Spaniards regained the initiative on the Real, and caught between two fires Ali was again put on the defensive. The Turks would not surrender, however, and the battle was far from over.

Santa Cruz' galleys churned the water as they sped from place to place rendering aid wherever allied galleys were about to be overwhelmed. Many Christian survivors of the battle owed their lives to his timely assistance. Seeing the crisis of the Real, Santa Cruz turned in that direction. As he approached the knot of smoking, blood-soaked vessels in the center, two Turkish galleys loaded with Janissaries bore down on the Real from behind. If those soldiers were allowed to board the Real Don Juan and his men would be overwhelmed. Santa Cruz raced to cut them off and closing with the first enemy galley blew it out of the water, firing all of his bow cannons together at point-blank range. He then attacked and boarded the remaining Turkish galley, which resisted stubbornly. A brief but bloody struggle ensued, resulting in the death of all of the Turks and a number of Spaniards. Santa Cruz was wounded twice by arquebus fire.15

Despite his wounds the Marqués pressed on to the Real and put two hundred soldiers aboard the flagship from his galleys. It was enough to turn the tide in the intense
struggle between the two flagships, and for the second time in almost as many moments Don Alvaro's intervention meant the difference between victory and defeat.\textsuperscript{16} He withdrew from the Real, his work there completed, and rejoining the fray captured two more Ottoman galleys in quick succession.

With the fresh troops brought by Don Alvaro, the Spaniards aboard the Real now rallied to the attack for the third time, finally gaining control of the Sultan's deck.\textsuperscript{17} The struggle between the two titans had lasted almost two hours, and over four hundred Turks lost their lives on the decks of their flagship. Ali fought bravely and was one of the last to die. One version of his death is that Ali died by his own hand after it became obvious that his cause was lost, while another is that he was shot down at close range while fighting. Ali's head was cut off and raised aloft for all to see; the Ottoman standard was removed from his galley and a Christian banner put in its place.\textsuperscript{18} At the death of the Ottoman supreme commander the Christians blew their trumpets and gave shouts of victory, which had the desired effect of encouraging the allies and lowering the morale of the Turks. There was still scattered fighting on the left and in the center, but the tide had definitely turned in favor of the allies.

Opposite the Christian right wing Alugh Ali was still uncommitted to battle, however, and his sizable force was
fresh. Alugh was more outraged than disheartened by the allied shouts of victory and determined to show his adversary that their assumption of victory was premature. Still convinced meanwhile that the Algerian intended to outflank him, Doria continued moving away from the center on a course roughly parallel to that of his adversary. When the gap between the allied right and center was sufficiently large, Alugh Ali detached some of his galleys to detain Doria, then cut back and sped toward the exposed right side of the Christian center division. The Algerians fell violently upon the Maltese, Sicilian, papal, and Venetian galleys in that zone and soon overwhelmed them. In the process they captured the flagship of the Knights of Saint John, their bitterest foe, and Alugh later took their banner to Selim II as a consolation prize.

Santa Cruz saw the new crisis developing on the right and threw his reserve into the fight there, fearing that the Moslems might yet snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.19 Even the normally anti-Spanish Venetians admitted that if Santa Cruz had not arrived when he did it is likely that not a man or galley in that area would have escaped destruction.20 A stalemate was thus achieved there and some of the bloodiest fighting of the day took place as Alugh’s experienced men rendered a good account of themselves.

With Ali dead and the Ottoman flagship captured Don
Juan ordered the Real to head toward the fighting on his right. Veniero, wounded but fighting heroically all through the afternoon, joined Don Juan, as did Colonna. Upon their arrival the stalemate on the right was broken.  

Doria detached part of his division to meet the enemy galleys intended to occupy the allied right wing and turned to join the fighting in the center. The fortunes of battle turned against the Ottoman forces once more, this time decisively. The outnumbered Algerians were overpowered by the combined forces of Santa Cruz, Don Juan, and Doria. Alugh had taken the Maltese flagship of the Knights of Saint John as a prize of war and was attempting to make off with it. Santa Cruz saw this and headed for the corsair to challenge him, but Alugh cut the prize galley loose and with some thirty-five of his vessels fled to the northwest toward Cape Oria. Santa Cruz and others gave chase and managed to force some of the fleeing galleys ashore, but the allied rowers were weary by now and could not overtake the best of the corsair galleys. Other Ottoman galleys had also been forced onto the beach on the allied left and many Turks were killed or captured as they attempted to flee on foot.  

Although scattered fighting continued after 4:00 P.M., most of the Ottoman forces that had not escaped were surrendering. Wholesale scavenging followed as cadavers were relieved of jewelry, weapons, anything of value, and in some
cases even clothing. Great hordes of riches were found on some of the vessels since Ottoman commanders customarily carried most of their portable wealth with them in their galleys. Enemy vessels too badly damaged to salvage were burned, and the remaining galleys were taken in tow. The sky grew dark, and the breeze upon which Alugh Ali had escaped turned into a gale. Don Juan hurriedly assembled his scattered fleet, and though many of his galleys were badly damaged they made for shelter under sail and oar, towing their prizes of war. Just as they reached the protection of Petala Bay a tremendous storm lashed the coast of Greece.

The Ottoman fleet had been destroyed, but Don Juan's victory was not won cheaply. Just as there is no agreement as to how many men and vessels entered the battle on either side, so there is lack of agreement as to the losses suffered by each protagonist in the conflict. The allied fleet probably lost twelve galleys and approximately 7,600 men; the heaviest losses were suffered by the Venetians. Twelve thousand Christian galley slaves were freed from the Turkish galleys. A list of the wounded would include most of the notable names in the allied force, among them Don Juan of Austria, Veniero, Santa Cruz, Cardona, and the Duke of Urbino.

The Ottoman losses were considerably heavier, however,
the dead being estimated at over 25,000, and 3,486 were taken prisoner. Fifteen Ottoman galleys were sunk in combat, and an almost unbelievable 190 vessels fell into allied hands; of that number sixty were burned as not worth saving, and 130—117 galleys and thirteen galliots—were later divided among the victors.\(^{25}\)

In appreciation for his services in the battle, Don Juan gave Santa Cruz four galleys. These galleys were part of the Spanish share of the booty, and Philip II later approved the gift by buying back the galleys from the Marqués for 56,000 ducados.\(^{26}\) Santa Cruz received letters of congratulations for his extraordinary performance in the battle from Don García de Toledo and Philip II. Philip's letter expressed deep satisfaction with Santa Cruz' excellent performance but added that he was not surprised since he had learned to expect such from everything the Marqués put his hand to.\(^{27}\)

It is difficult to name the heroes in a battle like Lepanto, where so many men fought so well. The Spaniards tend to depreciate the role of the Venetians, while the Venetians feel that they did most of the fighting and the Spaniards got most of the credit. Don Juan is generally given the lion's share of the credit for his leadership, singleness of purpose, and bravery. Santa Cruz and Don Juan de Cardona also emerged as key figures in the allied victory, as did Veniero and Colonna. Although Barbarigo did not survive to
share the glory he certainly died a hero's death. Of all these outstanding figures, however, only one took part in all three combat sectors, left, center, and right—the Marqués of Santa Cruz. He prevented the Turks from turning the allied left flank early in the battle; he saved Don Juan from being overwhelmed in the center, and also aided the hardpressed Cardona at a crucial moment nearby; and he rushed to the scene when Alugh Ali threatened to roll up the allied right, thus preventing Doria's error from ending in tragedy. Until the moment of battle the Venetians questioned the Spaniards' willingness to fight; yet Santa Cruz, who was one of the four members of the advisory council Philip II instructed Don Juan to rely upon, consistently insisted on seeking out the Ottoman fleet and destroying it wherever it might be found.

Swift galleys were sent to Philip, Venice, and Rome with news of the victory. As the good news was spread all along the couriers' route, spontaneous demonstrations of religious fervor and joy erupted. The atmosphere was that of crusading years, and the victory was celebrated in verse, song, and art. Even in France the common people rejoiced at the news of a Christian victory.

The allied fleet remained at Petala for four days making repairs to its vessels and caring for the wounded. Santa Cruz was dispatched back to the battle zone to salvage
whatever cannons or equipment that appeared worth saving. Suggestions were made for further enterprises while the fleet was still together and riding the crest of such a decisive victory, but the much maligned Doria was right after all. The season was too far advanced for the galleys to operate effectively, and since the Venetians and Spaniards were squabbling again, Don Juan ordered the fleet to return to Corfu. There they found the sailing vessels, which had been delayed by contrary winds, and took advantage of the supplies and men to get their vessels and crews in first rate condition once more. The booty was distributed, and the various contingents of the allied fleet returned to their respective home ports. They all received heroes' welcomes, and the units in Spanish pay were overwhelmed by their joyous reception at Messina. Santa Cruz returned to Naples with his galleys and was received there with fireworks, festivities, religious processions, the reading of poems celebrating the victory, and the performance of plays written especially for the occasion.

Meanwhile, Alugh Ali was not licking his wounds in some obscure port. He gathered together the Ottoman vessels which escaped the grasp of the Christians, and gleaning whatever galleys he could find along the coast of Greece sailed into Istanbul at the head of a fleet of eighty-seven galleys and galliots. In reward Sultan Selim II appointed him the
new Captain Pasha to replace the dead Pasha Ali and also gave him a new name, Kilidj, which means "The Sword."\textsuperscript{35} The old veteran Piale was still alive, and together these two experienced seamen directed a crash program of naval construction. While the rejoicing Christians built churches, the resolute Turks built galleys. As a result, by the following Spring Ottoman losses had been replaced and a fleet almost 250 strong, including eight galleasses (mahons), was ready to meet any allied offensive.\textsuperscript{36}

Historians have traditionally heralded the victory at Lepanto as marking a decisive shift in the balance of Mediterranean sea power against the Turks. That is not borne out by the facts. It was a notable tactical victory, but did not break Ottoman sea power and had only marginal long-term strategic significance. The Turks replaced their losses by the following year, retained Cyprus, exacted heavy compensation from Venice, and eventually forced the Venetians to withdraw from the Holy League in 1573.\textsuperscript{37} The Turks reconquered Tunis in 1574. The North African corsairs were still free, and Santa Cruz was consulted by Philip II about means of dealing with their attacks on Spanish shipping and ports up until the death of the Marqués in 1588. The sultan likened his defeat at Lepanto to having his beard singed, with the obvious implication that it would grow back. He called the Venetian loss of Cyprus the amputation of an arm, which
would not grow back. Cabrera de Córdoba lamented that never was so glorious a victory so barren of fruit. 38

The results were not all negative, however, and Italy had clearly been saved from the possibility of a massive Ottoman assault. The greatest significance of Lepanto was probably the shattering of the myth of Ottoman invincibility at sea. The morale of Christian Europe was lifted, and a giant step taken in overcoming the inferiority complex afflicting Christian naval forces in the Mediterranean. Conversely, the shock to Ottoman confidence made them less willing to commit themselves westward in force, and though the newly replaced Turkish fleet sighted allied squadrons over the next few years, they declined to give battle, fearing a repetition of the disaster of Lepanto. This subsequent disengagement was the worst possible disaster for the Ottoman fleet, which began to rot in their ports from inactivity. 39

Lepanto did mark the end of set-piece battles between massed fleets of galleys, however, as the cost proved prohibitive for Ottomans and Europeans alike. It would be premature, nevertheless, to bury the galley as a fighting vessel as a result of the role played by the galleasses at Lepanto, as many have done. Galleys were very much in evidence in the Mediterranean for two more centuries.

The British are especially fond of chiding the Spaniards for not seeing the save of the future in the firepower
of the galleasses and point to the defeat of the Spanish Armada as the price paid by Spain for not learning that lesson. Although the concentrated cannon fire of the galleasses did break the Turkish order and inflict some damage, once their galleys swept past the lumbering galleasses the latter were out of the fight. Having to tow the heavy galleasses everywhere, then tow them to their battle stations in front of the line, hardly seemed like a harbinger of great things to come at the time. As it was, only four of the six galleasses took part in the battle, since the right wing was constantly on the move and the two big ships assigned there could not keep up nor get into position without help from the galleys. The Venetian galleasses at Lepanto were probably large merchant mahongs converted for warfare, and even though the Turks were impressed enough by them to build some of their own the following year, the Ottoman galleasses were never effective fighting ships. The allies also built some more, but never with the idea that they would replace the galley as the backbone of the fleet.

Without discounting the service rendered by the galleasses at Lepanto, we must look elsewhere for an explanation of the allied victory over a larger force. Removing the rams and high wooden structures built over the prows of the galleys made possible a more effective working of the forward-firing cannons and reduced the size of the target
the enemy could hit, thus allowing many cannon shots to pass harmlessly overhead. The Spanish galleys were sturdier craft to begin with. The Spanish infantry was better equipped, had more firearms to oppose Turkish arrows, and had better body armor. The Turkish soldiers were spread throughout a larger number of vessels, and it seems likely that galley for galley, the allied vessels carried a larger number of fighting men. As to crusading fervor, bravery under fire, and even the quality of the allied versus the Ottoman soldiers, these all had a bearing on the outcome but are difficult to evaluate. It is obvious that in a battle inflicting personal losses on the Turks of almost 30,000 killed while sinking only fifteen galleys that the brunt of the conflict was directed against the men, not the ships. Learning to fight with galleons in the Atlantic, broadside against broadside with heavy cannons, would require unlearning centuries of experience and ways of thinking about naval warfare. Britain, with no galley tradition, had no such transition to make.
NOTES


3 Ibid., p. 242.


5 Ibid.

6 Fernández Duro, Armada Española, II, 152.

7 Ibid., p. 154.

8 Amario Dennis, Don Juan of Austria, The Imperial Bastard (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, S.A., 1966), p. 175.


14 Ibid., p. 357.

15 Ibid., p. 363.

16 Fernández Duro, Armada Española, II, 158.

17 Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 69. See also Gregorio Leti, Vita del Catolico Re Filippo II, Monarca delle Spagne (Coligni, 1670).
18. Navascués, En loor de Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 117.
see also Jerónimo de Torres Aguilera, Crónica y recopilación de varios sucesos de guerra desde que el turco Selim rompió los venecianos (Milan, 1579), and Jurien de la Gravière, La guerre de Chypre et la bataille de Lépante (Paris, 1888).


22. Ibid., p. 266.

23. Dennis, Don Juan of Austria, p. 189.


27. Archivo del Excm. Señor Marqués de Santa Cruz, legajo 6, número 19. (Unpublished.)


29. Ibid., p. 37.


31. Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, pp. 74-75.

32. Navascués, En loor de Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 123.


34. Navascués, En loor de Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 124.

35. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks, p. 222.

36. Ibid., pp. 222-223.

38 Cabrera de Córdoba, *Felipe II, Rey de España*, II, 120.


40 Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant*, p. 36.

41 Marriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire*, IV, 139.
CHAPTER V

THE SHIFT FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN

TO THE ATLANTIC

The stinging defeat at Lepanto jarred Selim II into action. While Alugh Ali supervised the rebuilding of the Ottoman fleet the Sultan's agents worked feverishly during the winter of 1571-1572, encouraging their French allies to stage diversionary attacks on Spain and striving to weaken the Venetian commitment to the Holy League. Death struck the severest blow to the Christian alliance, however, by removing Pope Pius V on May 1, 1572. His successor, Gregory XIII, favored continuing the alliance but could not get along with Philip II.

Spain faced increased harassment from France and England in the Atlantic and rebellion in the Netherlands. Spanish ports in the Caribbean were defended by inadequate forts and a handful of soldiers; growing corsair activity gave a new sense of urgency to the Viceroy's requests for more men and arms. Philip II had to weigh carefully his worldwide commitments along with the Mediterranean enterprises and to consider the enormous cost of large galley fleets of soldiers in relation to possible gain from continued warfare against the Ottoman state.
Philip II attempted unsuccessfully to bribe Alugh Ali to abandon the Sultan's cause. Gregory XIII criticized Philip's attempts to obtain peace in the Mediterranean by means other than continued warfare and accused him of deliberately failing to give full support to the League. The Spanish monarch, in turn, resented Gregory's failure to cooperate wholeheartedly in the suppression of Dutch heretics, suspecting that the pope secretly desired the weakening of Spain by the loss of the Netherlands.¹

While monarchs plotted and planned in Naples Santa Cruz busily repaired his galleys and supervised the construction of new vessels. By August 1, 1572, he was at Corfu leading a galley squadron as part of an allied fleet of 194 galleys under Don Juan of Austria. The fleet was organized much as it had been at Lepanto, but the vanguard or right wing composed of fifty-two galleys was commanded by Santa Cruz. The center division of sixty-two galleys was led by Don Juan personally. The rearguard or left wing under Foscarini consisted of fifty-two galleys. A reserve squadron of twenty-eight galleys was commanded by Don Juan de Cardona. Eight galleasses accompanying the fleet were assigned four to the center and two each to the right and left wings.²

Scouting vessels returned with the information that a Turkish fleet of 200 galleys was divided in the ports of Modón and Navarino. The allied fleet left Corfu on
September 8 for the island of Sapiencia, located between the
two ports, hoping to prevent a union of the two enemy divi-
sions and thereby overwhelm them separately. This maneuver
was unsuccessful, however, for the enemy galleys in Navarino
joined the other division in Modón. Santa Cruz almost caught
the Navarino galleys in flight and fired a shot of challenge,
but the Turks declined the invitation and sped to safety. 3

The harbor at Modón was protected by extensive
entrance fortifications on the bluffs. The Venetian com-
mander, Roscarini, offered to lead a galley charge into the
harbor past the forts, but Don Juan rejected the idea as too
risky. 4 A suggested plan to build a "floating battery" over
the decks of some galleys would have placed heavy cannon
from the galleasses on a platform and batter the Ottoman
defenses into uselessness in order to force an entrance into
the harbor. The plan was rejected as unworkable before the
construction was completed, however, and the leaders then
considered an alternate course of action. 5

Aware of the allied activities, Alugh Ali in the
meantime had hauled additional cannon from his galleys to
the fortresses. The decision was finally made by the allies
to attack Navarino instead of Modón. On the night of Octo-
ber 2, 1572, allied fleet arrived off the coast of Navarino
and began to disembark an assault force of 8,000 Spanish
and Italian infantry under the Prince of Parma. A combination
of bad weather and massive Ottoman reinforcements dictated a strategic withdrawal. However, and at dawn on October 6 the troops were recalled to the galleys.6

The following day, the first anniversary of the victory at Lepanto, the allied fleet reappeared off the coast of Modón. Sighting a Venetian sailing vessel from Crete about twelve miles from the coast, the Turks sent a number of Ottoman galleys to intercept the lone vessel. When Don Juan learned of this he sped to the scene with his fleet, hoping to catch the Turks outside the harbor and force them into a decisive confrontation. More enemy galleys were sent to cover the withdrawal of those attacking the sailing ship, however, and it was obvious that the Ottoman forces did not intend to stand and fight. Don Juan ordered Santa Cruz to intercept the enemy's return to port if possible, and the Marqués' galleys churned the water in their haste to block the entrance of the harbor. They arrived too late, but Santa Cruz' capitana did overtake the enemy squadron capitana and ram it from behind. The Ottoman galley was commanded by Mahomet, twenty-two-year-old son of the Bey of Algiers and nephew of Barbaroja. Soldiers from the two galleys engaged in a bloody boarding and hand-to-hand action in full view of both fleets. After a thirty minute struggle the Spaniards were victorious.7

One hundred of the 250 Ottoman soldiers aboard the
galley were janissaries; the Spanish infantry had once again beaten the Sultan's best soldiers. Mehomet died in the action; 220 Christian galley slaves were freed and 200 enemy soldiers captured. Six Spaniards were killed and thirty wounded. In his report to Philip II concerning the action, Don Juan singled out Santa Cruz for special commendation. The king wrote to the Marqués the following month congratulating him for his initiative and valor. Santa Cruz was permitted to keep the captured vessel and the janissary captain as prizes of war.

Don Alvaro's victory was the only positive result of a massive and expensive naval expedition. The season was too far advanced for further action and Don Juan withdrew from the area. Various contingents of the allied fleet went their separate ways; Santa Cruz retired to Naples with his galleys for the winter. The energetic Marqués immediately began to make preparations for next year's campaign. Philip II authorized Santa Cruz to construct and arm fifteen new galleys; Gian Andrea Doria was also to prepare fifteen galleys, and Cardona five.

Before the campaign of 1573 could get under way, Venice signed a separate peace with Selim II and withdrew from the Holy League. Philip decided to continue without the Venetians. A fleet of 150 Spanish, Genoese, papal, and Maltese galleys had assembled at Messina and Don Juan called
a meeting of the most important commanders. Opinions varied considerably as to what project they should undertake. One suggestion was made that the fleet move east as in preceding years and seek out Alugh Ali's fleet. The Genoese commander, Doria, opposed this idea because it would be aiding the Venetians. Others favored an attack on Tunis, and Santa Cruz urged the conquest of Algiers. The council deadlocked between those favoring an Algerian campaign and those preferring the Tunisian enterprise. The matter was referred to Philip II for final disposition. 13

The king selected the Tunisian expedition, and the fleet left Sicily for Tunis on October 1, 1573. Don Juan hauled down the League's banner and hoisted the royal standard of Spain over the Real. 14 Gian Andrea Doria remained in Sicily with forty-eight galleys in case he should be needed to intervene in politically uneasy Genoa. The forces at Don Juan's disposal were still numerous, comprising 104 galleys, forty-four large sailing vessels, sixty lesser sailing craft, and 30,000 soldiers. 15

The Spanish troops disembarked on October 9 near Tunis at La Goleta. Santa Cruz went on to Tunis with 2,500 soldiers to scout the defenses and land the infantry if possible. Among the soldiers was the still unknown Cervantes. After looking over the area carefully, the Marqués landed his men, and both Tunis and Biscara fell to the Spaniards.
without resistance.\textsuperscript{16} The defenders were apparently caught
by surprise and upon determining the size of the Spanish
force decided to abandon the towns. Spanish garrisons were
left in Tunis and La Goleta\textsuperscript{17} and on October 24 the fleet
began a stormy crossing to Palermo. From there each squadron
returned to its respective base. Santa Cruz returned to
Naples, where he received another letter of personal con-
gratulations from the king.\textsuperscript{18}

In Naples Don Alvaro supervised the construction of
eight new galleys to replace an equal number of old and
battered vessels. Funds for the fleet had not arrived from
Spain by the Spring of 1574, however, and news that a large
Ottoman fleet was headed west caused great concern. Philip
agreed to furnish the funds necessary to meet the threat, but
somehow the money did not reach Don Juan, Santa Cruz, or
others in time to prepare their forces for combat. In June
a Turkish fleet of 330 ships, among them over 200 galleys
under Alugh Ali and carrying over 40,000 soldiers, attacked
La Goleta and Tunis. North African tribesmen jined their
Moslem brothers in the assault, doubling the number of
attackers. The situation quickly reached critical proportions
for the defenders, but help did not come. The 300 soldiers
at Biserta had been transferred earlier to La Goleta, bring-
ing the strength of the garrison to 2,000 Spanish and Italian
soldiers.\textsuperscript{19} The garrison defending Tunis numbered 4,000 but
the soldiers called the fort there a "cattle pen" and it was taken for granted by all who had seen it that Tunis could not long be held without outside assistance.

The garrison at La Goleta eventually yielded after a siege of almost two months, but the commander, Portocarrero, was criticized for not holding out longer.\textsuperscript{20} Santa Cruz was especially disappointed at the surrender, for he had sold his jewels and personally borrowed money to pay his crews and outfit his galleys. Don Alvaro then sailed to Sicily where his forty galleys joined those already assembled. Don Juan was again the commander and had a force of almost 100 galleys at Palermo ready to attack the Turkish fleet, hoping to distract the enemy and draw some of them away so that Gil de Andrade could slip reinforcements into Tunis. Bad weather hindered this plan and on September 13, 1574, the garrison at Tunis surrendered.\textsuperscript{21}

Philip II installed a new system of naval administration in 1575 as an experiment. According to the new system Santa Cruz was to serve under a two year contract. The terms of the contract obligated the Marqués to have forty galleys in a constant state of readiness.\textsuperscript{22} The king furnished the forty galleys—the forty that Santa Cruz already had—and allowed Santa Cruz 6,500 escudos annually (calculated at 375 maravedis per vessel and half again that much for the capitana and patrona) for payment of crews and upkeep. After two
years Santa Cruz would return the forty galleys in the same condition as he received them. The purpose of this experiment was to prevent a repetition of the fiasco which resulted in the loss of La Goleta, Tunis, and Biserta. The new system did not solve the basic problem, however, for if there were insufficient funds for direct administration of the galleys so would the money be lacking to fulfill the crown's obligation to the Marqués under the contract. The experiment failed. Philip never developed a central naval administration, and nothing existed which could be called a Spanish navy. Philip was unwilling to pay for the construction and maintenance of a standing navy at this time, but continued to rely on a small nucleus of crown ships and galleys augmented by private vessels pressed into service to face a given crisis. The contract approach to both commercial and combat vessels was utilized from time to time by Philip II.

The years 1575 to 1578 were years of relative peace for Don Alvaro, interrupted by minor skirmishes such as the raid on the Cuerquernes islands in 1576. Of more importance to Don Alvaro's career was his appointment as commander of the galleys of Spain. Philip wrote to the Marqués in December of 1576 informing him of his promotion and requesting his presence in Spain. The official title and instructions for the new position are dated March 26, 1577, but Santa Cruz was still in Naples at that time and did not
arrive in Barcelona until May of 1578. The king demanded to know why it had taken seventeen months for the Marqués to respond to his summons. Don Alvaro replied that the galleys of Naples first had to be made ready for his relief, and secondly the king's order in January of 1578 to deliver infantry in transit further added to the delay. The explanation presumably satisfied Philip, for the matter was never mentioned again. 26

The events of 1578 brought Portugal prominently into Don Alvaro's career. King Sebastião of Portugal launched his ill-fated "crusade" against the infidels of Morocco in June of that year despite warnings by Philip II and others against such a venture. With a force of about 20,000 Portuguese, Italian, and German soldiers and adventurers, 27 Sebastião allied his forces with one of three contending factions in a Moroccan struggle for power. After delay and indecision he confronted a much larger Moslem force on August 4 at Alcazar-el-Kebir. The Christians were cut off from retreat and overwhelmed in a great slaughter. Sebastião was among the thousands of crusaders who lost their lives, and most of the remainder were taken prisoner and held for ransom. 28

Upon receiving word of the disaster at Alcazar-el-Kebir, Santa Cruz immediately dispatched ten galleys to escort the Indies fleet to port and sent additional galleys to Tangier, Arcila, and Ceuta with troops to reinforce the
garrisons there. They were also to assist any survivors of
the debacle who might reach the coast. Santa Cruz then
wrote to the king informing him of the steps taken to meet
the emergency. Philip II authorized the latter to render
such aid, only to receive Santa Cruz' reply that it had
already been done. In characteristic fashion Don Alvaro
had exercised his own initiative in taking the appropriate
action based on his own sound judgment.

Sebastião died without heir, precipitating a succes-
sion crisis in Portugal. The elderly Cardinal Henrique,
only surviving son of Dom Mancel, succeeded Sebastião.
Henrique was also without heir and the pope refused his
request for release from holy vows. Because of the cardinal's
advanced age and ill health it was obvious to all that his
interim reign would be brief. Two of the cardinal-king's
brothers had heirs. One left a legitimate daughter, Catarina,
moved to the Duke of Bragança, and the other left an
illegitimate son, António, Prior of Crato. Mancel's daughter
Leonor had married Emperor Charles V and was the mother of
Philip II of Spain. Catherine de Médici, queen mother of
France, also had a distant claim to the Portuguese throne
through King Affonso III. Other claimants were the Duke of
Savoy and Ranuccio Farnese.

Henrique appointed a commission of five governors in
1579 to act as regents upon his death. Philip II sent
Cristóvão de Moura to Portugal as his personal representative. Moura presented the Castilian monarch's claim to the Portuguese throne and also bribed some influential Portuguese to favor Philip's claim. Propaganda campaigns also presented the claims of Dom António and Catherine de Médici.

Portuguese morale was low. The best young men of the land had been killed or captured in North Africa, leaving the country virtually defenseless. Thousands of families from all levels of society were in mourning. An epidemic ravaged the land, and the suffering was compounded by an acute food shortage. At a time when thousands were in need of charitable aid, few of the wealthy families were able to help. Heavy ransom payments for captured loved ones in Morocco had drained even the most illustrious families, and the less prosperous were driven deeper into debt to raise ransom money. A prostrate Portugal was no match for the Spanish war machine being assembled across the border.

Henriques died on January 31, 1580. The five appointed governors tried to maintain order until the judges could decide on the merits of the various claimants and name a successor. Moura did all within his power to influence the decision in favor of Philip II. In the meantime the Spanish monarch made generous offers to the governors, the Cortes, the municipalities, and his Portuguese rivals Dom António
and the Braganças. He promised to respect Portuguese laws and liberties, have his son educated in Portugal, dismiss no one appointed by Henrique, defend Portugal and its overseas empire, help ransom the prisoners still held by the Moors, and send food.

Of the various contenders for the vacant throne Philip II probably had the best claim of the lot, but he was forced to win the throne in three ways. He inherited it; he bought it; he conquered it. The Duke of Alva had been recalled from retirement by Philip to command the army forming on the Portuguese frontier. Santa Cruz' sizable force for use in North Africa was diverted to the Portuguese enterprise. 34

Philip consulted both the Duke and the Marqués concerning possible campaign plans for the conquest of Portugal. Alba favored a major thrust by land with the fleet merely sealing off the coast to prevent outside assistance from reaching the Portuguese forces. Santa Cruz' plan projected a two-pronged assault by land and sea with the larger force attacking by sea. 35 Alba established his headquarters at Llerana and sent for Santa Cruz to join him there to reconcile the details of the campaign together. In meetings held April 26-29, 1580, the two friends agreed that there were not sufficient troops for two armies and decided that Santa Cruz' galleys would carry only 1,000 men more than their
usual complement. Alba would strike across Portugal to Setúbal and Santa Cruz would bypass the Algarve and assault Setúbal by sea. From there soldiers would be loaded onto galleys for an assault on the fortresses of Cascaes which guarded the entrance to Lisboa harbor on the Tejo River.

Santa Cruz returned to the Andalucian ports and the Duke’s army gathered at Badajoz. The Marqués not only had to prepare his own forces for the expedition but was also responsible for transporting the Italian and German regiments, their supplies, and artillery, to Cádiz for the Duke’s army. Philip’s forces consisted of approximately 30,000 infantry, 2,100 cavalry, and 136 pieces of artillery.

Close communications between the King, the Duke, and the Marqués continued until the Spanish forces struck into Portugal on June 27. Alba’s units pushed across that country almost unopposed, arriving at Setúbal on July 16. The Duke expected to see Santa Cruz and his galleys in the harbor, but they were not there. The town had yielded without a struggle, but the fort resisted and in the bay the galleons São Mateo and São António landed reinforcements. Three days passed and still Santa Cruz did not appear. The Duke grew impatient at the delay and wrote to the King complaining of the Marqués' conduct.

Don Alvaro had left port on July 8 with fifty-six galleys and forty-eight support ships. His brother, Don
Alonso de Bazán, followed with thirty-six sailing ships and six galleys. The Marqués, under the impression that he had permission from the king, stopped along the way to bring the Algarve ports and fortresses into submission. Santa Cruz was convinced that he needed ports to fall back upon in case of bad weather or military reverses, and he disliked the idea of leaving strong enemy positions behind his forces. Don Alvaro arrived at Setúbal only four days late notwithstanding his extra undertakings, and quickly subdued the two Portuguese galleons in the harbor. Cut off by land and sea, the garrison surrendered.

The Duke of Alba suspected that Santa Cruz deliberately disobeyed orders and had followed his own plan, although the Duke, as commander-in-chief, had heard him out and overruled the seizure of ports along the way. Don Alvaro did indeed ignore the Duke by re-submitting his plan to Philip II, but having convinced the king of the wisdom of such an approach, he was officially protected. Both Santa Cruz and Alba were experienced, extremely competent, and strong-willed men. They were friends and comrades, yet in a sense were also inter-service rivals, one being the foremost Spanish advocate of a more important role for naval forces, and the other a backer of the traditional emphasis on land forces, nevertheless the two men continued to be friends after the Setúbal incident.
Santa Cruz had no way of knowing that the Duke had not been informed of the change in his assignment, and the misunderstanding between Alba and Don Álvaro as to the final details of the battle plan was not fatal to their enterprise against a weakened Portugal. However, similar confusion and misunderstanding between the Dukes of Parma and Medina-Sidonia would have much more serious repercussions in the enterprise against England in 1588. The England of 1588 was a much more worthy adversary than the Portugal of 1580. Parma and Medina-Sidonia would communicate directly with Philip but never with each other, and the English Channel was not the mouth of the Tejo River.

The Spaniards launched a pincer movement against Lisboa, and while infantry and cavalry units moved north by land Santa Cruz landed troops from his galleys which quickly overcame the forts protecting the mouth of the harbor. Dom António, with limited financial and military support, offered only token resistance. His irregular forces were crushed near Lisboa at the battle of Alcántara on August 25, and that same day Santa Cruz entered the Tejo with sixty galleys and eleven ships, capturing the forty-four Portuguese vessels in the harbor after a brief cannon duel. Don Álvaro landed his infantry to seize the city, but in compliance with Philip's orders forbade his soldiers to sack Lisboa. Meanwhile Don Alonso de Bazán had been sent to meet the returning Portuguese
Asian fleet and thus prevent it from falling into the hands of Dom António's supporters. After overcoming brief resistance at Oporto, the Spaniards were in complete possession of Portugal. Dom António managed to escape by ship to France.

All of the Portuguese overseas holdings accepted Philip II as their new monarch, except the Azores Islands, which declared their loyalty to Dom António in a gesture of nationalism. An exception to this was São Miguel Island, largest of the Azores group, which declared for Philip and thus gave the Spaniards a foothold in the midst of the rebels. Terceira, the second largest island of the group, became the center of Dom António's plan to build up financial and military support to retake Portugal.

The chief importance of the islands in 1580 was their strategic location. Ocean winds and currents were such that the Azores straddled the trade routes followed by ships on their return voyage from East Africa, India, and the Orient, as well as the New World. The Azores were the last stop for water and supplies before the ships began the last leg of their voyage to Iberia. Spain's treasure fleets stopped there on their return trip and were welcomed by the friendly Portuguese. An enemy could cut off Spain's vital flow of silver and other goods by controlling the Azores.

At first Philip attached little importance to the rebellion in the Azores, assuming that if Portugal was
quickly defeated it would be a simple matter to subdue a few small islands. He was aware of the strategic location of the islands but did not think it necessary to place them at the top of his lengthy list of priorities. Santa Cruz was preoccupied with the Turks once more as rumors continued to reach Spain that Alugh Ali was preparing a large fleet to penetrate into the western Mediterranean.41 This threat momentarily loomed larger than the Azores rebellion.

The Spanish ambassadors in Paris and Rome informed Philip that corsairs in various French and English ports were preparing to plunder the silver fleet as it approached the Azores.42 This was a serious matter and on April 5, 1581, Philip ordered Santa Cruz to prepare the ships of Don Pedro de Valdés for an expedition to the Azores.

On May 28 Valdés received orders to clear the Azores of corsairs; to cruise between the westernmost islands and send word to the flotas not to put in at Terceira; to direct the Portuguese ships from the Orient to enter Lisboa and the Spanish ships from Tierra Firme and Nueva España to enter San Lúcar de Barramada; and to escort the fleets to Iberia if necessary.43 Later he was instructed to prevent any communication between the flota from the Orient and Terceira Island since the flota commander, Dom Manoel de Jalo, was a close friend of Dom António and would divert his convoy into a French port if he knew the political reality.
Valdés left the port of Cascaes on June 16, 1581, with six armed sailing vessels—four large and two small—of unspecified armament and tonnage. They carried 600 infantrymen and eighty artillerymen in addition to the seamen. Valdés also carried a letter offering pardon and peace if the islanders would acknowledge Philip II as their sovereign.

Philip knew that with the encouragement of France and England the islanders might reject his gesture of reconciliation and ordered Santa Cruz to prepare another squadron to follow Valdés should that occur. Don Galcerán de Fenollet commanded the second division of twelve ships transporting 2,200 German and Spanish soldiers under the command of Don Lope de Figueroa. Its multiple purpose was to aid Valdés in carrying out his instructions, to give added security to the flotas and their valuable cargo of bullion, and by a show of force to induce the rebels on Terceira to make peace. As a last resort the two squadrons were authorized to attack the island with their combined strength if it seemed probable that they could seize it with one quick blow.

Valdés arrived at São Miguel Island on June 30, and reported to Philip on July 4 that Terceira Island had received shipments of arms and supplies from France and England but the troops promised to Dom António had not yet arrived. On July 15 Valdés reported that French corsairs were using Terceira as a base from which to attack Spanish
shipping, and that three captured Spanish vessels from Santo Domingo were in the harbor. Their cargos of hides, sugar, and pearls had been trans-shipped to France.

Valdés further commented in his report that the season was advancing and that bad weather would soon make it impossible to do anything for another year. He indicated reluctance to return to Spain while rebels and pirates remained free in the islands. After scouting some beaches and possible landing sites, he told Philip that he might attempt a landing even though he had only a handful of men.45

Indignant that the islanders rejected the King's offer of pardon, Valdés landed 350 men on a small beach near Praia on July 25, feast day of Santiago, patron saint of Spain. Diego de Valdés, son of the squadron commander, led the landing party, with Luís de Bazán, nephew of the Marqués de Santa Cruz, as second in command. The Spaniards quickly routed the defenders at the battery overlooking the beach. Flushed with victory they charged headlong after the fleeing defenders, who turned and made a stand at the villa of Praia. The defenders of the villa were reinforced from the city of Angra and other parts of the island, until finally about 2,000 men faced the small landing party. The Spaniards gave a good account of themselves until the islanders stampeded about 500 cattle into their ranks, breaking their formation and causing great confusion. The defenders followed close
on the heels of the animals and slaughtered over half of the landing force with knives, swords, and farm tools. The survivors fled to the beach where they were trapped and most were killed. Only a small number survived by swimming out to the ships.46

The political consequences of this action went far beyond the loss of some 300 Spaniards. The triumph greatly bolstered the confidence of the islanders and changed their attitude from fear to arrogance. They felt almost invincible now in their island stronghold. The moderates among the islanders believed that Philip II would surely avenge this defeat and that the door to a peaceful settlement had been shut by their rash action. The unexpected victory also gave new importance to their cause in France and England, where Dom António was seeking aid for the reconquest of Portugal.
NOTES


3. Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 80.


5. Ibid., p. 181.

6. "Carta de D. Juan de Austria a S. M. fechada en el puerto de las Guenuinas a 18 de Octubre de 1572, dándole cuenta de las operaciones de la armada de los puertos de Navarino y Moçon," in Archivo General de Simancas, Secretaría de Estado (armadas y galeras), leg. 446, sin folio. MS reproduced in Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, pp. 226-232. An interesting battle narrative of action against the Turks. Don Juan writes a special commendation for Santa Cruz at end of this letter to Philip II.


10. "Carta de Felipe II al Marqués de Santa Cruz, Noviembre de 1572." Archivo del Marqués de Santa Cruz. MS reproduced in Ibañez de Ibero, Santa Cruz, pp. 113-114.


13. Ibid., pp. 84-85.


16 "Carta de D. Juan de Austria al Rey dándole cuenta de lo sucedido en la expedición a Túnez, fechada en la Alcazaba de Túnez a 11 de Octubre de 1573." Archivo General de Simancas. Secretaría de Estado, África y Levante, leg. 497, sin folio. MS reproduced in Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, pp. 233-235.


18 Alcalá Galiano y López, Palacio del Marqués de Santa Cruz, p. 32. MS reproduced.

19 Fernández Duro, Armada Española, II, 192.

20 Ibid., p. 193.

21 Navascués, En honor de Don Alvaro de Bazán, pp. 166-169. See also Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant, p. 57.


23 Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 88.

24 "Carta de D. Juan de Austria a Don Alvaro de Bazán, fechada en 13 de Mayo de 1576, ordenándole hacer una expedición a las costas de Berbería." Archivo de E. S. Marqués de Santa Cruz, leg. 7, núm. 27. MS reproduced in Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, pp. 253-255.

25 "Carta de S. M. al Marqués de Santa Cruz fechada en San Lorenzo a 10 de Diciembre de 1576 dándole noticia de haberle elegido para el mando de las Galeras de España." Biblioteca Central de Marina, Colección Navarrete, XL. MS reproduced in Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 257.

26 Ibid., p. 92.


29. Ibáñez de Ibero, Santa Cruz, p. 130. MS reproduced.

30. Ibid., pp. 129-131. MS reproduced.

31. C.D.I.E., XL, 260ff. See also C.D.I.E., VI.


33. Fortunato de Almeida, História de Portugal, IV (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1926), 37-38.

34. C.D.I.E., XXII, 15-17, 151-160. Volumes XXII, XXXII, XXXIV, XXXV, and XL contain correspondence too voluminous to itemize in this work, between Philip II, the Duke of Alba, the Marqués of Santa Cruz, and others, concerning the succession crisis and invasion of Portugal.

35. "Copia de minuta del paracoar que dio el Marqués de Santa Cruz sobre romper la guerra con Portugal." Archivo General de Simancas. Mar y Tierra, leg. 100, sin folio. MS reproduced in Ibáñez de Ibero, Santa Cruz, pp. 273-276.


37. Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 92.


CHAPTER VI

DOM ANTÓNIO AND THE AZORES REBELLION

Queen Elizabeth of England and Catherine de Médici of France were kept informed of the developments in Portugal by their personal agents. Edward Walton spoke to many influential people in Lisboa, including Dom António and the Duchess of Bragança, reporting to Elizabeth that there was little hope of opposing Philip successfully. M. D'Abadie had reported basically the same view to Paris early in 1580, adding that Dom António's strongest support came from the common people while the nobility and upper clergy generally favored Philip.¹

Dom António's attempts to resist the military might of Spain had failed miserably and he was forced to flee for his life. After a brief stopover in Calais he proceeded to England. He hoped for aid from both France and England, but found the monarchs distrustful of each other. Walsingham and Burghley discussed with Elizabeth the possibility of sending an armed fleet under Drake and Hawkins to the Azores to prey on the rich commerce from America and the Orient. The Queen coveted the wealth of the Iberian flotas and possible control of the important Azores, but she did not dare take official action alone. She did allow initial steps to be taken toward a possible venture of this sort, however, while she investigated
the possibility of French support against Spain. As English ships were secretly being prepared for the undertaking, the news of possible English support for Dom António reached Spain. Philip II informed Elizabeth that he knew Dom António was in London and that English ships were being prepared to aid the Prior's cause. Philip demanded that Dom António be returned to Portugal, or at least banished from England. 2

Elizabeth did not wish to antagonize the Catholic King further, especially since it appeared that joint action with France was impractical. She limited her aid to the promise of four ships and 5,000 pounds silver, suggesting that the Prior would be well advised to seek further help elsewhere. Dom António crossed the channel to France where one of his staunchest supporters, the Count of Vimioso, had been laying the foundation for negotiations.

Dom António learned that he could negotiate with Catherine de Médici more easily than with Elizabeth. The Tudor queen demanded an alliance with France as a condition for her cooperation in the venture. Catherine was willing to proceed alone. Elizabeth had no specific plans for Dom António, but Catherine did.

Catherine's distant claim to the Portuguese crown gave her a more direct interest in the succession problem than Elizabeth. When Philip asked if her scheming had hostile intent, she replied that she meant no harm to anyone
but merely sought what might legally be hers. Nor did her interest stop with Portugal, for France had long desired the New World foothold offered by this opening. If Dom António could be properly manipulated, France might join Spain and Portugal in carving out rich empires across the seas. French expeditions had already cast covetous looks at Brazil and now might well be the time to turn those dreams into reality.

Dom António was received in Paris with the pomp reserved for visiting dignitaries of high rank, being addressed as the King of Portugal. It suited Catherine's purposes to regard the Prior as the legal King of Portugal in exile. This reception contrasted sharply with his London experience where he was treated as a king's illegitimate son with a weak claim to a foreign throne, forced to flee by a more powerful competitor. He did manage, however, to use some jewels smuggled from Portugal to secure loans for men and ships while living personally on the verge of poverty in London.

Catherine possessed greater imagination. She had already prepared a plan of action while working to gain the support of her son, King Henry III. She had shipped food to Lisbon in 1580 when a famine produced hardship and starvation and encouraged the circulation of a book in Portuguese outlining her claim to the Portuguese crown in order to strengthen her hand at the bargaining table. Catherine now
posed as Dom António's friend, his only powerful friend, and expressed a willingness to help him gain his throne, for a price. She agreed to renounce her claim to the Portuguese throne and supply the pretender with ships and men in exchange for Brazil. Historians include in the deal various combinations of African Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands, the Madeiras, and the Azores, but their disposition is uncertain. France also sought the right to trade with all Portuguese colonies.

Duke François d'Alençon, Henry III's younger brother, represented the French crown in these negotiations with Dom António; Strozzi, the queen mother's cousin, and the Count of Vimioso were also present at the secret meeting in Eu when the agreement was made. The price was steep but Dom António consented, for he was bargaining away land he did not have in exchange for a kingdom if the plan succeeded.

For her part Catherine planned to take Brazil and probably intended to seize control of the Madeiras and Cape Verde Islands as well. She also insisted that the vast spice trade of the Orient be opened to France and hoped that Dom António's hold on the Azores would complicate Spain's commercial relations with the New World, possibly even choking off the flow of essential bullion to Spain. Rather than cast the pretender aside after these gains, however, she planned to help him invade Portugal than marry him to one of
her nieces of Lorraine, 10 thus forming a marriage alliance with a French dominated Portugal. Catherine was a typical Médici who thought on the grand scale.

Queen Elizabeth had also been advised to support Dom António in an invasion of Portugal, "in force and with diligence, to the end that that kingdom may serve as a barrier between Spain and England, and that the King of Spain may have war in his own country, with the result that the resources of his country and of the Indies may be lost." 11 Drake was not the first to suggest that the best defense was a good offense, and support for the Prior was linked in English thinking to a means of extracting England from the conflict in the Netherlands by keeping Spanish forces busy at home. Rumors revived of Elizabeth's possible marriage to the Duke of Alençon and Anjou, but she insisted on a mutual defense pact with France as part of the marriage contract. Henry III balked. He favored the marriage of his brother to the queen but not the defense pact. Elizabeth was more interested in the French treaty than the French marriage, and the matter ended there.

Dom António had obtained some French weapons in the meantime which he sent to his supporters on Terceira, telling them of a large army being assembled to reinforce them. He encouraged his governor there to repair the defenses and resist any Spanish attack until help arrived. He further
instructed his officials to confiscate the goods of Philip II's supporters and send them to him in France, along with the booty taken from Spanish ships passing the Azores. A few months later the first contingent of 800 French soldiers arrived with artillery to help strengthen the island's defenses. They immediately constructed more fortifications and greatly improved the island's chances of withstanding a Spanish invasion.

As early as February, 1580, Philip II had asked Santa Cruz to prepare a report delineating the relative importance of the Azores. The report indicated that the strategic location of the islands made them vital to Spain's commercial and imperial interests. The Duke of Alba and Bernardino de Mendoza then brought the king up to date on what was taking place in the islands, showing him diagrams made by the Italian engineer Tiburcio Espanoque of the beaches and defenses.

Taking the islands by force would not be easy. Philip ordered the escort for the flotas strengthened and temporarily set the matter aside while he handled more pressing matters, but news of a large French fleet being prepared to aid Dom António revived the matter. Philip doubted the wisdom of any naval undertaking in the winter since his ships would necessarily sail across 900 miles of open sea. His advisers were divided, some arguing that the longer they delayed the more
difficult it would be to take the islands. If a large foreign garrison established itself, Spain might not be able to take the islands at all.

Those in favor of waiting argued that a winter campaign in mid-Atlantic would be suicidal, calling the king's attention to the poor landing possibilities on the islands due to sparse beaches surrounded by rocks and cliffs. Such an undertaking would be difficult under ideal conditions, but to attempt it in the season of storms and high seas was out of the question. The French engineers, they reasoned, could do little to improve the defenses anyway. It might even be to Spain's advantage if the Frenchmen stayed there for a while, for their large numbers would overcrowd the islands and strain the available food and water supplies, even granting that the French troops brought some supplies with them. The islanders would soon grow weary of the haughty Frenchmen, they argued, and realize how good they had it before when the Spanish flotas stopping there for supplies had made them prosperous, but otherwise had left them alone.

Philip leaned toward the latter view, which was reinforced by other important factors. The epidemic that hit Lisboa had spread through the coast of Andalucía, and from the standpoint of ships and supplies it would be almost impossible to increase the larger orders already requested for other projects. The coastal cities were working on the
greatest program of naval armament ever undertaken by Spain.\textsuperscript{14} Independent of the three major fleets to the Orient, Nueva España, and Tierra Firme, a small squadron was being outfitted under Rui Díaz de Mendoza to be based at Santo Domingo for the purpose of patrolling the Caribbean against pirates. A larger fleet under the command of Diego Flores de Valdés was sent to patrol the coast of Brazil, Argentina, and the strait of Magellan. Squadrons of galleys still patrolled the Mediterranean, and others guarded the coasts of Galicia and Portugal. Spain ruled a vast worldwide empire and its lifeline was the sea. Philip's sea power, though large, was mainly a mercenary force and spread dangerously thin. Spain was overextended and had assumed international responsibilities far beyond her resources, obligating Philip to resort to the expedient of embargoing any vessel found in his ports, and that included Naples and Sicily. In addition to all these embargoed vessels and new ship construction, he hired others by contract, mostly large merchant vessels (\textit{urcas} and \textit{naos}) from Flanders, Ragusa, Venice, and Genoa. The king had already commandeered nearly all available Spanish vessels, even the fishing and shrimp fleets. The provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa were stripped of able-bodied men for they were pressed into service as seamen, and Spanish commerce and carrying trade slipped irrevocably into foreign hands.\textsuperscript{15}
At Philip’s order Santa Cruz managed to scrape up four Guipúzcoan vessels to carry two companies of Spanish infantry to São Miguel Island. Rui Díaz de Mendoza made a story crossing with this small force in March, 1582,16 and Santa Cruz prepared a larger squadron to sail to the Azores in the summer. The arrival of Mendoza’s force was so opportune that without it São Miguel would probably have fallen to the French forces in the area. The loss of Spain’s foothold in the Azores would have seriously compromised Philip’s plan to take the rest of the islands.17

A squadron of French ships arrived in May, seeking the submission of São Miguel to Dom António. The four Spanish vessels in the bay at Ponta Delgada drew close to the fort that commanded the anchorage for protection, and when the French squadron attacked the Spanish ships resisted. With the support of the covering guns of the fort, they drove the attackers away. The Spaniards suffered twenty men killed.

Philip II sent couriers to his ambassadors in London and Paris demanding that the respective queens explain the meaning of the continued military preparations in their ports. Reliable sources informed him that these forces were to be used in Dom António’s cause. Both Elizabeth and Catherine de Médici reportedly denied any knowledge of preparations hostile to Philip II, adding that if there were such forces
they were adventurers acting independently of crown authority and could be punished as corsairs if caught. These denials were common for Elizabeth and not unusual for Catherine. Their statements seemed innocent enough at the time, but caused difficulty later when Philip ordered Santa Cruz to take them at their word.

Elizabeth restrained Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, but Catherine did not waver and Strozzi continued to prepare a large fleet and army at Nantes. A regular flow of correspondence passed between Strozzi, Catherine, Henry III, and Marshal Matignon concerning the hiring of soldiers, transport of cannons, gathering of ships, and acquiring of supplies.

Dom António returned a second time from England in April, 1582, with seven English ships recruited to join the fleet Strozzi was assembling in Nantes. Ammunition came from Brittany, and the ships and pilots from Normandy. The fleet then moved to nearby Belle Island, the final rendezvous point, where a few more ships joined them and last minute preparations were made for the expedition to the Azores and Brazil.

There is considerable controversy as to the strength of the French fleet. French historians have presented it as weaker than it probably was, and the Spaniards present it as more powerful than it probably was. It was a collection of
various types of vessels, some of the difficult to classify with certainty, but from a total of approximately seventy ships on the eve of the battle, probably only about thirty could be considered first-rate fighting ships of that epoch. Unfortunately little is known of the tonnage or characteristics of most of the French vessels and nothing of the number or size of their cannons.

A French eyewitness to the battle later reported that Strozzi's decision to engage the Spanish squadron commanded by Santa Cruz was based on his assurance of victory because "the enemy had only a force of thirty-one large ships and ours consisted of seventy-three large and small . . . ."21 This approximates the figure that most Spanish sources suggest. Fernández Duro merely says there were over sixty French ships, large and small. A more recent account by Cambra states that the French fleet was composed of seventy-five ships of all classes.22 Portuguese historians usually take the lower figure of fifty-five vessels. Most sources agree that the French fleet carried about 5,000 soldiers in addition to the ships' crews.

Strozzi sighted the Azores on July 14, 1582, after a four-week voyage and landed approximately 3,000 French troops on Spanish-held São Miguel. The Spanish garrison of 350 men was joined by 150 seamen from some ships in the harbor, which brought the defensive forces to about 500 men, though French sources speak of over 600 men. After a brief skirmish near