especially after the First World War. In February 1922 Britain

214. The Earl of Cromer, "The Earl of Cromer: Why Britain Acquired Egypt in 1882, (1908)," Fordham University, July 1998, accessed April 19, 2016, <http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1908cromer.html>.

215. John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9, no. 4 (November 1978): 473-75, accessed April 19, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/162074>.

216. Dan Halvorson, "Prestige, Prudence and Public Opinion in the 1882 British Occupation of Egypt," Griffith University, accessed April 20, 2016, http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/34630/64876_1.pdf?sequence=1, 1.

renounced its Protectorate over Egypt but “it took the British and the Egyptians from February 1922 to August 1936 to come to an understanding concerning ‘the independence with reservations’ granted to Egypt.”²¹⁷ Even as Egypt began to attain more and more autonomy, by the time of WWII Hitler understood that while he could not invade England he could secure quality sources of oil, capitalize on the strategic value of the Suez Canal, and possibly arouse the Muslim world against the British (and the Zionists) by moving his forces into the Middle East.²¹⁸ Although Hitler ultimately lost, the war took its toll upon England as well. As the sun finally began to set on the British Empire, Egyptian nationalists forced King Farouk into exile in mid-1952 and a year later an assembly of army officers took over the government effectively replacing the short-lived Kingdom of Egypt (1922-1953) with the modern Republic of Egypt.

Leading this movement was Gamal Abdel Nasser, “an ambitious and visionary young colonel who dreamed of reasserting the dignity and freedom of the Arab nation, with Egypt at the heart of the renaissance.”²¹⁹ As one eyewitness observed,

The charismatic Nasser inspired Arabs everywhere to dream of the unification of all Arab countries under one government to bring back the ‘old lost glory’ of the Arabs. Nasser’s vision, which was firmly linked to hatred of Western imperialism and Zionism, rallied the Arab world into a warlike frenzy. Many people gathered in cafés to listen on the radio to his passionate speeches, heroic defiance of the West, and promises to restore Arab glory.²²⁰

By 1956, following the geopolitical debacle that was the Suez Crisis, the Egyptians were at long

217. Pierre Crabites, “Britain’s Debt to King Farouk,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941, accessed April 20, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-kingdom/1941-07-01/britains-debt-king-farouk>.

218. Ibid.

219. Derek Brown, “1956: Suez and the End of Empire,” *The Guardian*, March 14, 2001, accessed April 20, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education1>.

220. Nonie Darwish, *Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror* (New York: Sentinel, 2006), 4-5.

last in charge of their own affairs after successfully expelling British forces. The result was a populace rallying behind the nationalistic ideals espoused by Nasser, ideals that would come to be known as Pan Arabism and serve as a unifying force in the Middle East (ex. an understanding of life and reality in the region that contributed to many of the wars involving Israel). In Nasser's own words: "If we stand united as one, no enemy can ever conquer us . . . For it is in our division that Israel has been able to remain victorious."²²¹ This is the context in which the modern Republic of Egypt must be understood – a nation united by ideas about who they are and a perceived divine purpose.

Ever since the Egyptian army ended President Hosni Mubarak's 20-year reign in February 2011, "the rule of law has been unstable across the country, and the judicial system's independence [has been] poorly institutionalized. Judicial procedures tend to be protracted, costly, and subject to political pressure."²²² By and large, this tumultuous power vacuum has enabled authoritarian and oppressive Islamic ideologies to establish a foothold within essentially every facet of society (the constitution does provide for freedom of belief and religious practice but Islam is the official state religion and the primary source of legislation is Sharia principles).²²³ Demonstrations of this reality can be seen in two of the primary political parties at work in post-Mubarek elections – the Al Nour Party and the Freedom and Justice Party.

Although there is a key difference between the two that must be understood, the similarities

221. Rym Ghazal, "Remembering Nasser, the Godfather of Pan Arabism," *The National* – UAE, September 28, 2010, accessed April 20, 2016, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/remembering-nasser-the-godfather-of-pan-arabism#full>.

222. Terry Miller, Kim Holmes, and Edwin Fuelner, "2013 Index of Economic Freedom," Heritage Foundation, accessed April 18, 2016, http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2013/book/index_2013.pdf, 198.

223. "Egypt," U.S. Department of State, September 1, 2011, accessed April 18, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171733.pdf>, 1.

attest to the viability of constructivism.

The Salafi ideology banning its followers from involving themselves in politics notwithstanding, the Al Nour Party formed as an umbrella organization for the various Salafi movements and explicitly supported the candidacy of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.²²⁴ Fearing that non-Islamists were attempting to replace the Mubarek government with a secularist state, there was widespread agreement in the Salafi community that the doctrine of necessity (*darura*) allowed them to participate in the political arena on the grounds of a perceived threat to Sharia and the Islamic identity of the country.²²⁵ Similarly, and in spite of what its namesake suggests, the Freedom and Justice Party is in fact the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. As stated by the Brotherhood's Deputy General Guide, their "overall mission as Muslim Brothers is to empower [Allah's] Religion on Earth, to organize our life and the lives of people on the basis of Islam . . . and to the subjugation of people to [Allah] on Earth."²²⁶ This is where the key distinction between the two factions arises.

Although Islam and Sharia are the driving force behind both parties' ideology and policy platform, they differ in terms of their end state. For the Salafi movement, the focus is largely internal – strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith, calling people to "true Islam," and resisting democratic and Western influence on the basis that it subordinates the will of Allah to the will of

224. Yusef Selman Inanc, "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: Egypt's Rival Islamist Groups," *Daily Sabah*, May 7, 2014, accessed April 18, 2016, <http://www.dailysabah.com/features/2014/05/07/salafis-and-the-muslim-brotherhood-egypts-rival-islamist-groups>.

225. Samuel Tadros, "What is a Constitution Anyway?," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 14 (January 2013): 10, accessed April 18, 2016, <http://www.hudson.org/research/9905-what-is-a-constitution-anyway->.

226. *Ibid.*, 8.

man.²²⁷ Conversely, the political outlook for the Freedom and Justice Party is comprehensive:

It is to explain the Quran, to raise the wealth of people, to unify Muslims, to combat ignorance, to free Islamic lands from foreigners and their allies and to promote peace across the world. The struggle is quite pervasive and includes every aspect of daily life. In order to achieve these goals, the Muslim Brotherhood has not avoided making alliances in politics and being pragmatic.²²⁸

In light of this, while both parties bear significance to the nation of Egypt due to the reality that they represent the views held by the majority of Egyptians, the Freedom and Justice Party wields a greater impact upon the region than the internally focused Al Nour Party. Considering the Muslim Brotherhood has stated via its puppet-party the intent to restore “the leading role of Egypt in its regional and Arab, Islamic, African and global spheres,”²²⁹ the Freedom and Justice Party stands to spread political Islam thereby creating an Egypt that may stand as an impediment to Western interests in the region.

Iran

Unlike the majority of its neighbors in the region, Iran is of Persian heritage rather than Arab. Also unlike many of its neighbors, rather than being a former vassal or possession of the Ottoman Empire the land of modern-day Iran (known as Persia until 1935) instead represents territory held by a number of Persian dynasties that battled the Ottomans for centuries. Nonetheless, by the turn of the 20th Century the dynastic system that had withstood numerous conflicts would come under siege from a Western antithesis – constitutionalism. Materializing as a weapon against royal autocracy, the Iranian constitutionalist movement was led by an awkwardly assembled coalition of interests and contradictory understandings of what a

227. Inanc, “Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: Egypt's Rival Islamist Groups.”

228. Ibid.

229. “The Founding Statement of the Freedom and Justice Party,” Freedom and Justice Party, accessed April 21, 2016, <http://www.fjponline.com/view.php?pid=1>.

constitutional government should achieve. The three main components of this movement were: the *ulama* (“the learned of Islam, those who possess the quality of ‘*ilm*, ‘learning,’ in its widest sense”²³⁰), the Shia religious establishment, disjoined in their support but seeing the movement as a means to guarantee their independence from the state and possibly increase their power; the traditional bazaar merchants, a group that detested the Shah’s practice of granting concessions to foreign governments and saw Iran’s acquiescence to Christian economic interests as and offensive to their religious sensibilities; and a small group of radical reformers, motivated by sentiments of liberalism, patriotism, and a belief that a constitutional government was critical to a strong and progressive Iran.²³¹ Put another way, the combination of religion and Western constitutionalism yielded a hybrid with considerable mobilization capacity that could be characterized as “a weak state that existed with a strong society where the clerics, merchants, statesmen, and other social groups were serious challengers to the state’s authority.”²³²

The first Persian constitution materialized from 1906-1907. Modeled after the Belgian Constitution of 1831 (with consultation of the Bulgarian, French, and Ottoman constitutions also taking place), the new legal foundation restricted the power of the king; expanded the power of the prime minister, parliament, and the newly established secular judiciary (thereby mitigating the religious jurists’ traditional authority); yet also established unprecedented institutional powers within the clerical establishment and simultaneously undermined the new civil liberties,

230. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. “Ulama,” accessed May 2, 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/topic/ulama>.

231. William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 143-45.

232. Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 288-89.

Parliament, and the judiciary.²³³ As the sociopolitical environment of the country continued to evolve, the country would experience a civil war and Mohammad Ali Shah would attain power, albeit briefly, to the point that his despotic renown would be characterized in the Ottoman press as a Muslim ruler who slaughtered and oppressed his people without peer – his closest rival being non-Muslim Czar Nicholas of Russia.²³⁴ By 1909, the revolutionary environment at hand forced him to abdicate but he would attempt (and fail) to regain his position by force, rallying Azerbaijani supporters to counter the nationalist movement, in 1911.²³⁵ In fact, from 1909-1914 Persia saw the rapid succession of over 10 short-lived governments at the same time that foreign involvement, particularly from Britain and Russia, was on the rise (e.g. Russia issuing an ultimatum to Tehran to oust American Morgan Shuster who was employed by the government to reform public finances; protests and shifts in public opinion that effected England's ability to craft an effective foreign policy for Iran in conjunction with Russia's financial dependence on Britain; etc.).²³⁶

Further exacerbating the foreign involvement predicament was the outbreak of WWI and

233. Janet Afary, "Civil Liberties and the Making of Iran's First Constitution," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 25, no. 2 (2005): 341-42, accessed May 3, 2016, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/186819>.

234. Palmira Brummett, *Image & Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2000), 96, accessed May 3, 2016, Google Books.

235. David N. Yaghoubian, *Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in Iran* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2014), 76-78, accessed May 3, 2016, Google Books.

236. N. Nasiri-Moghaddam, "Iran and its Eastern Regions (1848-1989)," in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia Vol. VI*, ed. Chahryar Adle (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2005), 476, accessed May 3, 2016, Google Books, and Mansour Bonakdarian, *Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 197, accessed May 3, 2016, Google Books.

the disregard for Persian neutrality by the Ottomans, Russians, and British who engaged in battle and/or occupied swaths of Persian territory. Even as the withdrawal of foreign forces took place in the immediate post-war period and into the early 1920s, competing social forces continued to wreak havoc upon the country. In 1921, army officer Reza Khan supported a coup that led to extensive political, economic, and social changes (he became prime minister in 1923; parliament voted him ruler in 1925, deposing Ahmad Shah; and crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926) – yet amidst the transition from the Qajar dynasty (1795-1925) to the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), the Shia clergy tended to view their role as one of “protecting the people from the power of the state.”²³⁷

In 1935, Persia officially changed its name to Iran – a symbolic adjustment for a nation dealing with an internal nationalist movement and coming at a time when independent states and self-determination of peoples were the geopolitical commodities being exported around the globe. When Germany resurfaced as a force to be reckoned with at the onset of WWII, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reliance on German technology in support of his ambitious development plans troubled the Allies and on August 25, 1941 Iran once again found itself occupied by British and Russian (this time under the Soviet banner) forces.²³⁸ During this time, Reza Shah abdicated (or was deposed) in September 1941 and was replaced by his son, Mohammad Reza. In January of 1942, Iran, England, and the U.S.S.R. signed the Tripartite Treaty that guaranteed political independence and territorial sovereignty for Iran (Article 5 stated: “The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities

237. Glenn E. Curtis and Eric Hooglund, ed., *Iran: A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), xl-xli, accessed May 3, 2016, Google Books.

238. Bill Samii, “World War II -- 60 Years After: The Anglo-Soviet Invasion Of Iran And Washington-Tehran Relations,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 6, 2005, accessed May 3, 2016, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058759.html>.

between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended”).²³⁹ Although this treaty stated that it was entered into “having in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter,” the behind-the-scenes involvement of the British, Soviets, and Americans (through personnel from the Office of Strategic Services) indicated that the initial frosts of the Cold War had already begun to fall.²⁴⁰

Domestically, the end of the Second World War and initial ruminations of the Cold War ushered in a critical period in modern Iranian history. In 1950, Ali Razmara became prime minister but was assassinated, leaving the seat open for the nationalist Mohammad Mossadeq in early 1951. That same year, Mossadeq’s government voted to nationalize the oil industry dominated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and he subsequently demanded that he be made Minister of War, using the newly acquired power to dismiss officers loyal to the Shah and hedging his position by gaining support from the *Tudeh* Party (i.e. the Iranian Communist Party that the pro-Western Shah had banned).²⁴¹ Amid the internal strife produced by Mossadeq’s monumental reforms, the Shah attempted to dismiss Mossadeq but instead found himself fleeing the country as a result of public protests in support of the prime minister. Departing the country in 1953, the Shah, however, would only be gone for a few months.

239. “Iran-U.S.S.R.-Great Britain,” *The American Journal of International Law* 36, no. 3 (July 1942): 177, accessed May 3, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2213572>, and Samii, “World War II -- 60 Years After: The Anglo-Soviet Invasion Of Iran And Washington-Tehran Relations.

240. “Iran-U.S.S.R.-Great Britain,” *The American Journal of International Law*, 175, and Samii, “World War II -- 60 Years After.”

241. “Iran Profile – Timeline,” BBC News, February 29, 2016, accessed May 3, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14542438>, and Thayer Watkins, “Mohammad Mossadeq, the Nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Attempted Overthrow of the Shah,” San Jose State University Department of Economics, n.d., accessed May 3, 2016, <http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/mossadeq.htm>.

Also in 1953, the CIA and British intelligence backed a coup that utilized the alienated military officers to reinstate the Shah and try, convict, and sentence Mossadeq for treason. For the Western powers, this coup removed a Communist sympathizer and replaced him with a pro-West regime; preserved access to critical oil supplies while successfully countering the Soviet's access; and established a critical strategic foothold during the perpetual tensions of the Cold War. For the Shah, it brought him back to power for a quarter of a century. For Iran, it placed a recipe for social unrest on a low-simmer for the extent of his reign. Formulated from 1958-1963 and promoted from 1963-1978, the Shah attempted to provide a legitimizing ideology for his regime and foreign involvement (in the face of an increasingly politically aware population) through the "White Revolution" and its message of modernization and its championing of revolutionary nationalism.²⁴² Despite his best efforts to craft a narrative conducive to his administration, the reality that he surrounded himself with symbols of wealth, did little to curb his lavish lifestyle, and ultimately ignored the mounting discontent of his people fostered an environment where the fissures between the "haves" and the "have-nots" combined with frustrations of perceived Western influence on Tehran led to the 1979 Revolution.²⁴³

In January, the political situation deteriorated to the point that the Shah and his family were forced into exile; in February, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (the Islamic fundamentalist exiled by the Shah for opposing the regime) returned after 14 years in Iraq and France; and by April the secular state of Iran was officially replaced by the Islamic Republic of Iran following a

242. Ali M. Ansari, "The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, 'Modernization' and the Consolidation of Power," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2001): 1-3, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284172>.

243. Heather Lehr Wagner, *The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), 52, accessed May 4, 2016, Google Books.

referendum.²⁴⁴ By November, the fundamentalist Islamic militancy would generate the Iran Hostage Crisis in which 52 American hostages were seized in the U.S. embassy while their captors demanded for the Shah's extradition (he was receiving medical treatment in the United States at that time). In short, the year 1979 is the standard by which the Islamic Republic is measured even to this day. This momentum continued into 1980. For one, as discussed previously, the Iran-Iraq War that began when Saddam invaded Iran evolved into what the Ayatollah believed was a "Holy War" and contextually is regarded by some as the single-greatest defining event for Iran's politics, revolutionary ideology, and perspectives on security and society.²⁴⁵ But on the home front, the Ayatollah established the Council of the Cultural Revolution that was charged with shaping the social fabric and worldview of the Iranian people and embarked upon a three-year purge of the universities that sought to cleanse ideological debate forums of "subversives" (i.e. authoritarian censorship).²⁴⁶

And such has been the foundation for Iranian society ever since. The group responsible for the student protests that eventually gave rise to the 1979 Revolution have since formed a political party – Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Leader – that sources its ideology from the Shia belief in a successor to the Prophet and the historical narrative of Imam Mahdi or the "Twelfth Imam" (modern Shias believe that the Twelfth Imam did not die and will one day

244. "Iran Profile – Timeline," BBC News.

245. Behnam Ben Taleblu, "The Long Shadow of the Iran-Iraq War," *The National Interest*, October 23, 2014, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-long-shadow-the-iran-iraq-war-11535>.

246. Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (Updated Edition)* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 250, accessed May 4, 2016, Google Books.

reappear to resume his rightful role as spiritual and temporal ruler).²⁴⁷ As a direct byproduct of this ideology,

The “Islamic” Constitution of Iran, introduced by Khomeini in 1979, is a mixture of Western and Islamic forms, not an “Islamic” constitution as such. Far from being subject to Islamic law, Khomeini made it clear that the Islamic state, as successor to the Prophet Muhammad, had the power to override Islamic law, even in such fundamentals of the faith as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage.²⁴⁸

It is this same belief in the succession of the Prophet and the Twelfth Imam that has enabled the authoritarian policy platform of the regime to last for more than 30 years (successors to the Prophet are considered infallible and Khomeini established a theory that postulated the most learned scholar should rule as the Imam’s deputy until Imam Mahdi returns from his currently hidden state)²⁴⁹ and why the nation’s nuclear endeavor is such a destabilizing force in the region (Khomeini allowing himself to be referred to as “Imam” exploited a religious source of power and the eschatological implications of the Twelfth Imam unifying the world under Islam).²⁵⁰

Consequently, this bulwark of ideology that has buttressed the regime’s power base has also led to the façade of party politics within the country. In addition to banning those who oppose the government, candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council, a powerful 12-member body that vets political candidates prior to elections and certifies their eligibility to run for

247. Cynthia Shawamreh, “Islamic Legal Theory and the Context of Islamist Movements,” *Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 213, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://www3.nd.edu/~intl/V2I2/Shawamreh.pdf>.

248. Malise Ruthven, *Islam: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.

249. Shawamreh, “Islamic Legal Theory,” 198, 215.

250. Ruthven, *Islam: A Very Short Introduction*, 71, 131.

office.²⁵¹ Thus, even elected officials claiming membership in a different political party become yet another extension of the theocratic regime. This can be seen in current president Hassan Rouhani who, despite being a so-called “reformist” that proclaims the value of unity and meritocracy, originates from within the regime and has a history of quelling non-violent protests, suppressing free speech, and endorsing the employment of chemical weapons.²⁵² Therefore, regardless of the illusion of representative government or republicanism, “as long as criticism is considered a danger to the system, Iran will never have a true multi-party democracy.”²⁵³

Transnational Terrorism

Terrorism is an enigma. While attempts to define the term exist in abundance, a standardized definition upon which the international community agrees upon is notably absent. To the contrary, upon examining the assorted definitions available too often “rather than learning what terrorism is, one instead finds . . . a somewhat potted historical – and, in respect of the modern accepted usage of the term, a uselessly anachronistic – description.”²⁵⁴ Further complicating matters is the innate difficulties in discussing and defining terrorism independent of

251. Asa Fitch and Aresu Eqbali, “Iran Disqualifies Most Candidates in Election for Clerical Body,” *The Wall Street Journal*, January 26, 2016, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-disqualifies-most-candidates-in-election-for-clerical-body-1453825693#:TPW4GSa9KCQ31A>.

252. Steven Ditto, “Who Is Hassan Rouhani?,” Washington Institute, September 24, 2013, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-is-hassan-rouhani>.

253. Jashar Erfanian and Mitra Khalatbari, “Rouhani encourages Political Freedom in Iran,” *Deutsche Welle*, September 1, 2014, accessed January 25, 2015, <http://dw.de/p/1Anpv>.

254. Bruce Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism,” *The New York Times on the Web: Books*, 1998, accessed May 4, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/h/hoffman-terrorism.html>.

the connections between terrorist organizations and the nations that support them.²⁵⁵ However, upon further examination the most widely accepted contemporary understandings of the term contain a key conceptual component: terrorism “is fundamentally and inherently political.”²⁵⁶ In light of this, if one assumes that terrorism is a politically motivated act conducted by an individual (or group of individuals) then the analysis of terrorism can be framed similarly to the aforementioned sections (i.e. Thomas Dye’s postulation that ideas are combined with governmental action to formulate public policy and the psychological observation that “human cognition and behavior are powerfully influenced by sets of beliefs and assumptions about life and reality”). Thus the intent of this case study is not to provide an *ad nauseum* survey of the development of terrorist organizations, but instead to discuss the development of modern Middle Eastern terrorism and a cross-section of the motivating forces behind it.

Brutal atrocities for political purposes are not a new occurrence in the Middle East. To the contrary, the Assyrians are often considered “the earliest practitioners of psychological warfare” to the point that in ancient times the term “Assyrian” was synonymous with “cruelty to one’s neighbors.”²⁵⁷ Over a thousand years later the piracy and forcible acquisition of Western slaves by the Barbary Pirates led William Eaton to assert: “There is but one language which can be held to these people and this is terror.”²⁵⁸ Even in the 20th and 21st Centuries, Palestinian

255. Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 1-2.

256. Bruce Hoffman, “Defining Terrorism,” in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, 3rd ed., ed. Russell Howard, Reid Sawyer and Natasha Bajema (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), 5.

257. Randall D. Law, *Terrorism: A History* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), 10-11, accessed May 5, 2016. Google Books.

258. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 65.

nationalist organizations (e.g. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, non-Islamist militias associated with the Palestinian Authority such as Fatah Tanzim, etc.)²⁵⁹ and the secular movements trained by Hezbollah (a fundamentally religious organization that receives support from Iran and Syria)²⁶⁰ employ terrorism to support their objectives. However the events of September 11, 2001 radically adjusted the way in which terrorism is perceived in the modern era.

The post-9/11 world has led some to argue that “terrorism in the name of religion has become the predominant model for political violence in the modern world.”²⁶¹ More specifically, the correlation is drawn between terrorism and the religion of Islam. While this has regrettably produced a number of convoluted responses and sweeping generalizations (to be addressed in Part 4), the fact remains that there are many who view it as their duty as Muslims to wage *jihad* against those considered to oppose the will of Allah – which is often the West. Such a position finds its modern ideological roots in the teachings of a Western-educated Egyptian by the name of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). Regarded as the “intellectual godfather” of the Muslim Brotherhood, there exists a level of ambiguity as to whether Qutb’s disenchantment was primarily seated in a detestation of the United States or authoritarian Islamic governments that failed to adhere to Muslim ideals.²⁶² Nevertheless, the impact of his work remains. Describing

259. Matthew Levitt and Ehud Waldoks, “The Return of Palestinian Nationalist Terrorism,” The Washington Institute, May 3, 2002, accessed May 5, 2016, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-return-of-palestinian-nationalist-terrorism>.

260. John Moore, “The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview,” PBS Frontline, 2014, accessed May 5, 2016, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html>.

261. Gus Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing, 2016), Chapter 7, accessed May 5, 2016, Google Books.

262. Omar Sacirbey, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Intellectual Godfather,’” *The Washington Post*, February 12, 2011, accessed May 6, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>

the Arabic word for “striving” (i.e. *jihad*) as “any form of activity, either personal or community wide, of Muslims in attempting to strive for the cause of God and for the sake of Islam,” Qutb’s world-renowned commentary on Islamic scholasticism, *Milestones*, outlines the Muslim’s responsibility towards three categories of non-believers: “one, those with whom there was peace; two, the people with whom the Muslims were at war; and three, the Dhimmies [non-Muslims living in a Muslim country whose protection and rights were to be protected by the Muslim government].”²⁶³ Those in the first category were to go unharmed, provided they continually met the obligations of the peace treaties in existence; those in the second category, war was to be declared against the “polytheists,” “hypocrites,” and “the ‘People of the Book’ [i.e. Jews and Christians] who declare open enmity, until they agree to pay Jizyah [i.e. tax] or accept Islam;” and those in the third category were to be protected accordingly.²⁶⁴

Contextually, Qutb’s position developed in concert with a number of geopolitical and social circumstances transpiring during his lifetime. For one, the French and British capitalized on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and created new governments and maps for the Middle East; for a proud man such as Qutb “the humiliation of his country at the hands of secular leaders and Western puppets was galling.”²⁶⁵ After his time in the United States, he struggled to understand a society with rampant promiscuity, materialism, and vulgarity that successfully blinded people to the “real zenith of civilization, which for Qutb began with Muhammad in the

[/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/AR2011021106019.html](http://wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/AR2011021106019.html).

263. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Cedar Rapids, IA: The Mother Mosque Foundation, n.d.), 53.

264. *Ibid.*, 54.

265. David Von Drehle, “A Lesson in Hate,” *Smithsonian Magazine*, February 2006, accessed May 7, 2016, <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/a-lesson-in-hate-109822568>.

seventh century and reached its apex in the Middle Ages, carried triumphantly by Muslim armies.”²⁶⁶ As these circumstances fused with his deeply held beliefs, he leveraged his intellectual prowess to become the most influential advocate for *jihad* in the modern era and the chief developer of doctrines legitimizing violent Islamic resistance to so-called Muslim regimes whose implementation of Islamic precepts is deemed imperfect (doctrines extended to the Western World in accordance with the second category of non-believers).²⁶⁷

It is these ideas espoused by Qutb and the geopolitical context in which they were written and marketed that are critical to the understanding of *jihad* as waged by *al Qaeda*. Osama bin Laden established a clear and detailed framework for understanding the *al Qaeda* perspective on the struggle between Islam and the West in his “Letter to America.” He wrote, “While seeking Allah's help, we form our reply based on two questions directed at the Americans: (Q1) Why are we fighting and opposing you? (Q2) What are we calling you to, and what do we want from you?”²⁶⁸ To answer the first question, bin Laden meticulously outlined a number of “tragedies” America inflicted upon him and fellow Muslims – attacking them in Palestine and Somalia; supporting the Russians in opposing the Muslim uprisings in Chechnya; “stealing” oil at “paltry prices” via international influence and military threats; occupying Muslim countries and starving their populations; and supporting the Jews “in their idea that Jerusalem is their eternal capital.” Yet, by his own admittance this list was by no means considered exhaustive:

266. Von Drehle, “A Lesson in Hate.”

267. Robert Irwin, “Is This the Man who Inspired Bin Laden?,” *The Guardian*, October 31, 2001, accessed May 7, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan-terrorism3>.

268. Osama bin Laden, “Letter to America,” *The Guardian*, November 24, 2002, accessed May 5, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver>.

These tragedies and calamities are only a few examples of your oppression and aggression against us. It is commanded by our religion and intellect that the oppressed have a right to return the aggression. Do not await anything from us but Jihad, resistance and revenge. Is it in any way rational to expect that after America has attacked us for more than half a century, that we will then leave her to live in security and peace?!!

With the “why?” foundation established, the leader of *al Qaeda* transitioned to answering the second question (“what are we calling you to, and what do we want from you”). First and foremost, he called for America to embrace Islam. From there he demanded that the United States end the “oppression, lies, immorality and debauchery that has spread” throughout the country; take “an honest stance with [itself]...to discover that [it is] a nation without principles or manners;” terminate support for Israel, the Indians in Kashmir, the Russians against the Chechens, and the Manila Government against Muslims in the Philippines; withdrawal forces from Islamic countries; remove support for “corrupt leaders” of Muslim countries; and interact with *al Qaeda* on “the basis of mutual interests and benefits.” At first glance it could be misconstrued that these are distinct and separate demands. However, when understood at their fundamental essence and interpreted through the lens of Qutb’s framework for *jihad*, it becomes evident that bin Laden’s entire answer to the second question is a multifaceted call to Islam. In other words, if America willingly embraces the Islamic faith then the remaining portions of the second answer will come about automatically (i.e. the newfound ideas would combine with governmental action to generate the demanded policy decisions).

That said, while it is critical to understand the pivotal role played by *jihad* as a motivator for terrorism it is also paramount that one understands the term is interpreted and applied differently by various groups invoking it as the mandate for their cause. For example, the U.S. backed warlords in Afghanistan during the 1980s sought to validate their looting and pillaging while the Taliban that toppled them endeavored towards a state that would enforce *Sharia*; “both

parties use the same language of legitimacy – Islam, *jihad*, and *mujahideen* – which adds to the confusion, but their similarities are skin-deep.”²⁶⁹ Similarly, as a field reporter observed with regards to ISIS:

We have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways. First, we tend to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al-Qaeda to an organization that has decisively eclipsed it. The Islamic State supporters I spoke with still refer to Osama bin Laden as “Sheikh Osama,” a title of honor. But jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s priorities and current leadership.²⁷⁰

Considering that the Taliban and Islamic State organizations have since declared *jihad* against one another replete with rhetoric campaigns undermining the spiritual and religious credibility of leadership on both sides, it becomes increasingly apparent that the global *jihad* movement is in disarray.²⁷¹ Thus, sound analysis of the issue of terrorism in the Middle East must not only sift through the religious and secular genres of terror, but, in the event it is deemed religiously motivated, must take into account which strain and interpretation of Islam and/or *jihad* is at work in a given situation. Failing to manage this compendium of differing ideas during the analytical process will inevitably lead to superficiality and impreciseness – a recipe for disaster if the analysis and resulting recommendations are the driving force behind strategy and policy development.

269. Nushin Arbabzadah, “The 1980s Mujahideen, the Taliban and the Shifting Idea of Jihad,” *The Guardian*, April 28, 2011, accessed May 7, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/28/afghanistan-mujahideen-taliban>.

270. Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” *The Atlantic*, March 2015, accessed May 1 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980>.

271. Aaron Kliegman, “Taliban and Islamic State Declare Jihad on Each Other,” Center for Security Policy, April 23, 2015, accessed May 7, 2016, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/04/23/taliban-and-islamic-state-declare-jihad-on-each-other>.

Part 4

Reconciling the West and the Middle East

War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. . . . Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and Law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to obtain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory.

–Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Ideas matter. According to a tradition stemming from the days of Aristotle, man is considered distinct from the animals, capable of sensation and appetite, due to their unique ability to wield rationality.²⁷² When correlated with Aristotle and Aquinas’s observation that “man is naturally a social and political animal,” it can be argued that the social and political nature of man that also stands in stark contrast to the Animal Kingdom is an offshoot of the capability to reason. If one accepts Clausewitz’s assertion that war “is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,”²⁷³ then it necessarily follows that conflict is a manifestation of political decision making which is in turn a byproduct of ideas and socially contrived national interests (i.e. “will”). Thus, for the purpose of analyzing geopolitics and international relations, it can be concluded that there is a pragmatic answer to the question with which this thesis began: What is truth?

272. Matthew Boyle, “Essentially Rational Animals,” Harvard University, n.d., accessed May 7, 2016, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8641838/Essentially_rational_animals.pdf.

273. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2010), 11.

Unfortunately, and at the risk of being anticlimactic, that answer is: Irrelevant. This must not be misconstrued that the Master's Candidate is assuming a relativistic outlook and somehow arguing that truth does not exist. To the contrary, because of the plethora of belief systems in existence (e.g. atheism, monotheism, polytheism, etc.) that are mutually exclusive it is a logical and metaphysical certainty that one of them is accurate and therefore true (i.e. there is no god/God, there is a god/God, or there are many gods, etc.). Nevertheless, despite the reality that these various worldview types cannot be simultaneously true, there are people who believe them to be true and said beliefs impact the way they behave. The same can be said of nations on the basis that they are collectives of humans. Merging Hegel's philosophy with psychology and neuroscience, just as suppressing traumatic memories may block memory formation in the present²⁷⁴ and emotional memories are seemingly stored and retrieved more effectively than non-emotional memories²⁷⁵ the so-called "core memories" (i.e. dialectic) of a nation or organization can be skewed, suppressed, modified, and/or emotionally charged, thereby effecting the way in which it behaves. Consider Germany during the interwar years. Although Versailles was not as harsh as it could have been, it was portrayed as such by Hitler in order "to create a tidal wave of anti-Versailles sentiment on which he could then ride into power"²⁷⁶ – yet once he attained power he struggled at times to implement his desired objectives, as seen in his lament: "It's been

274. Nicola Davis, "Suppressing Traumatic Memories can Cause Amnesia, Research Suggests," *The Guardian*, March 15, 2016, accessed May 8, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/mar/15/suppressing-traumatic-memories-can-cause-amnesia-research-suggests>.

275. Brendan E Depue, Marie T. Banich, and Tim Curran, "Suppression of Emotional and Nonemotional Content in Memory: Effects of Repetition on Cognitive Control," US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health, May 31, 2010, accessed May 9, 2016, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2878760>.

276. "Viewpoint: 10 Big Myths about World War One Debunked," BBC News, February 25, 2014, accessed May 8, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25776836>.

our misfortune to have the wrong religion. Why didn't we have the religion of the Japanese, who regard sacrifice for the Fatherland as the highest good? The Mohammedan religion too would have been much more compatible to us than Christianity. Why did it have to be Christianity with its meekness and flabbiness?"²⁷⁷

As demonstrated up to this point, when East met West at the turn of the 20th Century a convergence of ideas resulted and is attempting to achieve equilibrium even to this day. "The Middle East is a Shatterbelt, rent by the deep divisions within and between its sovereign states and peoples, and further inflamed by Great Power competition."²⁷⁸ As imperialism spread, the most persistent and powerful Western political idea that permeated the region was that of revolution – more specifically self-styled revolutions as opposed to Islamic traditions of challenging the social and political orders "by leaders who believed that it was their sacred duty to dethrone tyranny and install justice in its place."²⁷⁹ Because these revolutions were self-styled, they took the shape of the prevailing ideas and worldviews motivating them (no different than that of the American Revolution): in Iraq, the Ba'thist Party and Saddam's successful establishment of a Sunni regime despite the Shia majority; in Egypt, Nasser's Pan-Arabism or the more recent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood; and in Iran, the constitutionalists in the early 1900s or the 1979 Revolution that remains at the center of Tehran's decision making. The prevailing ideas and worldviews also explain why many of the resulting regimes setup educational indoctrination and censorship to root out and destroy ideas contrary to their cause (a

277. Eric Metaxas, *Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy* (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 165.

278. Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*. 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 355.

279. Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 376.

position not unique to the Middle East, considering the Church's handling of heresy during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance²⁸⁰). In light of this, as the West (particularly the United States as "leader of the free world") engages the Middle East it is paramount that it understands both the ideas upon which its society rests and the ideas foundational to the various nations and organizations with which it interfaces.

The Failure of Westphalia – Paradoxical Assumptions

Divorcing the religious and the secular is a fundamentally Westphalian assumption. This does not mean, however, that the export of the post-Westphalian nation state system constitutes the universalization of this assumption. What many fail to realize is that the Westphalian separation of Church and State was a separation of institutions rather than the interplay of their ideas. Although the Westphalian treaties demarcated geographic lines and established secular governments, the resulting nations were crafted largely based on sub-sects of Christianity (e.g. Protestants, Catholics, etc.). "Medieval international relations theory thus consisted of speculation by contemporary observers about Latin Christendom and the means by which its internal political relations were regulated."²⁸¹ In other words, the unique beliefs and ideas of these sub-sects would produce policies only existing within their borders while the overarching similarities would produce the same baseline policies – "Law was either peculiar to one community (*jus civile*) or common to many (*jus gentium*)."²⁸² It was these same overarching

280. A. J. Dunning, *Extremes: Reflections on Human Behavior*, trans. Johan Theron. (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 138-48.

281. J. L. Holzgrefe, "The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory," *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 1 (January 1989): 11, accessed February 6, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097163>.

282. Holzgrefe, "The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory," 14. The assumptions buttressing international law further support the Constructivist paradigm: "Those

presuppositions common within Christendom that fused with classical foundations of Western Civilization to directly contribute to the development of the post-Westphalia community of nations and the associated concepts of sovereignty and rule of law.

There was never . . . an ignorant, superstitious, and irrational age in the cultural development of Western civilization. The Christian leaders responsible for the development of Latin Christian doctrine were the products of a meticulous classical education. The Latin apologists, Tertullian, Minucius Felix (late 2nd century), and Lactantius (250-326), came to Christianity from a classical professional background. Minucius deliberately borrowed the Greek literary style of the dialogue, together with the Roman use of legal rules of evidence, to persuade pagans that Christianity was consistent with the classical search for wisdom and goodness.²⁸³

In short, Christianity was arguably the single-greatest defining force in the development of Western Civilization from the Romans to Westphalia.

But the Westphalian understanding and application of separation of Church and State would slowly evolve. “The Christian West embraces a worldview that differs fundamentally from that of the pre-Christian West and the post-Christian West, which enabled it to develop and sustain the rule of law unique to the Western legal tradition.”²⁸⁴ As the religious and civic arenas came to be understood as mutually exclusive, the foundation for rule of law transitioned from a moral lawgiver (i.e. revealed law) to the concept of legal positivism (i.e. that which is legal is moral). Such a philosophical paradigm shift was subsequently reinforced by the emergence of

who consider custom elaborate the psychological and physical prerequisites to treating mere habit as ‘custom.’ They talk about how frequently a norm must be respected, and by whom, before it becomes a customary norm” (see David Kennedy, “The Sources of International Law” *American University International Law Review* 2, no. 1 (1987): 8, accessed March 5, 2016, <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1632&context=auilr>).

283. Ricardo Duchesne, “Christianity is a Hellenistic Religion, and Western Civilization is Christian,” *Historically Speaking* 7, no. 4 (March/April 2006): 17, accessed February 10, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hsp.2006.0056>.

284. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, “Chinese and Western Worldviews: Implications for Law, Policy, and War,” *Regent Journal of International Law* 6, no. 1 (January 2008): 91, accessed May 8, 2016, http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lusol_fac_pubs/32.

postmodernism and its fundamental assertion that truth is relative set Western Civilization on an irreversible course. “A culture cannot lose its philosophic center without the most serious of consequences, not just to the philosophy on which it was based but to the whole superstructure of culture and even each person’s notion of who he or she is. Everything changes. When God dies, both the substance and the value of everything else die too.”²⁸⁵ For America, the leading Western superpower and leader of the free world, the postmodern crisis shakes the core of its “liberty heritage, attacking those historic Christian principles of individuality, self-government, property and conscience, and limited civil jurisdiction that were so prominent and influential during our founding era.”²⁸⁶ To put it more succinctly, by denying the existence of truth, moral law and the law of nature (e.g. Locke, Hobbes, etc.) cease to have any societal impact and the American political philosophy is rendered self-referentially incoherent.

The Middle East’s Rejection of Westphalia – Political Islam

In the wake of Arab Spring and other transnational movements, some scholars have noted that, “like a pendulum swing, secular nationalism is increasingly being replaced as the dominant intellectual paradigm in the Middle East by the emergence of Islamist political thought.”²⁸⁷ Yet, this is to be expected based on history and the basic tenants of Shari’a. As the imperial powers leveraged their will in the region, the dynamic political environment “gradually but decisively shifted from building liberal constitutional governance systems [e.g. Egypt, Iraq, Iran, etc.] to assertive nationalism whose main objective was getting rid of the colonialists and the ruling

285. James Sire, *The Universe Next Door: A Basic Worldview Catalog* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 211.

286. G. M. Ferdon, *A Republic If You Can Keep It: America’s Authentic Liberty Confronts Contemporary Counterfeits* (Chesapeake, VA: Foundation for American Christian Education, 2008), 28.

287. Shawamreh, “Islamic Legal Theory,” 218.

systems that worked with them.”²⁸⁸ This was also a key factor behind the ascension of militarist regimes that came to dominate many Arab countries from the 1950s until the Arab uprisings of 2011.²⁸⁹ Now that the colonialist powers have been expelled from the area, the prevailing worldview of Islam has gained considerable momentum through the illusion of “democracy” as promulgated by the Arab Spring. Combine this with the firmly established authoritarian Islamic regimes in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and it was arguably inevitable that a time would come where Islam would dominate all other intellectual paradigms in Middle Eastern politics.

Nevertheless, while the political environment has facilitated the revitalization of Islam as a political ideology, Islam, by its very nature, is inherently political and therefore serves as both religion and constitution. Islamic law (i.e. Shari’a) is “all-encompassing, addressing all aspects of life. Islam does not distinguish between rituals and the every-day aspects of conduct; all are to be done according to the will of *Allah*.”²⁹⁰ The indisputably spiritual elements notwithstanding, “it would be a mistake to think of Shari’a as a ‘religious’ code in the Western sense because it seeks to regulate all manner of behavior in the secular sphere – economic, social, military, legal and political.”²⁹¹ Simply put,

In Islam, the entire political entity is ordained “by [Allah] himself, to promote his faith and to maintain and extend his law.” This is the primary reason why many Muslims demand the enforcement of Shari’a in all countries in which they reside. Because mosque and state are not separate, a devout Muslim must have the state recognize and

288. Tarek Osman, “Why Border Lines Drawn with a Ruler in WW1 Still Rock the Middle East,” *BBC News*, December 14, 2013, accessed May 10, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553>.

289. *Ibid.*

290. Gelpe, *The Israeli Legal System*, 281.

291. William G. Boykin et al., *Shariah: The Threat to America* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Security Policy, 2010), 6.

apply Shari'a, or he or she cannot fully practice Islam.²⁹²

Although there will be fundamental differences between Sunni and Shia implementation within a given society, this understanding of Political Islam will serve as the conceptual baseline for understanding its impact in the Middle East.

With regards to a nation employing Political Islam, Shari'a guides policy formulation. The preeminence of Shari'a within the realm of policy, as described by Sayyid Abdul 'Ala Maududi (one of the key developers of Political Islam in the modern era), seeks "to replace the sovereignty of the people expressed through parliamentary legislation, with the 'sovereignty of [Allah]' as revealed, in its perfection and finality, through the Shari'a."²⁹³ In practice, this sovereignty of Allah concept manifests itself differently depending on the form of government – as seen in Egypt, where the Salafi's have broken away from their traditional abstention from governmental activity and now navigate the parliamentary system to push a policy agenda promoting strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith, calling people to "true Islam," and resisting democratic and Western influence on the basis that it subordinates the will of Allah to the will of man²⁹⁴ or in Iran, where the Shiite Ayatollah Khomeini asserted that the Islamic state succeeded the Prophet and therefore had the power to override areas of Islamic Law, thereby producing a more dynamic policy environment vis-à-vis the governments of their Sunni neighbors. However, despite any differences in practice, generally speaking the essence of Political Islam's relationship with policy is the supremacy of Allah's will within society itself.

Considering that laws are essentially policies that governments choose to enforce

292. *Shari'ah Law: Radical Islam's Threat to the U.S. Constitution*, (Washington, D.C.: American Center for Law and Justice, 2011), 7.

293. Ruthven, *Islam: A Very Short Introduction*, 5.

294. Inanc, "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: Egypt's Rival Islamist Groups."

coercively,²⁹⁵ it is only logical that, given the abovementioned relationship between Shari'a and policy in Political Islam, law also finds its origin in Shari'a. Islamic legal scholars have “developed five legal categories into which all human behavior can be divided: 1) prohibited, 2) discouraged, 3) neutral, 4) recommended, or 5) obligatory” (e.g. fasting and prayer are obligatory, pork and alcohol consumption are prohibited, smoking is discouraged but not prohibited, etc.).²⁹⁶ These five categories of human behavior, in conjunction with the five higher objectives of Shari'a law (i.e. life, the ability to practice Islam, property, children, and human rationality),²⁹⁷ guide the legislative process within a Political Islam legal system.

For instance, it can be argued that the most definitive evidence of Political Islam's pervasive impact on law is the absence of true freedom of religion (to include the prohibition of converting from Islam). Because Shari'a is all-encompassing, there can be no absolute separation between the state (i.e. government) and Islamic society (*ummah*) as such a distinction “would be a logical absurdity.”²⁹⁸ Consequently, those bearing religious views contrary to the government (to include Shia Islam in a Sunni society and vice-versa) often lack any form of legal standing in the community on the grounds that they are a subversive force that runs contrary to the well being of society as a whole (ex. Christians and other minority religious groups in Iran being charged with “anti-government propaganda,” “propaganda against the state,” “gathering

295. Akers, “‘Law’, ‘Policy’, and the ‘Middle East.’”

296. Shawamreh, “Islamic Legal Theory,” 204.

297. Ibid.

298. L. Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics* (New York: Columbia University, 2000), 72.

against national security,” and “insulting Islam”).²⁹⁹ Put another way, being unaffiliated with Islam religiously is analogous to high treason within the construct of a Political Islam state.

Further exacerbating this issue is the reality that even in politically Islamic countries that supposedly maintain laws “respecting” some form of freedom of belief and/or freedom of religion (e.g. Iran, Egypt, etc.), when these laws are not enforced appropriately (e.g. discrimination is permitted, arbitrary arrests, etc.) it is no different than if the law were not in effect. Many naïve geopolitical commentators envisioned a post-Arab Spring Middle East that embodied democratic values such as freedom of religion, but they have been severely disappointed by the increased repression exacted upon religious minorities.³⁰⁰ What these analysts have failed to understand is that public policy (to include law) is “anything that governments do or choose not to do.”³⁰¹ In other words, it is not the actual verbiage of a law or the format of a government that leads to a free society but it is entirely contingent upon the worldviews involved in generating ideas that are subsequently combined with governmental action (or inaction in the case of non-enforcement) to become policy and law.

Recommendations for Strategy and Policy Development

Once again, ideas matter – strategy and policy development must take into account this reality. Ideas drive action, inaction, and routine behavior of geopolitical actors. Ideas also drive the way in which analysts and strategists describe, explain, and interpret said action, inaction, and behavior, making it of the utmost importance to understand not only the ideas of the actors

299. “Iran,” U.S. Department of State, September 13, 2011, accessed May 10, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171734.pdf>, 15.

300. Lauren Markoe, “Religious Oppression Rises Despite Arab Spring, Pew Study Shows,” *Huffington Post*, June 21, 2013, accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/21/religious-oppression-rises-arab-spring_n_3474747.html.

301. Akers, “‘Law’, ‘Policy’, and the ‘Middle East.’”

but also the ideas possessed by the analysts and strategists about the ideas of the actors (ex. “the transitional nature of comparative political analysis is illustrated by the adamant refusal of many to adopt new perspectives and to move in newly charted directions, while others enthusiastically and uncritically embrace new approaches and methods at first sight”³⁰²). Ideas also explain the absence of a legal code on an international scale (and the inability thus far to compile one)³⁰³ and the “permeability, the limited nature, of the boundaries between states and societies.”³⁰⁴

Thus, ideas also hold the key to understanding the Middle East. Although a comprehensive examination of the entire region would be valuable, it would also constitute a length and rigor far surpassing the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Part 3 the geopolitical “case studies” present the preeminence of ideas in the shaping of a country’s identity (i.e. dialectic) and these same Middle Eastern identities stand in stark contrast with the evolution of the American identity from the Colonial Era to the present (Part 2). Therefore, the United States as the leading Western superpower must not only understand its own identity and

302. James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. *Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1981), 1. See also the arguments in favor of “distinguishing the regional from the global level” in Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27-30, and the assertion that “different assumptions yield different explanations and findings” in Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, *The Great Powers and Global Struggle: 1490-1990*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 60-61.

303. Gerhard von Glahn, *Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law*, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1976), 10. International law is a fundamentally Western notion, but the preeminence of ideas and the absence of universal consensus within the Middle Eastern equivalent to international law (i.e. Sharia) reinforces this point – “there are so many varying interpretations of what sharia actually means that in some places, it can be incorporated into political systems relatively easily” (See Toni Johnson and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Islam: Governing Under Sharia,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified July 25, 2014, accessed May 11, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034>).

304. Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 161.

associated implications but must also consider the same of the nation(s) it finds itself interacting with on the global stage. Consequently, the following are three recommended pitfalls to avoid during the policy and strategy development process.

Beware a Stubborn Hubris

While it is relatively simple to portray the Middle East as barbaric and inferior, such an approach does little to assist in understanding this dynamic region. As noted by Edward Said, “because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly small.”³⁰⁵ Similarly, even Said’s intellectual rival Bernard Lewis noted that the rise of the Islamic civilization possessed not only periods where it regarded the outside world “as an outer darkness of barbarism and unbelief from which there was nothing to learn” but also times in which it was a leading contributor to the arts and sciences, thereby further inflaming the enigmatic nature of understanding the Middle East today.³⁰⁶

In the West, “for some people history is irrelevant; they believe they have passed the end of history and moved into a new, timeless world of speed and progress. They believe they can overwhelm the deep structures of history by their sheer wealth, power, and technology. Too often, they feel they do not need to honor history or can afford to be ignorant of it.”³⁰⁷ Such a

305. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 27.

306. Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003), 4-7. Lewis goes on to assert that “in most of the arts and sciences of civilization, medieval Europe was a pupil and in a sense a dependent of the Islamic world, relying on Arabic versions even for many otherwise unknown Greek works.”

307. Michael Hamilton Morgan, *Lost History: The Enduring Legacy of Muslim Scientists, Thinkers, and Artists* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2007), 289.

postmodern position is both reckless, as it chooses to forfeit invaluable opportunities to learn from the past, and intellectually arrogant. At its core lies the assumption that man has reached the apex of its evolutionary progression in the development of Western liberal humanism.³⁰⁸ Because this assumption is understood evolutionarily, the progressive reinterpretation and redefinition of “truth” is subsequently applied retroactively and key events and actors are understood in present terminology as opposed to what motivated them at the time and why (or why not) they were successful. This inevitably leads to inconsistencies and unintended consequences.

“Some Americans believe that we should not learn from history but just copy it. If only we could find another Truman administration . . . it would establish a new set of institutions for a new era.”³⁰⁹ However this completely misconstrues the peculiar institutions (e.g. separation of powers, Bill of Rights, Constitution, etc.) produced by the prevailing ideas and worldviews in early America (Part 2). The notion of American exceptionalism was “a moral and religious belief” that the United States had “a special mission in history.”³¹⁰ Yet when the focus becomes the institutions instead of the ideas and convictions that produced them, the result is a haphazard and paradoxical foreign policy that seeks to maintain “a ‘separate peace’ with other industrialized democracies, while engaging in recurring conflicts against authoritarian

308. Karen Armstrong, *A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), xix.

309. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009), 231.

310. Loch K. Johnson, *Seven Sins of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Pearson Education, 2007), 14. See also Chris Stewart and Ted Stewart, *The Miracle of Freedom: 7 Tipping Points that Saved the World* (Salt Lake City, UT: Shadow Mountain, 2011), v-viii.

regimes.”³¹¹

But “authoritarian” is inherently subjective. Is it the institution of consolidated power that leads to oppression and corruption (i.e. is a benevolent monarchy possible?) or is democratic self-determination an unfailing approach to generating sound and impartial governments? The answer is: No. It is the ideas that fuse with governmental action to create public policy that produce just or unjust governments – not a given government’s institutional form. An appropriate appreciation and respect for history, rather than an “End of History” approach, affirms this position. World War II emerged as a result of the Wilsonian approach to geopolitics following the First World War; “from the conflict between territorial arrangements based on the principle of ‘self-determination’ and the realities of ethnically mixed patterns of settlement”³¹² (e.g. the democratic, post-Versailles Germany that elected Adolph Hitler, the festering irredentism in Germany and areas formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, etc.). “Only through self-government, [Wilson] assessed, could peoples express their will toward international harmony.”³¹³ Yet this model has continually failed, particularly in the Middle East (Part 3), and will continue to fail as long as democracy is blindly applied to resolve the world’s problems and the lessons of the past are indignantly cast aside.

Beware Nation Building

After the Cold War, America proclaimed its intention to construct a “new world order” by applying its domestic values to the rest of the world. Contextually, this proclamation was

311. Steven W. Hook, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, 3rd ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), xxi.

312. Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 142.

313. Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 260.

taking place for the third time in America's history (Wilson after WWI then FDR and Truman after WWII), hence George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton's rhetorical use of classically Wilsonian terms.³¹⁴ While endorsing the concepts of democratic self-governance and self-determination makes for lofty and idealistic rhetoric, it is fundamentally flawed. Aristotle classified democracy as a deviant constitution because it inevitably regresses to majority rule (which in his day would have empowered the poor to use their newfound influence to right any perceived injustice in the social order).³¹⁵ Similarly, based on "such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution," John Stuart Mill observed that phrases such as "self-government" and "the power of the people over themselves" do not contain the true intent of all who wield them – hence his comments that "in political speculations 'the tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard."³¹⁶

For America, it was not democracy that initiated its unrivaled ascendancy to greatness but rather republicanism and the Judeo-Christian beliefs "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" (i.e. the foundation for a self-governing "moral and religious people"). But when America began its quest to export itself abroad, it erroneously exported and endorsed Western institutions rather than attempt to reshape the culture in its image. As it initially supported the Western imperial mandates following WWI, it set into motion a period that would disenfranchise much of the Middle East with the West and open a fissure that Hitler would

314. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 804-05.

315. Fred Miller, "Aristotle's Political Theory," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2012 ed., accessed April 16, 2016, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics>.

316. John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in *John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays*, ed. John Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 7-8.

eventually exploit. As time went on, imperial authority was spread thin and collapsed when it was viewed as conflicting with Western liberal principles (e.g. self-governance, self-determination, etc.) and was ultimately supplanted by political and military resistance movements that led to the creation of sovereign states as a result of marketing a secular Westphalian model.³¹⁷ In short, encouraging “majority rule” systems of government in a region of the world notorious for Islamism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Western sentiments as a result of imperialism, and reinforcing said governments with the concept of self-determination, would eventually lead to a region of independent sovereignties that includes some of America’s deadliest opponents.³¹⁸

The repeated failings of this paradigm notwithstanding, the “new world order” put stock in the colloquialism: “third time is a charm.” With the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the advent of global democratization was perceived to be at hand. As the formerly bipolar world looked to the one remaining pole for guidance, the United States was expected to lead the world into a new era. Experts who had once worked for freedom in the Soviet Bloc during the Reagan administration adapted their methodologies to fit the Middle East – a region drastically different, for where multiparty systems had existed in Eastern Europe prior to the Soviets the Islamic world had no democratic model to return to because, with few exceptions, “liberal democracy had never taken root after the collapse of the Sultanate.”³¹⁹ This plight continues even in the post-9/11 environment. Despite the toppling of the Taliban and the Iraqi Ba’ath, the elimination

317. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society*, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 332.

318. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy*, 501.

319. Walid Phares, *The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2010), 99.

of despotic institutions has not rolled back jihadist or ultra-authoritarian ideologies; “since the U.S. bureaucrats never factored in a war of ideas, or an ideological renaissance, they weren’t able to sweep societies swiftly into the realm of democratic pluralism.”³²⁰ In Iraq, democracy changed the state from Sunni-led to Shia-led, created internal instability and disenfranchisement, and ultimately paved the way for the rise of the Islamic State. In Afghanistan, the democratic national government still struggles to find validation from the general population and Western concepts are irreconcilable with much of the tribal system.

A tribe is a “natural democracy.” In Afghan shuras and jirgas (tribal councils), every man’s voice has a chance to be heard. The fact that women and minority groups have no say in the process does not make it less effective nor less of a democracy to them. Asking them to change the way they have always conducted their business through their jirgas and shuras just does not make sense.³²¹

Even the democratic Egyptian government ushered in after Mubarek’s overthrow (as opposed to American intervention) and the associated Arab Spring, a so-called democratization movement that reflected not the culmination of Western values but instead the prevailing worldviews of portions of the Middle East, yielded a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and contrary to Western interests in the region. Simply put, democracy and sovereign states (in the Westphalian sense) are not solutions in and of themselves but rather institutions to be wielded for good or evil by the majority who controls them.

Beware Superficial Analysis

In the end, the two aforementioned pitfalls stem from the third and final: superficial analysis. For the hubris associated with the evolutionary belief in Western liberalism as the apex of civilization and its associated principle of building nations in its own image is the result of a

320. Phares, *The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East*, 99.

321. Gant, *One Tribe at a Time: The Paper That Changed the War in Afghanistan*, 46.

misunderstanding and misapplication of Western principles.

The argument now that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods around the world represents the triumph of Western civilization trivializes Western culture. The essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac. The fact that non-Westerners may bite into the latter has no implications for their accepting the former.

It also has no implications for their attitudes toward the West. Somewhere in the Middle East a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, drinking Coke, listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an American airliner.³²²

This misunderstanding and misapplication is exponentially worsened by the progressive interpretation of history and the postmodern tenet that truth is relative and therefore no idea is any more valid than the next. The geopolitical implications with this mindset have been discussed exhaustively via the unintended consequences of intervening in the Middle East in Part 3 and up to this point in the current chapter. However, there is one remaining discussion that must be had regarding the West's interaction with the Middle East.

September 11, 2001 thrust the United States back into the Middle East and brought to the forefront a religion many still do not understand. Regrettably the superficial analytical efforts attempting to address this issue typically digress to one extreme or another. On one end of the spectrum is an irrational Islamophobia that argues all Muslims are terrorists. There are a number of mainstream Islamic theologians who assert that the radical leaders who encourage a *jihad* against the infidels by means of terrorist acts “employ a faulty reading of the Quran.”³²³ Pragmatically speaking, considering that there are more than one billion Muslims in the world today one would expect that the number of terrorist attacks would be far greater than it is if the call to violence was a universally accepted tenet of Islam (i.e. accepted as the Sixth Pillar).

322. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 58. This ominous sentiment was written 5 years prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

323. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think* (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 19.

Conversely, on the other end of the spectrum is the argument that the religion of Islam has nothing to do with modern terrorism. It is this latter perspective that has formed the basis of U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy.

The present-day secularized, postmodern identity of America is one built upon multiculturalism and therefore cannot bring itself to condemn any facet of Islamic society. While American leaders make it abundantly clear that the U.S. is not at war with Islam, it does not change the reality that those who use violence and fear in an attempt to establish a Caliphate that would be a “severe and repressive fourteenth-century literalist theocracy” do so because they believe it to be their duty as Muslims.³²⁴

There is . . . a much more serious problem in the use in Western public policy of intellectual “guided missiles” that present a superficially nobler vision to woo Muslim activists away from opposition through the apparently benign strategy of defining Islam appropriately. They try to wrench Islamic terrorists from violence by insisting that Islam is a religion of peace, and that a “true Muslim” must be a tolerant individual (“so come off it and be peaceful”). The rejection of a confrontational view of Islam is appropriate and extremely important at this time, but we must also ask whether it is at all necessary or useful, or even possible, to try to define in largely political terms what a “true Muslim” must be like.³²⁵

Such an approach can even lead to efforts so bent on divorcing the religious implications from the terrorist actor or organization that they begin to humanize the gruesome acts of terror they carry out – case in point, George Friedman’s response to bin Laden’s Letter to America: “What al Qaeda is fighting for is a traditional understanding of the family. This is not a minor part of their program: it is at its heart.”³²⁶

324. Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 35.

325. Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 13-14.

326. George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century* (New York:

As a result of this convoluted rationale for confronting the perpetrators of 9/11, America embarked upon a “Global War on Terror” that has had ambiguous results. “Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such.”³²⁷ Terrorism is not an enemy but rather a tactic used by the enemy – countering the tactic of the religious fanatic “requires a credible alternative to the absolutes with which he conjures.”³²⁸ Winning hearts and minds has become the slogan of the War on Terror and counter-insurgency efforts in the 21st Century. Although hearts are fickle and can be temporarily purchased through petty temporal offerings, minds present a far more formidable challenge. A war of ideas with the overarching objective of winning hearts *and* minds can only be achieved with superior ideas that are systematically coherent and sound in every possible regard (e.g. philosophically, logically, etc.). For in a war of ideas, the mind must be regarded as a “domain” for warfare no different than land, sea, air, space, and cyber – a battlefield upon which victory is achieved by leveraging superior weaponry with sound and decisive tactics, techniques, and procedures. Failure to do so will inevitably yield results marred by volatility, inconsistency, and unsustainability.

Conclusion

Great similarity exists between today’s Middle East and 17th Century Europe leading up

Doubleday, 2009), 50. Even for the sake of argument, if one concedes that al Qaeda is fighting for a traditional understanding of the family it inevitably follows that the Letter to America flows from the teachings of Islam to care for the orphans and the poor, detest decadence, etc. (see Tom Holland, *In the Shadow of the Sword: The Birth of Islam and the Rise of the Global Arab Empire* (New York: Anchor Books, 2013), 400.

327. Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 137.

328. Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2002), 161.

to Westphalia – a Tunisian fruit vendor igniting himself on fire is regarded as a trigger for the Arab Spring just as Bohemian Protestant uprisings against the Catholic Habsburgs is considered a flashpoint for the Thirty Years War; the Middle East is fractured by a religious struggle involving competing traditions of Islam just as Christendom in Europe; and both regions can be characterized as one of civil wars and proxy wars blurred to the point of being indistinguishable from one another.³²⁹ However, the way forward from these distinct moments in history are extremely different. The end of the Thirty Years War yielded a post-war system through the Westphalian treaties that found its philosophical origin and moral lifeblood in Christendom and the classics of the Western World. It was a Western solution to geopolitical problems that was sustainable because it was applied to a Western populace. Yet its export to the Middle East has been largely unsuccessful because, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, it was applied to a culture with a different philosophical and moral foundation and was therefore found to be foreign and largely incompatible with the region. Arguably, it is the unintended consequences of the Westphalian system in the Middle East that have exacerbated transnational fault lines in the present day and introduced additional competing forces that must be understood when analyzing the region. “Nationalist sentiments among Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, Malaysians, Indonesians, and others [have] fragmented the historic ‘land of Islam’ (*dar el-Islam*) into communities with clearly different priorities.”³³⁰ Conversely “any fundamentalist pan-Islamic movement, even a Shiite-inspired one, must embrace the fact that the Prophet, and later his Caliphs, sought to build empires with temporary but expanding borders, not nations with fixed

329. Richard N. Haass, “The New Thirty Years’ War,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2014, accessed May 14, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/new-thirty-years-war/p33267>.

330. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 24.

borders and identities.”³³¹ Simply put, the Western influence as a result of intervention and the transnational elements of the Islamic world will perpetually result in geopolitical friction and are unlikely to ever find equilibrium.

Ending this thesis where it began, ideas and perceived truths correlate with the way in which people behave (and the way in which people conceptually explain the way in which people behave, i.e. liberalism, realism, etc.). Although the Western world may continue to strive towards the “End of History” and democratizing the globe, it does not alter the fundamentally religious origin of the peculiar American system of governance. Returning once more to the words of John Adams,

While our country remains untainted with the principles and manners which are now producing desolation in so many parts of the world; while she continues sincere, and incapable of insidious and impious policy, we shall have the strongest reason to rejoice in the local destination assigned us by Providence. But should the people of America once become capable of that deep simulation towards one another, and towards foreign nations, which assumes the language of justice and moderation while it is practising iniquity and extravagance, and displays in the most captivating manner the charming pictures of candor, frankness, and sincerity, while it is rioting in rapine and insolence, this country will be the most miserable habitation in the world; because we have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the strongest cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.

Although the postmodern viewpoint can divorce the religious and the secular and continue to perpetuate the Westphalian model, it does not mean that these ideas, beliefs, and convictions are universal. It must be understood that the Middle East (and all other regions of the world for that matter) have distinct philosophical, religious, and cultural components that make them unique. Objectively speaking, the words of John Adams are not all that different from Sayyid Qutb:

331. Melik Kaylan, “The Iranian Empire,” *Forbes*, March 3, 2009, accessed May 14, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/02/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-iran-opinions-columnists_melik_kaylan.html.

Islam cannot fulfill its role except by taking concrete form in a society, rather, in a nation; for man does not listen, especially in this age, to an abstract theory which is not seen materialized in a living society. From this point of view, we can say that the Muslim community has been extinct for a few centuries, for this Muslim community does not denote the name of a land in which Islam resides, nor is it a people whose forefathers lived under the Islamic system at some earlier time. It is the name of a group of people whose manners, ideas, and concepts, rules and regulations, values and criteria, are all derived from the Islamic source. The Muslim community with these characteristics vanished at the moment the laws of God became suspended on earth.³³²

Both individuals were writing of a prevailing worldview and how that same worldview served as the philosophical and moral foundation for everything within a society. The implications of this are of the utmost importance, for as America attempts to market its ideals abroad without acknowledging the source of its ideals, it blindly endeavors to replace “core memories” of societies for the purpose of behavior modification. The resulting “clash of civilizations” means that until such a time where people and their ideas are acknowledged as the fundamental element of international relations (i.e. constructivism), as opposed to preconceived notions of Man’s perfectibility (i.e. liberalism) or obsession with power (i.e. realism), the West’s interaction with the Middle East will continue to be haphazard, unproductive, and marred with unintended consequences that could have been avoided. For until postmodern America understands that something cannot be objectively wrong unless there is an objective standard for morality (i.e. transcendent, immutable truth), an application of Westphalian sovereignty and self-determination will only empower the prevailing worldview of the people involved. Consequently, the convergence of Westphalian (i.e. Western & secular) politics with the Middle East (i.e. non-Western & non-secular) implies that, “to a significant extent, American power will depend on how it confronts fanatical enemies who believe more firmly than it does.”³³³

332. Qutb, *Milestones*, 9.

333. Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon* (New York: Random House, 2010), 57.

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