

Scientism, Satire, and Sacrificial Ceremony in Dostoevsky's *Notes From Underground* and C.S.
Lewis's *That Hideous Strength*

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Abstract

Though the nineteenth-century Victorian belief that science alone could provide utopia for man weakened in the epistemological uncertainty of the postmodern era, this belief still continues today. In order to understand our current scientific milieu—and the dangers of propagating scientism—we must first trace the rise of scientism in the nineteenth-century. Though removed, Fyodor Dostoevsky, in *Notes From Underground* (1864), and C.S. Lewis, in *That Hideous Strength* (1965), are united in their critiques of scientism as a conceptual framework for human residency. For Dostoevsky, the Crystal Palace of London's Great Exhibition (1862) embodied the nineteenth-century goal to found utopia through the means of scientific progress. Though the Crystal Palace offers this hope for man, Dostoevsky shows that palace's monological design is ultimately uninhabitable for humans, who are dialogical beings. Writing a century later, Lewis explores the implications of scientism within the National Institute for Coordinated Experiments (otherwise known as the N.I.C.E.), which offers the same conceptual framework as the Crystal Palace. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis exposes the monological myth of scientism and both present hearty critiques of scientism as a way of life for man. They use satire, exaggeration, and wit to show the absurdity of a conceptual framework built on the foundations of a naturalistic philosophy of science.

Chapter One: Connecting Dostoevsky and Lewis

And New Philosophy calls all in doubt,
 The Element of fire is quite put out;
 The Sun is lost, and th' earth, and no man's wit
 Can well direct him where to look for it.
 And freely men confess that this world's spent,
 When in the Planets and the Firmament
 They seek so many new; then see that this
 Is crumbled out again to his Atomies.
 'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone;
 All just supply, and all Relation.

John Donne [1611]

Upon first glance, Fyodor Dostoevsky and C.S. Lewis seem as dissimilar as two authors can be. Apart from their shared Christian beliefs, their writings are a century removed from each other; they wrote in distinct social milieus, and they had different literary motivations.

¹Dostoevsky worked in Russia as an editor for *Epoch* and *Time* and primarily published prose—at times, to financially survive. Lewis held a professorship (first and for longer at Oxford) at Cambridge as the chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature and wrote children's fiction, poetry, apologetics, and literary criticism with considerable market success but donated two thirds of his income (Como 112). However, upon further investigation, it appears that these authors, despite such differences, are united in fundamental ways: Both were exposed to literature at a young age through fairy tales, folk tales, and mythology, and as a result, they

¹ I am honored to finish this project on the 150th anniversary of the release of *Notes From Underground*.

affirm beauty as integral to the religious experience.² They were repulsed by Western individualism since it isolates the “self” and inhibits man from authentic engagement with others and God.³ And most importantly, for the aims of this argument, Dostoevsky, in *Notes from Underground*, and Lewis, in *That Hideous Strength*, expose the incompatibility of scientism⁴ with Christian eschatology revealing that scientism offers a place of residence—a conceptual framework for human existence—that is ultimately uninhabitable and dehumanizing.

Before tracing the authors’ critique of scientism, one must contextualize their critique using their Christian eschatological vision. Dostoevsky and Lewis are united in their eschatological vision of the forthcoming New Jerusalem and the dangers of the scientific goal to immanentize the eschaton.⁵ They view the earth as a temporary residence, one that provides a robust and meaningful existence but is ultimately a “stopping place” for the life to come.⁶ Dostoevsky explores this theme with Elder Zossima in *The Brothers Karamazov* when, in conversation about the Kingdom of God, Zossima says, “And when will that come to pass? And will it ever come to pass? Is it not simply a dream of ours?” (312). He eventually contrasts the Christian eschatological vision with the utopian dream of scientific socialism:

²Dostoevsky explores the importance of beauty for the religious experience in the characters of Sonya (*Crime and Punishment*), Zossima (*The Brothers Karamazov*), and most notably with Prince Myshkin (*The Idiot*) where he shows the crux of Christ’s sacrifice in Holbein’s “Christ in the Tomb.” For Lewis, beauty is foundational to the religious experience since it creates *sehnsucht*, a state of longing for God through the beauty of nature.

³ Dostoevsky was repulsed with Western individualism, and Lewis believed that Hell is choosing the Self over choosing God.

⁴ In a fairly standard definition, Huston Smith writes, “Scientism adds to science two corollaries: first, that the scientific method is, if not the only reliable method of getting at the truth, then at least the most reliable method; and second, that the things science deals with—material entities—are the most fundamental things that exist” (qtd. in “Demarcation and the Scientific Fallacy”).

⁵ A phrase Eric Voegelin develops in *The New Science of Politics*. Voegelin explains, “The attempt at immanentizing the meaning of existence is fundamentally an attempt to bring our knowledge of transcendence into a firmer grip than the *cognition fidei*” (124). Voegelin sees the movement away from faith and transcendence as a corollary to the revolutionary aims, by such men as Comte, Marx, and Hitler, for the “redivination of society” (124). Once society is bereft of God, it opens the door for a secular utopia.

⁶ Certainly, Dostoevsky and Lewis do not subscribe to Gnosticism; their shared, deep appreciation for beauty attests to this.

Believe me, this dream, as you call it, will come to pass without doubt; it will come, but not now, for every process has its law. It's a spiritual, psychological process. To transform the world, to recreate it afresh, men must turn into another path psychologically. Until you have really become in actual fact a brother to everyone, brotherhood will not come to pass. No sort of scientific teaching... will ever teach men to share property and privileges with equal considerations for all.

(313)

In this passage, the narrator writes in the future tense: “this dream, as you call it, *will* come to pass without doubt” (313), revealing Dostoevsky’s belief that the true utopia is according to God’s timing and when the New Jerusalem descends. Until this glorious transformation, man must undergo the spiritual process of repentance, which unites all men in the brotherhood of the body of Christ.⁷ For Dostoevsky, this shared brotherhood is only possible in the body of Christ and even in that body not until the end of all things by God’s decree. In contrast, science offers the hope of utopia now, as Dostoevsky noted, but cannot provide the grounding for true brotherhood. One of the strongest representatives of Christian love in Dostoevsky’s writings, Zossima expresses a fundamental theme in Dostoevsky’s work, that of Christian eschatology. His question, “Is it not simply a dream of ours?” attests to how seriously Dostoevsky himself considered the question and should not be taken as a sign of empty doubt, but of the difficulty of the eschatological question for Christians; it requires that man be both present here but also patiently awaiting the future Age through a demonstration of faith.⁸

⁷ “Brotherhood” is a term Dostoevsky uses and should be seen as an exclusively male idea. Frank explains, that for Dostoevsky, “True brotherhood, as in the *obshchina*, is an instinctive mutual relation between the individual and the community in which each desires only the welfare of the other. The individual does not, as in the West, insist on his exclusive rights as an isolated ego; he freely brings these rights to the community in sacrifice without even being asked to do so” (380).

⁸ John Bennett, in *Social Salvation*, explains six commonly held eschatological views all united by the “hope that in a mysterious way, beyond time and history as we know them not necessarily in a world in which there is no change

Lewis, likewise, illustrates this difficulty in his book *The Great Divorce* where the eschatological question is symbolized in the “journey” of several travelers with various earthly ambitions, on a bus toward the afterlife.⁹ The destination of these travelers is also elucidated in *The Weight of Glory*. Here, Lewis provides an eschatological vision where every encounter we have with beauty and others is a gateway to transcendence and the coming age. This experience, what Lewis calls *sehnsucht*, is “the scent of a flower we have not found, the echo of a tune we have not heard, news from a country we have never yet visited” (31). Lewis argues that every creaturely being has this eschatological vision as a reflection of the Creator; it is the “secret thread...the secret signature of each soul, the incommunicable and unappeasable want” (*The Problem of Pain* 118). Christian eschatology affirms this desire in man, for, “While we are, this is. If we lose this, we lose all” (119). Without this signature, man is trapped in the sphere of immanence; his desires point to nothing beyond, only to his own absurd aloneness. This, boiled down, is the Christian eschatological vision—man’s dual citizenship.

In contrast to Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s view of man is the view known as scientism. Scientism replaces the New Jerusalem, a city that will come when God brings all things to completion, with a modern Tower of Babel; the authors see the rise of scientism as a modern Tower of Babel because it symbolizes man’s attempt to bring heaven to earth through scientific progress.¹⁰ Since a naturalistic philosophy of science is scripted on natural phenomena, it effectively equates physical satisfaction with utopia. Scientism offers man bread instead of

or duration, there will be a perfect consummation of the Kingdom of God. It need be no static perfection, but a further process, a process in which there will be no compromise or defeat for the ideal, in which God will be all in all” (qtd. in Purinton 49).

⁹ *In Inklings of Heaven: C.S. Lewis and Eschatology*, Sean Connolly provides a thorough analysis of Lewis’s eschatological vision and the emphasis in Lewis’s work on eschatology; everything is aimed toward transcendence.

¹⁰ Lewis predicts and challenges a political system that is controlled by scientific thought; progress, for Lewis, is simply an illusion unless it includes man’s “goodness and happiness” (“Is Progress Possible?”). Science alone is incapable of providing this for man.

spiritual nourishment.¹¹ For Dostoevsky, the Crystal Palace of London's Great Exhibition (1861) embodied this utopian aim, and for Lewis, the National Institute for Coordinated Experiments, otherwise known as the N.I.C.E., fulfills this vision on the dystopian level. The Crystal Palace, in Dostoevsky's opinion, could be catastrophic because it presented the false, future hope that science could objectively understand man, and through that understanding calculate his behavior towards a benevolent end, an earthly utopia.¹² Hence, the rise of scientism parallels and reinforces the drive to found an earthly utopia.¹³ Lewis's contained dystopia is a world where science is taken to an extreme and becomes hegemonic as well as ideological. At the height of its power, the N.I.C.E. symbolizes a modern Tower of Babel; Lewis intentionally shows the eventual demise of this Tower with a linguistic rupture. Instead of community, the Institute begets chaos.

I will focus on the Crystal Palace and Institute as conceptual frameworks for human residency—places men can inhabit. Dostoevsky's vision of the Crystal Palace, an all-encompassing symbol of scientism, is realized in Lewis' vision of the N.I.C.E., albeit Lewis' vision is more distorted than Dostoevsky's since he is writing within the fairy-tale genre. Lewis' N.I.C.E is fantastical; it possesses supernatural elements yet remains within reality, warranting careful attention and substantive response. Though it would be misleading to assume that Lewis is explicitly fulfilling Dostoevsky's vision of a scientific utopia, the parallels between Dostoevsky's Crystal Palace, the "new man," and Lewis's N.I.C.E are close enough to warrant

¹¹ A problem Dostoevsky develops with the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

¹² This belief is at the core of scientism and has continued to today: "The tendency of science to imperiousness in our intellectual and cultural life has been dubbed 'scientism'— the attitude that the only kind of reliable knowledge is that provided by science, coupled with a conviction that all our personal and social problems are 'soluble' by enough science" (Peacocke 7–8).

¹³ Lewis explains that "[u]nder modern conditions an effective invitation to Hell will certainly appear in the guise of scientific planning" ("A Reply to Professor Haldane" 74). Lewis is not equating science and evil; rather, he says that any destructive institutions will arise out of scientific planning science has become the supreme ideological force.

further examination as treatments of same phenomena.¹⁴ Viewed together, these places of residence are united by their scientific underpinnings, which purport to meet man's physical needs to the demise of his spiritual and existential needs.

I will identify and trace the sources of scientism, which culturally intersect and enlarge during Dostoevsky's to Lewis's time, and how Dostoevsky, in *Notes From Underground*, and C.S. Lewis, in *That Hideous Strength*, use satire to expose the limits of this system. By satire, I mean the literary use of humor and wit to criticize human problems for the purpose of change. Both authors primarily use indirect satire, where characters, through narrative, are critiqued by their own absurd behaviors. I accept Matthew Hodgart's criteria for successful satire as both a revelation of the absurdity of a belief and also a "warning to the future" (*Satire: Origins and Principles* 248) to those who hold the belief. Lewis and Dostoevsky satirized with purpose—to challenge, to warn, but also to reveal the innate value of human nature and man's need for divine intervention through Christ's sacrificial, salvific act. According to Dostoevsky and Lewis, a naturalistic philosophy of science is incapable of affirming a complete view of man because it overlooks man's human nature, which is sinful and in need of Christ—who exists outside man's material conditions.¹⁵

My argument will develop Dostoevsky's and Lewis's view of the necessity of dialogue with God and community for man's existential fulfillment as a speaking, acting, and reasoning being. Both authors share a dialogical view of truth, as founded in the Person of Christ—*Logos*, the Word who spoke the world into existence and established dialogue with humanity through

¹⁴ The twentieth-century Pan-Slavic Totalitarian regimes speak to this fact.

¹⁵ I will use "a naturalistic philosophy of science" interchangeably with "scientism," "naturalism," and "metaphysical naturalism" to avoid redundancy.

the Incarnation and the living Word (John 1.1).¹⁶ Through the Incarnation, Christ immanently revealed himself to man. However, important to Dostoevsky's and Lewis's view is Christ's transcendent existence at the right hand of the Father. *Logos* exists "outside" a scientific Total System and provides the metaphysical and epistemological base for reason and communication.¹⁷ Dialogue, then, is only possible in the dual existence of the material and the spiritual, the immanent and transcendent. Furthermore, the Christian conception of residency affirms the innate value of dialogue with others in community. And this conception appears from the very beginning—in the Garden, in the Burning Bush, in the cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night (Exodus), in the tabernacle, and on and on to the very indwelling Holy Spirit in Dostoevsky and Lewis's own times. The metaphysical possibility of dialogue with God allows man to dialogue with others, which, in turn, provides man with a more meaningful dialogical understanding of God.¹⁸

Though dialogue is an existential need, I will argue that the conceptual framework of scientism does not allow for dialogue. Hence, at the center of both the Crystal Palace and the Institute is the symbol of the Tower of Babel, man's attempt to reach divinity through a language of his design. In the modern era, Dostoevsky and Lewis see scientism as this new language. As Jacques Ellul explains, science, with its aim towards objectivity, enjoys the status of offering an exclusive, ultimate pronouncement of "the way things are," and admits no dialogue:

¹⁶ In "Obstinacy in Belief," Lewis explains the difference between belief in a set of propositions and belief in a Person who is trustworthy. Biblically, too, knowledge includes relational components and intimacy elements—more than propositional.

¹⁷ As Lewis explains in *Miracles*, reason is not reliable within a naturalistic Total System; as such, without ability to form reliable belief-forming mechanisms, man is rendered incomprehensible (313).

¹⁸ In order to differentiate my use of the word "dialogical" when referring to truth: I am maintaining that truth is *ontologically* dialogical since it is founded in *Logos*, and that we *epistemologically* know truth through dialogue--special revelation, the communication of the holy spirit with the Father and Christ on our behalf, prayer, and dialogical community with the body.

To the degree, in fact, to which objectivity stems from pure methodology, then becomes a state of consciousness, an attitude, an ethic, it becomes a value judgment, an exclusion of every other mode of apprehending truth. That relation to truth introduces us into the mythical. But more than that, objectivity presents itself as a value which synthesizes all science... On those two profound motifs, “belief-images” are constructed, one degree more superficial, in which are interwoven the two major themes of “history-meaning” and “science-salvation.”

(The New Demons 102,103)

Ellul shows that the scientific goal toward objectivity presents itself as a totalizing view of the world; by presupposing a naturalistic framework, scientism deconstructs the metaphysical realm and, in turn, gives man a monologic myth grounded in the sensual, the objective, and the mathematic. With this breakdown, science replaces the role of the sacred; it becomes a meaning-making, belief-forming, modern myth which, at its core, offers man a type of salvation.¹⁹ Though the myth of scientism offers man a new language, it ironically cannot provide the rational grounding for its own language. Further, it cannot adequately satiate human beings’ capacity and desire for communication and understanding—tendencies that prompt and engage man in a dialogue with scientism, though such dialogue demands from the human being an inescapable submission.

For this reason, both authors, through satire, show the flaws of “science deified.”²⁰

¹⁹ The scientism of the nineteenth-century—as embodied in the Crystal Palace—sustained the Victorian belief that science would solve the “world’s problems ‘once and for all’, which is to say that the ‘complete truth’ of science is a finite truth” (Thompson 190).

²⁰ M. D. Aeschliman explains in “C. S. Lewis on Mere Science” that Lewis believed that there is, in scientism, “radical empiricism, materialism, or naturalism, an implicit or explicit rejection of all nonquantifiable realities or truths, including the truths of reason. Its logical terminus is determinism or ‘epiphenomenalism,’ Huxley’s notion that the brain and mind are fully determined by-products of irrational physical processes” (n.pag.).

Science, taken to its extreme, becomes philosophy rather than inquiry.²¹ Since a naturalistic philosophy of science presupposes only what can be sensed, all other ontological possibilities outside of the Total System are necessarily discounted.²² This development marks the point when science changes from a model of studying nature to a way of viewing the world and eventually ruling men's lives ("Dostoevskii & Science" 197)—a movement Jürgen Habermas describes as "Science-as-Ideology" (*Toward a Rational Society* 81). The danger for Dostoevsky and Lewis is not in the objective study of nature; rather, the danger lies in the objective study of man as a finite and material species. Necessarily, a scientific understanding of man centers on immanent physical laws. As Thompson explains, when scientism prevails Nature is no longer God's creation; rather it is structured solely on the deterministic physical laws at play.²³ Consequently, "Nature [becomes] thoroughly rationalized, and depersonalized" (194). Scientism by definition precludes transcendence and must explain the human experience—morality, the mind, body, etc., according to a Total System hypothesis. An explicit consequence of this belief is that man is a material being without a soul. Additionally, implicit in this view of nature is the absence of personhood. If there is no God, then there is no infinity. If there is no infinity, then man is only material. If he is material, then he can be understood holistically through scientific observation. He essentially becomes a statistic, a mathematical principle, and an amalgamation of chemical

²¹ As Gregory R. Peterson explains, switching from science to philosophy is a categorical mistake. The problem lies neither with philosophy or science as disciplines. Rather, the mistake is when a particular philosophy of science operates under the guise of objectivity and unquestioned assumptions.

²² Here, an important distinction between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism must be made. According to C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis, methodological naturalism "is the view that all scientific explanations, as such, must refer only to natural entities and their properties—in short, that an explanation qualifies as 'scientific' only if it restricts itself to the natural world" (142). Metaphysical naturalism, however, posits the view "that the only things that exist are 'natural entities'—that is, whatever entities are posited by the natural sciences in constructing theories which attempt to explain the natural world" (141). Metaphysical naturalism is in complete contradiction with theism, whereas methodological naturalism allows for the existence of other ontological possibilities.

²³ Here we see the scientific desacralization of nature; we no longer fear nature because we have technological control over it. Consequently, the desacralization of nature has supported the sacralization of science.

properties that can be quantified and predicted.²⁴

Specifically, in my discussion of Dostoevsky, I will focus on the Underground Man and his satire of the monologue of scientism.²⁵ Through the interaction with key symbols of the Crystal Palace, including the stone wall, the anthill, and “ $2 \times 2 = 4$,” the UG Man satirizes the scientific goal of the Crystal Palace. He stands as both a subject and an object, in that he embodies the beliefs he satirizes. Hence, the UG Man is a “hyper-conscious” narrator whose conflicting paradox affirms the uninhabitability of the conceptual framework of scientism for man. Important to my discussion is a Bakhtinian reading of Dostoevsky’s aesthetic. Bakhtin reveals that Dostoevsky operates according to a polyphonic aesthetic where all characters contribute dialogically to the novel. Dialogue is of utmost importance to Dostoevsky’s characterization, especially for the UG Man; even his monologue in the first half of *Notes* is a dialogue with “Gentlemen” who represent scientific beliefs. Moreover, dialogue flows out of Dostoevsky’s belief in Christ as *Logos*, the Word. Since Dostoevsky’s dialogical discourse deals with layers, voices rather, that all contribute toward truth, he affirms the existence of two realities—the material and the spiritual; without transcendent dialogue, man is trapped in immanent monologue. Accordingly, scientism deals with one layer, the material. For this reason, Dostoevsky’s poetics cannot include science because he is dealing with personalities (Thompson 198). The UG Man’s extreme paradox attests to this incapability. His philosophical underground is a place more befitting spiders and dust than persons.

Though Lewis does not write according to Dostoevsky’s polyphonic aesthetic, he further affirms the necessity of dialogue for the understanding of truth. For Lewis, I will focus on his critique of the scientific residency of the N.I.C.E. and the new scientific myth it offers through

²⁴ It is no surprise that statistics as a formal discipline rose in the nineteenth century.

²⁵ Heretofore referred to as the “UG Man.”

its conceptual framework. My discussion will center on key leaders of the Institute, most significantly, Professor Frost, Feverstone, and Deputy Director John Wither. Each of these characters embodies a different scientific approach, which Lewis takes to an extreme in order to reveal its absurdity. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis affirms the importance of dialogue, and he recognizes the Institute's aims to create a "new" scientific language. The Institute is founded on the modern "myth" of scientism, and it seeks to undo the linguistic breakdown enacted by God on the Tower of Babel.²⁶ However, Lewis shows the danger of this modern language; it bifurcates reason and imagination, disenchanting the world of traditional truth and replacing it with a modern myth of facts. Moreover, this new language, since it is founded on metaphysical naturalism, locks man in his subjective "stimulations." As a result, men lose their "soul" and become what Lewis called "men without chests" (*The Abolition of Man* 26). Without the chest—the heart and soul—men are trapped in the isolation of subjectivism; they cannot dialogue about an objective reality.²⁷ Consequently, man loses his language, reason, and moral capabilities. Through satire, Lewis shows the absurdity of the Institute's conceptual framework; it is a residency that admits no residents.

Divided by their time periods and cultures, Dostoevsky and Lewis are united by their Christian convictions regarding man's relationship to man, God, and nature, and scientism's inability to provide a substantive conceptual or actual framework for this relationship. They both view man as a desiring and free agent, one whose desires are realized only in the context of Christian community. Whereas scientism objectifies and depersonalizes man, Christian community offers a conceptual residency that affirms man's existential needs, including his

²⁶ The allusion is intentional: The novel's title, "That Hideous Strength," is based on Sir David Lyndsay's *Ane Dialog*, which describes the Tower of Babel.

²⁷ Lewis would advocate a tripartite or dualistic soul. The "chest" or heart is one part of it; the mind another; and, if tripartite, the belly or appetite is a third. Dualistically, a head without a heart (a "chest") is a partial man or no man at all. But a "chest" without a mind would be a beast.

personhood and need for unity with other persons.²⁸ As such, both Dostoevsky and Lewis show that characters must return to a person before they can maintain their personhood. What distinguishes their Christian community from a naturalistic, false community is its view of man as a dialogical being.

Though the UG Man never reaches his conversion, his ancestor, Raskolnikov, finds his conversion through Sonya, a manifestation of Christ's self-sacrificial love and catalyst for Raskolnikov's conversion. For Dostoevsky, man must return to the soil and to Sonya—"ecstatic love for all creation." Love for Sonya, a clear allusion to *Sophia*, the Greek understanding of wisdom, is founded in another equally substantive Greek concept, *Koinonia*. Wisdom understands the need for community. Thus, love for Sonya requires an appropriate view of nature where all elements, water, trees, and man, are inherently beautiful and infinitely valuable as reflections of Christ. A proper view of nature, according to Dostoevsky, recognizes man's innate need to belong to nature and others sacrificially. Thus, his redemption is only possible within the context of a dialogical relationship to nature and community made possible by Christ's Incarnation and sacrifice.

Lewis satirizes the Institute's deficiency and offers mythological community of St. Anne's as the solution. His view of community is a gathering point where people can experience the divine through nature. This experience is possible only when man affirms supernature and his imagination is baptized by beauty. If man understands the supernatural, then the natural has its fitting place. Hence, Jane and Mark Studdock find their redemption in the mythical community of St. Anne's, and more specifically in the marriage bed, a symbol of the sacrificial communion the church has as the bride of Christ. Though Mark and Jane begin their marriage in broken dialogue, Mark's journey through the Institute assures him of the value of dialoguing in

²⁸ As seen in the unity of the Jews and Gentiles in Ephesians 2 and elsewhere in the New Testament.

community with others. Their marriage is healed once Mark enters the Christian community at St. Anne's. Here, people fellowship, are connected with nature, and dance in obedience to God—a humble recognition of one's place in the universe. Lewis brilliantly calls man back to an analogical vision of the medieval Christian mythological picture where Christ is the center of the universe, not man, and not the empty abyss.

I have chosen to unite Dostoevsky and Lewis because I believe that, together, they offer a complex critique of scientism. Though scholarship is abundant on both writers' views of science, few have composed a side-by-side comparison of these authors' satire of scientism, and very few, if any, have composed an analysis of the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. to the degree that I intend to in this project.²⁹ When studied together, we get a picture of Dostoevsky's prophesy of the rise of scientism and Lewis's prophesy of the continual breakdown of dialogue, language, reason, and morality as a result of scientism's rise in the West. Both are prophetic. Though Dostoevsky and Lewis are culturally removed and have different foci and solutions to the problems of scientism their critiques, when read together, offer a robust challenge to the conceptual framework of scientism, which continues today.³⁰

Three Major Developments that Contributed to the Rise of Scientism:

Before embarking on a critique of scientism, one must trace the rise of this system. The word first appears in 1870 in *Fraser's* as a reaction against religious dogmatism: "It's dogmatism on

²⁹ Though scarce research exists connecting Dostoevsky and Lewis, I am thankful to David Rozema for his research in "Inside-out or Outside-in? Lewis and Dostoevsky on the 'New Man.'"

³⁰ In August 2012, Stephen Hawking, award-winning physicist, caustically opined that "[t]here is no heaven; it's a fairy story" (*The Guardian* n.pag.) and scrapped nearly two millennia of Western religious belief into the rubbish heap of obsolescence. For Hawking, our experience is a composite of neurological phenomena that operates much like a computer processor and "will stop working when its components fail." As such, "[t]here is no heaven or afterlife for broken down computers" (n.pag.). Eternity is simply a fairy tale for those afraid of the dark, argues Hawking, revealing his disregard for the historical belief in the land of the fairy and his belief that transcendence has irrevocably collapsed. And he is not alone. The "New Atheist" movement supports this notion, as do more reputable scholars (Churchland, Critchley), physicists, and neurologists.

the one hand,. And it's 'scientism' on the other" (qtd. in "Scientism" *OED*). To prevent devising a straw man, one must note that "scientism" is viewed as a derogatory term applied to a system of science that is taken to an extreme. Few, if any, openly embrace scientism. As such, in discussing Dostoevsky and Lewis' work, I will show that the widely advocated naturalistic philosophy of science they critique *is* scientism. It is important to note that science, based on the empirical model currently adhered to by the majority of scientists, is relatively new. Since the seventeenth-century, the word "science" has undergone a significant semantic development toward a specific and totalizing empirical model of acquiring and organizing knowledge. The semantic development undoubtedly reflects a concurrent epistemological shift taking place in metaphysics. Steven Shapin explains, "the word 'science' (from the Latin *scientia*, meaning knowledge or wisdom) tended to designate any body of properly constituted knowledge (that is, knowledge of necessary universal truths)" (*Scientific Revolution* 5). "Science" in the medieval era was any study of the natural world, and this study was divided into natural history and natural philosophy. When seventeenth-century thinkers studied what existed in the natural order, they engaged in "natural history." When they studied the cause and effect relationship within nature, they engaged in "natural philosophy" (5). When someone spoke of science, they did not refer to the universal empirical model we follow today or even to what Descartes had in mind.

However, when the "Scientific Revolution" challenged pre-existing natural philosophy, science developed toward naturalistic methodology.³¹ During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, "science," as a congruous body of universal truth, was challenged and divided. In cosmology specifically, scientists traditionally accepted the Aristotelian account of the universe as a fixed, ordered, and perfect system. As Shapin explains, Galileo's discovery of sun spots in

³¹ As Shapin explains, it is misleading to speak of a unified "essence" during the scientific revolution, and thus many mistakenly assume that the revolution was unified as whole. Though many natural philosophers challenged Aristotelian belief, they were by no means unified in their beliefs or intentions.

1611 directly contradicted the medieval belief that celestial bodies, higher and separate from the Earth, are perfect (16.) This belief can be traced back to Aristotle's conception of the Unmoved Mover. Aristotle maintained that each of the planets and star clusters exist in a sphere, all of which rotate in harmony with one another by love and desire for the First Mover (Copleston, *History of Philosophy: Medieval Philosophy* 315). What motivates the cyclical process are immaterial beings within each of the spheres called Intelligences who strive to emulate the spirituality of the First Mover, but incapable of true emulation, move in perfect spheres—the closest idea to perfection in medieval thought. All of these spheres move in conjunction with one another and create a heavenly dance of sorts. As bodies occupying a space higher in the universal hierarchy, the planets, most notably the sun, were conceived to be without blemish as they fulfilled their purpose of loving the first mover. When Galileo's observation revealed the sun was not in fact a "perfect," or blemish-free celestial body, Aristotelian cosmology lost explanatory power in different spheres of the emerging scientific community.

Galileo's discovery continued to build on an already divided scientific community. Copernicus' debunking of Ptolemaic cosmology, nearly a century earlier, began a trajectory toward a rational empirical model. Medievalists viewed the universe geocentrically and hierarchically on the Ptolemaic construct. Lewis, in his capacity as Chair of Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Cambridge, was enamored with the Ptolemaic system knowing full well it was not empirically accurate but still, he thought, spiritually expressive of God's ordering of the cosmos. In his renowned work, *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature*, Lewis explains that when man looked into space, he was not looking into the unknown or into a vast, immeasurable vacuum, but towards an ordering of the planets and spheres that begins with the moon and lead to Primum Mobile, the Empyrean, and eventually to the true sphere of God

(Lewis 45). Further, Lewis explains, "Because the medieval universe is finite, it has a shape, the perfect spherical shape, containing within itself an ordered variety...." "The spheres ... present us with an object in which the mind can rest, overwhelming in its greatness but satisfying in its harmony (Lewis *The Discarded Image* 99). The medieval man viewed the universe harmoniously. Every substance, from the rocks on the earth to the constellations, fit harmoniously in the Great Chain of Being. However, Copernicus challenged this notion, showing the sun, not the earth, as the center of the universe, further disrupting the medieval conception of cosmology. When the enlightened man looked into space he was now looking into an eternal void, not the celestial dance he once viewed.

As a response, natural philosophers developed an alternative methodology to form truthful observations of the world. Undoubtedly, this shift has allowed science and medicine to become the powerful method we know today. However, not all was gained during this shift. The most notable development during the sixteenth and seventeenth century was the rise of mechanical philosophy. As Shapin explains, mechanical philosophers, i.e., Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and others, "attempted to discipline, if not in all cases to eliminate, teleological accounts of the natural world" (Shapin 119). This is not to say that these thinkers rejected supernatural reality out right; rather, their move towards mathematical certainty prompted a mechanical methodology of science. For instance, Newton's "crucial experiment" on the nature of light (1670s) sought the demonstrative certainty afforded to the realm of mathematics; however, Newton recognized the impossibility of philosophy reaching demonstrative certainty and abandoned the previous notion of philosophy. Others followed suit, as mechanical philosophers believed that "imperfections in sensory capacity, variations in "wit," and divergences in theoretical or social interest might all be corrected by the mechanical action of

right method” (122). Mechanical philosophy moved away from the truths once found in the Scriptures and moved toward the “Book of Nature” (122). In this way, mechanical philosophy moved the scientific enterprise toward *method*, and that method, over time, became the empirical model that science currently holds. Although this method has successfully helped us make accurate observations of the natural world, it is dangerous, in Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s eyes, when it is used to discount other ontological possibilities beyond the natural world—when its presuppositions limit man to his biological function and as one observing cause and effect relationships as regards movement. Additionally, they criticize this approach when it presupposes that man is a purely material phenomenon and subject to the laws of all matter: $2 \times 2 = 4$ absolutely.

Since this development encompasses a wide range of scholarship beyond the scope of this project, my discussion will focus on Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s critique of how this method would change society’s view of man. Cognizant of this change, Dostoevsky prophesied that the western conception of science would permeate and fundamentally shift how man is thought and spoken of in Russian society. The confluence of a science’s view of man and nature is clear; man, as species, is part of nature and thus our view of man will shift with our view of nature and with the interpretive framework we use to understand both. Hence, the rise of mechanical method not only applied to the natural world but also to man. In approximating an accurate, scientific view of man, Descartes viewed the human body as a “statue, an earthen machine” (qtd. in Shapin 158), and as such, sought to bring “the human body within the scope of a mechanical philosophy” (158). Descartes viewed the body according to patterns of “reflex action” (158). While this reduction is necessary to accurately understanding the various functions of the body, it has the unfortunate tendency reduce man only to his function. Following Descartes, Hobbes’

Leviathan (1651) opens by providing his account of mechanical philosophy, which, as Copleston explains, “takes no account of anything but bodies” (*History of Philosophy* 5). His exclusion of the supernatural arises from his *method* and from the view of the body as function.

As mechanical philosophy sought complete knowledge of man, that knowledge would be developed as a means to take control over man towards a benevolent end. If man can be reduced to his function, then he can function in a predictable way. Dostoevsky calls attention to this in *Notes* when he satirizes the rational egoism of the 1860s Russian intelligentsia. The UG man speaks of man as an organ key, a piece in a machine that serves a particular, pre-determined function. Although this view rose out of a Christian view of science, it eventually became naturalistic. Shapin explains, “When Bacon wrote *The Great Instauration*, he signaled his (widely shared) conviction that humanity had, through the fall from grace in the Garden of Eden, lost its original technological control over nature. It was also a religious duty to restore that sovereignty, and the new natural philosophy was meant to be a powerful tool in that task” (139). Bacon’s hope in science was, at the time, grounded in his Christian convictions. However, his faith in the scientific enterprise would eventually shed the Christian conception and move toward a completely naturalistic account. This ideal was fully realized in his scientific utopian work, *New Atlantis*. In Bacon’s utopia, the Solomon House is a stratified institution where knowledge and power coalesce to serve a poliscientific function—to order the society according to its knowledge, and in turn to increase its knowledge from the well-ordered society. Bacon’s utopian conception, like the ship pictured on the front cover of his famous *Instauration Magna*, “a ship sailing beyond the pillars of Hercules—the straits of Gibraltar that customarily symbolized the limits of human knowledge” is a departure from earlier ways of knowing the world.

As scientists continued to move toward universal knowledge, the discipline became increasingly narrow in epistemological scope. The rise of positivism in the Victorian Era attests to this extremist narrowing of the dominant philosophy of science. The challenging of medievalism, rise of mechanical philosophy, and Darwinian evolution, all contributed to an epistemology that sought to completely remove the metaphysical and replace it with method. The consequence was Comte's belief that, just as nature operates according to laws, so, too, does society operate within the same mechanisms. As a result, the positivists' methods to appropriating truth became increasingly absurd as they reduced truth statements to analytical tautologies. Naturally, then, the first record we have of "scientism" first emerged during this time period. The first record of its use comes in 1877 when it is compared with religious dogmatism ("Scientism" OED); this comparison is fitting as modern science took its own limits of knowledge to an ideological extreme.

It is during this time that Dostoevsky lived and wrote. The life and times of Dostoevsky are important because of his critique, as Parrinder explains, of the "Victorian belief in the connection between scientific knowledge and social progress" (20). This connection presupposed that science could correct man's ill fate; it could help man progress individually and as a species. Thus, this belief continued Bacon's notion that science, through technology, could replace the prelapsarian dominion man had over nature. In this way, Dostoevsky critiques the Palace's claim that man can reach a "god-like" control over nature through the creation of a modern Tower of Babel. Parrinder recognizes that this belief came to a culmination toward the end of Dostoevsky's life and the beginning of Lewis's: "In retrospect it might seem that there was a clear connection between the Positivist aim of universal scientific knowledge and the political vision of a single world-empire. Both, as we have seen, treat the world as a closed system" (25).

Victorian ideals not only shaped the Western world, but also they spread into the Eastern world, including Russia where Dostoevsky first faced them in the 1860s. Joseph Frank explains that Dostoevsky, after spending ten years in exile, returned to Russia where he encountered a synthesis of eighteenth-century French materialism—heavily influenced by the mechanical philosophers—mixed with Bentham’s English Utilitarianism (xvi). As Frank explains, this synthesis was grounded on the belief that emotions, values, and behaviors are a product of man’s genetics and his environment. The implications of this view pervaded political ideology as well. Politics became subservient to dominant scientific rational, and the Russian intelligentsia called for progress in the name of nihilism; in Bazarovian fashion, all traditions, political systems, and religion must be overthrown for political progress. As such, the nineteenth-century rise of nihilism proposed that man’s behavior could be completely understood through science and calculated toward utilitarian ends (Frank 603). Dostoevsky and Lewis both see this “progress” as an absurd digression; this is not man’s positive evolution, but his devolution.

C.S. Lewis begins writing his Space Trilogy nearly a century later, ending with *That Hideous Strength* in 1945. Lewis, aware of the rise and fall of pan-Slavic utopias—Dostoevsky’s cruel prophecy—and of the rise and consequences of logical positivism, chose science fiction to communicate his views of science, technology, and myth. As a genre centered on the potential of scientific advancement into the unknown, science fiction was the ideal choice for Lewis to present his critique of scientism. All three parts of the trilogy discuss the achievements and also the limits of science. In *That Hideous Strength*, Lewis is criticizing the modern scientific “materialist myth” (Downing 125) that man is only a cerebral being—that all of life is neurological activity; man has no “soul.” Lewis’ definition of scientism is the “quasi-religious hope of using technology to perpetuate the species on other worlds and to grope toward

godhood” (322). This is the ideology the N.I.C.E. offers within its conceptual framework, and perhaps one that still echoes into post-modernity.

Dostoevsky and Lewis critique the Palace’s and the N.I.C.E.’s conceptual frameworks with the ultimate aim of offering a Christian alternative. Dostoevsky offers the prison—a place of suffering where one accepts responsibility for his or her transgressions—as an alternative to the Palace. The prison’s conceptual framework is founded on the *freedom* to choose suffering, which stands in direct contrast to the scientific determinism of the Crystal Palace. Through Raskolnikov’s relationship with Sonya, a parallel to the UG Man’s relationship with Liza, we see Dostoevsky’s solution to the problem of scientism, which is the willing acceptance of one’s guilt through suffering. Sonya, a sacrificial Christ-figure, offers Raskolnikov this solution through constant dialogue and grace. By accepting this dialogical encounter, Raskolnikov willingly enters prison where he develops an analogical vision of nature—one where all man and beast co-exist in harmony. Hence, Dostoevsky’s prison is paradoxical; by choosing suffering one is liberated to a fuller understanding of reality.

Lewis offers St. Anne’s as the alternative framework to the N.I.C.E., which deconstructs the Christian mythological picture and offers a scientific myth in its place. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis maintains that community is necessary for man to become existentially filled as a speaking, reasoning, and moral agent. Therefore, Lewis calls man to return to Christian mythical community, and St. Anne’s, a place of grace, symbolizes this community. Like the Ptolemaic cosmological design, the community at St. Anne’s is hierarchical, with beasts and man in service to one another and under the spiritual authority of Ransom and the Oyeresu. Though this hierarchical picture has a clear authority, it is not a place of perverted or disproportionate power like the Institute; rather, it operates on sacrifice and service between all members of the

community. As such, the community functions like a dance, where all members exist in proportion, harmony, and love, like the medieval Intelligences who circle around God—the center and purpose of the universe. While man is in this dance—loving God and others in sacrificial obedience—he is most existentially fulfilled.

Chapter Two: Dostoevsky—Prophet and Satirist

Looking along the metal beams and glass panels of the Crystal Palace, Dostoevsky was terrified. Here, stood the modern picture of man's technological and scientific freedom; man could finally undo the effects of the Fall and build the perfect earthly utopia—through science! In the beams stood the hope of Russian revolution, of a better life, even the fulfillment of man's deepest existential needs. The weight of Dostoevsky's terror grows clearer when contrasted against Chernyshevsky's sublimity over the same symbol. In Vera Pavlovna's Fourth Dream, from Chernyshevsky's *What is to be Done?* (1863), she envisions a utopian society, a "New Russia," where men and women cohabit in perfect harmony and brotherly love. This society has echoes of the prelapsarian Garden of Eden where, instead of communion with God, technological efficiency eases the burden and pain of work:³² Men and women "do all their chores and enjoy their work very much... Why shouldn't they be singing? Machines are doing almost all the work for them—reaping, binding the sheaves, and carting them away" (115). Technology gives humanity complete control over the environment, and in the center of this Garden they build their Tower of Babel:

There stands a building, a large enormous structure such as can only be seen in a few of the grandest capitals. No, now there's no other building like it! It stands amidst fields and meadows, orchards and groves. The fields grow grain, but they aren't like the ones we have now; rather, they're rich and abundant... Great care... has been lavished on them; there's not a single diseased tree... But this building—what on earth is it? What style of architecture? There's nothing at all like it now.

³² Technology, in Vera's dream, replaces the sacred communion between God and man. The citizens of "New Russia" sing the praises of technology, "machinery." Vera's dream, however, in reality is more of a nightmare as Friedrich Engels shows in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1844).

No, there is one building that hints at it—the palace of Sydenham: cast iron and crystal, crystal and cast iron—nothing else. (114)

Under the Crystal Palace, there will be no pain: “For everyone there will be eternal spring and summer and joy everlasting” (115) because man will be united through scientific progress.

However, Chernyshevsky’s delight is Dostoevsky’s terror.

As we enter the dusk of modernity—even the night—Dostoevsky’s terror of the Crystal Palace is strikingly prophetic. The modern belief in the objective value of science and technology spurred the twentieth-century attempts to immanentize the eschaton, to use Voegelin’s phrase again. In practice, however, we learned that this utopian drive is actually dystopic, as the Pan-Slavic socialist attempts alone show us. Nonetheless, though Modern belief in the objective value of science has been weakened, it has not been destroyed. The New Atheist movement, modern Neurology, and Popular Science, still hold to the objective value of science alone to give us accurate truths about reality. The Postmodern breakdown in metanarrative, objectivity, and foundationalism cracked the glass of the Crystal Palace, but it did not shatter it. We now value multiple narratives instead of just science, but basing epistemology on the scientific method is effectively what led us to hold everyone’s limited perspective in tension together with no one able to claim above the fray. Our present epistemological uncertainties, though modified, still have roots in scientific epistemology. In *Notes from Underground*, Dostoevsky prophesies and satirizes such blind adherence to scientism.

Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky published *Notes from Underground* during one of the most cataclysmic times in Russian history.³³ Political tensions between the serfs, the Russian intelligentsia, and Alexander II culminated in 1861 with the emancipation of the serfs. Two years

³³ And also one his most trying times personally, as we see in a letter to his brother, Mikhail Dostoevsky on April 2nd, 1864: “My nerves are distraught and I still can’t gather my strength. My torments of all kinds are now so onerous that I don’t even want to talk about them. My wife is dying, *literally*” (“Selected Letters” 96).

before, Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859) began permeating Russian intellectual circles, challenging Western religious views of nature. In light of this challenge, Darwin further reinforced the scientific enterprise's movement toward metaphysical naturalism. Westerners speculated that if traditional Christian views of nature were inaccurate, then perhaps the Christian view of truth and man would be equally dubious. As such, this challenge to religious truth shifted society's view of man, as the two are necessarily intertwined. Released while Dostoevsky wrote *Notes*, T.H. Huxley's "Man's Place in Nature" marks this philosophical shift; Huxley explicitly claimed that man had an evolutionary past contra the Christian belief in the creation model. Darwin and Huxley's evolutionary claims were reinforced by other seminal Western writers, such as Hume, Feuerbach, Bentham, and J.S. Mill.³⁴ Like religion, economics, and philosophy, these scientific developments permeated and shifted Russian culture; the Russian intelligentsia, conspiring for political revolution, recognized the revolutionary goals of these "new" beliefs. Science could now bring the means for "progress" and for a political revolution.

Dostoevsky recognized that these "new" beliefs would radically shape the Russian intelligentsia's view of truth. The scientism of the nineteenth century—as embodied in the Crystal Palace—sustained the Victorian belief that science would solve the "world's problems 'once and for all,' which is to say that the 'complete truth' of science is a finite truth" (Thompson 190). "Truth," in this emerging system, is no longer found in the scriptures or Christian revelation but in the "Book of Nature" (Shapin 122)—in what can be empirically

³⁴ An empiricist, David Hume, in *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) presented a criticism of supernatural claims. Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* (1842), which will be explained further in this chapter, inverts the traditional Creation / creator paradigm; Bentham and Mill offer a completely naturalistic ethical system to the West grounded in scientific method. Though Mill tipped his hat toward the possibility that God is the great utilitarian, my focus is on the classical utilitarian claims minus a theistic foundation. Theism explains the particular question, "why believe in the essential equality of persons?" whereas secularism cannot nearly as well.

observed. We can trace Dostoevsky's awareness of this philosophical shift in his writing periods—pre-Siberia and post-Siberia. Though Dostoevsky wrote about political issues before his time in Siberia—*Poor Folk* the most noteworthy—discussion of natural sciences before the 1860s is negligible (Thompson 192). However, after spending eight years in Siberian labor camps, Dostoevsky emerged in a transforming Russia where the understanding of truth radically changed to cohere with science.³⁵ This transformation is clear when one examines all of the emerging scientific theories in the nineteenth century.³⁶ Hence, the Westernization of Russia brought with it a revolutionary conception of truth; science, as many “progressives” understood it, became exclusively definitive of truth. Dostoevsky would spend the remainder of his career exploring the “Authority” of this “new” science.

With this new, scientific view of truth came a radical shift in Russia's view of man. Though political revolution was the Russian intelligentsia's primary concern, a philosophical revolution resulted. The presuppositions one brings to nature—whether it is designed, accidental, or other—will invariably shape one's view of man as well. As Frank explains in his chapter “The Portrait of a Nihilist,” even if the revolution never happened, the 1860s marked an explosion of new ideas—especially in relation to Russia's view of man (341). The philosophical revolution was founded on the emerging scientific materialism of Feuerbach, and a synthesis of French materialism and English utilitarianism (Frank xvi).³⁷ *In The Essence of Christianity*, (1841)

³⁵ We can also trace this development through the use of the Russian word, *nauka*: “The Russian *nauka* means both ‘science’ and ‘scholarship’. The context determines which sense is meant. By Dostoevskii's time it had come increasingly to be used for the natural sciences, mathematics, statistics and economics” (192).

³⁶ As Thompson explains, “Common to all these nineteenth-century theories—positivism, evolution, utopian socialism, utilitarianism, empiricism, rational egoism, social Darwinism—is a philosophical grounding in materialism and determinism, underpinned by scientific thought and methodology” (194).

³⁷ Friedrich Lange, in *History of Materialism* (1865), discusses “a purely atomistic conception of society in which all motives ordinarily called moral drop out” (qtd. in Anderson n.pag.). Bentham and Mill are most important to Dostoevsky's critique of utilitarianism. In 1860, Chernyshevsky translated John Stuart Mill's “Principles of Political Economy,” two years before Dostoevsky visited London and four years before he wrote *Notes From Underground*. In 1844, V.F. Odoevsky, in *Russian Nights*, explains Bentham's ideas as they influenced

Feuerbach makes a clear case against the Christian conception of man as a spiritual being endowed with a soul, a bold revolt against the man-as-soul. As K.A. Lantz explains, “Feuerbach’s writings could not be published in Russia; nonetheless they quickly spread through intellectual circles there and had a profound effect on Westernizers in particular” (“Feuerbach” 141). For the Russian intelligentsia, Feuerbach’s materialism was “progressive” and revolutionary. P.V. Annenkov, in reference to Nikolai Ogarev’s copy of *The Essence of Christianity*, which he smuggled into Russia, writes, “It could be said that Feuerbach’s book had nowhere produced so powerful an impression as it did in our ‘Western’ circle, and nowhere did it so rapidly obliterate the remnants of all proceeding outlooks” (qtd. in Lantz 141). For revolution to succeed, it must obliterate the past and make way for a new view of man. Feuerbach clearly establishes this obliteration:

Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature). The divine thing is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective—i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of the human nature. (qtd. in Gardiner 239)

Contra Hegel, who maintained that the Absolute Geist, or rational spirit, comes to consciousness through individuals acting dialectically, Feuerbach argues, “man is fundamental, God being only a reified idea representing his own alienated human essence” (238).³⁸ Therefore, it can be said

Chernyshevsky and the intelligentsia: “Yes, advantage is the essential motivator for all man’s actions. Whatever is useless is harmful, whatever is useful is permitted. That is the only solid foundation for society...let advantage replace the unstable foundations of so-called conscience, so-called innate feeling, all poetic nonsense, all philanthropic schemes—and society will achieve lasting prosperity!” (qtd in Katz 102).

³⁸ It is important to note that Hegel was extremely important to the 1840s intelligentsia. Here, we see that that the 1860s men wanted to completely abandon any acknowledgement of transcendence—even Hegel’s rational spirit.

that Feuerbach “turned speculative philosophy on its head” (238) by arguing that God is a human construct man uses in order to become self-conscious.

Accordingly, Feuerbach inverts the traditional creation paradigm so that man assumes the creator role and God the creation role.³⁹ As such, Feuerbach continued in the Hobbesian tradition by further dethroning the prominence of the Christian conception of man as a spiritual being; this challenge, viewed contextually, had at its core revolutionary aims. Dostoevsky saw the danger implied in this revolution. Instead of his society maintaining belief in a God-man, the young radicals, like Feuerbach, inverted this to the man-god.⁴⁰ Chernyshevsky openly embraces this revolutionary man-god. In Vera Pavlovna’s dream, he embodies this inversion in Vera’s self-creation. When Vera communicates with the goddess—who “anticipates the contemporary scientific concept of synergy” (Katz 112)—she, herself, becomes a goddess. The goddess in her dream—a mixture of classical mythological gods—loses her divinity while Vera deifies herself. Hence, “Drawing on both the doctrine of transfiguration and the ideas of the German philosopher Feuerbach, Chernyshevsky deifies Vera Pavlovna while anthropomorphizing his goddess” (111). Like Vera who deifies herself through the anthropomorphization of the gods, man could now reach the status of self-created divinity—a sacred immanence.

Accordingly, Feuerbach’s man-god established the intellectual foundations for the creation of a “new man.” As Dostoevsky saw, the “new man” will be created by radical men who view humanity in terms of matter and chemistry, not spirituality. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dmitri proclaims the rise of these new men: “It’s magnificent, Alyosha, this science! The new man will come, I quite understand that. . . . And yet, I’m sorry for God” (589). Dmitri’s remorse is

³⁹ Feuerbach’s inversion pre-dates Freud’s twentieth-century atheist account of God as the patriarchal symbol of man’s subconscious needs, and also stands as a significant influence for Marxist dialectical materialism.

⁴⁰ In *Demons* Dostoevsky would most notably explore this criticize this idea through Kirillov’s perversion of Christ’s salvific act. Kirillov affirms himself as a Christ figure, but in his final moments, his costly suicide amounts to nothing. He will not rise again. His death is one of total isolation and strangely inspires no one.

an affirmation of what the new man means—the death of God and of the human soul. Dmitri continues to explain how the Russian intelligentsia will view the new man: “Imagine, in the brain are these nerves . . . they have little tails. . . as soon as they begin to quiver, an image appears . . . this is why I visualise, and then think . . . because of these little tails, and not at all because I have a soul and am a kind of image and likeness (589). The new man will be nothing beyond chemical structures and reactions. Accordingly, anything related to the “soul”—or spirituality—will pass away with the old man.

Dmitri’s remorse for the loss of God—spirituality—directly contradicts Chernyshevsky who affirms this new view of man and believes his rise will mark the beginning of a positive era: “We did not see these men six years ago; three years ago we despised them: and now—but it matters little what we think now; in a few years, we shall appeal to them: we shall say to them ‘Save us!’ and whatever they say then will be done by all” (qtd. in Barstow 25). Using the salvific language of Christianity, Chernyshevsky reveals that the new man will replace Christ’s salvific act. To men instead of Christ society will cry, “Save us!” Chernyshevsky develops his “new man” in *What is to be Done?* wherein Rakhmetov, the novel’s protagonist, is an ascetic whose primary motivation is to spur on social revolution through enlightened self-interest. Rakhmetov is a clear embodiment of the nineteenth-century belief in the “new man,” a pre-Nietzschean *Übermensch* who recreates himself as a man of power, social dominance, and who is not delimited to traditional moral boundaries; he is free to transgress, to step over moral boundaries according to his self-interest.⁴¹ His transgression is revolutionary. His aims are revolution. Following through with Feuerbach’s man-god inversion, the “new man” can lead society to a new utopia.

⁴¹ In Raskolnikov’s theory, Dostoevsky makes a clear connection between a scientific view of man and the “new man” objective of stepping over traditional moral boundaries. Raskolnikov’s theory is only possible when he views man as an abstraction, a principle, a statistic.

With the “new man” came the possibility of a new *society* built on the premises of scientific progress. Rakhmetov is the fictional embodiment of Chernyshevsky’s belief that earthly happiness could be achieved through an ethics of utility, a system he develops in *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* (1860). Chernyshevsky affirms a scientific view of man and argues that society could function perfectly once individuals began acting in accordance with “enlightened self-interest,” i.e., their egoistic impulse.⁴² This belief is Chernyshevsky’s Rational Egoism—a belief he propagated but never explicitly named in his works. At the heart of Chernyshevsky’s thought is that Russian society should eschew traditional Orthodox conceptions of sin, and instead, move towards enlightened self-interest—founded on the core presuppositions of utility.⁴³ Contra the Russian Orthodox view of man’s sinful human nature and need for redemption, the young radical wrote, “It is not human nature that must be changed, but social relations must be so altered as to correspond to the requirements of human nature” (qtd. in Turin 32). For man to flourish, he need not change; rather, society should impose a rational, scientific ideology on his behavior—a scientific method that will serve as a self-correcting guide for man’s behavior.

By viewing man strictly in terms of matter and reason, Chernyshevsky believes that man can be predicted, calculated, and moved toward specific, benevolent action. Like the predictable flow and pressure of river water, man’s behavior could be guided by the dam of Rational Egoism. Chernyshevsky finds man’s predictability in terms of function but also virtue: He believes that “[g]oodness will spread through history culminating in universal rationality when the ultimate and enduring positive stage has been achieved” (Barstow 26). Once the new man

⁴² Once again, a blend of Bentham’s and Mill’s ethics of utility—egoism for the ‘Greater Happiness’ of society.

⁴³ Here, we must note the difference between egoism, which argues that man should maximize self-interest, and utilitarianism which maximizes overall utility. Chernyshevsky seems to conflate both—by acting according to one’s rational egoistic impulse, he or she will create a utopian society.

begins living in accordance with his rational egoistic impulse, society could reach the threshold of utopia and eventually enter the lush, green hills of such a place. In contrast to Dostoevsky, who believes that human nature is inherently flawed, Chernyshevsky believes that man is inherently good when he acts according to his rational egoistic impulse. Humanity, and therefore society, does not need Christ or Christian community; rather, man need only follow his ego.⁴⁴

Clearly, then, God has no place in this new society; the New Jerusalem, or hope for a Christian community, must be set aside to make way for an earthly utopia—a divide Alyosha clearly recognizes in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Alyosha explains that the new scientific socialism—which is causally related to the vision of founding an earthly utopia—is not only the question of how man will work, eat, and live, but is also “the question of the modern embodiment of atheism, the question of the Tower of Babel built precisely without God, not to go from earth to heaven but to bring heaven down to earth” (Dostoevsky 26). The new society will not only feed man but will also meet his deepest existential needs. These concerns were also discussed in Turgenev’s *Fathers and Sons*. With a distorted, religious zeal, Turgenev’s protagonist, Bazarov, believes that the emerging scientist will correct the ills of Russian society. He says, “A good chemist is twenty times as useful as any poet” (7). His language is particular here, as he recognizes the pragmatic nature of utility—it is geared towards a specific social use. Bazarov presupposes a naturalistic philosophy of science, and as such, his “scientism delimits experiences to ‘sensations’” (Frank 345). Since man is thoroughly material, his experiences are merely sensations fixed toward survival value. Hence, Bazarov tries to act only on what is “useful or attractive” since this is the only means he can justify in scientism (348). Bazarov is a clear reaction to “the beautiful and the lofty” romantic 1840s ideals, and his belief in “chemistry”

⁴⁴ Dostoevsky’s affirmation of man’s human nature—as both beautiful and fundamentally flawed—must be kept in mind. For Dostoevsky, man is incapable of saving or correcting his own nature. He must dialogue with others and God and ultimately accept and embrace suffering, like Christ.

coheres with the rational egoistic impulse; if the new man is only material, then he can be fulfilled as long as he behaves in accordance with rational egoism.

Dostoevsky recognized that the new society, as embodied in the Crystal Palace, is monolithic—all-encompassing.⁴⁵ When he visited the Crystal Palace in the summer of 1862 he recognized that the Crystal Palace was the scientific attempt to organize society rationally, to unite all of humanity as one under scientism—reuniting the linguistic divide of the Tower of Babel:

You feel a terrifying force which has joined here all these numberless people who have come from all over the world into the *one* fold; you're aware of a gigantic thought, you feel that something here has already been achieved, that here is a victory, a triumph. You even, as it were, begin to be afraid of something. However independent you may be, for some reason you become frightened. Is not this really the achieved ideal? . . . Is not the end here? Is not this in fact the 'one fold'? Won't you really have to accept this for the complete truth and fall silent once and for all? It's all so triumphant, victorious and proud . . . It's a kind of biblical picture, something like Babylon, some kind of prophecy from the Apocalypse being fulfilled before your eyes.

(“Winter Notes on Summer Impressions” 98)

In the Crystal Palace, Dostoevsky recognizes the revolutionary aim to unite man into “one fold.”

He alludes to Christ, the Shepherd, who will one day unite the body into one: “And other sheep I

⁴⁵ This was reinforced by Russia's industrialization in the late, nineteenth century, which presented a new way of life. Primarily an agrarian society for a majority of the nineteenth century, Russia's social reforms did not propel the country into industrialization until the Crimean War defeat showed Alexander II Russia's inability to defend itself; its factories were incapable of producing sufficient weaponry for proper defense. After facing major defeat, Alexander II enacted the “Emancipation of the Serfs” in order to create the kulak class—a protocapitalist class that would allow a greater distribution of resources. However, it was not until Sergei Witte's reforms in the late nineteenth-century that Russia began noteworthy industrialization (“Russian Industrialization” Jennifer Llewellyn, John Rae and Steve Thompson n. pag.).

have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd” (John 10.16). When Dostoevsky viewed the Crystal Palace, he recognized that the Crystal Palace, like the Tower of Babel, symbolized man’s attempt to reach divinity within the realm of immanence; the Palace, a symbol of scientific power, would try to unite man as one. As Dostoevsky walked the dirty and bustling streets of London, he was terrified by the Crystal Palace’s grandeur. Its technological prowess, its expression of Western individualism, and its overtness in a city overwhelmingly lacking moral vitality⁴⁶ caused Dostoevsky to fear what the West had become and how the materialistic ideologies bolstering the Crystal Palace would shape Russia.⁴⁷

Dostoevsky: The Necessity of Dialogue

Dostoevsky believes that in order for man to fully exist, he needs to dialogue, which is why the UG Man’s communication parallels Dostoevsky’s dialogic view of truth. Dostoevsky’s view of truth is founded in the Person of Christ and the members of the body. Consequently, his understanding of truth is essentially a reflection of *Logos*—the Word that both spoke the world into existence and became embodied to openly dialogue with humanity (John 1.1) and by way of the indwelling Holy Spirit.⁴⁸ Truth is not an elusive or abstract theorem; rather, it is tangible and

⁴⁶ In “Winter Notes,” he explains that the Russian man knows morals but doesn’t follow them; the European has lost the complete sense of the good, true, and beautiful.

⁴⁷ Yevgeny Zamyatin feared the scientism the Crystal Palace symbolized as well in his novel *We*. The parallels between the Crystal Palace and One State (a scientific state enclosed in ‘glass’), the Inquisitor and Zamyatin’s Benefactor, the complete mathematization of One State and the symbols of ‘2x2=4,’ the ‘stone wall,’ and the ‘ant hill,’ all show a close connection between these two novels. Unfortunately, censorship laws prevented *We*’s publication in Russia until 1988 because of the radical connection Zamyatin makes between Dostoevsky and emerging totalitarian regimes in the U.S.S.R.

⁴⁸ Once again, Dostoevsk’s view of dialogical truth is twofold: Man *epistemologically* knows truth through dialogue and truth itself is *ontologically* dialogical.

personal.⁴⁹ In Dostoevsky's view of truth, man is dependent on the Word for his very existence and dependent on others for his self-consciousness. Dialogue is of utmost importance for Dostoevsky because he is more interested in the individual's relationship with the community rather than with the individual himself. Since the UG Man is a self-admitting "paradoxilist," Dostoevsky recognizes the paradox of the individual's relationship to a community: "The highest aim of Dostoevsky's Christianity is not personal salvation, though, but the fusion of the individual ego with the community in a symbiosis of love, and the only sin that Dostoevsky appears to recognize is the failure to fulfill this law of love" (Frank 410). Paradoxically, Dostoevsky believes that by sacrificially dialoguing with community—not focusing on the self—man becomes more human, more himself. In contrast, without authentic dialogue, man becomes individualistic—an important distinction in Dostoevsky's aesthetic.⁵⁰ As such, the highest form of truth, for Dostoevsky, is the sacrificial body working together in open dialogue, just as Christ intercedes for us before God and the Holy Spirit and scriptures help us commune with God.

Dostoevsky brilliantly weaves in his dialogic view of truth with his literary aesthetic. In the *Problem of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, Mikhail Bakhtin explains that Dostoevsky's novels are infused with "the relative freedom and independence enjoyed by the hero and his voice under the conditions of polyphonic design...and the special placement of the idea in such a design; and,

⁴⁹ However, it is important to recognize the Word both as incarnate and transfigured. As Ellul explains, language preserves the mystery of the Other while allowing us to get as close as possible to this realm. In the *Humiliation of the Word*, Ellul explains, "Myth is born of the revealed Word of God, but because it is figurative, it has no visible image. As the highest expression of the word, it reaches the edge and very limit of the expressible, the ineffable, and the unspeakable" (106). The Other is both immanent and transcendent—evasive to a graven image. Language, especially figurative, allows one to get close without making a graven image. Dialogue, a verbal form of language, is effectively the same.

⁵⁰ Dostoevsky viewed the rise of scientism and Western individualism as corollaries. He writes: "the personal principle, the principle of isolation, of intense self-preservation, of self-solicitousness, of the self-determination of the I, of opposing this I to all nature and all other people as a separate, autonomous principle entirely equal and equivalent to everything that exists outside itself" ("Winter Notes on Summer Impressions" 98). This blatant egoism has its underpinnings in scientific materialism. By precluding the spiritual, and necessarily the transcendent, a naturalistic philosophy of science grounds man in the sphere of immanence. Science replaces the sacred; the material replaces the spiritual. Man occupies the space that a transcendent being used to occupy. It comes as no surprise that this switch parallels the Western effusive affirmation of individualism.

finally, on those new principles of linkage shaping the novel into a whole” (8). All of the novel’s elements—voices being the most important—contribute to the whole. Bakhtin recognizes the sheer power of Dostoevsky’s aesthetic as a polyphonic approach to narration: “A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky’s novels” (6). Bakhtin’s analysis applies not only to the diversity of characters within Dostoevsky’s individual works, but also to the diversity of individual characters—especially the UG Man, which is why “[i]n the confession of the Underground Man what strikes us first of all is its extreme and acute dialogization: there is literally not a single, monologically firm, undissociated word” (152). Dostoevsky’s view of truth—as the communicative, personal, Incarnate Word—is reflected in his polyphonic aesthetic; the richness of his aesthetic comes from a diversity of voices interacting and contributing to the whole. These voices are dialoguing so they can encounter the great Dialoguer.

Therefore, writing an abstract criticism of scientism would not fit within Dostoevsky’s dialogical aesthetic, founded in Christ.⁵¹ Hence, he creates characters who display the repercussions of residing within the walls of the Palace’s scientism. Frank compares Dostoevsky’s writing to the eighteenth-century “*Conte Philosophique*, whose characters were also largely embodiments of ideas; but instead of remaining bloodless abstractions like *Candide* or *Zadig*, they will be fleshed out with all of the verisimilitude and psychological density of the 19th century novel of Social Realism...” (440). Dostoevsky’s “psychological realism,” as Frank has explained, infused with ideology; his characters operate through “idea-feelings” (477)—Dostoevsky’s remarkable synthesis of ideology and human psychology.⁵² As such, Dostoevsky’s

⁵¹ As shown by Mikhail Bakhtin and which I will explain in further detail in the forthcoming pages.

⁵² Frank’s definition is focused on the painstaking detail Dostoevsky uses in describing his characters’ inner psychological desires: “Dostoevsky gives us a strikingly artistic depiction of Russian society, but with him this

characters are often studied for their depth of feeling and human curiosity, longing, and spiritual confusion. Although analyzing Dostoevsky's characters in this manner may lead to a satisfactory literary analysis, such an approach pursued with blinders on is liable to overlook Dostoevsky's primary motivation for writing, which was "[c]ounteracting the moral-spiritual authority of the ideology of the radical Russian intelligentsia" (Frank 440). Dostoevsky wanted to combat scientism—"science-as-ideology," and he believed literature was the most effective medium to do so. This is why the UG Man, in reference to the 1860s scientists, says, "I have in my life carried to an extreme what you have not dared to carry halfway" (Dostoevsky 115). For, Dostoevsky believed that "an idea is always somebody's idea" (Thompson 193). Dostoevsky uses the UG Man as an embodied critique of scientism.

In order to properly understand the relationship between the second half of *Notes* and the first half, one must see Dostoevsky's "single, sustained effort" (Matlaw 164) to unite both sections via dialogical interaction. In the second half of *Notes*, the anti-hero's need for dialogue sends him out into the snow, where he eventually finds himself with Liza—a Russian archetypal prostitute. After sleeping with Liza, the anti-hero wakes in anguish, as if he were waking in an "underground cellar, damp and musty" (81). Though the anti-hero desires for dialogue, his dialectic of vanity prevents him meaningfully engaging with Liza; as a result, the anti-hero will become the UG Man, one who is isolated and without the ability to dialogue with others. Waking up in Liza's room is the beginning of the anti-hero's descent underground. His vanity has driven him into the arms of Liza. However, he is incapable of authentically empathizing with her in a dialogical act of suffering. As a result he continues in his dialectic, never reaching dialogue. When Liza visits the anti-hero in his own home, he admits that he wanted to "unload offense"

provides only the background of the picture, and is....completely swallowed up by the importance of the psychological interest" (131).

(111) on her. Instead of paying for his offense and accepting her love and pity, he offends Liza and foregoes his redemptive moment. In contrast, “Liza’s self-sacrificial love, her ability to empathize with the UG man’s troubles, frees her from the dialectic of vanity” (Frank 439). Frank makes clear that Liza’s suffering is a “negative reversal of egoism” (438). Though the anti-hero claims he has love, it is a romantic gesture, an ideal: “There was so much of it, this love, that afterwards, in reality, I never even felt any need to apply it” (54). This is why the UG Man—driven to the underground after interacting with the deism and romanticism of the 1840s men—dialogues with and against the 1860s underground movement.

For this reason, though the first half of *Notes* is a monologue, it is still dialogical. Matlaw argues that the psychological interactions of the second half drive the UG Man into his philosophical “underground” in the first (175). If this is true, then his philosophical musings are in clear contradiction to the Russian intelligentsia’s “underground” movements, which were heavily influenced by Western scientism.⁵³ As Matlaw further shows, Dostoevsky is working with a tinge of irony since the UG Man is the true revolutionary, not the 60s underground men. Hence, though the first half takes the form of a monologue, the narrator addresses “gentlemen” with notes of dialogue: “you say,” “you laugh,” “this is all that you say,” “yes, gentlemen” (qtd. in 164). As Thompson explains, “the UG Man’s internal dialogue is divided into two voices: his own and various scientific interlocutors who defend ‘our negative age’” (194). Throughout his monologue, the narrator switches between his voice and the voices of those advocating scientism, making his communication appear at times schizophrenic or simply confused. He constantly switches between voices of science-as-ideology, but then, in the next instant, returns to an imaginative character with emotion, wit, exaggeration and even irrationality, such as his comical expression that “ $2 \times 2 = 5$.” Dostoevsky’s genius is his ability to merge his satirical

⁵³ Since, the Russian intelligentsia primarily shared their revolutionary ideas in “underground” circles.

form—paradox and exaggeration—with the content of his satire, scientism.

The Crystal Palace: A Monolith, a Monologue

Highly concerned with dialogue, Dostoevsky recognizes that the scientism of the Crystal Palace inhibits man from authentic communicative relationships with God and others. Once again, the Crystal Palace offers man a conceptual framework for human existence. However, aimed toward an objective, totalizing materialistic conception of man, the Palace's naturalistic philosophy of science admits no dialogue; it views man in terms of mathematical predictability, and these terms are incommensurable with personalities. The UG Man satirizes this position when he says that in the Crystal Palace "all human actions will...be tabulated according to these laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms up to 108,000 and entered in a table" (25). Here, the UG Man is satirizing satirizing Fourier, who conceived a model of man where all of his pleasures are calculated with mathematical precision—in terms of aggregates (Frank 228).⁵⁴ Hence, "Dostoevsky thus combines Fourier's table of passions with Chernyshevsky's material determinism in his attack on the ideal of the Crystal Palace as involving the total elimination of the personality" (229). Thompson agrees, arguing that the Crystal Palace is the embodiment of scientism and that "[s]cience and math are context-free object systems, devoid of subjects" (Thompson 198). Thompson continues to explain that science's investigation can only deal with "objects, units, aggregates, whereas Dostoevsky's characters are pre-eminently subjects, personalities" (198). Accordingly, science operates on naturalistic methodology, and "it cannot

⁵⁴ Once again Zamyatin recognizes Dostoevsky's critique and presents his own satire of Fourier's belief in his depiction of the dystopian One State as a place where mathematical happiness completely depersonalizes every individual: "But in reality the *Tablet of Hours* transforms each and every one of us into the six-wheeled hero of a great epic poem. Every morning, with six-wheeled precision, at one and the same hour, at one and the same minute, we, millions of us, wake up as one person. At one and same hour we begin work...and at one and the same second...we raise our spoons...we go for our stroll, go to the hall to do our Taylor exercises, and then go to bed" (*We* 136).

assuage the heart, it cannot offer a word of love or hate” (198). It is a faceless, person-less inquiry that leads to de-personalization when it does not allow for other ontological possibilities.

By reducing man to his material conditions, the Palace’s scientism effectively strips him of the ability for dialogue. By viewing man in terms of rationalistic utility, Chernyshevsky offers a complete rationalization of man, which is possibly only if man is solely a material being. In Dostoevsky’s view of man, the soul stands outside, apart from a complete utilitarian rationalization. Hence, “Total rationality for Chernyshevsky may lead to self-affirmation, action, and progress; but, for Dostoevsky it means self-annihilation, inertia, and stagnation” (Barstow 25). If man is only material, then physical laws are responsible for his make-up, albeit, random and impersonal laws, which, if true, lead to the destruction of the self as a free, communicative being with moral agency. In contrast, Dostoevsky’s discourse deals with layers, voices rather, that all dialogically arrive at truth, who, we must remember, is a dialogical being—*Logos*; 1860s scientism deals with one layer, the material. Nonetheless, by arguing that man is only his *head*, Chernyshevsky robs man of his *voice*. This is why Dostoevsky’s poetics cannot include science because he is dealing with personalities (Thompson 198). In a scientific system, the subjective—the personal—cannot be dealt with; the human soul, man’s ability to reason, stands outside a naturalistic framework.

The UG Man calls attention to the imprisoning nature of the Palace’s conceptual framework by satirizing it as a giant stone wall. He writes, “What stone wall? Well, of course, the laws of nature, the conclusions of natural science, mathematics. Once it’s proved to you, for example, that you descended from an ape, there’s no use making a wry face, just take it for what it is” (Dostoevsky 13). The UG Man, here, is exemplifying a double satire:

In feeling that one had reached the ultimate wall; that, this is all there is, that it cannot be otherwise; that there is no way out for you, that you will never change into a different person; that even if you had enough time and faith left to change yourself into something different, you probably would not wish to change; and even if you did wish it, you would still not do anything, because in fact there is nothing to change into. (9)

If at the core of man's existential being is the ability to freely *become*, then he has lost this potential within the Palace. The stone wall metaphor is a composite of the fixed, natural laws that determine reality. If man is only a material being, then he cannot escape the natural laws that have brought forth his existence.⁵⁵ When the UG Man says, "there is no way out for you," he is discussing the same critique Lewis brings to naturalism with his discussion of the Total System; man is trapped within the sphere of immanence. Acting against natural law, then, is useless: "For goodness sake, it's impossible to protest: it's two times two makes four! Nature doesn't ask for your opinion; it doesn't care about your desires or whether you like or dislike its laws. You're obliged to accept it as it is, and consequently, all its conclusions" (10). Chernyshevsky accepts this system and believes that man can be corrected and guided according to empirical and mathematical precision. However, the UG Man quickly responds that if this is true "[t]hen the final result, gentlemen, is that it's better to do nothing! Conscious inertia is better! And so, long live the underground!" (27). The UG Man is faced with the deterministic framework of scientism and realizes that everything that happens within this framework is inevitable and equally meaningful or meaningless. Wasting energy is useless, the UG Man realizes, if entropy is

⁵⁵ First, it is important to delineate what Dostoevsky means when he explains natural law since there is a clear difference between acknowledging the existence of natural laws and maintaining that these laws are all that exist. The former is necessary to the scientific method, which presupposes the basic laws of logic, i.e., the laws of non-contradiction, modus ponens or tollens, causal and nomological laws, etc.; it must assume the general unity within nature, namely that it is predictable so that experiments can be reproduced; moreover, though no scientific system can fully explain natural laws, it must assume these laws will stay in place. Before beginning an experiment, one must assume that, say, gravity will stay consistent. However, the latter is metaphysical naturalism, i.e., scientism.

inevitable; action is inconsequential.

The UG Man's satire of the stone wall centers on Dostoevsky's affirmation that free will is necessary for dialogical interaction. Within a naturalistic framework, however, free will—an ontological possibility if man is a spiritual being who can make decisions outside his material conditions—loses its credence. This logical consequence has been the case since Dostoevsky's time, and Daniel Dennett, contemporary naturalist, reveals that this is still the case:

Our widespread tradition has it that we human beings are responsible agents, captains of our fate, because what we really are are souls, immaterial and immortal clumps of Godstuff that inhabit and control our material bodies rather like spectral puppeteers. It is our souls that are the source of meaning, and the locus of all our suffering, our joy, our glory, and our shame. But this idea of immaterial souls, capable of defying the laws of physics, has outlived its credibility thanks to the advance of the natural sciences. (qtd. in Rozema 173)

Contemporary naturalists have verified Dostoevsky's fear of naturalistic philosophy. Dennett ultimately accepts that man is pre-determined, though he offers a compatibilistic compromise (Mckenna "Compatibilism" n.pag.) As Dennett asserts, the discoveries of the natural sciences are incompatible with the traditional conception of the soul. For Dostoevsky, it is man's soul that allows him to freely act. Without the ability to step outside the Total System, man is stuck within the evolutionary natural laws that determine his behavior—a monologue.

Dennett's language regarding the "soul" as a tradition—a thing of the past—is quite accurate. Under a regnant naturalism, the "soul" is meaningless and must be replaced with "progressive" material conditions—physical laws, energy, motion, etc. Dennett's postulation is nothing new; the soul irrevocably collapses under a scientific system. Dostoevsky recognized

this radical redefinition of man when he stood terrified in front of the Crystal Palace. In “Winter Notes on Summer Impressions,” Dostoevsky explains the breakdown of personhood and the soul under the precepts of scientism:⁵⁶ There is no such thing as a native soil, as a people. Nationality?—only a certain system of paying taxes! The soul?—a *tabula rasa*, a bit of wax, out of which you can paste together on the spot of a real man, a universal general man, a homunculi—all that’s necessary is to apply the fruits of European Civilization, and read two or three books (qtd. in Frank 375). When Dostoevsky viewed the Crystal Palace in the summer of 1862, he knew that the rise of technology and science would mean the destruction of “traditional” views of man. Though the Palace offers man a conceptual residence, this residence closes its doors to the elements of man that Dostoevsky sought most to defend; if man is only matter, he is a *tabula rasa* which may or may not be valuable in an instrumental sense, depending on what is inserted on the slate. Moreover, he is not separate from his naturalistic causality, and thus, is not innately valuable as a being higher than molecular amalgamation. Dostoevsky’s critique is twofold; when we lose the personal conception of the soul, the “soul” of Russia—its nationality steeped in the tradition of Christian Orthodoxy—will be lost as well. The Christian conception of the soul, however, affirms that, contra Feuerbach, man is an image of the Creator, made from dust, yes, but spoken into existence by *Logos* and endowed with the ability to speak, and by these very facts connected intimately with both God and the earth. This is man’s soul, as language (dialogue) undoubtedly separates man from animals. Though we cannot fully predict or observe how the spiritual interacts with the physical, Dostoevsky does not see this as a case against Christianity; rather, it is an affirmation of the miracle and mystery of humanity and of dialogue.

⁵⁶ As does Zamyatin when the One State describes the soul as a state of “madness” and tries to completely remove this irrational, mathematically resistant aspect of man.

The UG Man's satire of the Palace's scientific conceptual framework centers on its uninhabitability for man as a free, existential being. The residency of the Palace offers a monolithic, utopian happiness. Whereas Chernyshevsky sees the rise of this scientific utopia positively, the UG Man views his time as the "Negative Age" (7). He illustrates that his society's "conditions" have necessarily created the UG Man type, or, at the very least, the conditions have made possible his existence: The author of the diary and the diary itself are, of course, imaginary. Nevertheless it is clear that such persons as the writer of these notes not only may, but positively must, exist in our society, when we consider the circumstances in the midst of which our society is formed (1). The conditions to which Dostoevsky refers are those spreading through the Palace's conceptual framework. His irony is clear. Though the UG man *must* exist in his Russian milieu—as a product of his times—his existence as a human being is impossible; no human can fully exist within the Palace's monological design; these conditions have created a divided, fractured consciousness.

By both embodying and satirizing the Palace's scientific beliefs, the UG Man stands as both subject and object. This paradox is his "hyper-consciousness." He is a subject, i.e., a person, but he embodies object beliefs, or, beliefs that come under objective scrutiny through satire. Though Thompson is correct in noting that "[h]yperconsciousness is an illness," (193) we must also recognize that his spiritual illness attests to movement and to the potential for healing. And although scholars disagree over the nature of his hyper-consciousness, they are united by the fact that he is divided, and therefore, able to be healed.⁵⁷ The dialectic taking place in the UG Man testifies to his inner dialogue, albeit a fractured one.

Though the UG Man's "hyper-consciousness" has spawned much disagreement between literary critics, critics agree that his fractured state attests to his existence in a framework that is

⁵⁷ Most notably, Frank and Scanlan disagree over the emotional / philosophical nature of his "hyper-consciousness."

ultimately uninhabitable. Frank argues that the UG Man “is an intellectual disciple but an emotional critic of Rational Egoism” (qtd. in Scanlan 1). Frank views the UG Man as one who has intellectually embodied the rational egoism of the 1860’s intelligentsia but whose subjective emotional and intuitive beliefs contradict his intellectual commitments. In contrast, James P. Scanlan argues that the UG man does not accept Rational Egoism intellectually as Frank argues. Instead, Scanlan believes that the UG man forms a rational argument, as well as an emotional response, against Rational Egoism (3). Alina Wyman agrees with Frank’s diagnosis, viewing the UG Man’s intellectual commitment thwarted by his subjective beliefs. She further highlights how the UG Man is trapped between the grandiose egoism of the 1840’s liberals and the deterministic materialism of the 1860’s: “The UG man’s conflict may then be described as that between the lofty conception of freedom, cultivated by the social idealists of the 1840s, and the negation of individual will, expressed as the empirical impossibility of freedom in the materialist doctrines of the 1860s” (124). Instead of conforming to either ideological stance, Wyman argues that “[t]he UG Man takes a third option...accepting natural law on the rational level but rejecting it on the belief level...taking a leap” (124). Though it is unclear from the text that the UG Man takes the ultimate positive leap—censorship laws required Dostoevsky to remove the overtly Christian response in chapter, which was Dostoevsky’s primary response to the scientism of the 1860s—Wyman believes that his very resistance to an intellectual commitment is his leap. He does not leap far, but he still is willing to move.⁵⁸

Flowing from his “hyper-conscious” state, the UG man illustrates extreme paradox to reveal the incompatibility of his existence within the monologic walls of the Palace. Since *Notes*

⁵⁸ In a letter to his brother Mikhail, Dostoevsky writes, “I am also bewailing my *Notes*. Terrible misprints, and it would have been better not to print the penultimate chapter (of Pt. 1) at all (that chapter where the idea is stated), than to print it in that form, that is, with sentences left out and contradicting itself. But what can be done? Those swine of censors left in the passages where I railed at everything and pretended to blaspheme; but they deleted the passage where I deduced from all this *the necessity of belief and Christ*” (qtd in Katz 96).

is a literary work, it should be no surprise that the UG Man's opening lines reveal his psychological *paradox*. If Dostoevsky were to write a treatise, his argument would need to follow the contours of rhetoric, but by presenting ideologies as an extension and facet of a character's thoughts and deeds, Dostoevsky has the freedom to develop complex satire. Hence, we see Dostoevsky's aesthetic approach from the opening lines:

I am a sick man...I am a wicked mad. An unattractive man. I think my liver hurts. However, I don't know a fig about my sickness, and am not sure what it is that hurts me. I am not being treated and never have been, though I respect medicine and doctors. What's more, I am also superstitious in the extreme; well, at least enough to respect medicine. (I'm sufficiently educated not to be superstitious, but I am.) No, sir, I refuse to be treated out of wickedness. (Dostoevsky 5)

Like any good work of literature, we are able to see a majority of the work's themes within the opening lines. In this passage, the narrator paradoxically claims that he is a "wicked man" who knows nothing about his sickness. He knows he is sick but he cannot explain the origin or reason for his sickness. Though he should have the ability to "know" or "reason" through his wickedness, and act in his self-interest in the face of this wickedness, he, as a hyper-conscious agent, recognizes that his intellectual beliefs in scientism are undermined, even contradicted by his emotional beliefs. Hence, though he is "sufficiently educated not to be superstitious" (5), he is still superstitious, even irrational, regarding medicine, a practical science.

Education holds an important place in the UG Man's satire, as Dostoevsky uses man's incapability with scientific education to show its flaws. Education should have as its purpose the reform of wayward or incorrect thinking—an "enlightenment" from dark or misguided ideas into the light of truth. For Chernyshevsky, those who hold the "old" or primitive views of man—as a

desiring being with a soul—must be re-educated in the new scientific utopia so that they “will then voluntarily refrain from erring... More than that, science itself will [teach] man... that he does not really have either will or caprice... that he himself is nothing more than some sort of piano key” (24). The UG Man is recognizing the goal of Chernyshevsky’s education, which is the complete reformation of man’s unpredictable and irrational parts that exist outside the monologue, the Total System. This reform coheres with Mill’s view of hierarchical pleasures—that man can be educated towards “higher” pleasures. Dostoevsky saw that the implication of a scientific education for his Russian folk was that these commoners were “superstitious” and needed reform.⁵⁹ The UG Man’s education is that of a 40s man who is now aware of 60s ideas, which explains his egoism and his scientific awareness.

However, though the UG Man has been educated towards “higher” knowledge, i.e., scientific discourse, his “superstition,” still remains intact. In the opening lines, he discusses his wickedness, but then immediately admits that he has lied about his wickedness because he has “lied out of wickedness” (6). He is faced with Chernyshevsky’s notion of what is right—but he contradicts it at a whim since the whimsical is an irrational equation: $2 \times 2 = 5$. Hence, he commits evil simply because he wants to; because he can; because he is free to do so. The paradox continues. After lying “out of wickedness,” he is immediately aware of his guilt and is “conscious every moment of so very many elements in myself most opposite to that” (6). These opposing elements are indeed paradoxical and point to the complexity of human make-up that Dostoevsky saw as impossible to support in the Palace’s framework. He is satirizing the false hope in a scientific system to purge man of his “base,” superstitious, beliefs and present him with “higher”—more objective—ones. Even if science could objectify his sickness, the UG Man

⁵⁹ As Thompson explains, “The claims of religion to absolute truth were being steadily undermined by science to the extent that the very notion of truth changed: science and truth came to be synonymous, and religion was relegated to the sphere of myth and superstition” (192).

would choose his sickness, ironically, in order to maintain his free will, which is necessary for spiritual health and existential wholeness.

The Palace: A Monologic Moral Morass

Dostoevsky's primary critique of the Palace is that it prevents man from authentically dialoguing with others. When man cannot enter meaningful dialogue, he is faced with considerable moral dangers. If scientism's monologue is true, then the UG Man would fittingly act in accordance with his self-interests. Chernyshevsky's ethic of utility maintains that man can be definitively known and calculated according to his self-interest. As Scanlan explains, Chernyshevsky's "[r]ational [e]goism is a mixture of descriptive and prescriptive elements—'psychological egoism' states that humans are not free and that they act according to determined causes and that benefiting others is really a way to benefit oneself" (557). This belief reduces altruism to personal benefit, one's survival value—egoism. Most notably, "Psychological Egoism" forms the supposedly 'scientific' foundation of Rational Egoism" because it expresses the "natural law" that people invariably act in accordance with what they think are their own "best interests" (557). Chernyshevsky's utilitarian ethics grounds "moral" decisions in a rational, egoistic impulse. However, this grounding defies Dostoevsky's concern with dialogical interaction. If man is operating with others according to his ego alone, he is not meaningfully dialoguing with others. Moreover, he is not able to dialogue; he is trapped within himself, within a monologue and within a moral morass.

However, the UG man satirizes this conceptual framework through irrational action; he acts in order to preserve his moral freedom and not to benefit himself. He specifically addresses Chernyshevsky's egoism when he explains that man will indeed act against his self-interest in

order to preserve his free will: “Because profit for you is prosperity, wealth, freedom, peace, and so on and so forth; so that a man who, for example, openly and knowingly went against this whole inventory would, in your opinion...be a complete obscurantist or a complete madman” (21). Undoubtedly, the UG Man’s hyper-consciousness makes him a clear madman, but there is a method to his madness. Through his paradox and caprice, the UG Man shows that man will inevitably act against what is rational, calculated, or scientific to preserve his freedom: Man “has always and everywhere liked to act as he wants, and not at all as reason and profit dictate” (25). Higher than scientific rationalism is existential desire: “Man needs only independent wanting, whatever this independence may cost and wherever it may lead” (25). Nonetheless, his ability to desire is only possible if he is a free agent. Hence, his deepest existential desires point to his freedom. He writes, “Destroy my desires, wipe out my ideals, show me something better, and I will follow you...But so long as I live and desire—let my hand wither” (34). Maintenance of life—self-interest—is not as high of an existential need as freedom. The UG Man is willing to relinquish his health, his left hand, so long as he can desire—even irrationally against his own interest.

Necessarily, then, the UG Man’s paradox is a testament to his personhood, a moral category. The Christian understanding of the human involves a complex relationship between the matter, the dust that composes man’s body, and the spirit, the part of man that stands separate or outside his material conditions and in relation to the eternal. This dualism has been explored since the time of Plato’s *Phaedo*, through the Neo-Platonists, by Christians Platonic and Aristotelian alike, and still exists as a fundamental tenet of Christian orthodoxy.⁶⁰ In Dostoevsky’s view, a *person* is distinct from a *hominoid* or biological species via his “soul.” Without the spiritual element, man is necessarily his chemistry alone. Dmitri’s claim, in *The*

⁶⁰ St. Paul also distinguishes between a spiritual and material body in 1 Corinthians 15.

Brothers Karamazov, that the “old” views of man, as a being with human nature and a soul, must “move over for chemistry...” (589) reduces man to “[l]ittle fish tails in the brain” (589). In this passage Dmitri explains that motivations for murder can be expunged if man is not morally responsible for his actions. Hence, Dmitri is parodying Rakitin, his foil and an embodiment of 1860s scientism. When Dmitri follows Rakitin’s ideology to its logical conclusion, he says, “Without God and the future life? It means everything is permitted now, one can do anything?” (589). If man is chemistry alone, who can keep him accountable for his moral responsibilities? He is simply acting in accordance with his physiognomy and within his environmental conditions; he is determined to behave according to these conditions. However, this reduction is essentially dehumanizing; robbing man of his moral agency places him into a monologic morass; he cannot meaningfully interact with others or even with himself.

This reality is why Dostoevsky affirms the Orthodox conception of the soul. Dialogue is only possible between persons who *desire* and converse, and persons cannot exist within a scientific view of reality.⁶¹ After finding a “document” that ostensibly condemns Dmitri of murdering the brothers’ father, Ivan exonerates himself of his involvement in the situation—an irony, no doubt, as it is Ivan’s atheism that prompts the actual murderer, Smerdyakov, to kill the father. Dostoevsky writes, “This letter suddenly assumed a mathematical significance in his eyes” (619). Ivan views his moral decisions in terms of mathematical precision; since he did not commit the actual murder, he justifies his involvement with the affair. However, it is clear that his mathematical rationality is misguided; he is the variable X that allows the murder equation to work; his father’s death was only possible under his rational influence over Smerdyakov. Thus, though Ivan exonerates himself mathematically, he cannot escape his pangs of conscience: “Is it

⁶¹ Under a materialistic system, there is not a sufficient justification of man’s existential desires versus his physical make-up: “Human *bodies* no more have desires than tables do,” and thus desires in a materialistic framework “would treat these desires as identical with events in the brain or nervous system” (Honderich “Materialism”).

because in my *soul* I'm just as much a murderer?" (620). Ivan's rationalization of the murder is thwarted by the irrational X that stands outside his physical conditions. Though he can deny his responsibility for the murder with his head, he is faced with his existential guilt and need for redemption.

For this reason, Dostoevsky recognizes the absolute necessity of defending the existence of the "soul," even if this view is "old" and outdated. Without the soul—the spiritual sphere outside his material conditions—man loses his ability to make free, moral decisions. However, Dostoevsky recognizes that within scientism, the agent has lost the ability to freely act; thus, he is devoid of his subjectivity and becomes his own biological function. Even if he were to engage in a moral act, he would not be acting by his own volition.⁶² The UG Man sees this reduction symbolically as an organ stop: "Moreover: then, you say, science itself will teach man (though this is really a luxury in my opinion) that in fact he is neither will nor caprice, and never did have any, and that he himself is nothing but a sort of piano key or a sprig in an organ" (Dostoevsky 24). Here, the narrator directly discusses the French materialist philosopher, Denis Diderot's claim that "[o]ur senses are piano keys upon which surrounding nature plays, and which often play upon themselves" (qtd. in *Notes* 123). Diderot's presuppositions require him to follow through with his naturalism; within a naturalistic framework, a man is a causal product of his environment. In his *Diary of a Writer*, Dostoevsky explains the implications for man if he is an organ peg: "In making the individual dependent on every flaw in the social structure, however, the doctrine of environment reduces him to an absolute nonentity, exempts him totally from every personal moral duty and from all independence, reduces him to the lowest form of slavery imaginable" (14). An organ stop is a servant to its function. Likewise, if man is akin to

⁶² However, scientism cannot use the language of morality; it can speak in terms of utility, efficiency, and survival value, but it cannot adequately speak of moral code.

an organ stop, he is not capable of existing outside the conditions of his milieu, and his moral actions are simply serving to fulfill survival or pragmatic functions.

Few are willing to follow through with a deterministic framework, recognizing its inconsistency with our existential needs; we believe and act as if we are free agents. Hence, some ground morality in the evolutionary process—keeping it in the sphere of immanence and moving toward humanistic naturalism.⁶³ To assume that there are objective moral duties, one must step outside the Total System and affirm that there are ontological realities that transcend mere utility—that certain values and moral beliefs exist absolutely, regardless of man’s physical conditions. A conceptual framework that affirms this possibility allows man to step out of monologue and into a dialogical view of truth.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, one is hard-pressed to defend objective moral duties within a scientific conceptual framework since behaviors in this system can only have survival value, utility, or contribute to the evolutionary process.

When Dostoevsky beheld the Crystal Palace, he prophesied the rise of naturalistic ethics, and we see today how insightful he was. Contemporary naturalist philosophers of science solve the moral questions by giving credence to moral facts as intrinsic to biological makeup. Frans De Waal, for instance, in his book, *The Bonobo and the Atheist* (2013) argues that the bonobos have basic moral intuitions within their herd, which he argues corroborates a naturalistic view of ethics. If primates have basic moral intuitions, then man’s moral intuitions are evolutionarily defensible; they can be accounted for according to natural evolutionary law. E.O. Wilson argues for the same basic premise in “The Biological Basis of Morality” (1998), where he interestingly enough argues that the debate of morality is “the coming century’s version of the struggle for men’s souls” (qtd. in Baggett, Walls *Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality* 8). And

⁶³ This belief affirms two major propositions: 1.) Nothing is beyond nature and 2.) A humanistic explanation of ethics is sufficient (Rem Blanchard Edwards *What Caused the Big Bang* 29).

⁶⁴ Or, at the very least, a dualistic conception—both natural and sub or supernatural.

Richard Dawkins points to our pity, or moral intuitions, as “misfires” when he argues that our feelings of pity for those less fortunate are comparable to our feelings of sexual desire for someone who is sexually infertile: “Both are misfirings, Darwinian mistakes: blessed, precious mistakes” (*The God Delusion* 253). Dawkins solution to stepping outside of the Total System—grounding morality in transcendence—is his “four good Darwinian reasons”—including kinship, reciprocity, reputation, and social dominance (251). His Darwinian reasons are remarkably similar to Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism, and this contemporary stance mirrors Chernyshevsky’s own view. Both naturalistic philosophies of science maintain that man behaves according to his self-interests in order to increase his chance of survival.

However, though the naturalist may possibly defend moral facts, he cannot defend moral obligations among them. Recognizing the existence of moral intuitions—even those grounded in herd mentality and survival value—is much different from recognizing moral imperative or binding moral law. Even if we grant de Waal’s bonobos basic moral intuitions, the logical leap from existence of these moral intuitions to moral obligations is by no means justifiable.⁶⁵ Baggett and Walls explain, “An evolutionary account of *feelings of or beliefs in*, say, moral obligation is certainly possible, but how would naturalism explain obligation itself? How collections of atoms could generate and issue genuinely binding moral commands is altogether mysterious, if not absurd” (20). The naturalistic attempt to ground morality in physical law and mathematical certainty is, thus, ironic; its logical foundation is the furthest we have from demonstrative certainty.

The UG Man recognizes a further cardinal difficulty in the naturalist’s dilemma; even if a

⁶⁵ Baggett and Walls argue that naturalists who use traditional moral language while abandoning traditional moral categories are in a bind: “When naturalists use moral language, they have to change the subject by subtly abandoning traditional moral categories, while still using words that retain their purchase from a borrowed moral vocabulary with a philosophical history that the naturalists have renounced” (43).

person acknowledges moral facts, he would by no means willingly *act* according to these facts. As Baggett and Walls make clear, “Moral facts have no purchase unless we have moral freedom” (18). In order for an action to hold any moral weight, the agent must be free to choose that action. If not, then moral facts are just a product of natural laws and man is determined to behave this way—he had no other choice. The UG Man is aware of the necessity of freedom in making substantive moral decisions. In fact, the UG Man’s recognition that moral facts exist makes him resistant to them:

Oh, tell me, who first announced, who was the first to proclaim that man does dirty only because he doesn’t know his real interests; and that were he to be enlightened, were his eyes to be opened to his real, normal interests, man would immediately stop doing dirty, would immediately become good and noble, because, being enlightened and understanding his real profit, he would see his real profit precisely in the good. (20)

The UG Man’s sardonic question in the beginning of this passage is a direct allusion to Cherynshevsky’s belief that if man recognized what was best for him then he would act in accordance with this knowledge. The UG Man, however, finds this claim absurd:

“*What is to be done* with the millions of facts testifying to how people knowingly, that is, fully understanding their real profit, would put in second place and throw themselves onto another path, a risk, a perchance, not compelled by anyone or anything” (20). The UG Man is showing that man will always preserve his freedom to act, even if his action takes him outside the rational, the natural, or the moral. For the UG Man, a system that permits man to freely choose evil is of higher value than a deterministic system where man must choose the good; without freedom there is no ontological difference between “right” or “wrong”—choosing the good is

counterfactuals since it is impossible. One could speak in terms of utility or pragmatism, but not moral correctness. Once again, the UG Man's early admission that he "lied out of wickedness" affirms his undeniable commitment to free will.⁶⁶

The Crystal Palace: A Monologic Society:

Not only does the UG Man satirize the implications of scientism for the individual, but he also plays out the dangers for man's relationship to others. In the second half of *Notes*, we encounter a younger, twenty-four-year narrator who is a clear anti-hero. He ironically refers to himself as a "hero" (Dostoevsky 53) but then quickly admits that he is in dialectic: "Either hero or mud, there was no in between" (54). This either or distinction is no more than the anti-hero's "dialectic of vanity" (438), as Frank highlights.⁶⁷ By concerning himself with "everything beautiful and the lofty" (Dostoevsky 53), the anti-hero is essentially only concerned with his own egoism—how the high, bookish ideals of the 1840s will help promote his own ego. Consequently, as any vain person is wont to do, he constantly vacillates between self-deprecation and self-aggrandizement:

I hated my face, for example, found it odious, and even suspected that there was some mean expression in it, and therefore every time I came to work I made a painful effort to carry myself as independently as possible, so as not to be suspected of meanness, and to express as much nobility as possible with my face: "Let it not be beautiful," I thought, "but, to make up for that, let it be a noble, an expressive, and, above, all, an extremely intelligent one." (42)

⁶⁶ The UG Man exhibits two types of freedom: First, he demonstrates *necessary* freedom—one that is an ontological prerequisite to making meaningfully moral decisions. Second, he demonstrates *existential*, or expressive freedom.

⁶⁷ Frank's Dialectic of Vanity places the anti-hero between two extremes: self-love and self-loathing. Also, the UG Man is stuck between desire for community and his egoism, which inhibits him from that community.

His dialectic of vanity is crippling, and so he removes himself existentially from society, disengaging from others and occupying an empty space where he feels “at home” and where he will retreat into his philosophical underground for the first half of the novel. He overemphasizes his individuality and uses it as an excuse to disengage with others: “One other circumstance tormented me then: namely, that no one else was like me, and I was like no one else” (42). He is one who wants to “understand everything...not to be reconciled with anyone...” (44). And his vanity is only reinforced by his intellectual arrogance. He believes, “I have an explanation for everything” (48), which will play into his “hyper-consciousness” later in *Notes* when he accepts the budding philosophies of scientism.

At any rate, the UG Man still desires to be “on the inside.” Though he has distanced himself from others, he cannot contain his desire for dialogue. As his dialectic continues, he admits, “Towards the end I myself could not stand it: as I grew older, a need for people, for friends, developed. I tried to start getting closer with some; but the attempt always came out unnaturally and would simply end of itself. I also once had a friend. But I was already a despot in my soul” (64). The anti-hero longs for dialogue, but his dialectic of vanity prevents him from authentic interaction with others. The anti-hero’s dialectic is a satire of the egoism of 40s that would be mixed with the materialism of the 60s—rational egoism—and then become monological (or, in a way, monist).

The UG Man, for this reason, is a clear precursor to Dostoevsky’s other famous anti-hero, Raskolnikov in *Crime and Punishment*. In order to get a full grasp of Dostoevsky’s satire in *Notes from Underground*, it is necessary to look at the UG Man in light of Raskolnikov; the two stand as ideological counterparts. They are both sullen, removed from society, and relatively young bachelors who have been exposed to the scientism of the 1860s. Like the UG Man, when

we first encounter Raskolnikov, we quickly see that Dostoevsky develops him according to his dialogic aesthetic. An original Russian reader would immediately identify the intention in Raskolnikov's name, which symbolizes his spiritual dialectic. *Raskol*, meaning "schism" in Russian, is the etymological root for Raskolnikov, a character of paradox, trapped between his intellectual commitments and his subjective beliefs. Naturally, then, Raskolnikov's first thoughts, like the UG Man's, are paradoxical and revealing of his inner schism: "I want to attempt such a thing, and at the same time I'm afraid of such trifles" (*Crime and Punishment* 4). In reference to his "new man" theory, Raskolnikov makes paradoxical leaps—from intellectual commitment back to desire for community, from murder to Christian charity. He follows suit with the UG Man in his ideological divide; he embodies a scientific ideology, but his existential desires undermine his intellectual assurance, especially in the "punishment" section of the novel. As such, he stands as a mirror to the UG Man.

Raskolnikov and the UG Man share paradoxical satire and also complex potential of being; as persons, they have the potential to actualize in an infinite number of ways. Frank highlights the complexity of Raskolnikov's dialogical discourse: "Bakhtin aptly remarks that each character Raskolnikov encounters becomes 'for him instantly an embodied solution to his own personal question, a solution different from the one at which he himself had arrived; therefore every person touches a sore spot in him and assumes a firm role in his inner speech'" (qtd. in Frank 484). Raskolnikov moves through St. Petersburg almost as if in a house of mirrors; he sees in others a mirror for his own potential. He has the potential to be selfless like Sonya or selfish like Svidrigailov. The UG Man, however, addresses an imaginary audience of scientific interlocutors. When he says, "Dear gentleman," he is addressing an ideological counterpart whom he can embody or eschew. As Wyman notes, the UG Man uses squinting vision

(Nietzsche's "sideward glances" to see the value of oneself in the other's eyes) towards these imaginary interlocutors in the first chapter and to his three Russian service friends in the second half; this "squinting vision" is a characteristic of his relationship with others" (134). He and Raskolnikov look to others as mirrors for themselves, but they do so from a distance that prevents actual dialogue with others—until, for Raskolnikov, Sonya comes on the scene. The UG Man, on the other hand, has his opportunity for authentic dialogue with Liza.

Further, both the UG Man and Raskolnikov reveal Dostoevsky's fear that the Palace's motivation is to unite all of society under the authority of scientism. The UG Man speaks of Chernyshevsky's utilitarianism as an anthill:

With the anthill, the respectable race of ants began and with the anthill they will probably end, which does the greatest credit to their perseverance and staidness. But man is a frivolous and incongruous creature, and perhaps, like the chessplayer, loves only the process of the game, not the end of it. And who knows (one cannot swear to it), perhaps the only goal on earth to which mankind is striving lies in this incessant process of attaining, or in other words, in life itself, and not particularly in the goal which of course must always be two times two makes four, that is a formula, and after all, two times two makes four is no longer life, gentlemen, but is the beginning of death. (31, 32)

Whereas the UG Man's is only hyper-conscious of the anthill ideology, Raskolnikov acts on behalf of this system. His "new man" theory clearly reflects Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach's man-god prototype. He hopes to enact a better society through utility since killing the pawnbroker will bring about the "greatest" amount of pleasure for the greatest amount of people. He argues that there exist extraordinary men in society who can overcome moral boundaries and

act according to their own maxims and principles—such as Napoleon and Muhammad (*Crime and Punishment* 265). These men—the elite—whom Raskolnikov develops as extraordinary archetypes in his philosophical article, “On Crime,” would have complete and total freedom over any moral boundaries; they are free to shed blood for their own socio-political purposes, and they often do.

Hence, he asserts himself as an “extraordinary” man, one for whom the anthill functions. Raskolnikov’s “new man” theory is grounded in the belief that society can be structured according to enlightened self-interest and the “greatest happiness principle.” The new, extraordinary man has the means to overstep all boundaries for the greater good. Dostoevsky wants to establish that the conceptual framework of the Palace could be used to justify all actions according to utility. Outside of utility, who can determine what man should or should not do? The parallels between the Chernyshevsky’s “enlightened self-interest” and Raskolnikov’s own theory are remarkably clear. He finalizes and justifies his theory to kill Alyona Ivanova, a local pawnbroker who financially exploits him and his neighbors, when he overhears a group of young 60s intellectuals discussing Ivanovna’s nefarious pawn business: “Kill her and take her money, so that afterwards with its help you can devote yourself to the service of all mankind and the common cause: what do you think, wouldn't thousands of good deeds make up for one tiny little crime?” (65). To which one young officer agrees, “Nature has to be corrected and guided” (65). And though the narrator discusses these remarks as “youthful and common” (66), the narrator is quick to explain, in an omniscient fashion, “But why precisely now did he have to hear precisely such talk and thinking, when...exactly the same thoughts had just been conceived in his own head?” (66). In this passage, Raskolnikov wishes to assert himself as removed from the Palace’s scientism, but he is trapped within it. Though he is schismatic in this section, vacillating between

Christian charity and his intellectual commitment to scientific utility, his intellectual commitment eventually motivates him to logical action, to murder.

Though Raskolnikov purports his “new man” theory as a reflection of his desire to do good for the greatest amount of people, Dostoevsky quickly shows how illogical his venture is. The narrator in *Crime and Punishment* is non-intrusive for the most part. However, Gary Rosenshield explains how the narrator cannot resist undercutting his Napoleonic venture by showing how clumsy he is in the moment right before he goes to kill the Pawnbroker. In his “extraordinary” moment, Raskolnikov is psychologically tormented by this own theory and can barely act. As a result, his clumsiness prevents him from ever stealing the money that he intended to redistribute for his theory; he is too psychologically distraught to finish his exploit. In Raskolnikov’s greatest moment, his “step” is more of a circus act. His “extraordinary man” is essentially a joke (Rosenshield 403). Dostoevsky is showing that without an objective grounding for moral behavior, actions that purport to do good will actually undercut themselves. Though the Palace’s ethics of utility purports to have man’s best interests in mind, without a dialogical moral grounding, man is free to behave however he sees fit. This descent should not be seen as slippery slope; without an objective moral referent, man can only speak of morality in terms of pragmatic value; hence, a decision can be useful at one point and useless at another.

Accordingly, Raskolnikov uses the Palace’s logic to justify murder.

Dostoevsky is showing that the Palace’s conceptual goal to bring about the “one fold” through scientific utility is ultimately dangerous and counterproductive. The death of the sisters is a forecast for the death that will take place to the individual’s personhood and to the society as a whole. Like the individual who has lost the ability for dialogue under the precepts of scientism, society, according to Dostoevsky, will lose its personality and the ability to interact with one

another in meaningful ways. Though this transformation sought to “benefit” mankind, it led to death. The Palace’s conceptual framework would replace authentic unity, only offered through dialogue with Christ and with others through suffering, with a false unity, offered through scientism. The Palace’s residency is the false utopia Chernyshevsky and Mill sought to create: Instead of man’s need to change his nature through suffering and salvation, man would be “corrected and guided” according to scientific method.⁶⁸ This is the Crystal Palace’s grandeur, a perverse replacement of the sacred with the profane, transcendence with immanence, the spiritual with the material.

Dostoevsky’s prophecy of the rise of scientism made itself known in the twentieth century when Lewis wrote his *Space Trilogy*. Chernyshevsky’s utilitarianism, the belief that society, not human nature, could be “corrected and guided” replaced the Christian doctrine that man is innately fallen and his nature can only be corrected through Christ’s salvific act. Moreover, Chernyshevsky’s ethic of utility succinctly merged with the Victorian belief in the interconnectivity of scientific knowledge and social progress (Parrinder 20). As such, these modern beliefs affirmed the utilitarian belief that society could be corrected so long as it conformed to a method—“enlightened self-interest.” If everyone behaved according to natural law—and at the heart of this law is the rational egoistic impulse—then society would become a benevolent utopia. Hence a clear parallel exists between the scientific view of man—as innately ego—and the rise of Western individualism, of which Dostoevsky believed the Crystal Palace symbolized. Dostoevsky’s vision of the Crystal Palace was further realized in the Pan-Slavic and socialist attempts for an earthly utopia. Further, the “New Man” figure, found in Raskolnikov’s theory, became embodied in Stalin, Lenin, Hitler, and Mao—all grand, god-like figures who

⁶⁸ Once again, we must remember the importance of Christ for man’s flawed human nature in Dostoevsky’s Christian conception of existence.

united their countries under this scientific planning. It is after these socialistic attempts that Lewis begins writing his Space Trilogy, where man will divinize science and project it into the cosmos.

Chapter 3: The N.I.C.E.: A New Myth

Like the Crystal Palace, the N.I.C.E. offers a conceptual framework for human residency. However, in contrast to Dostoevsky's "psychological realism" and polyphonic aesthetic approach, Lewis's fictional approach should be understood according to his decision to write a "Modern Fairy Tale for Grown-Ups" in the science fiction genre. Similar to early mid twentieth-century science fiction, *That Hideous Strength* explores the possibility of interplanetary travel and man's relationship to science and technology. What we gain in the final installment of the trilogy is the influence of the spheres—medieval cosmology and astronomy / astrology, all Christianized. Lewis, a purveyor of myth, infuses his fictional universe with mythology, creating an atmosphere where High Eldils, Fallen Angels, spirits, and magic all interplay with science. However, unlike the first two installments of the Trilogy, the general atmosphere of the work can be characterized by a dark, spiritual energy when the action takes place within the confines of the N.I.C.E.—a dystopian residency.⁶⁹ As the final installment of the trilogy, *That Hideous Strength*, which takes place on Tellus—Earth—is more dark than the earlier books because Lewis is showing the devolution of scientism into meaninglessness. Instead of exploring medieval cosmology on Malacandra and Perelandra, Lewis establishes the action on Earth, mostly at St. Anne's and the confines of the N.I.C.E., where the Institute seeks total control over Edgestow. Lewis proposes two opposing forces in the novel—the N.I.C.E as a force of evil, and St. Anne's as a force of good.

Since the action of the novel primarily surrounds the N.I.C.E and its rise to power, I will

⁶⁹ Though I have characterized the N.I.C.E. as a dystopian framework, I do not mean to imply that the novel is a dystopian work of literature. Lewis presents the N.I.C.E. as a force of evil in clear contrast to St. Anne's, which I will explore and develop in the final chapter. Without the light of St. Anne's, the work would be a dystopian novel. However, Lewis shows that, under God's providence, the earth will not succumb to evil forces; Lewis's eschatological views can be seen in his examination of the opposing forces at play for men's hearts. Moreover, the existence of two opposing forces flows out of Lewis's Christian mythological vision where evil and good combat, with good eventually rising victorious. St. Anne's represents the good, and I will explore St. Anne's in Chapter Four.

focus in this chapter on the Institute as a place of human residency and the way of life it offers man—a “home” that is ultimately uninhabitable. Like Dostoevsky’s vision of the Crystal Palace as an all-encompassing symbol of science, Lewis’s vision of the Institute is a totalizing scientific establishment directed to run men’s lives. In order to understand Lewis’s primary motivation for writing the work, which was to “remythologize a demythologized world” from modern scientism (Guite), it is necessary to do a close reading of the work alongside its philosophical counterpart, *The Abolition of Man*, where Lewis reveals the poisonous outcomes of a scientistic system for man; it destroys his tripartite soul, locking him in a subjectivist framework. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis takes philosophical ideas and embodies them in characters in order to show the absurdity of their beliefs when lived out. Under the Institute’s scientism, the Christian understanding of man is abolished and with it his ability to meaningfully communicate, reason, and make moral decisions.

Before beginning a discussion of the N.I.C.E., we must recognize Lewis’s allusion to Sir David Lyndsay’s poem, *Ane Dialog*, wherein he describes the Tower of Babel as a perverted symbol of power: “The shadow of that hyddeous strength / sax myle and more it is of length” (qtd. in Lewis). No doubt a feat of human strength, the Tower of Babel symbolizes the humanistic aim to create a veritable golden calf—a replacement of God with an earthly idol to scale the heavens. Since Lewis maintains that scientism is modernity’s golden calf, he draws upon this allusion to show that N.I.C.E. is the contemporary manifestation of the Tower.⁷⁰ Thus, Dostoevsky’s eschatological vision of the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. have clear parallels when we look at the narrator’s description of the Institute’s towering influence over the novel’s fictional world:

⁷⁰ Once again, Lewis explains that “[u]nder modern conditions an effective invitation to Hell will certainly appear in the guise of scientific planning” (“A Reply to Professor Haldane” 74).

However far you went you would find the machines, the crowded cities, the empty thrones, the false writings, the barren beds; men maddened with false promises and soured with true miseries, worshipping the iron works of their own hands, cut off from the Earth their mother and from the Father in heaven... The shadow of one dark wing is over all Tellus. (Lewis *That Hideous Strength* 290)

The shadow is cast by N.I.C.E.'s appropriation of nature and its attempt to establish a scientific utopia without God.⁷¹ Mark first hears of the Institute's intentions when he converses with Curry and Feverstone. As the narrator explains, "The N.I.C.E. was the first-fruits of that construction fusion between the state and the laboratory on which so many thoughtful people base their hopes of a better world" (23). The hope is founded in the prospect of scientific advancement; its foundations are in Western individualism, and the belief in science-as-progress, much like that of the nineteenth-century's Crystal Palace.

As we can see, then, the Crystal Palace and the Institute are united by their modern creation of the Tower of Babel, but the residence of the Institute is dystopian even though the leaders of the Institute, perverted by evil, purport to create an earthly utopia.⁷² As James Busby, the Bursar of Bracton explains, the Institute will bring scientism into the realm of political ideology:

It's the first attempt to take applied science seriously from the national point of view. The difference in scale between it and anything we've had before amounts to a difference in kind. The buildings alone, the apparatus alone—! Think what it has done already for industry. Think how it is going to mobilise all the talent of

⁷¹ Since the N.I.C.E. is a force of evil, the leaders believe that any state of affairs without God will be utopian; they find scientism the means by which they can bring about this utopia.

⁷² And, therefore, a substantial contrast to Vera Pavlovna's utopian dream of the "New" Russian utopia, though it is important to note that the Institute believes that its conceptual framework will be a utopia as well.

the country; and not only scientific talent in the narrower sense. Fifteen departmental directors at fifteen thousand a year each! Its own legal staff! Its own police, I'm told! Its own permanent staff of architects, surveyors, engineers! The thing's stupendous! (36)

Busby lays out the Institute's "utopian" political goals. In order to create this totalitarian Institute, the leaders have a full political force, a police force without a court system (a significant sign of the emphasis on power rather than justice), technologies (Pragmatometer, an extraordinary sanitation system, vivisection tools), and control over media (propaganda). The Institute takes the all-encompassing scientific vision of the Crystal Palace to the hegemonic level; thus, Lewis shows that any organization built on the hope of scientific progress alone will inevitably be uninhabitable for man. Instead of a utopia as its directors imagine, the Institute is a clear dystopia.

The Institute's goals are only possible if they provide a "new" myth for man; however, before tracing the implications of this myth it is necessary to understand the significance of myth for Lewis. As Jeffrey J. Folks writes, "With Western culture, narrative literature has always been the means by which people have understood the nature of the human condition and the shape of their lives" (107). Narrative provides the framework for the true, the good, and the beautiful—*telos*. Twentieth-century scientism and the vestiges of it that insinuate their way into the current century break down the traditional narrative and present a new materialistic myth for man.⁷³ Undoubtedly, Lewis, lover of myth, was cognizant of scientism and sought to battle this new myth. Lewis was primarily attracted to myth in his literary studies, since, before his

⁷³ This breakdown stretches far and wide in modernity: Nietzsche's Transvaluation of values, Sartre's existentialism, Deleuze and Guattari's deconstruction of the Other. The modern myth is clear; man is alone.

conversion, he discovered Norse mythology and the state of *sehnsucht*⁷⁴ along with it. The beauty of this world and the beauty of myth pointed him to the beauty of transcendence—the origin of beauty. After many discussions with Tolkien, Lewis came to accept the truths of Christianity by recognizing that the early, pagan myths prefaced the Incarnation of Christ (“Myth Became Fact”). In other words, Lewis believed that every myth before the Incarnation pointed to but never reached the full picture of truth until Christ revealed himself. Lewis, for this reason, sees the early pagans closer to Christian dogma than modern materialists; pagan myths affirm the existence of a spiritual realm, whereas the new myth of science rejects the supernatural reality out right.

By rejecting a spiritual reality, the Institute’s scientism provides man with a new, monologic myth. Lewis adroitly highlights that this new scientific myth is religious in nature; it simply replaces one metanarrative for another.⁷⁵ As Downing explains, Lewis created the Space Trilogy as a critique of the scientism that projects “Darwinism into the metaphysical sphere, speculating that humankind may eventually evolve into its own species of divinity, jumping from planet to planet and star to star” (38). In addition to Stapledon and Haldane, H.G Wells propagated this view through his science fiction. This new myth provided man the means to become a god-like character, Raskolnikov’s “New Man,” the Nietzschean *Übermensch*. Lewis, aware of this new myth, sought to counter this form of scientism. He, however, was not alone, as Parrinder explains: “The Neo-Christians (G.K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc, T.S. Eliot, Lewis,

⁷⁴In *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis develops his understanding of *sehnsucht* in relation to joy. In *Pilgrim’s Regress*, he explains *sehnsucht* as a state of “intense longing. It is distinguished from other longings by two things. In the first place, though the sense of want is acute and even painful, yet the mere wanting is felt to be somehow a delight...In the second place, there is a peculiar mystery about the object of this Desire...every one of those supposed objects for the Desire is inadequate to it: (qtd. in Kreeft 22)

⁷⁵As Parrinder explains, J.G. Frazer’s, *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion* (1890) paralleled Causabon’s “Key to all Mythologies.” Frazer delineates three stages of man—the magical, the religious, and in the modern age, the scientific. He lambasts the religious stage and sees the development into the scientific as good (16). Frazer’s work makes clear that the breakdown of a metanarrative / myth leads to a different myth. Lewis saw scientism as a new “myth” that would replace old Western myths.

Tolkien) typically sought to expose the ‘scientism’ of their opponents as a form of quasi-religious (and necessarily heretical) dogma” (23). Like Dostoevsky and other Christian writers aware of this new myth, Lewis knew the implications of this new myth are monological and followed with religious fervor.

Lewis recognized that the Institute’s new myth would motivate men to action—that the twentieth century advancements in technology would merge with this new “myth” and would drive man to act on this new understanding of the cosmos. As Downing explains, Lewis was motivated to write after reading Olaf Stapledon’s *Last and First Men* (1930), and J.B.S. Haldane’s *Possible Worlds* (1927) (38). In the opening of *That Hideous Strength*, Lewis explains that he was motivated to write after conversations with a scientific colleague who suggested he read Stapledon, which he did (7).⁷⁶ In *Last and First Men*, Stapledon creates a fictional world where humanity eventually leaves earth and establishes itself on a different planet. Following Hegelian dialectical thought, the people conduct mass genocide in order to “progress” into space. They operate according to this new myth—that science could help man better the earth and reach out into the cosmos— which parallels J.B.S. Haldane’s postulation in “Man’s Destiny” of man “taking his own evolution in hand” (qtd. in Downing 38). In this essay, Haldane inverts Chernyshevsky’s utilitarian belief that human nature cannot be corrected; instead, Haldane argues that man can scientifically engineer human nature and guide the evolutionary process towards divinity:

In the improbable event of man taking his own evolution in hand—in other words, of improving human nature, as opposed to environment—I can see no bounds at all to his progress. Less than a million years hence the average man or woman

⁷⁶ After reviewing *The Space Trilogy*, Haldane charged Lewis as being “anti-scientific (“Auld Hornie, F.R.S.”). Lewis responded to Haldane and clarified that his issue was not with science but with scientism (“Reply to Professor Haldane”).

will realise all the possibilities that human life has so far shown. He or she will never know a minute's illness. He will be able to think like Newton, to write like Racine, to paint like Fra Angelico, to compose like Bach. He will be as incapable of hatred as St. Francis, and when death comes at the end of a life probably measured in thousands of years he will meet it with as little fear as Captain Oates or Arnold Von Winkelried. And every minute of his life will be lived with all the passion of a lover or a discoverer. We can form no idea whatever of the exceptional men of such a future. Men will certainly attempt to leave the earth. The first voyagers into interstellar space will die. . . . There is no reason why their successors should not succeed in colonising some, at least, of the other planets of our system, and ultimately the planets, if such exist, revolving around other stars than our sun. There is no theoretical limit to man's material progress but the subjection to complete conscious control of every atom and every quantum of radiation in the universe. There is, perhaps, no limit at all to his intellectual and spiritual progress. ("Man's Destiny" 304-5)

Haldane affirmed the scientific hope in the nineteenth-century that man could progress himself, that through science and technology, man could reach an almost divine status.⁷⁷ As Downing quickly points out, "This goes directly back to the Fall, 'Ye shall be Gods'" (39). Haldane's scientific goal to reach divinity also harkens back to Vera's self-divinization through the destruction of the gods; however, Haldane's vision is coupled with the belief in the evolutionary growth of scientific technologies that could enable man power over nature, man, and the cosmos.

⁷⁷ Lewis caricatures Haldane in the character of Weston in *Out of the Silent Planet* and *Perelandra*. As Downing explains, Weston, and those like him, "set aside ordinary morality in favor of utility or in favor of some lofty, abstract goals for humanity; they disregard the sanctity of life, whether human or animal; they are 'progressive' and find little value in history, tradition, or the classics; they prefer the scientific, artificial, and industrial over the simple and the natural; they use language to conceal and distort reality, rather than to reveal it" (84).

Haldane's vision, then, is clearly reflected in the N.I.C.E.'s conceptual framework, which is aimed at taking control over nature, man, and eventually the cosmos. When Mark inquires about the Institute's aims, Curry says, "The N.I.C.E marks the beginning of a new era—the really scientific era... This is going to put science itself on a scientific basis" (38). The Institute equalizes all of nature into a monistic, monologic system—everything is of equal material (instrumental) value, i.e., how it can serve the Institute. By diminishing its spiritual value, the Institute desacralizes nature (and necessarily man and the cosmos).⁷⁸ Lewis traces this philosophical shift in *The Abolition of Man* where he explains that "[w]e reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may 'conquer' them. We are always conquering Nature, because 'Nature' is the name for what we have, to some extent, conquered" (*The Abolition of Man* 43). Under the Institute's scientific framework, all of reality is conquerable, which is evidently espoused by the Institute's control over animals in the story; their vivisectionist practices are a grotesque picture of dominion over nature offered by God to man in the Garden; they abuse animals for experimental purposes.

Necessarily, the Institute's control over nature applies to man as well. In order to foundationally support their new conceptual framework, the Institute creates the "new man." Curry appeals to Mark's vanity by explaining the Institute's motivation to unite science and sociology with the support of "the whole state, just as war has been backed by the whole force of the state" (38). With the power of the state, science can now be applied to sociology and toward creating a technocracy with the goal of "the scientific reconstruction of the human race in the direction of increased efficiency—the elimination of war and poverty and other forms of waste—a fuller of exploitation of Nature—the preservation and extension of our species, in fact" (258).

⁷⁸ In *The New Demons*, Ellul notes that the sacred engenders both fear and hope—fear because it stands as something sublime, much larger and more powerful than us, but also hope as it offers man salvation and freedom from his smallness. Through scientific technology man has desacralized nature.

Once science is applied to sociology (the study of man), the Institute can transfer their power over nature to man. Feverstone quickly concurs, arguing that science can now have the force it needs to finally correct and guide the evolutionary development of humanity toward complete divination: “If Science is really given a free hand it can now take over the human race and re-condition it: make man a really efficient animal. If it doesn’t—well, we’re done” (41). When Mark, curious and skeptical, asks Feverstone, “What is the first practical step?” (42)⁷⁹ Feverstone replies: “Man has got to take charge of Man. That means, remember, that some men have got to take charge of the rest—which is another reason for cashing in on it as soon as one can. You and I want to be the people who do the taking charge, not the ones who are taken charge of” (42).⁸⁰ In order for the Institute to actualize its plans, new, extraordinary men must rise and take control of others; they must stand outside and above others and nature. The Institute intends to use this power toward the conditioning of man toward an earthly utopia.⁸¹

However, like the UG Man—whose existence in a scientific society is “necessary and impossible”—Mark will eventually discover that Institute’s conceptual framework is not a place where people can meaningfully exist; even the “new man” cannot inhabit the Institute’s residency. Mark, in fact, has clear parallels to the UG Man. When we meet Jane and Mark Studdock, we are immediately aware of the brokenness of their marriage. Jane, a modern woman, is bitter from her relationship with Mark since living with him is close to “solitary confinement” (13). He is “always either sleepy or intellectually preoccupied” (13). When Mark is home—a sacred place where two people should share “mutual society, help, and comfort”

⁷⁹ Reminiscent of Raskolnikov’s quip, “A new step, a new word, that’s what they’re most afraid of” (4), before he enacts his “New-Man” theory. Raskolnikov follows the same logic after hearing the 1860s scientific intelligentsia—arguing that nature must be “corrected and guided.”

⁸⁰ Precisely the dynamics underlying the serpent’s enticement to Eve.

⁸¹ Lewis develops the same idea in *The Abolition of Man*: “From this point of view, what we call Man’s power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument” (55).

(13)—he “hardly ever talk[s]” (13). Instead, he is driven by a vanity to be on “the inside” (Rozema 177) of the Progressive Element at Edgestow. A sociologist, Mark values the acceptance of his intellectual and scientific peers over his commitment to wedding vows. Like the UG Man, Mark is driven by vanity to be accepted by his colleagues and the prospect of a “progressive” group of scientists. Yet it also shows a desire for others; he cannot exist alone.

When Mark finally gets on the inside, he finds the Institute’s dark, spiritual connection. As Lewis writes, *That Hideous Strength* is “A Modern Fairy-Tale for Grown-Ups.” Hence, Lewis brilliantly blends the scientism of his day with fantastical spiritual elements, no doubt challenging the materialist’s position that reality is only matter and dually exposing the religious fervor of those who follow scientism. He wants readers to see that, even in a scientific dystopia, there is a spiritual battle at play for men’s hearts (Rozema 183). In contrast to Ransom’s adventures in the beautiful worlds of Malacandria and Perelandra (in *Out of the Silent Planet* and *Perelandra*) where he interacts with Eldils, the Institute is a dystopia—a force of evil that opposes the light of St. Anne’s. Professor Frost and the Institute’s leaders refer to the Dark Eldils as “Macrobes,” masking their nature with a scientific label, whereas Ransom and the community of St. Anne’s refer to them as Fallen Angels. The Institute’s leaders employ the help of Dark Eldils (demons) to help grow their Institute.⁸² These fallen angels join with the Institute in their plot against nature and man.⁸³

⁸² In *Out of the Silent Planet*, Ransom asks a Malacandrian to describe an eldil to him: “To us the eldil is a thin, half-real body that can go through walls and rocks: to himself he goes through them because he is solid and firm and they are like clouds. And what is true light to him and fills the heaven, so that he will plunge into the rays of the sun to refresh himself from it, is to us the black nothing in the sky at night” (95). The Eldils involved with the Institute are, however, fallen and dark.

⁸³ Once again, we see a connection to Dostoevsky. As Rozema brilliantly explains, “It seems that in Frost’s ‘progress towards objectivity’ he opens the door for anything—anything at all—to become a cause of his behavior” (186). And here, once again, we see a connection to Dostoevsky. In *Demons*, Nikolai Stavrogin and Peter Verkhovensky relinquish traditional moral values and bring destruction to their community through murder, rape, and hatred. Their abandonment of traditional moral conscience brings a demonic darkness over their community as well.

N.I.C.E and Language: A Linguistic Dystopia

With a residency founded on the myth of scientism, the N.I.C.E. is united by a new language. The Institute offers the false hope of unifying man through a universal scientific language on “its own scientific basis” (43). In a discussion among Curry, Feverstone, Mark and James Busby, he remarks that they have “different languages” (37) regarding the nature of progress, but that they “all really mean the same thing” (37). Without a unifying language—a discourse community—the Institute would not be able to build its empire. Upon examining the Institute’s new language, it appears that the N.I.C.E seeks to reverse the linguistic division enacted by God after the Tower of Babel. Now, within the walls of the Institute man can speak a shared language of scientism and operate under the same philosophical assumptions. This new language, though, is one of power, exploitation, and *technique*.⁸⁴

Like the Tower of Babel, a symbol of man’s power, the Institute is a system of power and effectively uses language as a tool to enact its power. As such, the Institute exploits language in order take control over Edgestow, London, and the eventually the cosmos. Since the Institute is grounded in a naturalistic philosophy of science, it can only deal adequately with modes of power, utility, and function, since language, a set of symbols, has an adaptive evolutionary advantage for those who recognize its usefulness.⁸⁵ For the Institute, writing is necessary as a language of power. Feverstone appeals, once again, to Mark’s vanity by saying, “You are what we need...a sociologist who can write” (42). Bewildered, Mark asks Feverstone exactly what he

⁸⁴ *Technique* could be described as an ultra-rational mentality that accompanies human interaction with technology, but isn't reducible to it. 'Efficiency' approximates it; a closer approximation would be the drive toward the 'one best way' of doing things. Donald Phillip Verene has said that Ellul's work on technique produces something like "a phenomenology of the technical state of mind." Some of its many characteristics are the prevalence of means over ends, increasing speed, geometric progression (where each change is the logical outgrowth of the preceding ones), and the inability to question what is presented as fact. Critical for Ellul's work is how this creates a milieu in which the human simply doesn't fit, physically or otherwise.

⁸⁵ This plays out into post-structural analysis as well. Downing shows the relationship between post-structuralism’s tendency to “despair objective truth” and have a “concentration upon mere power” as seen in the writings of Thomas Kuhn (55).

will write, and Feverstone replies, “We want you to write it *down*—to camouflage it. Only for the present, of course. Once the thing gets going we shan’t have to bother about the great heart of the British public” (43). Feverstone is referring to their Institute’s directive to create the “new man”—a new view of humanity where man finally can create the man-god without the need of a god-man. The “new man” forgets all “old” views of language as beautiful, good, or true and instead focuses on the usefulness of language.

To camouflage their intentions, the Institute adopts propaganda—a language of power—in order to take control over the masses. Thus, Mark’s role as a propagandist parallels Winston’s revisionist work for Big Brother in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*; both use propaganda as a way to dilute the truth.⁸⁶ Big Brother uses the decrepit and withering language of Newspeak, and the N.I.C.E. uses the misleading and ambiguous language of propaganda. Feverstone, aware of propaganda’s intentions, shrewdly explains to Mark that “it does make a difference how things are put” (43). Feverstone, an opportunist, has a perverted psychological awareness that successful propaganda falsely validates the subject through using abstract and misleading information.⁸⁷ Propaganda assumes a control over the subject it comes in contact with. Hence, it functions like any other technology used to control men by those in power. In *The Abolition of Man*, Lewis likens the propagandist’s discourse to war, an environment operated through power and domination of the weak by the strong: “Man is as much the patient or subject as the possessor, since he is the target both for bombs and propaganda” (55). As the Institute’s writer, Mark immediately begins writing down and camouflaging their dystopian plans, ignorant of the full implications of his association with the Institute.

⁸⁶ In his article, “That Hideous Strength in Lewis and Orwell: A Comparison and Contrast,” Peter Schakel shows the relationship between N.I.C.E. and Big Brother—both are totalitarian powers that use language ultimately to dehumanize those they have control over.

⁸⁷ The connection between propaganda cannot be overlooked, as made clear by Stalin’s use of propaganda. Stalin used propaganda to engender loyalty through fear and love; he falsely affirmed the Russian peasant.

In addition to power, Feverstone's language here reflects the Institute's adoption of *technique*. Feverstone says, "If it were whispered that the N.I.C.E. wanted powers to experiment on criminals, you'd have all the old women of both sexes up in arms about yapping about humanity. Call it re-education of the mal-adjusted, and you have them all slobbering with delight" (43). Feverstone's move here is intentional; instead of speaking of criminals (persons with moral agency who are guilty of violating a moral code), Feverstone speaks of the "mal-adjusted"—an inhuman category fit to deal more aptly with material objects than moral persons. This movement from the personal to the abstract, in Lewis's aesthetic, is highly depersonalizing. Using "Mal-adjusted" is not only a denotative trick, but also this phrase has a connotatively emptied meaning; it is no longer discussing persons, only abstract, removed, singularities.

Statistics, a measurement of data using *technique* and often used for propaganda, present the same linguistic problem, which can be seen when Mark walks around with Cosser through an English village gathering sociological information on the farmers.⁸⁸ The more Mark views humanity in terms of statistics, the less in touch with persons he becomes: "His education had had the curious effect of making things that he read and wrote more real to him than things he saw. Statistics about agricultural labourers were the substance; any real ditcher, ploughman, or farmer's boy, was the shadow" (87).⁸⁹ Both propaganda and statistics—Mark's primary contribution to the N.I.C.E—are reflections of the Institute's conceptual framework built on power and *technique*. Lewis satire reveals that any conceptual framework that operates according to technique will invariably devalue human life.

⁸⁸ In *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, Ellul explains that propaganda is not interested in viewing people as individuals; they are only valuable if they are reduced to an average (7). Thus, propaganda both affirms the individual—by making him or her connected ideologically to society—and strips him of his individuality.

⁸⁹ Dostoevsky makes clear that this depersonalization leads to literal and figurative death. After murdering the Pawnbroker, Raskolnikov says, "It wasn't a human being I killed, it was a *principle*" (274). Raskolnikov embraces the 60s mentality; the pawnbroker is not just a principle; she is a statistic, an abstraction, far removed from humanity and stripped of her humanity.

Further, a language built on *technique* coheres with the scientific aim of arriving at all-encompassing empirical objectivity. The Institute creates a new language because it aims to discuss people with as much technical efficiency as possible. Lewis's satire of the movement to the technical is not *in vacuo*—the positivist tradition of the nineteenth-century marks the same movement. The materialism of Dostoevsky's time heavily influenced the positivism of the twentieth.⁹⁰ As Parrinder explains, positivism is “a collection of prohibitions concerning human knowledge, intended to confine the name ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ to the results of those operations that are observable in the evolution of the modern sciences of nature” (20). The positivist movement viewed truth as a closed, materialistic system. Accordingly, “truth” statements were boiled down to analytic tautologies. Positivists, like the Institute leaders, attempted to create a new mechanical language.

This trend can be seen most clearly in Quine's *Word and Object* (1960), which takes the scientific aim for technical language to its logical conclusion. Quine maintains that each individual speaker's “stimulation” of the external world is isolated and removed from others, and thus, his epistemological uncertainty is followed up with a movement toward a completely analytic system of language that allows for communication:

It would seem that this matching of observation sentences hinges on sameness of stimulation of both parties, the linguist and the informant. But an event of stimulation, as I use the term, is the activation of some subset of the subject's sensory receptors. Since the linguist and his informant share no receptors, how can they be said to share a stimulation? We might rather say that they undergo

⁹⁰ As C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis make clear, Comte—a clear forerunner to Quine—believed that “[a]s science matures, such explanations (theological) are replaced by mechanistic ones involving natural regularities” (qtd in *Philosophy of Religion* 144).

similar stimulation, but that would assume still an approximate homology of nerve endings from one individual to another. (370)

Since individual speakers experience separate stimulations, Quine argues that they cannot meaningfully—in the classical sense—discuss the thing-in-itself. We are isolated in a world of phenomena and signifiers and cannot interact with the noumena or the signified. This view of language aligns with Quine’s metaphysical belief that there is no absolute meaning of “tree” because there is no “tree” in objective reality, at least not in the sense that we can adequately discuss the tree outside of our “stimulation.”⁹¹ Hence an individual’s understanding of tree will always be different from another’s because there is no objective tree that we can reach through mutual engagement—only our subjective stimulations of that tree. As such, Quine follows suit with the “myth” of matter and offers a non-fictive account of this belief. Not only is Quine’s technical jargon dull and uninteresting, but it also fails to point to any metaphysical realities outside language itself.

In this way, a scientific language of *technique* linguistically strips words of their metaphysical significance, grounding them in the sphere of immanence. However, words themselves resist this secularization. In “How Literature Resists Secularity,” Graham Ward offers a Lewisian critique of a scientific use of language. He shows that literature—a collection of individual words—has resonances that are highly infused with Judeo-Christian universals: words such as “love,” “compassion,” “honor,” “man,” etc., carry with them meanings that resist a completely secular framework; they speak to a universal and transcendent significance.⁹²

⁹¹ Quine stood as a reverberating voice for this sort of scientism. He further argues in *Word and Object* “that mental notions like belief or sensation could simply be abandoned in favor of a more accurate physiological account” (qtd. in Ramsey “Eliminative Materialism” n. pag.). Quine grounds man’s mental states completely in his physiology. He writes, “[t]he bodily states exist anyway; why add the others?” (qtd. in Ramsey n.pag.).

⁹² In *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, Postman has a helpful summary of Northrop Frye’s theory of resonances: “Through resonances a particular statement in a particular context acquires a universal significance” (qtd. in 17).

Ward's theory of language and literature recalls Lewis's since both writers recognize the innate characteristic of language as a pointer to the spiritual realm that stands outside the material. The moment one begins speaking of universals, like love, compassion, and justice, one has stepped outside metaphysical naturalism; these ideas, these universal beliefs stand outside materialistic conditions; either these resonances are merely illusion, or, perhaps, they resonate from a Voice outside the Total System.

John Wither, the Deputy Director of the Institute, most aptly embodies a scientific view of language. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis uses characters, such as Wither, to embody different scientific beliefs.⁹³ As Rozema explains, Wither is a “consummate manifestation of Newspeak” (178)—a distorted and fractured lump of empty linguistic signifiers. His aim for technicality in speech renders his speech indecipherable. Thus, Lewis fittingly names him: Wither's communication “withers the mind and spirit” (178) of those with whom he communicates. For instance, when Mark asks the Deputy Director how he will serve the Institute, he replies, “We do not really think, among ourselves, in terms of strictly demarcated functions... Everyone in the Institute feels that his own work is not so much a departmental contribution to an end already defined as a moment or grade in the progressive self-definition of an organic whole” (Lewis 54). Wither's explanation of the Institute, here, is meaningless. He ironically says that they do not see themselves in terms of “function,” but this is exactly how they view their roles in the Institute. Moreover, he offers phrases like “self-definition” and “organic whole” without a conceptual framework, a residency, that can sustain the “self” or the “organic.” Hence, Wither's technical language is self-contradictory since it seeks to understand *man* according to technical efficiency.

⁹³ Lewis defends his characterizations in the science fiction genre, which make some of his characters appear more like philosophical beliefs than actual characters: “It is absurd to condemn them [science fiction novels] because they do not often display any deep or sensitive characterization. They oughtn't to. It is a fault if they do... Every good writer knows that the more unusual the scenes and events of his story are, the slighter, the more ordinary, the more typical his persons should be” (“On Science Fiction”).

A language built on *technique* is dangerously inaccurate; man cannot inhabit a conceptual framework built on the pillars of such a mode of discourse.

As Dennett makes clear in his book *Freedom Evolves*, the scientific movement toward a language of *technique* continues in contemporary naturalistic philosophy of science. Dennett describes humanity in as technical and “accurate” terms as possible. He writes, “A person is a hominid with an infected brain, host to millions of cultural symbionts, and the chief enablers of these are the symbiont systems known as language” (qtd. in Rozema 173). Here, Dennett eschews the use of metaphorical language typically used to understand humanity; he believes that “technical” words are more accurate than metaphorical or vernacular ones. As Rozema makes clear, Dennett’s linguistic move allows him to categorize persons and language in a naturalistic framework: “‘Euprimates’ and ‘symbiont systems’ are ‘technical terms,’ and therefore supposedly more accurate than their ‘vernacular’ counterparts, ‘persons’ and ‘languages’” (173). However, Dennett’s linguistic move fails to see the connection between connotation and denotation and form and content. As Wright explains in “Generic Man; An Endangered Species? Some Reflections on *The Abolition of Man*,” the positivist’s abolition of man primarily attacks “man,” a signifier that has different connotations than more technically “accurate” signifiers, including “male,” or “hominid.” In fact, Wright explains that the language of the Bible (for instance, Jesus as the “Son of Man”), the poetry of John Donne, Shakespeare, and other significant English writers before the rise of positivism, all use poetic language that resists positivism’s breakdown of connotation and denotation (167-169). The positivist view, and thus the Institute’s view, fails to see that *how* something is said is intrinsically connected to *what* it means and what it means to what it is. By using language that is more scientifically accurate, the scientist becomes absurdly inaccurate; he no longer discusses persons, only

things—non-persons.

Lewis confronts the Institute’s discourse “by using the power of poetic language in verse and prose to effect a ‘felt change of con-sciousness’, to heighten and deepen our awareness by re-enchanting the disenchanting, by remythologizing a demythologized world” (306). Lewis especially recognized the need for myth that could communicate truth—synthesizing reason and imagination to its fullest. For Lewis, poetic language, with robust resonances that point to a meaningful universe, cleave reason and imagination and allows the communication of transcendent truths.⁹⁴ When *That Hideous Strength* is viewed contextually in the Space Trilogy, we see how concerned Lewis is with using poetic language and myth. As Kreeft explains, “Lewis explanation, in *Perelandra*, is itself mystical. Ransom finds that what is myth in one world is fact in another; that on pre-fallen Perelandra the distinction between myth and fact has not occurred” (51).⁹⁵ Imaginative language is the solution to the Institute’s linguistic breakdown.

Lewis, influenced by Chesterton’s view of language, very much agrees with Feverstone’s quip “that it matters how a thing is put,” though for different reasons. In *Orthodoxy* (1908), Chesterton recognizes the absurdity of this scientific approach to language and argues that we must distinguish mathematical (technical) language from poetic (metaphoric) language:

To say, ‘The social utility of the indeterminate sentence is recognized by all criminologists as a part of our sociological evolution towards a more human and scientific view of punishment,’ you can go on talking like that for hours with hardly a movement of the gray matter inside your skull. But if you begin ‘I wish

⁹⁴ In response to Sister Penelope’s inquiry about the Space Trilogy, Lewis writes, “Any amount of theology can now be smuggled into people’s minds under cover of romance without their knowing it” (*The Collected Letters of C. S. Lewis* n. pag.).

⁹⁵ Lewis’s brilliant and imaginative descriptions of setting of Malacandra and Perelandra are enough to support his view of the importance of poetic language to arriving at truth.

Jones to go to gaol and Brown to say when Jones shall come out,' you will discover, with a thrill of horror, that you are obliged to think. (231)

Chesterton's view of language, and his simple, honesty profoundly impacted Lewis's own view of language and style (Kreeft 30). Here, Chesterton shows that when language works on the technical level alone, it cannot speak of the personal, the aesthetic, or even the divine. Thus, naturalists' attempt to make technically truthful statements ironically defeats itself. Without a view of language that allows for persons, man is incapable of speaking or thinking.

As we can see, not all naturalists are as linguistically ambitious as Dennett and Quine and try to have the best of both conceptual frameworks—a naturalistic philosophy of science (that cannot justifiably account for rich, teleological experiences) with a rich, robust philosophy of language (which still includes universal, Judeo-Christian resonances). In his highly popular PBS series, *Cosmos*, Carl Sagan, popular physicist, maintains the poetic and robust tradition of poetic device even though he professes the modern view of the universe that Lewis critiques: "The Cosmos is all that is, or ever was, or ever will be" (Sagan). Sagan's opening line is a clear satire of Revelation 1:8, "I am the Alpha and the Omega," says the Lord God, "who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty." Though Sagan aligns with a naturalistic framework, he linguistically paints the universe with poetic and Biblical language:

I believe our future depends, powerfully, on how well we understand this Cosmos in which we float like a mote of dust in the morning sky...it's a story about us ... how the Cosmos has shaped our evolution and our culture and what our fate may be. We wish to pursue the truth no matter where it leads.... The Cosmos is full beyond measure of elegant truths, of exquisite interrelationships, of the awesome machinery of nature. Some part of our being knows this is where we came from

[the stars], we long to return. And we can because the Cosmos is also within us; we are made of 'star stuff'—we are a way for the Cosmos to know itself. (Sagan n.pag.)

Interestingly, Sagan views the Cosmos as a “story” with, no doubt, parallels to the new myth of scientism. Sagan implies that the Cosmos is “calling” us to “pursue the truth” and discover the “elegant truths” and “awesome machinery” of the universe. Moreover, he discusses the Cosmos as a universal agent—much like the Christian God—who “is also within us” and can “know itself.” Sagan’s naturalism is exactly the scientism Lewis wishes to expose—a fervent, religious belief in the power of science to improve and advance our lives. Sagan wishes to re-introduce a neo-pagan, Averroistic view of the soul, which is not individual but general. His language is attempting to unite all of man into a collective human consciousness based on scientific progress. However, Sagan employs a rhetorical trick; the universe, an amalgamation of molecules, energy, and laws, cannot really “know itself,” nor can it call us to itself. Sagan maintains the robust, poetic language of metaphor, but what does his language point to besides an irrational, misguided universe (one of many if multi-verse theory is correct) where death is the only constant? His language is like a fresh coat of paint on an automobile headed for the junkyard about which he wants us to get excited.⁹⁶ As Dilorenzo explains of Sagan, “It’s a bit naïve to get rhapsodic about pure materialism.” The moment one gets rhapsodic about this conceptual framework, it is no longer an issue of pure materialism, at least not justifiably so.

As Lewis wants us to be aware, scientism has serious implications for language—whether or not naturalists are willing to admit these implications. By employing a language of power and *technique*, the N.I.C.E. reveals its hostility both to language and alienation to human

⁹⁶ I do not mean to imply that the universe, in itself, is not full of beauty; rather, Sagan’s naturalism disallows him from using the poetic and rhetorical language he uses.

community. As such, the Institute's new, shared language becomes increasingly isolating and chaotic, leading to the climax when the leaders' discourse is ruptured in a modern Tower-of-Babel scene. Merlin, who can speak the pure language of the Eldils, thwarts the Institute's dystopian plans by confusing their language through the casting of a linguistic spell (229). Though his interruption is a classical *deus ex machina*, he simply expedites the linguistic deterioration already in process. After his spell, the leaders lose the ability to understand one another and mass confusion ensues; animals break free from their prison and storm the meeting room, revealing that the Institute's control over nature is indeed illusory. Just as their new language is chaotic, so is their entire motivation for control over nature and man.

Some critics, including Orwell, find the *deus ex machina* ending an artistic downfall of the novel; Orwell believes that the novel loses its autonomy and becomes polemical because of Lewis's intrusion (Schakel 38). However one criticizes Lewis's use of Merlin, one must recognize Lewis's intention; in Orwell's worldview, Big Brother inevitably resumes power because Orwell's eschatological vision is ominous; the processes that allow men to rise to totalitarian control will never come to an end; man will always be in a power struggle over other men. Lewis's eschatological vision, however, affirms that a New Jerusalem will come and bring peace and restore language. However, since *That Hideous Strength* does not explicitly deal with end times, it appears that Lewis is postulating another noteworthy idea: God will not permit the triumph of scientism in His world. Orwells fails to grasp that the two preceding novels in the Trilogy pave the way for the degeneration of the N.I.C.E into meaninglessness. For this reason, Merlin's linguistic intrusion is not necessary, *per se*, since he only expedites the collapse of a language built on ambiguity, misfiring, and exploitation. However, the *deus ex machina* ending fulfills Lewis's artistic purpose to depict the Modern Tower of Babel. Built on these foundations,

the N.I.C.E cannot offer a “home” or a welcoming conceptual residency for man.

Here, we can stop and recognize Lewis’s own prophetic insight. His critique in *The Abolition of Man* no doubt centers on how scientism affects language and our ability to speak. If we grant scientism merit, then, like Turgenev’s Bazarov, we will be reduced to “sensations.” Our ability to engage the Other will be futile as we are locked in our own perceptions.⁹⁷ Hence, we see a clear connection between the scientism of the nineteenth century and the post-modern condition of the twentieth-century. When Nietzsche’s Zarathustra claimed, “God is dead,” he essentially followed through with the Enlightenment’s distinction between noumena and the phenomena, the thing in itself, and our perception of that thing.⁹⁸ Nietzsche continued the nineteenth-century materialistic trajectory toward the post-modern deconstruction of the Wholly Other, as exemplified by post-structuralist theory. In this system the signifier is stripped of its metaphysical property, and man lives in the world of infinite signs.⁹⁹ Engagement with the Other is both impossible and meaningless.¹⁰⁰ Lewis, for this reason, was prophetic like Dostoevsky. On the edge of the rise of post-structuralism, Lewis defends robust classical-Christian belief that language is intrinsically meaningful, points to an objective reality, and allows man to step outside of himself.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ In this context, I mean the “Other” to be that which stands outside oneself; it approximates the “noumena,” the thing-in-itself, which exists independently of the phenomena. However, in this context I am specifically referring to the idea of a transcendent being who stands outside time, space, matter but who is still possible to interact with. As I will show in footnote 30 below, post-structuralists find the Other a wholly oppressive idea and deconstruct it.

⁹⁸ Roger Lundin traces this development as it applies to Christian aesthetics in his essay, “The Beauty of Belief.”

⁹⁹ In Baudrillard’s “The Ecstasy of Communication,” as well as in his *Simulacra and Simulation*, he maintains that objects have evaporated. We can only experience simulated otherness (145).

¹⁰⁰ Gilles Deleuze’ and Felix Guatarri’s *Anti-Oedipus* aims at the radical deconstruction of the Other: “Christianity taught us to see the eye of the lord looking down upon us. Such forms of knowledge project an image of reality at the expense of reality itself” (xxii).

¹⁰¹ In fact, Lewis finds the act of reading one of the most transcendent experiences one can have. Reading good literature allows one to transcend and interact with the Other: “But in reading great literature I become a thousand men and yet remain myself. Like the night sky in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad eyes, but it is still I who see.

The N.I.C.E.'s Attack on Reason

Bearing in mind Lewis's critique of the Institute's exploitation of language, I will attempt to go "deeper"—into the mind and man's ability to reason. Lewis sees language and reason as inextricably connected, and because they are, I will follow my discussion of the N.I.C.E.'s debasement of language with an examination of the Institute's implications for reason. The new "language" of scientism attacks classical reason, mounting its attack in a self-contradictory strategy that lacks epistemological grounding and the means to use its own weapons, that is, language itself. The Tower of Babel is a fitting symbol for N.I.C.E because the Institute's new language is self-referentially incoherent; these are not men (rational persons) talking; these are beasts—progenitors and products of the systems of power at play in the Institute. The Institute's framework shows us that without a transcendent referent, language can only serve pragmatic uses—power, utility, function. In a theistic system, however, language has both function and *telos* and is grounded in *Logos*. Since the Institute's scientific language is grounded in power structures, it radically shapes man's ability to reason. In this new myth, man is only "stimulations"—a product of evolutionary processes and neurological cause and effect.¹⁰² If this is true, then, like language, there are serious implications for man's reasoning capabilities.¹⁰³

Though a majority of the Institute's leaders launch an attack on reason, Professor Frost is perhaps the most aggressive. Like Wither, Frost is named in accordance with the angle of scientism he embodies. As a pure materialist, Frost eschews traditional reason and traditional values, and through his characterization, Lewis highlights the connection between man's ability to properly reason and his ability to arrive at the good, the true, and the beautiful. First, before

Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more myself than when I do" (*An Experiment in Criticism* 141).

¹⁰² Once again, similar to Bazarov's "sensations."

¹⁰³ Lewis develops this in his argument from reason in chapter 3 of *Miracles*.

exploring the collapse of the good, it is necessary to view Frost's view of reason. In a conversation with Mark about the proper way to understand the "tendency of events"—causality—Frost argues that he must abandon classical reason in favor of modern pragmatism:

Of course, if you insist on formulating the problem in those terms. In reality the question is meaningless. It presupposes a means-and-end pattern of thought which descends from Aristotle, who in his turn, was merely hypostatizing elements in the experience of an iron-age agricultural community. Motives are not the causes of action but its by-products. You are merely wasting your time by considering them. When you have attained real objectivity you will recognize, not some motives, but all motives as merely animal, subjective epiphenomena. You will then have no motives and you will find that you do not need them. Their place will be supplied by something else which you will presently understand better than you do now. So far from being impoverished your action will become much more efficient. (296)

Frost's scientism has three major implications for reason: First, the classical understanding of reason is meaningless and should be done away with. Second, reason is a byproduct of one's space-time context; hence, Aristotle's "means-and-end" system of physics only works in his agricultural time. Thirdly, all actions, behaviors, and thoughts are evolutionarily caused and should be viewed in terms of pragmatic efficiency—maximizing the most efficient means to ensure survival value.

Lewis heatedly contends with Professor Frost's "chronological snobbery" about the irrelevance of classical reason (*Surprised by Joy* 167). In addition to finding this modern view extremely arrogant, Lewis shows that it collapses on itself. In the chapter "The Cardinal

Difficulty of Naturalism” of *Miracles*, Lewis, similar to his fictional approach, takes the naturalists’ claims to their logical extreme. He examines, premise by premise, how this system plays itself out. The opening lines state, “If Naturalism is true, every finite thing or event must be (in principle) explicable in terms of the Total System...If any one thing exists which is of such a kind that we see in advance the impossibility of ever giving it that kind of explanation, then Naturalism would be in ruins” (311). If Naturalism is true, then all phenomena must be explainable according to Nature. No event, action, or state exists outside of nature or can be explained outside of natural events. Further, under a Total System, man’s evolutionary development is a result of a determined series of random causes. The causes are *random* because they are without intention; they are *determined* because man cannot step outside of this Total System. Contemporary naturalist, George Gaylor Simpson, agrees: “Man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not have him in mind” (qtd. in Plantiga). *Contra* the Christian understanding of God as a personal Creator and Nature as a reflection of the Creator, a naturalistic philosophy of science maintains that the universe evolved out of mindless causes. Frost embodies this cold philosophy of science, which is why Lewis names him in accordance to this system; his view of the universe is enclosed, purposeless, and cold.

If Frost’s belief is correct, then man acts in accordance with pragmatic considerations—with what is useful not with what is true. Lewis shows that in naturalistic science, man is concerned with the usefulness of a belief not necessarily its truthfulness: “You may, if you like, give up all claim to truth. You may say simply ‘Our way of thinking is useful’—without adding, even under your breath, ‘and therefore true’...The old, high pretensions of reason must be given up. It is a behavior evolved entirely as an aid to practice” (*The Abolition of Man* 32). And this is exactly what Frost seeks to do when he disparages Aristotle’s belief in means-end pattern of

thinking. Frost wants to convince Mark that he should make decisions according to pragmatic efficiency, and Frost's beliefs are not a straw man, but mirror naturalists of Lewis's time and many today.¹⁰⁴ Patricia Churchland, contemporary eliminative materialist, argues in the same vein:

Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive... Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost. (qtd in. Plantiga 315)

Churchland's "essentials" are merely pragmatic considerations. She agrees with Frost that we should abandon the traditional understanding of the "good" and begin to understand man in terms of four basic biological impulses. Truth is irrelevant.¹⁰⁵ Survival is vital.

However, Churchland's materialism is non-sense. If truth is irrelevant or secondary, she has provided little grounding for the very claims she is making. Churchland uses "reason," which should have at its base the approximation of truth. However, she states that truth takes the "hindmost," and in doing so, she is making a truth claim—one which, under further examination, is highly unlikely to be true. This dilemma is naturalism's "cardinal difficulty." If we follow

¹⁰⁴ Including Quine, et al.

¹⁰⁵ In fact, Churchland seeks to completely rid modern science of words such as "belief" and "desire" when discussing man. She believes we need a "new" language founded on the technical language of neurological science. Thus, Churchland, an Eliminative Materialist, has continued in the positivist tradition and posits that all of man's experiences can be understood in terms of neurological frameworks. She and her husband, Paul Churchland, argue that traditional "folk psychology," which understands man in terms of "belief" and "desire" (directly related to the Platonic conception of desire) will eventually be obsolete as we discover more about neurological processes (William Ramsey "Eliminative Materialism" n.pag. Stanford).

through with Churchland's logic, then, according to naturalists we have true beliefs that are pragmatically non-valuable and false beliefs that are pragmatically valuable (religion, for example).¹⁰⁶ Naturalists, such as Dawkins, argue that belief in a higher power is an adaptive feature, a coping mechanism, which allows us to increase our chance of survival: "It gives us consolation and comfort. It fosters togetherness in groups. It satisfies our yearning to understand why we exist" (Dawkins 190). If this is true, then religious beliefs provide one with a selective advantage over those who have not developed these neural pathways. But, obviously, since a naturalistic philosophy of science does not maintain that religious beliefs are true beliefs, it is stuck in a bind; how can one differentiate between falsehood and truth?

Plantinga recognizes this dilemma and argues that naturalism is actually in contradiction to scientific thought because it prevents man from differentiating truthful beliefs from false beliefs. He shows that we must make a distinction between Neural Pathway properties (physical states in the brain) and content (beliefs that are either true or false) that fills these states. NP properties determine the content of a property:

But as long as the NP properties are adaptive, it doesn't matter, for survival and reproduction, what content is determined by those NP properties. It could be true content; it could be false content; it doesn't matter. The fact that these creatures have survived and evolved, that their cognitive equipment was good enough to enable their ancestors to survive and reproduce—that fact would tell us nothing at all about the truth of their beliefs or the reliability of their cognitive faculties. It would tell something about the neurophysiological properties of a given belief; it

¹⁰⁶ That said, even if it turns out that all truths are pragmatically valuable, it does not follow that pragmatic value thereby entails truth. Consider the difference between these two syllogisms: If x is true, then x is pragmatically valuable vs. If x is pragmatically valuable, then x is true. Obviously, these are very different and necessary distinctions. However, some crass pragmatist theories of truth may try to conflate these axioms.

would tell us that by virtue of these properties, that belief has played a role in the production of adaptive behavior. But it would tell us nothing about the truth of the content of that belief: its content might be true, but might with equal probability be false. (33)

As Plantinga argues, the error in logic here is that the pure naturalist has no grounding to determine the veracity of a belief—only the pragmatic value. Lewis agrees, and postulates the necessity of forming a reliable system for rationality: “All possible knowledge, then, depends on the validity of reasoning... Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true” (*Miracles* 313). However, under the Total System of the Institute, man’s reason and his belief-forming mechanisms are not reliable: If man has descended from an unguided evolutionary process, filled with an indeterminate set of non-rational causes, then man’s belief-forming mechanisms are themselves non-rational.¹⁰⁷ Even Professor Haldane, whom Lewis critiques, recognizes this cardinal difficulty: “If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true... and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms” (314). In contrast to a theistic view of evolution, a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot justifiably maintain a materialistic evolutionary process is rational because this would assume the existence of a mind. Even if the evolutionary account is true, the development of sentient beings with rational minds would have taken place far into the process; the microbes leading up to the development of a human mind would not follow a rational set of causes. Instead, these cells would propagate according to favorable environmental conditions that maximize chances of survival. In other words, species would operate according to pragmatic considerations, not truthful considerations.

¹⁰⁷ The issue here is between materialism and immaterialism, not evolution and non-evolution. Lewis’s critique targets a materialistic philosophy of evolution, not necessarily an immaterial or divine theory of evolution.

Thus, in order to determine the veracity of a belief, we must step outside the Total System. To argue for the veracity of human reason, one cannot do so within the Total System because this is circular—using reason to support reason. Therefore, Lewis harkens man back to a medieval conception of reason, not because he thinks the Ptolemaic account is accurate, but because he recognizes that this account provides a conceptual framework for reason to exist:

Perhaps the safest way of putting it is this: that we must give up talking about ‘human reason’...where thought is strictly rational it must be, in some odd sense, not ours, but cosmic or super-cosmic. It must be something not shut up inside our heads but already ‘out there’—in the universe or behind the universe: either as objective as material Nature or more objective still. Unless all that we take to be knowledge is an illusion, we must hold that in thinking we are not reading rationality into an irrational universe but responding to a rationality with which the universe has always been saturated... We must, then, grant logic to reality. (*De Futilate*)

From this statement it is clear that Lewis believes that an objective world must really exist and independent rationality—outside of the Total System—is requisite to forming true, justifiable beliefs. For Lewis, objective, transcendent reality is God, the “cosmic logos...the great I AM, that ‘eternal, self-existent, rational Being’” (Ward 217). In a scientific community where truth is only what can be seen, tasted, and heard, Lewis antagonistically proclaims that this view of truth is puny, unreliable, and a reflection of “chronological snobbery” (*Surprised By Joy* 201), an idea that man naturally believes what is current and modern. Lewis affirms that “[i]f anything is to exist at all, then the Original Thing must be, not a principle or a generality, much less an ‘ideal or a ‘value,’ but an utterly concrete fact” (*Miracles* 87). In the Incarnation, the Word—*Logos*—

became the highest known Fact; He stands both within and outside the universe, allowing man to reason and dialogue.

Lewis, therefore, infuses his literature with a return to medieval Neoplatonic views of truth, which see truth as “incognito,” waiting to be discovered (Ward 19). As Ward explains, Lewis’s view of truth is heavily influenced by the medieval notion that truth is hidden. Lewis argues in *Spenser’s Images of Life* that Spenser drew on “neo-platonic thought which deemed it proper that ‘all great truths should be veiled’” (qtd. in 19). Undoubtedly, Lewis here is referring to a theistic, Platonic understanding of the cosmos, where truth—perfection of form—exists in the transcendent reality of ideas and forms. Lewis seems to be synthesizing several aspects of Augustine’s and Plato’s cosmological beliefs when he argues that truth exists both in nature and in the world of transcendence—the higher form. Though truth is both present in nature and transcendence, nature only provides us with a glimpse, an image of truth. Lewis attests to this view of the cosmos when he writes, “I think that all things, in their way, reflect heavenly truth, the imagination not least. ‘Reflect’ is the important word. This lower life of the imagination is not a beginning of, nor a step toward, the higher life of the spirit, merely an image” (*Surprised by Joy* 171). Continuing in a dualistic, NeoPlatonic view, Lewis maintains that truth exists in a higher form, and we are provided analogical images of that truth within nature. Lewis starkly contradicts Professor Frost, who tries to objectify truth claims through naturalistic methodology. Lewis makes clear that Frost’s logic is ultimately illogical, and more importantly, dangerous.

In contrast with the Institute’s scientific conception of truth, Lewis’s affirmation of *Logos* provides him with the grounding that “rationality is at least potentially capable of giving us a true picture of reality if we commit ourselves to consistency and non-contradiction” (Aeschliman 75). Shippey explains that Lewis’s friendship with Charles Williams was especially

enlightening to his view of truth within literature. Through this friendship Lewis learned that “one could write a work inspired by recondite learning (in both cases essentially Neoplatonic learning) but still use the style and method of popular fiction” (*The Ransom Trilogy* 238). At any rate, Lewis’s concern is not just reaching truth but also synthesizing reason and imagination in a fractured, scientific world.

As an establishment founded on scientism, the N.I.C.E. offers a view of reason that is based on pragmatic value and not truthfulness. However, under further investigation, this system collapses on itself. A naturalistic philosophy of science cannot provide a substantive framework for truthful beliefs or for reliable belief-forming mechanisms. Hence, Lewis harkens back to earlier conceptions of the universe, specifically to the Aristotelian understanding of truth and the universe. By abandoning belief in *Logos*, the Institute’s own language and reasoning capabilities break down. Hence, Lewis makes it clear that with the new language of the N.I.C.E., man’s view of reason will demonstrably change, and when that happens, he opens the door for moral morass.

A New Man: A New Morality

With a new language and new view of reason, the N.I.C.E’s conceptual framework leads man to a moral morass. As Michael D. Aeschliman explains, “Modern scientific doctrine holds all fact to be objective and all values to be subjective” (74). The modern tendency is to disparage the subjective since it cannot be quantified¹⁰⁸ and affirm the objective—facts and statistics, which are quantifiable.¹⁰⁹ As a consequence, the naturalist’s belief that values are a result of *accidental* change (evolutionary process) permits values to be guided by *intentional* change—

¹⁰⁸ As Rozema notes, this is a categorical mistake. An “outside in” scientific study of man presupposes the ability for the social scientist to objectively remove himself from humanity in order to look back at itself. (183). But, if man is trapped in a Total System, how can he objectively remove himself?

¹⁰⁹ Certainly, Lewis would see this as a modern “myth of facts”—the dogmatic belief in the power of scientific facts to alone provide man with truths.

man “taking over man” and creating the “new man.” If values are accidental, rather than objective, then they are social conventions that can be used or abandoned based on pragmatic need. Also, if they are only accidental, then man can direct them however he sees fit. Once again, let us revisit Feverstone’s belief that “man has to take charge of man” through “[s]terilization of the unfit, liquidation of backward races (we don’t want any dead weights), selective breeding” (42). As the Eugenics of the early twentieth century reveal, Feverstone’s belief paralleled real scientific intentions to “correct and guide nature” toward maximum efficiency.

Hence, the “new man,” a reflection of Nietzsche’s “Transvaluation of Values,” is only possible with the breakdown of objective moral values. Without the existence of a transcendent moral code, moral values are really just an illusion, as Nietzsche recognizes:

It is unfair to Descartes to call his appeal to God's credibility frivolous. Indeed, only if we assume a God who is morally our like can “truth” and the search for truth be at all something meaningful and promising of success. This God left aside, the question is permitted whether being deceived is not one of the conditions of life. (qtd. in Plantiga 314)

With God a discarded image, man is existentially free to create his own values—everything is permissible, as Dostoevsky and Nietzsche understand. For Nietzsche, then, “life is an aesthetic phenomenon ‘beyond good and evil.’ The only ‘goods’ are subjective and hedonistic—the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain by individuals for themselves” (Aeschliman 74).¹¹⁰ Nietzsche’s recreation of values places values in the subjective.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ In the Postmodern or late Modern period, Nietzsche’s aesthetic is still influential. Our goal for the maximization of pleasure (in clear contrast with Dostoevsky’s notion of suffering) is increasingly supported by new, personal technologies. With the rise of the personal computer and iPhone, we have devices that seek to maximize our pleasure and diminish pain, or at the very least, our social discomfort. Our technologies offer the false hope that we can overcome our pain (existential loneliness, which is ironically supported by the distance created through our constant use of technologies in lieu of embodied, human interaction). The prominence of pornography and its general acceptance in America attests to this growth. Moreover, American obsession with entertainment and the

Lewis recognized this belief creeping into the English educational system of his day. In *The Abolition of Man*, the philosophical counterpart to *That Hideous Strength*, Lewis subtitled the work, “Reflections on education with special reference to the teaching of English in the upper forms of schools.” In this work, Lewis combats the highly “progressive” positivist aim to reduce truth statements to the analytic and moral/value judgments to the subjective. Lewis begins by critiquing *The Control of Language: A Critical Approach to Reading and Writing* by Alec King and Martin Ketley wherein the two authors argue that statements of value are merely subjective reactions to external stimuli and do not hold objective merit. Under King and Metley’s subjectivism, English education will establish “firstly, that all sentences containing a predicate of value are statements about the emotional state of the speaker, and secondly, that all such statements are unimportant” (4). Lewis, here, shows the breakdown of the subjectivist framework; if all value statements are subjective akin to Quine’s “stimulations,” then they are all of equal, and thus, unimportant value; one cannot be better than another. King and Martin abandon the category of *ought* in favor of *is*. If one accepts that man is just a neurological / material being then there is no correct way one should look at a text, only the way one feels. Though “Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he *ought*” (13), King and Metley find this educational goal obsolete and favor more relativistic educational aims.

Highly concerned with aesthetic value, Lewis finds this materialistic and naturalistic

technologies that constantly entertain us—the smartphone, for one—reveals that our personal technologies have assumed the place of the sacred. Instead of looking to transcendence to find our self-consciousness, we stare into the fantasy frames in our smartphones to find our identity. For confirmation of this influence in America one need only look to the Black Friday trampling scandal in 2008 when a Wal-Mart employee was trampled to death by an over-zealous crowd of shoppers looking to buy the latest computer. With increasingly personal technologies, postmodern society takes subjectivism to the level of the sacred; self-creation is a pleasure grounded in our technological use.

¹¹¹ Not only in the subjective, but as Lewis recognizes, Nietzsche’s new values are effectively connected to the will to power: “For the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means, as we have seen, the power of some men to make other men what *they* please” (*The Abolition of Man* 59).

position absurdly reductionistic. How can one begin any sort of aesthetic evaluation without the existence of objective standards?¹¹² If one can only speak of how Homer's *Iliad* makes one feel, then what is the aim of literary evaluation? Further, what is the point of education, in teaching the student to make evaluations?¹¹³ Discovering the objective qualities—the good, the true, and the beautiful—of a text or of a work of art would be futile if man can only emotionally respond to the outside world.

It should be no surprise, then, that the N.I.C.E. seeks power over education; Feverstone seeks to enact the Institute's new myth through re-educating the masses to adopt its new scientific framework. Feverstone writes, "Then real education, including pre-natal education. A real education makes the patient what it wants infallibly; whatever he or his parents try to do about it. Of course, it'll have to be mainly psychological at first. But we'll get on to biochemical conditioning in the end and direct the manipulation of the brain" (42). For the Institute to successfully re-educate man under this new extreme subjectivism, it must begin from an early age. The "old" has to be abandoned for the "new," and it must begin with a complete re-education.¹¹⁴ Lewis harshly critiques the highly subjectivist tendency of scientism in part because he recognizes its implications for English education.

Nonetheless, Lewis' fear of subjectivism has larger implications for man than in aesthetics alone; subjectivism renders man incapable of living the "good" life or making morally

¹¹² Lewis' view of authorship is extremely important to note. He does not believe that authors can create "original" work in the modern sense; rather, he believes the creative act mirrors the originality of the Creator. Therefore, authors should view themselves as windows intended to be viewed *through* rather than studied and looked *at* (*The Personal Heresy* 23). The author is a window to the objective world; with this view of authorship, Lewis lays the groundwork for evaluative literary criticism; we can make objective literary evaluations only if an objective world and objective standards exist.

¹¹³ As Lothar Bredella makes clear, literary theory (post Lewis) continued in the subjectivist trajectory: David Bleich views the meaning of the text as completely dependent on the subject; Stanley Fish sees the text dependent on an interpretive community; and, Richard Rorty abandons all epistemological claims, arguing that the text seeks to aid "self-creation" (*Pragmatism and Literary Studies*)

¹¹⁴ It should come as no surprise that Chernyshevsky proposes the same thing in the 1860s, as I discussed in the previous chapter.

virtuous actions. Feverstone recognizes this when he argues that Mark must begin to relinquish the idea of the good life in order to see “how much of what you mistook for your thought was merely a by-product of your blood and nervous tissues” (258). With that idea as his premise, Feverstone argues that “[f]riendship is a chemical phenomenon; so is hatred” (258). If all of our values are subjective “epiphenomena” then we are stuck in an ethics of utility, pragmatism, or relativism. We can arrange organisms of the particular man and society to produce the optimum results, no doubt a reflection of Bentham’s “Greatest Happiness” principle. By giving into his scientism, Professor Frost disparages man’s ability to reason, and thus, his moral purpose. By applying his new “education” to himself, he strips himself of objective value. After the Institute’s plans are thwarted, Frost, in perhaps the darkest moment of the novel, follows his scientism to its logical extreme:

He did not know where he was going or what he was about to do. For many years he had theoretically believed that all which appears in the mind as motive or intention is merely a by-product of what the body is doing. But for the last year or so—since he had been initiated—he had begun to taste as fact what he had held in theory. Increasingly, his actions had been without motive. (357)

Frost views himself according to his own scientism and consequentially experiences an existential contradiction akin to the UG Man’s “hyper-consciousness.” He views himself as subject and object—becoming removed from his body:

Thus the Frost whose existence Frost denied watched his body go into the ante-room...Still not asking what he would do or why, Frost went to the garage. The whole place was silent and empty; the snow was thick on the ground by this. He

piled up all the inflammables he could think of together in the Objective Room.

Then he locked himself in by locking the outer door of the ante-room. (358)

In a state of divided consciousness, Frost enters the dark Objective Room—an underground chamber he created to purge man of all subjective feelings—with “that tiresome illusion, his consciousness, screaming in protest” (358). He pours gasoline into the Objective Room and lights a match, and not until this moment does he realize that “death itself might not after all cure the illusion of being a soul...He became able to know that he had been wrong from the beginning; that souls and personal responsibility existed. He half saw: he wholly hated” (358). In his final moments, Frost is ironically filled with the hate he perceived as chemical phenomena and which he denigrated throughout the novel (Rozema 184). As we can see, Lewis uses Frost to show the devolution of man when he is educated to believe that his entire existence is “epi-phenomenon.” The Objective Room is a place of death; only material objects, not men, can exist here.

Once again, Dostoevsky deals with the same recreation of values. In *Demons*, Kirillov follows through with a proto-Nietzschean recreation of values. He says, “If there is no God, then I am God...Man has done nothing but invent God, so as to live without killing himself” (618). Without God, man is existentially alone. Objective values do not exist. Fear of this recognition, according to Kirillov, keeps man from admitting the truth that God does not exist. Without the existence of God, man will be faced with the *absurd*—his existential loneliness in the face of a dark cosmos. Hence, Kirillov views himself as a man-god who can overcome his fear of death and the death of God: “Fear is man’s curse...But I will proclaim self-will, it is my duty to believe that I do not believe” (619). Instead of aligning with Camus’ absurd tragic figure—Sisyphus, who metaphorically “pushes the rock” against the reality of the absurd, i.e., lives in the

awareness of his existential absurdity—Kirillov gives into the absurdity of suicide and kills himself in a perverted man-god self-sacrifice. He convinces himself that his suicide will provide humanity with the freedom to renounce Christ and become “like gods.” However, in his final moments, Kirillov’s suicide is meaningless. He screams, “Now, now, now, now” (Dostoevsky 625) and behaves in a way that can be described as bestial until he finally pulls the trigger. His perverted suicide, like Frost’s, is strangely isolated and entirely ineffectual in creating a significant “new man.”

Frost’s dark suicide is the consummation of the death lurking throughout the Institute’s claim on man; his suicide in the Objective Room—a place of his own creation intended to destroy the subjective parts of his being—is ironic. When man fundamentally reshapes values according to his own scientific maxims, his enterprise collapses on itself. Frost’s view of the universe is fixed on destruction and death. In contrast, Lewis, a traditional rational theist, argues that society must return to the *Tao*—“the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of things the universe is and the kind of things we are” (*That Abolition of Man* 18). The doctrine of the *Tao* is universal, uniting the “Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental” beliefs alike. Unlike the N.I.C.E.’s conceptual framework, these “traditional” systems all affirm an objective reality and objective moral values. Further, Lewis shows that under the *Tao*, “Emotions and sentiments are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform” (19). Lewis recognizes that without a transcendent referent, man would be locked in his own head; he would not be able to make objective aesthetic or value evaluations, and thus his education would be futile.

For this reason, Lewis, like Aristotle, grounds his view of education in “first principles”

since every philosophy of truth requires an epistemological grounding (Scruton 4-6). Aristotle begins his *Physics* by explaining that the primary rational inquiry is to begin at the beginning, the first, most foundational causes—the origin (n.pag.). Aristotle's Unmoved Mover provides the foundational grounding for his *Physics*. Lewis, following Aristotle's first principles, grounds his foundation in *Logos*. Man is able to make rational, non-relativistic claims because his logic is grounded in *Logos* and it points to *Logos*—ultimate reality. This reality, if really true, defies the positivist belief that all non-analytic statements are merely feelings and cannot be grounded in objectivity. Thus, the positivists' aim to get as close to empirical certainty renders their own logic absurd. By using only their eyes, they lose a different kind of sight: "You can't go on 'seeing through' things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it. To 'see through' all things is the same as not to see" (*The Abolition of Man*).

In contrast to the Institute's scientific vision, Lewis urges man to see with a different kind of vision. In "Meditations in a Toolshed," Lewis recounts a day when he stood in a dark tool shed with the sunlight shining through a crack above the door. Observing the beam of light, Lewis realized that he could approach the beam in two different ways—by "looking *at*" the beam and "looking *along*" the beam. If he chose to look directly at the beam, he could see a myriad of dust particles floating and moving within the light's cylindrical beam. He could contemplate the particles, even try to count and compare them as an objective viewer. Accordingly, "contemplation" of the thing is impersonal, analytical, evaluative, and removed; it is "uninvolved knowledge" (Ward 17). However, if he chose to, he could bend his knee, dirtying his pants, and look along the beam; the dust particles would be overshadowed as his eyes glanced through the hole and viewed the sun. This looking along is personal and "committed

knowledge” (17). A boy who meets a beautiful girl and falls in love with her after seeing her warm and delicate smile is enjoying her presence—“looking along the sexual impulse” (212). A scientist who watches the entire scene unfold and analyzes how the boy is experiencing chemical and biological reactions is contemplating the scene—“looking at the sexual impulse” (212). Though the Institute’s framework allows only the latter vision, Lewis urges his readers to develop the first vision, one that looks along the beam of St. Anne’s-on-the-hill, the light of the earth.

Chapter Four: Conclusion and Solution

I have argued that the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. offer conceptual frameworks for human residency which are ultimately uninhabitable. These conceptual frameworks continue the post-Enlightenment rise of mechanical philosophy and the consequential breakdown of Christian conceptions of residency. Following the rise of nineteenth-century Western scientism, the Russian intelligentsia recognized the need to replace Christian authority with the new authority of science. Aware of this change, Dostoevsky prophesied that “new” Western science presented revolutionary views of nature, truth, and ultimately man. His prophesy was correct, as time shows; while Russia hoped for political revolution, the intelligentsia embodied this hope in the “new man.” However, Dostoevsky finds this new view of man ultimately destructive. By building a conceptual framework on a naturalistic philosophy of science, these new men would create residencies, most notably the Crystal Palace, that are uninhabitable, inhuman, and as Dostoevsky reveals, absurd. Though this residency’s new scientific view of man had sincere motivations to improve society for the “greater good,” Dostoevsky foresaw that, within this framework, the greater good was trivial, even dangerous because it robs man of his soul, and as Lewis argues, creates “men without chests” (*The Abolition of Man* 32)—men who are brains and viscera but who do not possess the tripartite soul or the ability to meaningfully communicate.

Moreover, these residencies, symbolized by the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E, stand as modern Towers of Babel; they reflect the attempt to bring heaven down to earth. In *Notes from Underground*, Dostoevsky, writing according to his dialogical aesthetic, shows that a scientific residency ironically does not allow for dialogue; it is monologic, in that it reduces man to physical laws, mathematics, and an ethics of utility. Since Dostoevsky is primarily concerned with how people dialogue within communities, he satirizes the Palace’s monologue because it

inhibits man from entering authentic community. The UG Man, through paradox and “hyper-consciousness,” shows that man cannot reside within the walls of the Palace. As such, Dostoevsky’s vision and terror of the Palace was prophetic. In *Notes from Underground*, Dostoevsky prophesies that the Crystal Palace will attempt to unite man into “one fold” under the guise of scientific progress. With the turn of the century, we see through the Pan-Slavic socialist attempts that Dostoevsky’s terror of the Palace was startlingly accurate.¹¹⁵

Writing nearly a century later, Lewis expresses a similar fear. In *That Hideous Strength*, the N.I.C.E. mirrors the Crystal Palace’s goal to found a utopian society. Like the Palace, the Institute offers a new scientific myth that includes a radical “new man” theory, complete with a utilitarian ethical system. However, though the Institute’s leaders believe their scientific society will be a utopia, it is a clear dystopia, a force of evil in the Orwellian sense. For this reason, both Dostoevsky and Lewis believe that man’s attempt to bring heaven to down to earth is ultimately destructive for man and earth—especially destructive to those who attempt it. Lewis shows that the N.I.C.E.’s conceptual framework replaces the Christian mythological picture with a naturalistic one; it deconstructs the medieval hierarchical picture and constructs a man-made Tower in its place based on a curious combination of science and devil worship. As the N.I.C.E. grows exponentially, it towers over Edgestow as a residency of perverted power. Though the Institute offers an alternative conceptual framework to the Western Christian conception, this framework cannot existentially support man; language, reason, and morality break down under this system, leaving man in complete darkness, a mirror to the modern view of the cosmos. Thus, to the degree that the novels show this new scientific framework, they try to present an optimistic vision. However, the Tower and its optimistic vision crumble down and men are scattered and isolated.

¹¹⁵ As mentioned earlier, the socialism of Lenin and Stalin gives credence to Dostoevsky’s prophetic terror.

Comparing the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. side-by-side reveals a substantive critique of these residencies' scientific conceptual framework. However, Dostoevsky and Lewis do not only satirize these frameworks. They also offer alternative conceptual frameworks for habitable human existence. They offer residencies that parallel their Trinitarian view of God, who communicates with man through three different Persons but as One; this communicative relationship is a picture of a conceptual residency where man can exist—where all parts exist in harmony. Dostoevsky shows that the Palace's Rational Egoism is deterministic and therefore monological; it does not allow for such a dialogue. Free will, which he believes is foundational for a meaningful dialogue, is not sustainable in the Palace. Therefore, Dostoevsky proposes suffering—the prison—as an alternative to the Palace. The prison is paradoxically a place of liberation; accepting suffering liberates one to develop dialogue and an anagogical vision of reality. The prison, therefore, is in direct contradiction to the utopian happiness of rational egoism since it mandates a free choice to accept one's guilt and to live in community—to affirm the needs of others before self and to become one with man. The Palace offers physical nourishment. The Prison offers spiritual pain, but this pain, according to Dostoevsky, brings about deeper, existential nourishment, one for the soul and for all mankind, one that brings true life.

Though the N.I.C.E.'s darkness is heavy throughout *That Hideous Strength*, it cannot overpower the light of St. Anne's, which Lewis offers as an alternative conceptual framework. Lewis doubly critiques the determinism of a naturalistic philosophy of science and recognizes the need for sacrificial ceremony. Without sacrifice—suffering—one cannot find his place in a welcoming residency. In light of this belief, Lewis maintains that man must realign himself within a Christian mythological hierarchy; he must find his place between nature and God in sacrificial

obedience, which is the relinquishing of one's will to power in order to serve the All-Powerful, others, and nature. Through the *Tao*, Lewis shows that there exists an objective world with objective values by which man can live. He believes that the body of Christ operates according to these principles to the fullest capacity. St. Anne's, a symbol of the body of Christ and of Christian mythological design, offers a residency where man fully exist, where language and reason have a purpose, and where Christ illuminates these activities. St. Anne's-on-the-hill shines over the darkness of the Institute, but in order for man to enter this community, he must bend his knee, and "look along" St. Anne's mythological hierarchy towards Christ, who is the center and source of light. When looking at St. Anne's, we can still see its light shining into this century and beyond.

Dostoevsky: A Place of Suffering vs. A Palace of Science

Dostoevsky satirizes the Crystal Palace according to his dialogical aesthetic, which, at its core, unites all voices in a critique of the Palace's conceptual framework. By presupposing a monologic view of man—that is, man understood as a completely material agent—the Palace is not a place where man can dialogue. Without the ability to dialogue, man is completely isolated from others and from God who, in Dostoevsky's view, is dialogical. The Crystal Palace, a place of human residence, offers man progress, but, built on the premise of scientism, admits no dialogue, and thus becomes absurdly regressive. Dostoevsky was highly aware of the Palace's claims on man. By reducing man to chemistry and physics—liquids, solids, and gases in motion—the Palace's conceptual framework abandons man's soul, and thus his ability to interact meaningfully and honestly with others.

The UG Man highlights the connection between dialogue and health and monologue and

death. Without dialogue man, like stagnant water, becomes motionless and eventually lifeless. In contrast, the running waters of dialogue can move man, and “whatever moves may rise” (Pevear xi). Dialogue is community. Community is built on love—an act of suffering—and suffering brings life. For Dostoevsky, love is suffering because it requires one to painfully diminish the ego and take on the sufferings of others. By entering Christian community, one chooses to put others first, which requires that the individual ego suffer for the better of the whole. In contrast, scientism is monologue. Monologue is pure ego, and ego leads to death.¹¹⁶ This distinction is why the most sullen and isolated characters in Dostoevsky are those trapped in scientism—a monologue—and are the most perturbed. In *Crime and Punishment*, for instance, Raskolnikov’s “schisms” attest to his openness to the moving waters of dialogue; whereas Svidrigailov, Raskolnikov’s foil, is unable to dialogue. Accordingly, Raskolnikov’s schisms contrast Svidrigailov’s stasis; his schisms reveal that he is not static and has the ability to dialogue with others. In contrast to Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov is trapped in monologue and his view of eternity as a “village bathhouse, covered with soot, with spiders in all the corners,” (Dostoevsky 289) testifies to his stasis; his monologue is a place where humanity isn’t welcome.¹¹⁷ As such, Dostoevsky wants us to see that dialogue allows man the ability to step outside of the Total System of his material conditions and connect man with the source of dialogue, *Logos*.

¹¹⁶ Lewis agrees and recognizes that hell is choosing Self—a clear contrast to Sartre’s “Hell is other people.” In *The Screwtape Letters*, the narrator writes, “We must picture hell as a state where everyone is perpetually concerned about his own dignity and advancement, where everyone has a grievance, and where everyone lives with the deadly serious passions of envy, self-importance, and resentment” (xi).

¹¹⁷ Svidrigailov is one of Dostoevsky’s most terrifying characters. He appears after Rodya’s fourth nightmare, and as one critic has explained, “Svidrigailov is Rodya’s nightmare” (Shaw 138). Svidrigailov has lost his dynamism. He is static and overcome by a 60s emphasis on order and calculation; though there is overwhelming speculation that he physically abused his wife to death, he pardons himself based on the experts: “It was all performed in perfect order and with complete precision. . . . didn’t I contribute to this whole. . . . misfortune, somehow morally, through irritation or something like that? But I concluded that this, too, was positively impossible” (Dostoevsky 282). Since the medical experts confirmed, with precision and order, that he was not to blame for her death, he believes that he is morally free from abuse. Not only is his account of the situation unreliable, but also his tone evinces his own moral depravity; he is exactly the kind of person who would do such a deed and walk away without guilt. Unlike Rodya, Svidrigailov does not have the capability for both good and evil; his dialectic has reached an ending point.

Since the Palace's conceptual framework views man as a pure material being, it assumes that man can be satisfied so long as he is physically nourished. Accordingly, the 1860s Russian intelligentsia equates progress with earthly comfort. The Palace assumes that man will be satisfied so long as he does not hunger, and so the Palace offers man the hope that it can acquire food more effectively, that it can protect his cities, and that it can overcome the effects of the Fall, including one of its most immediate and anarchic effects, the breakdown of language at the Tower of Babel. The Palace, then, offers man unity so long as he conforms to his egoistic impulse. In Chernyshevsky's *What is to Be Done?*, Kirsanov embodies the rational egoistic impulse. A benefactor, he visits an archetypal Russian harlot and alleviates her consumption and pain out of his impulse for "brotherly love." Although meeting one's physical needs is an imperative within a Christian framework, he overlooks her spiritual need, which, for Dostoevsky, is of higher importance. He oversimplifies the prostitute to the 1860s view of man as a purely material being, and thus, he mistakes the maximization of pleasure with true freedom. In *Notes From Underground*, Dostoevsky uses the UG Man to satirize Kirsanov's egoistic impulse for "brotherly love." In a parody scene, the UG Man gives Liza money to humiliate her, making us realize that "[i]n this relationship, the UG Man is the diseased party; his inability to love is as incurable as Nasenka's consumption" (Barstow 27) and no different from Kirsanov's "love" since neither is really love. Dostoevsky satirizes Kirsanov in order to show that an ethical system built on ego is fractured; the UG Man could just as easily humiliate the prostitute as heal her. Moreover, the UG Man shows man will act against the rational egoistic impulse for freedom.

In *The Brothers Karamazov*, the Inquisitor makes the same mistake as Kirsanov. The "Authority" of scientism, according to Dostoevsky, confuses earthly pleasure for authentic freedom. Ivan's myth is similar to the myth of scientism, in that it mistakes bread for freedom. In

this myth, Christ walks the streets, heals the blind, raises the dead, and as expected, causes a commotion within the village. Soon after these events, the Inquisitor, a symbol of distorted earthly authority, imprisons Jesus and faults him for affirming human freedom. The Inquisitor recognizes the difficulty of freedom since “nothing has ever been more insufferable for man and for human society than freedom! But do you see these stones in this bare, scorching desert? Turn them into bread and mankind will run after you like sheep, grateful, and obedient” (Dostoevsky 252). Here, the Inquisitor faults Christ for not undoing the consequences of the Fall by satisfying man’s physical needs. Christ could exert a will to power and demand man’s allegiance, “[b]ut you did not want to deprive man of freedom and rejected the offer, for what sort of freedom is it, you reasoned, if obedience is bought with loaves of bread” (252). Even though Christ has the power to satisfy meet man’s physical needs he chooses to preserves man’s freedom to obey or disobey.

Therefore, in Christ’s place stands the Inquisitor, a false Christ who offers earthly bread without spiritual nourishment—a monologue instead of dialogue. Christ could have chosen to take complete control over man and demand worship, but he resisted this temptation in the wilderness. Instead of building an earthly kingdom, Christ chose the heavenly kingdom, which is both immanent—through the Incarnation and the body of Christ—but also transcendent, a hope to come in the New Jerusalem. The Inquisitor delights in Christ’s decision because it allows him to create his own earthly kingdom: “In place of your temple a new edifice will be raised, the terrible Tower of Babel will be raised again” (253), and the inhabitants of this place will cry, “Feed us, for those who promised us fire from heave did not give it” (253). The Inquisitor, therefore, stands as the grand figure of the Crystal Palace, a false Christ.

Dostoevsky, then, uses the UG Man to highlight the intrinsic flaw in the Palace’s bread

offering. For Dostoevsky, the “Authority” of the Palace—a monologue—prevents man from true redemption, which is only possible through an act of suffering on behalf of the individual for the community. By becoming the flesh and blood of the people, Christ offers the freedom to choose obedience and enter into the sacrificial ceremony with others. Dostoevsky establishes the necessity of freedom for this ceremony through a contrast between the UG Man and Raskolnikov. Like Kirsanov, the UG Man and Raskolnikov encounter Russian prostitutes who offer them love, and both are presented with the choice to reciprocate or disparage that love. For the UG Man, “[w]hen Liza comes to his house the tables are turned. She offers him love, not ‘fine sentiments’ but he is humiliated by the threat of her power over him and retreats into the safety of his cynicism” (Barstow 27). Liza, an embodiment of self-sacrifice and grace, dialogues with the UG Man, but he ultimately rejects it. He is not ready to embrace his need for suffering, and so he humiliates her and rejects her love, exerting his will to power. Since the UG Man has chosen the path to the underground, he is unable to dialogue with Liza, and without dialogue, he is isolated and will become static. Unfortunately for the UG Man, a community, based on shared sacrifice, requires a level of vulnerability by all of its members. The UG Man refuses to enter dialogue with Liza, accepting instead the lofty ideals of the 1840s intelligentsia and the scientism of the 1860s. He grounds his intellectual commitment in the idealism and hope of social utopia instead of in the embodied Liza; his “love” is ultimately ego.

What the UG Man loses, redemption resulting from genuine dialogue within a sacrificial community, Raskolnikov finds in dialogue with Sonya. Like Liza, Sonya offers Raskolnikov authentic dialogue. Though he has been consumed with his “new man” theory, he shows the potential for active, authentic love. Sonya embodies this alternative, and through dialogue offers him the choice to embrace active love—a subversion of his “new man” theory. Raskolnikov’s

theory is grounded in the will to power, whereas Christian love requires suffering and the belittling of one's ego. Once again, it is important to note that Dostoevsky establishes Raskolnikov with the potential for sacrificial love; he is not a static character. However, though his mother reminds him of his Christian heritage, and he admits that he believes in the story of Lazarus and the Apocalyptic vision of the New Jerusalem (22, 236), he converts only when he witnesses Sonya's sacrificial love for her family and her willingness to suffer alongside him in Siberia. Her constant dialogue, and his willingness to enter dialogue, builds a foundation for a welcoming residency.

Sonya is able to offer dialogue to Raskolnikov only because she has first embodied suffering in her own community. Since her father, Marmeladov, wastes her family's money in alcoholic bouts, Sonya prostitutes herself in order to feed her family. She embraces suffering—the prison of prostitution—so her family can eat. And though her actions violate her Russian universal ethic, she transcends the universal ethical code and enters the realm of the absolute.¹¹⁸ Sonya's radical sacrifice defies the Palace's conceptual framework because she acts out of sacrificial love, not rational egoism. As such, the parallel between her name and *sophia* (wisdom) is intentional. She is a complex Christian symbol, and “[i]t is possible to live the fullest life only when in harmony with these symbols; wisdom is a return to them... Science and these symbols are incommensurables” (Gibian 995). The wisdom of suffering is foolishness to the scientific framework that operates on pragmatic considerations, but for Dostoevsky, this foolishness is the greatest wisdom.¹¹⁹

As an embodiment of sacrificial love, Sonya becomes the catalyst for Raskolnikov's

¹¹⁸ She essentially becomes a Knight of Faith, as did Abraham by conforming to the Absolute over the universal. Kierkegaard makes it clear that Abraham's dialogue with and obedience to God is what propels him into the Absolute.

¹¹⁹ Here we can see a connection to St. Paul's writing that "...the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God" (1 Cor. 1.18)

redemption. She begs him to run to the crossroads and kiss the earth so he can reconnect with a proper view of the earth, humanity, and himself. And despite the fact that he responds to her advice, Raskolnikov's dialectic does not end here.¹²⁰ Even in the Epilogue, he shows signs of his former self. The change, though, is that his obedience to and dialogue with Sonya reconnects him with earth; he is no longer living in the abstractions and principles of the 1860s conceptual framework; he humbles himself and can see the humanity in those he previously disparaged. Hence, Dostoevsky wants us to see that dialogue is foundational to a proper understanding of man and the earth. Without dialogue, man is cut off from the "soil" and from other people. Once again, it is important to remember that Liza offers the UG Man the same dialogue but that he chooses to enter the underground instead. As such, Liza's love for the UG Man parallels Sonya's because she offers sacrificial love. By reaching out to the UG Man, she shows a willingness to suffer and dialogue with him.

Elder Zosima understands the necessity of dialogical truth, both ontologically and epistemologically, and Dostoevsky uses him as a parallel to Liza as one who offers personal, engaged dialogue. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Zosima consistently communes with Alyosha and those less fortunate. In a conversation with a young, Russian peasant boy, we see that his dialogue with others and God gives him an appropriate analogical vision of nature and man's relation to it:

We fell to talking about the beauty of God's world and about its great mystery.

Every blade of grass, every little beetle, every ant, every golden bee, everything so amazingly knows its own course even though it has no mind: it witnesses

God's mystery and is itself continually fulfilling it. And I saw the heart of the dear

¹²⁰ What I mean by this is that he continues to vacillate between selfishness and selflessness; as a complex character, he is never fully converted until the final scene. However, even then, we see that Raskolnikov will always have the freedom to choose self or God.

youth was filled with enthusiasm; he confessed to me that he loved the forest and the forest birds. He was a bird-catcher; he understood all their calls and could bring to him any bird he wanted. “I know of nothing better than to be in the forest,” he said, “everything is good.” “That is true,” he replied, “Everything is good and wonderful, because everything is the truth.” And I said to him, “Look at a horse, a great animal which is close to man, or at an ox which feeds man, and works for him, an animal that is bowed down and pensive. Look at their faces: what gentleness! What lack of malice there is in their faces! What trust and what beauty! It is touching, even, to realise that they are without sin; for everything is perfect; everything, apart from man, is sinless, and Christ was with them even before he was with us.” “But surely,” asks the boy, “how can it be that Christ is with them?” How can it be otherwise,” I tell him, “for the word is for all, for all creation and for all creatures. Every little leaf strives towards the word, sings praises to God, weeps to Christ unknown to itself, fulfills this by the mystery of its sinless existence.” (16)

In this dialogical encounter, Zossima recognizes the beauty of nature and the sinfulness of man; these two stand in tension with one another but both point to Christ—the source of all beauty and redemption.¹²¹ Thus, Zossima is able to offer Alyosha authentic community just like Sonya offers Raskolnikov community. Zossima and Sonya are important parallel characters to Liza because both offer open dialogue and an anagogical vision to those with whom they commune.

Though Liza offers this dialogue to the UG Man, he ultimately refuses this dialogue. For this reason, we must compare the UG Man with Raskolnikov to see Dostoevsky’s solution to the

¹²¹ Thus, Dostoevsky reestablishes the sacred in nature: “Dostoevsky’s attitude to nature confronts us with a paradox: on the one hand ideological ecstasy; on the other - terror, or at the very least descriptive awkwardness and reticence” (Peace 71).

Palace's monologue. Raskolnikov's and Sonya's relationship has considerable parallels to the UG Man's and Liza's, as Dostoevsky himself views their relationships similarly. Through Sonya we see that Dostoevsky calls man to abandon the "new" scientific view of man and return to the "old" Christian conception. As George Gibian explains, Sonya is an embodiment of many of the traditional Russian Christian and pagan symbols before the 1860s rise of scientism. As this embodiment, she urges Raskolnikov to return to a pre-1960s conception of man: "Love for Sophia is generalized ecstatic love for all creation, so that the images of flowers, greenness, landscape, the river, air, the sun, and water can be subsumed in the concept of Sophia and figuratively in the person of Sonya, the embodiment of the concept" (994). Love for all of creation is not Razumikhin's scientific "love" founded on ego; rather, it is a dialogical love, substantiated through suffering, and only realized in the context of sacrificial community. Hence, Raskolnikov must "bow to the crossroads" (Dostoevsky 420) and take on suffering before he can come to a complete view of nature and man. When he does so, he develops the proper anagogical vision of nature and man, which stand as reflections of Christ.

Like Lewis, who establishes St. Anne's as a clear contrast to the N.I.C.E., Dostoevsky establishes the prison—a place of suffering—as the contrast to the Palace. The UG Man refuses Liza's life-giving dialogue because he does not want to enter the prison of suffering; he would rather preserve his will to power than undergo the humbling act of suffering. As Frank reminds us, the Crystal Palace—an earthly institution—is incapable of providing the redemption man needs in order to live fully. Hence, all institutions, including the Palace, "must clash with Christian love" (410). For this reason, Dostoevsky uses single characters as voices of dialogue. For Raskolnikov, embracing prison—a place of suffering in direct contrast with the Palace—leads to spiritual health. Freely entering suffering is key for the prison's conceptual framework

because it shows a penitence of heart and a willingness to accept responsibility one's transgressions. Though the prison's framework may seem bleak, Dostoevsky uses Sonya as a picture of grace. When we enter suffering, we will always have dialogue with those who have done the same and who can support and empathize with us. As we see, Sonya willingly suffers in Siberia alongside Raskolnikov and strengthens his will to accept the prison sentence; her continual dialogue with him, even when he is behind prison walls, gives him a new anagogical vision. From behind the prison bars, Raskolnikov envisions a field where "[t]here was freedom, there a different people lived, quite unlike those here, there time itself seemed to stop, as if the centuries of Abraham and his flocks had not passed" (Dostoevsky 549). Paradoxically, from behind the prison of his suffering, he has a vision of freedom, where man and beast co-exist through love, where his imagination is baptized with a vision of a New Earth.

This vision causes Raskolnikov to finally embrace his suffering. By suffering with him, Sonya gives Raskolnikov the grace he needs to become aware of his own need for suffering; she loves him so that he may love:

How it happened he himself did not know, but suddenly it was as if something lifted him and flung him down at her feet. He wept and embraced her knees...But all at once...she understood everything. Infinite happiness lit up in her eyes; she understood, and for her there was no longer any doubt that he loved her, loved her infinitely. (549)

Here, Dostoevsky makes clear the connection between humbly bowing and love; without the embrace of another person, man cannot actually love. Without dialogue, man cannot escape his ego. When Raskolnikov finally embraces his suffering, he becomes aware of her suffering: "He was thinking of her. He remembered how he had constantly tormented her and torn her heart;

remembered her poor, thin little face; but he was almost not even tormented by these memories: he knew by what infinite love he would now redeem all her sufferings” (550). And the two finally become one: “They were both pale and thin, but in those pale, sick faces there already shone the dawn of a renewed future, of a complete resurrection into a new life. They were resurrected by love; the heart of each held infinite sources of life for the heart of the other” (550). Sonya’s dialogue catalyzes Raskolnikov’s departure from the Palace’s residency. In Sonya, Raskolnikov finds authentic community, which man can freely enter through embracing suffering. Sonya’s dialogue is impossible within the walls of the Palace. Man must step outside and into the prison so that he may see the light.

St. Anne’s: A Light on a Hill

In contrast to the N.I.C.E., St. Anne’s offers a conceptual framework where man can be home—a sacred place where grace, not power, provides the structural integrity. Immediately apparent is Lewis’s allusion to St. Anne whose name in Hebrew means “grace” or “favor” (Kevin Night “St. Anne”). Lewis establishes St. Anne’s as a fictional embodiment of grace and a picture of the body of Christ. The body, the bride of Christ, is foundationally stable only when it mirrors Christ’s sacrificial act, which is why one New Testament writer equates light—health, stability—with love: “Anyone who loves their brother and sister lives in the light, and there is nothing in them to make them stumble. But anyone who hates a brother or sister is in the darkness and walks around in the darkness” (1 John 2.10-11). This mutual, shared love radiates from St. Anne’s as the manor stands on a hill, a double allusion to Christ’s Sermon on the Mount: “You are the light of the world. A city set upon a hill cannot be hidden” (Mat. 5.14). Set upon a hill, St. Anne’s light shines over the darkness of the N.I.C.E. Hence, Lewis establishes St.

Anne's in opposition to the darkness of the N.I.C.E., showing that this conceptual residency, in contrast the Institute, welcomes man to become existentially filled. The light of St. Anne's can be seen when Jane retreats here after her nightmare of Alcansan's decapitation. She meets Mrs. Dimble who directs her to Miss Ironwood, and though Jane is initially skeptical, she eventually takes residence at St. Anne's where grace slowly transforms her from a lonely and bitter wife to a loving and welcoming member of the community.

Lewis shapes St. Anne's embodiment of grace according to a medieval mythological view of hierarchy. Although the Institute disparages the medieval conception of the universe and replaces it with a new, monologic myth, St. Anne's embraces the traditional view—not in historical accuracy but in spiritual essence. The Director of the Manor, Elwin Ransom, is the Trilogy's early protagonist who travels to Malacandra and Perelandra in the first two installments. In *That Hideous Strength*, he has become the Pendragon—King—of *Logres* and is the direct descendent of King Arthur. As the Director of St. Anne's, he is also in communication with the Oyeresu — medieval angels, or Intelligences, who rotate in love for the Divine God (Copleston 315). Accordingly, the community at St. Anne's forms a hierarchical structure, where Ransom and the Oyeresu are under direct spiritual authority of God and are the clear spiritual authorities over the community. Like the celestial bodies of the medieval hierarchy, every individual member of St. Anne's has a fitting place; all members of the community, animals and men alike, relate to one another, not in perverted power like the Institute's members, but in service.

The contrast between the Institute's scientific framework and St. Anne's mythological framework can be clearly seen by man's relationship to nature, most notably, animals. In the Institute's scientific framework, nature is determined by how useful it is; nature is only valuable

to the Institute if it increases its power. For this reason, the Institute subjects animals to ruthless experimentation because the leaders want to exercise a “man-god” authority over nature.

Contrastingly, St. Anne’s cherishes and relates to animals, symbolizing a prelapsarian harmony where man, in dominion over nature, adds value to nature by tending to and naming the animals.

The distinction between dominion and power is its source; Christ bestows St. Anne’s with a balanced and contingent dominion over nature; it is a gift that can be as easily taken as it was given by the All-Powerful. In contrast, the man-god is built on the will to power over nature.

Lewis shows how the different frameworks shape man’s view of nature and his relationship to animals. After Merlin liberates the animals from the Institute’s vivisectionist laboratory, a place that cuts and devalues, the creatures begin ascending St. Anne’s in a picture of harmonious alignment; elephants and animals of all kinds return to their proper place in relation to the human residents and angels of St. Anne’s. The Director recognizes the profundity of this moment and calls attention to the medieval hierarchy: “We are now as we ought to be—between the angels who are our elder brothers and the beasts who are our jesters, servants and playfellows” (Lewis 378). With the Oyeresu in the attic above and the beasts outside, man stands in perfect relation to others under God and in dominion over nature, an extension of the circumstances on Perelandra.

In order for this mythological picture to function, man must be willing and obedient to find his place. Lewis recognizes that love requires obedience on part of the individual, and even though the Institute’s framework disparages “obedience,” the Director explains, “But you see obedience and rule are more like a dance than a drill” (149). When man and beast are in obedience to God, they are fulfilling a picture of grace, equal sacrifice, and proportion like a harmonious dance. As such, this dance reflects the medieval cosmological picture where Intelligences dance in love for God in rotating circles (Copleston 315). In contrast to the

N.I.C.E., which functions on power, the community at St. Anne's operates according to sacrificial love for God, humanity, and nature. As Wolfe explains, "Lewis maintains that all relationships which are governed by love, and so transcend the allure of power for its own sake, should embrace hierarchical order—especially friendships, familial relationships, learning communities, and the church" (179). Lewis's hierarchy of relationships is informed by medieval hierarchy where all stars and planets align in relation to God, the center of the universe. Lewis highlights the importance of sacrificial obedience before finding love; recognizing one's place in the universe—under God and in service to men—allows man to love.

Hence, man's failure to love is effectively a failure to accept one's position as a creaturely being within the hierarchy. For this reason, the Director says, "You do not fail in obedience through lack of love, but have lost love because you never attempted obedience" (147). In order for man to fully love, he must act in obedience to God and in service to his fellow man and nature. Though the modern man sees obedience restrictively, Lewis views obedience as a greater freedom—not a freedom *from* action but a freedom *to* fulfillment. Here, we must explore Lewis's Neoplatonic conception of love and view it in relation to *sehnsucht*. As Caroline J. Simon explains, "Lewis's view of the nature of 'Agape,' or 'Charity,' is much closer to...Augustine's '*caritas* motif'" (154). For Augustine, love "is always longing; if longing rightly ordered by our longing for God, it is *caritas*. If it is disordered or inordinate longing—longing that treats creatures as more important than the Creator—it is concupiscence" (154). Love, in Lewis's system, necessitates longing since man is not in the immediate presence of God. Accordingly, everything man does should be motivated out of love and pointed to God, who is love, and who, in turn, enables him to fully love.

The unity of St. Anne's forms a remarkable contrast to the N.I.C.E.'s fractured scientific

unity. The N.I.C.E. replaces the medieval mythological picture with a “new” scientific myth. Like the group who tried to scale the heavens in the Genesis narrative, the Institute’s leaders try to build a modern Tower of Babel instead of finding their place in the Christian mythological picture. However, though the Institute’s new myth deconstructs this hierarchy, it does so without constructing a foundationally stable replacement. The replacement it offers—a scientific myth—ultimately crumbles since its foundation has no structural integrity. This breakdown can be seen by the way language, reason, and morality suffer within the Institute’s conceptual framework; like the Crystal Palace, the N.I.C.E. is uninhabitable. However, in St. Anne’s mythical framework, man’s language, reasoning, and moral capabilities have a foundation and structural integrity. Once again, we must remember that Lewis does not factually support the medieval hierarchical account. Rather, he affirms the account’s spiritual essence; it grounds man’s language and reason in *Logos*—which stands outside the Total System; moreover, *Logos* affirms the existence of objective values, which also stand outside the naturalistic system.

By embracing the Word, St. Anne’s conceptual framework offers a residency where man is a complete being according to original earthly design, and thus can speak, reason, and exist in a moral capacity. After rising from Bracton Wood, Merlin visits St. Anne’s, and it is here that the community experiences pure language through the Oyeresu: “For this was the language spoken before the Fall and beyond the Moon and the meanings were not given to the syllables by chance, or skill, or long tradition, but truly inherent in them as the shape of the great Sun is inherent in the little waterdrop” (229). The Oyeresu’s language, spoken by Merlin, is a complete, symbiotic relationship of form and content, one that humanity has never seen. The sign and signifier are not arbitrarily matched; they are purely connected. Ransom and Merlin’s interaction with the Oyeresu sparks a language revival at St. Anne’s, full of dance imagery and excitement:

Now of a sudden they all began talking loudly at once, each, not contentiously but delightedly, interrupting the others. A stranger coming into the kitchen would have thought they were drunk, not soddently but gaily drunk: would have seen heads bent close together, eyes dancing, an excited wealth of gesture. What they said, none of the party could ever afterwards remember... If not plays upon words, yet certainly plays upon thoughts, paradoxies, fances, anecdotes, theories laughingly advanced yet (on consideration) well worth taking seriously, had flowed from them and over them with dazzling prodigality... such eloquence, such melody (song could have added nothing to it), such toppling structures of double meaning, such skyrockets of metaphor and allusion. (321)

In a meeting of joy, the group engages one another, not as “stimulations,” but as purely embodied beings who transcend positivistic subjectivism and authentically engage with one another. As Lewis makes clear, this discourse of metaphor, wit, and poetic language is the closest on earth man will ever come to pure language; it engages not only the head, but also man’s chest—his tripartite soul. These moments, when man is under the angels and in community with others, are the closest to fullness of joy and love man can experience on earth; he has stepped outside of self and created a space for others to inhabit.¹²² Through this scene we can see that stepping outside of self requires a forgetfulness of self. Thus, in this dance of language, the group of participators cannot recall the particulars of the evening because they are in ecstatic and selfless love for one another. Their forgetfulness of the night’s details attests to their mindfulness for one another. Jane learns this lesson at St. Anne’s when she says, “We weren’t meant to see ourselves” (362) in a comment about mirrors, which send back an image of oneself. After spending time in St. Anne’s conceptual framework, Jane realizes that she is most

¹²² Here we see the glorious paradox of *kenosis* as exemplified in Philippians 2:7.

herself when she is not herself; she is most herself when she is in obedience to God and in service to men.¹²³

Although Jane is fortunate enough to find her place in St Anne's, Mark struggles to find his place until he fully steps inside the Institute's and sees the dark, uninhabitable residency. At the climax of Mark's involvement with the N.I.C.E. he is accused of murder and sent to the Objective Room to be fully purged of all subjectivity. In the Objective Room, Mark is subjected to a series of "petty obscenities" (Lewis 309) in a spotted room. With scientific "objectivity," Frost experiments on Mark as a test-subject for the Institute's "new man" theory; if Mark can be purged of his emotional make-up, he can be the progenitor for a new scientific man. However, as the tests progress Mark detours from Frost's plan. Staring into Frost's bleak, cold conceptual framework—a view of the universe in direct contradiction to St. Anne's— Mark becomes aware of the *Tao* and the existence of an objective world and values:

The idea of the Straight or Normal which had occurred to him during his visit to this room, grew stronger and more solid in his mind till it became a kind of mountain. He had never before known what an Idea meant; he had always thought till now that they were things inside one's own head. But now, when his head was continually attacked and often completely filled with the clinging corruption of the training, this Idea towered above him—something which obviously existed quite independently of himself and had hard rock surfaces which would not give, surfaces he could cling to. (310)

¹²³ Lewis connects the act of reading great literature (a composition of language) with other transcendent acts: "But in reading great literature I become a thousand men and yet remain myself. Like the night sky in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad eyes, but it is still I who see. Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more myself than when I do" (*An Experiment in Criticism* 141). Hence, we can see that Lewis connects language, worship, morality, and experiential knowledge with transcendence; the emptying of oneself allows one to be filled to a greater capacity—a paradox of human existence enacted by One who died paradoxically so that He may live in glorious resurrection.

In this moment, Mark's beholds the *Tao* as the most real Idea; he is given an anagogical vision to see beyond the Objective Room, outside his "stimulations," and into the existence of objective values.

With this new vision, Mark develops a more accurate vision of himself. Lewis, in this way, connects the necessity of a correct view of nature with a correct view of oneself. He most fully fleshes this idea out through his enjoyment and contemplation distinction. In "Meditations from a Toolshed," Lewis differentiates "looking at" and "looking along" a beam of light. The first type of vision is contemplative, analytic, scientific, and monologic; the second type of vision is experiential, personal, enjoyable and dialogical. The second type of vision allows one to dialogue with another person and transcend oneself; it can be likened to the ecstasy one has when in love. Accordingly, Lewis complements Dostoevsky's view of dialogical truth because he shows that scientific knowledge alone does not allow one to look along the beam, out of the door, and into the light of the sun. Therefore, he finds anagogical vision—"looking along"—necessary to properly seeing the mythological picture where Christ is the center and illuminates the universe with love. Without this anagogical vision, which is incommensurable with scientism, man cannot baptize his imagination with the Christian mythological picture.

By developing an anagogical vision, Mark identifies his own waywardness and motivation for power and the contrast Jane and the community of St. Anne's offers. As Wolfe explains, St. Anne's manor makes it clear that "the correct exercise of power requires a common submission and directedness towards a shared good (and, ultimately, God)" (177). St. Anne's conceptual framework affirms the individual by placing him in the context of the community; when the individual prioritizes a "shared good" with others, he is most fully human. However, though the N.I.C.E. offers a "shared good" through utilitarian ethics, it excludes the necessity of

sacrificial obedience. As a result, the Institute's ethical system leads to a perverted view of man and the drive to be "like God." By entering the Institute's framework, Mark grows in awareness of the Institute's darkness and the need for sacrificial obedience. As Wolfe explains, "Lewis believes the essence of the Fall to be precisely the turning away from the directedness and a turning away instead towards love of power for its own sake, i.e. towards the untruth that human beings are self-sufficient, that they can be 'like God' in power, rather than like him in will self-abandonment" (177). Without sacrificial obedience to others and God, the Institute's ethical system offers ostensible hope; in reality, this conceptual framework leads to darkness and destruction. After entering the Objective Room, Mark is able to see his own drive to be "like God" and how destructive this drive is for man. "Looking at" the Objective Room gives Mark the motivation to "look along" a different conceptual residency.

Lewis uses circle imagery to highlight Mark's progression back into the mythological hierarchy. For instance, it is his desire to be on the "inside" of the scientific *circle* at the Institute that leads Mark to the Progressive Circle and eventually the Objective Room. While in the Objective Room, Frost explains the purpose of the Room, which is to "...promote objectivity. A *circle* bound together by subjective feelings of mutual confidence and liking would be useless" (Lewis 255). The Institute's intellectual circle is united by their shared, scientific myth. However, after they manipulate and accuse Mark of murder, he realizes that this circle is perverted and incomplete: "For he now thought that with all his life-long eagerness to reach an inner *circle* he had chosen the wrong circle. Jane was where she belonged. He was going to be admitted only out of kindness" (358). After coming to an awareness of the *Tao*—"the Straight, the Normal" (310), Mark has a referent by which he can judge the Institute's circle.¹²⁴ He

¹²⁴ It is no surprise that Lewis uses circle imagery to describe man's innate awareness of the Good in *Mere Christianity*.

realizes that Jane had chosen to the right circle at St. Anne's—a place where kindness and love form the structural integrity. As Lewis makes clear, the circle of St. Anne's operates under the medieval conception of love. Once again, Aristotle claimed that star and planet clusters exist in sphere, all of which rotate in harmony with one another by love and desire for the First Mover (Copleston, 315). What motivates the cyclical process are immaterial beings within each of the spheres called Intelligences who strive to emulate the spirituality of the First Mover, but incapable of true emulation, move in perfect circles—the closest idea to perfection in medieval thought. Mark's anagogical vision allows him to see that Institute is an incomplete and fractured circle, that he needs to look along a different residency.

The circle at St. Anne's illuminates over Edgestow and draws him back. As he gets closer, "Everything became a mist; and then, as the lights in the west vanished, this mist grew softly luminous in a different place—above him, as though the light rested on St. Anne's" (Lewis 380). When he finally arrives to St. Anne's, he is greeted by a large figure who is "...not human...divinely tall, part naked, part wrapped in a flame-coloured robe" (382). This figure is Venus, who has descended into St. Anne's. As the goddess of love and fertility, Venus sets the scene for Mark and Jane to meet with "sweet smells and bright fires, with food and wine and a rich bed" (382). Mark is overwhelmed by the beauty as he enters the room, patiently awaiting Jane who also experiences rich beauty when she descends from the Director's room to meet Mark. She walks "into the liquid light and supernatural warmth of the garden and across the wet laws (birds were everywhere)...going down all the time, down to the lodge, descending the ladder of humility" (382). Though Jane is surrounded by beauty, she is still aware of the sacrificial reality of her duty: "Then she thought of her obedience and the setting of each foot before the other became a kind of sacrificial ceremony" (382). Her obedience to God allows her

to love Mark and become aware “of all his sufferings” (382). Here is Lewis’s picture of grace; following Christ, Jane becomes aware of Mark’s sufferings and prepares to face them—to carry a burden that Mark could not carry himself. Her obedience to God makes her aware of her need to show grace to Mark in sacrificial ceremony.

As Mark enters the marriage bed with Jane, we can see the overarching purpose of St. Anne’s, which is to mirror Christ’s marriage to the body. St. Anne’s conceptual residency is important because it affirms the entire body, not just the head or the chest. In this framework, members are not “men without chests” (Lewis 26). Rather, they are existentially whole individuals and fully capable of communing with other members of the body. Here again, we see the metaphysical oneness and plurality that reflects the One Trinity; the three parts of the trinity exist separately but communicate and act as one. Lewis makes clear that the unity of the body is only possible through sacrificial ceremony. Christ’s commitment to his bride is an act of grace that reaches into earth but also extends into the final age to come. Thus, Jane graciously welcomes Mark back even though he wanders into the Institute’s residency. Through St. Anne’s Jane learns the necessity of grace, which itself incommensurable with scientism. Her sacrifice defies both the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E.’s ethics of utility, which views ethics in the abstract: “You see, MacPhee, if one is thinking simply of goodness in the abstract, one soon reaches the fatal idea of something standardized—some common kind of life to which all nations out to progress” (370). Jane’s sacrificial welcoming embodies Christ’s sacrifice, and by welcoming Mark into this residency, Jane allows Mark to dialogue, to step outside the monologic scientific myth and into dialogue with God.

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