

UNEQUAL DEMOCRACIES:
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS' IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS BY
DANIEL DORAN PARTIN, PHD

Presented at the Helms School of Government Conference: Promise of the Declaration April 12-14, 2023

ABSTRACT

In the past, research into the field of human rights has treated regime as a dichotomous variable and divided the type of governmental structure into either autocracies or democracies. By lumping all democracies into one category, all variation between different categories of governmental composition is discarded and it is difficult to examine the differences between types of democratic governments and their human rights capacities. Due to their tendency to accrete power centrally, presidential democracies are thought to repress the rights of citizens more often and severely than parliamentary systems. Further, an exogenous shock to the political system, such as the threat or the imposition of an economic sanction is expected to act as a catalyst for repression. Using three different datasets of indicators of physical integrity human rights from a global sample over the years of 1976-1990 for two datasets and 1981-1990 for another, democracies are indeed shown to differ in their propensity to violate human rights. The effect of economic sanctions is negligible and is only significant in one model.

Introduction

Gamal Abdul Nasser's announcement that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal came as a surprise to the major powers that were still invested in the Middle East. Nasser sought to assert Egyptian power and independence from colonial dependence after Britain retracted an offer to assist with the building of the Aswan Dam. By the end of July 1956 Egyptian forces had established control of the canal. British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, sought to muster support from Britain's Second World War allies for a military engagement with Egypt in order to reclaim the Suez Canal and the crucial sea route to distant oceans. America's response to Eden's calls for assistance with the Suez crisis was not what Britain preferred. President Eisenhower was not willing to extend American forces to interfere into the politics of Egypt. Eisenhower's administration was preoccupied and attempting to deal with the Soviet invasion and annexation of Hungary. Due to America's reluctance to aid Britain, Eden was forced to find assistance from France and Israel against Egypt.

Within months, the British, French, and Israeli military forces had accomplished their primary objective and captured the Suez Canal. American leadership quickly responded and expressed displeasure with the policy that was pursued by Britain and its allies. Eisenhower's administration issued demands that British, French, and Israeli forces withdraw from Egyptian territory. Rather than express hollow sentiments for withdrawal from Egypt, the Eisenhower declared that the United States would flood the market with the British pound sterling if Britain and her allies did not meet the demands of the United States. Overnight, the economy of Britain suffered as a consequence of the American threat. Eden was left with little choice than to capitulate to American demands or face the full cost of American economic sanctions.

Most interesting about the case of the Suez Crisis of 1956, is not the military ease with which the British, Israelis, and French captured their targets in Egypt, but the American policy toward allied nations. America's response to British, French, and Israeli incursion into Egypt was not a promise of military force, but rather a threat of economic strife. Eisenhower threatened sanctions which put all nations involved on the precipice of economic catastrophe (Boughton 2001). Most historical accounts focus on the electoral and economic costs imposed on Great Britain, France, and Israel. Each of these nations obtained assistance from the International Monetary Fund, and the political legacy of Anthony Eden was largely shaped by Eisenhower's economic threat.

What was the effect upon the masses within these democracies? Respect for human rights was not approached in the same manner within the realms of Britain and France. Britain, a parliamentary democracy, intensified efforts to decolonize, and grant autonomy to former imperial colonies. France, a presidential democracy, intensified its campaign to maintain power in Algeria, and regularly utilized torture as a tactic against enemies. Both of these nations were democracies, yet their response to the imposition of what equates to the threat of an economic sanction varied dramatically. Analyses have been conducted with the intention of discerning whether economic sanctions lead to human rights violations, but regime type is merely a control variable and there is no distinction between different forms of democracy. This analysis seeks to contribute to the literature by analyzing the differences between presidential and parliamentary democratic systems' recognition of human rights when presented with the threat or imposition of an economic sanction.

Sanctions and Human Rights Violations in Democratic States: A New Theory

What does the relationship between the impositions of economic sanctions and human rights integrity look like within different democratic systems? In other words, what is the causal connection between sanctions and human rights in different democratic systems? Drawing from the literature and previous research on each individual topic, a connection can be discerned.

Governmental legitimacy can be challenged if the citizenry is affected by the imposition of an economic sanction because the people hold the government responsible for their misery.

Governments, fearing an uprising due to public displeasure, are inclined to repress the citizens within national borders. Sanctioning usually inflicts a greater harm upon the general population, worsening the level of human integrity rights which are recognized within a nation (Ang and Peksen 2007; Peksen 2009; Wood 2008).

At the most fundamental level of conception, sanctions are a form of coercive diplomacy.

Sanctions are issued and implemented to elicit a change or alteration of some type in a foreign state. Sanctions are not as forceful in their ability to coerce a target as the process of military intervention; however, they remain a significant policy tool often utilized by political actors. Bartilow explains the differing goals which sanctions can be implemented to achieve. Coercive diplomacy can be divided into three separate, yet related, categories: Type A, Type B, and Type

C. Type A coercive diplomacy is intended to persuade a target to abandon pursuit of a particular policy outcome (Bartilow 2001, 118). The Type B variant of coercive diplomacy differs only in that the intended goal of the issuing state is to motivate a target to retract a policy which has already been implemented. Type C coercive diplomacy seeks to dismantle the political leadership in a target state and force them out of power in favor of a new government without an escalation to war (Bartilow 2001, 118). Type C coercive diplomacy is arguably the most ambitious and the most difficult variant of coercive diplomacy to achieve because of the significant costs associated with removing a leader.

For sanctions to be effective the issuer must have some capability to effect or influence the target through the sanction. Therefore, a sanction leveled against the United States by a poorer and weaker nation is not likely to be as influential as a sanction issued by a stronger power against a weaker state. Sanctions can also be effective if they are issued against a target of equal power. Since the majority of sanctions are issued by developed nations toward developing nations, it can be argued that it is democratic nations which are primarily issuing sanctions. While there is anecdotal evidence of democratic nations such as the United States undermining democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean during the early-to-mid-Twentieth century, most research would suggest that democracies are not prone to overtly attempt to force leadership change on another democracy. Therefore, due to shared democratic values, sanctions issued against democracies will be either Type A or B, with the goal of either preventing a policy or having the target retract the legislation after it has been instituted.

Presidential democratic electoral systems are rather fragile. The primary argument concerns the legacy of military dictatorship which is usually present within newly established presidential systems (Cheibub 2002; Cheibub 2007; Stepan and Skach 1993). Indeed, presidential systems might be particularly appealing in these nations because the citizens are accustomed to a strong central executive figure rather than a large legislative majority composed of coalitions and groups. Most scholars who study democratic electoral systems assert that presidential systems are more likely to revert into dictatorship if they fracture (Cheibub 2002; Cheibub 2007; Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Stepan and Skach 1993). When there is a crisis in the government, it is impossible to remove the president and attempt to

establish a new government as is the case in a parliamentary system. During a crisis the only solution in a presidential system is to essentially ride out the period with the current leader at the helm of the nation (Stepan and Skach 1993, 19). Thus, Stepan and Skach argue that, “Such situations often cause both the president and the opposition to seek military involvement to resolve the crisis in their favor” (Stepan and Skach 1993, 19). The president pushes the border of his delineated powers in an attempt to solve the issue and can, as a result erode the democratic values and processes which lifted them to power. Presidential systems have been shown to be more prone to collapse and reversion into dictatorial regimes.

This trait has been posited as arising through their constitutional framework which divides the powers into legislative and executive branches, and arguably more importantly, through the heritage of military dictatorship in which these fledgling democracies were conceived. Also, shocks to the economic or political system can lead elected presidents in transitioning democratic regimes to adopt policies which are much more repressive and undemocratic in nature. Therefore, when an economic sanction is issued against a presidential democracy, an economic crisis is created in the nation. This crisis can arise in a number of ways. For example, certain imports or exports might be blocked or aid money might be revoked or suspended. The imposition of the sanction affects the public through higher prices for imports or a reduced governmental capacity to provide public goods. Leaders will fear that segments within the population will seize an opportunity of perceived weakness in the regime and will present a threat to the ruling government.

Thus, sanctions can create an economic crisis in the target nation which can present a challenge to the authority of the leaders. As a response, the government will respond with repression of all forms of human rights. This includes both physical integrity rights and social and political rights. The repression of all forms of human rights serve the purpose of preventing the organization of political opponents and the abuse of physical integrity rights as a message that any insurrection will not be tolerated. This is the case even when there are not opportunistic groups within the nation. Instead, repression is occurring merely because of a perceived threat assessment by the president of the target nation.

By contrast, parliamentary systems are not expected to react to a crisis created by a sanction the same way because it is more difficult for leaders in these systems to individually assume massive amounts of power. Parliamentary systems require coalitions and dependence in order for the government to effectively function. Since one individual cannot easily assume power, it is not likely for human rights to be violated by a power-hungry individual. Indeed, anecdotal evidence appears to support this distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. Analyses have shown that parliamentarian systems have a higher rate of survival as compared to presidential counterparts. Why would it be the case that parliamentary systems live longer than presidential electoral systems? According to Cheibub, “for the 1946-2002 period, the expected life of a presidential democracy was 24 years versus 58 for parliamentary ones” (Cheibub 2007, 136). This point is also iterated in an earlier piece by Cheibub in which he states, “Indeed, existing evidence shows that parliamentary democracies tend to last longer than presidential democracies...The instability of presidential democracies has been commonly accounted for by the principle of separation between executive and legislative authorities” (Cheibub 2002, 285). Therefore, when sanctions are applied which place pressure on the leadership of a parliamentary democratic system, the leaders are constrained by the legislative power which is inherent in the system. It is less likely that one individual or even a group of

people will be able to impose repression on the population since power is predicated in coalitional governance.

Therefore, two hypotheses can be drawn from this theory. First, economic sanctions on presidential systems will lead to more systematic violations in all variants of human rights (H1). Second, presidential democratic systems will experience more human rights abuses than parliamentary systems (H2).

Variables and Data

There are a number of datasets that quantitatively measure human rights. Of all the datasets available, the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database is one of the most extensively utilized measures of physical integrity rights. The database includes data on all countries from the period of 1981-2008 and contains individual measurements of numerous individual indicators of human rights components. Specifically, it includes four variables measured on a three-point scale: torture, extrajudicial killings, political disappearances, and political imprisonment, each of which is coded from 0 to 2 (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). A value of 0 indicates high or frequent abuses of these rights while a value of 2 signifies very low or nonexistent levels of these violations. Further, these four variables are compiled into an additive index which ranges from 0 to 8 where 0 indicates no respect for any of these rights and 8 represents perfect respect for all the aspects of physical integrity rights.

The Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database contains an inherent feature in the coding that can cause some confusion in the presentation and interpretation of any results which are obtained. The original coding scheme utilized by Cingranelli and Richards gives a value of 0 to severe and systematic violation and 2 as no violation of these rights. Keeping the variables in their original coding format can potentially lead to misinterpreting of the coefficients and misleading conclusions about the effect of the explanatory variables. The inverse coding scheme which Cingranelli and Richards use is simply counterintuitive. Therefore, it is appropriate to recode each of the measures of human rights so that higher levels of violations receive higher values on the ordinal scale. Therefore, a value of 0 now represents no abuse of the right by the government and a value of 2 indicates higher levels of abuse. Coding the variables as measures of violation allows for intuitive interpretation of coefficients that are produced through the quantitative analysis.

What is meant by torture, extrajudicial killings, political disappearances, and political imprisonment and how are Cingranelli and Richards determining what value to assign to a country? Political disappearances are defined by Cingranelli and Richards as cases where, "people have disappeared, political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not been found" (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). The difficulty in accurately coding the political imprisonment measurement becomes manifest when the ambiguity of political motivation is considered. There could be systematic bias in the coding of this variable in certain nations. Some nations might be especially adept at making individuals disappear without public knowledge, thereby biasing the estimate downward. On the other hand, if the government is wrongfully attributed with the disappearance of people then the estimate could be too high. For example, in politically turbulent nations, random disappearances could be attributed to the government even when the government was not involved. However, because political imprisonment, and the other physical integrity indicators, contain a global sample of nations, the bias has an equal probability of being either high or low, and can be considered stochastic noise.

The other three variables are more straightforward and are more easily defined. Torture, according to Cingranelli and Richards is the deliberate infliction of pain on individuals by the

government. Torture can be both mental and physical in nature. Extrajudicial killings are defined as the killing of members of the citizenry by government officials without the process of law (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). Finally, political imprisonment is the incarceration of individuals for their political or religious affiliation and their membership in racial, political and religious groups (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007).

I also utilize the State Department and Amnesty International measures of human rights to obtain a more complete perspective of human rights. These indicators both cover the time period of 1976-2000, and their values range on a scale of 1-5. A value of 1 indicates systematic and uniform recognition and protection of all physical integrity rights and a value of 5 indicates systematic repression of human rights. This measure suffers from the same problems as the additive index created by Richards and Cingranelli because it is impossible to determine what specific aspects of human rights are causing the value to change in each case, and what factors are being influenced by the sanctions. However, when used in conjunction with the individual components of the CIRI index, these two measures can serve as corroboration of any conclusions that are obtained and a substantial boost to this study's robustness.

To quantify economic sanctions I have chosen to utilize the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. This dataset includes not only sanctions which were imposed upon a target regime but also situations in which economic sanctions were threatened upon a target regime. This dataset covers the years from 1971-2000, representing a nearly two decade long period which is included in the human rights data. Types of sanctions that can be implemented include: economic embargoes, restrictions on imports and exports, freezing target assets, cessation of foreign aid to the target, travel ban, and blockades (Morgan, Krustev and Bapat 2009). These various forms of economic sanctions are coded into an ordinal measure ranging from 0 to 2. A value of 0 indicates no sanction or threat imposed in a given year. If less severe forms of sanctions are threatened or implemented the target country receives a value of 1 in a particular year. Severe sanctions implemented against a target warrant a value of 2 according to the ordinal scale of sanction severity (Peksen 2009).

Because the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset is so thorough and includes the actual motivation for the sanction in the dataset, there is a way in which I can correct for endogeneity by using this dataset. It is possible to exclude all cases in which the motivation for the sanctions had anything to do with human rights. Through the elimination of these cases that could feed an endogenous loop I am essentially removing any feedback which is occurring. Since the motivation for the sanction is known and only cases of sanctions which were implemented for reasons other than violations or repression of human rights, the potential for feedback and endogenous bias is significantly reduced. Another solution to the potential bias resulting from endogeneity would be the formulation of a set of instrumental variables which are correlated only with economic sanctions and can be measured against components of human rights. However, if these instruments are not sufficient or theoretically strong, the bias will not only remain but will actually be exacerbated. Thus, a more practical and pragmatic solution is the exclusion of sanctions which were issued in response to human rights dilemmas. This solution frees the analysis theoretically from the quandary of endogeneity, and alleviates the problems which could result from poor instrumentation.

Variables such as interstate and civil conflict are measured and included in the analysis (Davenport 1995; Howard, and Donnelly 1986; Mitchell, Howard and Donnelly 1987; Peksen 2009; Poe 1992; Poe and Tate 1994; Richards and Cingranelli 1999b; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; Zanger 2000). Nations that are engaged in international wars are occupied with the

affairs of the battlefield and feel politically susceptible to any perceived act of sedition. Because the government feels vulnerable, it will repress the population to prevent any threat. Likewise, when a nation is embroiled in a civil war, every citizen is a potential enemy. The government will repress and violate the physical integrity rights of the population in an attempt to eliminate potential enemy soldiers and sympathizers. However, the research designs which incorporate measures for these variables which serve as controls have arrived at quite dissimilar results.

War, or the presence of hostilities in a nation, either from the actions of a rebel group within the state or an international adversary, is hypothesized to have a negative impact upon human rights violations. If any type of war is occurring within a nation during a period of observation, it is believed that the human rights of citizens will be less secure and more likely to be violated by the regime. However, previous literature on human rights fails to deliver any semblance of a consensus on whether civil or interstate war has any significant effect upon human rights violations. Poe and Tate find that both international and civil conflict have a significant positive effect upon levels of human rights violations within a nation (Poe and Tate 1994, 866) while Peksen concludes that civil war operates as expected similar to as in Poe and Tate's study, but international conflict is not significant at all (Peksen 2009, 74). Peace years simply measured as the number of years since the last military conflict within a nation is expected to be inversely related to higher levels of violation. Finally, the political instability of a nation and how close they are to engaging in conflict is expected to be related to higher values of repression.

The replication data used by Peksen (2009) includes the complete data from both the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data. The Peksen dataset also includes revised and recoded variables for each of the human rights measurements included in the Cingranelli Richards Database. Peksen recognized

the inherent problems of the counterintuitive coding scheme of these variables and corrected for the problem. The second important contribution of the Peksén data is that he distinguished between sanctions that were issued over human rights issues and those which were implemented for other reasons. By using the measure of economic sanctions which does not include sanctions issued over human rights issues there is no longer a threat of the coefficients and standard errors being biased by endogeneity. Sanctions are coded on a scale of 0 through 2. A value of 0 indicates no sanction implemented, a value of 1 indicated limited and less severe sanctions, and a value of 2 indicates severe and costly sanctions. While this coding scheme limits the amount of variation within the variable, it does allow analysis through maximum likelihood estimation because of the ordinal nature of the coding. Population and GDP per capita data is included in this data set and is logged so that each exhibits a more normalized distribution.

Civil war, international war, peace years, and political instability information are obtained from the data collected and used by Clayton L. Thyne in his article “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War, 1945—1999,” which was originally pulled from the PRIO database. In this dataset, Thyne uses a dummy variable to measure civil war, international war, and political instability. The peace years variable is coded to represent the number of years since the last military conflict that the nation was engaged in.

According to Thyne, “Instability captures possible weakness and disorganization in states that have recently become independent or have undergone major transitions” (Thyne 2006). By combining the replication data of Peksén and Thyne I will be able to draw robust, conclusions concerning the relationship between economic sanctions and human rights levels within distinct democratic regimes. Finally, the data which distinguishes democracies according to their electoral system is obtained from the replication data of Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski’s study (1999). This data, which covers the time period of 1950-1990 assigns a value of 1 to parliamentary systems, 2 to mixed democratic systems that are semi-presidential, and 3 to presidential democracies. Autocratic, or non-democratic states receive a value of 0. Because this analysis is concerned with democracies, and not autocratic nations, I drop all autocratic nations from the sample leaving only variation in the institutional makeup of democracies. Further, because autocracies make up such a large share of the original dataset, these values will skew and bias my coefficients no matter how they are coded. Also, this dataset includes a variable which measures how often leadership changes within a nation. Using this measurement it is possible to determine the extent to which leadership is susceptible to electoral pressure or whether the leadership is insulated from political threat.

Typically, data pertaining to regime type or institutional composition is dichotomized for ease of use and interpretation. I have opted to keep the measure of presidentialism in its original coding scheme. Running the entire series of analysis with both the original measure as designed by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski and the dichotomous institutional composition measure reveal no differences in either the direction or the levels of statistical significance of the coefficients. Transforming the original three point scale of presidentialism also throws out valuable information inherent in the measure. By using the original measurement system, conclusions can be made about movement along a scale of presidentialism rather than just presidential democracies or parliamentary governments.

Data obtained from Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski also offers a measurement of riots, which is given a value representing the number of violent protests with

over 100 participants during a year. Nations with more riots in a year should be more prone to repress, *ceteris paribus*, as the government seeks to control the violence within the national borders. Also, they include a measurement for the period of recovery after wars or conflicts. This variable is given a value of 1 for every year within the five year period after a conflict has ceased, and a value of 0 otherwise. Physical integrity rights are expected to be diminished in this period because the leadership is still wary of reverting back into violence and will respond to any potential problem with violence and repression. In summation, the dataset that I am utilizing offers a time period of analysis from 1976-1990 using the State Department and Amnesty International data and 1981-1990 using the CIRI index.

Figure 1- Summary Statistics of Main Variables				
	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
Torture	437	0.764	0.8	0.635
Political Killings	438	0.479	0.721	0.52
Disappearances	438	0.281	0.606	0.367
Pol. Imprisonment	437	0.588	0.79	0.624
Amnesty International	592	2.076	1.183	1.4
State Department	592	1.745	1.035	1.07
Presidentialism	682	1.71	0.916	0.838
Non-Human Rights Sanctions	649	0.069	0.294	0.086

Solving the Riddle Quantitatively

There are many ways to statistically and empirically test the two hypotheses derived from the theory of human rights and economic sanctions. Due to the fact that the dependent variables, the different measures of human rights, are all discrete there are regression assumptions which are violated. Because of heteroskedascity and non-linearity within the data, the standard errors obtained will be wrong, however, the coefficients will remain unbiased. Therefore, because of the noise added to the standard errors it is possible that the conclusions will lead to a Type II error where the null hypothesis is retained when it would actually be possible to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Worse, it is possible that if the correlation between the independent variable and the error term, “are positively correlated, the bias in s_b is negative, and thus s_b will tend to underestimate the standard deviation of the OLS estimator, b ” (Berry and Feldman 1985, 78). The result of such a bias in the standard errors would lead to a Type I error in which the null hypothesis is erroneously rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis when there is insufficient evidence to do so given the data that was used. While OLS models could be used in this research, it is more fitting for a weighted least squares model, generalized least squares model, or maximum likelihood estimation to be used instead. While it is not an optimal solution, it is possible to cross check the regression analysis using the robust qualifier in STATA 11.0 SE and if the robust standard errors did not change the p-values for any of the coefficients in the full models it might be tempting to accept the standard errors as unbiased. However, the usage of the robust qualifier is, at best, a treatment and not a cure for the violations of the classic regression model.

Results obtained from a simple OLS analysis alone will not be adequate to test the two hypotheses primarily because the variables of interest are measured at the ordinal or nominal

level instead of continuous at the interval level (Berry and Feldman 1985, 10). Because of the numerous violations of OLS regression assumptions a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to the data is warranted. This analysis utilizes ordinal data to measure both economic sanctions and human rights and most of the control variables are either nominal or ordinal. Due to the limited nature of the both the explanatory and response variables in this analysis, a series of ordered probit models appears to be the most appropriate means to test the hypotheses. Ordered probit models are specifically designed to account for ordinal dependent variables such as the different measures of physical integrity rights used. This analysis will consist of probit models for both parliamentary and presidential democratic states. By conducting the analysis through the lens of maximum likelihood estimation the conclusions obtained will be more efficient and robust than if OLS regression was utilized.

Are All Democracies Equal? Quantitative Tests

To test my hypotheses I utilized 18 different ordered probit models that incorporated seven different measurements of physical integrity rights. Because I have hypothesized that physical integrity rights levels are contingent upon the institutional composition of a democratic nation, i.e. whether the democracy is a presidential or a parliamentary system, and the simultaneous severity of an imposed sanction, I was forced to create a variable which measured the interaction between institution and sanction severity. This interaction term acts as the main explanatory variable through this analysis. Examination of the entirety of the results presents interesting conclusions dependent upon the measurement that was utilized in the particular test. Using different measures of human rights produce drastically different conclusions about the implications of physical integrity rights within different types of democratic regimes that have been the target of economic sanctions.

Ordered probit results for the models using the three point ordinal scale of torture are found in Table 1. In both of the descriptive models, the variables of interest move in a positive direction and are statistically significant. Within the first descriptive model (Model 1A) which measures the interaction of presidentialism and sanction severity, the coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.002 level indicating that a relationship this strong would have only been obtained .2% of the time, purely by chance, given this data. The second descriptive model of torture provides similarly expected results. Both presidentialism and the severity of sanctions are strongly statistically significant and move in a positive direction as hypothesized. Therefore, the first descriptive model (Model 1A) suggests that as democracies become more presidential in their institutional design, and more severe sanctions are imposed that torture will increase. Likewise, the positive and significant coefficients for both presidentialism and sanction severity (Model 1B) indicate that nations which are more presidential in their makeup and democracies which have more severe sanctions are associated with higher levels of human rights repression. It is not possible to establish causality from a bivariate or descriptive model. Examination of the complete model which contains the full set of variables is necessary for causal and robust conclusions to be drawn.

The results for the complete model of torture present some interesting findings. Looking at the coefficients in Table 1 for Model 1C, it can be seen that the measure of presidentialism is still positive and significant. The interaction term between presidentialism and the severity of the sanctions is no longer significant at any accepted level. More interesting, the coefficient for sanction severity is now negative and is no longer statistically significant. This explains why the interaction term between presidentialism and sanction severity is no longer significant.

Table 1- Torture			
Ordered	Model	Model	Model
Probit	1A	1B	1C
	Descriptive Model 1	Descriptive Model 2	Full Model
Presidentialism		0.438 *** (0.059)	0.196 *** (.075)
Sanction Severity		0.581 *** (0.195)	-0.68 (.846)
Civil War			0.845 *** (.223)
International War			0.152 (.429)
Sanction Duration			0.056 ** (.027)
Instability			-0.03 (.191)
Peace Years			0.006 (.006)
Riots			0.027 (.031)
GDP per capita			-0.488 *** (.063)
Population			0.214 *** (.049)
Recovery Period			0.426 (.414)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.222 *** (0.072)		0.171 (0.292)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	-0.07	0.713	-0.172
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.789	1.655	1.188
Observations	437	437	434
Pseudo-R ²	0.0111	0.074	0.2805
Log-likelihood	- 456.514	- 427.448	- 329.672

NOTE:Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 2- Political Killings			
Ordered	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 2C
Probit	Descriptive Model 1	Descriptive Model 2	Full Model
Presidentialism		0.602 *** (.065)	0.555 *** (.089)
Sanction Severity		0.741 *** (.195)	0.191 (.81)
Civil War			1.641 *** (.257)
International War			-0.42 (.425)
Sanction Duration			0.035 (.027)
Instability			-0.226 (.199)
Peace Years			0.000989 (.00699)
Riots			-0.036 (.026)
GDP per capita			-0.485 *** (.068)
Population			0.182 *** (.058)
Recovery Period			-0.038 (.42)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.291 *** (.072)		-0.118 (.281)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.44	1.587	0.748
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	1.17	2.454	2.29
Observations	438	438	435
Pseudo-R ²	0.0232	0.1399	0.4439
Log-likelihood	- 374.278	- 329.546	-210.87

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Because this variable measures the interaction between presidentialism and the severity of sanctions, the contrasting direction of the coefficients erodes the likelihood of obtaining statistical significance. What the full model of torture shows is that more presidential democratic regimes are correlated with higher levels of torture. Presidential regimes have a higher probability of torturing citizens than do parliamentary democracies. This relationship does not appear to operate through the imposition or severity of economic sanctions. Sanction severity actually has an inverse relationship with torture, as exhibited by the negative coefficient.

Therefore, as sanction severity increases, democratic nations are less inclined to torture their populations. Civil war, sanction duration, and population are all positive and significantly related to torture, as expected. GDP per capita, has a negative coefficient and is significant, indicating that as wealth in a nation increases, democratic nations are less apt to resort to torture as a policy.

The results from the series of models examining the relationship of the explanatory variables with political killing present a similar picture as the first series of ordered probit regressions focused on torture. In model 2A and 2B, presented on Table 2, the descriptive models behave as expected and in a similar manner to the earlier models using torture. In Model 2A, the interaction between sanction severity and the presidentialism of a democracy is statistically significant and has a positive coefficient as predicted. In Model 2B, both of the variables of interest possess positive and strongly statistically significant coefficients. However, in the full ordered probit model, the significance for the interaction term disappears, and the coefficient's direction changes and is now negative. Of the main explanatory variables, only presidentialism remains significant. Just as with the full model of torture, democratic systems that are more presidential in their framework are strongly related to more systematic and

widespread instances of political killings. Although, just as with the analysis on torture, the severity of the economic sanction that is imposed does not seem to factor into whether more presidential nations engage in political killings. Still, the more presidential a system, the more likely it is that the nations will engage in political killings.

The final two series of ordered probits conducted using components of the CIRI index, are arguably less severe forms of human rights abuses. Political imprisonment and disappearances, while unsavory, are not perceived with the same degree of international outrage with which killings and torture are viewed. While killings and torture are events which make the evening news and draw public outrage, both domestically and internationally, disappearances and imprisonment tend to go under the public radar. Therefore, it would seem that democracies, in an attempt to protect their international image would be more inclined to implement these types of repressive tactics. However, this assumption does not hold upon examination of the series of ordered probit regressions using political imprisonment and disappearances. In both Tables 3 and 4, the coefficients in the descriptive models all behave as expected and are strongly significant. Both presidentialism and sanction severity are significant and positive, indicating a that more presidential democracies and more severe sanctions are associated with higher levels of disappearances and political imprisonment. Further, when political disappearances and imprisonment are regressed on the interaction between sanction severity and presidentialism's coefficient is positive and significant as expected. The bivariate ordered probit regression in Models 3A and 4A initially suggest that as nations that are more presidential are subjected to more severe sanctions, that both political imprisonment and disappearances will increase. Once again, upon running an ordered probit regression for the complete models, the results become less clear. Most notable is the model for political imprisonment displayed in Table 4.

Table 3- Political Disappearances			
Ordered	Model 3A	Model 3B	Model 3C
Probit	Descriptive Model 1	Descriptive Model 2	Full Model
Presidentialism		0.68 *** (0.079)	0.833 *** (0.117)
Sanction Severity		0.424 ** (0.188)	-1.184 (1.088)
Civil War			0.856 *** (0.278)
International War			1.119 *** (0.434)
Sanction Duration			0.057 * (0.03)
Instability			-0.312 (0.219)
Peace Years			-0.03 *** (0.009)
Riots			-0.013 (0.029)
GDP per capita			-0.192 ** (0.076)
Population			-0.133 * (0.073)
Recovery Period			0.122 (0.454)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.226 *** (0.066)		0.225 (0.359)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.892	2.276	-1.419
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	1.45	2.965	-0.362
Observations	438	438	435
Pseudo-R ²	0.0211	0.1649	0.3989
Log-likelihood	- 271.502	- 231.611	- 164.937

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 4- Political Imprisonment

Ordered	Model 4A	Model 4B	Model 4C
Probit	Descriptive Model 1	Descriptive Model 2	Full Model
Presidentialism		0.319 *** (0.062)	0.068 (0.082)
Sanction Severity		1.8 *** (0.361)	-0.087 (1.346)
Civil War			1.21 *** (0.242)
International War			0.023 (0.449)
Sanction Duration			0.021 (0.028)
Instability			0.463 ** (0.206)
Peace Years			-0.006 (0.006)
Riots			0.029 (0.03)
GDP per capita			-0.306 *** (0.066)
Population			0.171 *** (0.055)
Recovery Period			0.44 (0.438)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	1.123 *** (0.3)		0.788 (0.942)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.32	0.915	0.815
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.988	1.615	1.924
Observations	437	437	434
Pseudo-R ²	0.0527	0.0864	0.3509
Log-likelihood	-392.39	- 378.424	- 265.721
NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1			

None of the key variables are significant, and the coefficient for the measure of sanction severity is negative indicating that as more stringent and intense sanctions are imposed on a democracy, the incidents of imprisonment for political motives becomes less prevalent. Similarly, the coefficient for sanction severity is also negative and insignificant in Model 3C in Table 3. However, because of the weakness of these coefficients with respect to their standard errors it is impossible to say with any certainty that these relationships are not being reported in these equations by mere chance.

The different measures of physical integrity rights which make up the CIRI index did not support the hypothesis that presidential systems will violate physical integrity rights more than parliamentary democracies. The interaction term between sanction severity and presidentialism was not significant in any of the models and the coefficient of sanction severity shifted from a positive to a negative orientation contingent upon the measure of physical integrity rights used. Only presidentialism remained fairly consistent across most of the models, moving as expected and exhibiting a statistically significant coefficient in three of the four full models.

Instead of merely determining whether to retain the null hypothesis or reject it, based solely on the ordered probit tests using the CIRI indicators, I have also tested the set of variables using human rights data from the United States State Department and Amnesty International. Table 5 contains the results from the series of ordered probit models using human rights data from Amnesty International as the dependent variable. Just as with the models in Tables 1-4, the descriptive models show a positive and strong statistically significant relationship. Most notably, however, is that when the full model with all control variables included is utilized, the

significance of the coefficient for sanction severity and presidentialism's interaction not only evaporates and becomes insignificant, the sign also changes. Model 5C in Table 5 shows that the interaction term of sanction severity and presidentialism has a coefficient of -.069. A negative sign for this coefficient suggests a relationship that is in complete contrast to the hypotheses set forth in this paper. Instead of human rights being harmed as a result of democracies which are more presidential experiencing sanctions, a negative coefficient for this variable indicates that human rights are adversely affected by parliamentary systems that are sanctioned. Although the direction of the coefficient is interesting, the high standard error, and therefore, the low Z-score means that it is not certain whether this result was obtained by accident given the data utilized.

Outside of the interaction term, presidentialism remains statistically significant and shows a positive coefficient.

Of all of the measures and models utilized in this analysis, only the State Department indicator of human rights integrity produces results that completely support hypotheses 1 and 2. In Model 6C presented in Table 6, the coefficient of the interaction term between sanction severity and presidentialism is positive and statistically significant with a P-value greater than .001. A P-value this strong indicates that I would have arrived at these results less than one time in a thousand by complete chance if there was no relationship between the interaction and the State Department measurement of human rights. Therefore, the State Department data supports the argument that the imposition of more severe types of economic sanctions against democracies with more presidentialist political structures. Interestingly, while the coefficient for presidentialism is significant and positive, the coefficient for the severity of the imposed sanction is negative and statistically significant.

Table 5- Amnesty			
Ordered	Model	Model	Model
Probit	5A	5B	5C
	Descriptive Model 1	Descriptive Model 2	Full Model
Presidentialism		0.594 *** (.05)	0.48 *** (.06)
Sanction Severity		0.673 *** (.145)	-0.208 (.471)
Civil War			1.215 *** (.191)
International War			-0.44 (.342)
Sanction Duration			0.044 ** (.02)
Instability			0.086 (.143)
Peace Years			-0.006 (.005)
Riots			-0.035 * (.02)
GDP per capita			-0.435 *** (.049)
Population			0.213 *** (.039)
Recovery Period			0.374 (.295)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.228 *** (.06)		-0.069 (.178)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	-0.16	0.872	0.222
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.533	1.684	1.422
<i>cutpoint 3</i>	1.073	2.314	2.522
<i>cutpoint 4</i>	1.779	3.135	3.782
Observations	592	592	589
Pseudo-R ²	0.0087	0.0972	0.3085
Log-likelihood	- 810.862	- 738.468	- 560.945

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Table 6- State Department			
Ordered	Model 6A	Model 6B	Model 6C
Probit	Descriptive Model 1	Descriptive Model 2	Full Model
Presidentialism		0.586 *** (.053)	0.32 *** (.066)
Sanction Severity		0.896 *** (.152)	-1.799 *** (.521)
Civil War			1.316 *** (.202)
International War			0.336 (0.352)
Sanction Duration			0.072 *** (.021)
Instability			0.075 (.149)
Peace Years			0.000441 (.00556)
Riots			-0.07 *** (.022)
GDP per capita			-0.662 *** (.0563)
Population			0.217 *** (.0434)
Recovery Period			0.274 (.3)
Presidentialism * Sanctions	0.365 *** (0.064)		0.7 *** (.196)
<i>cutpoint 1</i>	0.225	1.31	-1.178
<i>cutpoint 2</i>	0.847	2.031	0.086
<i>cutpoint 3</i>	1.435	2.693	1.385
<i>cutpoint 4</i>	2.348	3.707	2.896
Observations	592	592	589
Pseudo-R ²	0.0241	0.1128	0.3996
Log-likelihood	- 672.275	-611.14	-409.549

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

An examination of the results of all full models shows some interesting trends. In all but the full model using State Department data, the interaction between sanction severity and presidentialism was statistically insignificant. Further, coefficients for sanction severity were negative in all models, except for killing where the coefficient was statistically insignificant.

Finding negative coefficients for this variable across most of the models leads to the conclusion that when more severe sanctions are imposed against any type of democratic regime, human rights typically improve. Therefore, all types of democracies are not equal in regard to their respect for human rights. In all of the full models except for political imprisonment, presidentialism is positively associated with increased levels of violating a particular human rights indicator. Human rights are typically worse in presidential regimes. Although, the theory that I offered is not entirely exhibited in the results provided by the data, I was correct in the theoretical assumption that presidential systems are more likely to violate their populations than democratic systems governed by parliament. However, because sanction severity is actually inversely related to human rights abuses in democratic nations, appears that implementing sanctions might actually help human rights in presidential systems rather than cause harm.

Results obtained by running the ordered probit models through Clarify reveal the substantive change in probability from moving from a parliamentary system to a presidential democracy. In running the model, I set all other variables to their mean, because I wanted to see the difference in human rights recognition between average presidential and average parliamentary democratic systems. Table 7 shows the results from using Clarify on all of the full ordered probit models. Moving from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system, decreases the probability of encountering the lowest level of repression for any of the indicators.

Table 7- Change in Probability of Repression When Moving from Parliamentary to Presidential Democracy					
Figure 1- Torture		Mean	Standard Error	95% CI Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels		-0.15	0.056	-0.257	-0.037
Moderate Levels		0.064	0.025	0.017	0.116
Pervasive Levels		0.085	0.035	0.02	0.156
Figure 2- Political Killings		Mean	Standard Error	95% CI Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels		-0.381	0.06	-0.5	-0.262
Moderate Levels		0.31	0.05	0.21	0.407
Pervasive Levels		0.071	0.022	0.036	0.12
Figure 3- Disappearances		Mean	Standard Error	95% CI Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels		-0.293	0.051	-0.398	-0.199
Moderate Levels		0.232	0.04	0.157	0.315
Pervasive Levels		0.062	0.022	0.028	0.111
Figure 4- Political Imprisonment		Mean	Standard Error	95% CI Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Low Levels		-0.053	0.062	-0.175	0.068
Moderate Levels		0.031	0.037	-0.043	0.102
Pervasive Levels		0.022	0.026	-0.027	0.077
Figure 5- Amnesty International		Mean	Standard Error	95% CI Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Secure Rule of Law		-0.316	0.036	-0.387	-0.245
Limited Violations		0.011	0.021	-0.031	0.051
Extensive Violations		0.213	0.03	0.153	0.273
Near Systematic Violations		0.086	0.019	0.053	0.128
Systematic Violation		0.006	0.003	0.002	0.013
Figure 6- State Department		Mean	Standard Error	95% CI Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Secure Rule of Law		-0.246	0.051	-0.345	-0.146
Limited Violations		0.153	0.032	0.091	0.216
Extensive Violations		0.085	0.022	0.046	0.132
Near Systematic Violations		0.007	0.003	0.002	0.016
Systematic Violation		0.00006	0.00008	0.0000005	0.0003

For example, Figure 2 shows that the average presidential system is over 38% less likely to see low or limited levels of political killing than the average presidential democracy. Similarly, moderate levels of political killings are 31% more likely in presidential systems than

parliamentary ones, and the probability of pervasive and systematic killings jumps just over 7% when moving to a presidential democracy. This substantive and statistical trend holds across all models except for political imprisonment.

Results for tests using CIRI's political imprisonment variable are enigmatic. It would seem natural that imprisonment would be less severe than torture and killings, and that nations that are engaging in seemingly more severe types of repression would have high levels of imprisonment by default. The data does not support this conclusion. While arguably more severe forms of repression are strongly associated with systems that are presidential, imprisonment remains insignificant. One theoretical answer for this perplexing result lies in the visibility of political prisoners. These people are often able to get their message out to domestic and international groups. Democracies, which care about their reputation among other actors might opt for severe forms of repression which inhibit the flow of information to other groups in the international arena (Tomz 2007). Instead of merely imprisoning individuals governments determine to silence them by killing or simply causing them to disappear instead.

Political imprisonment might display unexpected and statistically insignificant coefficients because democracies find non-political reasons to incarcerate political targets. According to the coding scheme devised by Cingranelli and Richards, political imprisonment is the incarceration of individuals for their political or religious affiliation and their membership in racial, political and religious groups (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). Instead of arresting individuals for their opposition of the ruling government, people are charged with other offenses in an attempt to euphemize the political nature of the incarceration. An individual leading a protest rally might be detained and charged with disorderly conduct. Instability in the indicator could be a consequence of a lack of available information. It is possible that presidential regimes

are more likely to violate physical integrity rights through political imprisonment, but these governments have found a way to obscure the true level of political prisoners within their borders.

Power of the People?

Analysis conducted in this paper argued against much of the generally accepted knowledge of democracies. Democracies are typically perceived as virtuous counterparts to the inherent evil of autocracies. Autocracies, after all, inflict physical harm on their populations and repress them through fear and intimidation. I have shown that not all democratic forms of government are equal in their respect for human rights. Presidential systems' linkage to military authoritarianism makes them more susceptible to repressive governmental tactics against citizens. I attempted to theoretically explain this relationship positing that the imposition of economic sanctions act as a catalyst for violence against populations in presidential democracies. However, this relationship was not significant. Differences between parliamentary and presidential systems were significant. Presidential systems have a lower probability of having little or no incidents of repression and a higher probability of experiencing all other levels of repressions across every indicator except political imprisonment. Finally, in many models the severity of a sanction had an inverse relationship with repression, indicating that a side effect of more severe sanctions could possibly be higher levels of human rights recognition in democratic nations. However, this is uncertain as most coefficients were statistically insignificant.

This research brings a new angle to the discussion of how nations should democratize.

As the United States and other Western powers attempt to spread democracy, the leaders of these nations should be mindful that the electoral system which a nation adopts can have severe

ramifications for the citizens in these nations. Spreading democracy is not enough. Care must be taken to ensure that the democratic framework of nations ensures the protection of fundamental human freedoms and the physical integrity of all people. Sadly, presidential systems do not offer this assurance better than parliamentary systems.

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