Toledo and the labors of Don Alvaro de Bazán. Philp stipulated, however, that although his tercios could be landed on Malta to engage in a land battle, his vital galleys were not to be risked in a sea fight. The galleys were Spain's last line of defense if things went badly for the expedition, as they had at Gerba in 1560 when a combined Spanish-Italian force under Gian Andrea Doreà met disaster at the hands of Piali Pasha and Aluch Ali.

Leaders of the relief expedition discussed their plan of attack, adopting a scheme suggested by Alvaro de Bazán. A large number of galleys and sailing vessels had been gathered at Messina, but many were in poor condition, and others useless for the purposes of the expedition. Bazán's plan was to select the sixty best galleys, place 150 of the best infantry in each, and land them on the shore of Malta at some isolated place not likely to be defended. The Turkish galleys would be concentrated near the battle zone, and any patrols that might chance upon the Spanish galleys could be handled easily.

The weather was the Spaniards' first problem. The fleet left Messina on August 26 in a raging storm, reportedly one of the worst ever experienced there. After more than two weeks of continuously bad weather the relief force was still delayed, and when an attempt was made to land troops in spite of the heavy seas, it failed. The galleys returned to
Sicily for food and water, while the Knights on Malta fought for their lives. On September 7 the relief force finally succeeded in landing 9,600 men on the embattled island without losing a single vessel. The Spanish fleet immediately withdrew, firing a cannon salvo within sight of both the defenders and the Turkish fleet to announce that help had indeed arrived. The Knights were overjoyed, while the Turks were greatly discouraged. If a few defenders had held the Ottoman forces at bay, how could they possibly take the island from the experienced and respected tercios, for the superiority of the Spanish infantry to all others was recognized in the East as well as in the West.\textsuperscript{22} Piali Pasha undertook a final desperate attack, and when it was repulsed the Turks began to retire. By September 12 the last of their vessels had sailed away, and the additional Spanish reinforcements did not even come ashore.

The high-ranking officers of Malta, led by Grand Master La Valette, boarded the Spanish flagship offshore to express their gratitude for the timely aid. La Valette greeted Don García de Toledo first, then turned to Don Alvaro de Bazán and in the warmest terms expressed thanks for his energy and bravery, since Don Alvaro's advice and leadership were in great measure responsible for the relief of the island.\textsuperscript{23}

The Black Sea had long been a Turkish lake,\textsuperscript{24} but the
setback at Malta halted the Ottoman attempt to gain similar dominance over the Mediterranean. Everyone anticipated that Suleiman would seek to avenge his defeat at Malta, probably the next year, and Philip II ordered a crash program of galley construction to meet the coming threat. Death caused two important changes in leadership, however, which altered the course of events. Pope Pius IV died in 1566, to be replaced by the more energetic crusading Pius V; that same year Suleiman the Magnificent was killed in a campaign against Hungary, and replaced by his weak son Selim II, called "the Sot," denoting one of his many character defects.25

Don Alvaro de Bazán spent the next three years patrolling the coasts of Spain, capturing enemy corsairs and freeing many Christian slaves from Moorish galleys. A widower now, he married the daughter of the Count of Santisteban, Doña María Manuela Benavides, in 1567. Six children resulted from this union, the first-born being called Alvaro, the fourth to bear the name Alvaro de Bazán.26

Philip II's military and naval build-up brought in its wake a shake-up in the command structure of the Spanish military establishment. When the aging Don García de Toledo resigned his command of all Spanish sea forces, the post went to the king's illegitimate half-brother Don Juan of Austria. Don Luis de Requesens, the comendador mayor of Castille, was made Don Juan's second in command, and the
commander of the galleys of Naples, Don Sancho de Leiva, was elevated to commander of the galleys of Spain. On February 29, 1568, Don Alvaro de Bazán was designated the new commander of the galleys of Naples, at a salary of 400 gold escudos a month, with instructions to clear Italian waters of corsairs and to assist Don Juan of Austria in whatever enterprise the latter might undertake. As was his habit, Philip II enumerated in great detail his instructions for the new Neapolitan area commander in a lengthy document, even specifying how the captured vessels, prisoners, and booty were to be divided.

Don Alvaro's inspection trips to Massina, Naples, and Malta confirmed his worst suspicions. The galleys responsible for defending the Spanish holdings in Italy and maintaining communications between the two peninsulas were in no condition to carry out their mission effectively. He sent detailed reports to the king on the state of each vessel, as he had done previously from Gibraltar and the northern provinces of Spain. Don Alvaro's ability as an organizer, his capacity for hard work, and his zeal for high standards of vessel maintenance made him one of Philip II's most valuable commanders.

Early in his naval career Don Alvaro had gained a reputation for rigorous standards and was known for his personal inspections of men and vessels, in which he paid
attention to the smallest details. He had the advantage of knowing the ways of the sea, ships, and seamen, and he knew what to look for. He believed that Spanish naval strength was far from corresponding to Spain's important role in world affairs, and he called attention to his country's maritime needs at every opportunity. Three years earlier, in April, 1565, he had written to the king's secretary, Francisco de Eraso, that the galleys defending Spain's eastern coast were in such a terrible state of disrepair that it was painful to look at them. They were, in addition, without the necessary equipment and supplies to put to sea because the port consuls in Málaga had not expedited royal orders to make the vessels operative. In 1566 he wrote to the king again from Puerto Santa María that though local officials tried to keep the galleys there seaworthy, the vessels could not withstand heavy seas and needed to be replaced with new galleys being built for Spain in Genoa. Genoa enjoyed the reputation of being a leading center of naval construction, arms, and heavy ordnance.

Don Alvaro lodged a formal complaint from Naples that he had been given leaky vessels, then immediately initiated a program of reform and construction which went far beyond the mere caulking of leaky galleys. Bazán encouraged Naples to challenge Genoa and Venice as a center of marine construction, upgrading the former's shipyards and related shops and
facilities until they produced new galleys of excellent quality. Within a year he had strengthened his squadron with thirty-eight new galleys built and outfitted in Naples under his own supervision. These, and additional galleys which he built and outfitted, were to play a key role in turning the tide against the Turks in the Mediterranean. In this he was following the tradition of his father, who had been instrumental in the development of the galleon and a modified galleas favored by some Spaniards.

Don Alvaro's assignment in Naples included service in the Consejo Colateral of that city. Before assuming his duties in Naples, however, he went on a religious retreat to the monastery of Uclés, where he fulfilled the requirements for full membership in the Order of Santiago. On June 17, 1568, he was granted the encomienda of Villamayor, vacated by Don Sancho de Córdoba.

Philip II was indebted to Don Alvaro for greatly enhancing Spain's capacity to wage war at sea by improving vessels and maintenance procedures, but these were not his only contributions. Until this time Spanish mariners had lacked a naval academy. The training of leaders for the famous Spanish infantry was based mainly on the examples and principles of "El Gran Capitán," Gonzalo Fernández de Córdova, who astounded Europe with his epic Italian campaigns. From the academy founded in his honor proceeded a
steady stream of famous names in European military history. The Spanish naval service lacked a similar academy, and Don Alvaro de Bazán was instrumental in organizing the needed naval training school. Its guiding spirit was the deceased Don Alvaro the Elder, and the "nautical catechism" of the Spanish mariner, Breve compendio de la sphera y de la arte de navegar by Martín Cortés, was dedicated to the elder statesman of Spanish arms at sea.

Renewed efforts to "purify" Spain, meanwhile including enforcement of the hated "Edict of 1526," led to open rebellion of the Moriscos in 1568. In the beginning it appeared that the insurrection could be put down easily, but such was not the case, and the seriousness of the situation finally induced Philip II to put Don Juan of Austria in command of a larger and more experienced army. To this end Philip ordered the comendador mayor of Castille, Requesens, to bring the tercio of Naples to Spain, leaving Bazán in charge of naval affairs in Italy. As Requesens approached Spain a storm dispersed his vessels. Four ships were lost, while some turned up at Minorca, Sardinia, and Corsica.

Don Alvaro sailed into a Sardinian port while on a routine patrol and discovered five of Requesens' galleys there. He immediately had them repaired and joined them to his own galleys, heading for Spain to render whatever service he could. His initiative brought the needed infantry
to Spain with only a few days delay, and all but four of the galleys were saved. Philip II personally wrote to Don Alvaro, congratulating him for his energy and quick thinking. The prudent King may have had difficulty in making decisions himself, but he appreciated resourcefulness coupled with responsibility in his subjects. From May to November of 1569 Don Alvaro patrolled the coasts of Spain to prevent outside aid from reaching the Moriscos, and during that time he took part in a number of skirmishes and minor actions.

For his many services to the crown Don Alvaro de Bazán was honored by Philip II with the title of Marqués de Santa Cruz on October 9, 1569. Some speculated that his penchant for marrying into esteemed Spanish families contributed to his elevation to Marqués, but most would agree that no one in that century deserved the honor more than Bazán. In any case, he had been commander of the galleys of Naples for only twenty months, and his star was clearly on the rise.

With the Moriscos pacified and Spain's naval strength improved in the western Mediterranean, thanks mainly to the hard work of Santa Cruz, Philip turned his attention to the growing Ottoman threat farther East. Finding a way to deal with the Turks was not Philip's only problem, however, for many European countries, suspicious of Spain's growing power, were harassing Spanish shipping. Philip had no plan to
expand into the eastern end of the sea, for his forces were
already spread too thin in Europe, the New World, and the
Mediterranean area. Renewed Turkish aggression, however,
made defense of his Italian possessions more difficult.

Pope Pius V had called for a new crusade against the
Crescent, but with little response. In 1570 Sultan Selim II
gave added weight to the papal proposal, however, by demanding
that Venice surrender the island of Cyprus to him. The
Venetians refused and the Turks prepared for war. Venice
did not want war because of her vast commercial interests in
the eastern Mediterranean, and had ignored earlier papal
pleas for a Holy League against the Turks. Now necessity
forced them into the Christian alliance. Even at their best
the Venetians could not withstand Ottoman might, and now they
were somewhat weakened by an explosion and fire that had
destroyed segments of their shipyards and arsenal, though
this damage is often exaggerated. Their woe was compounded
by disease and a food shortage.

News of Turkish preparations for another military
campaign made Philip II suspicious of a possible move to aid
the Moriscos in a united Moslem crusade to retake Iberia.39
He ordered Santa Cruz to carry reinforcements to La Goleta
and other Spanish enclaves on the North African coast, to
prevent these stepping stones to Spain from falling to the
Turks. The North African corsair Alugh Ali slipped past an
attempted Spanish blockade with twenty-five Algerian galleys to join the main Ottoman force. Although the Turks attacked La Goleta and captured Tunis, their main objective was Cyprus.

A Turkish invasion force estimated at 100,000 men, including irregulars, under the command of Kara Mustapha Pasha, landed on Cyprus in July, 1570, and laid siege to the city of Nicosia. The army was transported and supported by a fleet of over 200 vessels under Piali Pasha. There were only two defensible positions on the island, Nicosia and Famagusta, and the Venetians held them both against tremendous odds. The defenders, knowing they could not hold our indefinitely, hoped that outside help would reach them in time.

Venice, the Papacy, and Spain formed an alliance to meet the threat. They assembled a fleet for the relief of the beleaguered Christians on Cyprus, but all did not go smoothly. The Venetians distrusted the Spaniards almost as much as they did the Turks, thus mutual suspicion and open dislike often hampered joint efforts. A fleet was finally assembled, however, and on September 1, 1570, a meeting was called on the galley of the papal commander, Marco Antonio Colonna, to plan the campaign for the relief of Cyprus. Present were Gian Andrea Doria, young nephew of the famed Andrea Doria, Alvaro de Bazán, and other commanders representing the pope, Naples, Genoa, and Venice. Bazán and Andrea Doria wanted to sail immediately to the rescue of
Cyprus, but most of the others favored attacking some other Turkish city, hoping that the Sultan would withdraw from Nicosia to come to its aid. Still undecided on a plan, the allied leaders sailed for Crete and joined their fleet to a Venetian galley squadron at Suda Bay.

A quick, decisive action, such as suggested by Santa Cruz, might have saved Nicosia, for the garrison defended the city with uncommon bravery and the Turks were hardpressed to storm the city in spite of their overwhelming numbers. The Christian fleet was commanded by a committee, however, and petty bickering and jealousies prevented agreement on a course of action. While the committee debated, Nicosia fell. On September 9, 1570, the Turks stormed the city and put the few survivors to the sword. The Christian fleet returned to Italy for the winter with nothing accomplished. Santa Cruz returned to Naples with his galleys.

The Turks laid siege to Famagosta the following year and the Christian League began to assemble another fleet. All agreed that there would have to be one commander-in-chief for the Christian forces, but could not agree upon the man. Contributing the lion's share of men and money, Philip II insisted that Don Juan of Austria command the expedition. Don Juan was a personable and gallant young man of twenty-six whose most important attribute turned out to be his ability to hold together the mutually distrustful allies. Although
he had commanded the Spanish forces in the Morisco uprising, and was personally courageous and daring, he was not an experienced nor especially able commander. In matters of combat tactics he relied on the counsel of the more experienced Gian Andrea Doria and Álvaro de Bazán. The commander of the Ottoman fleet, Ali Pasha, was likewise a young man without naval warfare experience who relied on more experienced assistants. Fortunately for the Holy League's fleet, Ali Pasha did not always follow the advice of his counselors.

One result of the fall of Nicosia was that Venice, doubtful of the value of aid from the West, tried to make a secret peace with the Sultan. When this failed she had no choice but to continue with the Christian League, hoping against all odds that Famagusta could be saved.

Pope Pius V called a meeting in Rome of representatives from the allied parties. The main Venetian concern was Cyprus; the pope called for a holy crusade against the followers of Islam wherever they might be found, while the Spanish delegates let it be known that if Philip II sent forces as far east as Cyprus he would expect the League to aid Spain should the Spanish holdings in North Africa be threatened. Each participating power had a different motive for joining the Holy Alliance. Only the diplomacy of Pius V held the meeting together. The League's forces were to consist of 200 galleys, 100 sailing ships, 50,000 infantry, and
a proportionate quantity of supplies and artillery. The fleet would be ready in April each year. The concerned parties agreed that Spain would pay three-sixths of the total cost, Venice two-sixths, and the Holy See one-sixth. Each party would name a commander of its contingent and the three in counsel would have a voice in campaign plans. Final authority would rest with this group, headed by the League's commander-in-chief, Prince Don Juan of Austria. None of the allied parties could make a separate peace with the enemy, and the flagship was not to fly a national emblem but rather the especially designed banner of the League. This pact was made public in Rome on May 24, 1571, and later in Madrid and Venice, amidst great pomp and religious festivity.

Renewing his efforts to seize all of Cyprus, Selim II replaced Piali with Ali Pasha as naval commander when he heard that 1500 Venetian soldiers had managed to slip into Famagosta. Alugh Ali joined the Ottomans with his corsair squadron; Hassan of Algiers, son of Barbarroja, brought additional galleys. Reinforcements from Egypt and Rhodes enlarged the besieging forces to 80,000 men and 250 vessels. Some of these ships were detached to harass Christian ports and shipping in the Adriatic sea. Venetian holdings suffered the brunt of these depredations, and her commercial empire began to disintegrate. Ragusans filled the vacuum
which these developments created in the Mediterranean carrying trade, and while Venetian commerce was paralyzed during the Cyprus war (1570-1573) sixty "great ships" from Ragusa (Dubrovnik) were trading between Istanbul, Alexandria, Beirut, Tripoli, and Salonika.47

Massina in Sicily was designated as the base of operations for the League's fleet, and irascible old Sebastián Veniero, commander of the Venetian forces, was the first to arrive on July 23, 1571, with forty-eight galleys. Next were the galleasses from Venice, large three-masted vessels with oars, castles fore and aft, and carrying forty large cannons each as opposed to the four or five forward and one aft of the galleys. Marco Antonio Colonna soon arrived with twelve galleys which constituted the papal contribution. The Spanish forces were late in arriving, much to the consternation of the other allied commanders. Don Juan of Austria had to gather Spanish forces that had been used against the Moriscos in Granada, then embark German and Italian soldiers at Genoa. Santa Cruz was obliged to reinforce Spanish outposts before returning to Naples to take on Italian infantry. Spain's logistical problems were simply more complex than those of her allies.

The best intentions of Spaniard, Venetian, and Pope were not enough, however, and after a bizarre struggle of heroic proportions the garrison at Famagusta surrendered on
August 4, 1571. The Turks lost an estimated 30,000 men taking the city, and though Mustapha granted reasonable surrender terms to the Venetian commander, Marco Antonio Bragadino, he did not honor them after the Christians surrendered. Accounts conflict as to why Mustapha broke his word, but the ending turned out to be even more horrible than the battle as he ordered the nobles and officers slaughtered and the soldiers sent to the galleys as slaves. Bragadino was tortured over a period of days, his nose and ears cut off, and then he was skinned alive. His hide was filled with straw, elevated for all to see and ridicule, then sent to Selim. Cyprus belonged to the Turks.
NOTES


11. Altolaguirre, *Don Alvaro de Bazán*, p. 34.

12. Ibid., p. 35.

14. Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 35.

15. Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Armada Española Desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilla y de Aragón, II (Madrid: Est. Tipográfico Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1896), 76. See also C.D.I.E., XXI.


17. Ibid., pp. 413-419.


19. Ibid., p. 119.


22. Merriman, Rise of the Spanish Empire, IV, 120.


26. Ibáñez de Ibero, Almirantes y Hombres de Mar, p. 60.


30. Ibid., p. 63.

32. Archivo general de Simancas, Registro general del sello de Castilla, legajo del mes de Octubre, 1569, cited in Navascués, En Loor de D. Alvaro de Bazán, p. 68. See also Navarrete, Revista General de Marina, pp. 81-82.

33. Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 46.


35. Martín Cortés, Breve compendio de la sphera y de la arte de navegar, con menos instrumentos y reglas exemplificado con muy subtiles demonstraciones (Sevilla: Por Antón Alvarez, 1551). Prólogo reproduced in Navascués, En Loor de D. Alvaro de Bazán, p. 61.

36. Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 47.

37. Ibid., p. 48.

38. Archivo general de Simancas, Registro general del sello de Castilla, legajo del mes de Octubre de 1569, cited in Navascués, En Loor de D. Alvaro de Bazán, p. 68.


40. Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 50.

41. Eversley, The Turkish Empire, pp. 139-140.

42. Marco Antonio Arroyo, Relación del progreso de la armada de la Santa Liga (Milan, 1576), cited in Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 51.

43. Merriman, Rise of the Spanish Empire, IV, 130.

44. Eversley, The Turkish Empire, p. 141.

45. Fernández Duro, Armada Española, II, 132. See also Amarie Dennis, Don Juan of Austria (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1966), pp. 146-147.

46. Merriman, Rise of the Spanish Empire, IV, 129.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE TURKS

Don Juan of Austria sailed into Messina a month after the arrival of the first Venetian galleys commanded by Veniero. Don Juan de Cardona appeared with additional Spanish forces the following week, and sixty Venetian galleys that had wintered at Crete sailed into port on September 1. The next day Gian Andrea Doria arrived with eleven galleys, followed on September 7 by the Marqués de Santa Cruz with his squadron of thirty galleys from Naples. Although the Marqués was the last to arrive, his combat experience and reputation for coolness in battle were so highly valued that Don Juan's relief was obvious to all and he happily overlooked his earlier consternation at the lateness of the Marqués' arrival.¹

Only through the negligence of Alugh Ali did the Venetians reach Messina at all. Ali could have bottled up Veniero's galleys at the island of Corfu (off the Albanian coast) and might also have prevented the Venetian galleys at Crete from reaching Sicily. Fortunately for the Christians, Ali was a pirate by trade who busied himself with lucrative raids on the coastal villages and commerce. The course of history might have been changed had he and the
other Ottoman commanders held a broader view of the principles of naval warfare. But theirs was the spirit of the buccaneer, and while they raided, the various contingents of a powerful Christian fleet gathered at Sicily.  

It would be a mistake to underestimate Alugh Ali's skill, however, for he was almost within sight of Venice when word of the League's preparations at Messina obliged him to turn south and rejoin the main Ottoman force under Ali Pasha at its new base in the Gulf of Corinth. Ali probably knew more about Don Juan's activities than Don Juan knew of the Turks', though both sides received much misinformation about the other before they fought at Lepanto. Prior to Don Juan's arrival at Messina, Alugh Ali had sent one of his corsairs, Kara Khodja, to reconnoiter the allied fleet. The daring Kara painted his vessel and sails black and under cover of night slipped into the harbor at Messina. Gliding ghost-like among the unsuspecting Christians, he counted galleys, galleasses, great-ships, and frigates, then withdrew unchallenged and undetected. His report led Ali to underestimate the allied strength, however, since the entire Christian fleet had not yet assembled.  

When the various allied contingents finally arrived in early September, 1571, over three hundred vessels crowded the harbor of Messina. The composition of the Holy League's fleet included Spain with ninety galleys, twenty-four large
sailing ships, and fifty frigates and brigantines; Venice with 106 galleys, six gallesasses, two large sailing ships, and twenty frigates; and the Papacy with twelve galleys and six frigates.  

Since galleys bore the brunt of battle in Mediterranean naval warfare, the surest measure of a fleet's combat readiness was its galley strength. Of the 208 League galleys Venice contributed an impressive 106, but their quality was poor. After inspecting the Venetian galleys, Don Juan expressed great dismay at the condition of most of the undermanned vessels and the absence of discipline (at least by Spanish standards) exhibited by their men. With great reluctance Veniero finally yielded to Don Juan's demand that this situation be at least partially rectified by placing 4,000 additional soldiers (1,500 Spaniards and 2,500 Italians in Spanish pay) aboard the Venetian galleys and gallesasses.

Since galley warfare resembled a land battle fought on water, the quality of fighting-men aboard the galleys was probably as important as the quality of the galleys. The allied vessels were manned by approximately 50,000 rowers and sailors and carried about 30,000 soldiers. Of the latter, 20,000 were Spanish, Italian, and German infantrymen in the pay of Philip II; Venice furnished 6,000 (though some Venetian sources put their contribution at 8,000-9,000) and the Papacy supplied 2,000 men. A number of adventurers also
accompanied the expedition (estimates range from 1,500 to 3,000), supplying their own equipment and serving without pay. A list of these soldiers of fortune, many of whom thought of themselves as crusaders, would include most of the great noble families of Spain and many Italian nobles as well. The then unknown Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra took part in this great crusade, serving in the company of Captain Diego de Urbina.⁷ The infantry was commanded by Don Lope de Figueroa, a veteran of the Low Countries' campaigns with the Duke of Alba. The two most respected groups of soldiers in sixteenth-century Europe, the Ottoman Janissaries and the Spanish tercios, would soon meet in a fight to the death on the decks of galleys.

While preparing his fleet in Messina, Don Juan corresponded regularly with Don García de Toledo, who was too ill to take part in the expedition. The experienced Don García advised the young prince on galley tactics and formations, how to handle the suspicious Venetians, the use of heavy and light cannons in galley warfare, the best route to follow to Cyprus (they were still unaware of the fall of Famagosta), which ports to call at and which to avoid on the way, and finally warned him not to take any non-rowed vessels into combat.⁸ Don Juan also sought and received advice from the battle-wise Duke of Alba, then in the Netherlands.⁹ Though only twenty-six years of age, Don Juan had the wisdom
to know his limitations and sought the best counsel available to him.

The Christian fleet was ready to sail early in the second week of September but storms and rain-squalls prevented its departure. The weather cleared on September 14 and troops were loaded. Santa Cruz' galleys carried eight companies of the tercio from Granada, ten companies from Naples, and four companies under Don Miguel de Moncada. A Spanish infantry company usually consisted of 250 men. With twenty-two companies assigned to his thirty galleys, Santa Cruz' galleys would each carry an average of 183 infantrymen. Only six of the Neapolitan companies were taken on immediately, however; the remainder were to be picked up on route. 10 As an example of the flower of Spanish and Italian nobility volunteering for the expedition, Santa Cruz carried aboard his flagship the following: Don Pedro de Padilla, Comendador of the Order of Santiago, Don Pedro Velázquez and Don Fernando Tello of the same Order; Don Manuel de Benavides, eldest son of the Señor de Javalquinto; Don Gutierrez Laso; Don Agustín Mejía, brother of the Marqués de la Guardia; Don Felipe de Leiva, son of the Princess of Asculi; Pompeyo Lancy, brother of the Prince of Sulmona; and Don Juan de Guzmán, brother of the Count of Olivares. 11 A similar list of notables could be compiled for most galleys in the Christian fleet.
Don Juan assigned each unit its place in the order of battle before leaving port, using a plan drawn up by Santa Cruz. The vanguard was composed of eight swift galleys under the command of Don Juan de Cardona, with instructions to patrol approximately eight miles in advance of the main force. When combat was imminent the vanguard took its place in the main line, or "battle line." Although galleys fought in line-abreast formation, they traveled in line-ahead formation, by units, and the allied fleet followed the "van" in four separate divisions. The first in line while "on the march" was the right wing, under the Genoese command of Gian Andrea Doria, a division composed of fifty-four galleys and distinguished by green pennants. Next came the battle line, which would take the center position during combat. It was the strongest division, being composed of sixty-four galleys flying blue pennants, and Don Juan reserved for himself the command of this unit. The rearguard formed the left wing when the fleet was drawn up in line-abreast formation; this division was composed of fifty-three galleys under command of the Venetian Agustín Barberigo and was identified by yellow pennants. Lastly came the reserve, composed of thirty Neapolitan galleys under the command of the Marqués de Santa Cruz and identified by white pennants.

Each of the three main divisions was assigned two galleasses, which were towed while traveling and then placed
into position in front of each division for battle. The galleys alternated at the towing chores. The galleasses had the sort of strengths and weaknesses one might expect from a compromise. It had both oars and sails (usually three masts) and so could make headway when a sailing ship could not, but it was neither as fast nor as maneuverable as a galley. At Lepanto the galleasses served as floating castles. Their high sides made them difficult to board from a galley, while their size made them a relatively stable gun platform for their forty-plus "ship-killing" cannons and dozens of light "man-killing" cannons.

The great ships, frigates, and brigantines which had been sent out of Messina first were to bring up the rear of the fleet. They served as supply vessels, troop transports, and tenders. The smaller of these sailing ships were divided into three groups to assist each of the three main divisions of the line of battle, taking soldiers to galleys when needed during the fight. Usually these troops would be transferred again from the galley that picked them up onto a besieged galley in the heat of battle.

Before leaving Messina Don Juan instructed his commanders concerning his expectations. He made special mention of the importance of the reserve squadron, stating that the fate of the entire expedition might depend on the timely arrival of the reserves when the outcome of the battle was
in doubt. Combat between massed fleets of galleys usually turned into a general mêlée, so specific instructions could scarcely be given in advance that would cover every possible eventuality. It was important, therefore, that the reserve be commanded by a man of experience, good judgment, and daring. Don Juan entrusted that vital task to Don Alvaro de Bazán, Marqués de Santa Cruz.14

The main body of the fleet of the Holy League left Messina on the morning of September 16, 1571, with Don Juan's beautiful galley, El Real, leading the way. Monseñor Odescalchi, papal nuncio, sent them forth with the special blessing of the Holy See, and the whole town turned out to witness the colorful spectacle of their departure.15 It took several hours for the fleet to clear the harbor, then utilizing both sails and oars the galleys headed south across the Strait of Messina to the Calabrian coast. By September 19 the fleet had rounded the toe of Italy and passed Cape Spartivento, where it encountered bad weather. The delay caused Don Juan not to follow the coast around the Gulf of Taranto (between the toe and heel) but rather to cut across the broad mouth of that gulf to Cape Santa María (on the tip of the heel). Santa Cruz was detached to pick up soldiers at Crotone on September 23.16 The following day a Venetian vessel brought news to Don Juan that a large Turkish fleet had been seen off the island of Zante near the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth where the Ottoman
fleet was known to be. Don Juan again detached Bazán with his thirty galleys, plus ten Venetian galleys under Paulo Canal, to pick up 1,500 Spanish infantrymen and an unspecified number of Italian soldiers at the ports of Taranto and Gallipoli.\(^{17}\) The main body of the fleet meanwhile proceeded east across the mouth of the Adriatic Sea to Corfu despite the bad weather, arriving on September 26. Santa Cruz rejoined the main fleet the following day, but without the additional troops.\(^{18}\)

Don Juan called a meeting of the Consejo or Council of the leading commanders. By now the officers and men of the fleet had seen the ashes and desolation left on Corfu by the raiding Turks, even though the fortress had not fallen. Reports continued to come of the carnage along the Greek coast, and the commanders were reminded anew of the fury and violence of which their enemy was capable. Gil de Andrada returned from patrol with news gleaned from fishermen and coastal traders indicating that the Turkish fleet was at Lepanto, in a sheltered part of the Gulf of Corinth. He underestimated the strength of the enemy fleet, however, just as Turkish spies and patrols continued to report that the Christian force was smaller than it really was, partially because it was so extended that the Turks never saw all of it at once. The sailing ships carrying the bulk of the fleet's supplies and siege cannons had not yet arrived at
Corfu, and the entrance to the Bay of Lepanto was known to be protected by heavily armed forts on each side.

Among the more important personages present at the Corfu council of war called by Don Juan were Marco Antonio Colonna, commander of the papal contingent; Sebastián Veniero, commander of the Venetian contingent; Don Luis de Requesens, the Spanish Comendador Mayor and Philip II's personal "eyes" in the fleet; Ascanio de Corgna, field marshal of the League's forces; Gian Andrea Doria, Agustín Barbarigo, the Marqués de Santa Cruz, Don Juan de Cardona, the Prince of Parma, the Prince of Urbino, the Count of Priego, Don Miguel de Moncada, the Count of Santa Flor, Don Octavio de Gonzaga, and others. 19

In a group so diverse it was logical to expect a variety of opinions as to what action the Christian fleet should take. Gian Andrea Doria advocated caution, arguing that it would be foolish to risk all "with one throw of the dice" unless absolutely necessary, reminding them that all of Italy would be open to Turkish assault if the allied fleet met defeat. In Andrea Doria's opinion the Turkish fleet was superior and its soldiers likely to be veterans, while many of the Christian soldiers were new recruits enlisted for this campaign. He further advocated harassing the enemy, and if possible aiding Famagusta without directly confronting the Turkish fleet. His closing argument was
that the season was much too advanced to reap any lasting
gain from the battle even if the allied fleet won.20

Others advocated assaults on various Ottoman holdings
in the area to gain some advantage from their large fleet,
but not to the point of risking defeat. After all they were
not in home waters, and there were no friendly ports to which
they could withdraw in case of trouble. They felt the enemy
had the advantage of a homogenous force, while the Christians
squabbled among themselves, and even spoke many different
languages.

Santa Cruz took a sharply different view from Andrea
Doria, stating that their respective "princes" had not
assembled so mighty a fleet at such great cost to have it run
at first sight of the enemy. In his view it would have been
preferable never to have left home than to come so far and
elevate the hopes of Christendom and then refuse to fight.
Cyprus would not be helped by raiding Turkish outposts, nor
would a number of small victories be of military significance.
Spanish honor would be disgraced by such conduct. Santa Cruz
closed his impassioned plea with the recommendation that the
allied fleet seek out the Turkish fleet and give battle
wherever it might be found.21 He was supported in this view
by Colonna, Barbarigo, and the Count of Priego. The latter
commented, "The pope (Pius V) said fight, so I vote that we
fight."22 After further discussion the majority of those
present finally favored a decisive showdown, which pleased
Don Juan, for that was how he had felt all along. Orders
were given to load 4,000 Venetian soldiers from the Corfu
garrison onto the fleet's galleys along with eight heavy
cannons and munitions. Even though the sailing vessels had
still not arrived, the galleys departed Corfu on September 29
to seek out the enemy fleet.

Unbeknown to the League commanders, their Ottoman
counterparts were faced with many of the same problems con-
fronting the Christians. The Turkish fleet was commanded by
the Captain Pasha, Mousinzade Ali, like Don Juan a young man
in his middle twenties with limited combat experience. Under
Pasha Ali were Alugh Ali (Ouloudji Ali), Bey of Algiers;
Djeffer Pasha, Bey of Tripoli; Hassan Pasha (son of Khaireddin
Barberossa), and fifteen other Beys of maritime Sanjaks, each
of whom was entitled to hoist a personal banner on his galley
as a Prince of the Sea.23 Perted Pasha (Pertew Pasha) was in
command of all troops aboard the galleys. In a heated coun-
cil discussion both Perted Pasha and Alugh Ali, two of the
most experienced combat commanders in the Ottoman force, were
outspoken in their opposition to a direct confrontation with
the approaching Christian fleet. They insisted that many of
the galleys were undermanned because of disease and combat
losses, and most of the fighting men in the galleys were
inexperienced militia; only a few thousand were highly
trained Janissaries. The Captain Pasha insisted on doing battle with the Christians, however, and Alugh Ali finally broke off the discussion, saying, "Silence. I am ready, because it is written that the youth of a Captain Pasha has more weight than my forty-three years of fighting. But the Gerbers have made sport of you, Pasha! Remember this when the peril draws near." 24 The war party carried the day—Selim II also favored such a course of action—and the Ottoman fleet prepared to leave its defended bay and seek out the enemy.

Both the Christian and Moslem commanders underestimated the numbers of their adversary, and each overestimated the quality of the other's personnel. The Christians assumed that the bulk of the enemy fighting men would be well-trained Janissaries, and thus more than a match for the large numbers of inexperienced Christian recruits. The Moslems in turn knew that most of their men were untrained militia, not Janissaries, and feared the outcome of these facing the highly regarded Spanish tercios. As it turned out, therefore, although a few thousand Spanish veterans and Janissaries did participate in the fight, the vast majority of the soldiers on both sides received their first taste of battle at Lepanto. For many it was also their last.

The Christian assumption of Ottoman homogeneity of forces was also contrary to the facts. The makeup of the
Moslem forces was equally as diverse as that of the Chris-
tians, if not more so. Most of the Ottoman soldiers and
sailors were not Turks at all, but Syrians, Egyptians,
Algerians, Tunisians, Berbers, and non-Turkish Anatolians.
Many of these peoples had been part of the Ottoman Empire
less than fifty years. The ethnic mixture in the Ottoman
forces was thus more pronounced than in the Christian ranks.

The rowers for both fleets were mainly galley slaves
who were normally chained to their oars. Although many of
the rowers on the Turkish galleys were captured Christians,
a considerable number were sailors enlisted from Adriatic
and Aegean ports. No doubt some of the Ottoman rowers on
this occasion were Venetian soldiers enslaved after their
surrender at Famagosta. On the Christian galleys most of
the rowers were derelicts from the prisons and jails, but
some were merely jobless men recruited by Santa Cruz in
southern Italy, and paid for their services. In both
fleets the slaves were promised their freedom in the event
of victory if they behaved well and were also told their
chains would be removed when the time came for battle.

Estimates of the number of galleys in the Ottoman
fleets vary from 230 to 290, probably because some sources
fail to distinguish between a galley and a galliot. The
Turks probably had about 230 galleys plus forty to fifty
galliots. A galliot was a small one-masted galley, and the
best Ottoman galliots were better than many of the second-rate galleys of the Venetian contingent. Most of the galliots belonged to the pirate states of North Africa; these vessels were fast, handled well, and were manned by crews in piratical warfare. Most Ottoman galleys were not as solidly constructed as the Spanish galleys, however, since they were built more for speed than for sustained combat. The Turks had no counterpart at Lepanto for the heavily gunned Venetian galleasses.

While the Turks made last-minute battle preparations, the allied fleet crossed to the west coast of Greece, stopping on September 30 at Gomonizza. One of Gil de Andrada's advanced patrol frigates brought news of the Turkish fleet to Don Juan. The Ottoman force was estimated by Andrada at less than 200 galleys, and many of those were reportedly undermanned due to disease among the enemy troops. Ali received a report, probably the same day, which he interpreted as confirming previous information, which underestimated the strength of the allied fleet.

Realizing that a confrontation with the enemy was imminent, Don Juan ordered a general inspection of his fleet to assure that all was in order. He inspected some vessels in person, delegating authority to his leading commanders to inspect the other galleys. Gian Andrea Doria was to have inspected a division containing a number of Venetian galleys,
but the Venetians refused to let him step foot aboard their vessels. Doria, a Genoese, was greatly disliked by the Venetians, who blamed him for the failure of the previous year's expedition, and thus the loss of Nicosia. Don Juan was upset by the evident lack of unity in his fleet, but decided not to make an issue of the matter and assigned a Spaniard to inspect the Venetian galleys.

Partisanship in the allied ranks did not end there, however, and another incident occurred which threatened to bring the precarious Christian alliance tumbling to ruin. An Italian infantry captain named Mucio Tortona, assigned with his company to a Venetian galley, became involved in a heated altercation with the Venetians (no one knows why). Veniero, the Venetian commander, ordered that the captain be seized. When Tortona resisted efforts to arrest him, Veniero became angry and ordered the captain to be taken by force; at least two Italian soldiers attempted to aid their captain and they too were seized. Veniero ordered the three of them to be hanged from the yardarm of his flagship. Santa Cruz attempted to intervene in the affair but was overruled by the Venetian general, and the men were executed without due process or defense.

Don Juan was outraged when he heard what had happened. Since he had not been consulted he felt that his honor had been violated and his authority as supreme commander
of the fleet undermined. Some sources suggest that Don Juan considered the execution of Veniero in reprisal, but there is little likelihood that such a drastic step was given serious thought. What did take place was even more potentially dangerous to the Christian cause than the hanging of Veniero. The earlier suggestion that raids be made on lesser objectives was revived and reconsidered. Since the Venetians opposed such a policy, the obvious import of this would be the splintering of the allied fleet into its component parts, and the abandonment of the Venetians to face the Ottoman fleet alone. Don Juan appeared ready to withdraw all forces in the pay of Philip II and was supported in this attitude by Don Luís de Requesenes, Gian Andrea Doria, Don Juan de Cardona, and Piero Francisco Doria.

Santa Cruz was the most outspoken opponent of such a course of action. He pointed out the folly of dividing the fleet when a large enemy force was known to be nearby and looking for the Christians. Daring to say what they all knew in their hearts, Santa Cruz declared that the result would surely be the piecemeal destruction of the allied contingents by the Turks. Santa Cruz suggested to Don Juan that the matter of Veniero's action be set aside until after the battle, and that the fleet stay together and continue to search for the enemy. After calling for a vote on the matter Requesenes finally swung to Santa Cruz' view and Don Juan
agreed to proceed as planned, closing the discussion with the remark, "Forward then, as the Marqués suggests." For the third time Santa Cruz' intervention salvaged the Christian cause.32

Don Juan swallowed his pride and postponed dealing with Veniero's high-handed action. He forbade Veniero to attend further meetings of the Council, however, and removed him from his command of the left wing, replacing the proud old veteran with another Venetian, Agustín Barbarigo. This in itself was no small punishment for a man of Veniero's position.33

The allied fleet left Gomnizza on October 3. Proceeding along the coast of Greece in search of the Turks, it arrived at Cabo Blanco the following day. A brigantine from Candia met them here and brought the first news of the horrors which took place at Famagosta. The righteous indignation and crusading fervor of the Christians was aroused to fever pitch by the atrocity stories, and in some small measure the horrible fate of the Venetian garrison at Famagosta probably enabled the various contingents of the Christian fleet to forget their differences and concentrate on the task at hand. The brigantine also confirmed that the Ottoman fleet was still at Lepanto. Strong winds again whipped the sea into a dangerous state for the galleys, and the fleet remained weather-bound in the bay for two days.
On October 6 the wind shifted to the east and the sea began
to subside. Don Juan ordered the fleet under way with bare
masts. Rowing hard against the wind and through choppy seas,
the galleys worked their way slowly among the Greek islands.
That night the fleet anchored in a sheltered cove between
the island of Curzolari and the Greek mainland, not far from
the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth. Ali brought the Ottoman
fleet out of the Bay of Lepanto and anchored it in the Bay
of Calydon in the Gulf of Corinth, less than twenty miles
from the Christian fleet.
NOTES


3Ibid., p. 85.


7Navascués, En Loor de D. Álvaro de Bazán, pp. 104-105. See also Martín Fernández de Navarrete, Vida de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (Madrid, 1819), and Césareo Fernández Duro, Cervantes, Marino (Madrid, 1869).


12Hale, Famous Sea Fights, p. 83.

13Fernández Duro, Armada Española, II, 139.

15 Ibid., XI, 364.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., III, 28.
18 Ibid., XXI, 329.
19 Navascués, En Llor de D. Alvaro de Bazán, p. 110.
20 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
21 Ibid., pp. 112-113. See also C.D.I.E., XXI, 330, and Bauer y Landeur, La Marina Española en el Siglo XVI, p. 339.
22 Navascués, En Llor de D. Alvaro de Bazán, pp. 112-113.
23 Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks, p. 219.
24 Eversley, The Turkish Empire, p. 141.
26 "Paracer del Marqués de Santa Cruz, Don Alvaro de Bazán al Rey Don Felipe segundo," MS reproduced in Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 495.
27 Eversley, The Turkish Empire, p. 141. See also Hale, Famous Sea Fights, pp. 87-88.
28 Hale, Famous Sea Fights, p. 86.
30 Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 63.
31 Ibid.
32 Fernández Duro, Armada Española, II, 150.
33 Altolaguirre, Don Alvaro de Bazán, p. 64.
CHAPTER XIV

THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO AND AFTERMATH

The allied fleet left its sheltered anchorage at dawn on October 7, 1571, rowing hard against the wind. There were some stragglers as the vessels moved slowly down the Greek coast and the tall galleysees, which were especially affected by the strong headwind, again had to be towed by the galleys. As the ships of the vanguard passed between Oxia Island and Point Scropha of the mainland, the wide mouth of the Gulf of Corinth opened before them. The lookouts immediately sighted several sails on the horizon to eastward, then more; the alarm was sounded, and land-based spotters for the allies soon confirmed that it was indeed the Turkish fleet.\(^1\) Don Juan's flagship fired a cannon shot to signal the rest of the fleet that the enemy was in view and unfurled a white signal flag.

The Turks were moving toward them under full sail with a favorable wind. The possibility existed that they might fall upon the Christian fleet before all of the allied vessels could get to their stations in the line. These were anxious moments for Don Juan as he realized now how large the enemy fleet was and how far back were the rearguard and reserve units of his fleet. The morning sun shone full in the Christians' eyes; both wind and sun favored the Moslems.\(^2\)
The battle alarm was passed back along the line-ahead formation in which the allied fleet was traveling and the men prepared for battle. Don Juan embarked on a fast frigate, accompanied by Don Luis de Córdova and Juan de Soto, and darted about the fleet urging the captains to rush their galleys into position. He also encouraged them with words befitting a medieval king leading a crusade as he reminded them that they fought for God and the true faith and could thus be assured that the heavenly powers were on their side. Don Juan was concerned because Santa Cruz had not yet appeared and the galleasses were not in place. He shouted orders to the galleys towing the two galleasses assigned to his center division, urging them to hurry. Time and the wind were against them.3

Agustín Barberigo quickly maneuvered the left wing into position against the land, and since he had the shortest distance to travel was the first to be ready. He left some distance between his land-most galleys and the shore because he was not familiar with the coastal rocks and shoals and feared having some of his vessels grounded. His capitana was on the extreme left, and was the mark the others used to form the line for battle. The two galleasses in front of the left wing were commanded by the Venetians Ambrogio and Antonio Bragadino, kinsmen of the murdered commander of Pamagusta.

Gian Andrea Doria commanded the rearguard, which
would now form the sea-most division, or right wing, of the line, since that position would be well out from shore he had the farthest to travel. His rowers strained against the sea to move into position, towing two lumbering galleasses with them. Andrea Doria had to gauge the distance by sight so that there would be enough room for the center and left divisions to form a long line abreast between his galleys and the shore, also leaving approximately the space of four galley-widths between each division. He had no easy task, and it was complicated further by the fact that he was matched with the wiley Alugh Ali, most sea-wise of the enemy commanders.

Don Juan returned to the Real to see that all was in order there, then re-boarded his frigate and sailed up and down the line, aft of the galleys, encouraging the soldiers, and reminding the galley captains to stay in line. Returning once more to the Real he could see that there were some difficulties on both the right and left wings and sent Requesens in the frigate to straighten matters out. Santa Cruz was rounding up stragglers and investigating unidentified sails in the rear and still had not arrived in the assembly area, nor had Don Juan de Cardona arrived with his eight galleys, to Don Juan's great distress. He sent frigates to encourage them to take up their battle positions with all haste.4

Ali Pasha's fleet was drawn up in a crescent formation
with the horns pointing toward the enemy, but upon seeing the unexpected size of the allied fleet, and the Venetian galleasses in front of the line, he formed a line similar to that of the allies, with three divisions and a reserve. The Ottoman right wing was composed of fifty-four galleys and two galliots under the command of Mohammed Scirocco, governor of Alexandria. Ali Pasha commanded the center personally and it was the strongest division with eighty-seven galleys and eight galliots. The left wing, led by the experienced Algerian sea-dog, Alugh Ali, was composed of sixty-one galleys and thirty-two galliots. The reserve was less important in the Turkish manner of fighting and contained only eight galleys and two galliots, plus twenty small sailing craft. The Ottoman right wing was roughly the equivalent of the allied left which it would oppose, each numbering their war-craft in the fifties; however, the Ottoman center with ninety-five combat vessels and the left with ninety-three were considerably stronger than their allied counterparts.

The chief commanders of the allied fleet hurried to the Real to consult with Don Juan as to the course of action he would take. Some even tried to convince him not to fight but to call a council of war to talk it over. Don Juan replied firmly that the time for talking had passed, and the
time to fight was at hand. The matter was not to be discussed further.

On the opposite side a similar drama was being acted out. The Turks had been surprised to see the Christians so soon, thinking them to be some distance away. A ripple of enthusiasm passed through the Turkish fleet and a sense of excitement gripped Ali Pasha, for at first glance the reports that the allied fleet was inferior seemed to be borne out. Point Scrope masked parts of the Christian fleet from their sight, however, and the left wing and reserve had not yet come into view. They also failed at first to recognize the galleasses for what they were. The Ottoman ardor for battle cooled as the allied galleys continued to stream around the point and into position and the real strength of the Christian fleet became apparent. Ali's two most experienced combat commanders, Perpete and Alugh Ali, advised withdrawal behind the protection of their fortress guns. Ali Pasha rejected the idea out of hand, however, as cowardly and dishonorable. The young Pasha seemed dazzled by it all, and the impending clash of arms took on an irresistible attraction of its own.7

The Christians, meanwhile, worked feverishly to get all of their units into place for the coming onslaught, but despite the abundance of cannons and muskets the atmosphere was one of a medieval tournament. Arms and armor gleamed
in the sun and a multitude of standards and banners were in evidence. Don Juan knelt in prayer on the deck of the Real. All aboard the flagship did likewise, and the men of the entire fleet followed suit. The robed Dominican, Franciscan, Jesuit, and Capuchin monks who accompanied the fleet as chaplains granted absolution to the men and blessed the venture in the name of Jesus and his Blessed Mother. The east wind had died down earlier, obliging the Turks to furl their sails and advance more slowly with oars, thus buying precious time for the allies. It also meant that the slight west wind would now blow the cannon smoke into the face of the enemy. The Christians considered this a good omen and were greatly encouraged that God was on their side, as well they might be, for it was also the feast day of Saint Mark, patron of Venice.  

Don Juan de Cardona and Santa Cruz were at their respective stations now, much to the relief of Don Juan. Don Alvaro hastened to the Real in a small boat to wish Don Juan well in the battle, congratulate him for his will to fight, and to assure the young prince that this would surely be a glorious day for the Holy League. Don Alvaro appeared quite elegant in his gold-hued armor and richly plumed helmet; he smiled broadly, reflecting his optimism and confidence, and lifted Don Juan's spirits at a time when he most needed assurance. Don Juan gave Don Alvaro an abrazo and
expressed his deep gratitude for all that the Marqués had done. Santa Cruz then returned to his galleys where he challenged his men to make the Turks respect Spanish arms.

The two lines of galleys advanced slowly toward each other, with the exception of the allied right under Andrea Doria, and the Ottoman left under Alugh Ali, both of which continued to move obliquely toward the sea. Four of the galleasses were at their stations in front of the allied line, but the two attached to the right wing were trailing behind that division as it continued to withdraw from the rest of the fleet. Don Juan sent word to Andrea Doria warning the latter not to move out too far, but the Genoese feared that Alugh Ali planned to out-flank the allied right and he intended to see that the Algerian was not successful.

Don Juan ordered all sailing ships to withdraw from the battle area and out of harms way. The opposing fleets had sighted each other shortly after dawn, but it was almost noon before a shot of challenge was finally fired and answered; there are conflicting reports as to which flagship fired the challenge and which responded. The sound of trumpets and drums resounded from the Christian fleet, answered by blood-chilling screams and battle cries from the Turks.

The heavy cannons of the four advanced galleasses roared as the Turkish vessels moved within range, causing much confusion and consternation in the Ottoman ranks. Some
of the enemy galleys veered from their place in line to give
the floating fortresses a wide berth, while others hesitated
and back-watered with their oars; a few dared approach the
galleasses only to find that their sides were too high to
board easily from a galley, their hulls too thick to pene-
trate with light cannons, and the concentrated fire of can-
on, musket, and arquebus that rained down from them too
deadly to resist. The Turkish flagship Sultan was hit at
least once, and two enemy galleys were sunk. The main effect
of the galleasses, however, was to break the enemy line,
disorganize his formations, and sow confusion. The galleys
of both fleets began to fire with their bow cannons, but
with their line broken in four places many of the Ottoman
galleys masked the fire of the galleys behind them so that
the Turkish cannonade was much less effective than that of
the allies.

The battle of Lepanto actually developed as three
separate clashes, the first of which involved the allied left
under Barbarigo and the onrushing Ottoman right wing of
Sciroco. The Egyptian governor immediately sent a detach-
ment of light galleys through the shallow water between Bar-
barigo and the coast in an attempt to turn the Christian left
flank. Some of these galleys did get through and fall on
the allied left rear, but Barbarigo knew that if their
galleys could pass that close to shore his could too, and
he turned to cut them off, driving a number of Turkish
galleys onto the beach.\textsuperscript{11} The Christian line was completely
broken by this maneuver, however, and with all semblance of
order gone the opposing galleys fell upon each other with
wild abandon.

Santa Cruz saw the fight on the left turn into a
general melee and recognized Bregadino's danger at having to
fight the enemy on three sides. He immediately entered the
fray, aiding the Venetians where their plight seemed most
desperate and assuring that the flanking attempt of the
Turks was not successful.\textsuperscript{12} As the battle raged on the left,
the flagships of Barbarigo and Sciroco met head-on in classi-
cal ram-grapple-board tactics. Janissaries leaped onto the
deck of the Venetian galley, and Barbarigo was mortally
wounded by an arrow which struck him in the face.\textsuperscript{13} His
nephew took command and was killed minutes later. Troop
reinforcements from allied galleys managed to regain control
of the flagship, however, and after Spanish arquebuseers
raked the deck of Sciroco's flagship with deadly fire, Span-
ish and Venetian infantry boarded the Ottoman vessel and
captured it after a bloody struggle. Sciroco was killed in
the fight, thus both wing commanders lost their lives in
the conflict. With the aid of Santa Cruz' reserves the
allied gained the upper hand; and when the Alexandrian flag-
ship yielded, many Turkish galleys on the left broke and fled.
Some headed back toward Lepanto; others beached their galleys and escaped on foot.

Meanwhile, one of the most savage struggles in the annals of naval warfare was taking place in the center. Don Juan had ordered the rams of his galleys cut short and the covers on the fore part of the vessels removed to give his artillery free play. Two or three cannons were kept loaded and ready for the moment of ramming. At the moment of impact the cannons were fired at point-blank range, doing great damage and giving a momentary psychological advantage.

The two supreme commanders sought each other out, recognizing the opposing flagship by its banners and insignia. Both the Real of Don Juan and the Sultan of Ali Pasha were oversized galleys and both were manned by the best fighting men available. Here on the decks of these two titans the issue would be settled. The Spanish tercios and the Ottoman Janissaries would be pitted against each other by their young commanders. Winner take all.

Ali singled out the Real and the Sultan bore down upon it with great speed, ramming it with such force that the prow of the Sultan penetrated the forward section of the Real as far as the third rowers' bench. The heavy Spanish bow cannons thundered out at the Sultan as it approached, then the smaller man-killing cannons and arquebuses sprayed the decks of the adversary with shot causing tremendous losses
among the Janissaries. The fallen men were quickly replaced from Turkish galleys supporting their commander, however, and these galleys were commanded by some of the most outstanding leaders in the Ottoman fleet.

The royal galley of Don Juan was likewise surrounded by the vessels of Colonna, Veniero, Requesens, and the princes of Parma and Urbino. They too were locked in mortal combat with the leading Ottoman galleys as fighting in the center of the battle line degenerated into a general mêlée. Almost four hundred Spanish arquebusiers fired into the Sultan from the Real, and approximately three hundred musketeers and a hundred archers returned the fire, at point-blank range. The slaughter was great on both sides. The Spaniards decided the time had come to settle the matter with cold steel and rushed onto the deck of the Sultan. Though momentarily successful they were driven back by the Janissaries, and a second attempt to take the Turks by storm met the same fate owing to reserves put aboard the Sultan from supporting galleys.

The Turks then moved to the offensive and rushed aboard the Real. The situation grew critical for the allied cause, and Don Juan received a slight wound on the ankle. Colonna overcame his immediate adversary in the meantime and seeing Don Juan's peril he rammed the stern of the Sultan with his papal galley, then raked the rear deck area of the enemy with arquebus fire. The diversion succeeded. The