Abstract: This paper examines the interaction between the premises of the moral argument for God’s existence and the problem of evil. The main contention of this paper is to show that in order to deny the goodness of God through the problem of evil, one must first assume the existence of a law by which the goodness of God can be evaluated. However, C.S. Lewis and a multitude of philosophers preceding him claim that the existence of such a law is a sufficient condition for the existence of God. Hence, if these philosophers are correct in their assertions, the existence of an evil for which God’s moral state could be questioned implies both the non-existence and the existence of God. The culmination of this paper is a demonstration showing that five specific premises vital to either the moral argument or the problem of evil are logically inconsistent. From the logical inconsistency of these five premises, it can be shown that one of these premises must be rejected. Moreover, this paper argues that the most reasonable premise to reject is that premise stating that pointless evils exist. However, the question of which premise ought to be rejected is largely subjective. The power of the paper is in providing an argument that forces the reader to reject the premise he believes to be the least probably true.