Stalinism in Albania: Domestic Affairs under Enver Hoxha

Stephen R. Bowers
Liberty University, srbowers2@liberty.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs

Part of the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/87

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.
STALINISM IN ALBANIA:
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS UNDER ENVER HOXHA

Stephen R. Bowers
James Madison University

The modern revisionists and reactionaries call us Stalinists thinking that they insult us. . . . But on the contrary, they glorify us with this epithet; it is an honor for us to be Stalinists for while we maintain such a stand the enemy cannot and will never force us to our knees.¹

Enver Hoxha

In discussing the evolution of communist party states in Eastern Europe, Chalmers Johnson argued that "Communists do not merely rule, or dominate, or suppress; they institute a process of change."² An examination of such a process of change in Albania, Eastern Europe’s least studied Marxist–Leninist regime, demonstrates the validity of Johnson’s assertion and, moreover, permits the student of change in Communist society to make generalizations about the direction of that process. Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985 and the emergence of Ramiz Alia as his successor provide a convenient occasion for such an analysis. The framework for this examination is a concept advanced by Zbigniew Brezinski in his book Between Two Ages. In this work Brezezinski advanced five alternatives for the development of Communist societies, one of which, militant fundamentalism, closely approximates developments in Albania under the leadership of Enver Hoxha. The characteristics of the militantly fundamentalist Communist society will be described in connection with the following account of Albania’s domestic policy during Hoxha’s last years.

Albania, according to one observer,

. . . Has succeeded in disproving the domino theory as applied to the Communist world. A Stalinist country practicing a militant type of Communism, it has withstood the ‘revisionist wave’ that has swept over East Europe since the 1956 thaw.
No one can deny that under Enver Hoxha's leadership Albania consistently maintained a rigid ideological posture in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds. Following its break with the Soviet Union, the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) changed its avowedly Stalinist policies very little, and in the eyes of some doctrinaire Marxist–Leninists, today represents the only Communist Party state which has resisted revisionist influences.

The Party and Society

In developing the concept of militant fundamentalism, Brzezinski stressed the requirement of a revolutionary relationship between the political system and society. Such a relationship has become the sine qua non of the APL's domestic policy. Hoxha and subordinate officials regularly demanded a continuing revolution in Albanian society with the party as the driving force of social dynamics. When the tenth volume of the works of Enver Hoxha was published shortly after the Sixth APL Congress, Rruga e Partise proclaimed the party as "the leader and conductor of all life in the country." The realization of all national hopes, according to this party journal, "depends on its political, ideological, and organizational work and on its revolutionary style and method of work." Indifference to these demands was repeatedly denounced as a threat to fulfillment of party objectives. The party daily Zeri i Popullit sounded this theme with an editorial call for a revolutionary attitude on the part of each citizen.

The greatness of the party's work consists primarily in molding our new man with a Marxist–Leninist world outlook and revolutionary characteristics. This new man spends all his energies in applying the party line, supports and embraces what is new and advances, and fights consistently against everything that is alien and regressive.

For the party to fulfill its proper revolutionary role there must be an active concern for the quality of its membership. Hoxha demonstrated this concern with his consistent admonitions that the party membership satisfy all official requirements and his frequent complaints that "although they are not many, within our ranks there are a few unenterprising party members lacking in initiative who harbor backward concepts on work and life." These people, he charged, are the cause of dissension within the party. To correct this situation the party should, according to Hoxha, do its utmost to educate these members into a more militant position and remove those who cannot learn. The upper echelons of the party were also subject to these criticism and in 1976 the 7th APL Congress provided an opportunity
for determining the degree to which such complaints were taken seriously. If the dramatic attrition rate among the APL's Central Committee is any indication, then the APL under Hoxha was seriously committed to maintaining the revolutionary quality of its membership. Of the seventy-seven members of the Central Committee there were forty-three newly elected, clear evidence of a determination to prevent petrification of the membership.3

Consistent with its militant orientations under Hoxha, the APL stressed the importance of "Stalin's instructions" regarding the composition of the party. According to the Soviet leader, workers were to be the dominant element of the party at all times. The Albanians take great pride in following his advice and Hoxha frequently boasted that over 85 percent of the APL's functionaries were workers by "origin, background, or present position" and that workers accounted for 36.41 percent of the party's total membership. Emphasizing the importance of having workers in leading positions, Hoxha warned of the "evil turns" that had occurred elsewhere in Eastern Europe where the parties had "degenerated into revisionism" as a result of the fact that "their leading organs were de-proletarianized, filled with specialist technocrats, bureaucratic intellectuals, and officials."4

While stressing the political importance of the proletariat, Hoxha also praised the material contributions of the working class. According to a report in the Albanian press in 1972, the working class constituted only one-third of the population but generated over two-thirds of the national income.5 Stress on the importance of the working class became a basic part of the APL's rhetoric and was supplemented by charges that the Soviet Union, by contrast, denied the proper role of workers. The consequences of that denial, according to a 1982 Albanian report, were "degradation, crisis, chaos, stagnation in social product and national income" throughout the USSR and other "revisionist countries."6

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat

A logical counterpart to this theme was Hoxha's insistence on the continuing relevance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. With the publication of volume twenty-two of Enver Hoxha's works in 1976, Zeri i Popullit, in an article entitled "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Albania Lives, Watches, and Works," explained the nature of this concept as developed in Albania.

The period of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country is characterized by a merciless class struggle which has aimed at preserving, reinforcing, and improving it, purging it of traces and influences of the old society. . . . This
class struggle has been waged against internal and external enemies. . . .

Hoxha repeatedly stated that the maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be a key problem of the revolution until the complete victory of Communism. The Albanian leadership appeared united in its commitment to the belief that the dictatorship of the proletariat could not be permitted to wither away. Khrushchev's replacement of this epoch with his "state of the whole people" was denounced by the APL as heretical and revisionist. Hoxha rejected the notion that the "state of the whole people" was a direct and appropriate evolution from the dictatorship of the proletariat and argued instead that the result of Krushchev's innovation was that "the party was undermined, the dictatorship of the proletariat was undermined and was replaced by the dictatorship of the new bourgeoisie. . . ."

In 1984 Hoxha boasted to foreign journalists that in Albania, unlike the Soviet Union, there was no "red bourgeoisie" enjoying special privileges denied the average APL member. Attacks in 1987 on privileges extended to the well-connected few indicate the persistence of egalitarian policies.

While most of the world's Marxist-Leninist parties were modifying their images, the APL under Hoxha refused to do so, insisting that such modifications were unjustified and ill-conceived. When the APL's leaders observed that the dictatorship of the proletariat had been "liquidated" in the USSR, they were not merely stating a fact but making what they regarded as a most serious indictment of the Soviet leadership. With the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat came the destruction of the party of the proletariat, Hoxha declared. The working class, he charged, had been displaced from power by the "new revisionist bourgeoisie." Party pronouncements broadened this criticism to cover not only the Soviet Communist Party, but all others following similar patterns of development. The French and the Italian parties were singled out with particular vigor for having embraced the "opportunist, counter-revolutionary theory" of revisionism.

An end to the dictatorship of the proletariat can be justified, in theoretical terms, only by a termination of class struggle. This assertion is made, implicitly if not explicitly, in some of the East European states. However, in its insistence on a continuation of the dictatorship, the APL clearly rejected this view. At the 6th Congress Hoxha spoke of "alien hangovers" that keep alive and nurture the "various forms of ideology of the exploiting classes." The APL leadership insisted that these manifestations made necessary an "ideological and cultural revolution" designed to preserve and consolidate the gains of
the revolution. This situation required an intensification rather than a relaxation of the ideological class struggle. Only this, argued Hoxha, would bring about the complete “emancipation of the physical, mental, and spiritual energies of all the working people.” The decisive year of this intensified effort was 1974, the time of the purges launched against top party and state officials who fell victim to the leadership’s preoccupation with the class enemy. Given Hoxha’s uncompromising outlook, there was little prospect for a significant change in the official view of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As long as the APL’s bitter ideological struggle against the vestiges of its non-Communist past continues, the dictatorship of the proletariat will endure in spite of Hoxha’s death. Recent analyses of Hoxha’s decision in 1974 to maintain the party’s rigid ideological posture are a clear indication of the continuity of policy since 1985. According to an article in Rruga I Partise in 1987, it was Hoxha’s “ideological and political clarity” which “raised the militant and revolutionary spirit of the communists . . .” and “saved the people and the homeland countless times from the traps laid by domestic and foreign enemies.”

Education and Albania’s Youth

During Hoxha’s four decades in power, ideological militancy, a necessary quality of the militantly fundamental Communist state in Brezezinski’s formulation, was clearly reflected in the APL’s educational policies. Albanian periodicals and books were replete with references to the “revolutionization of teachers” who, more than anything else, should be “political persons, loyal and indomitable fighters for the cause of socialism and communism, maintaining a communist stand and conduct in life and at work.” The social sciences became a special concern in this effort to thoroughly politicize the educations of young Albanians. According to Ramiz Alia, Hoxha’s successor and, for years, the APL’s leading cultural authority, Albanian social sciences have as their primary responsibility the defense of Marxist–Leninist principles. Hoxha described social science research as a mechanism to be used in improving Albania’s living and working conditions while also declaring his determination to intensify the struggle against efforts to “hermetically seal scientific work, to give it an academic character detached from the revolutionary productive practice of the working masses . . .” However, it was not the social sciences alone which were subordinated to ideological imperatives. In 1976 Rruga e Partise explained that Proletarian partisanship is a guiding principle for all the sciences, not only the social, but also the exact ones, the technical and natural. It is very wrong to think that there
is no room for proletarian partisanship and the Marxist-Leninist pivot in the exact sciences . . . because they are allegedly 'alike everywhere, both under socialism and under capitalism and therefore ideology has no place in them.' On the contrary, these sciences too, as a form of social science, are partisan, and their discoveries are interpreted and used according to their interests of a specific class.\textsuperscript{15}

Through this logic the so-called "hard" sciences also become concerns of the party ideologists and reflected Marxist-Leninist teachings.

Albanian education under Hoxha was intended to serve two purposes: first, propagation of the correct ideological view, and second, enhancement of the productive process. In the APL's view both objectives were a way of enhancing the stability of the regime. Yet, the educational system could hardly benefit as a result of the preeminence of ideological considerations. Such ideological favoritism did little to enhance the development of a professional educational system and retarded efforts to build a technical intelligentsia after the break with the Soviet Union in 1961. An educational program placing most of its stress on an ideological function could not be expected to meet the demands of industrialization and economic shortcomings evident in the mid-1980s could be attributed to this policy. The APL's commitment to such an ideologically oriented system, however, was consistent with Hoxha's vision of what Albania should become.

In spite of its pragmatic deficiencies, such a system may have been effective in the political indoctrination of youth. Since the end of World War II, the APL engaged in a program of revolutionizing the schools—a process that included the drafting of new textbooks and the adoption of new teaching methods.\textsuperscript{16} This reorganization of the schools demonstrated official concern for the political consciousness of Albanian youth. Hoxha spoke glowingly of the role of the Labor Youth Union of Albania as a "revolutionizing shock force" and contrasted their behavior with the activities of youth in Western and "revisionist" countries.\textsuperscript{17} The party's leadership may well have felt that its first requirement was to win the complete loyalty of its youth and hope that the technical fundamentals could be mastered later.

Hoxha required party workers to familiarize themselves with the problems of youth in order to prepare young people for their roles as part of the nation's "revolutionary shock force." Officials frequently observed that "youth always need to be kept close and to be taught." This responsibility has fallen on the APL cadres who are cautioned to be alert for any "foreign manifestations and bad habits" exhibited by young people. Cadres have also been instructed to be aware if young people exhibit any influences, prejudices or traditions associ-
ated with the precommunist order. Opposition to such tendencies is a requirement if cadres are to fulfill the demands of "revolutionary education." In a series of interviews conducted by foreign journalists at the Tirana University in 1984, Albanian students, under the careful supervision of university authorities, consistently demonstrated the success of the APL's educational policies. Again and again students asserted with well rehearsed enthusiasm that "to serve the people" under the party's guidance was the greatest possible honor. However, it is possible that the picture presented in such carefully staged interview does not reflect the actual situation. In fact, the publication of several journal articles as well as special instructions by the Central Committee on youth problems in 1984 and 1985 indicate that Albania may be suffering from some of the problems associated with most modern societies. If this is in fact the case, it is possible that the post-Hoxha leadership may not enjoy the same freedom in imposing the rigid, uncompromising policies associated with Enver Hoxha and communist Albania's first four decades.

The Revolutionary Role of Literature

The party's educational objectives have been supported by contemporary Albanian literature with its political and nationalistic themes, characteristics that led Enver Hoxha to boast about the educational achievements of the nation's literature. On numerous occasions, he spoke as if the sole function of literature was to reflect the events that were taking place in the country's political and cultural life.

A typical example of the style and content of Albanian prose is a story entitled "The Heights," which tells of a young man so dedicated to the work of his brigade—building chimneys—that he left his young wife to rejoin his fellow workers and resume his work in order to further "strengthen socialism." The introduction to an English language translation of a volume of short stories discussed contemporary, accepted themes of Albanian prose. According to this brief essay,

The major socialist transformations which are taking place in Albania have added new themes to our letters and art. Most of the stories in this volume depict real episodes of actual life. . . . Tractors clamber uphill to untrodden lands which youth have turned to arable fields, telephone lines carry messages to remote and rugged mountain regions, the mailman carries letters from girls engaged in voluntary work at the railroad site . . . , while the brave frontier guard keeps vigilant watch . . . .

The struggle against "backward customs" is portrayed in works such
as Ismail Kadare's *The Wedding*, a novel which relates the efforts of progressive Albanians to resist the "evil" influences of the church and other vestiges of pre-communist society. Kadare's novel presents an impressive array of customs ranging from blood feuds to child betrothals, all of which are said to have plagued Albania until Enver Hoxha's final effort to purge the nation of religious influences was launched in 1967.

The degree to which these themes permeate Albanian literature is an indication of the fact that such customs persist in many regions of the country in spite of the APL's determined efforts to eradicate them. In 1972 the journal *Bashkimi* reported on the activities of a Moslem faith healer said to have been doing a thriving business until apprehended by the authorities. The healer was given a public trial at which party workers took steps to insure that proper lessons were drawn from the experience for the benefit of the masses. "If there had been sharper vigilance, if there had been no indifference, if the threat of the poison of religious ideology . . . had not been underestimated," *Bashkimi* intoned, the priest would have been unable to operate. The article concluded by saying that the party workers had developed a sense of higher responsibility for increasing vigilance against all remnants of religious belief.\(^{21}\) For years, party journals have warned of the reactivation of religious rituals in disguised forms, complaining, for example, that many weddings are 'socialist' in name only since numerous old customs, such as the wearing of a bride's veil, are still followed.\(^{22}\) The problem, APL spokesmen insisted, was that too many party workers feel that the struggle against religion has already been completely won. Official policy maintains that since the APL has "not yet eradicated all the roots of religion" strenuous measures to purify society must be continued. The Council of the Democratic Front and other party sponsored organizations frequently complained that "religious ideology was operating in a camouflaged manner . . ." and that "religion, backward customs, and prejudices" had not all been eliminated. The revival of religious rites is not confined simply to old people, but also involves many of Albania's youth. Circumcision, religious feasts, and religious ceremonies associated with weddings are mentioned as examples of revived customs.\(^{23}\) In order to combat this, Hoxha repeatedly demanded that all organizations in the villages and cities raise the level of their work by penetrating even more deeply into family life.

It is important to note that, shortly after Hoxha's death, Ramiz Alia initiated a campaign against the "mediocrity, complacency, and superficiality" of Albania's cultural life. While this was initially interpreted as a direct criticism of Hoxha's cultural policies, it may be,
more than anything else, a domestic response to Albania's opening of contacts with the rest of Europe. As Albanian citizens experience more intimate associations with cultural products of other European nations, it is not unreasonable to expect that they will become more discriminating in their evaluations of their own country's cultural output. In fact, Hoxha himself stressed that as the population became more sophisticated the standards of cultural creativity would have to be improved. If presented in this light, the recent campaign could be viewed as a logical evolution of Hoxha's teachings rather than a repudiation of them.\textsuperscript{24}

**Garrison State Rhetoric**

A concern with the threat posed by vestiges of "backward ideologies" fits well with the Albanian Party of Labor's insistence on continual vigilance and Hoxha's garrison state rhetoric. When discussing the APL's programs, policies, and prospects, Hoxha always set an optimistic tone. At the Sixth Congress he asserted that he regarded "the future of the world with optimism, convinced that it belongs . . . to socialism." Yet, in a theme he stressed until his death, Hoxha cautioned party workers against excessive self-confidence and allowing unjustified optimism to "prevent us from seeing the threats and dangers to our country."\textsuperscript{25} The APL's leader noted the specific substance to those threats in his speech to the 7th Congress in 1976 when he announced the exposure and destruction of a "treacherous and conspiratorial, anti-party faction" within the APL. Members of this group, he charged, had been collaborating with Albania's "external enemies" in order to "open the gates to revisionism, to destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat and to liquidate the country's independence." These 'traitors,' Hoxha declared, have suffered a complete defeat and have been thrown "on the rubbish heap." Looking toward the future, Hoxha declared that "not one evil act, no matter by whom, will ever escape the great vigilance of the communists and the working masses." Violent events in 1981 and 1982 showed Hoxha's continuing concern about "external enemies" determined to overthrow Albania's fundamentalist Marxist-Leninist regime.\textsuperscript{26}

Throughout Hoxha's years in power, Albanian publications and radio broadcasts linked foreign and domestic concerns by stressing negative themes regarding most of the world powers—Communist as well as non-Communist. Radio Tirana commentaries frequently warned that the danger posed by NATO was increasing and would continue to do so because the United States had no interest in decreasing European tensions. Radio Tirana commentators cautioned their audiences to compare the "words and deeds of U.S. imperialism
and Soviet social imperialism" carefully. Such a comparison, listeners were told, would reveal a double threat to Albanian security posed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.\(^{27}\)

In discussing Albanian national security, Hoxha pointed out that "preparation for the defense of the Fatherland is a permanent and continuous task which is carried out in good times and bad. . . ." This preparation is to continue, he insisted, in spite of what enemies say they may be doing, regardless of the "events occurring in the world." In this context, he quoted Lenin’s instruction to make "every citizen a soldier and every soldier a citizen." He linked the external threats with Albania’s educational system by saying that special attention should be paid in the schools to programs for military training of young people. Hoxha warned that military training in the schools was not to be taken lightly, but should be done "in all seriousness." Throughout the seventies and early eighties, various programs were implemented in an effort to remedy any "backwardness" in students’ military education.\(^{28}\) Under Hoxha’s leadership the APL declared its "intention to put into practice the Marxist–Leninist principle of arming the people, of training them militarily and making them fit for the defense of their socialist homeland."\(^{29}\) The leadership supplemented traditional military preparedness with a state security apparatus directed against internal threats. "State security organs," regime spokesmen declared, "are the vigilant eye of the dictatorship."\(^{30}\)

The Quest for Domestic Order

In *Albania: China’s Beachhead in Europe*, Harry Hamm hypothesized that the encirclement that Albania’s leaders saw as a threat to their nation’s security made Stalinism a necessity for the APL.\(^{31}\) Hoxha and the others in the APL leadership felt that Albania’s encirclement actually became more pronounced throughout the past decade. At the 6th Congress, Hoxha stated that the building of socialism in Albania was taking place "in conditions of imperialist and revisionist encirclement."\(^{32}\) A similar theme was stressed by Mehmet Shebu at the 7th Congress with his assertion that

> We have been and continue to be surrounded and in a state of siege, but we have never been afraid and never will be afraid. We have so far met the encirclement and blockade with complete success and will continue to meet it with complete success in the future.\(^{33}\)

With this view as official policy, the social outlook of the Albanian leadership—even with Hoxha’s death—is unlikely to alter significantly. The militantly fundamentalist outlook of the APL is re-
STALINISM IN ALBANIA

fleeted in the puritanical attitude expressed by a cautionary note in the tourist guidebook issued by the tourist agency of Albania. According to the guide

... Tourists should see to it that they be properly dressed, particularly in towns. It is not permitted to walk about in a bathing suit. Women should avoid wearing mini-skirts or exaggeratedly deep decolletes. 34

Just as Hoxha’s APL rejected “decadence” such as that mentioned above, it also repudiated the orientation and attitudes of the Western New Left which so frequently praised Albania’s militant policies. While one might have supposed that the Albanians would appreciate the New Left’s stridence, in fact, this was not the case. Specifically citing the writings of Herbert Marcuse; a chief theoretician of the New Left, Hoxha said, “these views cause great harm to the revolutionary movement and create confusion among some immature militants. ...” In Hoxha’s opinion, there was “great ideological and political confusion” among the ranks of the New Left. The APL rejected this political tendency not only because of the utopian character of its programs, but also because of the “alien ideologies” that presumably influenced them. The New Left was considered “bourgeois” in substance as well as origin. 35 Moreover, the life-style commonly associated with the New Left was painfully inconsistent with official Albanian morality and unlikely to produce the type of society that Hoxha’s APL hoped to fashion. It was the APL’s intention to mold the attitudes and behavior of Albania’s citizens in such a way that “social opinion” would prevent “anti-social behavior,” while all citizens would wage “war against bourgeois, revisionist, feudal, and patriarchal ideology” and “backward practices and religious prejudices.” 36

Against the background of these concerns, the New Left, in spite of its effusive words of praise for the Albanian leadership, was simply irrelevant.

Albania’s almost complete isolation was being eroded, however, even before Enver Hoxha’s death. By 1986, only three European nations—Great Britain, West Germany, and Spain—did not maintain diplomatic ties with Albania. In 1984 Ramiz Alia, presumably with Hoxha’s blessings, had initiated an effort to normalize Albanian-English relations and expressed his confidence that through mutual efforts his country would be able to establish diplomatic ties with Spain and by 1987 the two nations were engaged in talks that aimed at broadening their contacts. 37

The APL’s rhetoric during Hoxha’s years reflected a propensity for rigid law and order themes. In order to bring the benefits of law
and order to Albania the masses were to be mobilized and vigilant in order to prevent "anti-social acts." The concerns of this effort extended far beyond such commonly recognized crimes as robbery, murder, or other Western criminal concepts. "Rascality, jealousy, and gossip" were also "crimes" for which citizens would be punished.\(^38\) In short, Hoxha constructed a regime that was concerned about every aspect of an individual's behavior and attitudes. The objective of his program, according to an editorial in the party daily, was the creation of conditions under which all citizens could be "happy, prosperous, and revolutionary."\(^39\)

The creation of a "revolutionary man," in Hoxha's view, required adherence to Stalinist traditions and keeping Albania firmly on a dogmatic, non-revisionist course. Hoxha frequently condemned anti-Stalinism as an "alien trend, irreconcilable with Marxism–Leninism and in struggle against it."\(^40\) To describe the Albanian leadership as Stalinist was to deliver what Hoxha regarded as the highest compliment. He would, however, have denied any suggestions that the Soviet Communist Party was Stalinist. In fact, before Hoxha's death, Zeri i Popullit charged that efforts to create the impression that the USSR's leadership is "returning to the old Stalinist positions are a big bluff." Hoxha insisted that the APL would never allow the "name of the great Marxist–Leninist revolutionary activity of Joseph Stalin" to be misused by revisionists. Stalin, he believed, "belongs to the Marxist–Leninists, to the proletarian revolution," not to anyone else.\(^41\) Accordingly, each year the anniversary of Stalin's death is observed throughout Albania with public meetings, articles, lectures, and photo exhibits dedicated to offering hymns of praise for the departed dictator.

Few topics of Albanian domestic affairs gained more attention and did more to show the dimensions of Hoxha's militant fundamentalism than the Red Chinese-style "Albanian cultural revolution." This was an important theme throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. Supplementing Hoxha's rhetoric during these years, Mehmet Shehu declared that the party "has always kept ablaze the fire of the struggle against manifestations of bureaucracy."\(^42\) Hoxha himself made frequent references to the fight against bureaucracy and other bourgeois tendencies as a permanent task of the party. Erroneous bourgeois concepts, he asserted, were a "great and deeply rooted evil" that must be relentlessly opposed by the party and all of its members.\(^43\) In order to carry out this effort, the mass organizations became responsible for "verification" of the "correctness of decisions" made by the state apparatus. This practice was justified by the principle of self-criticism, a method said to be incompatible with "the
bureaucratic . . . tendency to make a fetish of everything issued by the apparatus.” This practice, Hoxha assured his countrymen, guaranteed “direct control of the class . . . from below.” The entire project was under the direction and leadership of the APL, which, of course, was a true “revolutionary party” and therefore representative of the will of the working class. Hoxha also emphasized the role of the party by stressing that “socialism does not need bureaucrats and technicians who believe only in their own ‘genius’. . . . It needs cadres who purge themselves and live with the masses.”

Beginning in the early 1970s, an effort was being made throughout Albania to reduce the number of administrative personnel in the productive enterprises. This represented a major step in the struggle against “manifestations of bureaucracy” and, additionally, freed people for the all-important task of production. In some enterprises administrative staffs were reduced by as much as 20 percent. According to the Albanian press, many office workers gave up their office jobs and “volunteered” to work on the assembly line. By 1975 the APL’s rotation effort had been extended to include even former deputy ministers and directors of state enterprises. In commenting on this Zeri i Popullit observed

By going to a new production front, they will give their assistance and, more important, they will become revolutionized, they will become refreshed and will learn from life, from the working class . . . .”

During this Chinese-type campaign, there was considerable emphasis on improving the work of party organizations, an especially important concern for the party of a militantly fundamentalist society. Ruruga e Partise noted the deficiencies in the work of party groups but stressed the positive features of the situation, citing as an example the introduction of 25 percent increases in work standards as a result of effective party work in one community. Continuing, the article stated that “The party groups have also done a fine job in the preparation and development of meetings of basic organizations, bringing the voice of the masses to them much better.” The journal also emphasized the obligation of all basic party organizations to develop appropriate political themes in every aspect of their work. It cited as a model the basic organizations of the health institutions which were said to have “analyzed the problem of improving the content of the political work with the masses” while caring for the health needs of the population. No sector was to be exempt from this campaign for “strengthening the role and . . . further revolutionizing the operation” of the basic organizations of the party. Even after
Hoxha's death, the APL continued to emphasize militant traditions and a repudiation of bureaucratic tendencies. One of the most telling illustrations of this tendency was seen in 1987 in the industrial town of Lac where, according to the party press, workers issued a series of warnings to the managements of their retail enterprises. Corrupt managers in several warehouses, we are told, have been given "preferential treatment" to individuals with "connections" and selling goods directly from the warehouse without ever taking much sought-after consumer goods to retail outlets. Managers of such operations are identified by name in the party press and citizens are encouraged to take actions against those who practice favoritism against the interests of Albanian workers. Such efforts are consistent with Hoxha's instructions that the party play a militant, revolutionary role in Albanian society and continually force the "progressive evolution" of social institutions.

From this account it can be seen that the Albanian Party of Labor under Enver Hoxha kept alive an ideological fervor and maintained a dynamic, revolutionary relationship between the political system and society. For Hoxha, authoritatively induced social change was a major part of this task, one which was pursued, apparently, in the face of resistance by some elements of the APL itself. The ideological militancy of the regime was coupled with a hostile attitude toward the outside world. The image of an encircled, embattled Albania was repeatedly invoked as justification for popular sacrifices and repressive measures such as those following the violent Hoxha–Shehu dispute of December 1981, although there were indications of a softening of this position prior to Hoxha's death.

Whether Hoxha's Stalinist domestic policies will remain as an enduring legacy is yet to be seen. The continued adulation of Hoxha in the press, the tone of Ramiz Alia's rhetoric, and the prominent role of Nexhmije Hoxha, the late dictator's widow, in the months following his death might indicate that his policies enjoy a permanence that could project Hoxha's will into the future. Nexhmije Hoxha's references to a new party leadership "reared" by her husband may be evidence of a cadre that will remain dedicated to fundamentalist and Stalinist orientation. Alia's recent campaign against the bureaucratic managerial sector also echoes Enver Hoxha's concern for maintaining a domestic militancy reminiscent of China under Mao. While much has been made in the Western press of Albanian initiatives in turning West for help in such matters as boosting its oil production as well as secret Albanian–British talks aimed at improving relations between those two nations, it is important to note that similar steps were being made even before Hoxha's death.
may be that the APL under Hoxha's leadership came to the realization that it could pursue its own detente with the West and, in so doing, strengthen its weak international position and simultaneously solidify its absolute domination of domestic affairs. If that should, in fact, prove to be the case, Albanian domestic policies may continue to reflect the traditional Stalinist values of Enver Hoxha while the regime reaps the benefits of a reborn and expanded detente between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Notes

9 *Albania Today* (Tirana), No. 5, 1977, pp. 8–17.
10 Hoxha, pp. 133–134.
16 Hoxha, pp. 158–160.
17 *Albania Today* (Tirana), No. 6, 1977, pp. 7–9.


23 *Zeri i Popullit*, February 9, 1979, p. 2.


28 Hoxha, pp. 122–123.

29 *Shqiperia Socialiste Marshon*, p. 223.


32 Hoxha, p. 121.

33 *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, November 10, 1976, EE/5360/C/5.


40 Hoxha, p. 211.


49 Puna, June 9, 1987, p. 3.