Abstract

Title – Abortion, infanticide, personhood and potential: Why defenders of abortion and infanticide cannot principally and consistently reject enslaving actual human persons as seriously morally wrong.

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Abstract

This paper will examine a number of widely shared views in academia in reference to the human embryo, fetus, more recently newborns with regards to a few key controversial and contested points of dispute. This paper will examine various arguments made to justify abortion and infanticide but which are suspect when considered on the level of consistency with regards to other practices that such proponents would conceivably reject such as enslaving adult human beings or actual human persons. It is widely held that the embryo’s, fetus’s and newborn’s potential to become a person is not sufficient to condemn abortion and infanticide. It is also held in some circles that there are grounds to be skeptical on whether a threshold of personhood or full moral status exists and whether human equality is simply a pragmatically useful concept as opposed to reflecting reality. This paper will argue that defenders of the permissibility of abortion and infanticide must appeal to the human person’s potential to develop in such a way that would make enslaving her as morally wrong but that such a task cannot be consistently done without resorting to ad hoc assumptions. This paper will finally argue that skepticism about an adequate threshold of personhood undermines the full moral status principle for all human persons and maintains that – on their own grounds – enslaving actual human persons
cannot in principle be morally wrong and rejected.