Abstract

Skepticism about moral responsibility (SMR) is the view that takes seriously the possibility that human beings are never morally responsible for their actions. This presentation examines the most convincing case for SMR: Galen Strawson’s (1986; 1994; 2011) Basic Argument for the impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility - which rejected the traditional compatibilist view of free will. Recent notable attempts to refute Strawson could be classified into three categories, including: (1) arguing for the possibility of self-creation: Kane (2000; 2007) Self-forming Action and Roskies (2012) structure of causation and control. (2) arguing for a form of semi-compatibilism: Fischer (2004; 2007) Frankfurt-type case example and (3) attempt to revitalize Mele (1995) Modest moral responsibility: McKenna (2016); Coates (2017).

Nevertheless, this presentation would argue that these contemporary responses have not been successful in refuting Strawson’s Basic Argument.

Christian Worldview Integration: At first glance, SMR may seem to pose certain threats
against the Christian worldview by denying the possibility of agent-responsible acts, and thus the existence of moral absolutes. However, from another perspective, if we agree on the existence of moral responsibly, SMR could possibly allow us to form a basis for a version of moral argument for God, i.e., the existence of moral responsibility entails the actuality of causally independent acts- which can only be explained by the truth of a casually independent being.