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Francis Fukuyama: Identity and Migration Study Guide

Steven Alan Samson
Liberty University, ssamson@liberty.edu

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Study Questions

1. What is the hole in the political theory underlying liberal democracy? What is its (especially Hobbes’s and Locke’s) emphasis regarding the social contract? What historical circumstances were behind the rise of modern liberalism? What principle did it establish? What question did it leave unanswered? Why was it not seen as a central issue by the American founders?

2. Why did identity politics in the West begin with the Reformation? [cf. Minogue, chapter 4]. What did Rousseau and Herder contribute to developing the idea of authenticity? What kind of “contract” does it entail? How does it reflect the reality of modern market democracies? How does the ideal of *la carrière ouverte aux talents* [Thomas Carlyle’s quote about Napoleon: “The tools to him that can use them"] reflect the breakdown tradition barriers [i.e., the social classes associated with Ferdinand Tönnies’s idea of *Gemeinschaft*: personal, “face-to-face” community] to social mobility?

3. According to Charles Taylor, what makes modern identity inherently political? [cf. Minogue on politics as theatricality and “the personal is the political”]. What does modern identity politics revolve around? Give some examples [cf. Rahe on the politics of friendship and Minogue on those guardians of the West who sold the pass].

4. What is multiculturalism? What have been the typical controversies in America for the past generation? Why has America’s Lockean tradition made the assertion of group rights so controversial?

5. What makes radical Islamist ideology more a manifestation of modern identity politics rather than of traditional Muslim culture? How does Olivier Roy (Globalised Islam) explain its origin? Why does the question of identity not come up in traditional society? Why has identity become problematic? [Remember the idea of authenticity and then understand what makes the move from the *Gemeinschaft* of traditional society to the *Gesellschaft* – impersonal, “faceless” business or society of strangers – of modernity such a problem]. Why does determining what is haram and what is halal become such a problem? [Orthodox Jews adapted in part by incorporating Kosher (K) dietary laws right into the processing and packaging of food]. What does Roy mean by the “Protestantisation” of Muslim belief? What does his thesis help explain? Where does it overstate the case? Why does Roy’s analytical model remain valid even when applied to Muslim countries? What is some of the evidence?

6. What two implications follow from Roy’s thesis? What did Fritz Stern [*The Politics of Cultural Despair*] and Ernest Gellner [*The Conditions of Liberty*] recognize about the extremist politics of the 20C? Why is Fukuyama skeptical of the claim that “violence and even suicide bombing have deep Koranic or historical roots?” Why is “bringing modernization and democracy to the middle east” not the solution to the problem of jihadist terrorism? Why do more liberal societies have weak identities? Why is the nature of the national identity that remains a problem? According to Seymour Martin Lipset [*American Exceptionalism*], why is American identity political in nature? Identify
the five values of the American creed. What is unusual about the American civil religion?

7. What are some attributes of the “Anglo-Protestant” culture [note Max Weber], even though America has been somewhat “decoupled” from its dominant ethnic origins? What are some of the less pleasant aspects of contemporary American culture? In what sense is “American exceptionalism” a double-edged sword?

8. What is the reason Europeans sought to create a “post-national” European identity after WWII? What is the reality? Why is national identity, such as it is, still more ethnically based? How do the Dutch illustrate what Amartya Sen’s “plural monoculturalism”?

9. What makes Europe’s failure to integrate its Muslims a “ticking time bomb”?

10. What is the two-pronged approach that Fukuyama proposes to reconcile Europeans and their immigrant minorities?

11. Concerning the first prong, why cannot liberalism ultimately be cased on group rights? Why cannot European civilization be culturally neutral? Fukuyama, who wrote The End of History and the Last Man, refers to multiculturalism as a “game at the end of history.” What does he mean? What is the danger of having cultural diversity intrude into the public sphere. Think of the ancient Greeks, particularly Pericles on the public spiritedness of Athenian citizens that kept the private realm from including on public duty.

12. Why is it more difficult to ask Muslims in Europe to give up group rights than in the United States? Contrary to Fukuyama, I would say that the creation of something similar to “group rights” in the United States during the last generation has greatly complicated the picture here, too. What was one result of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf (culture-struggle)?

13. Concerning the second prong, what is problematic about European ways of understanding and experiencing national identity? Can newcomers value a national identity that Europeans themselves do not value? What is meant by Leitkultur (which was coined by Bassam Tibi [The Challenge of Fundamentalism], a German scholar of Syrian origins)?

Wikipedia: “Bassam Tibi first suggested a 'Leitkultur' in his 1998 book Europa ohne Identität ('Europe without identity'). He defined it in terms of what are commonly called western values, and spoke of a European rather than a German 'Leitkultur'. 'The values needed for a core culture are those of modernity: democracy, secularism, the Enlightenment, human rights and civil society.' (B. Tibi, Europa ohne Identität, p. 154). These core values are similar to those of the 'liberal-democratic basic order' (Freiheitlich-demokratischen Grundordnung) which is considered the foundational value of the post-war Federal Republic of Germany, and the unified German state after 1990. Tibi advocated a cultural pluralism based on a value consensus, rather than monoculturalism. However, he also opposed a value-blind multiculturalism, and the development of 'parallel societies' where immigrant minorities live and work, isolated from the western society around them. Tibi advocated a structured immigration policy, and opposed illegal immigration into Germany."
14. What can Americans teach Europeans about constructing post-ethnic forms of national citizenship? How are the French and British responding to the challenge? What makes the welfare state itself part of the problem? What does Fukuyama about postmodern elites and the "valuelessness of postmodernity?"

Review

- theory of liberal democracy
- Rousseau on authenticity
- Charles Taylor
- Gemeinschaft
- halal
- Anglo-Protestant culture
- Leitkultur

- religious toleration
- Herder on folk culture
- multiculturalism
- Gesellschaft
- extremist politics of the 20C
- Amartya Sen
- John Jay on American settlers
- social mobility
- group rights
- haram
- Seymour Martin Lipset
- corporatism