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Monotheism, Polytheism, Monolatry, or Henotheism?
Toward an Assessment of Divine Plurality in the Hebrew Bible

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Israel’s view of God and his relationship to other divine beings in the Hebrew Bible has long been the subject of scholarly debate. The dominant critical consensus since the late nineteenth century holds that Israel’s faith evolved from polytheism or henotheism to monotheism. Passages in the Hebrew Bible that assume the existence of other gods are compared to other passages that put forth the declaration that “there are no other gods besides” the God of Israel as proof of this view. Other scholars who reject this evolutionary paradigm tend to assume passages evincing divine plurality actually speak of human beings, or that the other gods are merely idols. This view insists that “monotheism” must mean that the existence of other gods is denied. Both views are problematic and fall short of doing justice to the full description of Israel’s view of God and the heavenly host in the Hebrew Bible. This article overviews the difficulties of each view and offers a coherent alternative.

Key Words: monotheism, polytheism, henotheism, monolatry, divine council, God, gods, angels, host of heaven, idols, Israelite religion, Psalm 82, Deuteronomy 32

INTRODUCTION

Most scholars whose work focuses on Israelite religion recognize that the Hebrew Bible contains a number of references assuming and even affirming the existence of other gods. As a corollary to this observation, scholars also frequently assert that no explicit denial of the existence of other gods occurs until the time of Deutero-Isaiah and thereafter (6th century B.C.E.) in a presumed campaign by zealous scribes to expunge such references from the sacred text. Even the Shema and the first commandment do not consign the other gods to fantasy, since the demand is made that no other gods should be worshipped. The data apparently in-
forms us that Israelite religion evolved from polytheism to henotheistic monolatry to monotheism.

While this viewpoint dominates scholarly discussion of Israelite religion, the question ought to be asked whether it is lucid. Does the viewpoint derive from the known data from earliest times into the Common Era, or is the reasoning offered in its support circular? Are terms like “polytheism” and “henotheism” truly adequate to describe what the writers of the biblical canon believed?

Treatments of the issue and the relevant passages by other Jewish and Christian scholars often assume the biblical writers spoke only of idols when discussing other gods, or that references to plural אֱלֹהִים in certain passages are best understood as referring to human beings. These options are also flawed in that they bring theology to the text. These alternatives assume that a 17th-century word (“monotheism”) has or can rightly be imposed on the theology of Israel and that, without this term, it must be acknowledged that Israelite religion was indeed henotheistic or polytheistic.

This article argues that the consensus view on divine plurality in the Hebrew Bible is marred because it assumes what it seeks to prove. It thereby fails to handle the evidence of late canonical and noncanonical texts that “retain” a council of gods in Israelite and Jewish theology. A fresh perspective is needed. The article also argues that scholars need not be driven to choose between a presumed evolution toward monotheism for Israel’s religion, a rhetorical use of polytheism to promote monotheism, and arguments that suggest the text cannot mean what it plainly says. In an effort to address these issues and in anticipation of certain questions, it is expedient to detail the weaknesses of what are hereafter referred to as the “consensus view” and the “traditional approach.”

1. The Consensus View of Monotheistic Evolution: Overview and Evaluation

1.1. Psalm 82

It is not difficult to demonstrate that the Hebrew Bible assumes and affirms the existence of other gods. The textbook passage is Psalm 82. Verse one (excluding the superscription) of that Psalm reads:

אֱלֹהִים נֹצַע בְּצַעְרָה ‏אֶזָּר בָּרֶכֶת אֱלֹהִים יִשָּׁמֶא

God stands in the divine council; in the midst of the gods he passes judgment.

The first אֱלֹהִים is clearly referring to a singular entity (God) due to subject-verb agreement and other contextual clues. The second אֱלֹהִים is obviously plural due to the preposition בְּצַעְרָה, because God cannot be said to be standing in the midst of a (singular) god or Himself. The Trinity is ruled out immediately as an explanation, because the plural gods over whom the
God of Israel presides are here being sentenced to die for their corrupt rule of nations on the earth.

Psalm 82 is considered late in composition on several grounds. The clear reference to a pantheon over which Yahweh presides must be explained, since by this time Israelite religion is assumed to have evolved into an “intolerant monotheism.” As a result, many scholars consider Psalm 82 to be either a vestige of polytheism overlooked by monotheistic redactors, or perhaps a deliberate rhetorical use of Israel’s polytheistic past to declare the new outlook of monotheism. After the exile, so it is put forth, the gods of the nations are relegated to the status of angels.

Both proposals fail on a number of levels. With respect to the first option, it is evasive to appeal to inept redactors when one’s theory of a campaign to stamp out polytheistic texts encounters a “problem passage,” especially when Psalm 82 is by no means the only text evincing divine plurality and a divine council “missed” by scribes. There are explicit references to gods and a divine council in Second Temple period Jewish literature. In the Qumran sectarian material alone, there are approximately 185 occurrences of various divine council terms (בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים) in contexts where a divine council is mentioned with the same vocabulary (בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים) utilized in texts of the Hebrew Bible for a divine assembly. In fact, it is apparent that some of these references allude to or draw on canonical material. If there was an alleged campaign to correct ancient texts and their polytheistic views, the postexilic Jewish community either did not get the message or ignored it. However, the presumptions of an evolution from polytheism to monotheism and the incompatibility of monotheism with a council of lesser gods are so entrenched in critical scholarship that scholars such as Carol Newsom in her work on the Qumran Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice coin oxymoronic terms like “angelic elim” to explain the material. It is more coherent to abandon the evolutionary paradigm and ask how it was that (1) late biblical authors had no qualms about an assembly of gods under Yahweh; and (2) Second Temple Jews, willing to suffer death rather than worship other gods, failed to consider divine council texts in the Hebrew Bible as a threat to monotheism.

Concerning the second viewpoint, that polytheism is being used rhetorically in Psalm 82, much is made of the last verse in that psalm, where

1. See Marvin Tate, Psalms 51–100 (WBC 20; Dallas, TX: Word, 2002), xxv. Throughout this article I use “Deutero-Isaiah” for convenience.
God is asked to rise up and possess the nations (82:8). This is interpreted as a new idea of the psalmist to encourage the exilic community—that, despite exile, Yahweh will rise up and take the nations as his own having sentenced the other gods to death. This view ignores preexilic texts such as Psalm 24 and 29, long recognized as some of the most ancient material in the canon. For example, Ps 29:1 contains plural imperatives directed at the רָאָשָׁה בַּעֲדֵי, pointing to a divine council context. Verse 10 declares,

“The LORD sits enthroned over the flood; the LORD sits enthroned as king forever.” In Israelite cosmology, the flood upon which Yahweh sat was situated over the solid dome that covered the round, flat earth. Since it cannot coherently be asserted that the author would assert that Gentile nations were not under the dome and flood, this verse reflects the idea of world kingship. The Song of Moses, also among the oldest poetry in the Hebrew Bible, echoes the thought. In Exodus 15:18 the text reads, “The LORD will reign forever and ever.” As F. M. Cross noted over thirty years ago, “The kingship of the gods is a common theme in early Mesopotamian and Canaanite epics. The common scholarly position that the concept of Yahweh as reigning or king is a relatively late development in Israelite thought seems untenable.”

Both of these perspectives (redactional bungling or rhetorical brilliance) are used to explain the presence of affirmations of other gods in texts where they are “out of place,” texts of late redaction or composition. The primary examples are Deuteronomy and Deutero-Isaiah.

1.2. Deuteronomy

The consensus view argues that Deuteronomy provides evidence of an evolution of Israelite religion toward an exclusivistic monotheism. The argument is offered on the basis of passages that forcefully contend there are “no other gods besides Yahweh.” This view seems coherent until one realizes that these “denial phrases” occur in the same chapters of Deuteronomy that assume and affirm the existence of other gods (Deuteronomy 4 and 32). In answer to the juxtaposition of polytheistic and monotheistic material in these passages, scholars argue that this phenomenon indicates either a rhetorical merging of polytheistic and monotheistic traditions or blunders by the redactors when updating the older traditions to monotheism. Since the evolutionary trajectory is assumed from the outset, an either-or fallacy is set forth for discussion.


The first issue before us is to determine whether the relevant phrases in Deuteronomy 4 and 32 actually deny the existence of other gods. The parade examples are Deut 4:35, 39, and 32:39.

Deut 4:35 “You were shown these things so that you might know that the Lord, he is the God (מְקוֹל הַעָלָיִם); besides him there is no other (דָּוִד לֹא).

Deut 4:39 “Know therefore this day, and lay it to your heart, that Yahweh, he is the God (מְקוֹל הַעָלָיִם) in heaven above and on the earth beneath; there is no other (דָּוִד לֹא).

Deut 32:29 “See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god besides me (יְהוָה אֲלֵהֵי אֲלֵהִים); I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal; and there is none that can deliver out of my hand.”

With respect to Deut 4:35, 39, מְקוֹל הַעָלָיִם is a verbless clause with the pronoun emphasizing the subject, but what does it mean that Yahweh is מְקוֹל הַעָלָיִם? Is this a denial of the existence of other gods? How can that be reconciled with the presumption of other gods in these passages: Deut 4:10–20; 32:8–9? It is at least equally probable from a linguistic perspective that the phrase means that Yahweh is superior or incomparable. That is, Yahweh is the God par excellence, as Deut 10:17 states: יְהוָה אֲלֵהֵי אֲלֵהִים (“for the Lord our God, he is the God of the gods”). If the other gods to whom Yahweh is compared here do not exist in the mind of the writer, where is the praise, and perhaps even the honesty, in the statement? Other passages in the Torah, such as Exod 15:18, beg the same question. When the author wrote “Lord, who is like you among the מְקוֹל הַעָלָיִם?” did he really mean, “Lord who is like you among the imaginary beings that really aren’t there”? When the final redactors, presumably zealous over the new idea of monotheism, allowed Deut 10:17 and Exod 15:18 to stand, did they simply err, or were they content to put polytheistic language into the mouth of Moses? How does such language accomplish rhetorical persuasion if the audience does not believe that any other deities exist to whom Yahweh may be compared?

But what about the second half of the statements of Deut 4:35, 39 (דָּוִד לֹא)? Must the phrasing be construed as a denial of the existence of all other gods except Yahweh? There are several difficulties with this understanding.

First, similar constructions are used in reference to Babylon and Moab in Isa 47:8, 10 and Nineveh in Zeph 2:15. In Isa 47:8, 10 Babylon says to herself, יְהוָה אֲלֵהֵי אֲלֵהִים (“I am, and there is none else besides me”). The claim is not that she is the only city in the world but that she has no rival. Nineveh

8. Reading Deut 32:8–9 with LXX and Qumran material. See n. 15.
9. The same kind of situation is found in 1 Kgs 18:21, a passage considered part of the Deuteronomistic history. Elijah challenges the crowd at Carmel, “If Yahweh is מְקוֹל הַעָלָיִם, follow him, but if Baal, then follow him.” Yahweh’s status as מְקוֹל הַעָלָיִם need not mean that Baal does not exist. It more likely means, “Yahweh is the unrivaled God (of Israel or in general)."
makes the identical claim in Zeph 2:15 (גאוני והם שלש). In these instances, the constructions cannot constitute the denial of the existence of other cities and nations. The point being made is very obviously the concept of incomparability.

Second, כלוב and other related forms (כלוב) need not mean “alone” in some exclusive sense. That is, a single person in a group could be highlighted or focused on. 1 Kgs 18:1–6 is an example. The passage deals with the end of the three-year drought and famine during the career of Elijah. After meeting with Elijah, Ahab calls Obadiah, the steward of his house, and together they set on a course of action to find grass in order to save their remaining horses and mules. Verse 6a then reads: "Ahab went one way by himself [כלוב] and Obadiah went another way by himself [כלוב]." While it may be possible to suggest that Obadiah literally went through the land completely unaccompanied in his search, it is preposterous to say that the king of Israel went completely alone to look for grass—without bodyguards or servants. The point is that כלוב (and by extension כלוב) need not refer to complete isolation or solitary presence. Another example is Ps 51:4 [Hebrew, v. 6], which reads in part: "against you, you alone, I have sinned." God was not the only person against whom David had sinned. He had sinned against his wife and certainly Uriah. This is obviously heightened rhetoric designed to highlight the One who had been primarily offended. It was God against whom David’s offense was incomparable.10

Third, the negation of such excluding prepositions and adverbs need not be construed as denials of existence. The construction can be some sort of incomparability statement. As Nathan MacDonald noted in his recent work, Deuteronomy and the Meaning of ‘Monotheism,’ the only consideration of the negative particle ב before the adverb דום with or without the subsequent excluding particle (כלוב) is that of Hans Rechenmacher.11 The first part of Rechenmacher’s study was a linguistic analysis of Hebrew verbless sentences with particles of negation. He concludes his analysis with an examination of prepositions and adverbs with an excluding sense, including those found in the verses from Deuteronomy and (Deutero-)

10. Among several possible examples, two will suffice. In Eccl 7:29 Solomon states, “See, this alone (כלוב) I found, that God made man upright, but they have sought out many schemes” (ESV). Is that the only thought or conclusion Solomon ever drew in his life? In Judg 7:5 we read (ESV), “So he brought the people down to the water. And the LORD said to Gideon, ‘Every one who laps the water with his tongue, as a dog laps, you shall set by himself [כלוב]. Likewise, every one who kneels down to drink.’” Are we to conclude that Gideon took all 300 men who passed this test and isolated them from each other? It is more coherent to say they were set aside as a group. The point would be that the group of 300 was set aside in comparison to the rest of the soldiers.

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Isaiah under consideration. Rechenmacher argues that the examples in Deuteronomy 4 point to exclusivistic monotheism, but he fails to explain why the construction in these texts cannot be describing incomparability. It seems he did not make this connection because of prior assumptions about the evolution of Israelite religion brought to the data.

MacDonald points out several methodological problems with Rechenmacher's study that are beyond the scope of this article. For the present purpose, it must be asked whether the negative particle רותא or exclusive particle רותא + רותא requires non-existence (as opposed to incomparability) and whether similar combinations offer the same semantic possibility. The question is relevant for the purpose of establishing an overlap with the denial phrases in Deuteronomy 32 and Deutero-Isaiah (see below).

Fourth, other verses in Deuteronomy 32 make it clear that the existence of other gods is assumed by the writer. Deut 32:8-9 and its explicit parallel, Deut 4:19-20, have Yahweh placing the Gentile nations under the authority of lesser divine beings:

Deut 32:8 When the Most High gave to the nations their inheritance, when he divided mankind, he fixed the borders of the peoples according to the number of the sons of God בָּנֵי אֱלֹהִים. But the Lord's portion is his people, Jacob his allotted heritage.

12. Ibid., 97–114, cited in Nathan MacDonald, Deuteronomy and the Meaning of ‘Monotheism’ (FAT 2/1; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 82.

13. For instance, MacDonald notes that, “Rechenmacher assumes, without argument, that רותא is exchangeable for a preposition with excluding function and personal suffix.” MacDonald counters by observing that on two occasions (Deut 4:35; Isa 45:21), רותא occurs with an excluding prepositional construction . . . and such an exchange would create a tautologous expression.” Lastly, as McDonald and other scholars have noted, neither the usual temporal sense of adverbial רותא ("still, yet") nor the conjunctive sense ("additionally, also, again") fit Deut 4:35, 39 and 32:39. If one accepts the list provided in BDB for those texts where רותא does not have either of these meanings, one is left with seven occurrences of the adverb, all of which occur in questions or answers to questions. MacDonald notes that “in each case, what is being questioned is not the absolute existence of an object, but only if there is an object in a person’s immediate domain. . . . In each of the questions what is being asked is whether the one being questioned has an additional [item or] member besides the ones already taken into account” (MacDonald, Deuteronomy, 83–84).

14. See the ensuing discussion for more on Deut 32:8–9.

Deut 4:19 Lest you lift up your eyes to heaven, and when you see the sun and the moon and the stars, all the host of heaven, you be drawn away and bow down to them and serve them, whom the LORD your God has allotted to all the peoples under the whole heaven. 20 But the LORD has taken you and brought you out of the iron furnace, out of Egypt, to be a people of his own inheritance, as you are this day.

Some scholars seek to argue that the “sons of God” and “host of heaven” in the passages refer only to idols or astronomical bodies. This issue will be discussed in more detail below in another section of this article. At this juncture, attention need only be drawn to Deut 32:17, a text that, alluding to the failures of Israel in disobeying the warnings of Deut 4:19–20, quite clearly has Moses referring to the other אֱלֹהִים אֱלֹהִים as evil spiritual entities (שֵׁר): “They [Israel] sacrificed to demons (בָּדִיקִים) who are not God (אֱלֹהִים),” to gods (אֱלֹהִים) they did not know; new ones that had come along recently, whom your fathers had not reverenced.”

While these lesser אֱלֹהִים are linked to the statues that represented them in the mind of their worshippers (Deut 4:28; 7:25; 28:64), these beings must be considered real spiritual entities. Indeed, it cannot be presumed that ancient people considered a humanly fabricated statue or fetish object to be identical with the god in whose likeness it was fashioned. As one scholar of ancient cult objects notes:

When a non-physical being manifested in a statue, this anchored the being in a controlled location where living human beings could interact with it through ritual performance. . . . In order for human beings to interact with deities and to persuade them to create, renew, and maintain the universe, these beings had to be brought down to earth. . . . This interaction had to be strictly controlled in order to avoid both the potential dangers of unrestricted divine power and the pollution of the divine by the impurity of the human world. While the ability of deities to act in the visible, human realm was brought about through their manifestation in a physical body, manifestation in one body did not in any sense restrict a deity, for the non-corporeal essence of a deity was unlimited by time and space, and could manifest in all its “bodies,” in all locations, all at one time. 19

16. See below for “star language” in Deutero-Isaiah and a refutation of the approach that this language refers only to inanimate astronomical bodies.
17. For example, Deut 17:3; 29:25–26; 30:17; 31:16; 32:16.
18. Note that אֱלֹהִים is singular, and so the translation “… who are not gods” is inaccurate. Such a translation is also awkward in light of the following plural אֱלֹהִים. Arguing that the אֱלֹהִים were merely idols creates contradictions with other portions of Deuteronomy and the Hebrew Bible. See the ensuing discussion.
To reject the reality of these entities in the Israelite worldview is to cast the canonical writer as someone who did not believe in the reality of demons, a position out of step with other canonical authors.

In addition to vv. 8–9 and 17, another portion of Deuteronomy 32 assumes the reality of other gods. Deut 32:43 is well known to textual critics, since the text-critical data make it abundantly clear that this verse was altered from its original form for theological reasons. A comparison of the MT with 4QDeutU displays this (see table, p. 10). It is significant that MT lacks the second line, an explicit reference to divine beings (םיִלֵּא), in what should have been the first bicolon. MT also changes the line to a singular form. This alteration seems odd, but the motive becomes clear if is understood not as “heavens” but as “heavenly beings,” a meaning found elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. This pairing was apparently deliberately eliminated to avoid the reference to other “divine beings.” The canonical author demands the other gods, evil spiritual entities hostile to Israel, to bow before the incomparable Yahweh.

20. Most, if not all, scholars hold that these changes came in the Hellenistic period. This conclusion is guided not by actual data but by the assumption that Israelite religion was steadily evolving toward an exclusivistic monotheism that rejected the existence of other gods after the exile. As this article details, this assumption has significant flaws. In terms of textual data, all that is known for sure is that the Qumran material, the oldest witness to this passage, contained references to other gods, whereas the later text of MT does not. The data says nothing about when the alteration of MT took place. In view of the abundant canonical and non-canonical postexilic and Hellenistic Jewish material in which the existence of other gods is assumed, it is far more coherent to postulate that these textual changes came much later during the period of textual “standardization” circa 100 C.E. One cannot argue that Hellenistic Judaism in particular considered such “demythologizing” a theological duty, for the LXX is often quite literal in passages where other gods are affirmed (e.g., Ps 82:1 [LXX 81:1]; 89:7 [LXX 88:7]). This means that the fact that certain LXX passages do soften language that points to other gods (see the next footnote) indicates only that some Jews felt uncomfortable with divine plurality, not that Judaism as a whole could not process such language in the context of the uniqueness of Yahweh. The abundance of evidence to divine plurality in a divine council in the Qumran material (Heiser, “The Divine Council,” 176–213) informs us that even the most conservative sects of Judaism in the first century might not object to the language of divine plurality. The Masoretic text rose to prominence only after centuries of textual diversity and not by “intrinsic factors related to the textual transmission, but by political and socioreligious events and developments” (Emanuel Tov, “Textual Criticism [OT],” in Anchor Bible Dictionary [ed. D. N. Freedman; New York: Doubleday, 1992], 6:407). The social and religious pressures that led to textual standardization in the first century C.E. are a much better milieu for these textual changes, and so the theological motivation behind them does not undermine the thesis of this article, it strengthens it.


23. The notion that this language is merely poetic—as though the use of poetry means the writer did not believe something expressed in poetry—is addressed briefly in the subsequent
The denial phrases in Deuteronomy 4 and 32 must therefore be contextualized in light of the canonical book as a whole. The primary phrases of concern are יד מ:י ויהי מ and ים יני. With respect to the former, in an Ugaritic text with parallel language Baal says: 'איהד ימלק 'י ילמ (“I alone am the one who can be king over the gods”).24 This is certainly no statement for exclusivistic monotheism at Ugarit! The phrase points to incomparability—only Baal among all the other gods of the Ugaritic pantheon was El's co-regent. More will be said about this phrase in the ensuing discussion of Deutero-Isaiah.

With respect to ים יני in Deut 32:39, the most thorough work is that of C. H. Williams.25 This study concluded that these are not statements of sole self-existence or divine interchangeability (“I am the same”).

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24. KTU 1.4:vi.49–52.
As such, the expression cannot be construed as an expression that inherently denies the existence of other deities. Sanders adds, “On the basis of this colon alone it is difficult to decide if it is a claim for the absoluteness of Yahweh (i.e., the existence of other gods is denied), or the incomparability of Yahweh.”

The solution seems to lie in balancing the colon (‘there is no god besides me’) with the phrase (‘there is none that can deliver out of my hand’). Hence a comparison is again being made: Yahweh’s ability versus the ability of opposing gods. Sanders says elsewhere:

How do we translate ? Theoretically ‘with’, ‘beside’, and ‘like’ are our options. In other parts of the song the existence of other gods is not denied but they are regarded as powerless; cf. v. 31, 37–38, 43a (4QDtq). This circumstance seems to render the translation ‘with’ less convincing. It is the incomparability [of God] . . . that is confessed here. The phrase must have virtually the same meaning as the far more common expression of YHWH’s incomparability by the phrase . . . . The possibility of translating by ‘like’ is also suggested by some Ugaritic evidence. . . . In KTU 1.6.i.44–45 Ilu and Athiratü are comparing various candidates for Ba’alu’s succession. Ilu rejects one of them, stating: dq ‘um m b/n db mrh ‘m bn dgn ktnsm (“One of feeble strength cannot run like Ba’alu, one who knuckles down cannot poise the lance like the son of Daganu”; lines 50–52). Since at this moment Ba’alu is not among the living anymore, the translation ‘with’ is obviously unacceptable here. It has long been perceived that ‘like’ is the preferable translation.

The point above regarding the relationship between Yahweh’s incomparability and his uniqueness is an important one. The fact that there is no deity who can save those whom Yahweh has targeted for judgment speaks to both aspects. This uniqueness in turn compels the confession that Yahweh alone is the “true” God (Jer 10:10). This is the heart of Israel’s theology.

As one scholar recently noted in a work on the question of monotheism in Deuteronomy:

[T]he belief in one God is the central issue in the theology of Deuteronomy. In later times, the monotheistic statements of Deuteronomy (esp. 4:35, 39; 6:4, 7:9; 32:39) are used by the monotheistic religions of Late Antiquity, Judaism and Christianity, to support their argument against those who did not believe in one God. . . . As far as the belief in one God is concerned, Deuteronomy is not concerned with a theoretical monotheism, but rather gives a confession of faith. The monotheism of Deuteronomy emerged from the struggle against idolatry. Moreover, the decline of Israel is attributed to the following of other

27. Ibid., 238; cf. n. 788 (emphasis mine). On the Ugaritic evidence, see also Johannes C. de Moor, The Seasonal Pattern in the Ugaritic Myth of Ba’alu According to the Version of Ilimilku (AONAT 16; Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker / Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1971), 203.
the existence of other gods is not denied, however, only their power and significance for Israel.28

If one sees a link between the composition of Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History, the case for understanding these kinds of phrases in terms of incomparability rather than denial of existence becomes even stronger. The absence of any unmistakable denial of the existence of other gods in Deuteronomy and the Dtr literature is bolstered by a study of the concept of alien deities in that material by Yair Hoffman.29 Hoffman studied the occurrence and distribution of אלוהים אחרים, ולא ר, אלהים ונכ, and אלהים נכר to discern whether Israel's faith reflected a monotheism that denied the existence of other gods, or if such phrases denoted only a difference in perspective (“they are other gods since they are not ours”).30 Based on the infrequent number of occurrences and their distribution, Hoffman concluded the first two phrases could not decisively answer the question. The third phrase, the most relevant to the study, resulted in more clarity. By way of summation, Hoffman found:

The qualifying phrase "םירא [םביר],אלוהים אלהים autre verifie that by the phrase אלהים אלהים Dtr did not intend a conclusive denial of deities other than Yahweh. . . . I suggest that the creation of the expression אלהים אלהים reflects Dtr's vague feeling that a term was needed which could express the dichotomy, though not absolute contradistinction, between Yahweh and all other gods. . . . The creation of a term was vital for the Dtr who wanted to contrast other deities with Yahweh not on the level of existence, but on the level of potency. . . . Thus the concept of “other gods” expressed by the term אלהים אלהים is that they exist, they may even be “helpful” for their natural worshippers, but not for Israel, which can be helped only by Yahweh. Such a concept of other gods leads indirectly to the belief that Yahweh is mightier than the other gods, and therefore it is not only immoral but stupid for Israel to transgress his covenant. The concept of the sovereignty of Yahweh over all deities, though not his exclusiveness, and the idea that it is legitimate for each nation to worship its own gods, are well attested in Deut 4:19–20. Here Israel is warned not to worship the sun, the moon, and the stars, "whom the Lord has allotted עד הקבה unto all nations under the whole world.31

To summarize, the confessional statements of Deut 4:35, 39 and 32:12, 39 must be viewed against the backdrop of the Most High's dealings with

30. Ibid., 71. Emphasis is the author’s.
31. Ibid., 71–72.
the Gentile nations and the gods he appointed to govern them. It would be nonsensical to conclude that Deut 4:19–20 and 32:8–9 show Yahweh giving the nations up to the governance of non-existent beings. The writer is not suggesting in turn that Yahweh allotted non-existent beings to the nations so as to explain why the nations outside Israel worship non-existent beings. The implication is that the declarations of Deut 4:35, 39 and 32:12, 39 are best understood as reflecting a worldview that accepted the reality of other gods, along with Yahweh’s utter uniqueness among them, not a worldview that denied the existence of lesser סנהגלף. The same picture emerges in Deutero-Isaiah.

1.3. Deutero-Isaiah

Nearly fifty years ago, James Barr noted that in no case did Deuteronomy deny the existence of other deities. Barr suggested that, in view of the use of identical phrasings, the same could be said for (Deutero-) Isaiah:

It may also be asked whether the question of mere existence [of other gods] is as important as has been commonly held for those later texts such as Deutero-Isaiah which are supposed to maintain the fullest type of monotheism. When we read in Psalm 14:1 that the fool has said in his heart סנהגלף י, we are commonly agreed that the foolish man is no absolute atheist asserting the non-existence of God; he is denying his significance, refusing to reckon with God. Is it not possible to understand in much the same way those places where Deutero-Isaiah uses the same negative particle?32

Deutero-Isaiah is consistent with Deuteronomy since the phrases in his work on which scholars depend for arguing other gods do not exist, are the same, or are similar to those just discussed in Deuteronomy 4 and 32. There is also solid evidence that Isaiah utilizes the worldview of Deuteronomy 4 and 32, as well as Psalm 82. If so, then his alleged denials of the existence of other gods must be contextualized by his broader theology.

To begin, scholars of the book of Isaiah have long recognized the presence of the divine council in the book of Isaiah, particularly Isa 40:1–8:33

33. See, for example, H. H. Rowley, “The Council of Yahweh,” JTS 45 (1944): 151–57; Kingsbury, “Prophets and the Council of Yahweh,” 279–86; Polley, “Hebrew Prophecy Within the Council of Yahweh,” 141–56; Christopher R. Seitz, “The Divine Council: Temporal Transition and New Prophecy in the Book of Isaiah,” IBL 109:2 (1990): 229–47; Frank Moore Cross, “The Council of Yahweh in Deutero-Isaiah,” JNES 12 (1953): 274–77; Martti Nissinen, “Prophets in the Divine Council,” 4–19. Two features of Isa 40:1–8 demonstrate the presence of the divine council. First, there are several plural imperatives in vv. 1 (וָשַׁלֶּחַ וָשַׁלֶּחַ; “console”), 2 (וַיְנַשֶּׂא יְהוָה; “speak . . . and call”), and 3 (וַיַּשְׁלַח יְהוָה; “prepare . . . make straight”) as well as plural suffixes (v. 1, לֶאָלָה [note the masculine 2pl], “your God”; v. 3, לֶאָלָה, “for our God”). The commands are issued to an unseen audience and require actions that cannot be fulfilled by earthly addressees. Seitz and others have pointed out that interpreting לֶאָלָה as a vocative is ruled out by the parallel לֶאָלָה, which is clearly the intended object and not a vocative. See especially
Scholars have also taken note of the familiar mythological motifs in the book associated with Yahweh’s assembly—the same sort of “star” language referring to divine beings noted in the discussion of Deuteronomy 4 and 32. For example, consider Isa 40:22–26:

22 (It is) he that sits / is enthroned upon the circle of the earth, and its inhabitants (are) as grasshoppers; he stretches out the heavens as a curtain, and spreads them out as a tent in which to dwell. 23 He brings princes to naught; the rulers of this world he makes as nothing. 24 No sooner are they planted, no sooner are they sown, no sooner do they take root in the ground, than he blows on them and they wither, and a whirlwind sweeps them away like chaff. 25 “To whom will you compare me? Or who is my equal?” says the Holy One. 26 Lift up your eyes to the heights and see: who created these? He who brings out their host by number, calling them all by name; by the greatness of his might, and because he is strong in power not one is missing.

This passage is intriguing on several levels. The reference to the “circle of the earth” (v. 22; ≈r,a,h: gWj) and “stretching out (hf</Nh) the heavens as a tent (lh<aøK:) in which to dwell” (v. 22) are overt references to the mythological dwelling of El.34 Likewise, the imperative to lift up the eyes “to the heights” (µ/rm:) in context with these references speaks of the dwelling of El, the place where the old council gods meet with the high God.

The wording of Isa 40:23 is of special interest: “He brings princes to naught; the rulers of this world he makes as nothing.” The word for “princes” here is not the familiar and expected µyric…, but µyniz/r, a word that is certainly within the semantic range of royal sons.35 This becomes noteworthy once it is recalled that in Ugaritic religion divine royal sons bore the


35. The word וֹיִשָּׂר is a Qal masculine plural participle from וֹי כ. The verb occurs elsewhere for royalty in Judg 5:3; Ps 2:2; Prov 8:15; 31:4; Hab 1:10.
title *tpt*, the philological equivalent to **סנה**, the same term used in Psalm 82 for the gods who were judging (**כָּלַחַק תַּשְׁפַּם–נְבִיל**). This assertion is difficult to defend, since the result of that choice is that Isaiah is describing how God commands chunks of rock and balls of gas, which somehow affect events on earth—specifically the corrupt judgment of Psalm 82. To say the least, this smacks of modern astrology. It is much more coherent to have Isaiah accepting the worldview of Psalm 82 as including a council lesser **אלים** who can in no way compare to Yahweh.

As in the case of Deuteronomy, it also cannot be argued that Deutero-Isaiah uses this star language with reference only to humanly fabricated idols that might depict astral deities. The star language of Isaiah 40 provides no hint that the writer was speaking of manufactured physical objects. Moreover, elsewhere Deutero-Isaiah informs us that the object and the deity were not identical. The statement in Isa 46:1 that “Bel bows down; Nebo stoops; their idols are on beasts and livestock” suggests a distinction between the two. Bel and Nebo are powerless to avoid “their images” being carried off into captivity. As with all the passages heretofore considered, the writer’s point in Isaiah 46 is Yahweh’s incomparability (46:5), not the non-existence of the other gods. Unlike Bel and Nebo, whose images can be carried off, Yahweh, who has no image, has carried the nation of Israel since its birth, and will carry them out of Babylon (46:1–4).

It is against this backdrop and the larger scope of Deuteronomy that Isaiah’s “none besides me” statements must be understood. Failure to do so leaves one with inner-biblical and logical contradictions. There are three primary passages to which scholars appeal to assert Isaiah denied the existence of other gods:

**Isa 43:10–12**

10 “You are my witnesses,” declares Yahweh, “and my servant whom I have chosen, that you may know and believe me, and understand that I am He (**אֲדֹנָי אֲנָפִי**). Before me no god was formed (**פָּדַה אֱלֹהֵי נְבִיל**), neither shall there be after me. 11 I, I am Yahweh, and besides me there is no savior (**מְעָטֶרֶה מֶשֶׁת**). 12 I declared and saved and I proclaimed, when there was no strange (god) among you: and you are my witnesses,” says Yahweh, “that I am God.”

**Isa 44:6–8**

6 Thus says Yahweh the King of Israel, and its Redeemer, Yahweh who creates the hosts: “I am the first, and I am the last; and besides me there is no god (**אָלֹהֵי אֵל**). 7 Who is like me? Let

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him proclaim it, let him declare and set it forth before me. Who has announced from of old the things that are coming? Let them tell me what is yet to be. 8 Fear not, neither be afraid; have I not told you from of old and declared it? And you are my witnesses. Is there a god besides me? There is no Rock; I know not any.”

Isa 45:5–7, 14, 18, 21–22 5 "I am Yahweh, and there is no other (איה את אלוהים), besides me there is no God (אלהים). I gird you, though you do not know me, 6 that men may know, from the rising of the sun and from the west, that there is none besides me; I am Yahweh, and there is no other ( איה את אל). 7 I form the light and create darkness; I make prosperity and create calamity: I Yahweh do all these things.”

Isaiah: “The wealth of Egypt, and merchandise of Ethiopia and of the Sabeans, men of stature, shall come over to you and be yours; they shall follow you; in chains they shall come over and fall down before you; they shall make supplication to you, saying, ‘God is with you only, and there is no other, there is no god besides him’ (את אלוהים ואת אלוהים).”

14 Thus says Yahweh, who created the heavens—he is God—who formed the earth and made it; he hath established it; he did not create it a chaos; he formed it to be inhabited. “I am Yahweh; and there is no other ( איה את אלי).” 18 For thus says Yahweh, who created the heavens—he is God—who formed the earth and made it; he hath established it; he did not create it a chaos; he formed it to be inhabited. "I am Yahweh; and there is no other ( איה את אלי).” 21 Declare and present your case; let them take counsel together! Who told this long ago? Who declared it of old? Was it not I, Yahweh? And there is no other god besides me; a just God and a Savior; there is none besides me ( ואת אלוהים). 22 Turn to me and be saved, all the ends of the earth! For I am God, and there is no other ( איה את אל)."

The following eleven “denial phrases” can be drawn from the above passages in Isaiah—phrases that are either identical or nearly identical to those found in Deut 4:35, 39 and 32:12, 39:

1. יא קר בambre מושש (1)
2. יא קר בambre אלאים (2)
3. ובש אתאלת בambre אלי זכר כל אברע (3)
4. וארדוע אתאלת בambre (4)
5. ובלת את אלות (5)
6. ובית (6)
7. יא עד (7)
8. יא עד אלאים (8)
9. יא עד בambre (9)
10. יא עד ב camer (10)
11. ליטי לאנתר אתל (11)

The first observation is that the prepositions (ברמ), the adverb אלאים, and the adverbial phrase בambre בambre in the above list are interchangeable. In Isa 45:6, יא עד אלי is juxtaposed with both את אלות and את אלות. In like manner, יא עד אלי has יא עד בambre in tandem with את אלות and את אלות. These interchanges allow an important methodological consideration. In some cases the con-
Heiser: Monotheism, Polytheism, Monolatry, or Henotheism?

struction containing an excluding preposition or the adverbial phrase found in Deut 4:35, 39 and 32:12, 39 is identical to those occurring in denial phrases in Isaiah. On other occasions, a semantically congruent preposition or adverb is used by the author. In order for one to argue that the denial phrases indicate one thing in Deuteronomy (other gods are real but are not Yahweh) and another in Isaiah (other gods do not exist at all), one would have to produce distinctive prepositions or adverbs in these syntactical structures or different “negative particle plus excluding preposition or adverb” constructions. This is not where the data leads.

Phrases 1 through 4 in our listing each have the negative particle ˆya and the preposition ydlbm in common (save for number 3, where vyeh forms a rhetorical question with an expected negative answer instead of ˆya). Deut 4:35 utilizes this same combination (ˆya ydlbm “there is none besides him”). Deut 32:39 echoes the same thought, albeit with a different preposition ˆya ydiM: “there is no God besides me”). In view of the earlier discussion that the wording of Deut 4:35, 39 and Deut 32:39 does not equate to a denial of the existence of other gods, on what grounds must we conclude that the same language in Isaiah means there are no gods?

Phrases 5 and 6 represent Isa 45:5, 21, and point to the use of the preposition ytlwz to describe Yahweh’s relationship to other gods ˆya ytlwz “besides me there is no god” and ytlwz ˆyia “there is none [no god] besides me”). Isa 45:21 transparently correlates this phrase with the use of ydlbm in tandem with ˆya, the same combination as in Deut 4:35. This interchange elicits the conclusion that the negative particle with excluding ytlwz does not intend to tell the reader that no other gods exist, only that Yahweh is unique.

Moving on, the phrase ydlbm ˆya also occurs in numbers 7 and 8 in our list, thereby aligning those references with the incomparability statements of Deut 4:35, 39. In addition to what has already been said about this correlation, it should also be noted that in Isa 46:9 ydlbm ˆya occurs in parallel with ˆya followed by the comparative preposition ˆy, which implicitly allows for the existence of other gods. The terms in the ninth phrase in our list, ydlbm ˆya, have already been seen to overlap with terms in Deuteronomy. As a result, phrases 7 through 9 in our list are not evidence that Isaiah denies the existence of other gods.

Phrase number 10 comes from Isa 43:12 and reads rz µk<B: ˆya (“and among you there were no strange (gods”) (“and among you there were no strange (gods”)). The distinct feature here is the word rz coupled with the particle of negation, ˆya. This combination is found in Deut 32:12, which is presupposed in Deut 31:29. Due to its correlation with Deut 32:39 and Deut 4:35, 39, it cannot be argued that Deut 32:12 conveys the idea of exclusivistic monotheism. The syntactical overlaps once again compel us to rule out the tenth phrase.

This leaves only phrase number 11: laE rx’nAalø yn’p:l}. It is a claim of Yahweh’s pre-existence with respect to all other gods; hence Yahweh is

37. Sanders, Provenance of Deuteronomy 32, 394.
incomparable among the gods. Yahweh, the One who created all the members of the heavenly host (cf. Neh 9:6; Isa 40:26; Ps 33:6), is ontologically pre-eminent. The phrase does not deny that Yahweh created other gods. There is no other god who can claim either creative power or chronological priority, and there will never be another like him.

Finally, Hebrew syntax aside, if one reads the denial statements in Deutero-Isaiah it is not difficult to discern upon what basis the denial language occurs. Is the language concerned with making the point that Yahweh is the only god who exists, or is the text intending something else? In Isa 43:10–12, it is Yahweh’s claim to be alone in his pre-existence, his ability to save, and his national deliverance. In Isa 44:6–8 the focus is on certain attributes of Yahweh. In the texts from Isaiah 45, there are very obvious comparisons between Yahweh’s deeds, justice, salvation, and deliverance of his children and the impotence of the other gods. All these passages are transparently concerned with comparing Yahweh to other gods—not comparing Yahweh to beings that do not exist; that would be empty praise indeed.

2. TRADITIONAL CONCERNS WITH DIVINE PLURALITY IN ISRAELITE RELIGION

Traditional approaches to affirmations of divine plurality in the Hebrew Bible are understandably motivated by theological concerns, most notably a perceived compromise of monotheism. The problem is one of language and its assumptions. On one hand, it is assumed that the modern person’s definition of “monotheism” can rightly be imposed on the ancient Israelite mind. On the other hand, it is also assumed that any disconnect between the modern notion of “monotheism” and the theology of the ancient faithful Israelite can accurately be labeled with modern terms like “polytheism” or “henotheism.”

2.1 Psalm 82: Gods or Men?

With these assumptions firmly in place, traditional objections to divine plurality usually take the form of appeals to the denial statements discussed above, casting the plural מנהיגים of certain passages as human beings, or asserting that the other מנהיגים are only idols. It is convenient to return to several verses in Psalm 82:

1 God stands in the divine council; in the midst of the gods he passes judgment.

6 “I said, ‘you are gods, sons of the Most High, all of you’. 7 Therefore you shall die as humans do, and you shall fall as one of the princes.
In verse six, the plural בְּנֵי חֶלֶם of 82:1 are referred to once again as בְּנֵי חֶלֶם but are further identified as sons of the God of Israel (the Most High). It is well known that the phrases בְּנֵי חֶלֶם, בְּנֵי חֶלֶם, and בְּנֵי חֶלֶם have certifiable linguistic counterparts in Ugaritic texts to a council of gods under El, and that the meaning of these phrases in the Hebrew Bible points to divine beings.38 Traditional Christian and Jewish scholars have commonly argued that similar phrases, such as references to Moses as בְּנֵי חֶלֶם (Exod 4:16; 7:1), Israel as Yahweh’s “son” (Exod 4:23; Hos 11:1), and Israelites as “sons of the living God” (Hos 1:10 [Hebrew, 2:1]) inform us that the בְּנֵי חֶלֶם of Psalm 82 are human rulers, namely, the elders of Israel.

As a number of other scholars have pointed out, this position is incoherent for several reasons. First, if the בְּנֵי חֶלֶם in Psalm 82 are humans, why are they sentenced to die “like humans”? This sounds as awkward as sentencing a child to grow up, or a dog to bark. The point of v. 6 is that, in response to their corruption, the בְּנֵי חֶלֶם will be stripped of their immortality at God’s discretion and die as humans die. A clear contrast is intended by both the grammar and structure of the Hebrew text, saving us from such logic.39 Second, what is the scriptural basis for the idea that this psalm has God presiding over a council of humans that governs the nations of the earth? At no time in the Hebrew Bible did Israel’s elders ever have jurisdiction over all the nations of the earth. In fact, other divine council texts such as Deut 32:8–9 have the situation exactly opposite—Israel was separated from the nations to be God’s personal possession and the focus of his

38. There are several general phrases for a council of gods that provide a conceptual parallel with the Hebrew Bible: pbr 'ilm—“the assembly of El / the gods” (Gregorio Del Olmo Lete and Joaquín Sanmartín, “pbr,” A Dictionary of the Ugaritic Language in the Alphabetic Tradition (rev. ed.; trans. W. G. E. Watson; HONME 67; Leiden: Brill, 2003) 2:669; KTU 1.47.29, 1.118.28, 1.148:9 [hereafter, DULAT]); pbr bn 'ilm—“the assembly of the sons of El / the gods” (DULAT 2:669; KTU 1.4.III.14); pbr kklm—“the assembly of the stars” (DULAT 2:670; KTU 1.10.1.4; the phrase is parallel to bn 'il in the same text; see Job 38:7–8); mpbrt bn 'ilm—“the assembly of the gods” (DULAT 2:566; see KTU 1.65.3; cf. 1.40.25, 42 along with bn 'il in 1.40.33, 41 and its reconstruction in parallel lines in the same text—lines 7, 16, 24; 1.62:7; 1.123:15). Of closer linguistic relationship to material in the Hebrew Bible are: dt 'ilm—“assembly of El / the gods” (DULAT 1.152; see KTU 1.15.II.7, 11); dr 'il—“assembly (circle) of El” (DULAT 1.279–80; see KTU 1.15.III.19, 1.39.7, 1.62.16; 1.87.18); dr bn 'il—“assembly (circle) of the sons of El” (DULAT 1.279–80; see KTU 1.40.25, 33–34); dr dt smym—“assembly (circle) of those of heaven” (DULAT 1.279–80; see KTU 1.10.I.3, 5); dr 'il 1ybr vb—“the assembly (circle) of El and the assembly of Baal” (DULAT 1.279–80; see KTU 1.39.7, 1.62.16; 1.87.18). This list hardly exhausts the parallels between the dwelling place of El, which served as the meeting place of the divine council at Ugarit, and the abode of Yahweh. For the other linguistic parallels for each council and their respective modes of operation, see Heiser, “The Divine Council,” 39–49. For other works that overview the divine council and the sons of God, see Gerald Cooke, “The Sons of (the) God(s),” ZAW 76 (1964): 22–47; Mullen, The Divine Council, idem, “Assembly, Divine,” in Anchor Bible Dictionary 2:214–17; S. B. Parker, “Sons of (the) God(s),” in Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, 204–8 (hereafter, DDD); Matitiahu Tsevat, “God and the Gods in Assembly,” HUCA 40–41 (1969–1970): 123–37; J. Morgenstern, “The Mythological Background of Psalm 82,” HUCA 14 (1939): 29–126.

rule. Third, why would the corrupt decisions of a group of humans shake the foundations of the earth (v. 5)? The statement of Ps 82:5 is comprehensible if the council in question were composed of cosmic beings whose sphere of authority went beyond a human Sanhedrin.40

It is also worth pointing out that one cannot argue that the references to the gods / sons of God outside Psalm 82 speak of humans. Job 38:7–8 has the sons of God present at the creation of the world, rendering a human interpretation impossible. The same can be said for Ps 89:5–7 (Hebrew, vv. 6–8), where the sons of God of Yahweh's council are in heaven in the throne room of God, not on earth.

2.2 Deuteronomy 32 and the Canonical Israelite Worldview

The real problem with the human view of Psalm 82, however, is that this view cannot be reconciled with the passages that form the conceptual backdrop to Psalm 82. That is, the idea that the sons of God were created by Yahweh and ordained to rule the nations comes from somewhere in the biblical corpus, namely Deuteronomy 4 and 32. Those chapters clearly speak of an act of God to divide the nations of the earth among the sons of God as a punishment for rebellion before there ever was a nation of Israel. As a result, the idea that the elders of Israel are the backdrop for the council of Psalm 82 cannot be sustained. This necessitates that we turn our attention to the appropriate passages in Deuteronomy.

Deut 32:8–9 When the Most High gave to the nations their inheritance, when he divided mankind, he fixed the borders of the peoples according to the number of the sons of God [בְּנֵי הַאָלָלִים]. But the LORD's portion is his people, Jacob his allotted heritage.41
The event referred to in Deut 32:8–9 harks back to events at the Tower of Babel. The statement in Deut 32:9 that “the Lord’s portion is his people, Jacob his allotted inheritance” provides the key for understanding the contrast between vv. 8 and 9. In v. 9 the nation of Israel (here called “Jacob”) is described as Yahweh’s allotted inheritance. The parallelism requires the “nations” of v. 8 to be given as an inheritance as well, but to whom? 32:8b provides the answer, but a parallel makes sense only if the original reading of v. 8b included a reference to other beings (the “sons of God”) to whom the other nations could be given.

While Deut 32:8–9 described the nations being given over to gods who were not Yahweh, Deut 4:19–20 gives us the opposite side of the punitive coin:

19 And beware lest you lift up your eyes to heaven, and when you see the sun and the moon and the stars, all the host of heaven, and be drawn away and bow down to them and serve them, which the LORD your God has allotted to them, to all the peoples under the whole heaven. 20 But the LORD took you and brought you out of the iron furnace, out of Egypt, to be a people of his own inheritance, as you are this day.

Tigay notes that these passages “seem to reflect a biblical view that . . . as punishment for man’s repeated spurning of His authority in primordial times (Gen. 3–11), God deprived mankind at large of true knowledge of Himself and ordained that it should worship idols and subordinate celestial beings. . . . He selected Abraham and his descendants as the objects of His personal attention to create a model nation.” In a punitive decision reminiscent of Romans 1, then, God “gave humanity up” to their persistent resistance to taking him as their Sovereign. God subsequently called Israel into existence as His own. Hence each pagan nation was put under

42. Deut 32:8a reads בְּנֵי גוֹיִם, הַנַּחֲלָה לִבְנֵי גוֹיִם. הַנַּחֲלָה is pointed as a Hiphil infinitive absolute, but it should probably be understood as a defective spelling of the infinitive construct: בְּנֵי גוֹיִם. The object of the infinitive form is בָּנֵי גוֹיִם. As Sanders notes, the Hiphil of the verb לֻבָנֵי גוֹיִם can be “connected both with an accusativus personae (the inheriting person; hence, “When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance”) or with an accusativus rei (the object inherited by this person; and so rendering, “When the Most High gave the nations as an inheritance”). Instructive parallels include Deut 1:38; 3:28; 21:16; 31:7; Josh 1:6; 1 Sam 2:8; Zech 8:12; and Prov 8:21 (Sanders, Provenance of Deuteronomy 32, 154). Both options are syntactically possible, but which should be preferred? The answer is to be found in Deut 32:9: “But the Lord’s portion is his people, Jacob is his allotted inheritance.” Verse nine clearly presents the nation Jacob/Israel as being taken (cp. Deut 4:19–20) as an allotted (הַנַּחֲלָה) inheritance. Deuteronomy 4:19–20 makes the active “taking” clear. Note also the wordplay with the Hiphil verb in v. 8. The parallelism of MT’s verse nine would require “nations” be given as an inheritance to the sons of God by the Most High.

43. Tigay, Deuteronomy, 435. The same idea contained in these verses also seems to be the point of 1 Samuel 26:19, quoting a distraught David: “Now let my lord the king listen to his servant’s words. If the Lord has incited you against me, then may he accept an offering. If, however, men have done it, may they be cursed before the Lord! They have now driven me from my share in the Lord’s inheritance and have said, ‘Go, serve other gods’” (niv).
the administration of a being of inferior status to Yahweh, but Israel would be tended to by the “God of gods,” the “Lord of lords” (Deut 10:17). This backdrop to Psalm 82 renders untenable the view that the of that psalm are humans.

2.3 The Host of Heaven: Idols Only?

The last objection offered by scholars concerned with perceived implications of divine plurality in the Hebrew Bible are that the host of heaven referenced by Deut 4:19–20 (and so, Deut 32:8–9) are merely idols. While the Old Testament at times refers to idols as something inevitable for the biblical writer given the behavior of the Gentile nations—it is not coherent to argue that the Old Testament writer always intends to convey to readers that the gods of the nations are idols.

When this argument is put forth, it is frequently inferred from Deut 4:15–18, where God, through Moses, warns His people to not make idols, lest they be turned aside to worship the sun, moon, stars, etc. However, as noted briefly above, Deut 32:17 quite clearly has Moses referring to the other as evil spiritual entities: “They [Israel] sacrificed to demons (מִנְפֶּרֶד) who are not God (כּלֵי לֹא), to gods (כּלֵי לֹא) they did not know; new ones that had come along recently, whom your fathers had not reverenced.”

Other passages from Deuteronomy make it clear that idols are not in view when it comes to host of heaven language, in that the gods referred to are those entities whom Yahweh allotted to the other nations. Triangulating Deut 4:19–20; 32:8–9 with other references to the foreign gods in Deuteronomy—the gods / host of heaven allotted to other nations, gods whom Israel “had not known”—compels the conclusion that the biblical writer considered them real entities. These gods, whom Israel later worshipped in apostasy, are called demons. To have these other gods as only idols would then mean that Yahweh instituted idolatry among the nations. The following verses are relevant:

Deut 17:2–3 2 If there is found among you, within any of your towns which the LORD your God is giving you, a man or woman who does what is evil in the sight of the LORD your God, in transgressing his covenant, 3 who has gone and served other gods (כּלֵי לֹא) and bowed down before them, the sun or the moon or any of the host of heaven (כּלֵי לֹא), which I have forbidden...
Deut 29:25 They turned to the service of other gods ( אלהים) and worshiped them, gods whom they had not known and whom He [God] had not allotted (setColor) to them.

The retrospect to the warnings and worldview of Deut 4:19–20; 32:8–9 is unmistakable. It is hardly persuasive to assume the writer would have Yahweh setting statues of wood and stone over the nations. Moreover, to be consistent, any interpretation of Deut 4:19–20 and 32:8–9 must be coherent in Psalm 82. It is equally incoherent that Yahweh would sentence the other אלהים to die like mortals if they were only wood and stone, or that Yahweh would be presiding over wood and stone statues in heaven (cf. Ps 89:5–7 [Hebrew, vv. 6–8]). The writer of Deuteronomy did not consider the host of heaven (sun, moon, starry host) whom Yahweh allotted to the Gentile nations only as humanly fabricated idols.

It is also unsustainable to suppose that the biblical writer merely sought to prohibit the worship of idols associated with astronomical phenomena. It was commonly believed in the ancient world, including Israel, that the heavenly bodies were either animate beings or were inhabited or controlled by animate beings. The classic divine council passage, 1 Kgs 22, utilizes the heavenly host terminology for what are clearly divine beings:

19 And Micaiah said, “Therefore hear the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven (すること) standing (こと) beside him on his right hand and on his left. 20 and the LORD said, ‘Who will entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead?’ And one said one thing, and another said another. 21 Then a spirit (こと) came forward (こと) and stood before the LORD, saying, ‘I will entice him.’ 22 And the LORD said to him, ‘By what means?’ And he said, ‘I will go out, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ And he said, ‘You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so.’ 23 Now therefore behold, the LORD has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these your prophets; the LORD has declared disaster for you.” (ENGLISH STANDARD VERSION)

Yahweh is not holding council with physical chunks of stone and balls of gas. The text clearly equates the host of heaven with spiritual beings (a member of the host “comes forth,” “stands” before Yahweh, and speaks; v. 21). This issue brings to light another significant problem for those who seek to deny that such language refers to real divine entities in the canonical worldview of Israel. Consider the following texts:

Neh 9:6 6 You are the LORD, you alone. You have made heaven, the heaven of heavens, and all their host (こと), the earth and all that is upon it, the seas and all that is in them; and you preserve all of them; and the host of heaven (こと) worships you.

Ps 148:1–5 1 Praise the Lord! Praise the Lord from the heavens; praise him in the heights! 2 Praise him, all his angels (ם"א:ג"ל"מ"א); praise him, all his hosts (ם"א:ג"ל"מ"א)! 3 Praise him, sun and moon, praise him, all you shining stars! 4 Praise him, you highest heavens, and you waters above the heavens! 5 Let them praise the name of the Lord! For he commanded and they were created.

The parallelism in these passages makes clear the conceptual overlap, in that it has the heavenly host worshipping and praising Yahweh, their creator. The description is also point-for-point consistent with the broader ancient Near Eastern worldview that assumed that the stars were animate beings.49 Readers familiar with conceptual metaphor know that one cannot argue that the language in these texts is merely poetic, as though poetic expressions do not convey the actual belief system of the ancient writer. Conceptual metaphors or poetic expressions are not based on what a person’s view of reality does not entail. Rather, the metaphor is a means of framing and categorizing something that is believed. Further, there is little coherence in the idea that theological content cannot be drawn from poetic texts. One wonders what moderns could know about the beliefs of any of the ancient Near Eastern civilizations if we eliminated from consideration what we read in their poetic epics. Taking the Baal Cycle as a specific example, we would very little about the religious belief of the people of Ugarit if we took such an approach.

2.4 The First Commandment: “No Other Gods before Me”

The first commandment of the Decalogue (Exod 20:3) charged the Israelites, “You shall have no other gods (אנ"ל:מ"א) before me (ynpAl[""]).” It has long been observed that this command does not actually deny the existence of other gods, despite being a very obvious opportunity to make such a position clear. Rather, the focus is on which god is exclusively worthy of worship.50 If that be the case, then the question of what exactly is meant that no other gods are “before” (על יבמ) Yahweh must be answered.

Building on an observation of Werner Schmidt, that while the command does not explicitly deny that other gods exist, it likely prohibits other gods from being in Yahweh’s presence, John H. Walton suggests that the phrase על יבמ should be understood spatially in Exod 20:3, with the result that other gods are removed from the picture of Yahweh’s governance.51 More

specifically, Walton argues that when נַעֲשָׂה occurs with a suffixed object pronoun that is personal, or a stated object that is a person, the resulting phrase should be understood spatially. If the first commandment is understood in this light, the conclusion follows in Walton’s analysis:

The Israelites were not to construe Yahweh as operating within a community of gods. There was to be no thought of pantheon or consort. He does not function as the head of a pantheon with a divine assembly. In short, he works alone. The significance of this is that the pantheon/divine assembly concept carried with it the idea of distribution of power among many divine beings. The first commandment becomes a simple statement that Yahweh’s power is absolute, not being distributed among other deities or limited by the will of the assembly . . . Although it does not say explicitly that no other gods exist, it does remove them from the presence of Yahweh. If Yahweh does not share power, authority or jurisdiction with them, they are not gods in any meaningful sense of the word. The first commandment does not insist that the other gods are non-existent, but that they are powerless; it disenfranchises them. It does not simply say that they should not be worshiped; it leaves them with no status worthy of worship.52

Certain parts of this interpretation of the Decalogue are quite consistent with the views put forth in this article. The first commandment does not deny the existence of other gods. Yahweh is certainly incomparable, holding absolute, unlimited power. The framing of the argument and other conclusions that extend from it make it difficult to sustain, however.

There are certainly instances where נַעֲשָׂה is coupled with a suffixed object pronoun that refers to a person, or where נַעֲשָׂה is followed by a personal stated object, where the phrase either cannot be understood spatially, or where doing so would result in very awkward exegesis. For example, a syntactical search53 of the Hebrew Bible for both constructions yields examples such as Deut 21:16 (“then on the day when he assigns his possessions as an inheritance to his sons, he may not treat the beloved son as the firstborn in place of the son who is not preferred נַעֲשָׂה, who is the firstborn”). The sense here is not spatial, but perhaps temporal (giving the beloved son an inheritance before the less preferred firstborn) or abstractly locational (giving the beloved son an inheritance in place of the less preferred firstborn). Other examples include Deut 2:25 (“This day I will begin to put the dread and fear of you on the peoples נַעֲשָׂה who are under the whole heaven . . .”), where the idea appears to be a fear put into the hearts of the foreign people, not something in their literal presence in a spatial sense. In Gen 32:22 Jacob’s bribe of Esau “. . . passed on ahead of him נַעֲשָׂה, i.e., Jacob),” an instance where the context conveys something

52. Ibid., 13–14.
53. These two constructions were searched using the syntactically tagged database of the Hebrew Bible created by Francis I. Andersen and A. Dean Forbes, The Andersen-Forbes Phrase Marker Analysis, Logos Bible Software, Bellingham, WA, 2006.
quite antithetical to the spatial meaning—the gift was certainly not in Jacob’s presence as he had sent it away to Esau. Consequently, the fact that the spatial sense can be conveyed in the Hebrew Bible is not an argument that it is conveyed in Exod 20:3.

Other elements of Walton’s conclusion are more fundamentally problematic. The statement that Yahweh “does not function as the head of a pantheon with a divine assembly” cannot be upheld. If this were the correct interpretation of the first commandment, it would stand out as a glaring contradiction to several explicit texts discussed above that have Yahweh superior in the heavenly council among its divine constituent members. This assertion is not the primary focus of Walton’s conclusion, though. The idea that Yahweh does not share power appears to be more of a concern. The coherence of this conclusion depends on what is meant by “sharing” power. Walton claims the other gods have been completely disenfranchised, and that this disenfranchisement is what makes them unworthy of worship.

There are two problems with this articulation. First, there is an unnecessary link between shared power and being unworthy of worship. As has been detailed here, Yahweh’s ontological uniqueness and incomparable power are the basis of his exclusive claim to worship, not whether he shares power with lesser beings. One can embrace that Yahweh is the unique, incomparable, sovereign head of his divine council without imagining any circumstance where the lesser members deserve worship.

Second, the Scripture is clear that Yahweh does indeed share his power with the members of his heavenly host, albeit while retaining his ultimate sovereignty. Several of the passages considered above make this unmistakable. The disinheritance of the nations and their subjugation under the sons of God in Deut 4:19–20; 32:8–9 portray a sovereign act of Yahweh, whereby he rejects direct rule of rebellious humanity. The sons of God are not portrayed as presumptively moving into this vacuum. They were put over the nations by Yahweh, and then subsequently judged in Psalm 82 for their corrupt administration. They were put over the nations by Yahweh, and then subsequently judged in Psalm 82 for their corrupt administration. This is shared dominion, albeit of a punitively bent. Yahweh must be the sovereign head of these beings in Israelite religion, otherwise a truly polytheistic picture would emerge. The biblical author was careful to make Yahweh’s headship clear. The same portrayal was seen in 1 Kgs 22:19–23, where Yahweh decrees the end of Ahab but leaves it to the members of his council to accomplish his sovereign will. This shared, symbiotic rulership is illustrated again in Dan 4:17 [Aramaic 4:14]. Nebuchadnezzar’s humiliation is described as handed down by members of the heavenly host who are working under the authority of God: “The sentence is by decree of the watchers, and the decision is by the word of the holy ones, to the end that the living may know that the Most High rules the kingdom of men and gives it to whomever he wants, and sets it over the humblest of men.” It isn’t clear just what role the members of the heavenly host play in the decree, but it cannot be said they had no role at all. How would the writer wish to convey that point by utilizing such vo-
cabulary? 1 Kings 22 might perhaps provide an analogy. There the members of the heavenly council participated in the decision, not in terms of Yahweh's decree that it was time for Ahab's death, but in the way that his death would be accomplished. This description of decision-making capacity on the part of lesser מַלְאָלִים plays an important role in what Patrick Miller referred to as the “cosmic-political” role of the divine council, a fundamental component of Israelite religion and Old Testament theology.54

The first commandment, then, does not constitute any sort of denial of the existence of other gods or of the divine council in Israelite religion. The point of the command, like so many other declarations in the Torah and elsewhere, is that Israelites were to have Yahweh as their sole object of worship.55

3. MONOTHEISM, HENO THEISM, MONOLATRY, OR POLYTHEISM?
THE INADEQUACY OF MODERN TERMINOLOGY FOR ORTHODOX YAHWISM

Does the affirmation of the reality of other בֵּית הַלַוֹגוֹ by the canonical authors disqualify Israelite religion as monotheistic? Are other terms used in academic discourse for ancient religious pantheons more appropriate? The short answer to both questions, in my view, is a qualified no. The answer is qualified with respect to the realization that little is solved by applying or refusing to apply a single modern term to Israel's ancient view of God.

“Monotheism” as a term was coined in the 17th century not as an antonym to “polytheism,” but to “atheism.”56 A monotheist, then, was a person who believed there was a God, not someone who believed there was only one spiritual entity that could or should be named by the letters G-O-D. This understanding of the term has been lost in contemporary discourse, and so it would be pointless to call for its re-introduction.

A more coherent approach is to describe what Israelites believed about their God rather than trying to encapsulate that belief in a single word. When scholars have addressed this tension, however, a shift to description over terminology has not been the strategy. Rather, scholars have tried to qualify the modern vocabulary. Terms like “inclusive monotheism” or “tolerant monolatry” have been coined in an attempt to accurately classify

55. Bruce Waltke and Michael O’Connor capture this meaning in their understanding of לֹוֵג אֱלֹהִים in Exod 20:3—“Thou shalt have no other gods over against me” (Bruce K. Waltke and Michael O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 218.
56. MacDonald, Deuteronomy and the Meaning of ‘Monotheism,’ 1–21. As studies of the origin and development of the term show, “monotheism” was initially not meant as an antonym to “polytheism” but to “atheism.”
Israelite religion in both preexilic and postexilic stages. These terms have not found broad acceptance because they are oxymoronic to the modern ear.

Other scholars have argued for an “incipient monotheism” that could perhaps include the affirmation of other gods who were inferior. There is precedent for this idea in the scholarly exchanges over henotheism, monolatry, and Israelite religion. Historically, henotheism assumes all gods are species equals and the elevation of one god is due to socio-political factors—not theological nuancing. Quoting Max Müller’s seminal work on the subject, Yusa writes that henotheism was a technical term coined “to designate a peculiar form of polytheism . . . [where] each god is, ‘at the time a real divinity, supreme and absolute’ not limited by the powers of any other gods.” Müller called this idea “belief in single gods . . . a worship of one god after another.” T. J. Meek referred to preexilic Israelite religion as both henotheistic and monolatrous, thereby equating the two, based on the prohibition of worshipping other gods. But did the canonical Israelite writer believe that Yahweh was superior on the basis of socio-political factors, or was Yahweh intrinsically “other” with respect to his nature and certain attributes? Did the writer view Yahweh as only a being who could not be limited by the powers of other deities, or was there something unique about Yahweh that both transcended and produced this total freedom?

H. H. Rowley, reacting to the work of Meek, moved toward the idea of uniqueness but did so using the word “henotheism.” What distinguished Mosaic religion in his mind from that of other “henotheists” was “not so much the teaching that Yahweh was to be the only God for Israel as the proclamation that Yahweh was unique.” Rowley’s focus on uniqueness was on the right track, but his approach has the disadvantage of trying to convince the academic community to redefine a term whose meaning by now is entrenched.

The proposal offered here is that scholars should stop trying to define Israel’s religion with singular, imprecise modern terms and instead stick to describing what Israel believed. “Monotheism” as it is currently understood means that no other gods exist. This term is inadequate for describing Israelite religion, but suggesting it be done away with would no doubt cause considerable consternation among certain parts of the academic com-

57. For these terms and their discussion, see Juha Pakkala, Intolerant Monotheism in the Deuteronomic History (Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 76; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 1–20; 224–33; MacDonald, Deuteronomy and the Meaning of Monotheism, 21–71.


community, not to mention the interested laity. “Henotheism” and “monolatry,” while perhaps better, are inadequate because they do not say enough about what the canonical writer believed. Israel was certainly “monolatrous,” but that term comments only on what Israel believed about the proper object of worship, not what it believed about Yahweh’s nature and attributes with respect to the other gods.

In my judgment, describing what Israel believed about Yahweh need not involve the kind of high philosophical speculation that most modern scholarship wants to deny the ancient Israelite. Several simple ideas have been communicated to the reader by the canonical authors that allow a description that demonstrates a firm, uncompromising belief in Yahweh’s “species uniqueness” among the other gods assumed to exist. Israel did not believe the other gods were species-equal with Yahweh and essentially interchangeable. Israel did not believe that Yahweh should be viewed as the supreme god only because of his deeds on behalf of Israel. The canonical authors considered Yahweh to be in a class by himself. He was “species-unique.”

In briefest terms, the statements in the canonical text (poetic or otherwise) inform the reader that, for the biblical writer, Yahweh was an אֹהֶל, but no other אֹהֶל was Yahweh—and never was nor could be. This notion allows for the existence of other אֹהֶל and is more precise than the terms “polytheism” and “henotheism.” It is also more accurate than “monotheism,” though it preserves the element of that conception that is most important to traditional Judaism and Christianity: Yahweh’s solitary “otherness” with respect to all that is, in heaven and in earth.

But on what grounds can this description be derived? The elements of the text that allow this approach have been copiously documented in the scholarly literature. As Isa 43:10 and 44:6–8 affirm, the canonical writers assumed that their God was uncreated and always existed and that the other gods were subsequent. This alone points to intrinsic superiority to and distinction from all the other gods. The other gods were not, chronologically speaking, co-existent. Moreover, the pre-existent and uncreated Yahweh created all the other members of the host of heaven (Neh 9:6, Ps 148:1–5). Their life derives from him, not vice versa. Rather than socio-political factors, the canonical writer believed the God of Israel alone was sovereign

62. Interestingly, species uniqueness is the basis for God’s distinction from the other gods in later Jewish writers. For example, 2 (Slavonic) Enoch (J) 2.2 affirms that while other gods are feckless, they exist and are temporary: “And do not turn away from the Lord, and worship vain gods, gods who did not create the heaven and the earth or any created thing; for they will perish, and so will those who worship them.” The same book later has God inform Enoch that, “There is no adviser and no successor to my creation. I am self-eternal and not made by hands” (33:4). Sibylline Oracles confess that “God is alone, unique, and supreme” since he is “self-generated and unbegotten.” Yet in the same text one reads that, “if gods beget and yet remain immortal, there would have been more gods born than men.” See John J. Collins, “Sibylline Oracles, Fragments,” OTP 1:470 (the citations are from Fragment 1:16; Fragment 2:1; Fragment 3:4).
and deserving of worship because his nature was unique (pre-existence) and his power was unquestionably superior (creator of all that is).

One could object that the idea of “species uniqueness” is unintelligible with respect to divine beings, perhaps by analogy to the human world. I am human, yet no other human is me, but all humans share the same species status. Hence one can be unique in properties, but species uniqueness is a fallacy. The analogy with humankind is flawed, however, since no such claim as pre-existence before all humans is seriously offered. An attribute shared by no other member in the species by definition makes that entity species unique despite any other shared qualities. In other words, a species unique being need not be unique in every attribute. The entity must only be considered to be set apart in a way or ways that are completely exclusive.

CONCLUSION

The approach to divine plurality and the matter of monotheism offered here is theologically and philosophically sound, while giving primacy of place to the data of the Hebrew Bible. Scholarship is not advanced by elevating presuppositions to the level of hermeneutical filters or by forcing vocabulary, grammar, syntax, and comparative data in a comfortable theological box. It is my hope that scholars will be encouraged to re-evaluate their assumptions about the reality of divine plurality in Israel’s worldview and how to parse that reality in understanding Israelite religion.

63. This issue would take us into the matter of just what is an מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ is. Traditional theologians have operated on the assumption that the word מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ denotes an ontologically unique thing or person. Those who work in the Hebrew text, however, know that there are variety of beings referred to as מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ. In addition to the many references in this article to the מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ of the Gentile nations, the Hebrew Bible describes several other beings or groups of beings as מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ: (1) demons (Deut 32:17); (2) spirits from Sheol (including the human dead; 1 Sam 28:13); (3) the Angel of Yahweh (Hos 12:4–5 [Hebrew text] and Gen 48:15–16, noting the compounded subjects with the singular verb עָרֹב); and (4) perhaps even angels (see Gen 28:12 and 32:1–2, with 35:1–7, noting the alternation between singular and plural predication). The data demonstrates that מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ is not restricted to Yahweh, and so the term itself cannot denote an ontologically unique being. That assumption is, at least in part, drawn from the use of מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ as a proper noun for the God of Israel. But that usage is in no way exclusive. In briefest terms, an מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ is a being whose proper “habitation” was considered the “spirit world,” and whose primary existence was a disembodied one. Hence Yahweh is an מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ, but he has attributes that nonetheless make him species unique with respect to all מִשְׁפָּט נֶפֶשׁ.