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Joseph Nye, Jr.: Understanding International Conflicts Study Guide

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CHAPTER ONE: IS THERE AN ENDURING LOGIC OF CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS?

Outline

A. WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS? (3-4)
   1. World Imperial System
      a. Western: Roman, Spanish, French, British
      b. Regional Empires: Sumerian, Persian, Chinese
   2. Feudal System
      a. Crosscutting, Non-Territorial Loyalties and Conflicts
   3. Anarchic System of States
      a. Examples
      1) City-States
      2) Dynastic Territorial States
      b. Absence of a Common Sovereign
      1) Self-Help System
      2) Thomas Hobbes: State of Nature
      c. Domestic (Municipal) vs. International Politics and Law
      1) Domestic Monopoly on the Use of Force vs. International Anarchy
      2) Domestic Sense of Community vs. Absence of a Common Loyalty
      3) Result: Gap between Order and Justice
   4. This Last System Is the Most Relevant to Contemporary International Politics

B. TWO VIEWS OF ANARCHIC POLITICS (4-8)
   1. Political Philosophy: Two Views
      b. John Locke: People Can Make Contracts
   2. International Politics: Two Current Views
      a. Realism is the dominant tradition; it is more pessimistic: Hans Morgenthau was a leading theorist
      b. Liberalism (often called idealism), the more optimistic tradition, traces back to Baron Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Woodrow Wilson
   3. Presuppositions
      a. Liberals emphasize economic and social interdependence
         (1) They see a global society that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for states (e.g., trade, the UN)
      b. Realists claim liberals overstate the difference between domestic and international politics
   4. Realist Rejoinder: “A State of War Does Not Mean Constant War”
      a. Sidebar: 1910
   5. Resurgence of Liberal Claims in the 1970s and 1980s
      a. Richard Rosecrance: States can increase their power either aggressively by territorial conquest or peacefully through trade
   a. Ozone depletion
   b. AIDS and drugs
   c. Richard Falk: non-territorial loyalty
   d. Transnational forces are undoing the Peace of Westphalia

7. Realist Rebuttal

8. Other Approaches
   a. Marxism
   b. Dependency Theory [Cardoso changed to a free market view and served as the Brazilian president]
   c. Kenneth Waltz: Neo-realism
   d. Robert Keohane: Neo-liberalism

9. Constructivists
   a. Concepts are socially constructed [cf. medieval nominalism, deconstruction, and Chomsky's deep structures]
   b. Focus on instrumental rationality
   c. John Maynard Keynes’ dead scribblers

C. BUILDING BLOCKS (8-12)
1. Actors
   a. States
   b. Non-state actors
      (1) TNCs or MNCs (multinational corporations)
   c. Middle East as an Illustration
      (1) MNCs
      (2) IGOs (intergovernmental organizations)
      (3) NGOs (non-governmental organizations)
      (4) Transnational ethnic groups such as the Kurds

2. Goals
   a. National security

3. Instruments
   a. Stanley Hoffmann: Link between military strength and positive achievement has been loosened
   b. Reasons
      (1) Nuclear weapons
      (2) Expense of conventional forces
      (3) Internal constraints
      (4) Alternatives to Force
   c. Basic game of security goes on
      (1) Hegemonic states
      (2) Hegemonic wars
      (3) New treaty sets the new framework of order: e.g., the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713; the Congress of Vienna, 1815; and the United Nations system, 1945

D. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (12)
1. Thucydides: The Father of Realism
   a. Strategos=general

E. A SHORT VERSION OF A LONG STORY (12-15)
1. Initial Alliance of the Greece City-States during the Persians Wars
2. Athenian Empire
   a. Delian League
3. Civil War in Epidamnus
   a. Democrats sought help from Corcyra [the metropolis=mother city] but were turned down
   b. Democrats turned to Corinth, an Athenian rival, but the Corcyreans sent a fleet to recapture their former colony and defeated the Corinthian fleet
c. Corinth declared war and Corcyra turned to Athens for help
4. Athenian Dilemma: Break truce or allow a shift in the power balance?
a. Athenians pursued a deterrence strategy: show of force against Corinth
did not succeed in forcing Corinth to back down
b. Corinth stirred up problems in Potidaea, which was an Athenian ally
c. Sparta had promised aid to Corinth if Athens attacked Potidaea
d. Athens sent forces to put down an uprising
5. Great Debate in Sparta
a. Spartans voted in favor of war in order to maintain the balance of power
   by checking the increase of Athenian power
6. War (431-404 BC)
a. Peace of Nicias
b. Disastrous Sicilian Expedition
c. Four Hundred Oligarchs
d. Athenian Defeat

F. CAUSES AND THEORIES (15-18)
1. What Made War Inevitable
2. Pericles
3. Athens’ Security Dilemma
   a. Security dilemmas are characteristic of anarchic organization
4. Prisoner’s Dilemma
   a. Cooperation
   b. Issues of Trust and Credibility
5. Balance of Naval Power
6. Question of Cheating

G. INEVITABILITY AND THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE (18-20)
1. Belief in War’s Inevitability as a Cause
2. Robert Axelrod
   a. Tit-for-Tat strategy
3. Belief in the Inevitability of War Is Corrosive in International Politics
   a. If you suspect your opponent will cheat, you rely on yourself
4. Thucydides’ View of Human Nature
   a. Donald Kagan contends that Thucydides erred; Sparta feared a slave
      revolt more than it feared Athens
   b. Kagan’s Conclusion: Precipitating Causes – Policy Mistakes by the Chief Actors
      – Were More Important
5. Modern Lessons
   a. Be aware of both regularities and changes
   b. Beware of patently shallow historical analogies
   c. Be aware of the selectivity of historians
   d. Historians are affected by their contemporary concerns; consequently the
      questions they ask change
7. The Cure to Misunderstanding History Is to Read More, Not Less

H. ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (19-20)
1. Uses of Moral Arguments
   a. They move and constrain people
      (1) e.g., Corcyra’s appeal
   b. They are used rhetorically as propaganda to disguise less elevated
      motives
      (1) e.g., the Melian Debate
2. The Basic Touchstone for Moral Arguments Is Impartiality
3. Kantian Tradition (deontological emphasizes duties and rules) vs. the Utilitarian
   Tradition (consequentialist); some add Virtue Ethics (aretaic)
4. Moral Arguments Can Be Judged in Three Ways:
   a. Motives or intentions involved
   b. Means used
c. Consequences or net effects

I. LIMITS ON ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (20-22)

1. Weak International Consensus on Values
2. Different Standards of Behavior: Private vs. Public
   a. Collective abstractions like the State not held to the same standard
3. Complexity of Causation
   a. Oxford Union debate, 1933
   b. Hamburger argument
4. Order and Justice Are Both Important
   a. Absence of institutions to preserve the order that precedes justice

J. THREE VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF MORALITY (23-28)

1. Skeptics
   a. Example: Thucydides
      (1) Melian Debate: might makes right
   b. Morality Requires Choice
   c. Criticisms: Some Choices
      (1) Thomas Hobbes: balance of power
      (2) International law and customs
      (3) International organizations
   d. Just War Doctrine in Wartime
      (1) Answer to pacifism
   e. Why Complete Skepticism May Be Rejected
   f. Realists Who Are Not Complete Skeptics
      (1) Emphasis on order
      (2) Moral crusades disrupt balances of power [cf. Hobbes]
   g. Tradeoffs between Order and Justice
2. State Moralists
   a. Example: Michael Walzer
      (1) States represent the pooled rights of individuals
   b. A Society of States with Certain Rules
      (1) Sovereignty: Good fences make good neighbors
      (2) Frequent violations
   c. Intervention is a long-standing problem
      (1) Examples of Panama and Kuwait
3. Cosmopolitans
   a. Need to focus on distributive justice
      (1) Problem of the “brain drain”
   b. National boundaries have no moral standing
   c. Limited cosmopolitan view looks at people’s multiple loyalties: pluralism
4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach
   a. Trade-Offs
   b. Outrage May Lead to Heightened Risk
   c. The issues recur throughout history

Study Questions

1. What Is International Politics? Identify three basic forms of world politics. Identify the chief varieties of the anarchic system of states. What does the author mean by calling international politics “a self-help system?” What is life like in Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature? Identify two ways international law differs from domestic law? With what result? (3-4)

2. Two Views of Anarchic Politics Identify the two major traditions in thinking about international politics that in some ways began with Hobbes and Locke. Who are some of the leading exponents of each? What is the central perception of each? What are some of the arguments
pro and con? Identify five other approaches. How do constructivists differ from neorealists and neoliberals? What is the practical importance of theories? (4-8)

3. **Building Blocks** Identify three concepts that are basic to theorizing about international politics. How is each concept changing? (For example, actors include not only states but also IGOs, NGOs, and transnational ethnic groups). Identify three changes in the role of force. What other factors may play a larger role than force? How is the balance of power supposed to work? What are hegemonic wars and how are they resolved? (8-12)

4. **The Peloponnesian War** Summarize the key events and circumstances that led to the Second Peloponnesian War. What was Athens’s dilemma? (12-14)

5. **Causes and Theories** What did Thucydides believe caused the war? What was the view of Pericles? What is a security dilemma? What is the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario in game theory? What was Athens’s security dilemma, as described by the Corcyraeans? (15-17)

6. **Inevitability and the Shadow of the Future** What does Robert Axelrod believe to be the most effective strategy in Prisoner’s Dilemma? What does it take to develop trust? (Trust is the title of a recent book by Francis Fukuyama). Compare Donald Kagan’s view of the precipitating causes with Thucydides’s theory of inevitability. What three lessons may be drawn from this ancient history. How did Thucydides’s questions differ from those we might ask today? (17-20)

7. **Ethical Questions and International Politics** How may moral arguments be used? What views did the Athenians and Melians take in 416 BC? With what result (p. 22)? Contrast the Kantian (natural or intrinsic ethical norms) with the utilitarian (constructivist or consequentialist ethical norms) tradition. Identify three ways moral arguments may be judged. (20-22)

8. **Limits on Ethics in International Relations** Identify four reasons why ethics plays less of a role in international than in domestic politics. Why is the “hamburger argument” unsound? (22-23)

9. **Three Views of the Role of Morality** Identify three different views of ethics in international relations. Which views do realists tend to take? Idealists? Give three reasons why the argument of skeptics is inadequate. According to Thomas Hobbes, what does escaping the state of nature require? What role may be played by international law and customs? International organizations? What takes priority: justice or order? What is the problem with moral crusades? (23-26)

10. What are the chief considerations for state moralists? What circumstances might justify intervention? What are the chief considerations for cosmopolitans? What is distributive justice? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each view? What is the place of morality? [In the Morgenthau reading later, we will consider the issue of morality from a classical realist perspective]. What has changed since the time of Thucydides? (26-28)

**Review**

- world imperial system
- city-states
- anarchic system of states
- balance of power
- NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
- Athens’s security dilemma
- Second Peloponnesian War
- Melians (Melian dialogue)
- reasons ethics plays less of a role in international than domestic politics
CHAPTER TWO: ORIGINS OF THE GREAT TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONFLICTS

Study Questions

1. **International Systems and Levels of Causation** What is an international system? What are some of its intangible aspects? In light of the issue of morality (p. 28), why are the unintended consequences of a system (such as the market system) important? How did the existing international system affect Bolshevik behavior? [Revolutionaries sometimes refer to the pattern as “co-optation,” which justifies destroy existing institutions]. What is the geopolitical view of the distribution of power among states, as understood by Kautilya and Machiavelli? What accounts for a checkerboard pattern? (33-35)

2. **Levels of Analysis** Identify three levels of analysis. What does Nye mean by overprediction? What is William Occam’s rule of parsimony? (35-37)


4. **Revolutionary and Moderate Goals and Instruments** What factors do constructivists take into account? What were the rules of the game in the eighteenth century (a period defined in part by the Treaty of Utrecht)? Why did states’ goals change? How did the Napoleonic Wars change the process? What makes the French Revolution exogenous to a structural theory? How did technology change the means? (38-39)

5. **The Structure and Process of the Nineteenth-Century System** What changes resulted from the Congress of Vienna? When did the big change occur? Why did it not produce instability? What changes do constructivists point out? (39-42)

6. **A Modern Sequel** How has the German problem changed over the years? What made possible Germany’s reunification? Identify three ways things have changed. (42-43)

7. **Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy** How may the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the onset of the Austro-Hungarian War, and the end of the Cold War be understood at the level of domestic politics? How did Karl Marx and classical liberals like Richard Cobden view the relationship between capitalism and war or peace? How well did Marxist and liberal theories account for the onset of the First World War and other events based on domestic politics? (43-44)

8. **Liberalism Revived** Why were liberal theories discredited? What are the four strands of recent liberal thinking? Why is trade important? Illustrate with the case of Japan in the 1930s, as noted by Eugene Staley, and recently. According to neoliberals, why do international organizations matter? How do institutions stabilize expectations? What did Karl Deutsch mean by “pluralistic security communities?” What circumstances might cause security dilemmas to reemerge in Europe? (44-47)

9. **Liberal Democracy and War** According to Michael Doyle, why do liberal democracies
not fight other liberal democracies? How does a **plebiscitary democracy** differ from a liberal democracy?

10. **Definition of National Interests** Compare and contrast the realist and liberal views. (46)

11. **Variations in Foreign Policies** Besides trade and democracy, what other factors in their Domestic affairs may explain different foreign policies? (47-50)

12. PowerPoint: The five **crises of national development** in the model developed by Michael Roskin are identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution.

   1) Identity: tribalism, unassimilated minorities
   2) Legitimacy: dynastic conflicts, rebellions
   3) Penetration: poor integration, political and financial corruption
   4) Participation: electoral turmoil, one-party dominance, voter apathy or discrimination
   5) Distribution: class struggle, social and economic democracy

Most emerging or developing countries are still trying to develop a national identity and unifying common culture of some sort. Many seek to redirect tribal loyalties to the central government and integrate (or oppress) unassimilated minorities. But the title of Samuel P. Huntington's last book, Who Are We?, shows that even a developed country like the United States is wrestling with this problem. Second: Are there disaffected groups that call into question the legitimacy of the regime? Mass public education and ethnic cleansing are rather different responses to the same crisis. Third: How effectively does the regime's rule extend over its territory? Does it assert effective sovereignty? Fourth: How well are people able to register their political views and demands? Are elections frequently accompanied or followed by riots or boycotts? Finally: How effectively, on the one hand, does the regime protect life, liberty, and property, and help regularize commerce within a civil society? On the other hand, how much does the regime favor some groups or classes of people over others and attempt to redistribute life's chances, including property and opportunities? This is a continuing problem for all regimes. Poorly-integrated countries are stuck in the third crisis. But to some degree, kleptocracy (rule by thieves) is a common problem everywhere. Transparency International evaluates the levels of corruption and relative transparency of countries around the world.

13. **Counterfactuals** What are they? How may they be used to define causal claims? Identify four criteria that can be used to test counterfactual thought experiments. (50-53)

**Review**

- system Richard Cobden Kautslya
- Prisoner's Dilemma Prince Metternich Congress of Vienna
- strands of liberal thinking 1870 unification of Germany Otto von Bismarck
- overprediction Occam's razor rule of parsimony
- neoliberals expectations of stability liberal democracies
- plebiscitary democracies structure and process levels of analysis
- Marxist and liberal views of the relationship between war and capitalism
- poorly integrated countries Japan's behavior in the 1930s Eugene Staley
- ideologies of nationalism and democracy Michael Doyle
- low-level generalization about variations in foreign policy counterfactual
- examples of revolutionary goals and instruments
- the idea of popular sovereignty as spread by Napoleon through Europe
- Frederick the Great's seizure of Silesia from Maria Theresa
- the French use of the *levée en masse* instead of mercenaries
- the once popular notion in France that all monarchs should be executed
CHAPTER THREE: BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR I

Study Questions

1. **Balance of Power** Compare and contrast David Hume's, Richard Cobden's, and Woodrow Wilson's ideas about the balance of power. Following the unprecedented Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the nine hegemonic wars that followed the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) were: the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697); the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713); the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748); the Seven Years War (also the Third Silesian War, 1756-1763); the War of American Independence (1775-1783); the War of the First Coalition against France (1792-1797); the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815); the First World War (1914-1918); and the Second World War (1939-1945). Why do states balance power? (58-59)

2. **Power** Define: power, power conversion, power resources, hard power vs. soft power. How has power been transformed in the age of information-based economies and transnational interdependence? (59-62)

3. **Balances as Distributions of Power** Identify three meanings of balance of power. What is the hegemonic stability theory? [Its opposite is the hegemonic transition theory]. What dog did not bark in 1895 [over disputed territorial claims between Venezuela and British Guiana]? (62-63)

4. **Balance of Power as Policy** How did Lord Palmerston and Winston Churchill articulate and Sir Edward Grey practice the policy of balancing? What is bandwagoning? Why is it risky in international politics? Identify five reasons countries join the stronger rather than the weaker side. (63-65)

5. **Balance of Power as Multipolar Systems** What are the distinguishing features of a classical balance of power system? How did the balance of power system following German unification break down? Identify five periods in the nineteenth-century balance of power system [known as the Pax Britannica]. (65-67)

6. **Alliances** Why are alliances form and why do they collapse? What were the hallmarks of Bismarck's alliance system? (67-68)

7. **The Origins of World War I** Identify some of the major international consequences of the First World War. (68-69)

8. **Three Levels of Analysis** What were the two key structural changes at the systems level of analysis? What role was played by: the Tirpitz Plan, the Boer War, the Crowe memorandum? When did Britain stop playing the critical role of balancer (maintainer of the balance of power)? What was the effect of the Triple Entente? Identify four changes in the process? [Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn has a different insight into the “Dear Nicky” letter, noting that Nicholas was deceived by two of his generals]. [Correction: Herbert Spencer articulated the “survival of the fittest” philosophy]. (69-71)
9. Why does Lenin’s imperialist theory fail to explain what happened at Fashoda in 1898? Who was threatened by the rise of nationalism in the Balkans and why? Why did the Coalition of Rye and Iron favor German expansionism? How did the personalities of Franz Josef, Count Berchtold, Nicholas II, and Wilhelm II contribute to the tragedy? (71-74)

10. **Was War Inevitable?** What were the deep causes of the First World War? The intermediate causes? The precipitating cause? What was the Schlieffen Plan? What possibly would have made its assumptions obsolete by 1916? (74-77)

11. **What Kind of War?** Counterfactually, what four other wars were possible? [Incidentally, United States entry into the war came shortly after the British intercepted the Zimmermann note, which offered Mexico incentives to ally itself with Germany if the Americans entered the war]. What three lessons does the author draw? (77-81)

**APPENDICES: OTHER TAKES ON THESE ISSUES**

1. **Eyre Crowe, Memorandum, January 1, 1907**

Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England; Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her foreign commerce, spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of her national energies, and create fresh German interests all over the world wherever and whenever a peaceful opportunity offers. . . . It will, however, be seen, upon reflection, that there is no actual necessity for a British Government to determine definitely which of the two theories of German policy it will accept. For it is clear that the second scheme (of semi-independent evolution, not entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into the first, or conscious-design scheme. Moreover, if ever the evolution scheme should come to be realized, the position thereby accruing to Germany would obviously constitute as formidable a menace to the rest of the world as would be presented by any deliberate conquest of a similar position by “malice aforethought.”

2. **Donald Kagan**

Bismarck’s unification of the Germans under the leadership of Prussia was an astonishing achievement. His ability to solidify the place of the new and threatening entity in a European system shattered by its emergence and to create a new international order in which Germany could live in peace and prosper may have been even more remarkable. For the two decades after 1871 that he remained in power there were no wars among the great powers. Even after he was dismissed in 1890 by the new German emperor, William II, it took his successors another quarter of a century to undo and reverse his policies and so distort the system he created as to produce a major war.

Bismarck’s second great achievement rested, in part, on Germany’s strong military and industrial power, which gave his policies weight and respect. . . . Central to his goal was
the need to convince the other powers that Germany was what he repeatedly asserted: a “saturated” power that needed to turn inward to consolidate in peace what had been gained in three swift wars.

[Following the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the first and most important part of Bismarck’s system to be sacrificed was a flexible accommodation (the Reinsurance Treaty) with the Russians that kept them isolated from France and kept Germany from becoming too closely linked to Austrian ambitions. A few years later the two-front Schlieffen Plan grew in response to a Franco-Russian alliance that Bismarck had so skillfully prevented].

3. David W. Ziegler

German preparation for war followed the Schlieffen Plan, which rested on several assumptions. One was that any major war in Europe would be for the Germans a two-front war, against Russia in the east and France in the west. Another assumption was that the huge Russian army would be impossible to defeat; the most the Germans could hope to do would be to keep the Russian army from defeating them. The one advantage that the Germans had, the Schlieffen Plan assumed, was technological superiority, particularly the ability to mobilize quickly. They assumed they could mobilize in two weeks; the Russians, with more territory and a less-developed railroad network, would need six weeks. Therefore, the Schlieffen Plan called for a major offensive first against France, to knock it out of the war before turning the German army to the more difficult task of fighting the Russian army. For this reason, the Russian mobilization was greeted with alarm in Berlin. If the Schlieffen Plan were to work (and for all practical purposes it was the only plan the Germans had), then it was essential that the Germans begin mobilizing as soon as the Russians did. Otherwise they would lose the advantage afforded them by their superior technology. Never mind that the Russian mobilization was directed against Austria. The crucial factor, in German eyes, was mobilization.

Thus when the Germans in their turn delivered an ultimatum to Russia on July 31, demanding that they demobilize, it was not so much in defense of Austria as in defense of their own strategic situation. When Russia declined to demobilize, the Germans mobilized. The French, realizing what was coming, did so too. . . .

The connecting thread, from the assassination in Sarajevo to the German attack on France, was military planning.

4. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn:

[At the end of the war the Reichstag appointed a commission to determine responsibility for the war. Dr. Arthur Rosenberg, a Social Democrat who headed the commission, exonerated Wilhelm II almost completely. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn describes the emperor as] a gifted but rather loud-mouthed and most undiplomatic ruler. . . . He was a
victim of too much adulation and misinformation, but was by no means a villain, as Walter Rathenau has pointed out. . . .

Harry Elmer Barnes, an American historian who tried to assess the guilt for this silliest of all major wars, named Serbia first, Russia second, Austria-Hungary third, France fourth, the German Reich fifth, and Britain sixth. What could have been a local intervention by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was transformed into a pan-European war by the actions of two Russians, War Minister Sukhomlinov and General Yanushyévich, chief of the Russian general staff. They lied constantly to their emperor about their mobilization not only along the Austrian, but also along the German frontier. An exchange of telegrams between “Willy” and “Nicky” (unfortunately, there was no “hot line” yet) caused the Kaiser to believe that his cousin and friend was trying to deceive him. He thereupon declared war on Russia. (Footnote: The Bolsheviks tried Yanushkievitch and Sukhomlinov in 1918 – at that time a fair trial was still possible. Both insisted that they acted as patriots. In retrospect it become clear that they acted less as patriots than as faithful servants of France. Lord Grey was very right when he wrote: “Let it never be forgotten that it was the energy and tremendous sacrifice with which Russia made this advance [i.e. into East Prussia] that saved the Allies in the summer of 1914. . . . The whole-hearted efforts and all the strength of Russia were needed in the early stages to save the Allies”). Russia was tied to France by a military alliance; and thus began a war that could have been ended by a compromise as late as 1917, which would have saved us the misery Europe has been living in ever since. But the American intervention made compromise impossible. The Germans, most of the time victorious in this war about Austria-Hungary, were forced to their knees primarily by the hunger blockade.

Appendices Review

two theories of German policy  Bismarck’s achievements  hazards of the Schlieffen Plan

Nye Review

David Hume  Woodrow Wilson  Richard Cobden
Sir Edward Grey  Lord Palmerston  power conversion
hard power  power resources  soft power
1815-1822: the Concert of Europe  1822-1854: the rise of nationalism and democracy
1854-1870: nationalism and the unification of Italy and Germany  Count Berchtold
1870-1890: Bismarck's Revived Concert  Emperor Franz Josef
causes of World War I: key factors at the individual and structural levels of analysis
Kaiser Wilhelm II  Czar Nicholas II  confrontation at Fashoda
Germany’s Coalition of Rye and Iron  corruption of the Ottoman government
complacency about peace  rise of German power  rigidity of the alliance system
rise of nationalism  Austria's desire to prevent disintegration
hegemonic stability theory  Tirpitz Plan  Schlieffen Plan
bandwagoning phenomenon  balance of power strategy  Bismarck’s alliance system

CHAPTER FOUR: THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND WORLD WAR II
Study Questions

1. **The League of Nations**  What change was Woodrow Wilson determined to introduce into the international system (which is reflected in his famous 14 Points)? Identify the three major points of the collective security system? Identify three ways in which it differed from the balance of power approach. What were some of the ambiguities in the Covenant of the League of Nations? What was its understanding of international law? (85-88)

2. **The United States and the League of Nations** [American opponents of the Versailles Treaty were divided into two camps: reservationists and irreconcilables. Henry Cabot Lodge, a political ally of the late Theodore Roosevelt, led the reservationists. [Intellectual animosity long characterized the relationship between Wilson and Lodge]. (88-89)

3. **The Early Days of the League** What did the French want? The British? Why did the French form alliances with Poland and the Little Entente? What was the state of Germany after the war? How did the Versailles Treaty make things worse? Why were the Italians unhappy with the peace (consider the Treaty of London)? What commitments did Germany make in the Treaty of Locarno? What was the Kellogg-Briand Pact? (89-90)

4. **The Manchurian Failure, the Ethiopian Debacle** Why did collective security fail in Manchuria and Ethiopia? [Discrimination against Japan by the United States in the Washington Conference’s 5:5:3:1:1 formula for postwar naval size was also a sore point]. Why did the sanctions against Italy finally take a back seat in 1936? [The Haitian delegate showed a real understanding of Thomas Hobbes’s point about equality in the state of nature]. (90-93)

5. **Hitler’s War?** How was the German problem solved after the Second World War? What kind of war did Hitler want? What is the significance of the Hossbach memorandum? (93-95)

6. **Hitler’s Strategy** What were Hitler’s four options when he came to power in 1933? Identify the four phases in which he pursued the fourth option. How did Hitler outmaneuver his foes at Stresa and in the Rhineland? [The Anschluss is the name given Hitler’s seizure of Austria in 1938]. What excuse did Hitler use to justify seizing the Sudetenland? The Munich Conference is now synonymous with the word “appeasement” (see pp. 107-08). Hitler’s “brilliant diplomatic coup” (p. 97) was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an alliance of two predatory regimes. The seizure of western Poland in September 1939 was followed by the “Phony War,” which lasted until May. But neither the Russians, who had seized eastern Poland in mid-September, nor the Germans were quiet. Russia annexed the Baltic states, then invaded Finland at the end of November, resulting in its expulsion from the League of Nations. The Phony War became a shooting war in the West when the Germans seized Denmark and Norway in April and then launched the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France in May. All through this period Hitler monopolized the initiative; his foes merely reacted. The real issue is: Why did Hitler finally fail? (95-98)

7. **The Role of the Individual** What aspects of Hitler’s personality brought on global war and failure? How did he misjudge the United States? (98-99)

8. **Systemic and Domestic Causes** At the structural level, what made the Versailles Treaty too harsh and too lenient at the same time (here analogies might be made with the conclusion of the Gulf War)? Identify three domestic-level changes. Food for
What domestic-level factors shape American policy today? How do the various causes fit together? (99-101)

9. **Was War Inevitable?** What might the Western democracies have done differently? When did war become virtually inevitable? (102-03)

10. **The Pacific War** What was the economic and political context in which Japan began to impose its East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? After Japan’s seizure of French Indochina following the fall of France, what three options could the militarists have exercised? Why did they choose to move against the United States? B How did the three levels of analysis work together? (99-103)

11. **Appeasement and Two Types of War** In the author’s judgment, when was appeasement appropriate? Inappropriate? (103-04)

**Review**

- collective security systems vs. balance of power systems
- sovereignty
- appeasement
- Henry Cabot Lodge
- Treaty of Locarno
- Kellogg-Briand Pact
- Treaty of London
- Treaty of Versailles
- war-guilt clause
- crises over Manchuria and Ethiopia in the 1930s
- League of Nations sanctions
- the four phases of Hitler's breakout strategy
- precipitating cause of World War II
- Franklin Roosevelt
- Sudetenland
- [Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact]
- appeasement
- Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
- oil embargo
- precipitating causes of the Pacific War
- what might have forestalled World War I
- what might have prevented World War II

**CHAPTER FIVE: THE COLD WAR**

**Study Questions**

1. **Deterrence and Containment** Distinguish between *deterrence* and *containment*. Give examples of each. (112-13)

2. **Three Approaches to the Cold War** Identify the three main schools of opinion on the causes of the Cold War. What evidence does each school of opinion cite in favor of its view? How do hard revisionists differ from soft revisionists? Basically, what view does John Lewis Gaddis take today? (114-16)

3. **Roosevelt's Policies, Stalin's Policies** Why did Roosevelt demand unconditional surrender? What are some examples of Soviet pragmatism during the war? (116-18)

4. **Phases of the Conflict** Identify the six issues that contributed to the eventual change from Roosevelt’s strategy to the onset of the Cold War. What happened to the lend-lease aid program? From Kennan’s and Litvinov’s perspectives, why would appeasement have failed to work? What did Kennan object to in the *Truman Doctrine*? What was the rationale for the *Marshall Plan*? What caused Truman finally to sign NSC-68 in June 1950? (118-23)

5. **Levels of Analysis** What did Alexis de Tocqueville predict (in 1835)?

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians
and the Americans. . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limited can be perceived. . . . The American struggles against the obstacles which nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men. The former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its arms. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe." -- Democracy in America, vol. 1

What changed between the two powers after the war? What were the two roots of Soviet foreign policy? Identify four peculiarities of Russian political culture. What did the communist system add? Identify four peculiarities of American political culture. How has the affected the American foreign policy process [which is often described as oscillating between introversion and extroversion]? (123-27)

6. U.S. and Soviet Goals in the Cold War Distinguish between possession goals and milieu goals. How did Soviet expansionism differ from Hitler’s? Is there evidence of a more threatening nature? What was George Kennan’s idea of containment? What was the rationale for American aid to Yugoslavia? What change after the Korean War? What were some signs of a thaw in the Cold War after Stalin’s death? Why did Khrushchev’s approach fail? What was détente? How did the Nixon Administration make use of it as a means to pursue the goals ofcontainment? Identify three trends in the 1970s that undercut it? (127-31)

7. The End of the Cold War Identify some of the explanations for the end of the Cold War. Why was an individual, Mikhail Gorbachev, the most important precipitating cause? [A case can be made for adding Ronald Reagan]. How did Gorbachev’s policies, glasnost, perestroika, and the new thinking, contribute to the Soviet collapse? [The 1980s arms race also contributed]. What was the role of liberal ideas and what Paul Kennedy calls imperial overstretch? What are some of the evidences of a loss of legitimacy? Identify some deeper consequences of de-Stalinization in 1956, repressive measures in the Soviet empire, and Soviet incompetence in face of the creative destruction (Joseph Schumpeter’s term) of capitalism? What were the effects of IMF shock therapy? (131-36)

8. Physics and Politics What was the Baruch Plan? Identify five significant political effects of the H-bomb. (136-39)

9. Balance of Terror, Problems of Nuclear Deterrence What made bipolarity a particularly stable type of system? What is the reasoning behind nuclear deterrence (especially in the context of a second-strike capability)? What accounts for early self-restraint? (139-41)

10. The Cuban Missile Crisis Identify various views that attempt to account for the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. What were the American options? How did its resolution a compromise? (141-43)

11. How could nuclear war fit the just war theory? What are some of the continuing
concerns about the potential use of nuclear weapons? (143-46)

Review

deterrence        containment        Truman Doctrine
Marshall Plan    Paul Kennedy's idea of imperial overstretch
Joseph Schumpeter's idea of creative destruction    political effects of the H-bomb
Stalin's use of Russian nationalism and communist ideology in World War II
C Cuban Missile Crisis and superiority in nuclear weaponry    credibility
traditionalists    soft revisionists        hard revisionists
postrevisionists    George Kennan        William Appleman Williams
John Lewis Gaddis    Marshall Plan    signs of the onset of the Cold War
Baruch Plan    Alexis de Tocqueville (above)        Mikhail Gorbachev
characteristics of Russian political culture    glasnost

democratization    perestroika        Gorbachev's new thinking
deep causes of the end of the Cold War    containment
Communism's loss of legitimacy    Soviet economic decline    Gorbachev's personality
doctrine of sufficiency    U.S. military buildup    fall of the Berlin Wall

CHAPTER SIX: INTERVENTION, INSTITUTIONS, REGIONAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Study Questions

1. **Ethnic Conflicts, Intervention and Sovereignty** Identify: ethnic wars, failed states. Why would constructivism attribute ethnic conflict to a Freudian “narcissism of small differences?” Political entrepreneurs seek to shape or reconstruct the political identity of political groups. For example: Russell Kirk published a work, *The Conservative Mind* (1953), that helped articulate and name the conservative intellectual and political movement. Subsequently it has been shaped and reshaped by various policy entrepreneurs, some of whom would have read him out of the movement. Why is nonintervention a powerful norm of international law? Illustrate some of the forms intervention may take, as in the case of economic assistance, electioneering, and the sending of military advisers? What makes intervention hard to define? (153-59)

2. **Sovereignty, Judging Intervention** Under the Westphalian (1648) system, what are some of the factors that set practical limits on sovereignty? How do realists, cosmopolitans, and state moralists differ in their views of intervention? Which school of thought is most apt to support humanitarian intervention? What were the Brezhnev Doctrine [the Soviet Union committed itself to prevent any parts of its empire from seceding or being overthrown] and the Reagan Doctrine? A book entitled *Reagan’s War* argues that Ronald Reagan made the defeat of Communism the central goal of his Administration, capping his own decades-long struggle against Communism in Hollywood and public life. (159-61)

3. **Exceptions to the Rule** Identify Michael Walzer’s four situations in which war or military intervention may be justified. What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments? (161-62)

4. **Problems of Self-Determination** What are some of the problems with intervention on behalf of secessionist movements? Why is the question of voting (in a plebiscite) so complicated? Why did Biafra’s secession (1967-1970) create a problem for the rest of Nigeria? What factors complicated the issue of how to respond to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia? Why then is self-determination “an ambiguous moral principle?” (162-64)
5. **Motives, Means, and Consequences** What are the three dimensions of judgment associated with the just war tradition? Why did George Kennan become disillusioned with containment? (158-61)

6. **Domestic Analogies, Predictability and Legitimacy** Why is international organization not an incipient world government? How does international law differ from domestic law, especially regarding enforcement and adjudication? Why are states interested in international law? (165-69)

7. **The Suez Canal Crisis** What precipitated the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956? What efforts were made to solve the problem peacefully? How and why did Israel get involved? What role was played by the United Nations? What is the purpose of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242? (169-71)

8. **U.N. Peacekeeping and Collective Security** Identify some of the formal steps taken in the development of international law and collective security? How does the U.N. Security Council work? What are some of the difficulties in defining aggression? What is preventive diplomacy? Why was U.N. collective security used in 1990 for the first time since the Korean War? What are some of the remaining practical limitations on collective security? (171-74)

9. **Conflicts in the Middle East** Identify three factors at the root of so much Middle East conflict? What miscalculations led to the Iran-Iraq War? (174-75)

10. **The Questions of Nationalism** How may “nation” be defined? What are the implications of the word being both descriptive and prescriptive? How did this idea arise and spread? How has decolonization changed the nineteenth century model? What role has been played by the “pan” movements? (175-77)

11. **The Arab-Israeli Conflicts** Identify the six wars produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict. What are some of the ambiguities of Resolution 242? What was the superpower role in the Yom Kippur War? Why were these wars generally short? (178-81)

12. **The 1991 Gulf War and Its Aftermath** What reasons did Iraq have for invading Kuwait? Why did the United States respond as it did? Was the war necessary? What did it solve? How did it affect the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian situation? The **Wye River Memorandum** (1998) between Israel and the Palestinians was intended to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement of 1995. It called upon each side to take measures to guarantee the security of the other and provided for the phased transfer of powers and authority from Israel to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the Jericho area. What factors contributed to the breakdown of the peace process? (181-84)

13. How did the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict change in 2000 and 2001? How did the international context of the conflict change? What have been some of the effects of Saddam Hussein’s removal from power? How do the three levels of analysis continue to interact? (184-86)

**Review**

- Uses economic aid, bribery, and foreign campaign spending during Cold War
- Character of the Security Council Reagan Doctrine
- Attitude of small states about the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War Brezhnev Doctrine
- Different uses of the ideology of nationalism
- Attitudes toward humanitarian interventionism
- Realists state moralists cosmopolitans
CHAPTER SEVEN: GLOBALIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE

Outline

A. INTRODUCTION (191-92)
   1. Fault Line Between Those with Skills and Mobility and Those Without
   2. New Competition Among States in “Geo-Economics” [cf. Walter Russell Mead’s millennial capitalism]

B. THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (192-94)
   1. Globalization: Worldwide Networks of Interdependence
      a. It does not imply universality
   2. It Has Made National Boundaries More Porous
      a. Homogenization does not follow from globalization
   3. Three Dimensions:
   4. Environmental
      a. Smallpox
      b. Black Death
      c. HIV/AIDS
      d. Exotic flora and fauna
      e. Global climate change
   5. Military
      a. World-straddling alliances
      b. Missiles
   6. Social
      a. American population
      b. Four great world religions
      c. Spread of constitutional arrangements and political ideas

C. WHAT’S NEW ABOUT TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GLOBALIZATION? (194-95)
   1. Network Effects
      a. Joseph Stiglitz: Spillover Effects
   2. Thickness
   3. Quickness
   4. Direct Public Participation
      a. Pluralization

Study Questions

1. **Dimensions of Globalization** What is meant by “geo-economics”? Why does globalization not imply universality? Identify its three chief dimensions. What is happening with the pace of environmental change? What are some of the features of political globalization? (191-94)

2. Identify four effects of contemporary globalization that reveal it to be “farther, faster, cheaper and deeper,” according to Thomas Friedman. What is some of the evidence of increasing inequality between people in the richest countries and people in the poorest? [In The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998), David S. Landes, a Harvard economic historian, maintained that the income difference between Switzerland and Madagascar is about 400:1]. What have been some of the effects of the market forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution? What is meant by “useful inefficiencies”? (194-97)
3. **The Concept of Interdependence** How do statesmen and analysts differ in their use of political words? As an analytic word, what is **interdependence**? What are some sources of interdependence? Why did the collapse of the Soviet bring relief in the West rather than cause anxiety? Why did the cost of bread rise in the 1970s? What happened when the United States decided in 1973 to stop exporting soybeans to Japan? Why is the distribution of benefits a “zero-sum game”? Why does the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs become blurred? Why does classical balance of power theory not fit economic interdependence very well? (197-200)

4. Distinguish between short-term **sensitivity** and long-term **vulnerability**. Identify three factors involved by vulnerability. What was behind the error in Lester Brown’s prediction that the United States would be dependent on imports of 10 of the basic 13 industrial raw materials by 1985? When the United States became dependent on imported Japanese capital to balance its federal budget in the 1980s, did this give Japan either a political or a trade advantage? How can manipulation of **asymmetries** be a source of power in the politics of interdependence? What is **linkage**? What are **trade-offs**? Even though Canada is more dependent on the United States than vice versa, what accounts for its ability to prevail in a number of disputes between them? What is the effect of pacts such as NAFTA? (200-205)

5. **Leadership in the World Economy** Why did hegemony over the international economy shift from Great Britain to the United States? What crisis occurred due to the American unwillingness to live up to its new responsibilities? What are some of the key institutions of the post-WWII international economic regime? How do the ideas of realism and complex interdependence describe the US/China relationship?

6. **The Politics of Oil** What were the characteristics of the international oil regime in 1960? What changes were evident as a result of the Arab oil embargo of 1973? Describe three explanations of the changes in the international oil regime. What are the particulars of each? Why was the oil weapon not more effective? (205-13)

**Review**

- globalization
- effects of globalization
- economic conflict
- interdependence
- why the cost of bread rose in the 1970s
- zero sum, positive sum, negative sum
- sensitivity vs. vulnerability
- United States and debt
- IMF
- World Bank
- oil regime in 1960 and 1973
- dimensions of globalization
- increasing inequality
- 1973 Arab oil embargo
- lack of anxiety about Soviet nuclear arsenal
- soybean trade between the United States and Japan
- NAFTA and interdependence
- asymmetry between the United States and Japan
- WTO
- OECD
- three explanations for the changes

**CHAPTER EIGHT: THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION, TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS, AND THE DIFFUSION OF POWER**

**Study Questions**

1. **Power and the Information Revolution** Why have governments always worried about the flow and control of information? How did Gutenberg’s invention of movable type change the world? What is the key characteristic of the information revolution, which is sometimes called the **Third Industrial Revolution**? What changes were wrought by the first two industrial revolutions?
What is meant by the **management of scale**? Why does productivity growth lag? What were the political effects of mass communication and broadcasting? How and why have they changed? (217-21)

2. **Sovereignty and Control** What do Peter Drucker and the Tofflers mean by **cyber-feudalism**?

The term "cybernetics" -- which was introduced by the scientist and philosopher, Norbert Wiener, in the 1940s -- is derived from the Greek root *kubernetes* [pilot or steersman], as governor is derived from the Latin equivalent. What are the implications of the communications revolution for national identity, loyalty, and sovereignty? What changed as a result of medieval trade fairs (*e.g.*, Scarborough Fair)?

**NOTE:** Serfs who escaped to live and work in the medieval free cities won their freedom after a year and a day: "Stadluft macht frei" [city airs makes (one) free]. Hitler's concentration camps changed the slogan to "Arbeit macht frei" [work makes one free]. The *lex mercatoria* [merchant or market law] was developed as a private set of rules, complete with courts, for conducting business. In *The Mystery of Capital*, the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto examines the development of property protections on the American frontier and commends the American model for land reform in Third World areas.

The ideas of complex interdependence and transnational actors are not at all new. Cf. Adda B. Bozeman on the origins of the **Hanseatic League** in *Politics and Culture in International History* (1960):

"The objective and subjective factors that had distinguished the Western European approach to peace and unity in religious, political, and intellectual matters, and had given rise, in consequence, to the permanent establishment of the three great concerts or "virtues" of the Church, the Empire, and the University of Paris, and the *ad hoc* assembling of all European interests at Constance were operative also in the field of Europe's economic life where they called forth a remarkable movement toward federalism among the rising groups of townsmen and merchants."

"This impulse toward corporate unity was particularly strong north of the Alps, where the absence of a protective secular international order was felt more keenly than in Italy. Here, in the midst of political confusion, where travelling merchants had long been in the habit of carrying their special *merchant law* with them, and where cities had evolved their own law in protection of their special peace, certain German towns recorded what may be the most suggestive chapter in the annals of inter-European constitutionalism when they formed the **transterritorial** League of Hanseatic cities."

"The North European scene in which the German merchants operated before the twelfth century . . . presented greater hazards and greater opportunities for adventurous action than the southern region. East of the river Elbe spread the vast territorial expanse of rural, pagan Slavdom. Here the pioneering merchants are known to have conducted a border trade as early as the ninth century A.D. This penetration, later supported by organized campaigns of colonization and Christianization, brought the entering Germans into contact with local rulers under whose protection they proceeded to found and build numerous towns. Lübeck, renowned in later centuries as the leader of the Hanseatic League, was
the first of these settlements that pointed, chainlike, toward the magnetic market of Novgorod. From the eastern ports of the “new” Germany the companies pushed to the farthest Baltic coast, gained economic control over the Baltic Sea, and established a direct route between these northern waters and the Black Sea by traveling on the Oder or the Vistula to Cracow, and thence on the Pruth or Dniester to their southern ports of destination.”

“The recognition granted the Germans abroad coincided with the constitutional status that the trading companies had evolved for themselves, for all Germans who were natives of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were actually organized at this time as universitas communium mercatorum. This first all-German universitas, the predecessor of the Hanseatic League, united the merchants of over thirty towns, from Cologne and Utrecht in the west to Reval in the east, and had its headquarters on the island of Gotland, then known as the axis and most celebrated market of Europe.” (505-06)

3. How does the transition from the medieval to the modern political world illustrate the resistance, slowness, or lag of political institutions in responding to change? Identify some of “the growing list of problems that are difficult to control within sovereign borders.” How do competing sovereignties affect border control, national security, and human rights? How have human rights issues effectively modified the UN rule against intervention? How do cross-cutting identities (like “cross-cutting cleavages”) and cosmopolitan identities complicate the existing mix of loyalties? How have diaspora communities (exiles, such as the Iraqis in America who voted in the 2005 election) used Internet to stay politically involved with their home country? What are “flash movements” and James Rosenau’s “fragmegration?” (221-25)

4. What are transnational actors? How do they add to the blurring of foreign and domestic politics even within the bureaucracy? What economic interests in America were not unhappy that OPEC raised oil prices? What is one of the distinguishing characteristics if complex interdependence? Give some examples of NGOs. Define terrorism. How does it compare with piracy in an earlier era? How important is the role of states? (225-231)

5. Information and Power among States Does the information revolution tend to equalize power among nations? What trends aid the already large and powerful? What is meant by the “paradox of plenty?” What does the author mean when he writes: “Now credibility is the crucial resource,” and “Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility?” Why are most information shapers democracies? Why are closed systems more costly? What conclusions does the author draw about the information revolution? (231-38)

Review

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CHAPTER NINE: A NEW WORLD ORDER?
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   a. Sanctions against South Africa
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J. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE (260-61)
1. Change
   a. Thucydides
   b. Kant
2. Thinking about Different Ideal Types
Study Questions

1. Why did Arnold Toynbee believe that the nation-state and the split atom could not coexist on the same planet? Identify five alternative futures. What do people want from their political institutions? How is the context of world politics changing? What is meant by “narrowcasting”? (238-43)

2. Compare and contrast the theories of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington. What are some of the criticisms? How does the author account for the virtual absence of intrastate conflict in Europe? Is nationalism dead in Europe? (243-45)

3. What third vision of the future does the author offer? Compare the benign with the malign vision? How is transnational investment [Mead’s millennial capitalism] helping to confuse identities? What were the chief obstacles to nuclear proliferation during the Cold War? Why is deterrence inadequate to protect from terrorist threats? What then is required? (245-50)

4. At a time of rapid power transitions, what future scenarios are usually invoked? In “The Prison of Old Concepts,” what does the author find salvageable? What does he mean by a “hybrid world order”? Why must we understand both the realist and the liberal views of world politics? (250-56)

Review

Arnold Toynbee  large territorial state and the five alternatives
Richard Falk  what people want from their political institutions
economic integration and political fragmentation  Francis Fukuyama
Samuel P. Huntington  East vs. West Europe  diffusion of power
Marshall McLuhan  Cold War obstacles to nuclear proliferation
rapid power transitions  future configurations of power