the beach the Spaniards withdrew to their fort. Strozzi sent Sainte-Soline, one of his regimental commanders, with some troops to reconnoiter the fortress and determine if it could be taken by storm. The fort, actually a villa, was not particularly strong structurally, but had cannons and four culverins ready for use on the land side. Dom António was quartered in the monastery of San Roque, holding court as the King of Portugal, and the citizens of the island came to pledge their loyalty and support to his cause, begging his forgiveness for wavering. And this was the one island supposedly loyal to Philip II.

Dom António sent a letter to the defenders on July 20 asking for their surrender, pledging safe conduct and pardon for both Spaniards and Portuguese. He complimented them on their bravery and the tone was conciliatory, but the meaning was clear: surrender or be blown to pieces. He pointed out the strength of his forces and the weakness of theirs, insisting that no help could come from Philip in time to save them.23

The fortress answered immediately, politely refusing to surrender and closing with a medieval pledge of faithfulness as vassals of Philip II. The stubbornness of the Spanish garrison threatened Strozzi's plans. His delay in France, the crossing to the Azores that took almost two weeks longer than expected, and now the week being lost on São Miguel was
precious time he could not spare. After all, this was not his final destination. He planned to reduce the island, leave enough troops to hold it in the name of Dom António, then sail on to take up his new duties as the first French Viceroy of Brazil. The delay would prove costly.

Santa Cruz had been working feverishly to put together a military expedition to the Azores. He traveled from Lisboa to Sevilla and back, wrote letters, ordered supplies, and supervised the arming of ships. He knew of the French fleet, and he had heard of rumors that an English squadron led by Drake might also be involved. Philip II had inaugurated these preparations on January 13, 1582, in a lengthy document detailing the ports where ships would assemble, the amount of money available, and the supplies to be taken. The original plan was to sail by the end of March with supplies for six months, but the Spaniards were also behind schedule.

The instructions to Santa Cruz included orders to capture any corsairs found in the area, to use torture if necessary to obtain information, to execute all violators of the peace, and dispose of the bodies by throwing them into the sea. All captured silver, gold, pearls, jewels, weapons, and munitions were to be property of the crown. All other booty would be divided "according to custom." The letter closed with a caution not to exceed the royal instructions.24

A companion document of the same date added further
instructions. The Azores were to be taken by force, using the special fleet and army assembled for that purpose. If French or English forces appeared they were to be destroyed. Santa Cruz was given authority to judge between loyal and disloyal inhabitants of the islands, and to punish or free them accordingly. If the islanders surrendered without resistance the villa of Praia, churches, and monasteries were not to be sacked by the soldiers. The instructions specified that all foreigners, especially French and English interlopers who were in the Azores for the purpose of aiding the cause of Dom António, would be hanged. Priests who had preached sedition would be returned alive to Lisboa for punishment.25

Philip was upset because the fleet had not sailed by the end of June. Word had come of the sailing of Strozzi's forces and Santa Cruz finally left Lisboa on July 10 with the first division of the Spanish fleet. He could not afford to wait any longer for Recalde to join him with the Andalucian division. The Marqués left instructions for the second division to join him as soon as possible and sailed with twenty-eight large ships and five nataches (small auxiliary craft, dispatch boats) of an original force of thirty-one ships and five nataches. Three not ready to leave on July 10 were to join Santa Cruz later.

Of the original squadron of thirty-one sailing vessels only two were crown ships, the captured Portuguese
galleons San Martín and San Mateo, which were the capitana (flagship) and almiranta (second in command) respectively. The San Martín is listed at 1,200 Spanish toneladas, which would be between 900 and 1,000 tons displacement in English tons. The San Mateo is listed at 600 toneladas, or a little over 450 tons.

In addition to the two galleons, Santa Cruz' squadron counted ten Guipúzcoan merchant ships (naves) averaging about 320 toneladas each, ten Flemish merchant ships (urcas) averaging almost 350 toneladas each, five Portuguese merchant ships averaging 250 toneladas each, three privately owned and manned merchant ships of 704, 329, and 139 toneladas, and an Aragonese merchantman of 600 toneladas which turned back in a storm and did not reach the Azores. The merchant ships were armed, but there is no information available as to the number or type of guns.

The original plan called for a much larger force. Santa Cruz had originally projected a fleet of approximately seventy large sailing vessels, twelve galleys, and smaller auxiliary craft, carrying a force of almost 11,000 infantry. The fleet was also to carry provisions for six months, siege cannons, ammunition carts, medical supplies, mules, and horses. Unusually severe storms dispersed the second division of ships from Andalucía commanded by Juan Martínez de Recalde. The galleys, under the command of Francisco de
Benavides, were even less prepared to withstand the heavy seas despite extra work in the shipyards to make them more seaworthy, and they had to turn back after covering only eighty leagues.

Santa Cruz' division also ran into bad weather shortly after leaving Lisboa. Many of his ships were damaged, and an Aragonese vessel was crippled so badly in the storm that she turned back, without permission, carrying three companies of experienced Flemish soldiers, the doctors, medicines, and hospital supplies. The Spanish fleet was now reduced to twenty-seven large ships and five pataches, and about half of the originally planned troop strength, but Santa Cruz pressed on. The weather improved on July 13 and the rest of the crossing was uneventful. They sighted the Morro on the north-east side of São Miguel Island on Saturday morning, July 21. Santa Cruz sent two of his pataches ahead, with Captain Aguirre in command of an advance party to inform the governor of the immediate arrival of the Spanish fleet. Aguirre was also to discover if the French fleet was in the area and report back to the Marqués, but Aguirre never returned.28

Strozzi's men captured Captain Aguirre and one of the two pataches sent ahead by Santa Cruz, and in doing so captured important dispatches revealing the strength and expected arrival time of the Spanish fleet. Strozzi called a council of his commanders to discuss their course of action. Some
suggested avoiding a fight and pushing on to Brazil, after all that was their destination, and they were seeking fame and fortune but not an early death. Plundering an occasional Spanish merchant vessel was one thing, but fighting a pitched battle with a combat fleet was quite another matter. Others urged an occupation of São Miguel and a defensive stance. Strozzi did not like either idea. The captured Spanish documents clearly showed that only part of the Spanish fleet was on hand, and it numbered only thirty-one ships (the original number, but not that many actually arrived with Santa Cruz). Surely his fleet could handle a force only half as large, and a victory over Santa Cruz would bring him great glory and fame, as well as make him master of the fleets from America and the Orient. A victory might even put Portugal within Dom António's grasp. Both Strozzi and Dom António wanted to fight, and that view carried the day.

Santa Cruz dropped anchor at Villa Franca on July 22 and began to take on fresh water. The second of the two advance pataches joined the fleet and reported the capture of Aguirre. Lookouts on the Spanish flagship sighted sails approaching from the direction of Ponta Delgada. Santa Cruz could stop looking for the French fleet; it had found him. The Spaniards were forced to forget the water and put to sea. As they drew farther from land they saw more enemy ships previously screened from their view by the point of the
island, finally counting more than sixty sails, large and small, including four Spanish ships captured earlier and added to the French fleet.

Santa Cruz ordered the battle standard to be raised, and when the French flagship fired a shot of challenge the Spanish flagship answered. It was 4:00 P.M. and the Spanish ships, trapped to landward, scrambled to get clear of the shore and form a battle line. Terms such as "line ahead" and "line abreast" were not in vogue in 1582 and the documents simply said "line," but it is assumed that the formation was "line abreast" since it is doubtful that a "line ahead" formation was used this early.

The ships of both fleets finally occupied their posts in good order, forming compact lines. Two Spanish shipmasters, Captain Marolín de Juan of the galleon San Martín (the capitana, or flagship, of Santa Cruz) and Rodrigo de Vargas, were given special responsibility for seeing that the line was maintained.

To the sound of fife and drum and with banners flapping from the masts and castles like a medieval tournament, the two fleets advanced toward each other from opposite directions to do battle. Aboard the Spanish ships priests called on divine aid for their cause, but the French fleet had the weather gauge.

Strozzi passed the word to his captains to attack in
pairs, choosing for themselves the enemy ship to which they would give battle. Since they had approximately twice as many vessels as the enemy, this would allow them to put two ships against each Spanish vessel. Strozzi led the attack himself, confident that his captains would follow orders and be right behind him. He selected the Spanish almiranta and five or six French ships followed him. The plan was to slip in among the enemy ships, close with what Strozzi probably assumed was the Spanish capitana, and board her. If successful the battle would be terminated in one swift stroke.

Strozzi suddenly realized that two sections of his force were holding back. Although a following wind was driving the French fleet upon the Spaniards, most of the French ships were keeping themselves into the wind and appeared hesitant to engage the enemy. Strozzi went after them to bring them back, but without success. The French captains who had complied with the order to attack were now confused, and seeing the disorder of their forces they too turned about. The wind had grown calm in the meantime, making it difficult to maneuver, and Strozzi thus lost his golden opportunity to strike a telling blow, though through no fault of his own.

The Spaniards were unaware of Strozzi's problem. They had seen the French ships in good order, divided into three sections, and assumed that two sections were supposed
to stay back while the first moved in, possibly to test the reaction of the Spanish fleet. Santa Cruz noted the calm which occurred just before dark, and as the French fleet withdrew towards Ponta Delgada the Spanish ships went out to sea.

A pinnace from São Miguel drew alongside the Spanish capitana about midnight bringing a message from the governor in the fortress. The letter informed Santa Cruz of the events on the island before the arrival of the Spanish fleet, the landing of the French troops, and the siege of the fortress. Don Alvaro sent the pinnace back with a message praising the brave defense of the garrison and promising to see that the king learned of their deeds.

Some of the French captains visited Strozzi about daybreak the next morning. They openly accused of cowardice those who had disobeyed orders by refusing to fight, demanding that they forfeit their heads as an example to all. Strozzi was not inclined to take such harsh measures, hoping that by admonishing them strongly they would do better next time, but discipline remained a constant problem for the French commander. 30

Both fleets resumed their stations the following morning and all day was spent tacking back and forth. The French line attempted three times to outflank the Spaniards, but without success. The French fleet had the weather gauge,
so Strozzi enjoyed the option of when and where to initiate combat. Another day was allowed to pass, however, without the issue being joined.

On the 24th a slight wind blew from the southeast. Both fleets formed their lines and jockeyed for position. This continued until about 4:00 P.M. when the Spanish fleet was forced to veer away from São Miguel Island, leaving itself vulnerable momentarily. Strozzi attempted to take advantage of this situation, falling on the Spanish rearguard of five vessels under Miguel de Oquendo. A lively exchange of heavy gun-fire followed, which became general as the Spanish vanguard doubled back to assist Oquendo. The French ships withdrew a little to assure that they kept the weather gauge, and as darkness overtook them the two fleets were again formed in parallel lines. Although the French vessels were not able to break through the Spanish defensive formation the events of the day showed Santa Cruz clearly that he was not only outnumbered two to one but that the French ships were faster and more maneuverable than his own. 31

Santa Cruz attempted to reduce the French advantage by continuing to tack after dark until he gained the weather gauge. The maneuver succeeded, and dawn of the 25th found the French fleet scattered and disorganized. The Frenchmen were attempting to repair the damage suffered by their vessels in the cannon duel the day before, and one of their
largest ships was so seriously damaged it had to be towed. Shortly after dawn this latter vessel sank in clear view of both fleets. No grappling or boarding had taken place and the potential for sinking large sailing ships at long to moderate range by cannon fire could hardly have been lost on Santa Cruz, and the other experienced seamen of both fleets. They did not have to wait until 1588 nor be taught by English gunners that such devastation was possible at a distance.

Santa Cruz had his own problem that morning, however, for two of his troop-carrying urcaes had disappeared during the night. Each of these two ships carried 200 German soldiers, thus reducing by 400 the fighting men at his disposal.

Santa Cruz had the wind in his favor now, however, and was pressing the attack when the mainmast parted on the ship commanded by Don Cristóbal de Eraso. Whether this was the result of French gunfire or was due to natural causes is not known. The crippled vessel was being pushed by the wind into the gunfire of the enemy, and Santa Cruz broke off the attack to take the damaged ship in tow behind his own galleon. Strozzi used this unexpected stroke of fortune to regain the weather gauge. A few salvos were exchanged by the two fleets at long range later in the day before darkness finally put an end to the hostilities.

Strozzi was frustrated by his inability to turn superior numbers into victory. The second division of
Spanish ships had not yet arrived, but Strozzi knew they were scheduled to appear soon and it became increasingly important to the French cause that a decisive confrontation be forced before additional Spanish forces arrived. Another war council was called.

Strozzi honored a young captain by asking for the latter's opinion based on the experience of the past few days. The unnamed captain claimed that the costly errors which had so hampered them, from the junior officers to the senior commanders, resulted from disobedience of orders. If some of them had been executed in the first instance, there would have been no second or third time for the others. His opinion was that too many of the captains were cowards. Strozzi had made his officers sign an oath that they would obey his orders and engage the enemy, but the captain doubted the value of such an oath and further suggested that Strozzi might be well advised to withdraw and use his forces to better advantage elsewhere. If Strozzi was determined to do battle here, however, the captain argued, he should make it clear that anyone failing to enter battle upon orders would be beheaded after the battle. The advice was rejected as too harsh.

Strozzi decided to change ships on the eve of the battle despite the protests of some of his officers. The ship in which he had been sailing was heavy and slow. He transferred to one of Brissac's ships, taking the Count of
Vimioso with him. Beaumont was the senior French officer aboard, but neither the name of the ship nor its armament is known. Estimates of its size range from 200 tons to about 350 tons and accounts declare that it was a beautiful vessel which sailed well.

Santa Cruz had twenty-six vessels on the eve of the fight, including the one which had parted a main-mast and was too crippled to fight. The crippled vessel, being towed by the capitana, would have to be cut loose when battle became imminent, leaving the Spaniards with twenty-five fighting ships. The Spanish ships were generally inferior to those of their adversary in sailing characteristics. Santa Cruz knew that his formations and tactics would be restricted by the slowness and heaviness of movement of the Flemish urcas, which were nearly flat-bottomed and at present fully loaded. They also tended to drift to leeward and were difficult to keep in formation.

Santa Cruz interspersed the clumsy urcas with the better sailing Guipúzcoan ships throughout the line. Although some of the circumstances of the battle might be more easily explained by assuming that the formation was a modified line-ahead, it was probably a line-abreast formation with the flagship in front of the line. The flagship was flanked by six of the better-handling ships in the Spanish force, three on either side. The reserve was composed
of a similar formation, independent of the line, with orders to rush promptly to wherever they were needed. This plan had worked well at Lepanto where Santa Cruz had himself commanded the reserve. Galleys may well function in such a manner in calm seas, but sailing ships deprived of the weather gauge by the enemy do not "rush promptly to wherever they are needed" against the wind, as the Spaniards were soon to discover.
NOTES


2Luiz Agusto Rebello da Silva, História de Portugal, III (Lisboa: Imprenta Nacional, 1867), 18.

3Lettres de Catherine de Médicis, VII, 400.


5Almeida, História de Portugal, IV, 41-42.

6Lettres de Catherine de Médicis, VII, 383.

7Ibid.

8Ibid., p. 28.

9Biblioteca Nat., Cinq Cents, 29, f. 574. Unpublished MS.

10Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, Elizabeth, XIV, 436; "Letter of Cobham to Walsingham."

11Ibid., p. 535.

12Fernández Duro, La Conquista de las Azores, p. 18.

13Ibid., p. 10.

14Ibid., pp. 19-21.

15Fernández Duro, Armada Española, II, 308.

16"Relación de la navegación que hizo el galeón Gran Gui, que fué por Almirante de las cuatro naos que llevaba á la isla de San Miguel Ruiz Díaz de Mendoza. Extracto." March 2, 1582. Fernández Duro, La Conquista de las Azores, pp. 253-260.


20. Ibid.


24. Ibid., pp. 234-245.

25. Ibid., pp. 245-250.


30. Ibid., VII, 399.


32. Ibid.

33. *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, VII, 399-400.

CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE FOR THE AZORES

At dawn on July 26 the French and Spanish squadrons were three miles apart and eighteen miles from São Miguel Island. The wind was from the west-northwest and both squadrons tacked on a northerly course, with the French ships to windward. It was not within his power to initiate the battle so Santa Cruz waited and maintained his ships in close formation. The morning passed with both forces sailing in good order, but Strozzi made no move. The Spaniards were beginning to think there would be no battle this day either, but about noon the action began.

The Spanish galleon San Mateo was out of formation. Whether this was accidental or a deliberate move on the part of her captain to lure the enemy into battle remains unknown. Aboard the San Mateo were the field marshal General Lope de Figueroa and the royal overseer of the fleet, Don Pedro de Tassis. The French records speak of this galleon, with its double battery of thirty bronze cannons, as the ship that covered the Spanish squadron's flank.

Strozzi saw that the San Mateo was some distance from the rest of the Spanish line and pulled out of his formation. 160
with five ships to attack her. He gave the signal for his squadron to follow and engage the enemy in a melee action. Both the French and Spanish commanders had the same objective—close in and grapple.

Aboard the San Mateo Figueroa showed no inclination to rejoin the Spanish formation, and the French ships, running before the wind, soon had him hemmed in and cut off. He did not fire a shot with his heavy bronze ordnance as Strozzi in the French capitana attempted to grapple the San Mateo from the port side, while the experienced Brissac in the almiranta did the same on the starboard side. The yardarms of the three ships were finally touching when suddenly the San Mateo let go double broadsides at point blank range with every piece she had, then reloaded and repeated it with great rapidity. The French ships managed to grapple her anyway as Du Mesnil Guerdel and Baret, assisted by a third vessel, raked the Spanish galleon with enfilade fire from stern to prow. Then a deadly hand-to-hand struggle began on the decks of the San Mateo which was to rage for five hours and take the lives of hundreds of men on both sides.

The plight of the Spaniards was critical as the French ships received additional soldiers from other vessels which were thrown into the fight, while the Spanish ships struggled against the wind to come to the aid of the San Mateo. Meanwhile, lashed together as they were, with endless discharging
of firearms and the constant clashing of steel, it became butchery on both sides as the hand-to-hand fighting raged on hour after hour. Flaming devices were thrown down from the French vessels which started fires in various parts of the San Mateo. This happened some twenty times and the Spaniards were repeatedly forced to turn their attention to extinguishing the flames. Figueroa passed the word not to board the enemy ships for he had so few men left he could not afford to have them scattered, though the French vessels seemed vulnerable to boarding.

A general melee had begun in the meantime as the Spanish ships finally drew near to the beleaguered San Mateo. Two French ships attacked the San Martín, obliging Santa Cruz to release the tow cable on the crippled vessel of Braco before the two attacking ships were finally driven off. The Spanish reserve was tacking into the wind as fast as it could to help the beleaguered San Mateo, but even so it took almost two hours for them to reach it. Santa Cruz was also trying to reach the stricken galleon, but the reserve contingent arrived first.

The Juana, commanded by Captain Garagarza, was the first Spanish ship to aid the San Mateo, arriving about two hours after the first shots were fired. She drew alongside the French capitana and the soldiers boarded her while the men of the Spanish ship commanded by Villavicencio also
boarded the French almíranta grappled to the other side of the San Mateo. Other French ships then arrived and grappled to the outboard side of the newly arrived Spanish vessels. A mass of sailing ships was thus formed resembling an island, or more aptly a volcano since smoke and powder fumes were so thick it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe.

Miguel de Oquendo then approached the island of smoking ships under full sail and rammed the bow of his ship between the San Mateo and the French Almíranta, damaging the side of the latter and tearing loose the grappling lines holding the two ships together. He then fired a broadside into the stricken French ship at point blank range and grappled her. The French almíranta was thus separated from the San Mateo and beset by the vessels of Oquendo and Villavicencio.

The French almíranta, on which Brissac flew his standard, was easily the equal of Oquendo's ship, to which it was now grappled, but the initial Spanish broadside had killed fifty French soldiers, and another Spanish vessel was also grappled to the other side of the French ship. The men fought on the arquebuses, muskets, spears, and even rocks, in spite of the fact that two of the vessels had been hulled at the water line by heavy shot early in the fray and the amount of water coming in was beginning to pose a serious problem.
The Spaniards swarmed over the decks of the French ship and captured Brissac's standard and banners. They sacked the cabins, taking everything they could find, including the furniture and silver service. They also took French prisoners, but Brissac fought for his life in his cabin and managed to escape into a small craft that came alongside.

The San Mateo was by now a smoldering hulk without sails, rigging, or masts. Her hull was riddled and she suffered forty dead and seventy-four wounded by Spanish count, among them the Captain, Jusepe de Talavera, and seven oficiales. Among the wounded were nineteen gentlemen and oficiales, not counting the slightly wounded who continued to fight. The heroic conduct of the crew, especially during the two hours when they fought alone, was a challenging example to the rest of the Spanish fleet and compares favorably with the heroic stand of the Revenge in the same waters some years later.

There were also examples of what fear can do. More than one account mentions the case of Figuaroa's chaplain, Juan de Jaén.2 He took refuge below decks where he ministered to the wounded and dying at first, but then was immobilized by fear. The confusion unnerved him. The roar of so many cannon that a musket shot could hardly be heard, the shouts of command, the cries and moans of the wounded, the thunder of the wheels and the squeal of pulleys, the stamping of
running feet, the crashing of cannon shot into the hull, the activity at the pumps, the crackling and glare of fires, the choking smoke, the heavy intoxicating smell of wick and powder, this mad concert of destruction, the shrill cacophony of terror, the multiple sounds and smells of death, overcame the priest. He was as a dead man, unable to speak, his face a strange mask of horror.

The bizarre struggle of the San Mateo overshadowed other acts of valor, of which there were many. The San Pedro, a lumbering urca, was attacked successively by four different French ships. She battered the first attacker severely and managed to hold her own against the other three in turn and prevented their crews from boarding. Captain Villaviciosa boarded two French ships, one after the other, suffering forty-five killed and fifty-two wounded among his men before he, too, was finally killed. He was so popular with his men that in a rage they avenged him by putting the entire crew of the second enemy ship to the sword.

Strozzi's ship managed to disengage itself from the San Mateo and pull away, but Santa Cruz in the San Martín immediately overtook him and successfully grappled the two flagships together. Captain Labastida brought the Catalina along the other side of Strozzi's vessel and the weary French soldiers and seamen found themselves forced to fight again. They gave a good account of themselves for an hour before surrendering.
Strozzi's capitulation was a signal for the French ships still engaged to break off and flee. Many had withdrawn earlier and others had never joined the battle at all, leading some French commanders to suspect that they had been betrayed. The French commanders Fumée and Saint-Soline were even accused of accepting bribes from Spanish agents before sailing.

Don Antônio had withdrawn on the eve of the battle and awaited the outcome on Terceira Island. News reached him in fragments until it became obvious that his fleet had been soundly beaten. Some of the French ships straggled into Terceira's harbor after the fight.

Dusk fell over a sea covered with burning hulks and the wreckage of many ships, a sea now controlled by Spain. The Spanish ships regrouped and made some essential repairs, but did not attempt to pursue the enemy. The battle had lasted slightly over five hours.

None of the other Spanish ships were as badly battered as the San Mateo but many had received considerable damage to rigging and hull and very few were in condition to return to Lisboa without some repairs, much less chase the fleeing French ships, as some critics later suggested should have been done. No Spanish ships were sunk, however, and the caravels carrying horses were recovered.

Spanish casualties were 224 dead and 553 wounded.
They greatly missed the doctors and medical supplies aboard the ship that turned back in a storm shortly after leaving Lisboa. The casualties as well as damage to his ships were offered as the primary reasons why Santa Cruz did not give chase to the disorganized French stragglers. Others would blame him later for not following through on his initial victory.

The French fleet lost ten large vessels, according to Spanish reports, including two burned, four sunk due to battle damage (including the capitana), and three others abandoned and sunk. The tenth vessel had been sunk the day before. The almiranta, after being sacked, was towed back to Lisboa as a prize of war. French losses were an estimated 1,200 to 1,500 dead. The casualties on the ships that escaped are unknown, but contemporary writers placed the overall total at about 2,500.4

Strozzi was gravely wounded by an arquebus shot and died aboard the San Martín shortly after being captured. Rumors later spread in Europe that Santa Cruz had him stabbed to death and his body thrown into the sea. Many French and Portuguese historians repeated the story uncritically in their accounts of the battle. All that is known is that Strozzi was gravely wounded during the battle and died on the Spanish flagship shortly after being brought before Santa Cruz. No reference is made to the burial of the French
commander, but he was probably "buried at sea" or "dumped into the sea" depending on one's point of view.

The Portuguese Count of Vimioso was also gravely wounded before his capture, but he lived for a few days longer, presumably long enough to tell the Spaniards about the schemes of Dom António. Some historians have denied that he did so, hinting that the Spaniards made up the so-called "confession" of Vimioso for their own purposes. Even the respected Portuguese historian Rebelão da Silva considered the confession suspicious, but most historians have accepted its validity.

Santa Cruz was the victor in the biggest battle fought up to that time by massed sailing ships on the high seas, a victory that foreshadowed events to come. His force was inferior in numbers but superior in quality, for it was composed of disciplined men commanded by experienced officers. There existed between Santa Cruz and Strozzi the same difference that distinguishes the professional carrying out a mission in a disciplined manner from the adventurer who occasionally takes up the sword for his own gain.

The political results of the Spanish victory were that the pretensions of Dom António were dealt a serious blow and the plans of France for possession of Brazil were shattered. Elizabeth of England's policy of caution was vindicated, and Philip II's grip on Portugal and her overseas empire tightened.
In regard to its military significance this battle, called variously the Battle of the Azores, the Battle of Terceira, the Battle of Punta Delgada, or the Battle of San Miguel, deserves more attention from naval and military historians than it has received. This neglect can probably be traced partly to the fact that English historians have considered the action of little importance and partly because it is sandwiched between the famous battles of Lepanto (1571) and the Armada (1588) which tend to overshadow it.

A typical English depreciation of Santa Cruz' achievement at Terceira is reflected in Laughton's State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588 when he speaks of the Spanish victory over Strozzi's "scratch fleet." Hale gets closer to the heart of the matter, however, when he credits English seamen with the development of modern naval warfare and then attempts to put Santa Cruz' victory in perspective with the comment that "the battle of Terceira is notable as the last great naval engagement in which the fighting was carried on in the fashion of the days of the car, when ships were little more than floating platforms on whose decks victory was decided by personal conflict between their crews, without any attempt to use their artillery with effect before closing side to side." Much of what Hale says is true, but there are significant differences between the battles fought at
Terceira and say Lepanto that deserve attention. The Battle of Terceira represents a transitional phase in naval warfare, in which Santa Cruz clearly shows that although he still holds some galley concepts, he is making the change from galley to galleon warfare. The English Sea Dogs had no galley tradition to overcome, but the Spaniards did, and Santa Cruz shows that he was capable of making the transition.

The old fighting style of the galleys is still reflected in this battle, however, by the traditional vanguard-main line-rear guard-reserve deployment of forces on both sides. Both commanders also had the same objective, close and board. After the battle Strozzi was criticized for his "ill judged and suicidal manoeuvre of closing with the Spaniards," for although he followed the traditional tactics in doing so, it was understood that the Spaniards were next to unbeatable at close quarters. Even the English commanders declined to test their strength against the Spaniards at close quarters in 1598.

The Battle of the Azores deserves to be divorced from its classification as the last battle in the tradition of the days of oars, however, and given a special transitional status, for the following reasons. There were no rowed vessels on either side in this battle and both fleets were required to depend entirely on the wind in maintaining their formations and jockeying for battle position; their maneuvers
to gain and maintain the weather gauge indicate that both commanders realized the importance of this vital factor. Santa Cruz did know how to use his heavy ordnance to good effect at long to medium range, Halle's denial notwithstanding, and drew first blood by sinking a French vessel at a distance, which precluded grappling and boarding, the day before the decisive conflict.

In galley warfare one of the cardinal rules was never to turn your beam (side) to the enemy, for you were especially vulnerable to ramming in that posture. In fighting sailing ships one must do just the opposite and turn broadside to the enemy in order to bring the maximum number of guns to bear on the target. To violate a long-standing taboo after almost forty years of experience in galley warfare requires a certain change of mind-set. Santa Cruz was a master of galley warfare, but he was also mastering the new tactics, making the transition. He was not bound to nor blinded by tradition and was quickly becoming the equal of any man in deep water fighting of great ships. True, the issue was finally settled at Terceira on the decks of ships, but is that to be the only criteria for evaluation? It was not the last time ships were boarded, and the overall characteristics of the battle have more in common with later naval battles than former ones.

None of the eyewitnesses who wrote of this battle
mentioned the tactics in any detail, seeming to take that for
granted. We must beware of reading the more stereotyped
tactics of a century, or two centuries, later back into this
action. "Line ahead" had not yet entered the naval lexicon,
and we do not know if the gunners aimed primarily at the
sails and masts with the intention of crippling the other
ship, or at the hulls in order to sink their adversary.
Maybe they aimed at the decks in order to cause the maximum
in personnel casualties. Since naval artillery was not yet
standardized, or very reliable, they may have just pointed
the pieces at the enemy vessel and were content to hit any-
thing. We simply do not know.

Heavy ordnance was replacing the sword as the deciding
factor in naval warfare. Dramatic changes were taking place
in naval tactics due to improved ships, rigging, and artillery.
It is to Santa Cruz' credit that he saw these changes taking
place and was one of the few men in history to win decisive
victories from the decks of both galleys and galleons. His
lack of experience as a pirate may have delayed his insights
in ship to ship fighting in comparison with some of his Eng-
lish contemporaries, but he understood what was happening.

Returning to the scene of the battle we encounter one
of the few dark blots on Santa Cruz' record, or so it is seen
by some historians. Shortly after the victorious Spanish
fleet returned to São Miguel Island, on August 1, 1582, four
companies of soldiers from the tercio of Don Francisco de Bobadilla marched the French prisoners to the plaza of Villafranca where the sentence of execution was read aloud. All of the prisoners over the age of seventeen were then executed. Twenty-eight señores and fifty-two caballeros died by strangulation, and 313 soldiers and sailors died by hanging. Santa Cruz carried out instructions from Philip II in this matter, and Philip's line of reasoning was that since France and Spain were at peace the French prisoners could not be prisoners of war. They were thus considered to be pirates and collaborators with rebels (Don António), and the penalty in either case was death. This was clearly a warning to the monarchs of France and England, both of whom encouraged the plundering of Spanish ports and shipping. In this case the French adventurers were caught red-handed, and at least three English ships were known to be with the French fleet, though the English ship masters had the good sense to withdraw when they learned what Strozzi had in mind. The purpose of the executions was no doubt to shock the enemies of Spain into realizing the dangerousness of their thinly disguised policy of aggression. Philip hoped to thus prevent the war which was becoming ever more inevitable. He did not succeed.

There was great indignation in Paris and surprise in London over the execution of the prisoners even though the St. Bartholomew Day's massacre was not quite a decade old,
and 600 captured Italians and Spaniards were put to death in England by Elizabeth’s soldiers only two years before, not to mention the Turkish atrocities on Cyprus. Such was the tenor of the times, and neither Moslem, Roman Catholic, or Protestant was above the execution of prisoners. The most surprising element of all was probably the fact that the nobles were not held for ransom, as they were in the case of the English atrocities of 1580 cited above. Upon hearing that her men had executed the Italian and Spanish soldiers captured on her shores, Queen Elizabeth made no comment beyond “regret that the officers had not shared the fate of the men.” Indeed the cause of the indignation in Paris was probably due to the high station of some of the French “pirates” executed by Santa Cruz, rather than the loss of the seamen and soldiers.

When Philip II had inquired earlier about the intent of the French fleet assembling at Nantes, Henry III had denied any knowledge of the expedition and agreed that if any such force did exist the men should be treated as free-booters if caught. In effect Santa Cruz thus executed the Frenchmen in the name of the King of France, though he acted according to the instructions of the King of Spain. Both Henry III and Catherine de Médicis had assumed that their fleet was strong enough to defeat any force the Spaniards might send against it. They failed to foresee the far-reaching consequences of the disavowal of their own men.
In the meantime Recalde arrived at São Miguel with the second division of the Spanish fleet. Philip wanted his forces to complete the victory by seizing Terceira Island immediately and informed Don Alvaro of his desire. The Marqués considered carefully all that was involved in attacking the island with the combined forces of the two divisions now assembled at São Miguel. Although he knew that he would have to answer to Philip for not carrying out the attack, he decided against it anyway in one of his acts of independence and good sense, for he knew that was involved in a successful naval undertaking better than anyone in Spain, including the king. The reasons for not attacking were that he lacked the proper equipment for an amphibious attack on an island in heavy seas, the casualties suffered during the fight had left him short of men, he had learned from Vímioso that the island was well defended, and the season was too far advanced to stay longer in that area.

Santa Cruz left the seriously wounded on São Miguel along with some companies of soldiers to reinforce the garrison there (a total of 2,600 men), and after repairing the fortifications and improving the harbor, began to search for the three Spanish convoys due in that area. The convoys were met at sea and escorted to Lisboa, the combined flotilla arriving at the mouth of the Tajo River on September 15. The flagship San Martín led the procession of vessels into
the port, towing the captured French flagship as a prize of war.

Santa Cruz was given a hero's welcome in Lisboa where he was met personally by Philip II and his wife, Archduke Alberto, and Archduchess Margarita. This day marked the peak of Don Alvaro's professional career and he was acclaimed by monarch, nobility, clergy, and common folk alike. His fame among the people and influence at the royal court were not due to some empty flattery of the king, bribery and "services rendered," or some courtly gesture, however, for he earned it through tests of arms and his proven qualities of leadership.

In France the reaction to the battle was somewhat different, and French historians have joined their English colleagues in playing down the importance of the Spanish victory. A typical comment is that

the Spaniards gave more importance to the matter than we did; in France the departure of the fleet was observed without concern, like a gambler risks a gold coin on a throw of the dice. In Spain the sailing of the Marqués of Santa Cruz was watched with anguished hearts because of the certainty that the fate of Portugal went in his hands. Two months later he returned to Lisboa in triumph, greeted by a shower of flowers...

The same author attributes the French defeat to the cowardice of most of the leaders in the fleet and says that three ships fought the whole Spanish fleet while forty-seven others fled. While it is true that all the French ships did not take part...
in the fight even the French eyewitness accounts fail to support the idea that only three stood and fought, and the Spanish and Portuguese accounts speak of a general mêlée in which many ships of both fleets took part.

It is true, however, that the reception Brissac and his fellow combatants received in France was quite different from Santa Cruz' reception in Lisboa. Catherine de Médici was furious at the defeat of her expedition by a smaller Spanish fleet, and two nobles, Saint-Soulaune and Funée, were formally accused of treason for their cowardly roles in the affair. It is certain that the French monarchs considered the matter as more vital than a casual throw of the dice, as French historians usually imply, for immediate plans were made for yet another expedition to be prepared. A new army was gathered to be sent to the Azores, for Catherine de Médici and Dom António wanted Terceira held at all cost.

In February 1583 Philip instructed Santa Cruz to prepare another fleet to sail to the Azores. The Prudent King sent emissaries to Terceira in the meantime, hoping to achieve the surrender of the island by peaceful means if possible. When it became clear that the defenders of Terceira would not yield to persuasion, and Spanish agents in France continued to report on the assemblage of a French force bound for the Azores, only then did Philip give the go-ahead for the expenditure of funds necessary for the new expeditionary force to the Azores.
Experienced seamen were scarce in Spain, and growing scarce in Philip II's Italian province, so that it was mid-June before Santa Cruz could get a fleet assembled in Lisboa. The Spanish force consisted of two galleazas, twelve galleys, five galleons, thirty great ships (armed merchant ships), forty-one auxiliary craft (pataches, xabres, carabelas), and seven troop barques which had to be towed. There were 3,923 seamen and rowers, and 9,976 soldiers accompanied the fleet. An unspecified number of knights and nobles with their servants and retainers accompanied the army at their own expense. The fleet carried supplies for five months.\textsuperscript{18} This force is almost a miniature version of the 1587-88 Armada projected by Santa Cruz and rejected by Philip II, the abridged version of which was led by Medina-Sidonia against England.

If seamen were scarce in Spain, they were doubly scarce in France after the defeat of Strozzi, and Henry III's problem was compounded by an equally serious shortage of vessels suitable for the intended purpose. Henry attempted to acquire ships from Denmark and Sweden but negotiations over terms drug on and on.\textsuperscript{19} Henry's first angry reaction to the defeat of his fleet had been to plot an attack on the northern Spanish port of Santander, but he lacked means to accomplish such an undertaking. He had also hoped to have his brother-in-law, the Duke of Joyeuse, command this revenge-seeking fleet, but realized that such a personage as Joyeuse would clearly declare to Philip II, and the world, that the crown
France was behind these depredations against a "friendly" power and the affairs of France did not allow for such an open challenge to Spain in 1533. In May, Aymar de Chastes (also Chatres) was named commander of a modest force of fourteen ships carrying 1,700 soldiers and 100 artillery pieces, which slipped quietly out of Le Havre for the Azores. Chastes and his men were warmly received by the people of Terceira, but Dom António's governor, Manoel de Silva, did not trust his French allies and began to put up obstacles to effective French organization of the defense forces.

Chastes insisted on commanding the armed men on the island, however, and soon transformed Terceira into a vast entrenched camp. A belt of coastal batteries ringed the island, manned mainly by French gunners, and each French infantry company was backed by two Portuguese reserve companies. Angra to the south and Praia to the East were the two most heavily defended areas since they were the most vulnerable to attack. La Praia had no less than fifty artillery pieces placed in ten redoubts, and the port of Angra was blocked by over thirty French and Portuguese vessels. The 1,700 reinforcements brought by Chastes combined with the 1,000 French troops already there made a total of 2,700 well disciplined French soldiers on Terceira (there were 400 more defending the island of Fayal), backed by Portuguese militia which totaled approximately 9,000 defenders.20
A Spanish fleet of ninety vessels, large and small, and towing seven troop barges, left the Tajo on June 23 with a favorable wind. Santa Cruz sent the galleys on ahead under the command of Don Diego de Medrano, and they arrived at São Miguel on July 3, eleven days ahead of the rest of the fleet. The remainder of the fleet arrived on July 14 and by the nineteenth all was in order for the assault on Terceira. In the meantime some captured Portuguese spies had provided valuable information concerning the strength of the defending forces, and revealed that the French and Portuguese defenders were not getting along well together. Contrary winds delayed the departure of the Spanish fleet from São Miguel until July 22, and on July 24 Santa Cruz' entire force was lying to off the coast of Terceira near the villa of San Sebastião.

Chastes had something of the same problem that Strozzi had experienced before him, however, for on July 22 when the lookouts first reported the approach of the Spanish fleet at least three French ships left the harbor and fled. Chastes followed them a long time in a patache pleading with them to return, but they refused. They knew the Spanish fleet was commanded by Santa Cruz, and they knew what had happened to Strozzi's men; they wanted no part of this fight.

The Spanish ships immediately came under fire from the coastal artillery, but Santa Cruz ordered his gunners not to return the fire. The galleys were sent to reconnoiter the coast, test the coastal defenses, and look for suitable
places to land the troops. Don Álvaro also sent an edict of
clemency ashore to the defenders, which further undermined
Chastes' position by eroding the will of many of the islanders
to resist. The amnesty was officially refused by Chastes,
however, and the French defenders responded with salvos of
cannon fire.

Santa Cruz finally selected a small bay called Las
Muelas (or Las Molas) as the landing spot. The beach was
small and dangerous, an unlikely spot for a major assault,
and therefore lightly defended. At 3:00 A.M. on July 26,
anniversary of the Spanish victory over Strozzi, the galleys
began to tow the landing barges toward the selected inlet.
The first wave of attackers was composed of 4,500 men of the
tercio of Don Lope de Figueroa. The coastal artillery opened
fire, and musket fire also rained down on the invaders from
French soldiers in the trenches overlooking the beach. The
galley bow cannons returned the fire and Santa Cruz led the
attack personally. The bank was steep and the Spanish
soldiers climbed it in the face of enemy fire with great
difficulty. Great bravery was displayed by the men on both
sides in the brief but bloody struggle. The Marqués had
chosen his terrain well, however, for there were only fifty
French soldiers there to oppose his 4,500, and the early
morning hour added the element of surprise. The French
defenders were commanded by the respected Captain Bourguignon
and thirty-five of the fifty men of his company died in the
desperate French holding action intended to delay the Spani-
iards until the alarm could be sounded and reinforcements
brought to throw the invaders back. 23 Captain Bourguignon
was one of those who gave his life defending that little
inlet on an obscure island in an unremembered battle.

The Portuguese militia fled at the first sounds of
battle, leaving their French allies to their fate. Pursued
by the Spaniards, the French survivors were forced to pull
back to higher ground until 300 French reinforcements arrived.
One small hill changed hands four times, with the defenders
finally holding it in the end. Santa Cruz came forward per-
sonally to encourage his men. By the end of the day Spanish
casualties stood at seventy killed and 300 wounded, and the
Marqués gave orders for the second wave of troops to come
ashore.

Some of the Portuguese defenders suggested a repeti-
tion of the trick used in 1580 of driving wild cattle down
on the Spaniards, but Chastes was not of the opinion that
the trick would work twice and refused to give the enemy
free beef. He was right, for Santa Cruz had given orders
that if cattle were stampeded toward them his men should
part and let the cattle rush through and then close ranks
behind them.

Spanish arquebusiers were sent to outflank the French
soldiers, and the maneuver succeeded. The Portuguese fled in panic, while the French troops made an orderly withdrawal into the hills to ready-made defensive positions. The capital, Angra, was now nearly defenseless and Santa Cruz ordered a two-pronged attack by land and sea. The galleys breached the harbor defenses and the troops on land closed in from the east. Angra fell with little resistance and Santa Cruz allowed his men to loot and plunder the city for three days, as he had promised he would if his offer of amnesty was rejected.

After three days of looting the Spaniards turned their attention to the remaining French troops in the mountains. Knowing what had happened to the prisoners taken the year before, the French soldiers were not encouraged to lay down their arms, and if they resolved to die fighting it would be a slow and bloody operation to extricate them from the hill fortifications. While Santa Cruz pondered his next move, a messenger arrived from the French camp and delivered a letter to the Spanish general Don Pedro de Padilla. Chaste and Padilla were both knights of Saint John and had served together at Malta against the Turks. The letter supposedly dealt with treatment of wounded prisoners, but it was really a preliminary exploration of possible surrender terms. Chaste explained that he was under orders from the King of France and no rebel or pirate. If he and his men would be considered as soldiers and not renegades, he was ready to
negotiate surrender terms since he saw no sense in fighting further where there was no honor to be gained nor service to his king to be rendered. Padilla, Figueroa, and other Spanish nobles knew Chastes to be honorable and took up the French cause before Santa Cruz. The Marqués granted them permission to deal with Chastes, but they could only offer the French commander the lives of his men and transport to France, nothing else. When no answer was forthcoming from the French camp, Santa Cruz ordered his troops to move out of Angra and up the road toward the French positions. The surrender terms were accepted without further delay.

Chastes sent his waistcoat to the Marqués as a symbol of his surrender and Santa Cruz allowed him and his nobles to keep their swords. Eighteen banners of old and respected French fighting units were yielded to the Spaniards and received with honor. The Portuguese surrendered thirty-six unit colors also, but the Spaniards considered them as worthless as the undisciplined units they represented. The French soldiers marched past the appointed place of surrender, depositing their arquebuses, muskets, pikes, drums, and fifes.

Santa Cruz received Chastes with courtesy and graciousness, greeting him with an abrazo. The two chatted about many things, and the Marqués asked the French commander what a man of his station, valor, and ability was
doing involved in such an undertaking, so far from home, and with so few men. He invited Chastes to share his quarters and the Spanish captains also invited their French counterparts to share their food and lodging in Angra.\textsuperscript{25}

The French forces on the island of Fayal surrendered after token resistance, and the other islands yielded without a whimper to the Spaniards. The French prisoners were put on three Vizcayan vessels for the return trip to France, except approximately 100 captured early in the fighting and thus not covered by the terms granted to Chastes. The latter were sentenced to the galleys. The three vessels carrying the French soldiers were short of food and water, however, and many died on the way back to France. The Azores affair turned out to be a disaster for France in every respect.

Don António's governor on Terceira, Manoel da Silva, was captured and tortured and forced to reveal much of the dealings between Don António and the French court. He was then beheaded and his head placed in a cage hanging from a tower in Angra, where he had placed the heads of Spanish sympathizers during his brief but despotic reign over Terceira.
NOTES

1 Roncière, Histoire de la Marine Française, IV, 182.

2 Fernández Duro, Conquista de las Azores, p. 43.

3 Ibid., p. 44.

4 Ibid., p. 45. For battle of Azores see also: Archivo dos Azores, publicación destinada a vulgarización dos elementos indispensables para todos os ramos de historia acoriana (Ponta Delgada, Azores: 1878- ); Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Filipe Segundo, rey de España (Madrid: Imp. estereotipía y galvano-plastia de Arribau y Ca., 1876-1877); Jerónimo de Franchi Conestagio, L'union du royaume de Portugal à la couronne de Castille, lv. VII, Tradução Francesa de Th. Nardin (Besançon, 1596); "Descripción de las cosas sucedidas en el Reino de Portugal desde la jornada que el Rey Don Sebastián hizo en Africa hasta que el invictísimo Rey Católico Don Felipe II deste nombre, quedó universal y pacífico heredero dellos, en la conquista de la Tercera y las demás Islas." MS de la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, s. 61, parte 11, folios 73 á 85; Manuel de Faria y Sousa, The History of Portugal (London: W. Rogers and Abel Roper, 1698), original in Spanish, translated and continued to the present year of 1698 by Captain John Stevens; Mosquera de Figueira, Comentario en breve compendio de disciplina militar (Madrid, 1598); Henri Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II (2d ed.; Paris: E. Plon et. co., 1831-1882), III; Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Cinco libros de la historia de Portugal y conquista de las islas de las Azores en los años 1582 y 1583 (Madrid: P. Madrigal, 1591); Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo . . . del tiempo del Señor Don Felipe II . . . (Madrid: Por L. Sanchez, 1601-1602); Heinrich Schaefer, Historia de Portugal, desde a fundação da monarquia até á revolução de 1920. . . (Por.: Fábrario da empresa editora, 1920); quadro elementar das relações políticas e diplomáticas de Portugal, XVI, 1580-1581; Erich Lastotz de Stelbaur, Relação del combate naval junto á las Azores (Madrid: Por Medina, 1591); Mechisalde Thévenot, Relations de divers voyages curieux qui n'ont point été publiés et cui on a traduit ou tiré des originaux de voyageurs français, espagnols, allemands, portugais, anglais, hollandais, persans, arabes et autres orientaux, données au public par les soins de feu M. Mechisalde Thévenot, Novv. éd., II (Paris: Chez Th. Moett, 1696); José de Torres, ed.,

Rebello da Silva, Historia de Portugal, III, 485-487.

Laughton, State Papers ..., Armada, I, xlvii.


Laughton, State Papers ..., Armada, I, xxv.

Fernández Duro, Conquista de las Azores, MS reproduced, pp. 332-333.


Ibid., p. 299.

Roncière, Histoire de la Marine Française, IV, 190.


Ibid., p. 57.

Le Vicomte Guy de Bremond D'ArEs, Jean de Vivonne, pp. 144-146.

Roncière, Histoire de la Marine Française, IV, 192.

Fernández Duro, Conquista de las Azores, p. 366.

Ibid., p. 425.

Roncière, Histoire de la Marine Française, IV, 193-194.

Altolaguirre, Don Álvaro de Bazán, p. 119.

Roncière, Marine Française, IV, 196-197.

Fernández Duro, Conquista de las Azores, p. 427.

Roncière, Marine Française, IV, 196-197.

Fernández Duro, Conquista de las Azores, p. 36.

Ibid., p. 499.
CHAPTER VIII

SANTA CRUZ AND THE ENGLISH ENTERPRISE

Santa Cruz' clean sweep in the Azores brought all Portuguese territories under the power of the Castilian monarch and deprived Dom António of his base for operations against Portugal. France was too weak and torn by internal strife to be of further aid to the Portuguese pretender so that any further military action on Dom António's behalf would have to come directly from England. But probably of primary importance to Santa Cruz, and no doubt to Philip II, was the fact that the vital "plate fleets" could once again call at the Azores for supplies, water, and protection. France's attempt to challenge the Spaniards at sea was premature and failed. The next challenge to Spanish sea power would come from the Tudor navy.

England was very much on Santa Cruz' mind, and on August 9, 1583, while still at Terceira, he wrote to Philip suggesting that the time was ripe to invade England and thus strike at the very root of Spain's problems.¹ In this era, before the day of standing armies and national navies, Don Alvaro was concerned that his experienced and victorious force not be disbanded. He suggested an expedition to North Africa during the winter of 1583–1584 to keep his forces
intact, hinted that additional ships, soldiers, and supplies be assembled and that the expanded fleet and army sail against England in the spring of 1584. Philip II's stance in foreign affairs had been defensive, as his father Charles V had advised, until circumstances had goaded him onto the offensive in the past few years. His new policy, if indeed it was such, had paid off in the annexation of Portugal and back-to-back victories over France. Santa Cruz and the Duke of Parma approved the strategy of taking the battle to the enemy, and at court Cardinal Granvelle encouraged it. But Philip seemed to think his recent successes too good to be true and put off any final decision concerning the invasion of England while he pondered the implications of it all.

Santa Cruz sailed from the Azores on August 17 but contrary winds delayed the entrance of his fleet into Cádiz until September 13. He received a hero's welcome with fiestas and fireworks, much as at Lisbon the year before, and Philip summoned him to Madrid. Representatives of all the great noble houses of Castile were assembled with the royal court at Spain's new capital.² It was a gala occasion, and feasting seemed to complement the many masses said to give thanks to God, to whom the victories were ultimately attributed.

Philip's expressions of gratitude were not empty and formal gestures of protocol or etiquette. When the Marqués
entered Madrid amidst the cheers of the crowd and kneeled to kiss the king's hand, as was the custom, Philip made him stand and greeted the aging warrior with a warm abrazo. He then granted Don Alvaro the right to cover his head in the royal presence, a privilege accorded only to the highest grandees of the realm. Philip bestowed upon Santa Cruz the title Captain General of the Ocean Seas, and the following year named him commander of the army of Portugal. The king honored the Marqués' sons with habits of the Spanish military orders, and to the eldest (the fourth Don Alvaro de Bazán) went the encomienda de Alhambra and the cape of the Order of Santiago.

Don Alvaro returned to his estate at Viso for one of the few periods of relative calm in his life. He built a chalet of white marble, often called the "palace" of Viso, and attended to accumulated personal and family matters. His home was filled with paintings and sculpture as well as innumerable trophies taken in his campaigns. He appeared at various receptions and social events in Madrid. In November 1584 he was among the grandees of Spain who attended the juramento of the young Infante Don Felipe, heir-apparent to the Spanish throne.

In 1585 the conflict between Spain and England intensified. On September 14 of that year Drake left Plymouth with twenty-six vessels, and after unsuccessful probes at the northern coast of Spain headed south to the Canary Islands.
and then across the Atlantic to the West Indies, where he plundered settlements along the Spanish Main, Puerto Rico, and Hispaniola. Santa Cruz had foreseen such a raid and warned Philip of the necessity of better defenses in these areas in a letter of June 26, 1585,\textsuperscript{6} three months before Drake sailed. Philip barely had time to digest the first damage reports from the Indies when news arrived that Elizabeth had sent to the Netherlands 5,000 infantry and 1,000 horses under the command of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester.

Santa Cruz was now residing in Lisboa where he commanded all land and sea forces in Portugal. His frustration knew no bounds at the insult to Spanish honor which the English raids represented, and on January 13, 1586, he wrote to the king suggesting again that the only solution to Spain's international predicament was a telling blow against England.\textsuperscript{7} Philip was now ready to listen. When Santa Cruz had recommended the same course of action three years earlier, Philip had thanked him for his suggestion and said he would think about it.\textsuperscript{8} Now Philip requested that the Marqués draw up a plan of action.

Don Álvaro's letter of January 13, 1586, is especially interesting in that it reveals the thinking of the war party concerning the conflict between Spain and England and the motives for an invasion of Elizabeth's realm. The first reason mentioned concerns religion; this does not mean
that the Armada of 1588 was primarily a religious crusade, but it shows that Santa Cruz knew of Philip's desire to see England brought back into communion with the Roman Church. There is no doubt that Santa Cruz shared his monarch's desire on that point, and religion must be considered one of the moving forces behind the Armada, though not the primary one. Don Alvaro pointed out the increasing, rather than diminishing, level of English aggression against Spanish outposts and shipping and stressed the damage done to the already weak Spanish economy. Spanish goods were increasingly being carried in "neutral" bottoms because the merchants feared to risk their valuable wares in Iberian bottoms, which were subject to plunder any time, any where. Only after citing the economic damage, English aid to the Dutch rebels, and the issue of religion did Santa Cruz mention the obvious affront to Philip's honor. Knowing how cost-conscious Philip was, Don Alvaro returned to the matter of finances and explained that although the outfitting of a fleet and army to invade England would indeed be costly, the losses being suffered at the hands of the English corsairs would compensate for many fleets. Santa Cruz then reminded the king that their traditional enemies, the Turks and the French, were occupied with other matters and Spain was free to give full attention and resources to the enterprise of England. Elizabeth's aid to the rebels in Flanders was mentioned early in the letter and
again at the end as the Marqués pointed out that if patient waiting was the answer all their problems would have been solved long ago. Things had not taken care of themselves while Spain merely defended herself against attack but otherwise left her enemies alone. Spain must take the offensive and carry the fight to the enemy.

Philip instructed Santa Cruz to draw up a projected invasion plan and estimate the cost, but it must be kept absolutely secret. In the meantime the Marqués was to strengthen the coastal defenses against further English attack. Emphasis was to be given to the northern coast of Spain and to Portugal. The king's orders seemed logical enough, but in 1587 Drake attacked in the far south at Cádiz. The increased coastal fleet in the north also meant that the available ships and men were away from Lisboa, and when Drake appeared at the mouth of the Tajo Don Alvaro lacked the men and ships to resist him.

Only two months after receiving Philip's request for a detailed plan of campaign Santa Cruz had it ready. The document is enormous and detailed almost beyond belief. Soldiers, sailors, and ships were to be provided by all of Philip's realms, with the exact number in each case and the percentage of cost to be borne by each province and realm specified. The fleet contained almost every type of vessel in existence at the time. The source and cost of weapons,
powder, shot, bread, cooking oil, wine, casks, mules, gunners were stated. No other man in Spain could have produced such a document. It is unlikely that there existed a man anywhere with such a grasp of logistics, combining the broad sweep of things with a masterly grasp of the minutest detail. It is true that Spain did not have a Sir Francis Drake, but neither did England have a Santa Cruz. The English seamen, Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, Howard, and Raleigh, could not have produced such a document.

One of Santa Cruz' most important accomplishments at this time was to propel Philip II toward positive action. That was also one of the English war party's greatest tasks, for Elizabeth was every bit as cautious as the Prudent King and certainly equally tightfisted with her money. The two monarchs had one more important factor in common; neither wanted war if it could be avoided. Elizabeth actually changed her mind more times than Philip when it came to vital decisions that would commit men and ships to a showdown and shared with her Castilian brother-in-law the tendency to wait upon events then react at the last minute.11 These over-cautious monarchial proclivities of Elizabeth were as much a vexation to Drake and Hawkins as Philip's were to Santa Cruz and Parma.

Santa Cruz' plan for the invasion of England called for a staggering total of 596 ships of all sizes carrying an