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SCHUBERT OGDEN ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

by

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In this dissertation I examine the proposals of Schubert Ogden in favor of the view that theology is an integral part of metaphysics. My construction of his system yields two arguments designed to demonstrate this view of the relationship between theology and philosophy. What is unique to Ogden's specific position is his use of an existentialist epistemology and anthropology derived from Heidegger and Bultmann as a basis for a process metaphysics influenced by Hartshorne and Whitehead.

Ogden's first argument involves the main components of his epistemology. I summarize it in the following propositions.

(a) A proper theology conforms to two criteria: it is adequate to its origination tradition and intelligible to contemporary secular man.
(b) The starting point of all thought is subjectivist, that is about the self.
(c) Theology is therefore possible only as existentialist analysis.
(d) Theology cannot use objectifying language, either in relation to the self or to God.
(e) There can therefore be no objective historical events that provide differentiating content for theology.
(f) Theology then falls within the scope of philosophy as a general analysis of existence.
Ogden's second argument is formulated within his metaphysics. I summarize it thus:

(a) Faith in meaning (e.g. in science, ethics, and religion) is unavoidable.
(b) Unavoidable faith implies a real God.
(c) An existentialist epistemology is compatible with a process metaphysics.
(d) A process metaphysics leads to a panentheistic view of God and the world.
(e) The panentheistic principle that God is the paramount example of metaphysical categories dictates that God is to be understood by analogy with the self.
(f) The world is then, by analogy, to be understood as God's body.
(g) It follows that every real world act and event are, in part, God's action.
(h) As with every self, some of God's actions are more characteristic than others.
(i) I can determine that those events and actions are characteristic of God to which I respond by realizing authentic human existence.
(j) By this criterion, the life of Jesus most fully represents God's character.
(k) Therefore, Christian theology, i.e., the understanding of existence based on Jesus' life, is also the right philosophical understanding of man and God in general.

I contend that both of these lines of argument fail. The first depends on an inconsistency within Ogden's system. Ogden appears to
affirm but also deny the concrete activity of God in history. Ogden's epistemology, particularly as it is applied to theological language in the project of demythologizing, explicitly forbids the use of objectifying language in reference to God. God is always subject, not object. Events characteristic of God are recognized only by a criterion of subjective response. Nevertheless, it is clear that Ogden's panentheism requires the general truth that all events are, in part, God's actions in history. Indeed, some events adequately represent God and are thus truly his. I show that there is a fundamental tension between the subjective base of his existentialist epistemology and the objective base of his process metaphysics.

I contend that Ogden's second argument fails to establish a workable criterion for the identity of theology and philosophy at any level. Most importantly, his metaphysics fails to derive from his epistemological base any justification for his use of analogy. Again the split between the existential epistemology and the process metaphysics invalidates Ogden's system.

I argue, in conclusion, that Ogden's attempts to prove that theology is an integral part of metaphysics miss the true issue. He does not confront the possibility of distinguishing theology from philosophy by the source of its content, but deals only with the issue of unique items of content.
PREFACE

Statement of purpose. - The purpose of this dissertation is to critically examine the relationship between philosophy and theology in the system of Schubert Ogden. Current discussion of this relationship has taken a new direction because of the influence of the recent revival of Whitehead by philosophers such as Wm. Christian, L. Ford, D. Griffin and others, and the specific application of his process philosophy to theological doctrines by D.D. Williams, C. Williamson, N. Pettenger and many more.

Schubert Ogden and John Cobb stand out as the most prominent\(^1\) of those dealing with the general application of process categories, the latter due to his concern for a systematic, Whiteheadian natural theology, and Ogden, especially since the late nineteen-sixties, because of his discussions of method and definition in philosophy and theology.

The primary catalyst and partial source in this revival, as in former ones, has continued to be Charles Hartshorne. Although I agree with Sessions\(^2\) and others that his philosophy developed in part independently of Whitehead, it is clear that they can be grouped together as "process" philosophers. But where Whitehead left most of the details of a philosophy of God undeveloped,
Hartshorne has spent virtually all of his philosophical career carefully working out a process doctrine of God in several major books and many articles.

Hartshorne's God-concept, and process metaphysics in general, have attracted many theologians since they seem to eliminate many of the difficulties of traditional, "classical" theism, in particular the problem of relatedness of man and God. Ogden is certainly to be numbered among these theologians and has written a number of essays on the doctrine of God, as well as on eschatology and Christology. As indicated, however, his primary concern has been to trace the boundaries of philosophy and theology, when both are conceived in process terms.

Why should process thought have brought about a new phase in the negotiation between Athens and Jerusalem? In brief, Ogden contends that the isolation of theology has been due to the inability of classical metaphysics to adequately account for an incursion of an absolute God into ordinary human history. With a "neo-classical" metaphysic based on event rather than substance categories, it is, according to Ogden, possible to relate general cosmology and history and thus to include theology as a specialization within metaphysics--and yet to identify distinct, particular theologies.
Whether or not Ogden does, in fact, make his case will be the subject of the pages that follow. Clearly, if he does, then we will have made a significant contribution to a new synthesis of theology and philosophy. It ought to be noted, in conclusion, that I am not concerned with the truth of process thought per se, but only with the coherence of Ogden's specific proposal concerning theology and philosophy.


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I. THE BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY OF OGDEN'S POSITION

A. The Precise Problem
B. The Context of Discussion
C. An Historical Outline of Ogden's Works
That there are still unsolved problems in the philosophy of religion is more than an overstatement. They hardly need listing. One of them, however, has plagued us since the very beginning of ancient philosophy: that of the specific relationship between philosophy and theology.

The problem has been aggravated by many factors, not the least of which has been the persistent lack of unanimity concerning the definitions of both disciplines.

A survey of the options shows at least the following broad categories of solutions.

Reductionist views: Such views deal with the problem by considering the language-game of one discipline as another, howbeit inferior, anachronistic, or mythological way of saying what the other discipline says accurately, purely or directly. Fritz Buri's "dekerygmatization" of theology in favor of (Jasper's) existentialism and Hegel's demythologizing in favor of pure conceptual philosophy would be cases in point. Braithwaite and Kant¹ are examples of a reduction of theological to ethical language. The reduction may occur, of course, in either direction.

Eliminationist views: In these positions either philosophy or theology is entirely eliminated in favor of the other. Occasionally, eliminating one discipline has
the effect of also substantially reducing the scope of
the other, as, for example, in logical positivism. Some
extreme versions of Calvinist theologians are elimina-

tionist in favor of revelational theology.

Subordinationist views: In such views one discipline
is regarded as logically subservient to the other, but
nevertheless as a proper enterprise in its own right.
Thomas' view of philosophy as preparation and clarification
of theology is subordinationist in one direction. Though
less explicit the subordination also can occur in the other
direction in such views as Toulmin's where theology serves
to introduce and clarify philosophical problems.

Coordinationist views: Here, both philosophy and
theology are considered as separate but equal disciplines.
This coordination of disciplines can be conceived in many
different ways, in some cases as the results of two entirely
distinct ways of knowing.

Containment views: Views in this category conceive
of theology or philosophy as a part or segment of the
other. The set of propositions of one are really a subset
of the propositions of the other.

What is unique about the last category is that it is
really the only one in which philosophy and theology are
not regarded as competitive in any sense. In addition it
avoids all of the difficulties of having two distinct
modes of knowing, which are frequently present in subor-
dinationist or coordinationist views.

The purpose of this dissertation is to present sys-
tematically the arguments of one recent version of a
containment view: that of Schubert Ogden. For Ogden,
theology is to be understood as a specification within
philosophy, with the same subject matter and epistemo-
logy. This position deserves careful presentation simply
for its uniqueness among contemporary models. It is
important that three limitations on the discussion be
noted from the outset. First, though a great deal will
be said about the general content of Ogden's system, that
is not the central topic. My interest is only in the
structure of that system and the specific topic of the
relation of theology and philosophy.

Second, I am limiting my scope to a particular tradi-
tion of discussion, namely that of Christian theology.
Cobb, Hartshorne and other process thinkers have occasion-
ally discussed non-christian traditions, but Ogden has
not.

Third, I shall evaluate only Ogden's position. Natur-
ally, other related positions will be touched on, and the
concluding chapter will of necessity contain my own present
evaluation of the issues.
The historical problem. - It remains in this section to isolate and more clearly identify the specific issue on which Ogden's position can be brought to bear. Thus far I have simply spoken of the problem of the status and value of philosophy and theology in relation to each other. I must now be more specific.

Historically, attempts to justify the possibility of theology, or the separate status of theology and philosophy, have almost invariably been based on the question of their respective sources. In other words, they have generally tried to establish a unique source for theology, in some way clearly distinguishable from human reason, observation, speculation, analysis, or whatever else one might hold to be the source of philosophy. Ordinarily this unique source is referred to as "revelation", or its response, "faith", depending on whether one is more interested in the divine or the human aspect, the objective or the subjective. Where revelation is seen as illusory or purely human and less reliable than reason--superstition, for example--theology is eliminated. Some examples of the distinction in sources will be helpful here.

Thomas Aquinas wrote:

...It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides the philosophical sciences investigated by human reason....
Sciences are diversified according to the diverse nature of their knowable objects.... There is no reason why those things which are treated by the philosophical sciences, so far as they can be known by the light of natural reason, may not also be treated by another science so far as they are known by the light of divine revelation. Hence the theology included in sacred doctrine differs in genus from that theology which is part of philosophy.

Second, John Locke:

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call revelation.

Locke, in other places, continues this line of reasoning to say that revelation is the unique source of theology.

Third, we ought to note Søren Kierkegaard. Although he is otherwise known as the father of the subjective, existentialist approach to direct knowledge of God, it is also true that he rejected the negative evaluation of Scripture and attempted to base true religion on revelation. Note the following from Philosophical Fragments in the context of a discussion of contemporaneity with Christ:

If we wish to express the relation subsisting between the contemporary and his successor in the briefest possible compass, but without sacrificing accuracy to brevity, we may say: The
successor believed by means of (he expresses the occasional) the testimony of the contemporary, in virtue of the condition he himself receives from God.4

What is unique, then, about theology as derived from revelation, as seen by most traditional positions, is its ultimately divine source. In some, God's "revelation" is interpreted as being extraordinary human insights for which God is responsible only in whatever sense he may be held to be the originator of any and all events. A case in point would be Friedrich Schleiermacher.

Within the extremely complex epistemology of Schleiermacher's Dialectic every experience is made up of varying proportions of "feeling" of dependence and of freedom. The limiting case at one end of the spectrum is the common experience or feeling of absolute dependence. Its "otherness" demands the reality of its object. Although it is at the very boundary of experience, it is still capable of being investigated. Thus, in Schleiermacher's epistemology, religious knowledge still has a uniquely identifiable, though natural source. While it is undoubtedly true that other factors might be suggested as distinguishing characteristics between disciplines, Ogden recognizes that that of source is central and historically most frequent. I turn then to the development of Ogden's view.

Ogden and the present situation.—Let me briefly, and without any substantive demonstration, trace what I take to
be the development of thought that has led to a strange reversal of position; that is, whereas at one time theology was queen and one could at least reasonably question whether philosophy was of any ultimate value, today philosophy, at least in some of its roles, is thoroughly entrenched and it is theology that often appears as meaningless or anachronistic.5

There are many reasons why theologians in the early nineteenth century began to give up their confidence in Christian revelation, that is, in a unique and supernatural source. Kant and Lessing, the Enlightenment worship of reason, the development of the natural sciences, theories of "higher criticism", along with many others, have all been assigned the blame. In any case, the rise of "liberal" theology was essentially a turn from objective propositional revelation to internal universal revelation. Religion sought its source in feeling and personal religious experience.

It may have appeared, for a time, that neo-orthodoxy heralded a return to Scripture as an ultimate source, but the "dialectical" character of Barth's theology in the end left only the possibility of an "encounter" revelation. Witness, for example, the following from John Baillie, one of Barth's disciples:
The Bible does indeed speak of saving knowledge, but this is no mere knowledge that, and no mere knowledge about: it is a knowledge of. It is what our epistemologists call knowledge by acquaintance as distinct from merely conceptual knowledge. God does not give us information by communication. He gives us Himself in communion.

It was, however, the influence of Rudolf Bultmann in Europe and Paul Tillich in America that shaped to a great extent our present situation. The application of existentialist categories to revelation produced a theory of internal and individual revelation, that is, theology as an analysis of human faith, not needing any outside revelatory source.

Thus, what was once considered the objective revelation of God's truth to all men has now become, in Bultmann, the records of human mythologies: misguided attempts to objectify divine reality. Faith appears primarily on the level of subjective individual experience. In this situation what could be more suitable in providing a rational, universal, and objective framework than philosophy? And so, if theology was once queen of the sciences, philosophy has now become king.

Ogden, I shall indicate, is of extreme importance in developing this latest position for theology. More explicitly than most of his contemporaries, he has brought philosophical categories into theological thinking. And yet he maintains that theology has retained its identity contained with philosophy. How he accomplishes this, and whether or not
he is truly successful, is the topic of this dissertation.

Let me then summarize the issue. If one can identify and justify some objective, divine revelation as unique source of knowledge of God, then theology is clearly distinguishable as a theoretic discipline with an appropriate hermeneutical method. Philosophy, then, is distinguished from it as simply human wisdom. Their contents may well overlap; they will still be separate disciplines, and require different methods: one interpretative, the other speculative. Ogden, however, gives strong reasons to think that such unique revelation neither is nor could, be available, thus eliminating what would appear to be the most viable criterion for distinguishing the disciplines.
B. The Context of Discussion

Introduction. - In the remainder of this chapter I shall be concerned with the sequential development of Ogden's thought. In this section the topic is the background of his position, the influences and mentors to which he has paid attention and whose concepts he put to use in his own system. In the concluding section of the chapter I shall briefly outline the chronology of Ogden's development of an understanding of what theology and philosophy are, focusing on his books and major articles.

It is oversimplified but reasonably accurate to characterize Ogden's position as a confluence of two trends in contemporary philosophical theology. John MacQuarrie has argued that there have been two major opposing lines of thought stretching from the nineteenth into the twentieth century: that of Hegel, Marx and Bloch and that of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Bultmann. It is the latter tradition in which Ogden clearly stands; it has provided him with a method and with basic goals. Much of the content, however, has been derived from a school of thought indigenous to our own century, beginning with A.N. Whitehead and C. Hartshorne, which has usually been labelled as "process", coalesce in Ogden to form a unique contribution to the problem of relating philosophy and theology.
Format. - A discussion of the influences on Ogden might easily get out of hand. It would involve a rather lengthy and careful investigation of Heidegger, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Toulmin and other philosophers, Barth, Bultmann, MacQuarrie, Buri and numerous other theologians.

Such a discussion is beyond my scope here. I shall confine myself to brief discussions of Ogden's most important acknowledged sources. In doing so, I shall view each through Ogden's own eyes, with his estimation of what is central to each position and, of course, of what has been adaptable to his own pattern of thought. I shall not be concerned in this chapter to fit these various strains of thought into any systematic order, but will discuss them in historical sequence, by tradition. Later chapters will demonstrate their systematic fit.

1. The Existentialist Tradition in Theology
   a. Barth and Liberalism: Bultmann's Theological Roots

Ogden has frequently agreed with Karl Barth that the paramount problem facing theology throughout the entire modern period is that of "finding the 'right' conceptuality for this situation." In part quoting Barth, Ogden has said that, Theology cannot consist merely "in ascertaining and communicating results already obtained in some classical period," but must consist rather "in a reflection that is constantly renewed" and therefore must "be undertaken again and again in complete seriousness and above."
Liberalism in the nineteenth century was just such an attempt to do theology while accepting the anti-supernaturalism and critical outlook of its day.\textsuperscript{10} It attempted a purely natural theology.

During the nineteen-thirties came the rejection of liberalism—as well as of orthodoxy, its great foe—associated with Karl Barth and first publicized by his commentary on Romans. His earlier writings are marked by their dialectical thesis which divides the provinces of science and revelation by affirming the "totally other" nature of God, the "infinite qualitative difference" between the natural world of time and space and the eternal being of God.

In his later works, however, Barth turned to a truly "neo-orthodox" position as indicated by his return to a strong emphasis on biblical authority and a denial of the apologetic enterprise.\textsuperscript{11} It is this situation, due in part to the Nazi development of "German Christianity"\textsuperscript{12}, that led to Barth's strong opposition to any form of natural theology, that is, to any attempt to mix the results of philosophical speculation with Christian revelation.\textsuperscript{13}

While Ogden does not specifically acknowledge any dependence on Barth, apart from his conception of the general obligation of theology, it will become quite clear as the discussion progresses in following chapters, that his philosophy of history and the presuppositions that help formulate
his doctrine of God are clearly dialectical in character. God's actions are not ordinary history.

It is in opposition to the later Barth--but in agreement with his earlier purely dialectical position--that Rudolf Bultmann developed his theology, using the categories of Heideggerian existentialism. We turn to Heidegger as the first major influence on Ogden.

b. Heidegger: Bultmann's Philosophical Roots

Ogden views Heidegger primarily through Bultmann's eyes, so that direct links are not always evident. However, as Bultmann's chief philosophical source, he is crucial for an understanding of Ogden.

Ogden does agree with Bultmann's assessment of Heidegger, namely that *Being and Time* provides the most adequate conceptual system for understanding the message of the Christian tradition as embodied in the New Testament, although indirectly. That is, he accepts Bultmann's conceptualizations and acknowledges Bultmann's dependence on Heidegger. The closest one can find is the following:

Indeed, we must insist that what Bultmann himself means by "existential interpretation" can be properly carried out only when Heidegger's analysis of human existence is viewed in the perspective of the general ontology it seems to imply and in which divine existence also is appropriately analyzed and conceptualized.14
This same claim, that the best categories for conceptualizing the New Testament are those of Being and Time supplemented by its theological corollary, the process theism of Hartshorne, is the thesis of numerous essays, especially "Bultmann's Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar Theism" (1964). Ogden, however, seems generally content to read Heidegger through Bultmann.

In the following, I shall identify, with little exposition, three well-known aspects of Heidegger's thought which, however indirectly, are of particular significance to Ogden's system.

**Self as primary category.** - In Heidegger, philosophy is the formal ontological analysis of the meaning of Being, Sein, as such. It is directed primarily toward the self since human Being has a unique ontic status. It is this orientation away from the world of objects toward the Being of selfhood that led Heidegger to reject substance as the primary category in favor of self as the primal ground of the world.  

**Self not objectifiable.** - Heidegger distinguishes between the "existentialist" (existenzial) understanding that is the proper business of philosophy and the "existential" (existenziell) understanding that is uniquely the concern of each existing person.  

It is only the essential structure, or the formal rather than material or concrete existence of man that is subject
to analysis. The self, since it is not an object, can never be captured by objectifying conceptualizations or language but is only ever the subject of experience.

God not objectifiable. - The final result of Heidegger's conception of philosophy's task and limitations that is crucial for both Bultmann and Ogden is that, analogously to the self, God also could never be the "abstract object of conceptual thinking, but only a concrete subject of existential encounter." 18

It is true that Heidegger does seem to allow for the possibility of an existenzial understanding of God as the subject of encounter but this project is never carried out. All that Ogden can find is a footnote in Being and Time:

It requires no extensive discussion to show that the traditional concept of eternity, in the sense of the 'stationary now' (nunc stans), is drawn from the vulgar understanding of time and is limited by an orientation to the idea of 'constant' presence-on-hand. If the eternity of God would admit of being 'construed' philosophically, then it could be understood only as a more primal and 'infinite' temporality. Whether the via negationis et eminentiae could offer a possible way to this goal would remain uncertain. 19

Bultmann's position also lacks a developed decline of God based on existenzial understanding. The possibility is, however, open and Ogden will use it.

These basic principles of Heidegger are adopted by Bultmann to whom we must now turn as a major influence on Ogden. We will find their indirect influence quite clearly
in later discussions of Ogden's definition of philosophy and of the analogical approach to knowledge of God.

c. Rudolf Bultmann

There is no doubt but that Ogden considers Bultmann to be his most important initial partner in dialogue.

Writing in 1962, he said:

Thus one can say that the deeper the reason for Bultmann's present theological importance is that he is the contemporary theologian par excellence. In a way that distinguishes him from almost all his contemporaries, he has profoundly involved himself in the present historical situation of Protestant Christianity in the West and has endeavored to work out a new theological synthesis within the limits and the opportunities of that situation.20

Later in the same essay, Ogden makes it clear that Bultmann's most important contribution in general, and most profound influence on himself, is in two areas: first, that of clarifying the present situation which theology must confront, and second, developing a specific methodology to be used in this confrontation.

This acknowledgement has been one of the constants in Ogden's writing. The theme of his first published essay, "Bultmann's Project of Demythologization and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy" (1957), as well as the recent "On Revelation" (1975), and of numerous essays in between, has been the same: although we must reject the specific content of Bultmann's Christocentric theology, his analysis of contemporary man's existential situation, and his argument
for the method of demythologization—the elimination of myth—and existential reinterpretation—interpretation in terms of man's potential—must be accepted. Two further quotes will help to make the point.

There is the need to find an appropriate way of thinking and speaking which can also be genuinely understood by men whose possibilities for understanding are limited by their acceptance of the scientific picture of the world. I do believe that it is Bultmann, more than anyone else, who has laid down the lines along which the achievement of this part of our task has to be sought.

And in reference to the specific methodology of such a solution Ogden writes:

The first principle of such a solution is that the demand for demythologization that arises with necessity from the situation of modern man must be accepted without condition. That the assumption of this principle is not gratuitous, but fully warranted, seems to us to have been demonstrated by Bultmann and to require little additional confirmation.

There is little need for me to discuss Bultmann's contributions to Ogden's methodology here; they will detain us at length in the following chapter. There is, however, one particular area of content which forms an important part of Ogden's system, although he nowhere treats it at any length: namely, the doctrines of man and soteriology. It is precisely on these topics that Bultmann himself is heavily indebted to Heidegger, although primarily for terminology and basic conceptualizations, and less for content.
Says Ogden:

For what has been provided, Bultmann believes, especially by the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger, is nothing less than a comprehensive phenomenology of man's personal and interpersonal life and a scientific terminology.... Therefore, the interpreter has available to him a precise conceptuality in which the fundamental intention of the New Testament to speak to existence may be realized....

It will be extremely important to be aware of Ogden's acceptance of Bultmannian-Heideggerian views of man and the nature of his need. This dissertation will be concerned only with faith as an intellectual function and thus not touch on the existential doctrine of salvation in any detail. The later is, however, an important aspect of faith, and therefore a helpful basis for the discussion in the following chapters as to the nature of existence.

Surprisingly, Ogden is curiously vague about salvation and is content to simply state his acceptance of the Bultmannian doctrine. Even in Christ without Myth one looks in vain for any serious treatment. What one does find is a statement of Heidegger's position and of Bultmann's restatement of it. It appears to be taken for granted that this view is shared by Ogden. In fact at one point, having summarized authentic existence as living "in radical dependence on God's grace, and so in freedom from the past and openness to the future," Ogden adds:
That these remarks say nothing different from what can easily be found in the New Testament may be so obvious that our making them seems unnecessary.28

What precisely is this "obvious" view? It is based on Bultmann's understanding29 of "existence" as such which Ogden sees as having three characteristics. First, existence is a being-in-relation-to-itself. What a man is, is not given, but is established by free decisions.30 Man is concerned with his existence, not indifferent as are animals. Second, existence is individual. Ogden summarizes Bultmann's position as follows:

Only in the act of existing itself can the existentiell question be answered. Only the individual man in his own unique existence can decide who he is to be.31

Finally, existence is both act and understanding. To quote Ogden: "To exist and to have an understanding of oneself in relation to others and the world are one and the same thing."32 This does not necessarily mean that our self-understanding is conscious, but only that it always moves us.33

To summarize Ogden's position based on Bultmann:

For man to "exist", in the technical sense that Bultmann presposes, means he is being who must continually face and answer the question of what it is to be a man. It means, in a word, that he is a moral or religious being, one who has always to deal with the problem of what he ought to be. What he is to be is never already determined, but, rather, is something he himself is required to decide freely and responsibly by his existentiell understanding of himself in his world.34
What is important in this view is that man has, in reality, only two directions in which he can determine his existence: he can exist either authentically or inauthentically. Authentic existence Bultmann regards as precisely what the New Testament means by faith. We can, therefore, ask for the characteristics of the life of faith.

Ogden's presentation of Bultmann in *Christ without Myth* suggests the following. Faith is, first of all, the location of ultimacy in the future, understood as God's grace, rather than in the objective and visible. This is Bultmann's rewording of the New Testament distinction between life in the "flesh" and life in the "Spirit." Faith is "the confidence that the unknown and unmanageable transcendent confronts man as a holy love which gives him his future and so releases him from his past." 35

But secondly, faith is true freedom. It is, as mentioned above, freedom from the world and the past, but it is also freedom from the dominion of self, and "for a life of self-giving in faith and love." 37 Thus Bultmann reinterprets the concept of sin and forgiveness.

Bultmann, however, holds that this freeing from self has become a possibility-in-fact only as a result of God's act in the Christ occurrence. As we shall see, it is at this point that Ogden parts company with Bultmann. For the latter, God has acted where man was completely powerless.
Salvation is part of human potential, but not actually possible without God's decisive act. For Ogden such a view is contradictory, unbiblical, and unnecessary. Much more will have to be said on this later.

As I have said, Ogden himself is not concerned to spell out this Bultmannian version of salvation, but he clearly assumes it as the completion of his view of the intellectual aspect of faith. We shall see that the existentialist tradition strongly molds Ogden's epistemology. But thus far I have wanted to show that Ogden is clearly a part of this tradition by assuming two of its central tenets. First, we shall find that Ogden's system depends on a concept of God that makes any use of observational, or "objectifying", language in reference to him impossible. This is, of course, a notion shared by much of contemporary theology. God is not to be understood as simply an object among objects. Certainly Tillich's insistence that God is not subject to the categories of existence but is rather the very ground of existence has been of great influence. Despite many differences, Tillich agrees with the line of thought from Heidegger to Bultmann, and finally to Ogden on the point of methodology. That is, that philosophical analysis begins with self-analysis, as opposed for instance to Barth, that this method always involves consciousness
of subject and never object, and that this analysis leads to a ground of being (though Heidegger would not equate this with the Christian God). Though Ogden will find this basis insufficient and supplement it with Whiteheadian concepts (a transition similar to Reinhold Neibuhr's), it is nevertheless an essential assumption.

The second influence of the existentialist tradition on Ogden, as we have seen, is its view of faith as a gaining of a new "way of seeing". It is not the solution to personal sin against the holiness of God, but the overcoming of ignorance related to one's own possibilities. It is the discovery of meaning which makes one's life authentic.

We shall see both of these factors worked out in Ogden's system in following chapters. I must now turn to the second major line of influence on Ogden's thinking: that of Whitehead, Hartshorne, and other contemporary process thinkers.

2. The Process Tradition in Philosophy
a. Alfred North Whitehead

There is no doubt but that in more recent years Ogden's principal goal has been the utilization of Whiteheadian and Hartshornian concepts in formulating a general theology as well as in working out various problems in the relationship of theology to philosophy. It is difficult to specify particulars in Whitehead's metaphysics which have influenced
Ogden. Ogden attributes his doctrine of God to process categories in general. I shall discuss this in chapter four. There is, however, one area of Ogden's thought which demonstrates clearly his acceptance of the whole scheme of Whitehead's metaphysics. Since Ogden nowhere acknowledges the details of this dependence it will be simpler in this case to outline Ogden's doctrine of eschatology and then indicate its source. Following that I shall discuss the influence of Whitehead's epistemology.

Two of Ogden's essays have been devoted specifically to eschatology: "The Promise of Faith" (1966)\(^ {38} \) and "The Meaning of Christian Hope" (1975)\(^ {39} \).

Ogden begins by claiming it to be necessary that we avoid two pitfalls in interpreting the concept of resurrection. The first, into which he claims many disciples of Bultmann to have fallen, is that of reducing the meaning of resurrection to a purely existential level, that is, as equivalent to finding true or real life or going from inauthentic to authentic life.\(^ {40} \) Although this grasps the motive of ultimacy in the New Testament it does not exhaust the concept. On the other hand one could fall into the trap of incomplete demythologization by regarding the resurrection of Christ as an actual historic event separate from the crucifixion.\(^ {41} \) What then is the meaning of the resurrection
as a symbol of our resurrection? It is summarized in the following:

Because God's love of others is literally boundless, whatever comes to be is fully embraced by his life, where it is retained forever without any loss of vividness. Such value as it has, whether positive or negative, becomes an integral part of his own divine life, and thus is in the strict sense immortal or of everlasting significance. For God... everything always counts for exactly what it is and never ceases to make just its own unique difference.  

It is true that the above quotation and, in fact, the whole of "The Meaning of Christian Hope" makes no reference at all to Whitehead or his explication of "perpetual perishing" and eternal objectivity as potential. However, parallel passages in other essays do make reference to him, and it is evident from Ogden's acknowledgements that, it is Process and Reality from which he has taken much of the metaphysical outline of his system.

The epistemological principle in Ogden's system which is explicitly Whiteheadian, and which I shall mention here without much comment, since it will detain us in the next chapter, is the "reformed subjectivist principle." As Ogden expresses it:

"The primary object of philosophical reflection is my own existence as an experiencing self and... philosophy's only proper task and method is integral reflective self-understanding."
Ogden seems to view Whitehead's epistemology as his most significant contribution, primarily because of his consistent application of this principle. It must lead, Ogden thinks, to a much broader form of empiricism than that of both traditional and contemporary sensationalists.

Of such an open experientialism Ogden remarks:

I wish...to point to the one philosophy where I find such an empiricism most fully elaborated - namely, Whitehead's. ...His contribution to theological reflection may well lie less in the conceptuality provided by his imposing metaphysical system than in the understanding of experience of which that system is but the explication.46

As mentioned above, we shall examine the "reformed subjectivist principle" and its function in Ogden's system, in the next chapter.

b. Charles Hartshorne

Hartshorne has been such a major catalyst for Ogden that it is impossible to assess his influence within the scope of a few brief pages. In particular, his concept of analogy, his neo-classical theism, and his definition of metaphysics will have to be considered at length below in their relations to Ogden's views. Therefore, rather than mention any matters of content in this section I will simply summarize Ogden's own statements as to the extent of Hartshorne's influence.

Ogden's acquaintance with Hartshorne is first-hand:
Ogden was a student of his at the University of Chicago Divinity School during Hartshorne's final teaching years at that institution. After his return there, this time as University Professor, Ogden's opening remarks in a seminar on "Christian Faith and Process Philosophy" in 1969 were printed by Criterion, the Divinity School's journal:

Through the work especially of those who have been called "philosophers of process," there has at last emerged the possibility of a radically new philosophical outlook, which, while comprehensive in scope, is in some respects as different from the traditional system of metaphysics as from the non-metaphysical philosophies that have so widely displaced them. One way of describing this new possibility is to speak with Charles Hartshorne of "neo-classical metaphysics."

In any case, the purpose of the present inquiry, as of all my current endeavor, is to prove this conviction by actually trying to answer the question in terms of this new resource. 47

The question to which he here refers is specifically that of the relation between theology and philosophy.

In relation specifically to the concept of God's nature, Ogden remarked in a 1963 essay that his views were primarily the result of Hartshorne's influence and added:

I can claim no originality for this conception but frankly acknowledge my dependence on Hartshorne, whose writings fully develop the kind of position I am concerned to present. 48

Finally, in relation to the question of the choice of the "right philosophy", that is, the appropriate metaphysical system for theology, Ogden has said the following concerning
both Hartshorne and Whitehead in an essay that first appeared in 1963 and was included in his 1966 collection.

But if an integral metaphysics in some form is a theological necessity...then, I ask, what metaphysics has more claim on one's attention as a Protestant theologian today than that represented by Whitehead and Hartshorne?...I am prepared to argue, therefore, that if any contemporary philosophy can be regarded historically as a "secularized" Protestant theology it is far less likely to be the philosophy of Heidegger or existentialism generally than the philosophy of process in its most mature and fully developed forms.49

This, then, is the second major line of influence on Ogden's thought. While Heidegger and Bultmann have played major roles for Ogden in defining philosophical method and, with that, a view of God as ground of being rather than a being, much of the central content of Ogden's metaphysics has come out of his dialogue with process philosophers and theologians. We shall see these influences worked out in detail as we examine Ogden's system, beginning in chapter two. The two most prominent aspects of process philosophy which have attracted Ogden are, first, the negation of a "substance" metaphysic in favor of an "event" metaphysic, and, second, the subjectivist starting point for epistemology. The former Ogden holds to be parallel to the existentialist denial of an objectifying treatment of the self and God, the latter to what he sees as the existentialist insistence on self-analysis as the starting point for all thought.
3. Concluding Remarks

It is clear that Ogden's position has been influenced by a number of varied sources. I have mentioned those which I, and Ogden himself, feel are most important. One of the strengths of Ogden's thought is just this factor, that it has grown, not in isolation, but along with its unique creativity within a broad context of contemporary philosophy and theology.

Nothing has been said in this section concerning Ogden and analytic philosophy. It, too, has been an influence as can be seen in the development of his position on the relation of empirical science and religion in "Falsification and Belief" (1974), intended in part as a response to A. MacKinnon's book of the same title,50 and the interaction with the non-cognitivism of R. Hare, R. Braithwaite, and P. Van Buren in "Theology and Objectivity."51 He has also written a lengthy essay in response to A. Flew's God and Philosophy as part of an exchange of reviews and discussion in the Journal of Religion.52

Most important in this regard is his use of some of S. Toulmin's theses in the argument for God's existence in "The Reality of God" (1966)53 and elsewhere, but I shall examine that in chapter III.

Having said all of this, it is necessary to indicate two facts which, though not central, will be shown by this
dissertation. The first is that Ogden is not a haphazard syncretist. Though he has drawn much from his contemporaries it has been carefully shaped and remolded into a systematic view. But I hope to show, secondly, that much of Ogden's mature position is unique, original, and worthy of consideration by theologians as well as philosophers. In particular it is his working out of the relationship of theology and philosophy that distinguishes his system and I shall choose to view the total construct from just that prospective.
C. An Historical Outline of Ogden's Works

Introduction. - The remainder of this dissertation will be largely systematic in nature. However, it is clearly the case that Ogden's position has developed over a period of time, and with a succession of partners in dialogue. Thus it is appropriate to provide first an overview of the chronology of Ogden's works in order to better understand the logic of the system. Let me emphasize that my concern in this chapter is to identify certain central themes as they appear in Ogden's essays, not to develop systematically any position.


During the years between the writing of Ogden's dissertation and its publication in 1961, as well as several articles published in 1962, his concern is with Rudolf Bultmann.

A number of themes are touched on. "Bultmann's Project of Demythologizing and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy" (1957) is largely a restatement of the central contention of his dissertation: that Bultmann's system contains a basic contradiction between the demand for the universality of the possibility of authentication and the uniqueness and necessity of the revelation of God in Christ. His "The Debate on Demythologizing" (1959) attacks the same question concerning
the consistency of Bultmann's proposal, although the argument here is historical rather than internal, attempting to show a basic instability in any dialectical theology which wants to clearly separate faith and history, and yet maintain that the central event in redemption is an event in history.54

"The Significance of Rudolf Bultmann" (1962) is primarily concerned with showing the consistency of Bultmann's definition of myth, while "Bultmann and the 'New Quest'" (1962) and "Wie neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem historischen Jesus?" argue that his position on the availability of biographical material on the historical Christ has not changed over the years.

While these early essays quickly established Ogden as one of the foremost commentators on Bultmann, as did his edition and translating of the latter's Existence and Faith (1960)55, what was to become Ogden's central problem already shows through: the problem of the relation between philosophy and theology. In fact, his first two published essays make significant statements which reappear in later writings. "The Concern of the Theologian" (1958) contains the following definition of theology:

The task of theology is that of the adequate conceptual statement in a given historical situation of the existential understanding of God, the world, and man, which is given in and with faith in the kerygma or proclamation of the Christian church.56
The Bultmannian influence is quite strong in this statement—it will be supplemented in later essays—as is evident from three key words. Theology is, first of all adequate, in the sense that there is a tradition of witness to which each new statement must in some sense conform and thus essentially be always a restatement. Secondly, however, theological statements involve a conceptual scheme which channels them and limits their possibilities of understanding. This is philosophy's foot-in-the door.

Now we have set the stage for tension in Ogden's theory of philosophy and theology, namely that between an intransigent content core and the necessities of historically shifting philosophical concepts and languages. The third key word, existential, indicates another tension. While theology is, virtually by definition, talk about God, it always arises out of, and is directed toward, the individual's own situation in life.

These emphases appear in the above-mentioned 1957 essay on Bultmann as well. Although the constructive proposals at the conclusion of the essay are brief—less than two pages—Ogden states his program quite clearly.

The only alternative, then, which is really open to contemporary theology is to abandon completely the attempt to distinguish itself in any final way from philosophy.
As long as the understanding of theology hinges on a particular historical event, as it does for Bultmann, then the "right" philosophy can only parallel or generalize it. Since, however, Ogden insists on the complete existentialization of theology's meaning, its differentia specifica disappears and with it the tensions between disciplines. They quickly reappear, however, as internal tensions as indicated in the above definition.

It may be simplistic, but it is not mistaken to understand Ogden's subsequent writing as a working out of the program of the 1957 essay, and, in effect, of his dissertation. We must, however, make brief mention of one other early essay before turning to the published version of Christ without Myth, namely "The Lordship of Jesus Christ: The Meaning of Our Affirmation" (1960).

This is an important essay in that it provides a crucial piece of the constructive puzzle only briefly indicated in Christ without Myth. It is here that Ogden provides an explanation of how the special revelation of the Christ-event can be understood as significant and decisive without falling into the Bultmannian incoherence of regarding it as unique and necessary.

Commenting on a statement of Paul, Ogden summarizes:

Still, in his view, the reality signified by the words "God our Father," is, in the last analysis, one and the same with the reality designated as
our Lord Jesus Christ" - or, better expressed, what it means to have God as our Father is existentially the same as having Jesus Christ as our Lord. To affirm Christ's lordship is to say that it is in his life that God gives a "final revelation" of the truth that has always confronted man concerning the authentic fulfillment that was always open to him. It is to say, not that he was God, but that his human word had, and has, divine authority on our ultimate allegiance. "Lordship," then, does not indicate uniqueness, but the authority of Christ's message. Ogden here uses the term "re-presents" to signify Christ's function; a word that will frequently reappear in other essays.

This argument is significant in that, while it, in fact, employs totally Bultmannian categories, it is nevertheless open to a "process" interpretation as well, and Ogden will later give it just that.

2. Christ without Myth: 1961

Christ without Myth, a revision of Ogden's dissertation, was published in 1961. It finally provided an extended treatment in print of Ogden's thesis on Bultmann's inconsistency which had previously been argued in brief versions in lectures and essays. Most of the major themes of the book, relating to the nature of philosophy and theology, will be discussed extensively in the following chapters. Within
this section, therefore, I shall limit the discussion to a summary of the line of argument.

Ogden begins by stating the criteria that face the theologian who attempts positive construction. We find the definition similar to that in "The Concern of the Theologian" although the notion of adequacy is here more carefully explained.

Any one who would attempt to pursue the theologian's vocation in the present situation is faced with a specific constructive task. He must by all means do his work in obedience to the New Testament proclamation and with a critical loyalty to the entire theological tradition; and yet he can do this responsibly only by also embracing the criticism of that tradition which arises with necessity out of modern man's picture of himself and his world.62

The remainder of the book, except for brief constructive remarks in conclusion, is an attempt to measure Bultmann to these as well as the general standards of logic, i.e. internal consistency.63

In chapter II, Ogden presents Bultmann's theology as an attempt to do three things. It is, first of all, necessary to eliminate from the Christian message the mythology of the New Testament. Myth, for Bultmann, is any attempt to translate the truth about the ultimate and non-empirical into objective, worldly terms. It is, of course, true that the particular world-view that forms the backdrop to the New Testament is hopelessly outdated, unscientific, and
unintelligible to modern man, but these are not its most serious faults. The root problem is its objectifying tendency, and it is thus necessary to "demythologize" the New Testament.

Secondly, however, there is a positive side to Bultmann Ogden argues. Bultmann wants to interpret the myth existentially, that is, to put it into language and concepts understandable to modern man, but without objectifying it. It is here that Heideggerian categories are seen as helpful. This process is justified because it is the intention of myth to require such interpretation. 64

Whether a work be literary, philosophical, or religious, it basically intends to express some understanding of the meaning of human existences. 65

For faith requires to be freed from every world-picture sketched by objectifying thinking, whether it be that of myth or that of science. The conflict between science and myth indicates that faith has not yet found its really adequate form of expression.... The criticism of the Bible's mythological world-picture and of the church's traditional proclamation arising from the modern picture of the world performs the great service for faith of calling it back to a radical reflection on its own true nature. 66

Bultmann's third objective is to carry out both demythologization and existential interpretation while preserving the message of the New Testament, especially its kerygmatic character. 67

It is Bultmann's adherence to this third standard that allows him to distinguish between theology and philosophy.
by insisting on the historical reality of the Christ-
occurrence.

The New Testament asserts that without the saving
act of God, the human situation is one of utter
despair. For philosophy, on the other hand, man's
situation neither is nor can be as desperate as
theology is wont to portray it.

The reason for this difference is that although
theology and philosophy both recognize that man can
only become what in some sense he already is, they
make very different judgments whether man as he
actually exists already stands in his essential
nature.68

The New Testament's unique message is the doctrine
of the fall of man's inability to free himself, and of
Jesus' death to save him! What philosophy knows as a
possibility--man's salvation--only the New Testament can
realize.69

Now, however, we can see what Ogden refers to as "the
structural inconsistency of Bultmann's solution."70 He
summarizes it by claiming that Bultmann holds the following
two tenets:

(1) Christian faith is to be interpreted exhaustively
and without remainder as man's original possibility
of authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence
as this is more or less adequately clarified and
conceptualized by an appropriate philosophical
analysis. (2) Christian faith is actually realizable,
or is a "possibility in fact," only because of the
particular historical (historisch)event Jesus of
Nazareth, which is the originative event of the church
and its distinctive word and sacraments.71

These two elements of Bultmann's theology can be reduced,
Ogden holds, to an explicit logical self-contradiction since
the first affirms, while the second denies, that Christian existence is open and possible to man as such.⁷²

There are only two alternatives to Bultmann; that represented by the right (e.g. Barth, "Conservatives") which rejects the need or possibility of demythologization, and that of the left (e.g. Buri) which carries out a total demythologization.⁷³ The former is quickly rejected as an attempt to hide from modern man's picture of himself and his world⁷⁴ and any attempt to avoid the latter involves either a contradiction such as Bultmann's or some form of special pleading as in John MacQuarrie's position.⁷⁵

We are left then with a position that essentially maintains Bultmann's first tenet⁷⁶ but rejects the second in favor of one that, while admitting the decisive manifestation of God's love in the Christ-event, nevertheless holds that "Christian faith is always a 'possibility in fact' because of the unconditioned gift and demand of God's love."⁷⁷

Ogden provided only the briefest sketch of problems that will need to be dealt with in order to work out such a position. One such problem is that we will need to go beyond Bultmann and develop a theology, i.e. an adequate means of speaking of God. Ogden indicates without elaboration that Hartshorne's doctrine of analogy provides the answer.⁷⁸
A further problem is that of adequately expressing the Christ-event as decisive but not necessary. An answer is given in a discussion that goes beyond that of the 1960 essay but is still sketchy. Ogden attempts to argue that Christ's revelation is objective and is an indication of what is always possible for man as authentic existence, but the philosophical justification for the view is lacking. A full solution awaits the adoption of process categories in later essays.


Having worked through Bultmann's position, the years following Christ without Myth provided the first attempts to decisively engage Hartshorne in dialogue in order to supplement his anthropology and christology with an adequate theology proper. This is an area in which Ogden finds Bultmann, despite his doctrine of analogy, rather deficient. These attempts are collected in his The Reality of God and other Essays, the title essay of which is something of a programatic essay: it has even the flavor of a manifesto.

Its importance for an understanding of Ogden's development lies in the fact that it brings together the basic themes of his writings in the mid- and late sixties. There is, first of all, the integration of Hartshornian and Whiteheadian motives and concepts into Ogden's thought.
It is interesting that in a brief note on contemporary resources in theology, "Systematic Theology" (1959), Ogden speaks of Reinhold Niebuhr, Tillich, and particularly Bultmann. Hartshorne is mentioned only in a footnote, even then in a parenthesis:

In the broad...sense in which I am using the term here, "existentialist philosophy" would comprise considerably more than it is ordinarily understood to include (e.g., the "process" or "actualist" philosophy of thinkers like A.N. Whitehead and, among philosophical theologians, Charles Hartshorne).80

In essays in 1961,81 1962,82 and 196383 he is briefly mentioned without elaboration, but the first serious use of his concepts by Ogden is in "What Sense Does It Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?" (1963). It is here that he notes Bultmann's reluctance to speak directly of God and the fragmentary nature of his doctrine of analogy,84 but then goes on to remark how easily Hartshorne's proposals can be fitted into or alongside of existentialist anthropology.85 In Hartshorne, God is to be conceived "in strict analogy to the human self,"86 or as Whitehead expresses it, he is to be understood not as the exception but as the chief exemplification of metaphysical principles.87 The remainder of this essay is an attempt to elaborate on the Hartshornian analogy, important because it provides a backdrop for solving the problem of God's revelatory action in Christ.88
The problem of Hartshorne's compatibility with Heideggerian-Bultmannian thought is faced head-on in "Bultmann's Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar Theism" (1964). The main point of the argument, which I shall examine closely in the next chapter, is Ogden's thesis that Heidegger's existentiell and existential is exactly parallel to Hartshorne's concrete and abstract poles. The great value of Hartshorne's analysis, however, is that it has been applied to God as well as man.

"Theology and Philosophy: A New Phase in the Discussion" (1964) is primarily a review of Hartshorne's The Logic of Perfection. It is Ogden's first use of the ontological argument to show the impossibility of unbelief, a theme that is developed at length in the argument of "The Reality of God," and in dialogue with Sartre in "The Strange Witness of Unbelief" (1966). The negative thesis, that atheism is attributable to the classical version of theism, is argued in "The Christian Proclamation of God to Men of the So-Called 'Atheistic Age'" (1966).

A second theme of these essays that reaches a high point in "The Reality of God" is Ogden's conceptualization of the doctrine of God. The above-mentioned essays of 1963 and 1964 express Ogden's dissatisfaction with Bultmann on this point and his use of process concepts, particularly his dipolar nature and his analogy with the human self. Throughout the
sixties, Ogden continued to develop his doctrine of God. "Beyond Supernaturalism" (1963) is ostensibly a reaction to J.A.T. Robinson's *Honest to God* but winds up as a dialogue between Tillich and Hartshorne on the possibility of God's real relation to the world.

In "The Temporality of God" (1964) Ogden comments on a footnote in *Being and Time* which briefly refers to God and attempts to show that if Heidegger had in fact developed a doctrine of God it would have paralleled the process conception.

Aside from "The Reality of God", Ogden's major essay on this topic is "Love Unbounded: The Doctrine of God" (1966) and the revision "Toward a New Theism" (1971). This is primarily an attempt to show that proper theological themes, as elaborated for instance by John Wesley, are not only expressible but in fact are better expressed in the language of process metaphysics than in that of its classical and traditional counterpart.

"How Does God Function in Human Life" (1967) picks up the recurring theme of God's relation to his creation, particularly man. Ogden's point here is to show how process metaphysics provides a clear conception of this relation that allows life to have true meaning.
The third theme of Ogden's work during 1963-69 is one that has been prevalent throughout his publishing years, namely questions concerning the nature and definition of theology and philosophy.

"The Understanding of Theology in Ott and Bultmann" (1963) is an attempt to evaluate the potential of using "the later Heidegger" for theological concepts, in particular the relationship between "primal thinking" and faith. Perhaps the most important discussion for our purposes here is Ogden's contention that, with Ott, theology and philosophy are to be identified, nevertheless, with Bultmann, they differ in their intentions. Theology's purpose is to "facilitate existential encounter," philosophy's is to communicate information.92

Although it is quite brief, "The Possibility and Task of Philosophical Theology" (1965) is extremely important in understanding Ogden's position. This article appeared in the Union Seminary Quarterly Review93 along with Bultmann's "On the Question of a Philosophical Theology" and Hartshorne's "Abstract and Concrete Approaches to Deity." Here, and in an extended treatment, "Theology and Objectivity" (1965), Ogden deals with the question of God and epistemology: in what sense is it proper and possible to speak of knowing God, particularly given the view that God is not an object among objects capable of scientific examination. This immediately
rules out any view of theology as directly verifiable, even in an eschatological sense. 94

Particularly in "The Possibility and Task of Philosophical Theology" Ogden develops his original position that consistent demythologization requires the identity of philosophy and theology. Now, however, the content of such a philosophical theology can be specified as a process neo-classical metaphysics, just as Heideggerian existentialism made possible a philosophical anthropology. Thus, after the long night of neo-orthodoxy we can again speak of "natural theology" understood simply as the analysis of man's experience and expression of the God he encounters as the ground of all encounters. 95

It remains, however, to specify an appropriate means of knowing God. As will be developed in the next chapter, Ogden holds that theology is a case of existentialist analysis, a way of knowing that lies on the continuum between purely objective external perception and existential self-awareness and has something of the qualities of both. The statements of metaphysics are logically of the same class but can be distinguished by their greater generality. 96

This position is extended in two directions in "Present Prospects for Empirical Theology" (1969). First, Ogden argues that such a revised empirical theology, that is, based on existentialist rather than objectifying knowledge, is in
But most important, for present purposes at least, Ogden finds this view of metaphysics to be identical with Whitehead's epistemology, particularly his concept of perception in the mode of causal efficacy. A similar approach is used against A. Flew in "God and Philosophy: A Discussion with Antony Flew" (1968).

Thus Ogden has developed during these years a specific epistemology for theology and metaphysics, expressible in both existentialist as well as Whiteheadian terminology, that sees both types of statements as being of the same logical type, although there are some hints of hesitation at simply identifying the two.

Mention must be made of two shorter essays before turning to "The Reality of God." "Theology and Metaphysics" (1968) explicitly states a theme of numerous other essays that is crucial to our understanding of Ogden's solution to the philosophy-theology problem. That is, traditional answers to the problem have proved fruitless precisely because of the type of philosophy one was attempting to relate to theology, i.e. one based on classical metaphysics, especially the Aristotelian-Thomistic variety. What makes a solution possible is not an ingenious new argument but the advent of a neo-classical metaphysics.
Finally, "The Challenge to Protestant Thought" repeats this theme. ("My conviction... is that the characteristic positions of Thomistic metaphysics have been shown to be sufficiently problematic that they can no longer serve either as an adequate philosophy or as an appropriate conceptuality for interpreting the Christian faith"101). Ogden adds, however, that the impact of transcendental Thomism has been positive for contemporary Protestantism by reviving an understanding of the need for metaphysics in an adequate theology.

As intimated, the importance of "The Reality of God" is to have brought together these three major themes of Ogden's thought into a careful argument for a new theism. It would obviously be superfluous at this point to outline the argument of the essay as a whole. I want only to mention the crucial argument for God's existence which is, at least in elaborated form, unique to this essay and which has provoked most of the response to it.102 Various interpretations have been offered, but I think that it is best understood as a version of the teleological argument.103 In essence, Ogden argues for the necessity of a ground of meaning from the existence of meaning in human affairs, that is, he sees faith as unavoidable at its basic level. From this, Ogden argues, follows that atheism is ultimately not only impossible, but actually non-existent.
This argument is of particular interest to the question of the relation between philosophy and theology, since it is precisely the analysis of this "faith" that forms the content of both. An examination of it will thus form the bulk of chapter three.

I have, in one context or another, already discussed the other essays which make up the book, The Reality of God, with the exception of one, "Myth and Truth" (1965). Not surprisingly, this is Ogden’s discussion of the sense in which myth can be true. The answer is already familiar: myth is an objectifying account of that which can be expressed properly only in existentialist analysis, namely the content of faith. Thus it is true only as translated and then in the sense that all theological and metaphysical statements may be said to be true.104


Ogden has continued his prolific writing in this decade; every year except 1973 he has published a major essay, three in 1975. What is significant is that, with only a few exceptions, his writing has focused on the definition of theology and its relation to metaphysics, particularly epistemological questions concerning the source and the truth of theological statements.

The first major statement of these years105 is "The Task of Philosophical Theology" (1971). This is Ogden's
explicit attempt to define philosophy and theology in relation to each other. He does so by means of increasing specialization so that the definitions are "concentric." The broadest concept is that of faith as the unjustifiable ground of all rational knowledge. The "fully reflective understanding"\textsuperscript{106} of faith is philosophy. The central task of philosophy is metaphysics, which has, in turn, philosophical theology as its most important specialty. Finally, Christian theology is the reflective understanding of a specific conceptualization of faith:

Just as philosophy is the fully reflective understanding of our common faith simply as selves, so Christian theology, say, is the attempt to become fully self-conscious about specifically Christian faith.\textsuperscript{107}

1972 saw the publication of "What is Theology?"\textsuperscript{108} In many ways this is simply an extension of the aforementioned essay. Ogden here amplifies, by stating and elaborating on twelve theses, the meaning of theology, specifically Christian theology. These theses deal with its source, its criteria of adequacy, its component disciplines and their unity, its purpose, and its possibility of truth. But all of these are based on the understanding of theology as the analysis of faith.

"On Revelation" (1975) continued this series of definitional essays, bringing up to date Ogden's earliest theses regarding the universality--and the reality--of the possibility of authentic faith which played such a central role in the
critique of Bultmann. What is crucial to the topic of this dissertation is that Ogden argues here more fully than anywhere else that although the Christian revelation is necessary to Christianity, it is not necessary to authentic human existence.

I am convinced that none of the rationalizations of Christian revelation as necessary even to the possibility of man's authenticity can continue to be maintained - and that, not because they all fail to meet certain criteria of meaning and truth but because...they do not pass the primary test of agreeing with the scriptural witness.109

That is, the only knowledge necessary to authentic existence, even according to Scripture, is that original revelation of God to all men everywhere.

The next link in this chain of definitional essays is "The Authority of Scripture for Theology" (1976). Ogden argues here for a number of theses concerning the nature and extent of theological authority, but particularly concerning the location of that authority in the apostolic witness itself. Most important, this authority is solely in terms of "determining the appropriateness of theological assertions"110 and not in relation to questions of the truth and meaning of such statements.111

Ogden's most recent essay, his presidential address to the American Academy of Religion, is entitled, "Theology and Religious Studies: Their Difference and the Difference It Makes."112 There is little new to be found here, although it is helpful in summarizing Ogden's major themes.
In addition to these strictly definitional essays, Ogden has also devoted some effort toward clarifying epistemological issues. Both the lengthy "Falsification and Belief" (1974) and the very brief "The Criterion of Metaphysical Truth and the Senses of 'Metaphysics'" (1975) are devoted to the topic of truth-criteria for metaphysical, including theological, statements. In the former, Ogden's primary concern is to argue for the distinction between strict empirical and existential verification. This is used as a solution to the conflict between science and religion.

Though brief, the latter article contains important definitions. The criterion of truth is stated as follows:

I submit that it is the criterion of unavoidable belief or necessary application through experience. Those statements are true metaphysically which I could not avoid believing to be true... statements which would necessarily apply through any of my experiences...

In "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle" (1971), Ogden accepts and comments on Whitehead's "reformed subjectivist principle." In particular he argues that much of modern philosophy has become problematic just because, from Descartes on, it has accepted the priority of the subjective and yet has often derived its philosophical principles and categories from another direction. This, of course, is precisely Whitehead's criticism--and Lonergan's also. Ogden then proceeds to "doubt Lonergan's account" at two points.
First, he continues to distinguish "sense" and "intellect:"

The reason this distinction leads to misunderstanding is the point of view from which it derives - namely, one which starts from understanding to understand experience instead of starting from experience to understand understanding.\textsuperscript{117}

Second, he fails to carry out his view of an isomorphism between epistemology and metaphysics--with which Ogden agrees--by using a category of "unrestricted understanding" to arrive at an infinite transcendent God.\textsuperscript{118}

Recent years have also seen a number of significant essays on specific doctrinal issues, two of which in particular touch on themes relevant to our topic. "The Point of Christology" (1975)\textsuperscript{119} gathers together some familiar theses related to the position of Christ for Christian theology and general philosophy. The material is not essentially new but this is, nevertheless, a valuable article in terms of systematizing Ogden's views.

I have already, in discussing the influence of Whitehead, referred to the argument of "The Meaning of Christian Hope" (1975). It is of interest both as an actual example of doctrine building by use of a demythologizing hermeneutic and also for the structure of metaphysical principles, in particular those relating to God, that form its basis.

My purpose in this section, as I stated, was to provide an historical overview of the development of Ogden's work.
This will allow the reader to place the thematic materials in following chapters in their chronological setting, as well as to see the major themes of Ogden's discussions.

We are now in a position to consider the actual content of Ogden's program of working out the relationship between philosophy and theology.

Chapter II will look at the basis of Ogden's system: its presuppositions and starting points, and particularly his analysis of the history of theology which defines the problem. This will bring us to the core of the chapter, Ogden's epistemology, and its implications for the identity of theology within philosophy.

Chapter III will show how Ogden's concept of faith is derived from his epistemology, and how it, in turn, leads to definitions of theology and philosophy. This will set the stage for the second argument.

Chapter IV will be concerned with the core content of theology-philosophy as an example of Ogden's principle that metaphysics must be derived from epistemological analysis. This metaphysical analysis will be used to construct a second argument for the containment of theology in philosophy.
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

A. The Presupposition and Criteria of a Valid Theology
B. An Experiential Epistemology
C. The Project of Demythologization
A. The Presupposition and Criteria of a Valid Theology

1. The Failures of Recent Theologies

Introduction. - There are undoubtedly many ways in which to interpret Ogden's system, depending on one's view of Ogden's own primary intention as well as the use which one wants to make of it. Some have seen it as an intricate combination of existentialism and process thought, some as an attempt to show the necessary reality of God, still others as an existential theology merely augmented by a process God. I shall not argue that these are not possible interpretations. My own goal, however, as stated before, is to say something about the relationship between theology and philosophy. To do this, I shall have to say something about Ogden's use of existential and process themes but only as an aside. I am also aware that I am constructing Ogden's system in a rather unique way in order to allow it to make a point that is undoubtedly not its primary intention. One cannot find either of the two arguments of this dissertation explicitly in any of Ogden's essays. In fact, he has said relatively little directly on the subject at all. Nevertheless, the view which I shall present in this dissertation is clearly implied.

In this chapter I want to show that Ogden's epistemology can be construed as an argument for the identity, pure and
simple, of Theology and Philosophy. The exposition of his
metaphysics in following chapters will modify that thesis
into what I termed a countainment view. My argument here
follows this pattern. a) Presupposing a version of the
"subjectivist principle" leads Ogden to a broadly experen-
tial epistemology. b) This epistemology, due to its exist-
tentialist flavoring, brings Ogden to an extreme view of
the demythologization and existential interpretation of
theological statements. c) This position, in turn, removes
for Ogden any uniqueness of content and source that theology
might claim for itself, which merges it into philosophy.

Ordinarily one of the most difficult decisions to be
made in expounding a system is the choice of a starting
point. Fortunately, Ogden makes two points which settle
the question. The first is his elaboration of a version
of Whitehead's "reformed subjectivist principle." Although
Ogden did not accept the principle explicitly, or by that
name, until 1966, it is implicitly presupposed by his
epistemology all along. Its function in Ogden's system,
contrary to Whitehead's, is to establish the precedence
of epistemology over metaphysics.

The second aid in finding a beginning is the consistent
application of his two criteria of adequacy and intel-
ligibility to theology in all of his essays, from the earli-
est to the most recent.
Together, we thus have a basic presupposition as well as criteria for the construction of any interpretation of Ogden. I shall elaborate on these in the next sections and then develop the first argument for the identity of theology and philosophy in the remainder of the chapter.

It is not always easy to ascertain just why a given thinker begins where he does. Ogden himself never provides any careful rationale for his foundations, although he clearly identifies them. I shall discuss the origins of the "subjectivist principle" in the next section. In this section I want to show that Ogden's criteria for a proper theology are in fact highly determinate for the resulting system. As far as their origin, however, my thesis is that they are best understood as the result of Ogden's perception of the recent history of theology. We shall see that his interpretation of that history indicates to him that theology must be both adequate to the Christian tradition as well as intelligible to the "man on the street." This may sound innocent enough. Both concepts, however, are given unique and narrow definitions which, I shall argue, are the antecedents of Ogden's existentialist epistemology.

The history of modern theology and culture is, for Ogden, a repeating alternation of periods of theological
thought-lag or reaction, and attempts to modernize and become relevant to cultural patterns. That is, there seems to be a tendency to work "too long" on a specific formulation. Thus, by the time theologians have perfected it, it has long since become unintelligible to the culture which originally generated it. It is also possible for conservative reaction to set in, particularly when the attempts at modernization are radical.

For Ogden it is seventeenth and eighteenth century theology that marks the first period of thought-lag. By the early part of the nineteen hundreds the Enlightenment had "decisively challenged" this orthodoxy.¹

It was "liberalism," following the lead of Schleiermacher, that undertook a complete revaluation of theology, according to Ogden. The concern of this movement was two-fold. First, it attempted to avoid the criticism of Lessing, and others, that the defense of Christian theology rested too heavily on unique historical events. Secondly, it had a revisionary purpose, namely to state Christian faith in terms intelligible to a society whose orientation was increasingly formed by the physical sciences, particularly in the latter half of the century.

Ogden concludes, however, that liberalism in general must be judged a "splendid failure,"² but a failure never-
neathless. The reason is that it went too far in its reformulation of Christian faith in that it compromised some of the essential claims of Christian truth, particularly in the areas of Christology and revelation.

In this instance a reaction against the attempts at reapprochement with culture set in. It began with Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr and came to be known as "neo-orthodoxy." Ogden sees its aim as primarily twofold: First, it "led to a fresh sense for authentic witness of Holy Scripture and of the Reformers." That is, it sought to replace the liberal emphasis on Gefühl (Schleiermacher) or Erlebnis (Herrmann) with the orthodox insistence on Scripture as the criterion for essentiality.

Secondly, however, Barth and his followers were reacting against the liberal obsession with relevancy and the intelligibility of the Christian proclamation to the unbeliever. Theology was now viewed as totally segregated from the sphere of secular culture. The sphere of the divine is the "wholly other."

Ogden summarizes the result as follows:

The new movement definitely succeeded in breaking the hold of liberal theology. But this it did, at least in some of its representatives, less by providing a more adequate solution to the problem with which the liberals had struggled than by exposing the inadequacy of their achievements and disregarding the seriousness of the problem itself. The result
was that, while some of the distinctive claims of 
Christian faith were rediscovered and reasserted, 
the question of the meaning and truth of these 
claims for men living in the modern secular world 
was for the most part not even clearly posed, much 
less effectively answered.  

Since the second World War, intelligibility to contem­
porary culture has appeared in the form of what Ogden inter­
changeably refers to as "neo-liberal" or "postliberal" 
theology as expressed by Bonhoeffer, Tillich, and Bultmann. 
This movement is once more concerned with the apologetic 
task, but still wary of compromising distinctive Christian 
traditions. At least on the surface, then, Ogden sees it 
as characterized by the positive aspects of both liberalism 
and neo-orthodoxy. On the one hand, Bultmann, especially, 
is concerned that theology be conceptualized in patterns 
intelligible to modern man and compatible with contemporary 
science. Yet there is also a concern among post-liberals 
that theology be truly Christian by maintaining essential 
distinctives, although each theologian's list may differ. 

My point in rehearsing Ogden's perception of recent 
theological history is that it demonstrates quite clearly 
his view of what makes a theology successful. The criteria 
are twofold: theology must be intelligible, and it must 
be adequate to its tradition. 

These two criteria are found implicitly in most of 
Ogden's definitions of theology, as, for example, the 
following:
The task of theology is that of the adequate conceptual statement in a given historical situation of the existential understanding of God, the world, and man, which is given in and with faith in the kerygma or proclamation of the Christian church.

One can also find explicit statements of criteria, such as this:

For what constitutes a given theology as adequate... is: (1) the extent to which, in its particular historical situation, it states the authentic Christian understanding of existence consistently and without essential distortion...; and (2) the extent to which the conceptuality that it actually employs for this purpose is genuinely understandable to those to whom it is here and now called to speak.

In the following section I shall discuss these criteria in detail, showing, in particular, their function in eliminating certain types of theologies. We must also note that they operate within Ogden's system as presuppositions. They are not justified or argued for in any direct way, but form the guidelines upon which the house is fashioned.

2. Criterion 1: Intelligibility

We have seen that Ogden's interpretation of the historical development of theology indicates the necessity for the general intelligibility of theological assertions to contemporary man.

However, two developments in modern philosophy, which have filtered through to the general culture, have seemed, at least to many, to present serious difficulties for statements about God in particular. The first was the formulation
of scientific method and the growing anthropocentrism and increasing naturalism of the last two centuries. This Ogden summarizes under the term "secularity." The second is the emergence of a "secularistic" mentality as a result of logical positivism and atheistic existentialism. Let us look at Ogden's analysis of each in detail.

Secularity leads to a war with theology wherever it intrudes into the physical realm. The dogmatic assertions or scripture of Church are no longer taken as authoritative, but subjected to the relentless and unsympathetic examination of scientists and often found to be without basis.

The result for theology has been a distinction between literal truth and myth, Geschichte and Historie, or sense perception and intuition. Thus the need to demythologize the assertions of traditional Christianity became apparent, and Bultmann's program is the result.

The current opposition to demythologization among conservatives is hopeless. Says Ogden:

The scientific world picture is here to stay and will assert its rights against any theology, however imposing, that conflicts with it. So far as his knowledge of the world is concerned, modern man long ago opted for the method of science and therewith decided irrevocably for secularity.

Ogden is quite willing to agree with this step in thought. In fact, it has become one of the main pillars and most repeated observations of his argument. He insists that
his development in thought shows the need to demythologize or even scrap many traditional doctrines and even classical metaphysics itself as the basis of traditional orthodoxy. We will enumerate these problem areas below.

a) Creation

A number of traditional beliefs of Christianity regarding creation seem simply untenable to contemporary man. A recent date for creation (Ogden refers to Wesley who thought that it was in 4404 B.C.), fixed species, and an at least partial denial of evolution are examples of such doctrines.9

The concept of creation as a specific historical event is also repugnant to science. God can be seen as the "ever-present primordial ground"10 or nature, but not as its past originator. Although the concept of historical creation has often been thought to be the necessary inference of a scriptural doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, "as Thomas Aquinas made clear, the conventional interpretation has no warrant in the idea of creation as such."11

b) Miracles

Ogden thinks that the biblical miracles can better be explained in one of two ways. Many of them were perfectly natural occurrences. Others are "the products of faith, instead of extraordinary happenings that somehow produced faith."12

There is, however, some hesitation regarding Christ's resurrection. Ogden notes that most theologians, himself
included, would consider it essential to Christian faith.

Accounts of miracles, in conclusion, simply lack the backing of scientific and historical evidence and can only be accepted by scientific minds with separate scientific and religious compartments.

c) Eschatology

Nineteen hundred years of unfulfilled expectations, together with our present knowledge of nature and history, have utterly discredited any notion of a near end of the world such as Wesley could still entertain...  

Thus Ogden is certain that Christian eschatology, in its traditional, literal, historical form, cannot be accepted, and this for two reasons. First, contemporary theologians tend to feel that "it is simply not given to us - to any of us - to speak with authority about issues that transcend our qualifications to speak."  

Secondly, eschatological symbols have lost any clear meaning to modern scientific man. He just cannot understand, says Ogden, what could be meant by Christ returning to earth on the clouds, or even heaven, hell and a last judgment.  

d) God and Metaphysics

Traditional theism has described God, Ogden claims, in terms borrowed from Plato and Aristotle. The conception is one of total absoluteness implying "timeless, changeless and unrelated being." For Ogden, this basis leads to a number of insoluble antinomies which must ultimately dis"
is the commitment of secular man to the dictum of "logical self-consistency as one of the necessary conditions for the truth of any assertion." Ogden enumerates three such antinomies as follows:

(i) Creation: The antinomy here involves the contingency of created beings and the necessity of God's nature. We can briefly state it thus:

"God creates the world freely, as the contingent or nonnecessary world our experience discloses it to be."

However: "...God's act of creation is one with his own eternal essence, which is in every respect necessary...."

The first of these propositions finds its basis, as stated, in experience, but also in the actual account of creation in scripture. The latter proposition is the necessary conclusion of classical metaphysics. Together we arrive at the "hopeless contradiction of a wholly necessary creation of a wholly contingent world."

(ii) Service: Here the antinomy involves man's activity "for" God and God's static perfection:

"...The end of man is to serve or glorify God through obedience to his will and commandments."

However: God, as actus purus, is a "statically complete perfection" and it is impossible that he be increased or diminished by anything.
Ogden sees the first proposition as the traditional doctrine of the Church, while the second again derives necessarily from classical metaphysics. In summary, it is inconceivable that God could in any way be affected by the service he commands.

(iii) Relationship: It is this antinomy that is mentioned most often by Ogden (and Hartshorne). It actually includes antinomies (i) and (ii) but is stated somewhat differently:

God is all-knowing and the cause of all things. However: "God is in no way genuinely related to the ordinary beings beyond himself," for that would involve dependence and God is immutable.

Put in general terms, we can say that classical metaphysics necessitates a God who is void of real connections, possessing only an external relation to the world. All of God's classical attributes signify this divine isolationism, e.g. pure actuality, immutability, impassivity, aseity, immateriality, etc. Aquinas may have been the theologian who gave this metaphysics its final form but Ogden feels that it has been part and parcel of Christian thinking since Philo of Alexandria attempted to identify the God of Israel with that of Greek philosophy. The early church Fathers followed his lead without recognizing his lack of success.
The problem is perpetuated by a faulty interpretation of scripture, forcing it into a Greek procrustean bed. Traditional theism simply eliminates scriptural myths rather than interpret them. It understands predications such as "know," "love," etc. not in an analogical sense, but instead takes them to mean the opposite of their function in ordinary language. Thus it can maintain a monopolar Absolute, unrelated, in a real sense, to our world.

The result is a strict dichotomy between the present world of time and change, and the divine timeless and unrelated being. God is the wholly other.

On the basis of these antinomies Ogden concludes that the supernaturalism of traditional theism is "in principle an inconsistent and self-stultifying position." It is, therefore, unintelligible to "secular" man.

We can see, then, how Ogden's criterion of intelligibility operates in eliminating certain traditional theological positions. This, however, creates a problem to which Ogden provides no answer. It is one thing to demand that theology be restated in contemporary language. Few would think that objectionable. But Ogden's treatment of "classical" theology demonstrates that he is after more. The criterion not only restates but eliminates certain doctrines. It is not that modern man has no linguistic devices for handling angels, resurrections, or eschatological events. The
difficulty is that he cannot believe them. Thus Ogden's criterion becomes a criterion of truth, and not just language.

Why, then, does Ogden accept such a criterion? Why should he think that contemporary methodological and epistemological biases are the correct or most fruitful ones? I have no doubt that there are good answers -- and bad ones -- to that question, but curiously enough Ogden does not provide one. We must, therefore, leave open the question of justifying Ogden's first criterion, apart from his interpretation of the demands of history.

There is another question which must be asked of Ogden here to which I know no answer. That is the question of how one determines just what actually is intelligible to contemporary man. The best one can say, from Ogden's examples, is that unintelligibility becomes apparent when there is significant social disinterest or desertion of once important views.

3. Criterion II: Adequacy

Ogden thinks that the meaninglessness of theological assertions to many men is due to a second development stemming from David Hume and logical positivism: extreme secularism. It is this trend which has attacked the very core of theology, thus making the issue of God's reality - conceptualized by any metaphysics - a problem.
This position, for which Ogden tends to use the terms positivism and secularism interchangeably, goes beyond the mere use of scientific method as a means of gaining knowledge of the physical world. It affirms, rather, that sensory knowledge is the sole source available. Since the assertions of theology, particularly those involving "God" seem to be unverifiable, they are discarded as meaningless.

Although positivism is not a general characteristic of our culture, it has, nevertheless, spread beyond professional philosophers and come to include many intellectuals. Some theologians, e.g. Paul van Buren, have attempted to escape this further attack by constructing a theology without God.

Ogden responds:

However absurd talking about God might be, it could never be so obviously absurd as talking of Christian faith without God. If theology is possible today only on secularistic terms, the more candid way to say this is to admit that theology is not possible today at all.3

Thus, for Ogden God is seen as the necessary center of Christian faith. We shall have occasion to amplify this point later. It is simply nonsense to speak of a God-is-dead theology. By definition, Christian faith is faith in God. If Christianity is to be viable at all, we must be able to speak of God. This is not to say that Christian faith is necessarily true, but that, if it is, God cannot be excluded.
Van Buren's capitulation to positivism, however, is held to be not only invalid, it is also unnecessary. Ogden considers the bases of secularity to be sound, but not those of secularism. His argument is the familiar one which can be summarized by asking how the verification principle itself is to be verified. It is apparently neither empirical nor tautological and must therefore on its own grounds be meaningless. 33

What is noteworthy about Ogden's rejection of secularism in general, and the verification principle in particular, is that it results from more than just the self-stultifying character of the latter. There is, in addition, the operation of the second criterion: the doctrine of God must be held on to because it is part of a validating tradition. But now we must be more precise. Just what defines this theological tradition which in turn provides a criterion for doctrine? We find the answer if we turn to Ogden's statements regarding Scripture.

Nothing can be validated as "Christian" unless it can be shown to be congruent with the re-presentation of God in Jesus Christ as attested by the Holy Scripture and, less directly, by the special tradition of the Christian Church. 34

While it is clear from the above quote that Ogden allows Scripture to be the determinate factor in deciding what is authentically Christian, it is, of course, not the criterion of theological truth in general. For Ogden this is due, in
part, to the general point that even established authority can never, by itself, be a sufficient method of determining truth.35

The question remains as to what authority Scripture possesses in defining Christian faith. The answer is quite simple, for Ogden. Scripture has a *de jure* authority, but this explicitly presupposes some rule or delegation of authority. This source is ultimately the authority of Christ as revealer, and thus it is the *event* of Christ itself that alone carries final authority.36

It is, therefore, not the New Testament *per se* that is authoritative for Christian theology but the direct apostolic witness to Christ that lies behind it.

By its very nature, Christian faith is apostolic faith - faith with the apostles in the Jesus to whom they uniquely are the witnesses and who is himself personally present as the Christ in their witness of faith.37

A valid Christian theology, then, is carefully defined as adequate to a particular source. As I develop the argument in following chapters, it will become clear why this criterion, though stated in specifically Christian terms, nevertheless has general importance. As indicated, Ogden argues for the identity of theology and philosophy, but he also holds that Christian theology, given a particular philosophical framework, is the correct understanding of existence. Thus what he originally states as a criterion of adequacy to the
Christian tradition ends up functioning as a criterion of general truth.

It is this development that will pose a problem as Ogden's position is unfolded, for we have now discovered two truth criteria. The first dictates that a proposition can be part of a valid theology if it is largely unintelligible to contemporary secular man. The second eliminates as equally false any proposition that contradicts the Christian witness as derived from the original statements of Christ. We shall see that there are tensions between the two and that ultimately Ogden's system has some structural difficulties as a result.

Let me briefly anticipate the problem. Clearly, there will be some possibility that certain propositions be clearly endorsed by the Christian witness which turn out to be unintelligible to Ogden's secular man. We have already identified some doctrines—creation in history, miracles, etc.—for which Ogden solves his problem by arguing that they are in fact, not a part of the original witness but are due to the influence of later philosophical biases, or are legendary additions. But this will not always help. What Ogden clearly needs now, as a basic procedure in beginning to construct his system is a method that will do justice to the obvious witness of Christ, yet render them intelligible.
It is just this predicament which, I think, makes Bultmann's method of demythologizing so attractive to Ogden. It is thus not surprising that he judges Bultmann to be the necessary standing point for theological activity in our day. Nor is it surprising that Ogden finally adopts a method, more radical perhaps, but nevertheless substantially identical to Bultmann's.

More than that, however, Ogden's criteria, particularly that of intelligibility, dictate for him the outlines of a whole epistemology, of which demythologizing as a procedural method will form an integral part. Ogden's epistemology must inevitably be existentialist in nature due to his particular interpretation of the concept of secularity. One of its components is the notion of radical autonomy and closely allied to that, of radical subjectivity. Together they give us the basic presupposition of Ogden's epistemology, as I see it, namely the subjectivist principle.

Let me, then, again summarize the course of this chapter as it develops what I have referred to as Ogden's epistemological argument. His criteria actually outline the whole epistemology but more particularly they lead Ogden to the subjectivist principle. This, in turn, when developed into a total theory of knowledge will lead to Ogden's choice of the method of demythologizing as consonant with his criteria. This, again, will mean for Ogden that there can be no unique content for theology. We now have the ingredients of an
argument for the identity of theology and philosophy.

I turn, then, to the subject of Ogden's epistemology in general, and, first of all, the subjectivist principle that conditions it. The reader should bear in mind that Ogden's epistemology was fashioned with a theological function in view, and based on criteria for a theological system. Thus, although it frequently has general application, certain aspects, for example, questions related to sensory perception, are left largely untouched. Since my interests are also theological and philosophical I shall not try to extend the system any.
B. An Experiential Epistemology

Introduction. - Before we can consider Ogden's positive construction of a theistic system we must examine carefully his epistemology and his resulting theory of language appropriate to God. Both of these aspects are discussed at length in essays that appeared between 1962 and 1965, and to some extent summarized in Ogden's dialogue with Antony Flew in 1968.

We find here an epistemology much along traditional existentialist lines, but carefully constructed to describe theological functions. Recent years, however, have witnessed a number of essays in which Ogden has added many process themes, insisting on their easy fit into an existentialist mold. I shall attempt to discuss the resulting epistemology as a whole, rather than survey the individual parts.

The elements of Ogden's epistemology. - Ogden's epistemology can be characterized under three headings. First, he is a realist in regards to the external world. There is a "cognitive encounter with reality." The discussion of Ogden's acceptance of the tenets of secularity above shows this point clearly. As we will see, the only evidence for this position that Ogden gives is that objectivity is simply given in perception. Perception carries with it a witness to its external reference.
Secondly, Ogden assumes that God cannot be an object of sense experience directly suitable to examination by scientific methodology. To speak of him as such would be to fall prey to the expressive form of myth:

By objectifying God in the sense of thinking and speaking of him under the same conditions as apply to the objects of our external perception, myth in effect denies God's qualitative difference from all things other than himself and thus fails to express appropriately its own real intention.... Like myth, science can think and speak about reality only as the object of our sense perceptions and so can represent God only by similarly misrepresenting the uniqueness of his being as God.39

Thus the refusal of some theologians to separate science and theology only destroys theology by forcing the identification of God as a "thing among things."

Thirdly, Ogden accepts the tenets of verifiability to a limited degree. This requirement, of course, refers to truth, that is, the availability of meaningful propositions, not the primal content of experience. "Not even faith can assert something as true which is in principle lacking in cognitive meaning."40 That meaning can only be established by intersubjective criteria.

Ogden, however, sees a need to restrict this principle of verifiability. "In its present sense, 'empirical' means applying through some but not all possible experience, while 'experiential' means applying through at least some possible experience, and perhaps all."41 Ogden also affirms that
metaphysical assertions are precisely those which must be substantiated by all experience. 42

The assumptions of Ogden's epistemology. - Before detailing the elements of Ogden's epistemology we must clarify the assumptions that condition it.

Of primary importance in this regard are the criteria for theology which we have just discussed. This is the case because Ogden's epistemology is designed, not for general use, but for the very specific requirements of a theologico-philosophical system. Thus, it is not fashioned ab novo, as it were, but built to a prescribed blueprint.

Epistemology, then, must, as is true of theology in general, conform to the requirements of intelligibility and adequacy. We have seen already how these criteria function in ruling out certain theological options. In following paragraphs it will become evident how the first criterion helps to indicate a broadly experiential epistemology.

The next section will discuss the method of demythologization and it will then become clear how the second criterion forms the basis of an argument for the use of an existentialist method in theology; that is, a method which focuses theology around questions of individual authentic existence.

There is, however, another presupposition, specifically epistemological in nature, that plays an important role in
Ogden's system. Ogden refers to it as the "reformed subjectivist principle." He claims that it is Whiteheadian in origin. I shall not here analyze the question of whether or not Ogden's principle is, in fact, identical with Whitehead's, but simply elaborate the former.

The "reformed subjectivist principle". - Ogden states the principle as following from the subjective turn of modern philosophy. It can be stated thus: the true object of philosophical reflection is the existing individual as an experiencing self.

In Ogden's earlier epistemological essays one can find a position elaborated that obviously derives from this principle, but it lacks such justification. In recent years, however, the reformed subjectivist principle has come to play an explicit and crucial role. Let me then expand on each of these points.

The basis of the principle is the Cartesian insight that subjective experiencing is the only immediate datum for knowing. In fact, my own judgment is that Ogden really holds that the principle is little more than a development or expansion of Descartes' insight. I emphasize that for Ogden the datum is interpreted as being the experiencing and not the experience as content. The primary encounter is always of the self. A characteristic statement is Ogden's
reference at one point to "the primal phenomenon of our own existence as experiencing subjects or selves." The "Self" is thus defined simply as a center of experiencing.

It is important to note that the self does not simply encounter itself per se, always in the context of being the subject of experience. Ogden's self is always experiencing itself experiencing. It is here that Ogden sees an agreement between Heideggerian existentialism and Whitehead. Ogden interprets both as rejecting the vone of the subject as an experienced substance. For both, the self is always subject and can never be objectified, or treated as simple content. Thus Ogden has no difficulty in adding his version of the Whiteheadian principle to the essentially existentialist epistemology we shall examine in the remainder of this chapter.

The full-blown principle, then has two main elements. First, it assumes as primary datum the experiencing subject. But second, it claims that subjects experience themselves in the act of experiencing.

For Ogden, the subjectivist principle has three implications. They are referred to as part of the meaning of the principle and as included in it. The first is best summarized by Whitehead's statement that "consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness."
Though Ogden does not say why this is part of the subjectivistic principle, the reasoning appears to be that the very notion of the primacy of conscious perception is a result of a substance-quality metaphysics. The model of visual perception of solid objects is not only applied to ontology by the Greek philosophers and their contemporary followers, but is also allowed to displace what is truly the fundamental given according to the subjectivistic principle. The immediate given is always the nexus of experience of which the self is part. Differentiation of subject and object is secondary.

The second result for Ogden is the primacy of epistemology over metaphysics. The essay, "Lonergan and the Subjectivistic Principle" (1971), is concerned to show this application of the principle. Perhaps the main criticism of Lonergan here is that, while accepting some version of subjectivism he continues to use metaphysical categories which are not derived from his cognitional theory. In this essay, and elsewhere, Ogden presents just this inconsistency as the ultimate systematic blunder and one must, therefore, assume that he explicitly agrees with Lonergan that cognitional theory comes first, metaphysics second. It is this view of priorities that is identified as "the subjective turn" and held to be the content of Whitehead's "reformed subjectivist principle."
The third result has to do with method. That is, methodology, too, must be conditioned by the discovery of the proper and fundamental object of philosophy.

The primary object of philosophical reflection is my own existence as an experiencing self.... therefore, philosophy's only proper task and method is integral reflective self-understanding. 53

As will be developed in following sections, this leads Ogden to see what he will call "existentialist" knowledge as the basis of philosophy and theology.

Three phases of experience. - We are now ready to analyze Ogden's concept of experience. This will provide us with the general categories of his epistemology. In "Theology and Objectivity," which is perhaps his most complete examination of knowledge, Ogden begins by accepting what he claims is the standard existentialist's distinction between external perception, i.e. objective knowledge, and the awareness of the knowing self, i.e. existential knowledge, as the two basic components of experience, a view made clear by Whitehead but traceable ultimately to Kant. 54

Objective knowledge is simply the sensory awareness of the external world. It is detached, that is, one can maintain distance and identify objects as separate from the self. It can be conceptualized and verbalized. "Objective" and "descriptive" are thus largely interchangeable for Ogden. In Whitehead's terms it is "presentational immediacy." 55
Existential knowledge is at the other end of the spectrum. It is immediate self-encounter, the experiencing of the self directly. Its content is the subject, and in that sense one cannot really say that it has an object. Subject and object coincide in existential knowledge. According to the subjectivist principle, this type is basic and precedes objective knowledge. It is perception in the "mode of causal efficacy."

Even more important is the unique attitude associated with existential knowledge.

Whereas existential speaking and thinking have to do directly with the gain or loss of our authentic existence as persons, our thought and speech about the objects of our external perception are only indirectly related to this paramount concern. Thus another familiar way of expressing this... difference between existential and objectifying knowledge is to represent the former as "concerned" or "involved," the latter as "disinterested" or "detached."

Empiricists have frequently ignored or eliminated this level of knowledge because their "substance metaphysics" forces them to focus on what is immediate in consciousness, rather than the primitive, basic, though vague, awareness of being demanded, as we have just seen, by the subjectivist principle. This is one theme in Ogden where one could wish for a closer bringing together of the existentialist and Whiteheadian elements. He is unclear as to whether objective and existential are two types of experience or two phases of experience. My presentation
here clearly favors the latter interpretation, primarily since it is closer to Whitehead, although Ogden's earlier statements lead one to think that his original view may have been closer to the former. In any case Ogden shows little interest in being precise here because he regards neither phase as the actual source of theology and philosophy.

Ogden claims, then, that the twofold analysis is insufficient. It allows only for direct sensory experience of anything other than the self. If it were asserted as the only form of knowledge it would reduce to secularism or positivism and make theology impossible.

The suggestions of those who follow the later Heidegger, e.g. Heinrich Ott, lead to an epistemology characterized as extremely subjective, which tries to provide for theology as existential knowledge. Here "theology shares in the immediate encounter or experience of faith and is, in fact, a 'movement of faith itself,' faith seeking understanding." This results, Ogden argues, in at least two difficulties. First, it precludes theology from being descriptive. Secondly, if any objective base for language is lacking, theology is reduced to equivocal descriptions at best, and is unavailable to the unbeliever.

Ott ends up in the same blind alley as do his mentors, the later Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers. He insists that there is a difference between faith and theology and if so, then
theology must have an object in some sense. It must be a
descriptive activity, beyond the sheer encounter of faith.
On the other hand, if theology has no describable object,
then there can be no real difference between it and simple
faith. 50

Ogden feels that a closer analysis of knowledge shows a
third level or phase beyond, actually between, the objective
and the existential that is implied by the very ability to
distinguish these two. 61 This he refers to as "existentialist"
knowledge. 62 It is a "descriptive analysis of the phenomenon
of existence in general." 63 It is the real source of any
ontology.

Ogden wants to extend the meaning of descriptive or
objectifying to include existentialist knowledge of God with­
out referring to him as a "thing." Such knowledge is still
descriptive and, therefore, objectifying since it has basic
characteristics in common with objective knowledge; namely
that it is "disinterested" and detached. 64 Bultmann argues
this same point against Jaspers by noting that he "cannot
help explicating what he calls 'clarification of existence'
in such a way that it becomes universally understandable,
i.e., he must objectify it as doctrine." 65 "Objective",
here, retains the sense of experience with a referent beyond
both the "experiencing" itself and the subject. We must note,
however, that the objectifying tendency of existentialist knowledge does not eliminate the sharp boundary between science and self-understanding, whether the latter is immediate or detached.

The introduction of this third form of knowing thus serves to open up the possibility of philosophy and theology as descriptive enterprises, but as a logically distinct form from that which generates science. Ogden signifies this distinction by saying that objective knowledge is open to empirical falsifiability, whereas the nonsensory experience of the self is existentially falsifiable. The primary difference, I take it is that objective knowledge can be falsified by just one observation, whereas existentialist knowledge can be falsified only by one's total experience. This will have significant application when we turn to Ogden's definitions of theology and philosophy in the next chapter.

The scope of existentialist knowledge. - Within the scope of existentialist knowledge Ogden distinguishes three subtypes relevant to theology: faith, proclamation, and theology proper. We can visualize the entire gamut of religious knowledge as indicated in the diagram below:
Faith is thus the least reflective type of existentialist knowledge. Although it involves a high degree of concern and involvement, the hallmarks of existential knowledge, it is nevertheless a "believing in", which implies that it is "conceptually explicit," that is, it has describable content.

Proclamation encompasses a variety of pretheological types such as prayer, spontaneous worship, etc. It is "ideally more a matter of action than of adjusting concepts." Ogden uses a quotation from Whitehead who states the matter with remarkable clarity:

The reported sayings of Christ are not formularized thought. They are descriptions of direct insight. The ideas are in his mind as immediate pictures, and not as analyzed in terms of abstract concepts.... He speaks in the lowest abstractions that language is capable of, if it is to be language at all and not the fact itself.

Theology proper, on the other hand, is the most generalized type of existentialist knowledge. Thus it leads to universal concepts and allows for a high degree of abstractness in its language.

The language of theology. - We are now prepared to turn to Ogden's discussion of the nature of language in reference specifically to God. This discussion, in Ogden, has two parts. One must, he thinks, deal first with statements within the context of the Christian theological tradition. This involves identifying their logical type and then developing a method
of dealing with them. The second part of the discussion becomes necessary, Ogden argues, because the classical philosophical framework within which traditional theology developed did not allow for univocal language about God. The categories of existentialist knowledge were not available.

The first part of this discussion involves us in the project of demythologization and existential interpretation, the second in Ogden’s doctrine of analogy. The former will provide the subject of the concluding section of this chapter, while we cannot develop the latter until we turn to Ogden’s metaphysics in Chapter IV.

Ogden feels that Bultmann limited himself by the choice of Heidegger, in his early, essentially atheistic, period, to a position that is theologically weak, despite its great anthropological advantages. Nevertheless Bultmann is seen as an adequate starting point for a theory of God-language. Bultmann has generally been criticized for disallowing any meaningful, objective, references to God since his view of theology is that it comprises “the affirmations of faith, all of which refer to the realities encountered in man’s experience of himself and his world.” It is largely in response to this charge that Bultmann makes a distinction in his later writings between myth and analogy which is used and developed by Ogden.
I must remind the reader again of the purpose of this brief outline of Ogden's epistemology. One could, of course, spend a whole book dealing with the topic, though much of it would be guesswork since Ogden himself shows little inclination to develop many of his central themes. Furthermore, it is difficult even to compare him or try to position him in relation to other theologians and philosophers. He is trying to solve two problems at once. He is akin to Tillich in refusing to regard God as just another object in the universe, thus a purely empirical or "secularistic" epistemology will not do. Yet his ideal of intelligibility to secular man leads him to also want a system that allows for meaningful and descriptive propositions about God. Thus a purely subjective epistemology, as we have seen, is also out of the question.

My interest here, however, is only to derive two essential points that I need to construct the argument of this chapter. a) It is possible to experience in a describable way the framework of existence itself. Theology and philosophy are possible as cognitive enterprises. b) All knowledge begins in subjectivity. It is rooted in self-awareness and never really transcends it.

These points have clear implications for the type of theology methodology fitting for Ogden's system and I turn now to that last phase of the argument. How are the traditional
statements in theology to be interpreted? Are they in any
sense unique, thus establishing a discipline separate from
philosophy? Ogden's answer, we shall see, is negative. Pro-
perly identified and interpreted they are identical to philo-
sophical statements.

C. The Project of Demythologization

Preface. - Most of Ogden's earlier essays, roughly bet-
ween 1957 and 1962, and including Christ without Myth, are
concerned with the proper method of hermeneutics for theology
vis-a-vis the biblical accounts. These essays presuppose
something of the criteria and definition of theology and its
relation to philosophy which is sometimes briefly stated, as
in "Bultmann's Project of Demythologizing..." (1957), but never
elaborated. In more recent writings these definitional matters
are clearly expounded and seen as fundamental to the question
of method.

One of the difficulties in interpreting Ogden on this point
is that it is not always clear when we are listening to Bultmann
and when to Ogden. This is overcome somewhat by Ogden's affir-
mation that he and Bultmann are essentially in agreement on
the question of method,73 although he insists that he is more
consistent in the application of the method and also goes beyond
it. Referring to Bultmann he says:

I, too, would say that the primary use of all
theological statements is existential and that the
sense of the statement "God acts in history" is
an existential sense.74
Thus I will ignore the ambiguity that sometimes is present.

The discussion of demythologization in this section is crucial since it shows the methodological results of Ogden's criteria and epistemology. More important even than that, is that it leads Ogden to identify theology and philosophy. The subsequent chapters must clarify and modify that identification as they discuss the content of this combined discipline.

1. What is Ogden's "Project of Demythologizing"?

Ogden claims that one cannot understand the contemporary theological scene without first understanding Bultmann.

It has become increasingly evident that for one who is concerned with the present theological task there is no better way to begin than by attempting to come to terms with Bultmann's proposal.

...To be sure, we are eventually going to argue that his proposal finally fails in being maximally significant because it cannot meet the test of logical self-consistency. But as we suggested above, this can hardly be taken to mean that his theology is not of singular significance.75

Bultmann's great achievement, according to Ogden, is the development of a precise theological hermeneutic based on his conception of the nature and goal of man. It is true, of course, that some elements of the method of demythologizing and existential interpretation are not original with Bultmann. Some indeed are as old as the patristic fathers. But it remains a real accomplishment to have specified a coherent and universal method and provided it with both a theological and philosophical framework.
Ogden summarizes the method as "an interpretation that rests on man's preunderstanding of his own existentiell possibilities and therefore is oriented in terms of the question of what ought to be." This statement is in obvious need of explanation.

To demythologize is, to interpret: it is not to attempt a literal understanding but rather to read through a specific set of glasses. Elsewhere Ogden clarifies this type of interpretation by defining the method as:

The restatement of traditional theological formulations, which as such are scientifically incredible, in terms of the understanding of human existence which they more or less inadequately express.77

The method has two aspects: First, it is negative interpretation that eliminates the "mythical" and inadequate. Second, it is also positive in its desire to restate theological statements in terms of "existentiell possibilities," that is, what they mean for the possibilities of human existence.

In the following I shall deal first with the character of myth: its definition, linguistic form, and intention. Secondly, I shall discuss demythologization and existential interpretation as separate parts of the total method. Thirdly, I shall look at some questions of justification of specific theses in regard to Ogden's method.

The definition of myth. - Ogden's usage indicates three general characteristics of theological myth. First, they are statements about human experience. They are not pure creations
of the imagination such as fairy tales might be. Second, they represent an internal awareness of the individual and his world as existing within the reality of all things. That is, the subject of mythology is not external realities, events, or living things, but always the individual himself. Third, myths make use of the terminology of objective awareness, of things and events.

Thus, for Ogden the biblical statements concerning God's actions in history are simply category mistakes. This assertion, however, needs two qualifications. On the one hand, we must remember that the category mistake involved is a very particular one, namely, the use of sense-perception language to describe non-describable experience. But we must also take into account that, although myths cannot be taken literally, they are, nevertheless, seriously intended and therefore in some sense still true. But in what sense?

For Ogden, truth takes on different appearances depending on the way it is represented in language. I take it that he does not mean to say that the truth itself which is under consideration changes, but rather that the criterion for establishing it varies as different language forms are used. The method of ascertaining the proper criterion must involve the determination of which distinctive questions the speaker is seeking to ask and answer. Myth is just such a language form.

Myths, Ogden claims, are found to be a type of religious
assertion which presents answers to the question of how faith can be affirmed. Apparently he thinks this to be true of all myths, but specifically of traditional theological statements.

...Mythical assertions are true insofar as they so explicate our unforfeitable assurance that life is worthwhile, that the understanding of faith they represent cannot be falsified by the essential conditions of life itself.82

Mythical statements, however, fail to meet the need for meaningful God-language for two reasons. First, they are improper since they objectify God. They speak of him as if he were a "something", identifiable within our universe of sensory experience. This points to the second reason: since they need to be reworded before they can be verified, such statements do not, prima facia, indicate the conceptuality or model by which they can be more properly stated.83 Myth is itself dependent on some other form of speaking of God, but by itself it in no way helps us in ascertaining that means.

The linguistic form of myth. - "Myth" for Ogden, and he claims here to agree with Bultmann,84 has only the very specific definition given above. It is the attempt to state in objective, empirical descriptions that which can only be existentially known. Ogden occasionally expresses this by saying that although myth and science share the same linguistic forms they have different meanings:

Although the "intention" of such mythological statements—or, as we may also say, their "use" or function—is quite different from that of scientific statements, their grammatical and logical form is the same.85
This means that their linguistic form is properly distinguished from their intended meaning and the latter expressed in other linguistic terms more appropriate to it.  

For example, the two propositions, "God spoke to Moses on Sinai," and "President Carter spoke to the Nation from the Oval office," both have the same linguistic form. They appear to be simple sensory observations. Their intentions, Ogden would say, are nevertheless quite different. The second is in fact, observational. The first, however, is really a statement about the possibilities of Moses' existence.

Myth obscures truth primarily in two areas, the nature of man and the nature of God. It represents man as subjected to outside forces, even to the fear of possession: as "standing at the mercy of divine or demonic powers whose efficacy is functionally independent of his own responsible decisions." In the same objectifying manner, God is presented as a thing-among-things, as meddling in the affairs of time and space, as creating and incarnating and resurrecting.

The intention of myth. - Myth as commonly understood is simply primitive science or cosmology. For Ogden it is true even of his more technical use that myths are at least that: "man's first crude attempts at what we now know as science and history." It is in this sense that myth takes on the character of an outdated and no longer acceptable world-view, and underlying that a weak view of empirical justification which allows for the fanciful. Thus myth's talk of demons, says Ogden
is on the one hand objectifying in that it destroys man's individuality by subjecting him to supposedly real external and personal forces, and on the other it is just bad science --the kind that results from an inadequate view of experimental method, as judged by Ogden's "secular" man.

Myths are, however, much more, and essentially much more than primitive science. For Ogden the real intention of myth is always to express the objectively inexpressible. This follows from--in fact, it is simply the restatement of--the definition of myth as existential meaning in objective language.

While...the mythical mind is able, by reason of its capacity for thinking uncritically, to represent its experience of the transcendent in objective mythological statements, it is also true that the real intention of such statements does not lie in their objective representational contents but in the understanding of existence which the latter express only more or less inadequately.91

Ogden repeatedly argues this point.92 The real use of myth is the existential, not the scientific. Myths speak about human life, not events or facts in the external world. Only on this view can myths retain truth value, as well as the possibility of their restatement in non-objectified language with the same meaning. We must now amplify these points.

Demythologizing. - Ogden frequently uses "demythologization" to refer to the entire method of demythologizing and existential interpreting. However, he is usually careful to distinguish
the two phases of the method of which demythologization is the first and negative.

Perhaps the most important aspect of demythologizing is that it is not simply censorship. It is not merely a technique to eliminate the miraculous and anachronistic, as one finds for instance in many liberal methodologies. Rather it is the identification of those ideas, stories, concepts, and statements, which are improperly expressed.

One does not, for example, simply cross out the resurrection of Christ as a flight of loyal imagination, but rather accepts the basic concept of continued relevance and seeks to alter those elements in its linguistic form which tend to objectify the divine presence.

Demythologizing is justified by the very nature of myth. It is really just a reversal of the process that created it. Although myth represents a linguistic mistake, its intentions are honorable. Ogden's view on this is that of Bultmann:

It is possible for the theologian to demythologize the kerygma only if the kerygma itself allows such interpretation. Although this does not mean that the kerygma is the only reason of demythologization, it does mean that unless the New Testament message admits of this procedure, theology as the obedient response to this message becomes impossible.

Aside from the general definition of myth that allows the New Testament to demand its own demythologizing, there are the following specific justifications. There is first the observation that many of the mythological statements in the New Testament are loosely connected or even contradictory.
Second, the basic motives are often in conflict, as evidenced especially in the tension between fate and guilt, determination and decision. Since myth's language is that of external actions and events, there is no commitment to a view of what is truly involved for the individual. Third, and most importantly there is the fact that the New Testament already begins to carry out its own demythologizing. For example, its emphasis on freedom and responsibility already indicates the proper understanding of the conflict between the motives mentioned above, and the Gospel of John's elimination of "the futuristic eschatology of the primitive community."96 is a further example.

Existential Interpretation. - The second and positive phase of the method is also determined and justified by the very nature and purpose of Myth. Let me repeat that for Ogden myth is always intended to say something existential about man.97 This is a crucial point in Ogden's argument. I have made it before, but it is the second phase of the method that applies it. The justification of the method as a whole, and especially of existential interpretation, for Ogden, is that myths should be translated existentially rather than literally because that is how myths are intended--simply by definition.

Ogden explicitly argues that the demand for demythologizing "follows logically" from the definition of myth as existential meaning in external forms of expression.98 More often, however,
Ogden argues indirectly by claiming that the possibility of myths being true hinges on its being existentially understood.

Because the meaning of myth is really existential-metaphysical, the conditions of its truth are the conditions implicit in that kind of meaning, not those with which either the scientist or the historian is quite rightly concerned. 99

After a longer version of the argument in "Myth and Truth" (1966) Ogden concludes:

Because this is so, the process of actually verifying mythical assertions always presents a peculiar problem... One can actually verify mythical assertions only by following the twofold hermeneutical procedure that Bultmann has called "demythologizing." 100

To summarize, we can thus say that the goal in dealing with myth is that of determining its truth. One can deal with that problem only by recognizing myth's existential nature.

Thus, method is dependent on definition. This is illustrated in various examples Ogden gives. One may suffice:

If mythical statements are considered in themselves, in abstraction from their actual function in human life, they can only too easily be taken as simply man's first crude attempts at what we now know as science or history. The Christian myths of creation and of the last things can then be dismissed as primitive cosmology.... But as soon as we recognize that mythical language has another and logically quite different use from that which its terms and categories suggest, this whole familiar situation appears in a new light.... Therefore, the real meaning...is to illumine each present moment of our actual existence as an existence within and under the all-embracing love of God. They teach us that the ultimate beginning and end of all our ways...is the pure unbounded love which is decisively represented in Jesus Christ. 101
It is important to reemphasize that for Ogden demythologization is necessary, not just because it is an appropriate process of understanding for myth, not just because he considers myth as outdated form of expression, not even because myth is inadequate and mis-representational, but because demythologization is precisely that for which myth was intended all along. Again, myth must be existentially interpreted because it is existentially defineable; it can be so defined because it was existentially intended. It was Bultmann's great achievement to find the adequate form of expression for myth's content in Heidegger's existentialism.

Let me summarize the development of this phase of the argument so far. Ogden's epistemology implies the possibility of theological statements but only in existentialist form. The traditional statements about God do not meet the requirements and need to be demythologized.

Two crucial questions must now be discussed more fully: first, why does Ogden think that myth is existential in intent? A method, and much more as will become apparent, depends on the definition, after all, so we ought to have some solid justification for it. Second, why does Ogden think that Heidegger's anthropology is the proper form of expression for myth? Why has it taken almost two thousand years to find the adequate linguistic forms for the content of the New Testament myths?
Is the intention of myth justified? - I am not aware that Ogden gives us what we are looking for at this point. What is really needed is some historical evidence or reason to think that the writers or originators of mythical statements were in fact trying to say something about the possibilities of human existence, but for some specified reasons were able to express it only in observational terms. They really intended to say something about divine immanence but could express it only in objectifying, spatial terminology. It is not clear to me, at least, what would provide such a proof.

Perhaps the closest thing to it in Ogden is an approving quote from Bultmann to the effect that lawful, scientific thinking "although only fully developed in modern science, is already 'preformed' in the 'work-thinking' (Arbeits-denken) that is as primitive as existence itself". Though primitive man did not have the concepts to express a law-governed view of the universe he subconsciously knew its truth and acted on that basis. He could express himself only in primitive, objectifying language, but his intention, his real meaning, is that of existential self-understanding.

This seems to beg the question. It offers a scenario of what may have been the case, but Ogden provides us with no proof that it, in fact, was. I must, however, preserve the expository nature of this chapter and wait until the concluding chapter to evaluate the position.
Bultmann, Heidegger, and the New Testament. - It remains for us to find an answer to the second question mentioned above, namely that concerning the choice of Heideggerian concepts to interpret New Testament myths. Bultmann has spent most of his academic career justifying this choice and Ogden has done little more than affirm its correctness. One of the rare statements of his own is the following:

Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human existence represents the translation into formal ontological terms of the understanding of man set forth in the New Testament.103

The argument in both Bultmann and Ogden104 is exegetical, i.e. that when one understands what the New Testament truly means to say about man and his possibility of authentic existence one can see that it is best and adequately expressed by the Heideggerian analysis in Being and Time, regardless of Heidegger's actual intentions.

The argument, as simply exegetical as it may seem, has its complexities and problems. On the one hand, it is difficult to determine just what a neutral exegesis of the New Testament might look like on the basis of which one could determine its relationship to Heidegger. In addition, there is the difficulty presented by Ogden's argument that Heidegger himself has been influenced in his conceptualization precisely by biblical viewpoints at least in Sein Und Zeit. Referring to a footnote in that work, Ogden claims this:
I am persuaded we are not far from the truth if we regard Heidegger's proposal as stimulated and perhaps even determined by the same theological influences that were otherwise so decisive for this phase of his work. I regard it as highly probable that here, as in Sein und Zeit generally, the historical background of Heidegger's statements is the understanding of man and God with which his encounter with Christian theology served to acquaint him.

2. Philosophy and Theological Methodology

Introduction. - In this section I shall briefly analyze questions which arise concerning the method of demythologizing and existential interpretation in its implications for the relationship between philosophy and theology. They focus initially on the problem of a limit to demythologizing. This is a problem which has for many years provoked a great deal of comment and controversy--it may in fact be the hottest issue in Bultmannian circles, and Ogden has certainly been a central figure in this discussion. John MacQuarrie's The Scope of Demythologizing is a very comprehensive and clear treatment of the problem, and there are others as well, so that at this point I shall simply present Ogden's view in outline. What is crucial as the last premise of the argument of this chapter is Ogden's position that, in fact, there is no limit to demythologizing. No mythical statements of theology can be excepted. As a result the historical elements that appear to brand Christian theology as a discipline separate from philosophy are eliminated.
The limit to demythologizing. - As we have seen, this was the first problem, chronologically, with which Ogden chose to deal in the published essays which were derived from his dissertation at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Although on the surface it may appear as the purely internal theological issue of the parameters of a particular method, it is cast by Ogden as the large interdisciplinary problem of the relation between theology and philosophy.

The problem is this: Bultmann, claims Ogden, maintains a "structural inconsistency." While insisting on the complete demythologization of New Testament myth, he stops short of eliminating the death of Christ as historical event and insists on its necessity for the authentic existence of any human being.

In other words, what distinguishes theology from philosophy in Bultmann's view is the fact that it speaks about a unique act of God in the person and destiny of Jesus of Nazareth, which, as he says, 'first makes possible' the authentic human existence that philosophy also knows about and proclaims as man's original possibility. What ultimately must distinguish the two is that philosophy is the completely general analysis of the possibility of authentic existence.
while theology in addition to this analysis, knows that the actuality of authentic existence comes only because of a unique event. Philosophy knows only what is true in principle, while theology knows of historic conditions that make possible authenticity in fact, though it has no unique prepositions. Bultmann's argument rests on the claim that the true Christ-event is not mythical nor is it intended so.

Ogden argues that in making this distinction Bultmann involves himself in inconsistency, primarily because on Bultmann's own definition the proposition, "God acted in Jesus Christ" is prima facie mythological. It is clearly a case of objectifying language used to refer to the divine.

This, then, is the ultimate inconsistency of Bultmann's position. He affirms a distinction between theology and philosophy which he can maintain only by appealing to an event that he himself not only in effect negatively rejects but also positively is incapable of expressing.

The inconsistency is seen even more clearly, Ogden argues, if we compare his following two summaries of Bultmann's position to which we referred earlier:

(1) Christian Faith is to be interpreted exhaustively and without remainder as man's original possibility of authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence as this is more or less adequately clarified and conceptualized by an appropriate philosophical analysis. (2) Christian faith is actually realizable, or is a "possibility in fact", only because of the particular historical (historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth, which is the originative event of the church and its distinctive word and sacraments.
Thus Bultmann is held to involve himself in speaking of a divine act of revelation in space-time history when his own definition identifies such a statement as myth. The issue is, of course, hardly that simple. Much controversy has raged around Ogden's contention and he is frequently accused of misinterpreting Bultmann. However, I am not concerned here with the validity of Ogden's understanding of Bultmann. What is important is Ogden's insistence that demythologizing be carried out unremittingly. There are no affirmable divine acts in history. Such acts could be referred to only by mythical statements.

Ogden concludes that there are really only two options. The first is to reject the entire concept and project of demythologization as do conservatives; for Ogden this is both culturally and theologically impossible. The other alternative is to reject Bultmann's limited demythologization, and consistently apply the method throughout the whole scope of theological statements. This will, of course, necessitate a new approach to God-language but it is the only viable course. Only this option allows theology to remain in compliance with the criteria established for it. A statement of the historical death and resurrection of Christ as an action of God would most certainly offend the empirical conscience of contemporary man, Ogden feels. Even worse, however, is its denial of the very intentions of the New Testament and myth in general.
Thus any attempt to hold on to a distinctive event as the identifying theme of theology is neither understandable to contemporary man nor adequate to its Christian tradition.

One question remains to be clarified. Is it the event or the statement of a unique action of God that contradicts Bultmann's method and thus the secular world-view? Ogden seems curiously ambiguous on this point. The ambiguity, however, dissolves if one keeps the definition of myth in mind.

A myth, again, is a statement about existential possibilities in the observational language of sensible events. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not the event that contradicts Ogden's (or Bultmann's) position. If Ogden is correct, there is no event. What contradicts the stated general method is to refuse to treat as a myth what one has already been defined as one. Thus the problem is not linguistic, nor is it scientific, but methodological.

Most important, however, is that this option of consistent application is theology's distinctive. Now "Christian faith is to be interpreted exhaustively and without remainder as man's original possibility of authentic existence, as this is clarified and conceptualized by an appropriate philosophical analysis." 114

At the basis of his system, then, Ogden establishes that philosophy and theology must be seen as indistinguishable, though we have not yet given them careful definitions. For
Ogden this is the only way in which theology can secure for itself a voice in contemporary culture. It is still true that theology, as Christian theology, knows of an event which gives rise to it, and as such it appears more culturally bound than philosophy. Nevertheless, it knows nothing beyond "the demand which has already been laid upon men by their Creator at all times and which, therefore, a truly adequate philosophy also properly knows and proclaims."115

Ogden's epistemology, then forces the conclusion that theology cannot establish an independent identity by specifying a unique content. That, by itself, will not completely establish the coextensional identity of theology and philosophy. Nevertheless, it does rule out one frequent rationale for separating the disciplines. For the time being, the notion that they speak in different ways of the same truth is still an option--Ogden's system will rule that out, too, however--but there cannot be two areas of truth: one of abstract and general propositions about God and man, and one of specific and historical actions that are his uniquely.

This particularly rules out many traditionally orthodox views of theology. They are Ogden's primary opponent at this point. In following sections the nature of his system will also rule out "language-game" views, that is, that theology and philosophy play entirely different roles.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF OGDEN'S SYSTEM

A. The Total Scope
B. Faith: The Datum of Philosophy and Theology
C. The Nature and Criteria of Philosophy
D. What is Theology?
Introduction. - If theology cannot claim any unique content, and if, in fact, it coincides with philosophy, then we must now ask for a more specific answer to the question of source. In our epistemological considerations we identified the existentialist level of experience as that which makes philosophical knowledge possible for Ogden. The aim of this chapter is to explain more fully the generation of philosophical and theological knowledge, and from that to clarify the definitions of those disciplines.

It will undoubtedly strike the reader as noteworthy that the actual content and definition of philosophy can be determined by purely epistemological considerations, as Ogden holds. That may be plausible--or not--in a system where the meaningfulness of metaphysics is derived, but here we have a complete metaphysic. Ogden does seem unaware of the metaphysical presuppositions built into his epistemology, as opposed, for instance, to his mentor Whitehead. We shall have to return to that matter; for now I simply warn the reader of what is coming. For Ogden "faith in meaning" is an unavoidable aspect of existentialist experience. Its analysis is philosophy-theology. Its ultimate implication is the reality of God.

I should emphasize here that in this chapter I shall be concerned only with the structural implications of Ogden's epistemology, in particular the formal relationship between philosophy and theology and their common source in faith.
While running the risk of getting the cart before the horse, it seems best to begin with an overview. This is advantageous due to the fact that Ogden's concepts of theology and philosophy flow from a common source: the self analyzing itself. Following this overview, there will be individual sections amplifying each aspect.

Ogden provided much of the outline himself in a lecture delivered at the "Consultation on the Future of Philosophical Theology" at McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago in 1970. It was later revised and published as "The Task of Philosophical Theology" (1971).

A. The Total Scope:

Concentric definitions. - I would represent Ogden's structure by four concentric circles, each one picturing a more objectivized, dogmatized, and specialized form of knowledge than its outer neighbor. These forms are faith, philosophy, philosophical theology, and Christian theology. A diagram of their relationships might be made as below. 

\[ \text{faith} \rightarrow \text{philosophy} \rightarrow (\text{philosophical theology}) \rightarrow (\text{Christian theology}) \]

direction of objectification.
This is not meant to indicate a narrowing of subject matter or content, but rather a more particularized methodology and terminology, and, perhaps primarily, increased objectification. Let me, then, outline each thought-type individually.

Faith. - The analysis of existence shows that a human self as a thinking, speaking, and perceiving being is possible only on the foundation of faith, be it explicitly confirmed, or only acted upon, perhaps even while being denied. This faith is not contentless for Ogden, but rather can be defined as a distinctively human, self-conscious confidence in the meaning, value, and purpose of one's environment.

We shall see, however, that faith contains only a minimum of objectivity. It may be analysed and understood reflectively, but it is not arrived at by argument. It is the presupposition of all activity, therefore necessary and unjustifiable in principle.

Faith is the essential material with which philosophy and theology deal in a reflective manner. It forms the basic topic and content of both of these disciplines.

Philosophy. - Philosophy is the general and reflective understanding of faith. Its source is thus the expression of human experience. As such, it must be seen as a secondary activity. That is, it does not provide its own "stuff" or content. It simply works with the given, namely the analysis of faith.
Since the reality on which faith is grounded, namely God, is present in all being, and since all philosophies are based on some aspect of being, no philosophy, though incomplete, is totally wrong. Instead, all philosophies must be seen as fragmentary or as pointing beyond themselves, unless, of course, they are self-contradictory.6

Philosophy, for Ogden, can be defined as the rational coordination of the direct insights of man into the nature, aspects, and implications of faith. It can be divided into more specific inquiries of which the central and most important is metaphysics.7

Philosophical Theology. - Philosophical theology is the general analysis of the reality of God, as the ground of faith. Its possibility is given in the possibility of philosophy:

...Philosophical theology is possible because the original encounter in which all our knowledge has its basis is an encounter not merely with ourselves or our fellow creatures, but also with our infinite ground and end.8

Ogden's God is not a special object of perception. He is included in all encounters with reality, and seen as necessary Being itself. Thus, the question of God, the clarification of which is the task of the philosophical theology, is not just an important question, not even the primary one, but, in fact, the only question that can be asked.9 For this reason theistic arguments from the nature of contingent beings are impossible.10
The method of philosophical theology is two-staged. It begins with a careful analysis of human experience and life. It then forms a synthesis of these data into a consistent whole. The resultant system can then be used to judge the authenticity of revelation as it occurs in the "acts of God."

Ogden notes that Hartshorne uses the term "natural theology" rather than "philosophical theology." The identification is correct as long as we avoid the traditional definition which involves a procedure along the lines of a contingent teleological or cosmological argument.11

Natural theology is a "secularized Christian theology, i.e., the restatement in wholly secular philosophical terms of the understanding of God decisively re-presented in the Christian revelation."12

Philosophical theology is dependent not only for its content but also for its methodology on philosophy proper. By definition, the task of theology is hermeneutical, that is, its purpose is to analyze faith. The epistemology and methodology by which this is accomplished is provided solely by philosophy.

By explicating in adequate conceptual terms our original encounter with ourselves, the world, and God, the philosopher also clarifies the specifically religious question to which the theologian interprets faith in Jesus Christ as the final answer.13

Christian theology. - Christian theology is seen as a particular form of general philosophical theology. It is the
examination of specifically Christian faith as it is seen in Christ himself and the tradition of the Church.¹⁴

Since, however, Christ's revelation is judged by Ogden to be the decisive act of God, Christian theology is, in a sense, the norm for all other theologies. This is not to imply that all else is false religion, but that other theologies are at best fragmentary. The Christian revelation, since based on a general philosophical explication of faith, has a "universal and all-inclusive claim."¹⁵

B. Faith: The Datum of Theology and Philosophy

Introduction. - One of the most important aspects of defining philosophy and theology, and their relationship, is the stipulation of content. For Ogden, this discussion falls into two categories. There is, first, the immediate content, faith, the object of direct existential analysis. According to the subjectivist principle, knowledge must start here. There is, however, a second and more ultimate content: the object of faith, God himself. I shall discuss the latter in Chapter IV.

We have already looked at the epistemological position which Ogden has taken as the basis for an analysis of faith. We can now look at the content of that analysis.

Although Ogden had studied under Hartshorne during his years at the University of Chicago, it was only during and after his year at Marburg, 1962-1963, that he first began to
make great use of Hartshorne's ideas. As we have noted, the first essays which resulted from this research are highly methodological in nature, although a somewhat minimal system is present. An exception is his 1963 essay, "What Sense Does It Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?", although even here the subject is fairly narrow.

Beginning in 1965, however, Ogden concentrated on developing a thorough doctrine of God, including a careful argument for divine existence as the ground of faith. Perhaps the two most important statements are his essays "The Reality of God," (1966) and "Love Unbounded: The Doctrine of God" (1966).

In this section I shall discuss Ogden's concept of faith, particularly as it serves the system as the only source of content.

1. The Characteristics of Faith

In the discussion of epistemology we have already given a minimal description of faith, but we must now elaborate. For Ogden, the concept of faith consists in the explication of two aspects: commitment and understanding. This follows clearly from the very fact that faith is experience and, moreover, a form of existentialist knowledge, comprising elements of both objective and existential knowledge. That is, although faith is primarily an inner involvement, it nevertheless demands an "object" to which it is directed. Ogden doubts that we can even speak of an "unconscious faith,"
that is, a simple faith in faith.\textsuperscript{16} We will consider each aspect separately.

a) Commitment: The Existential Aspect

According to Ogden there are at least two ideas subsumed under the notion of commitment. First, it has the character of confidence. It is a resting of the mind in the acceptance of specific facts. It is an existence in trust, a freedom from fear.\textsuperscript{17} Thus faith carries the connotation of 'security'. This in itself implies an object for faith, for it is not a self-assuredness based on some form of blind optimism, but a realistic appraisal leading to inner peace. This implies the second phase of commitment: faith as commitment is response.

Faith, for Ogden, is a response to God who has acted first in the 'resurrection' of Christ. At this point, we need to summarize Ogden's view of the resurrection and its implications for faith, particularly in light of the danger of myths as we saw in the last chapter.

The immediate meaning of the symbol 'resurrection' is the coming of faith in the possibility of self-authentication which the early church saw in Christ.\textsuperscript{18} Resurrection is the historic decision to affirm faith in the life and death of the man Jesus as a decisive revelation of man's possibilities.\textsuperscript{19}

However, this purely existential interpretation does not exhaust the scope of New Testament meaning. Ogden and Bultmann agree that Christian faith has an objective referent\textsuperscript{20} and so we must look beyond the immediate commitment.
This further referent is the "self-attestation of the risen one, the act of God in which the salvation-occurrence of the cross is completed."\textsuperscript{21} It is God's own witness to the decisiveness of Christ's cross, which in a sense is also the witness of the risen Lord to himself. What does Ogden mean?

By the very fact that this referent is an 'act of God' it is indicated that it is not a real historic event subsequent to the death of Christ. The New Testament language at this juncture is "undeniably mythical."\textsuperscript{22} Thus language of objective sense perception must be demythologized.

The witness of the disciples--their faith--was therefore itself an event in time as a response to God's own witness to the decisiveness of Christ's death.\textsuperscript{23} Thus the resurrection was not created by the disciples, nor is it 'decided into existence' by us today. It originated in a divine act and is only completed by the obedience of faith.

We are now faced with a problem in interpreting Ogden. What is an "act of God?" Clearly, this indicates a content for faith--though not an objectifiable or sensory one. The clarification of this problem is the end result of the analysis of faith as related to a content. In fact, it is the whole purpose of theology-philosophy: the understanding of the reality of God. We can now begin that analysis which will take us the remainder of the expository part of this dissertation.
(b) Understanding: The Objective Aspect

The understanding involved in faith includes two notions: the 'object' of faith and the content of faith. The 'object', for Ogden, is clear: only God is eligible. He is the loving Father, who is committed to our progress and controls our ultimate destiny. I shall reserve for chapter IV the explication of Ogden's doctrine of God as the object of faith.

Turning to the question of the content of faith, we can summarize Ogden's position thus: Faith is confidence that there is an objective ground of all reality, giving it meaning and value. We can best explicate this content by asking two questions. First, is there really any meaning? Second, why should we suppose that this meaning requires a ground?

Why do we need and even 'feel' that there exists meaning and value both in life and in reality in general? Ogden answers that an analysis of scientific, moral, and religious assertions all show a logically prior presupposition of meaning, value, or order. We shall look at each in turn.

For Ogden, every question or assertion of a scientific nature, including a simple observation statement, assumes an external reality. Although some philosophers have doubted real external existence and opted for an absolute idealism, a true science could hardly be grounded on such a base. Certainly the average non-philosopher grants such a foundation. Thus, science for Ogden is grounded in an unavoidable assurance in the reliable character of perception.
Moral questions are even stronger evidence for a presupposed order to life. Here we are forced to ask whether we could even make moral choices unless we were, at least to some degree, confident of their long-term significance.\textsuperscript{28} Granted that this confidence may be in practice subconscious and conceptually undeveloped, still no one could be called rational in opting for morality unless he somehow sensed that the value of actions was not null. To quote Whitehead:

\ldots the immediate facts of present action pass into permanent significance for the Universe. The insistent notion of Right and Wrong, Achievement and Failure depends on this background. Otherwise every activity is merely a passing whiff of insignificance.\textsuperscript{29}

Inevitably, therefore, both scientific and moral assertions are based on fundamental assumptions of meaning. Questions of the meaning of life are termed "boundary questions" by Ogden, and they are religious in that they are the ultimate questions about reality. It is with specifically religious questions that the issue is clearest:

Logically prior to every particular religious assertion is an original confidence in the meaning and worth of life, through which not simply all our religious answers, but even our religious questions first become possible or have any sense.\textsuperscript{30}

Or to state it more succinctly:

I cannot question the worth of life without presupposing the worth of questioning and the worth, therefore, of the life by which alone such questioning can be done.\textsuperscript{31}

Thus Ogden concludes that even to ask the question of meaning, in fact, to speak and think at all, presupposes faith
in meaning as a general ordering of man's environment.

Why does Ogden suppose that the basis of such a confidence is any more than our sheer trust itself? To answer this question Ogden must first give a definition of "real". He tells us that the criterion will vary from one language-game to the next, but with one element in common: "real" is "what we in some way find ourselves obliged to take account of."32 Put differently, "reality in any particular mode of reasoning must be understood as 'what (for purposes of this kind of argument) is relevant.'"33

I hardly need to point out that Ogden's argument is less than clear and seems to be mere word-trickery. What I take Ogden to mean is that the argument for God's existence from necessity of faith is really two-staged. I would summarize it as follows:

a. (1) All judgments, even speech and thought, imply the reality of meaning.
   (2) It is self-stultifying to renounce the possibility of judgments (at least in ethics, science, and religion).
   (3) There must be meaning.

b. (4) Meaning requires a source or ground as real as itself.
   (5) There exists a real ground of meaning, etc., namely God.
While the first stage of the argument is clear enough, though not without difficulties, premise (4) is given no backing. I can find nothing in Ogden's presentation that would justify the principle that meaning requires a real ground. As we will see, he explicitly denies one possibility, namely an analogical or _a posteriori_ argument such as the "teleological argument." The implication of his statements is clearly that the reasoning is _a priori_. While it is clear that meaning follows from the nature of God in Ogden's metaphysics, the reasoning is lacking that would permit us to go in the other direction, from the nature of meaning to the reality of God.

The argument is made only more complex by the fact that Ogden conflates two, perhaps three, senses of the word "meaning" in his essays. He implies by the form, first of all, the notion of the functional orderedness of the environment, the regularities, connectedness, and the adaptation that makes perception, language, and science possible. The term also includes the notion of purpose, satisfaction, and happiness in life: the final good of man. In addition, it also carries the denotation of value, particularly in an ethical sense.

No real justification is offered for this conflation of senses. In any case, the reasons cannot be metaphysical for Ogden wants to construct his metaphysics on just this foundation: that an unavoidable faith invariably detects a basic meaning-
fullness to the universe. We must say that the argument for the breadth of the sense of "meaning" is experiential. Man feels meaning to his environment. Whether he does so in an as yet undifferentiated larger sense, or in multiple ways which he sees as closely related, Ogden does not say. The subtle platonism which we shall detect in Ogden's metaphysics would indicate that, in fact, these senses of "meaning" do come together, that would not, however, necessitate that they are felt as such in primitive faith.

Nevertheless, Ogden holds that once we grant the proper mode of reasoning in religious questions it immediately becomes absurd to ask the question of God's reality. In the sphere of ultimate questions "God" and "reality" are synonymous.34

We may indeed inquire how the ground of our confidence is most appropriately understood or conceived, and whether any among the historical religions is justified in claiming to be its decisive representation or revelation. But to question whether the word "God" as here analyzed refers to anything objectively real is not, I believe, a sensible inquiry.35

Faith, then, the understandable commitment of an individual to "God", whom he recognizes as the ground of meaning in life. Such faith is made plausible for us by Christ's "resurrection" to which it is an obedient response.
The next stage of the argument, as I see it, must be to clarify the analysis of "ground of meaning" as God. This will give us the content of metaphysics. There are, however, two matters which we must elaborate on first. We must clarify the inevitability of faith. We see this aspect best by explaining Ogden's ideas on atheism. In the remainder of the chapter I will then discuss the definitions of philosophy and theology as those follow from the concept of faith.

2. The Impossibility of Atheism

Introduction. - Ogden's concept of faith allows for three forms of unfaith. On the theoretical side there may be misunderstanding, while on the existential side there may be divided commitment. Finally, a combination of both is also possible.

Unfaith, generally, is the refusal to "believe in" God. Specifically, it is a failure to respond to the resurrection as Ogden defines it. As noted, this may be because of misunderstanding or because of "idolatry," or both. In any case, unfaith turns out to be atheism because of the identity of God as the ground of meaning.

Existential Unfaith. - Existential atheism is really the most difficult kind of atheism to deal with since it often occurs without any intellectual problems. In Ogden it is a matter of the will's refusal to obey and is "quite compatible
with flawless orthodoxy." Thus, it may include moral culpability.

A closer look at existential atheism reveals that it is not a total lack of faith, not its polar opposite, but rather a perverted or deficient form of faith. An existential commitment to meaning is, in some sense, unavoidable. Samuel Beckett or Eugene Ionesco make meaningful use of language in everyday affairs; and cannot escape it even in their plays. There is always consent, perhaps unconscious, that the very existence of absurdity depends on rationality.

Thus, existential atheism is really idolatry. It accepts meaning and value but refuses to acknowledge their sole ground.

...The issue...is how we are to believe in the only God in whom anyone can believe and in whom each of us somehow must believe. And here there are but the two possibilities clarified once for all by the Protestant Reformers: either we are so to believe in God that we finally place our trust in him alone; or else we are so to believe in him that we divide our ultimate trust by placing it in part in some idol along side him.

At this point, Ogden disagrees with Hartshorne. The latter does not allow for inauthentic faith but feels that all atheism includes at least an implicit knowledge of the truth. Against this, Ogden frequently insists that it is not necessary that such implicit knowledge be authentic.

Existential atheism, then, is the idolatry of refusing to see God as the sole source of meaning. Ogden agrees with Paul's affirmation in Romans 3:22f, that all men are idolators
**Theoretical Unfaith.** - Atheism, however, can exist on a second, clearly conscious level. That is, it can be a rational denial of God's existence in any form. Such denials are generally concerned with apparent or even real contradictions within theism, either in terms of a particular type of God-concept, or of a certain metaphysical backing, or even of the very notion of metaphysics, let alone theism, itself.

Ogden, as noted above, considers the third possibility to be self-stultifying. The first and second objections, however, occur quite frequently and are often valid. Since one can only speak of God in terms of a specific metaphysic, the first possibility can be included in the second. This has been the usual historic form of atheism: the rejection of Christianity on the presumption that only the classical metaphysical basis was orthodox and that this basis was faulty. We shall deal with Ogden's solution to this problem in chapter IV.

A third type of atheism is conceivable, namely one which combines the theoretical and existential. Generally, however, this is simply an extension of theoretical atheism. Were that to be overcome, the existential rejection would cease.

We should note, however, that Ogden is aware of the fact that theoretical atheism may not always include willful rejection. Few men are completely consistent within the scope of
their conscious beliefs, not to speak of the frequent dichotomies between their intellect and their actual life. Ogden's method of dealing with theoretical atheism can at least be illustrated at this point if we analyze two of his essays challenging specific atheisms: "The Strange Witness of Unbelief" (1966) which is directed toward Sartre, and "God and Philosophy" (1968), which deals with Flew. If faith is truly unavoidable then it must always be possible to show that any atheistic position is internally contradictory, that is, that theism, in Ogden's sense, can be derived from one of its premises.

Sartre. - Ogden summarizes Sartre's position as follows: 46

(1) If there is no God, then all is permitted and there is no human essence.

(2) There is no God

(3) All is permitted man, who has no essence.

Ogden's route is to show an internal contradiction by demonstrating that it proves that man does have an essence, thereby destroying the major premise by modus tollens. Ogden is assuming here that Sartre's major premise is more accurately stated as: (1') If and only if there is no God then all is permitted and there is no human essence. This is a crucial characteristic of the premise since its denial not only refutes Sartre's argument but establishes its opposite.
Ogden claims to be able to marshal evidence refuting the major premise. He argues that Sartre's concepts of the human "universality of condition," "condemned to be free," etc. all clearly indicate some content to a human essence. One can even show, he says, that Sartre denies his own moral relativism by establishing freedom as an absolute.47

The important factor is that these data which negate the major premise arise from within Sartre's atheism. Thus it is a "strange witness of unbelief" to the reality of God. Sartre's system, then, is an example of an attack on classical theism; in fact, however, it ends up proving the necessity of God, although one perhaps quite different from the sovereign, absolute one of traditional metaphysics.

Flew. - Ogden's argument against Flew48 is even more instructive in pointing out the "necessary" character of faith. By using examples from God and Philosophy49 Ogden attempts to show that Flew's "Stratonician atheism" is itself non-factual. What, for example, could falsify the statement "the universe itself is ultimate"?50

Thus, Ogden wants to force Flew into the dilemma of choosing between whether the falsifiability theory is nonsense - at least at certain levels - or whether both theism and atheism are.

This argument makes it clear that metaphysics cannot be made liable to total empirical verification. It is true that
metaphysics is based on facts, but not on particulars, rather on the entire category of fact. Therefore, metaphysical assertions, if true, are necessarily true, not contingently so, and thus not falsifiable by an individual fact.

The implication for understanding is obvious, if Ogden is correct in this. If "God" denotes an individual fact within the universe, then it comes under the purview of falsifiability and is judged meaningless. If it refers to something beyond or apart from the universe, then it is totally separate ("wholly other") from experience, and it is not clear how we could speak of God at all. The only workable alternative is to see God as "the universe itself as a whole," though still in some sense unique and individual.

We can see already the directions in which Ogden will develop a metaphysical and theological content on the basis of an analysis of faith. For now, however, we must continue our examination of the implications of faith for the systemic relations between those areas.

In summary, for Ogden, faith, and therefore the reality of God, is unavoidable or inescapable for two reasons. First, even a denial of meaning affirms meaning. Thus, although faith may be idolatrous, it is always implicitly present. Secondly, when atheisms are examined and their inconsistencies reduced they tend to prove their opposite, namely the existence of God, the object of faith.
C. The Nature and Criteria of Philosophy and Metaphysics

1. Metaphysics as the Core of Philosophy

What is Philosophy? - In "The Task of Philosophical Theology" philosophy is defined as "the fully reflective understanding of the basic existential faith which is constitutive of human existence." Statements with similar import can be found in other places as well. Philosophy is the existentialist analysis of content, implications and prerequisites of the constitutive understanding of meaning.

This definition clearly excludes one concept of philosophy's role: it is not the quest or attempt to justify faith. "Faith" has two senses in Ogden. In its broad sense, which is the use with which we have so far been concerned, it includes a level of reflection and is thus a mode of existentialist understanding. But both "faith" and "reason" can be given strict abstracted senses, namely reflective reason and fully existential faith. In this second use, faith is not reflection, but encounter. Nevertheless, Ogden holds that it still has content, and thus gives a "preunderstanding" to reflection, and is, thereby, still experience.

This distinction lies at the basis of the insight to which Ogden also subscribes, that faith in the strict sense precedes reason and seeks it. From this it follows that faith as such neither needs nor permits justification. It is,
rather, the ground of justification and, thus, logically pre­cedes philosophy.

From the above definition it is clear that philosophy is essentially existentialist. Its subject is man's being within his meaningful world.

The very definition of philosophy already indicates its three major components. First, it is concerned with man's being and is thus anthropology. Second, it examines man as part of a total context and is thus cosmology. Finally, its discussion of both man and the world is dependent on the presupposition of meaning and its ground. Thus philosophy is theology. Together these three constitute metaphysics.

Ogden nowhere attempts a more refined delineation of the disciplines that make up philosophical inquiry. He notes at one point that any such attempt would be incomplete, arbitrary and of limited value. He does mention that philosophy of law, morals, science, art, and religion are "peripheral." Epistemology and logic are also mentioned but their classification is not indicated except to say that they are "important." As we have seen, they play an introductory methodological role, rather than one of content.

The centrality of metaphysics. - One thing is quite clear about Ogden's classification of philosophical inquiries, and that is that metaphysics is the central core. The argument
for this position begins with the definition of philosophy as a reflective understanding. This, for Ogden, demands that philosophy be both analytic and constructive. His argument is as follows.

In its critical and analytic phase, philosophy is concerned, among other things, with the clarification of language. Some, Ogden asserts, have confusedly identified philosophy with linguistic analysis. That they are wrong can be seen from their own recognition that philosophy is different from philology. They deal with depth grammar, with the presuppositions of language or with "logical frontiers," demonstrating thereby that their concern is really metaphysical, not linguistic. This point in Ogden is vague at best, but appears to mean primarily that linguistic analysts, though they profess to want only to dissect, actually involve themselves in the construction of theories about the nature of reality. Thus they echo what has always been the dominant theme of philosophy.

Precisely in meditation on the "variety of expression" which makes up the history of human life and culture, philosophy always has aimed, and quite properly should aim to lay bare the faith by which every man exists simply as a man, together with the structure of reality as revealed to such faith.

What Ogden has done here is simply to draw the logical conclusion from his definition of faith. If faith is the confidence in meaning as such and metaphysics is the heart of
its analysis, then it must follow that every attempt to discuss meaning—and surely linguistic analysis is such an attempt—is metaphysical in nature.

In summary, philosophy is metaphysical at heart, first, because in its second phase it is constructive or synthetic in its approach to the reality of faith. But it is metaphysical also because in dealing with faith it involves itself with the "most basic and comprehensive" themes that face us as human beings. The content of philosophy is focused on the meaning of life itself and its grounding in God, which, for Ogden, are the paramount existential concerns.

There is a third reason as well for the centrality of metaphysics. Not only is its content foundational, it is concerned with the conditional questions of human existence. Thus, content indicates clearly that the method of existentialist analysis is "transcendental," by which Ogden means "the raising to full self-consciousness of the basic beliefs that are the condition of the possibility of our existing or understanding at all." Metaphysics is the attempt to answer what is not only the first question for man, but also that question, namely of meaning itself, the answer to which is determinative for all others.

2. The Disciplines of Metaphysics

Ogden's earlier position. - We touch now on a question on which Ogden appears to have shifted his stance in recent years. Although I must admit that his present position is
not entirely transparent to me, it does differ in one signif-
ificant way from that elaborated in his essays through 1971.
Let me briefly state the original account of the disciplines
that make up metaphysics, much of which remains, and then turn
to the present development.

It may be helpful to clarify this division of metaphysics,
as well as the overall classification of philosophy in the fol-
lowing diagram. 66

Metaphysics divides into two main studies. First, Ogden
mentions what was traditionally known as metaphysica generalis,
or what today we call ontology. This is the study of the
most general features of reality, 67 or of existence itself, 68
features so general that they are inclusive of God, man, and
the world.

For Ogden the history of ontology appears to be made
up of classical metaphysics, which operated with the categories
of "being" and "substance", and the neoclassical alternative
in which "process" and "creativity" are the primary categories. 69

The second division of metaphysics is metaphysica specialis
which comprises three disciplines: theology, cosmology, and
anthropology. About the first nothing need be said here, since
the next section will discuss it in detail.

Concerning cosmology Ogden has said, as far as I am aware, nothing to date. It is, in fact, quite curious to find it as an equal partner here since Ogden's argument for the rejection of existential philosophy is that it is incomplete because it is no more than anthropology: it needs a theology to complete it. One may wonder why Ogden's system does not also need a cosmology. A partial answer is given in his most recent statement on the nature of metaphysics, which I shall discuss below, but no final answer.

Philosophical anthropology is the existential analysis of man as carried out, for example, by Heidegger and Bultmann. In some places this is referred to as "psychology" although Ogden states, without any argument, that "anthropology" is his preference.

Ogden's present position. - Ogden's most current analysis of metaphysics, brief though it is, presents some changes and refinements that leave us with something quite different than the original scheme. Nothing is said to indicate any change in the overall breakdown of philosophical disciplines, but metaphysics itself appears to have the following analysis.
The changes introduced can be summarized as follows.  

1. Metaphysics is now more precisely defined by a criterion of truth, namely that of necessary, unfalsifiable or unavoidable belief. I shall discuss this criterion in the following section. 

2. The primary result is that anthropology is no longer to be considered part of metaphysics since, although unavoidable to the individual, its statements are strictly contingent and falsifiable as such, and especially for God. 

3. This, however, would leave us with a metaphysics which no longer provides "the full truth about human existence," and which violates the general definition of an analysis of faith. Ogden, therefore, introduces a distinction between "metaphysics in the broad sense" or "integral existential truth" and "metaphysics in the strict sense" which is concerned only with necessary truth.

Aside from the above line of thought there is a second which also introduces some changes. 

4. Ogden's increased use of process categories in relation to God and the world has resulted in a breakdown in the distinction between ontology and theology.

Ontology is also theology in the sense that its constitutive concept "reality as such" necessarily involves the distinction/correlation between the one necessarily existing individual and the many contingently existing individuals and events. Conversely, theology can only be ontology, in the sense that its constitutive concept "God" necessarily requires that the implied distinction/correlation between God and the world be identical with that involved in "reality as such."
(5) Likewise, and for the same essential reason, ontology cannot be completely separated from cosmology. Reality as such is identical with God-and-the-world. (6) The result of (4) and (5) is that the distinction between metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis disintegrates. If the world is, in a sense yet to be clarified here, to be understood as God's body, then the most general features of reality just are the features of God (and the world), and neither have any special and therefore less general ones.

What is left unclear in this revised understanding of metaphysics is the position of anthropology. It's centrality to faith demands its inclusion as an equal, whereas its avowed contingency forbids it. And yet the puzzle is that man must surely be included in the total reality of God-and-the-world which is necessary. 

We have now had, in a number of instances, occasion to refer to the truth criterion and the notion of verification within metaphysics. I must now turn to that topic in detail.

3. Metaphysics and Truth

Introduction. - The notion of truth for metaphysics is doubly important in Ogden's system. For, as has become clear, it serves as a criterion not only for philosophical truth, but also for theological truth, since the latter is included in the former. Thus it bears the weight of the entire system.

As a result, one might expect Ogden to have spent more time on the subject than he has. Although he has not ignored
it, the statement that he has made lacks something in the way of careful exposition. As a result, this section may leave the reader with some feelings of vagueness, but I shall try to live up to the commentator's ideal of being at least a little clearer than the original.

**Factual versus metaphysical.** - The question of truth begins with a distinction between the statement of fact and the statements of metafact. The level of factual truths divides into the purely empirical, those based solely on the information of the senses, and the existential, or those based on our awareness of reality in a broader sense.76

Ogden provides at least three distinctions to characterize the factual level over against the metaphysical. First, factual statements are ontic, while metaphysical ones are ontological.77 The former are concerned to describe actual facts while the latter are intended to describe factuality. The difference, then, is at least one of the level of descriptions of the general features of what is observed.

The second distinction is that of contingent versus necessary. One shudders to even bring this up for all of the harrowing problems it involves and I shall avoid here going much beyond the few remarks Ogden makes. The distinction is explained as having reference to that which must exist versus that which can exist. It is, therefore, a distinction of
modal status, not merely logical. Ogden refers to contingent and necessary states of affairs as well as truths, but does not explain their relationship.78

I must, however, immediately add a caution. There are, as we have said, two senses of "metaphysics" and the contingent/necessary distinction applies only to metaphysics in the strict sense. Metaphysics in the broad sense includes anthropological statements about my own existence, which, however unavoidable for the individual are nevertheless contingent. Thus, there is an understanding of metaphysics for which it is not true that all of its statements are recognizable by being necessary. It is also true that Ogden does not claim the reverse, namely that all necessary statements are metaphysical.

The third distinction between factual and metaphysical is that of falsifiable versus unfalsifiable. Again, with this distinction the qualification regarding the two senses of "metaphysics" is relevant. Anthropological statements, including many of the typical claims of (Christian) theology are existentially falsifiable, although unavoidable, since they "could conceivably be false."79 But in the strict sense metaphysical statements are in no way subject to falsification.

The criterion of truth in metaphysics. -

What, then, is the criterion of metaphysical truth? I submit that it is the criterion of unavoidable belief or necessary application through experience. ....they are the statements which would necessarily apply through any of my experiences....80
Ogden makes similar statements in other places, but their meaning is anything but clear. His declarations that metaphysical statements are not falsifiable by individual facts that may not support them, only complicates understanding.

We must, I think, begin by reminding ourselves that metaphysics, as is true of all philosophy and theology, has its source in an analysis of faith—an existentialist analysis. The result is that Ogden's criterion of truth for metaphysical propositions cannot be consistency with observational facts since they are not derived from such facts, nor can it be simply coherence alone since they must be true to a given content. Let me repeat: metaphysical propositions are not, for Ogden, higher level generalizations (super-science), or abstractions from the data, or descriptive in any observational sense. While they have an objective—and hence descriptive—element, they are statements of existentialist analyses of a specific content: faith.

The key here is that a proposition about faith must always be a statement about the order of the universe—about its meaningfulness. It is thus a statement about facticity not about a fact or any collection of facts. I shall illustrate this point by two examples of Ogden's discussions. One example would be his interpretation of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Its real meaning, Ogden holds, is that the possibility of any metaphysics is identical with the reality
That is, if anything at all is true, then the meaningful structure of the existence of God-and-the-world is true. Metaphysical truth is one whole, not a collection of individually verifiable statements. That is, one cannot separate a theory of reality from the context of the grounding of that reality. Faith necessitates both an ordered world and a world orderer. This is a unity derived, not from the multiplicity of facts but from the simple experience of the meaning of facticity.

A second example brings out this same point. We noted in chapter II that Ogden dismisses classical supernaturalism as unintelligible to contemporary man. Its real difficulty is not its internal, structural incoherence, not its occasional incongruency with certain facts, but its inability as a world view to meet the requirements of modern thought. That is, classical supernaturalism as a whole is an extended analysis of faith that does not do justice to the contemporary secular criterion that must apply to our understanding of meaning. This traditional version of theism fails for Ogden as a metaphysical system, again, not because it misconstrues the facts but because it does not see the meaning of the universe implied by faith. Of the various problems Ogden mentions, the failure of classical theism to do justice to the autonomy of man seems to be its primary disqualification.

These examples will explain Ogden's view that a metaphysical statement may remain true even when the facts which relate to
it or may support it turn out false.

Something taken to be a fact may be taken as such with reference either to the factual question, "What are the facts?" or to the metaphysical question, "What is it to be a fact?" If in a given case, then, the taking should subsequently prove to be a mis-taking, any answer given to the factual question must, so far as dependent on the mistake, itself be rejected as mistaken or corrected accordingly. And yet, significantly, this need not be done in the case of an answer to the metaphysical question. Even though what is taken as fact should prove to have been mistaken, the metaphysical answer itself...may still be correct.84

To clarify, Ogden at one point compares the factual/metaphysical distinction to the empirical/existential in reference to history.85 Here, too, the meaning of an historical event can be relevant, regardless of the historicity of the facts from which it is derived, Ogden claims.

Consequently, if empirical-historical research should prove that Jesus did not in fact say or do what he is taken to have said or done, this need not in the least affect the truth of what the Christian witness of faith asserts, as distinct from what it assumes.86

In the same way the metaphysician can assume certain facts to be true in order to learn from them in their facticity, without asserting their truth or depending on it. That there is a ground of meaning does not depend on the statements of Jesus that there exists a God who as father and creator gives meaning to lives and things. That there is a meaningful order is known to us apart from and before the knowledge of individual facts. It is the metaphysical knowledge of existentialist experience that tells us how to coordinate and understand
the facts, not the reverse. I take this to be the meaning of "necessary application through experience." In summary, to say that a metaphysical proposition is true is to say the following:

(a) The proposition is part of the analysis of the existentialist experience of meaning.

(b) The proposition says something about every possible objective or sensory experience, but is not derived (in any sense) from any individual or collection of them.
D. What is Theology?

Introduction. - We have now seen that Ogden's definition of philosophy, metaphysics in particular, is that of an elucidation of faith. We turn now to theology. In chapter II we concluded that Ogden's epistemology leads to an identification of theology and philosophy. In this chapter we have indicated something of the nature of that identity by noting their common source and content in faith. The purpose of this section will be to define that identity in more detail.

1. Ogden's Statements of Definition

Ogden has frequently given brief statements in definition of theology. It will serve as a helpful introduction if I quote some of these.

(1) The task of theology is that of the adequate conceptual statement in a given historical situation of the existential understanding of God, the world, and man, which is given in and with faith in the kerygma or proclamation of the Christian church. (1958)87

(2) For what constitutes the essential theological task in every historical situation is the adequate conceptual statement in that situation of the understanding of human existence which is implied in obedient faith in the Christian proclamation. (1958)88

(3) Theological thinking and speaking are a more or less distinguishable type or level of thinking and speaking about God as apprehended through faith in Jesus Christ. (1965)89

(4) In this sense theology is the particular hermeneutical task of so understanding the Christian witness at the level of reflective thought that the resulting interpretation proves to be fitting to the essential claims of that witness. (1969)90
(5) Just as philosophy is the fully reflective understanding of our common faith simply as selves, so Christian theology, say, is the attempt to become fully self-conscious about specifically Christian faith. (1971)91

(6) Thus theology, properly so called, is the deliberate, methodical, and reasoned attempt to determine what is meant by the Christian witness of faith and whether or not this witness expresses, as it claims to do, the ultimate truth about human existence. (1975)92

2. The Method of Theology

Ogden has repeatedly emphasized that theology is a type of knowledge continuous with, but on a different level than faith. It differs from the spontaneous form by being reflective, deliberate, methodical, reasoned, sustained, and specialized.

It has already been indicated that theology, as philosophy, is the result of existentialist knowledge, a form of awareness that shares characteristics of both objective sense-based and internal existential forms.

Theology is objectifying in two senses.93 First, it shares with sense knowledge the fact of external direction. It is concerned with reality as distinct from ourselves. As such, it has to do only in an indirect way with authenticity. This is clearly distinguished from existential knowledge which is exclusively self-understanding.

But secondly, theology is objectifying in the sense of being "derived rather than original, peripheral rather than central,"94 and thus has the character of detachment and
disinterest. It is a type of knowing that is not pure intuition. It is not immediate, but goes beyond personal encounter to include some level of cognitive analysis of that which is not self.

As objectifying, theology always runs the risk of becoming mythology. As our diagram on page 84 illustrates, theology is placed well at the objective end of the existentialist continuum, and it will always be tempting simply to treat God as one more object among objects and to pattern our forms of expression after the scientific knowledge which our culture inclines us to think of as the only exact and respectable kind. To do this is to fall prey to the same temptation as the ancient Greeks or the writers of the New Testament, despite the greater sophistication of our scientific system.

Theology is held back from this danger in that, as existentialist knowledge, it has also the characteristics of purely existential understanding. As Ogden puts it, it objectifies as subject not as object.95

3. Theology and Truth

Perhaps the most significant result of theology's objectivity is that its statements clearly have truth-value. The nature of theological truth, particularly in relation to scientific truth, is spelled out most explicitly in Ogden's "Falsification and Belief" (1974).
Ogden sees two main positions that have been taken in attempting to settle the question of theological truth vis-a-vis factual or scientific truth. The first is to present theology and science as representing distinct logical types. Thus, no conflict could ever develop since their utterances serve very different functions and any apparent contradictions are the result of misunderstanding one or another's intentions. In no case can one be used to cast doubt on or falsify the other.

The second position argues that science and theology both belong to the same logical type, but that conflict is unlikely since they both have their source in the same commitment to understanding. For this view, theological statements have no special problem of verification since they share with many scientific utterances the character of being beyond empirical demonstration, since neither are strictly observational. When there is clear conflict on the level of particulars there will be no real reason to prefer the claim of science. Rather will the problem have to be arbitrated in the same way as any intrascientific dispute is settled. In fact, the claims of theology may often be preferable due to their greater scope.

Despite the obvious price, Ogden chooses the first type of position. The price to be paid is the inevitable assertions of doubt as to theology's cognitive status. His assignment
of theology to existentialist knowledge, while science belongs to the objective level, already commits Ogden to the position that they are of different logical types. How then does he rescue theology's cognitive status?

The problem is solved first by introducing two notions of falsifiability: empirical and existential. Empirical falsification pertains to those statements whose truth can be settled strictly by sensory observation. Existential falsification, relevant to theology, applies to statements whose truth claim can be decided by the "nonsensuous experience of our own existence" rather than such experience as we may have through our senses.

Statements that fall into this category are those concerning our perception of our own existence, as well as our existence in relation to others and the world around us. This category includes especially those central utterances relating to the authenticity of our existence.

There are, of course, some statements of theology, particularly in scripture, which are subject to simple empirical falsification, including many which we regard as mythological, although these are to be treated primarily by demythologization, due to their true intentions.

This, however, still does not exhaust the varieties of theological expression. In fact, nothing has yet been said of those statements which are more properly theological, namely those about God himself, his existence, attributes,
and activity. And furthermore, since there is a sense in which all theological statements are not only existential but also about God, there is therefore a sense which one can give to them that is not open to any sort of falsification.

Although they cannot be dealt with either empirically or existentially, statements about God, using language analogous to expressions about the human self, must, nevertheless, be justifiable in some sense, or else they would be non-cognitive.

If theological statements not only express faith but also assert something about the divine reality in which faith understands itself to be based, then the question of how they are to be rationally justified is an altogether appropriate question.

The clue to dealing with statements about God is provided by the fact that they both have reference to objective states of affairs and are true necessarily. Thus, they must be of the same logical type as metaphysical statements generally.

Let me add Ogden's warning:

Please notice that I have not said theological assertions simply are metaphysical assertions.... My point, rather, is that the class to which theological assertions logically belong is the general class of metaphysical assertions and that, therefore, the kind of rational justification to which they are open is the kind generically appropriate to all assertions of this logical class.

We can, then, at this point simply refer our discussion of the justification of theological statements back to the last section concerning the statements of metaphysics.
4. Theology as Included in Metaphysics

We have seen that theology shares with philosophy a common source, content, method and logical type. The discussion of metaphysics has indicated that their identity is to be understood by way of inclusion.

Ogden's remarks are frequently confusing, because in some places he treats philosophy and theology as separate and contrasting disciplines. This can be explained, I suggest, by noting that the specific content of theology, that is, the ground of meaning, occurs at two levels within the scope of philosophy. It appears first in the very abstract and general discussion of ontology, although in categories generalized beyond the specifically theological. It also appears, however, as a metaphysica specialis. At this level the more concrete terminology of "God," "authenticity," "revelation," etc. is possible. Within this general or philosophical theology there are also the particular theologies, such as the Christian with its even more specialized terminology (e.g. "Trinity," "redemption," and "Scripture").

This twofold division of metaphysics, therefore, allows theology to be included within philosophy and yet be distinguishable as the more specific and less general discipline. As such, theology is closer to life. At one point Ogden says

For the philosopher, ordinarily, God is less the answer to the existential question of the ultimate worth of his own life than the answer to the more reflective question of the ultimate coherence of reality....
Thus, more specific analyses of faith will tend to be closer to the existential pole of knowledge and more immediately relevant to one's experience. Nevertheless, what Ogden appears to offer as a distinction between philosophy and theology in terms of function, is almost fully taken back by his position that the intellectual and existential questions are really one and the same and that no person can ever be just a philosopher.

God-talk is existential talk--talk about the mystery of our own existence and all existence within the ultimate reality whence we come and whither we go and which therefore determines, finally, whether or in what way the course of our life as any abiding meaning.

In this chapter we have pulled together Ogden's definition of faith, philosophy and theology as they are derived from his epistemology.

Faith, for Ogden, is the unavoidable confidence in the meaning of one's life and environment which is part of existentialist knowledge. Philosophy is the general analysis of the implications of faith. Its central component is theology, the specific analysis of the ground of meaning, that is, God. Thus Ogden sees theology as a specification within philosophy. Its concern is a particular aspect of the analysis of the experience of meaning: What grounds or explains it? That theology must be identified within philosophy follows, as we saw in chapter II from the results of demythologizing. That both find their
content in the analysis of faith, follows, Ogden thinks, from the very possibility and nature of existentialist knowledge.

There is another argument for the identity of philosophy and theology to be discerned in Ogden's system. In this case the argument depends on some of central tenets of Ogden's metaphysics, particularly the nature of God's action in relation to the universe. It will thus be necessary in the following chapter to briefly trace Ogden's doctrine of God and the rationale for a choice of process categories. I shall then be able to state the second argument for the identity of philosophy and theology.
IV. THE METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT

A. The Central Content of Theology and Philosophy
B. The Doctrine of God
C. God's Action as Revelation
D. Summary: The Relationship of Theology and Philosophy
Introduction. - We are now in a position to discuss the core content of Ogden's system of theology-philosophy as it follows from the concept of an analysis of faith, and ultimately from his epistemology.

We have already established that unavoidable faith implies the existence of God. The first task of this chapter will be to develop Ogden's argument for the theocentricity of theology-philosophy. This, in turn, leads to his theory of analogy. The way has then been prepared for a discussion of the actual nature of God and the resulting concept of revelation.

This is a rather circuitous route but it is necessary to give us Ogden's full position regarding the identity of theology and philosophy. I argued in chapter II that Ogden's epistemology, in particular the consistent application of demythologization, makes the identity necessary since there can be no exception to the existential interpretation of historical events. Thus theology cannot claim a unique, objective, divine intervention in history as its separating criterion.

In this chapter I shall argue that Ogden is committed to the identity by his metaphysical position, in particular as it concerns the nature of God's action. This also provides us with Ogden's criterion of revelation which allows him to identify the right philosophy with Christian theology.

A. The Central Content of Theology and Philosophy

Bultmann's position. - Ogden's argument is best understood
in the context of an argument against Bultmann's christocentric system. Ogden reduces this system to two basic points:

(1) Christian faith is to be interpreted exhaustively and without remainder as man's original possibility of authentic historical (geschichtlich) existence as this is more or less adequately clarified and conceptualized by an appropriate philosophical analysis.

(2) Christian faith is actually realizable, or is a "possibility in fact," only because of the particular historical (historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth, which is the originative event of the church and its distinctive word and sacraments.

Thus, Christ is seen as an ultimately necessary historical event in that in him man's original and inherent possibility is realized.

The apparent anthropocentricity of demythologized theology. Ogden has stated frequently that, on at least a superficial level, theological talk is about man. Note the following quotations:

All theological statements are, directly or indirectly, existential statements and...there are serious dangers in speaking as though only some such statements are existential, while others have to do not with man but with God and his action.²

The question of faith necessarily presupposed by the Christian witness and by faith in the God whom it attests is, at bottom, the universally human question of the true understanding of our existence.³

By definition the analysis of faith is anthropocentric on one level because faith is always man's faith. Existentialist analysis is the self studying itself.
Bultmann, however, wishes to go beyond this. By constructing an incarnational theology he can claim that, in fact, theology is always christocentric since everything that it says about man's possibilities, it says because of, and actually about, Christ.

The false christocentricity of theology. - Ogden has denied the consistency of Bultmann's move for the following three reasons. a) It is exegetically inaccurate. In Christ Without Myth Ogden presents a fairly extensive treatment of the exegetical soundness of Bultmann's position, arguing in three points. First, the New Testament pictures every individual as ultimately and totally responsible before God. Ogden cites Paul in Romans 1:20 as an indication of this contention. Here it is made clear that all men at all times have been able to relate to God, thus fulfilling their authenticity, and were therefore responsible and capable of acting on that basis. There is, therefore, no need for a specific historical event to make redemption possible other than the "primordial revelation" which God gave of himself in creation. Thus Ogden argues that natural revelation is sufficient for man, and any direct revelation in the person of Christ, though perhaps helpful, is completely unnecessary.

Secondly, Ogden affirms that the New Testament knows of no other basis for man's salvation than God the Father.
I Corinthians 15:24-28 makes it perfectly plain that God is not only the source but also the goal of all creation as well as redemption. Ogden does not see Christ in this picture in any significant way. Thus he resists the general Protestant position that the scriptures are christocentric and holds, rather, that they are theocentric:

Unless it is made clear not only that "we are Christ's," but that "Christ is God's" (I Cor. 3:23; cf. 11:3), that is, unless the theocentric basis and sanction of "christocentrism" is explicitly acknowledged, emphasis on Jesus Christ can be a snare and a delusion and a mere travesty of authentic apostolic faith. Contrary to Bultmann, who, significantly, offers no scriptural support for his claim, the New Testament does not affirm that in Christ our salvation "becomes possible." It affirms, rather, that in him what has always been possible now "becomes manifest"...

Thirdly, Ogden suggests that even Christ himself, in Matthew 25:31-46, taught that the final condition for salvation lay not in the confession of himself as Lord, or of faith in him at all, but rather in the simple acceptance of God's love. That is, man must understand himself authentically.

Together, then, the scriptural evidence suggests to Ogden that Christ is not "the Way" but a way. Indeed, God is to be found everywhere. He "saves man by grace alone in complete freedom from any saving 'work' of the kind traditionally portrayed in the doctrines of the person and work of Jesus Christ."6

b) Ogden also argues in his essay, "Bultmann's Project of Demythologization and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy"
that Bultmann's solution is philosophically impossible. His point is simply that a "possibility in principle" as distinguished from a "possibility in fact" is meaningless:

   For to say that man has a possibility which cannot be realized—and this is all a possibility in principle means—is simply to deny that he has any such possibility at all.\(^7\)

The objection amounts to this: (1) Bultmann's proposal of demythologizing and, underlying this, his existentialist historiography, demands that man be capable of authentication in general, either by his own means or by the grace of God. (2) It must be factually possible for all men at all times to find authentication. (3) "Possibility in principle" is used to deny that any man at any time has or even could authenticate himself, since it means that apart from the contingent fact of Christ, actual (factual) authentication would have remained impossible in practice. (4) Thus, either all men before Christ, and those since him without knowledge of him, are not men at all, or the major premise (1) - (2) is false, or the minor premise (3) is false.

   Ogden's argument turns, of course, on the meaning of "possibility in principle" or, in fact, simply on the meaning of "possibility." For possibility by definition materially implies realizability so that "factual possibility" is redundant and "possibility in principle" either identically redundant or internally contradictory.
c) Finally, Bultmann's position is methodologically inconsistent. This objection is perhaps the most obvious, particularly when one states Bultmann's position as Ogden does in the quotation above. Now it may well be that Ogden has misunderstood Bultmann, although he argues that we would then have to say the same about Barth and Buri. Nevertheless we are really only interested in Ogden's conclusion in terms of its implications within his own system.

Ogden, then, claims that Bultmann is incomplete in the manner in which he carries out his demythologization. In terms of Ogden's summary of Bultmann's position, he is claiming that (1) contradicts (2). That is, on the one hand Bultmann holds that authenticity is open to all men as a result of an analysis or recognition of faith. On the other hand, however, he asserts that authenticity is unrealizable apart from a specific historical event—which remains undemythologized. Thus, Bultmann maintains christocentricity only by failing to complete his project of demythologization. For these reasons, then, Ogden denies the truth of Bultmann's claim of christocentricity.

The actual theocentricity of theology. — We have already examined Ogden's arguments negatively, but they also have the positive function of demonstrating the theocentric nature of
theology. Theocentricity is demanded by exegetical considerations, by the universal possibility of salvation within God's creation, and it results from a consistent application of demythologization and existential reinterpretation.

Theocentricity, however, leaves Ogden with a serious problem: he must provide some means of bridging a linguistic gap. As we have already seen, superficially at least, theological statements are about man, not God. It is this problem that leads Ogden to deny the adequacy of Heideggerian existentialism, and provides the impetus to make use of process categories, in order to develop a doctrine of God.

Ogden's solution to the problem of statements about human faith which are also about God is his doctrine of analogy. Like most other such doctrines, Ogden's is made up of two parts: first, a metaphysical thesis regarding the relationship between man and God; and, second, a translation device that allows us to convert empirical statements about man into statements about God without falling prey to the need to demythologize. In Ogden's case the first part of the doctrine is really his whole metaphysics. We turn then to the subject of the core content of metaphysics for two reasons. First, it completes our examination of the identity of theology and philosophy—now in terms of content—and, second, it will enable us to answer the question of how a theology can have its origin in an analysis of human faith.
B. The Doctrine of God

Introduction. - Along the way we have, of course, given a rough indication of the nature of Ogden's God, but it remains to spell it out in detail. In this section I shall first examine Ogden's specific God-concept. This will be followed by shorter chapters dealing with God's relationship to Christ, and to eschatological hope. Finally, I shall develop Ogden's account of God's action, in particular as it relates to revelation.

1. A Process Doctrine of God

Classical versus Neoclassical Theism. - Ogden has, thus far, written relatively little concerning his own general metaphysics. As we have seen, his epistemology is well developed and has been stated quite clearly. With the exception of the doctrine of God, Ogden's process metaphysics is limited to minor passages in a few of his essays. Beyond this, his reader is referred to Hartshorne and Whitehead for many of the basic principles of the system. I shall have to be content here to examine Ogden's reasons for accepting a process metaphysics rather than direct arguments for it. That is, Ogden accepts a process structure as a whole. It is not developed step by step from his basic principles. Rather, having rejected classical theism for reasons already discussed, Ogden adopts his neoclassical panentheism because, as a total system, it best fits the criteria for an adequate theology as well as his epistemological principles.
In general, Ogden argues that neoclassical theism avoids the contradiction and unintelligibility of its classical counterpart.

It is the most adequate reflective account we can give of certain experiences in which we all inescapably share.11

This general point is specified in four ways.

(1) Neoclassical or process theism alone accounts for the ultimacy of the self.

Ogden insists that the "reformed subjectivist principle" indicates not only the subjective starting point or source of epistemology but also the primary content of metaphysics. We generalize the disclosures of experiences, but these disclosures are also experiences of the self.

The characteristics of classical philosophy all derive from its virtually exclusive orientation away from the primal phenomenon selfhood toward the secondary phenomenon of the world constituted by the experience of our senses.12

Ogden argues that this misorientation leads to categories such as "substance" and nontemporal "being" which are applied also to the self.

As soon, however, as we orient our metaphysical reflection to the self as we actually experience it, as itself the primal ground of our world of perceived objects, this whole classical approach is, in the Heideggerian sense of the word, "dismantled."13

With this point, then, Ogden claims to have disqualified all of classical metaphysics and established process categories of "relation", "society," and "event." As we pursue
Ogden's concept of God we shall find that this point is also
the cornerstone of the doctrine of analogy.

(2) Neoclassical theism alone allows for a truly secular
view of the autonomy and significance of life in
the world.

We have already noted this point as a criticism of classical
theism. It fails to provide a God who is genuinely related
to the events and concerns of this world. As such, this
view must always be unacceptable to modern secular man.
As we shall see, the neoclassical alternative overcomes this
by allowing for real and significant relations between God
and the world.

(3) Neoclassical theism alone confirms the genuine
moral significance of man's decisions and actions.

This, too, we have noted as a criticism of classical super­
naturalism. Its God, says Ogden, is one of static perfection,
to whom our actions--even our existence--can make no con­
tribution, and therefore have no worth.

As we noted under (2), however, God's relation to man
in process theism is quite different. Its doctrine of real
relations as well as its concept of immortality allows Ogden
thinks, for the genuine value and significance of human actions.

(4) Only neoclassical theism meets the double criterion
of intelligibility to modern man and adequacy to the
tradition of Christian thought.
Classical supernaturalism is hopelessly flawed by internal contradictions according to Ogden's "antinomies." These are already suggested by points (1) through (3). While God is absolute, and the tradition insists on that, he is so at the expense of relatedness, and both Christian faith as well as secular faith insist on that as well. Classical theism is therefore both intellectually and "existentially repugnant."14

Ogden claims, however, that a process concept of God, linked to his experiential epistemology, provides modern man with a system of belief that is both intelligible as well as being genuinely Christian in its understanding of faith.

We turn, then, to Ogden's process metaphysics, specifically his concept of God. Applying the reformed subjectivist principle as indicated above, we must start with the content of the self's awareness of itself.

The self and God. - Ogden interprets the classical position on the nature of the self as one based on the notions of substance and being.15 This is due to the classical principle that what is most immediate for consciousness, i.e. sense experience, indicates most nearly the nature of reality.16 It only follows that the self should be conceived as a special type of substance, but always a substance nevertheless.
To the neoclassicist, such as Ogden, the primary categories are process and becoming. By viewing the self as it is actually present to us, he sees it as temporal and social. "It is nothing if not a process of change involving the distinct modes of present, past, and future."17 The self exists only within and by its social relatedness. It is known only as a sequence of present occasions which are "integrated" from the past and "anticipate" the future.18

God's existence is to be conceived as strictly analogous to that of the self, because God is not the exception to metaphysical principles but rather their eminent example.19 He is therefore living, growing, temporal, and related. Since, however, he is the eminent example, he is, in a sense to be specified, also immutable, eternal, and absolute.

The reality that is God.—For Ogden, God is to be understood as dipolar. He is both absolute and relative. I must note here again that Ogden does not provide an argument for this point directly. He simply assumes the process (read: Whiteheadian) ontology that implies this concept of God and is content to have shown reasons for accepting that ontology as a whole. He does, however, develop the theological content that results from this view. It will be simplest to deal with each pole of the divine being separately.

(1) God as Related to All

It is in enunciating the relative pole of God that Ogden
is most opposed to classical theism:

... We must cease, finally, to ask in what sense, if any, that which is absolute can be understood as personal and ask, rather, how that which, by analogy with ourselves, is genuinely and eminently personal can also be conceived as absolute.20

It is at this point that neoclassical theism attempts to be original in providing a corrective to traditional thought.

In order to understand clearly God's relatedness, we must explicate how Ogden understands the notion of having a body. Direct interaction for the self is limited to "its own brain cells."21 The body is the environment in which "I" am incarnate and to which I have direct relations.22 Ogden even refers to the "others that constitute one's body,"23 apparently meaning (Whitehead's) actual entities. It is hard to know how to interpret this except as extreme dualism in which mind is not a substance but yet a real process separate from that of the body in which it is incarnate.

God's being must now be understood in the same way, taking into account only that he is the eminent form of being. This follows from the position that God is also an actual entity subject to the same metaphysical categories. Thus, we must say that God's sphere of interaction is limited only by the confines of the universe. The world itself is God's body.24 The truth of God is therefore the truth about the total structure of reality.25 Since, then, all entities are part of his body, God must be internally related to them all. There are many aspects to this relation which we will consider individually.
(a) Love

Love is the "very principle of all being." This is to be understood in the Whiteheadian sense of the principle of relativity, that is, that every actual entity is related either by negative or by positive prehension to every other.

God as the eminent actual entity, therefore, is concerned with the being of every other actual entity which is his body. This not only has relevance to an individual in terms of ultimate present meaning, but also in terms of eschatological hope. God's relatedness is one of "sympathetic participation," since he is "synthesizing in each new moment of his experience the whole of achieved actuality with the plenitude of possibility as yet unrealized." 27

God is thus lovingly involved in constantly recreating the environment of actual entities. They are, as events, in continual process of returning to him.

(b) Value

God gives our lives value in two senses. First, as noted before, it is he who is responsible for the coming together of actual entities which constitute our bodies. He is the one responsible for the structure and order which exists. This is simply another way of saying that he is "whatever it is about this experienced whole that calls forth and justifies our original and inalienable truth in life's worth." 28 In saying this, we have described the whole purpose of God: he
alone makes it possible to avoid the conclusion of absurdity. Our lives make a difference, they are valuable, because he exists. This does not abrogate man's responsibility to decide for authentic existence. We must still choose to live in light of this God-given meaningfulness.

Second, he gives our lives eternal value as well. It is to him that actual entities return to become eternal objects.²⁹ It is in God that our lives make an "imperishable difference" and in him that they "find their ultimate justification."³⁰

(c) Dependence

Since the world is God's body, for Ogden, God's own reality as an actual entity is dependent on the cosmos.³¹ This is not to be understood in terms of God's existence as such. That he is, is dependent on "what actual state of the infinite number of states possible for him is in fact actualized."³³

We must take caution in understanding this, however, since Ogden also wishes to claim that it is meaningless to assert that God was ever without a body, that is, a real cosmos.³⁴ Thus, to create is for God necessary, yet any individual world is contingent.³⁵ Thus, there is never more than one necessary actual entity.

We can summarize God's relativity by saying that God is not an addition to the world. He is encountered in all experience and is immanent in all conception.³⁶ He is inclusive of all
reality, and therefore also of both the actual and the potential.37

(2) God as Absolute

Again we can best explicate this idea by indicating its various aspects. We shall note in each case that "absolute" does not have its classical meaning of infinite. In a dipolar concept there can only be absoluteness in terms of relativity, i.e. "relative absoluteness." This will become clear below.

(a) Absolute in Inclusion

The basic character of God's absoluteness is given for Ogden in his all-inclusiveness, a concept which implies not only relatedness as mentioned above, but supremacy as well. He is all being; to experience at all is to experience God.38 God's body is the universe and he is therefore the supreme actual entity, encompassing all, and in that sense absolute.

It is ultimately this notion of all-inclusion that emerges in the characteristics of God below.

(b) Absolute in Relation

The absoluteness of relation in God is understood in two ways. First, as we have noted before, he is immediately related to all entities in the universe in the way human beings are related to only those entities which make up their bodies.

Second, his relations are absolute in that there are "no gradations of intimacy"39 among the objects of his attention. His relatedness is equal to all actual entities.
We should emphasize the fact that God's relations are direct. Thus, he is both "affected by all," and affects all. The former signifies his dependence, the latter his love. Since Ogden is thinking of this within the scope of process it becomes clear that God is absolute in change:

- Ogden, then has a God who is in constant flux, as the actual entities which are his body change, and they do this co-caused by God and the precedent state, so he, in his essence, changes with them. Yet in this very fact lies the absoluteness of his nature, and thus his "perfection" of relation.

Whereas the classical notion of perfection was one of concurrent actualization of all possible value, for Ogden it is a "dynamic maximum of possibilities," the scope of which is constantly changing. At this point, Ogden defers to Hartshorne whose main work has been the discovery and elucidation of this neoclassical concept of perfection, primarily in his *The Logic of Perfection.*

(c) Absolute in Knowledge

The concept of absolute knower is not much developed in Ogden's writings; nevertheless it should be mentioned here in passing. God's "omniscience" is clearly implied in his absolute relatedness. "God knows all" means that at every stage of the process every existent is within the scope of
God's relatedness. Ogden usually tends to think of this relation in more fully personal terms as God's absolute love.

(d) Absolute in Temporality

If God is absolute in change, then he must also be "the eminently temporal one." Thus, God's perfection, in order to remain perfection, is constantly increasing:

This is so...because anything we do to advance the real good either of ourselves or of one another is done quite literally to "the glory of God," as an imperishable contribution to his ever-growing perfection, which is, indeed, "the true life of all."

We can summarize God's absoluteness by noting that his "being related to all others is itself relative to nothing, but is the absolute ground of any and all real relationships."

Thus, his perfection is a perfect relativity with many aspects such as love, value, dependence, knowledge, temporality, etc.

We shall conclude our elucidation of Ogden's God-concept by developing it in three areas. In each case Ogden has written at least one essay dealing specifically with the topic. Each is also an instance where Ogden has been highly creative in adapting process philosophy to Christian theism.

2. God and History

In this discussion, I am concerned with Ogden's answers to two questions. First, what is God's relationship to time? Second, what does it mean to affirm that God acts in time?

God's Temporality. - Ogden takes his cue from the following
note in Heidegger's *Being and Time*:

It requires no extensive discussion to show that the traditional concept of eternity, in the sense of the "stationary now" (nunc stans), is drawn from the vulgar understanding of time and is limited by a orientation to the idea of "constant" presence-on-hand. If the eternity of God would admit of being "construed" philosophically, it could be understood only as a more primal and "infinite" temporality. Whether the via negationis et eminentiae could offer a possible way to this goal would remain uncertain.50

The primal understanding of time is that of actually creating time by our experiences and relations, not of acting in time. Time takes its shape by our continual construction of significantly ordered wholes from memory and anticipation.51 Since, then, for man temporality is defined by relations and his relations are severely limited and finite, his temporality itself is restricted. Man's birth is "the constant reminder that there once was when he was not,"52 except as potential.

In God, however, the limits of relation are lifted. He is, therefore, not timeless but radically temporal and, by that, eternal.53 For God, time "exists" as a maximum unlimited by space, without beginning or end. But by the same token he is never above time in any sense. He knows the future only by anticipation of the potential.

Thus, God creates reality in two senses. First, it exists in relation to him and his own personal goals. Second, by his inclusiveness God is, in fact, temporalizing reality.

*God in history.* - We are now in a position to understand what it means for Ogden's God to act in history. God's action
exists on two levels. First, God as originator is the ultimate ground of all actual entities. Reality is constituted not only by its own subjective aims, but by God's loving, responsive decision of inclusion. This, however, is an acting above history, just as our decisions to act are not equivalent to our bodily actions, but are their ground. 54

On a second level, however, we can affirm God's action in history in two senses. In one sense every creature is an act of God. That is, there are not only joint causes on the level of decision, but also on the level of actuality. We are, in part, self-created, yet always based on God's creation, that is, his giving to the event its initial direction. This is true in that same way in which the actions of our bodies are also our actions. 55

Although the acts whereby God actualizes his essence are his acts and not the acts of the creatures, every creature is what it is only by partly reflecting or expressing in its action God's own free decisions. 56

God acts in a second sense as well, namely in events in history which uniquely express his character. This does not apply to every event in history, although each has the potential, 57 if it chooses to fulfill God's original direction. Anytime, however, an act is interpreted as a symbol of God as creator or redeemer it becomes God's unique revelational act. Other acts are distorted or fragmentary and are God's acts only in the first sense described above.
the doctrine of God itself, we need at this point to briefly clarify Ogden's thinking on the position of Christ in relation to God. Both this as well as the last topic will be crucial in understanding the concept of revelation with which we must deal in the next section.

We mentioned above that some human events or actions within history have a special revelatory character of the nature of God and are, therefore, his acts in a special way, usually that they are interpreted as fully carrying out God's intentions for them. The criterion by which a revelation is discerned is both objective and subjective. Referring to the revelational function of such characteristic acts, Ogden says:

This it can do only insofar as its form and structure are such that the possibility of selfunderstanding they express is in fact the true or authentic understanding of human existence.\[98\]

The objective part of the revelation is its actual content, whereas its subjective part is its "fit" or adequacy to our existence.

One of the clear marks of the Christian community is the understanding that Jesus is God's decisive act of revelation. "The truth as it is known in Jesus Christ is the only ultimate truth to be known anywhere."\[59\] This obviously rests on Ogden's demythologized view of Jesus, particularly of the resurrection. It is in Jesus that he sees the ultimate revelation:

...That all things have their beginning and end in God's pure unbounded love, and that it is in giving himself wholly into the keeping of this love,
by surrendering all other securities, that man realizes his authentic life.\textsuperscript{60}

Thus, the event that is Jesus, including his teaching, is not just a human act, but God's decisive revelation of himself.\textsuperscript{61} Jesus fully carries out God's intentions for authentic human existence.

In conclusion we should note three characteristics of Ogden's view of Jesus as a revelation. (1) The problem of the two natures of Jesus is solved somewhat simply for Ogden. The reality of Jesus is clearly the reality of God,\textsuperscript{62} just as all actual entities are God's body, yet identifiable as individual event. Thus Jesus' dual nature is not unique, but representative of every event.

(2) Just as Ogden argues against Bultmann's concept of Jesus as the actualization of authentic existence on the basis of the identity of philosophy and theology,\textsuperscript{63} so now, armed with a more thorough metaphysics, he can reaffirm that Jesus represents authentic selfhood,\textsuperscript{64} in a sense which I shall examine in the next section.

(3) We should note, finally, that for Ogden the decisiveness of an act of God does not lie in its historicity, but existentially in our response of faith to it. Faith is concerned with the message of Jesus not Jesus himself.\textsuperscript{65}

For Ogden, the eschatological hope is our inclusion in God's mind as an "eternal object" or memory, and thus as potential
for the future. This is what Ogden refers to as the "promise of faith." In a sense, we are already assured of our "eternal life" by our understanding of our present inclusion in God as shown by faith.

There is, therefore, a solution to the apparent meaninglessness of death, for we shall always be of significance in God. Even those who refuse total faith in God's love will be included in God, although still without true faith. This precisely is hell: to be bound to God without faith in his love. Thus, God does not deny man's freedom:

What is given man to decide is not whether he shall be the object of God's gracious love; that, to the contrary, God alone freely decides. Man's decision is only whether he shall accept God's love for him...

It should be noted that Ogden's understanding of immortality is a purely formal one. We retain significance as memories in the mind of God, as possibilities or models to be used in future goals. Certainly there is no concept here of conscious afterlife, let alone of bodily resurrection. This is one point where it is particularly difficult to maintain that Ogden is within the orthodox Christian tradition, or that he is merely demythologizing the New Testament.

This concludes the overview of Ogden's doctrine of God. My purpose is simply to provide a basis for an examination of his view of God's action, revelation in particular. I have indicated the metaphysical basis for speaking of God's action in history in Ogden's panentheism. This, however, leaves us
with a problem. How can we coordinate the notion of God's action with the criteria of demythologization? We must be able to specify how and why it is possible to speak of God acting in history without falling prey to objectifying language. We shall then be in a position to understand Ogden's metaphysical argument for the identity of theology and philosophy, that is, that the notion of decisive revelation can be explicated without uniquely theological categories.
C. God's Action as Revelation

1. The Doctrine of Analogy

Introduction. - We are now in a position to give a more complete answer to the problem of language about God in Ogden's system. Specifically, how can the existentialist analysis of faith also be theology? Put simply, the answer is in two parts. (1) Since the universe is God's body, any descriptive statement is descriptive of God beyond whatever other content it may have. Thus, in Ogden's "panentheism" the metaphysical portion of the doctrine of analogy is constituted by the complete inclusion of man in God. (2) The linguistic component, that is, the translation device, is supplied in the sharing of selfhood by God and man. The language of the self can be applied literally. Let me now expand.

Analogy of selfhood. - Bultmann holds that it is possible to speak of God analogically on the basis of univocal elements in the concept of human existence and Ogden accepts this view.\textsuperscript{70} By means of an analysis of human existentiality we can "explicate the conception of God and of God's action."\textsuperscript{71} The actual working out of such a theology, however, is lacking in Bultmann. It is precisely this theological deficiency in Bultmann which Ogden sees as supplied by his process metaphysics. A passage quoted in Ogden's essay for the Hartshorne Festschrift, \textit{Process and Divinity}, will serve as an introduction to his view.
... The analogy between God and man "may be used to shed light in both directions. On neither side of the comparison do we have simple direct, literal understanding, or wholly indirect, non-literal understanding. Rather, on both sides, we have something literal, but inadequate, needing to be helped out by the analogy with the other". 72

This is true, because God is the "Being in which all beings are precisely a diversity in unity,"73 and therefore neither God nor the self can ever be viewed in strict separation. The assertion of "something literal" on both sides implies, although Ogden does not develop this until his later essays, that there is at least some direct knowledge of God.

As we have seen, the theoretical basis of analogy is for Ogden primary content of theology and metaphysics. Let me briefly sketch the basic univocal element in the analogy.

The univocal element in the man-God analogy is the nature of selfhood. We understand God by understanding ourselves: i.e. existential analysis is the key to theological analysis. For Ogden this is guaranteed by one of the cardinal principles of process thought: that God is not the exception to, but the paramount example of metaphysical categories.74 He differs only by being the unique and perfect example.75

Thus, just as our self is spatial, temporal, and related to and dependent on a body, so too, God exists in space, but without limits, is infinitely temporal, and related to all that is.
Ogden's process doctrine of analogy claims success in finding a genuine univocal element, thus overcoming the inherent problems of the classical version which, according to Ogden, never accomplished its purpose of univocity. He claims that, since the God of classical theism is infinitely different from the universe, no real univocal element is possible. We have, then, a quite different type of analogy. There is an analogical relationship between God and man, but on both sides our knowledge as well as our language is, in part, direct. This is, of course, an advantage of Ogden's panentheism. Since the world simply is God's body--his relative nature--analogy is, in fact, based on identity.
2. Ogden's Concept of Original Revelation

**God's action.** - It will be helpful to introduce the topic of revelation by summarizing the basic points of Ogden's views of God's activity in history. Our understanding must begin with the fact that our knowledge of God comes by way of analogy with the human self.

Particularly essential is the distinction between inner and outer actions, that is, between mental acts and overt acts. Of these two, it is mental activity that is fundamental.

Behind all our public acts of word and deed there are the self's own private purposes or projects, which are themselves the product of action or decision...; all its outer acts of word and deed are but ways of expressing and implementing the inner decisions whereby it constitutes itself as a self.

This distinction is then applied to God. The interaction of the self's mind and body is analogous to the interaction of God and the world. The difference, in addition to the absence of finitude, is that God's participation is, if anything, even closer, since his love is boundless.

The whole world is, so to say, his sense organ, and his interaction with every creature is unimaginably immediate and direct.

When this conception is clarified in its process backdrop the following doctrine emerges. While it is true that each state of the world is in part the result of natural cause and effect and, in particular, the free decisions of creatures, those decisions are responses to God's initial aim and in turn to
responded to as potential for God's future choices.

God's existence is without beginning or end; he simply is. His boundless love extends to all that is actual. But more than that, he includes within himself the possibilities that will actualize the future. Thus it is his decisions that initiate what will be.

On the other hand, God includes within his memory all that has passed—that is, the past. Whereas the memory of the human self is limited and thus preserves only bits and pieces and that only for a short time, God's memory is all-encompassing and eternal so that nothing is lost. As the actual passes into the eternal it becomes part of that from which God continually recreates.

None of this, for Ogden, is meant to rule out human freedom, although the precise metaphysical parameters of divine and human initiative are not stated. It is meant to back up his conclusion that, in some sense, all that happens is the expression of God's character: it is, in part, his action.

**God's characteristic action.** - The analogy between the self and God can be carried a step further. It is true of human actions that some are more characteristic than others. That is, some of them more fully express our true being.

Such actions are, as we say, our "characteristic" actions, for in them or through them the persons we are, are uniquely re-presented or revealed to others. ...all the other things that we may be and do are interpreted by our fellows in terms of what they understand to be typically our state-
ments and actions.  

Just so, some actions and events in this world, which, as said, are all God's actions in some sense, most typically represent the truth of his being. This occurs primarily in those actions usually denoted as religious, in which man seeks to express the true meaning of his existence.

That is to say that man as the being who can understand his existence and can express its meaning symbolically through word and deed can, at least in principle, also re-present or speak for God. Insofar as what comes to expression through his speech and action is the gift and demand signified by God's transcendent action as Creator and Redeemer, he re-presents not only his own understanding of God's action, but God's action itself. ... in this case, man's action actually is God's action.

Thus, there are some historical events and actions which, because they express man's authentic existence, are truly God's characteristic acts. Nevertheless, they remain also man's free acts as his deliberate choices to carry out God's initiative.

The possibility of revelation. - We can now see how certain historical events carry with them the possibility of being, in fact, revelation. At this point we must distinguish between two kinds of revelatory events: original and special. Ogden follows, here, the long-standing theological tradition, but, as will be seen, his definitions, particularly of special revelation, are quite different.

Ogden sometimes identifies original revelation as the content of faith. It is the recognition of meaning in life,
and its grounding, that every man possesses as man. It is the
"original presentation of God to man which is the constitutive
event of all human existence;" hence, the universality of
religion. At one point he speaks of original revelation as
"the primal disclosure of reality as such as received somehow
through our common faith as selves." In his essay "On
Revelation" (1975) he is more explicit than in any other
place on the general topic of original revelation:

One is led to conclude that the only necessary
but also sufficient, condition of the possibility of
authentic faith is...an event that never fails to
take place as soon and as long as there is any
distinctively human being at all.

Implied here is an aspect of Ogden's position which he
has nowhere developed, perhaps because it is hidden, in a
sense, until the metaphysical implications of the system are
fully drawn out. If every act is, in part, God's, then it
follows that epistemic acts are his as well. And clearly
the epistemic act of faith, that is, the recognition of meaning
is a characteristic act which can therefore take on a revelatory
function.

Therefore, once one understands the doctrine of God,
one can recognize a metaphysical analogy to the purely
epistemological (anthropological) doctrine of faith. It is
not that faith is itself a revelation. To talk thus would be
to fall prey to the temptation of myth. The correspondence
between faith and revelation must be understood as that between
human action and God's action. They are an analogous pair, but, for Ogden, the divine action can never be the object of sensory experience. We know it to be the case only after we have developed the metaphysics of God.

I must repeat that this analogy between faith and revelation is not explicit in Ogden. It appears, however, to be the most consistent way of extending the system.

3. Special Revelation

The definition. - Ogden's argument from analogy for the uniqueness of particular human actions allows for a second kind of revelation. While it is true that every act is God's in a limited sense, and also that each event that constitutes a human history that are characteristically representative in a special way. That is, they very clearly display God's central attributes of love and concern as we have previously discussed them.

The existence of many different religions with conflicting claims is clear evidence that some authentically intended actions fail to represent the divine character, while others do so in a fragmented or distorted way.90

True representation can take place under two conditions. First, there are those actions which are intended by man to display authenticity.

The possibility of being such a special act of God is peculiarly open to those uniquely human events in which man expresses his understanding of the
ultimate meaning of his existence through symbolic speech and action.\textsuperscript{91}

In addition, there are those events and actions, apart from any intentions, which are received as authentic representations. This, of course, can happen with any action, event, or creature,\textsuperscript{92} dependent only on the individual's discernment.

It is important to note that special revelation for Ogden is always conditioned by the discerner's subjectivity. That is, there are no events in history that are simply God's. As we have seen, Ogden must regard any such claim as antecedently implausible and in need of demythologization.

Every event is at the same time natural and supernatural. It is always both part of the natural and/or human causal network as well as the result of divine initiative.\textsuperscript{93} Since, however, its divine aspect and function are known only by faith in meaning and never objectively, its character as revelation is dependent on the recipient. He cannot, for Ogden, know revelation until he understands neoclassical metaphysics, for that is the only assurance that revelation takes place, as well as the source of the only criterion for judging those especially characteristic events.

Are there necessary special revelations? - At this point the question of the necessity of special revelation to complete the original may well seem to be an insignificant
intratheological issue. In fact, however, it is central to Ogden's argument for the identity of theology and philosophy.\textsuperscript{94} It will be simplest if I confine my remarks to the special revelation claimed to be present in Jesus, since, although a few more general remarks can be found, Ogden himself is primarily concerned with clarifying this one instance.

The crux of Ogden's position is this: Jesus, as an example of God's special revelation, provides us with no understanding that was not already available to us in original revelation simply as human beings.\textsuperscript{95} Original revelation is sufficient for authentic existence; it is universal in that it is present in every act and event; it is unavoidable by its continuous presence to every human being; finally, it is naturally constitutive of human existence as such; there is therefore no doubt as to its presence to all men.

Why then should special revelation be important to Ogden, especially after his rejection of Bultmann's position? It is important, he holds, not in that it reveals new content, but in that it reveals a possibility to be, in fact, actualized.

What Christian revelation reveals to man is nothing new, since such truths as it makes explicit must already be known to him implicitly in every moment of his existence. But that this revelation occurs does reveal something new to him in that, as itself event, it is the occurrence in his history of the transcendent event of God's love.\textsuperscript{96}

Special revelation, then, is necessary only in one narrow sense. As Ogden phrases it, it is "mediately necessary."\textsuperscript{97}
By this he means that, although Jesus makes nothing possible that was not already open to man, it is only here that we find it lived-out in a fully explicit form. He does not create new possibilities but rather objectifies and "represents" a possibility already present. Ogden uses the hyphenated "re-presents" to indicate just this concept that the gift which God has always extended to man is, in Jesus, simply offered fully realized.

There is, then, a sense in which special revelation, particularly the Christian one, is necessary but it is not an epistemological sense, that is, it provides no exclusive knowledge. There is neither light nor saving act in Christ that is not already present in God's love to every man.

The decisiveness of Christ. - We have not, however, said the last word on Ogden's view of the Christ-event. The final question has to be concerning the truth of the revelation in Christ. Although it is not ultimately necessary—and theology therefore has no information or source not shared by philosophy—Ogden does hold that it is the final truth about human authenticity.

The truth as it is known in Jesus Christ is the only ultimate truth to be known anywhere.

There is no doubt that Ogden is quite clear on this point of the decisive truth of the Christian claim. Unfortunately Ogden is not very specific as to which criteria
are sufficient to judge the decisiveness of the Christ-event and thereby the truth of christianity. He does at one point argue that Christ's preaching, his acts of healing, his willingness to associate with sinners as well as his death are all decisive symbolizations of divine love and acceptance. Generally, however, his approach is to state that the existentially interpreted Christian kerygma is expressable in philosophical language and thus is verifiable in metaphysical statements. The conclusion of this argument for the identity of theology and philosophy lies, then, in Ogden's position on the relationship between specifically Christian theology and general metaphysics. Let me first summarize the argument to the point. Ogden will infer the identity of theology and philosophy from the absence of any unique content. That is, while some revelations are more complete than others, no single event displays a content beyond what is already available to every man. Two reasons for this position can be found in Ogden. The first is that original, general revelation is complete. Simple unavoidable faith already knows the possibility of authentic existence. Second, in Ogden's panentheistic system every event is God's action. This eliminates the notion of a singular incarnation in the person of Jesus--or anyone else. What then is the importance of specifically Christian theology in Ogden's system?
4. Universal and Particular Theology

Introduction. - It is extremely difficult to pin Ogden down on the question of the possibility of general theology (i.e. *metaphysica specialis*) and the status of specifically Christian theology. One finds, in fact, three apparently inconsistent emphases. First, Ogden almost always refers simply to theology in general. However, he also explicitly claims that Christian theology is only one among many possible forms and that theology exists only in its particular varieties. Finally, there is the clear implication that New Testament theology, using existential and process forms of expression, is the true understanding of human existence. Let me, then, document these points and attempt to correlate them.

Ogden's statements. - I shall begin with a selection of passages from Ogden's writings. As to the first point, Ogden's definitions of theology are almost invariably general. Among his actual attempts to define only one refers to specifically Christian theology, although frequently there is mention of the tradition of Christian witness. This is, of course, just the curiosity to be explained here. In what sense is the Christian analysis of the ground of faith tantamount to theology in general?

As for the particularity of Christianity, note the following:
The evidence to which theological reflection must attend cannot be restricted solely to the specifically Christian tradition, however broadly construed, or for all its decisive importance.\textsuperscript{104}

Religion never exists in general, ... , but always only as a religion, which has its origin and principle in some particular occasion of insight, whether "hierophany" or "revelation."\textsuperscript{105}

Of course, the claim of Christianity to be the decisive witness to that final truth is exactly that - a claim; and whether or not it can be vindicated is the crucial question which it is the task of theology to answer.\textsuperscript{106}

These quotes point out clearly that Ogden regards the Christian interpretation of faith as only one among many traditions. Furthermore, precisely because of the identity of theology within philosophy as a cognitive enterprise, there is a question of truth. That is, although the varying claims may contribute to each other to some extent, they also conflict.

As for Ogden's answer to that last question--does Christian theology provide the true analysis of human existence?--note these statements. I want especially to focus on the use of three terms: "adequate," "decisive representation," and "right philosophy."

Therefore, the important question is never so much whether a man has a theology but which theology he has, i.e. whether the theology which he holds is a really adequate theology....

...What makes any theology an adequate theology is the extent it states directly and clearly precisely what faith means....\textsuperscript{107}
The ultimate tests of truth are something other than the principles of a supposedly "pure" reason. They are themselves matters of faith, and so are grounded in that original revelation of God to mankind of which the Christian faith claims to be the decisive representation.

Inevitably...there is the wide variety of religious insights and traditions, each with its claim to be true. But this only intensifies man's need for a special revelation of God's gift and demand that will be decisive - that will objectify his existence in a full and adequate way.... Insofar, then, as such objectification is in turn necessary...it is by no means only Christians for whom the re-presentation of God in Jesus Christ can in a sense be claimed to be necessary.

The "right" philosophy for Christian theology is not Heidegger's analysis of man alone, but his analysis in conjunction with Hartshorne's dipolar doctrine of God.

Christian theology is true. - It remains to draw the inferences from these and many similar passages in Ogden. His position can, I think, be summarized as follows. (1) There is a general analysis of human faith as such. Ogden is somewhat ambiguous as to the name of this discipline. It is referred to as "philosophy," "metaphysics," "theistic metaphysics," "philosophical theology," "natural theology," and apparently simply "theology." The only suggestion of some differentiation in terms of content is that philosophy, as the broader concept, focuses more on the nature of faith, whereas metaphysics and theology (and their variations) are concerned more specifically with the nature of God, as known in faith. We have, however, already seen that God and faith cannot really be separated as contents or objects (better: subjects) of study. In any case
metaphysics, which does focus on God, is said to be the "noncompressible core" of philosophy.118

(2) The existential activity of religion does not occur as a general phenomenon, though it is universal, but only as the encultured expression of particular revelations. These insights account for a variety of expressions of faith.

(3) Particular theologies, including Christian theology, are attempts to be reflective within a particular religious tradition or understanding of faith.119 The function of the Christian theologian is principally to reflect on the Christian tradition of faith, in particular as it is grounded in the New Testament. An important characteristic, however, of every major theological tradition is its claim to exclusive truth.120 Each claims to be the "decisive representation of the ultimate truth of human existence."121

(4) Christian theology likewise includes a claim to final truth. Ogden clearly holds this claim to be borne out, due to the decisiveness of Jesus as a special revelation. As a result, Christian theology and theology in general are ultimately identical.

(5) Christian revelation, that is, the message of the New Testament, when properly understood or demythologized, turns out to be identical in meaning and best expressed by an existential anthropology and a process theology. This construct can then be viewed as the right philosophy or metaphysics and distinction between theology and philosophy disintegrates.122
(6) Ogden uses "right", "true", and "adequate", interchangeably, all three in the sense of necessary application through all experience. To be the right philosophy for a true theology is to be the total analysis of faith that is unavoidably believable.
D. Summary: The Relationship of Theology and Philosophy

**Introduction.** - It is now time to take stock of where we have come in this essay. My stated intention was to say something about the relationship between philosophy and theology by explicating the views of Schubert Ogden. We have noted that both share in using the method of existentialist analysis, although, as a specialized tradition, theology--Christian theology--employs the method of demythologization and existential interpretation in addition. We have noted that both share the same content: the understanding of faith as the existence of meaning in life as grounded in the reality of God. We have also examined Ogden's definitions of theology and philosophy as being both the existentialist reflection on the nature of faith and have noted particularly their identical logical status and method of justification as metaphysical statements.

In conclusion it remains to summarize Ogden's position on the relationship of theology and philosophy. I shall do so by discussing the topic separately under the categories of method, content, source, intention, and logical type. This will give a better overview of the specific issue, unhampered, as it has been up to now, by the necessity of staying with the logical order of development.

1. The Methods of Theology and Philosophy

It would appear on the surface that Ogden sharply delineates the method of theology from that of philosophy. Theology is an
historically conditioned enterprise. It exists within a specific tradition and finds its source in a specific historical event and person. As a result, its main concern appears to be the interpretation of that tradition into statements of existential import and its method is thus that of decoding and recoding—demythologization and existential interpretation.

Philosophy, on the other hand, is direct analysis of human faith. It is self-understanding. As such, it employs the method of existentialist analysis: it observes itself as subject.

In fact, however, the divergence is not nearly so sharp. In terms simply of time, the professional theologian may well spend the majority in historical interpretation, that is, discovering the present meaning of Scripture. And the professional philosopher, for his part, may well spend much or most of his time in original reflection. When one, however, seeks to discover what is essentially theological activity, one finds, in Ogden, that it, too, is self-analysis. Correspondingly, philosophy is part of its own tradition, so that contemporary philosophy is in some sense always a working out of historical conditions.

Let me elaborate on these last two points. Ogden's definitions of theology as an activity are identical with those of philosophy: it is a reflective understanding of faith. It, too, is said to be "self-reflection." As we have seen, original revelation is the ultimate source of theology so that, although it must be "adequate" to a particular tradition, theology, too, is primarily the direct analysis of faith.
Secondly, philosophy is also conditioned by a tradition. To the extent that any inquiry is genuinely philosophical, it can establish the truth of its assertions only through common human experience... Nevertheless, philosophy, too, is historically conditioned, and the philosopher cannot simply ignore the wealth of man's cultural expressions.

It is thus true for both theology and philosophy that they employ the method of self-reflection, although they exist within and are conditioned by their traditions. Furthermore, as Ogden recognizes, that tradition is largely shared.

2. The Content of Theology and Philosophy

After the discussion of chapters III and IV it should be clear that the content of theology and philosophy is identical. For both it is the analysis of faith and its grounding, God. In fact, many of Ogden's clearest statements regarding the identity of the two have been made in this context. Perhaps the strongest appears in his very first published essay:

The endeavor to distinguish between theology and philosophy by appealing to an einmalig salvation occurrence would have to be rejected as invalid on material grounds.

The only alternative, then, which is really open to contemporary theology, is to abandon completely the attempt to distinguish itself in any final way from philosophy.

The identity of content follows primarily from the argument recounted in section C, which revolves around the claim that there is no light shining in Christ that has not always been available to all men, that is, the lack of necessity of special revelation in relation to original revelation.
3. The Sources of Theology and Philosophy

In answering the question regarding the methods of these two disciplines we have largely also answered the question of source.

On the surface, theology may appear to have a specialized source in distinction to a general and unrestricted one for philosophy. While this distinction may have some validity in terms of emphasis, it is misleading when one considers the proper activity of theology and philosophy.

For the philosopher, while his source is universal, it is nevertheless true that he must pay ultimate heed to those characteristic events which give insight into the nature of God, in particular the decisive revelation of Jesus.

If we are to be Christian theologians at all, we must seek the "right" philosophy and that one of the marks of its rightness will indeed be its essential congruence with the claims of Christian faith.¹²⁷

This quotation, and others like it, make it clear that philosophy draws on the same material as does theology, and, thus, what makes it the "right" philosophy is the same criterion as what determines the right theology. They both endeavor to reflectively understand faith.

In addition, we have seen that Ogden is also strongly committed to the universality of theology's source. While Christian theology may regard the representation in Christ as decisive, as theology it is open to all data as it seeks to understand faith in the light of God's characteristic actions wherever they
occur, and irregardless of their specific religious tradition.

4. The Intentions of Theology and Philosophy

It is only on the issue of the respective intentions, purposes, goals, etc. of theology and philosophy that Ogden sometimes appears to argue for some difference between the two disciplines. As strong as his statements regarding their identity, particularly in content, have been, he has distinguished their intentions.

The primary intention of theological thinking and speaking is a different one than characterizes the thinking and speaking of philosophy and the sciences. Unlike the latter, theology intends to be an existential communication. Its primary purpose is not to communicate information to the intellect - although it does that, too - but to facilitate actual existential encounter....

Ogden has written very little about this aspect of theology. He has himself admitted to concentrating on the cognitive use of theology to the neglect of its directive purposes. But he has proposed that in such functions we ought really to speak of "witness" rather than "theology." This, however, seems to leave us with a theology whose intentions are really the same as philosophy's.

Ogden's lack of clarity at this point stems, I think, from a fundamental divergence in his two primary sources. His existentialist tendencies lead him to regard theology as concerned primarily with changing men's lives, taking them from inauthentic to authentic modes of existence. However, his process tendencies convince him that personal commitments are the
result of metaphysical positions. This is seen most clearly in his point that atheism is the result of misunderstanding, namely about the nature of God.

Ogden attempts to resolve this tension by speaking of the activity of theologians versus that of philosophers, while the content, etc. of their disciplines remains identical. Even here however Ogden hesitates to make any clear distinction by choosing to call this existential function "witness" as well as by noting that philosophy, too, is not purely cognitive.131

5. The Logical Types of Theological and Philosophical Statements

Ogden has been quite clear in recent essays on the point that religious statements fall into three logical types. Some of them are simply empirical. This category includes all of those statements, particularly in Scripture, which purport to be scientific or historical and therefore open to falsification. Some of these Ogden, of course, assigns to the level of myth or legend so that on a broader understanding they take on existential significance despite their pseudo-scientific character. Many, however, lack this intention.

Not being properly religious claims at all, they cannot be established existentially or metaphysically, ... , Christian belief, at least, has a necessary, if only indirect, relation even to empirical falsification.132

Secondly, the language of religion is often existential in nature. In fact, in his earliest essays, where his concerns are primarily anthropological, Ogden talks as if specifically theological statements were all of this type.133 That is, they
are concerned not with "What happened?" but with "What is the significance of what happened for human existence?" 134

Among these are primarily those which result from the application of the method of demythologization and existential interpretation, about which enough has been said in chapter II.

The third category is that of the metaphysical. In more recent essays it has been this type that Ogden has emphasized.

I have not said theological assertions simply are metaphysical assertions.... My point, rather, is that the class to which theological assertions logically belong is the general class of metaphysical assertions and that therefore, the kind of rational justification to which they are open is the kind generically appropriate to all assertions of this logical class. 135

Quite parallel things are said about philosophical assertions. We have seen that there is a large class of strictly metaphysical statements which are in principle individually unfalsifiable. There are, however, some, namely anthropological, statements about the meaning and possibilities of human existence, which are not unfalsifiable. Ogden nowhere explicitly says that these are identical to the existential statements of theology, but they must be related at least in the same way that the metaphysical statements of theology are related to those of philosophy: they are a sub-set of the broader category.

Ogden does not identify a class of empirical claims within philosophy. He holds, however, that any factual assertions may function for metaphysics in the same ways in which religious
empirical assertions function for theology. That is, they are falsifiable data that serve as the backdrop upon which statements of larger and general meaning are built. Nevertheless, in neither case do they function strictly as evidence. The metaphysical assertions stand on their own even if the data turns out to be mistaken.¹³⁶

There are, then, closely parallel characteristics of the logical types of theological and metaphysical statements. In conclusion, let me summarize Ogden's general view concerning the relationship of theology and philosophy.

6. A General View of the Relationship

What, then, is the sum of all this? I have shown here that Ogden's system can be presented as an argument for the identity of theology and philosophy as a type of what I have called a containment view. Specifically, philosophy is the all-inclusive analysis of man's unavoidable faith in meaning, while theology is the specific analysis of the possibilities for human existence as disclosed in the analysis of the ground of meaning. Theology is a specialization within philosophy. In many ways it is the central specialization, since it is concerned with the very ground of the objects of other specializations.

Theology's source is always the particular understanding contained in the tradition of an individual culture of a specific revelatory and, therefore, characteristic act of God. Of these, however, Ogden considers the Christian account, as embodied in
an existentialist anthropology and a process doctrine of God to be the true one. Thus it is Christian theology which is properly a part of the right philosophy.

While in general the methods of theology and philosophy are the same, that is, the existentialist analysis of experience, theology, because it is tied to specific enculturations often of a presecular period, must have an additional instrument. Thus Christian theology in particular is in need of demythologizing in order for its propositions to be meaningful to contemporary man. This does not invalidate the containment view, it simply identifies a problem unique to a specific part.

The theologian's specialty inclines him to be more than a theorist: he is also a witness. But strictly speaking theology, as philosophy, is a cognitive matter of constructing a theoretical system.

The identity of these two disciplines is seen most clearly for Ogden in terms of content. For theology to claim any direct, observable divine intervention as its special revelation offends both the standard of language defined by demythologizing as well as the metaphysics of panentheism, according to which every event is both autonomous and God's.

Identity is indicated also by the fact that theological and philosophical statements are of the same logical type. Neither are falsifiable by simple observations but are elements of a total system, itself unavoidably believed.

Philosophy, as Ogden sees it, is the broader umbrella
under which theology, general epistemology, philosophy of
science, aesthetics, and so forth are found. Its primary
function is to provide theology with a language and a
method. To use Ogden's words:

Philosophy provides theology with the principles
and procedure of a theological hermeneutics. 137

Hidden behind philosophy's role as provider, of course, lies
the role of critic. By controlling theology's language, philo-
sophy severely restricts its ability to suggest "ways of seeing"
and thereby supply its own categories. Yet this is not to
indicate a conflict between disciplines. Both theology and
philosophy as a whole develop out of the same analysis of the
same experience--that of faith. Nevertheless, in practice
conflicts will arise as the theological specialist and the
general philosopher work separately, often misunderstanding
their roles.

In particular, recent history shows up conflicts that
result from the theologian's primary concern with the second
of Ogden's criteria--adequacy to tradition--, and the philo-
sopher's insistence on intelligible language, a criterion
theologians often ignore. Such conflicts, Ogden thinks,
are entirely unnecessary and are the result of disproportioned
emphasis of one criterion over another.

Ideally, for Ogden, there can be no competition between
philosophy and theology; yet this is not due to their being
isolated from each other. Ogden avoids the conflicts that
result from any view in which theology and philosophy have different sources, speculation and revelation, for example. Such conflicts are irresolvable except by pronouncing one source as ultimately authoritative. Ogden's view also avoids the cognitive dissonance that results when theology and philosophy are isolated as being different logical types, language-games, or pre-categorical schemes. Here, too, conflicts are theoretically irresolvable, except by separating and compartmentalizing areas of thought.

Ogden's view clearly avoids both of these positions. The question remains, however, as to whether or not his own containment view is in fact sustainable. We must turn, then, in the next chapter to an evaluation of Ogden's system as an argument for the identity of theology and philosophy.
V. A CRITIQUE OF OGDEN'S POSITION

A. The Epistemological Argument and Internal Consistency
B. The Metaphysical Argument and the Criterion of Truth
C. Concluding Remarks
Introduction. - In this final chapter we must now ask whether Ogden's arguments concerning the relation of theology and philosophy are acceptable. I should remind the reader that my primary purpose is to formulate Ogden's position not to discuss it. Nevertheless, there are a few matters which cannot be left without examination, some points at which it appears to me that his formulations do not work at all, or at least need adjustment.

A comprehensive critique would be quite impossible here since it would involve thorough investigations of Heidegger's and Whitehead's epistemology, Hartshorne's and Whitehead's concept of God and of the self, Hartshorne's doctrine of internal relations and much more. I have avoided even detailing these areas in the expository sections since it would have involved unmanageable complexity and they are, in any case, not unique to Ogden's system. Many of these topics are currently the subjects of intense investigation in philosophical journals and deserving of dissertation topics in their own right.

I want, however, to focus specifically on Ogden's two arguments for identity, by way of containment, of theology and philosophy. I want to show that a critique of the first argument involves one primarily in questions of the internal
consistency of Ogden's system. Here, too, it is tempting to range far afield, since we shall ultimately face the question of the complementarity of existentialism and process philosophy—hardly a simple question to answer. Here I shall have to be content to carefully limit the scope of my remarks.

The critique of the second argument involves some questions concerning the clarity of Ogden's system, in particular whether or not his criterion for the decisiveness of Jesus, his criterion for analogy, and finally, his criterion for metaphysical truth are successful. All of this is not to say that there is not a great deal to be admired in Ogden's position on the relationship between philosophy and theology. I can only commend his avoidance of any dichotomy based on different types of knowing. It eliminates the artificial setting up of "faith" as a separate epistemic function that leads to theology. I do want to show, however, that Ogden's arguments that seek to disprove the possibility of divine action in history, specifically in the person of Jesus, and thereby remove any uniqueness for theology, will not stand up under scrutiny.
A. The Epistemological Argument and Internal Consistency

1. Can God Act in History?

The epistemological argument restated. - As we have seen, Ogden's first argument involves the main tenets of his epistemology. In outline, it runs as follows:

(a) A proper theology conforms to two criteria: it is adequate to its source and intelligible to secular man.

(b) The starting point of all thought is subjectivist.

(c) Theology, specifically, is therefore possible only as existentialist analysis.

(d) Theology cannot use objectifying language, either in relation to the self or to God.

(e) There can therefore be no objective historical events that provide differentiating content for theology.

(f) Theology therefore coincides with philosophy as a general analysis of existence.

The exposition in earlier chapters will have suggested some matters on which one could wish for more clarity from Ogden. It is certainly not clear, for example, that his two criteria are compatible. But then it is not obvious how a system should function when each of its propositions must meet more than one criterion. It is clear that Ogden demands that a proposition meet both criteria, such that the proposition is not acceptable if it meets one criterion, while the other negates it. That explains Ogden's procedure when "adequacy to source" suggests an interpretation of a doctrine which
"secular intelligibility" will not allow. A bodily resurrection, a creation in history, God as an objective, though supernatural being, may all have strong backing from the tradition of Christian thought, but we have no alternative but to see them as misguided, uninformed, or prescientific interpretations of God's original revelation known to all men, as judged by modern secular standards. Ogden does not, to my knowledge, give any examples of the reverse situation, but there are certainly many propositions that are intelligible to secular man but not in accord with the biblical tradition.

I want, however, to focus on the central theme of the argument and we will assume that other difficulties can be met. That is I think, the contention in (d) that empirical statements about God's action must be mythical.

God and demythologizing. - What I want to contend is that Ogden's position both does and does not permit propositions about God's action in concrete history. I shall begin with the negative.

Ogden's epistemology, particularly as it is applied to theological language in the project of demythologizing, explicitly forbids the use of objective language in reference to God. God is not to be spoken of as simply another object in space and time. Any attempt to so specify God's action in human history is myth. Even Bultmann's last holdout, the death and resurrection of Jesus, is not allowed by Ogden. The Christocentrism of the Reformation which still prevails in
Bultmann is transformed by Ogden into a fully theocentric system, yet without diminishing the requirements of demythologizing.

The result is the lack of any objective criteria for revelation. That is, what is to be judged as a true representation of the divine self is determined only by the evoked response toward authenticity and not by any characteristics of the event itself. It is noteworthy that this is in sharp contrast to other recent process theories of revelation and Christology. David Griffin, for example, has sharply criticized Ogden at just this point and proceeds to develop an objective Christology based on the fulfillment by Jesus of the divine aims given to him. Lewis Ford, in his _The Lure of God_, goes even further in identifying Jesus as the one who carries out God's evolutionary purposes for the advancement of mankind. In fact, Ogden stands quite alone among process theologians in maintaining strictly existential, subjective criteria. Yet this is surely in line with his epistemological and methodological precepts which dictate that God cannot be an object.

Demythologizing, then, ought to eliminate every objectifying reference to acts of God. It has been argued that this ought, in fact, to eliminate any reference to God at all. For example, Colin Gunton has argued that if anything ascribable to the specific agency of God is myth, then why need one speak of God at all? He becomes a superfluous hypothesis, whose
only identity is as "the one who validates human life as it is, a divine pat upon the human back." William Young, Clark Pinnock, and Frederick Herzog, have all made similar criticisms. William Young, in particular, describes Ogden's God as a "metaphysical myth" who serves no observable purpose.

These criticisms are natural inferences from Ogden's definition of demythologizing. They are, however, inaccurate in relation to other parts of Ogden's system. This brings us to the positive affirmation of God's action in history. Ogden's adoption of a process metaphysic was motivated by its ability to supplement the Heideggerian-Bultmannian analysis of man with a process analysis of God. This conjunction he holds to be possible, in part, because of the supposed similarity between the existential/existentialist distinction of the former and Hartshorne's abstract/concrete correlation.

Ogden concludes that, just as it is possible to objectify man as subject, so we can objectify God as long as we speak of the divine existentiality, that is, God's form or essence. It is, then, possible to speak of the acting God. This is evident from the general truth that in Ogden's panentheistic system every space-time event or action can legitimately be labeled as God's. Ogden himself allows that his theory of analogy permits "direct" speaking of God, in particular when it identifies those characteristic actions that represent authentic existence, such as the death of Jesus.
How can this be unless one can, in fact, isolate and identify God's acting in space-time? If God acts in every event then surely he acts characteristically in at least some. While Ogden may identify these by existential response criteria, that does not alter the objective, concrete, space-time nature of the acts themselves. Thus Ogden's process metaphysics leads him to identify certain events, however vaguely (for example, the "revelation of Christ"), as acts initiated and characteristic of God—his acts—yet, as I argued above, the secular method of demythologizing cannot allow propositions about such events.

Let me exemplify the problem by examining a passage in "What Sense Does It Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?" (1963, reprinted 1966). After summarizing and agreeing with Bultmann's position, which he claims properly maintains the "infinite qualitative difference" between God and the world, Ogden concludes the following:

The force of the preceding argument is to affirm that, in its fundamental sense, God's action is not an action in history at all. Although his action as creator is related to history—and, indeed, is the action in which all historical events are ultimately grounded—his creative action as such is not an action in history, but an action that transcends it... Likewise God's action as the Redeemer cannot be simply identified with any particular historical event or events.

Here Ogden is stating the implications of demythologizing and the existential epistemology that necessitates it. God does not, indeed cannot, act in history. Only a page
later, however, Ogden argues that God is not only an abstraction but also an eminently historical being.

God's being is the eminent instance of historical being. But . . . God's historicity is an eminent historicity, and it cannot be confused with the ordinary historicity of man . . . God's action is his action, and it cannot be simply identified with the action of ordinary historical beings.12

Suddenly we have gone from a God who can not act in history to one who is "eminent," the foremost example, in his historicity. Ogden is using here the Whiteheadian principle that God is the eminent example of, not the exception to metaphysical categories. Thus to say that he is eminent in his historicity is to say that God is historical. That Ogden makes just that transition can be seen a few paragraphs further on.

Insofar as what comes to expression through man's speech and action is the gift and demand signified by God's transcendental action as Creator and Redeemer, he re-presents not only his own understanding of God's action, but God's action itself. Indeed we may go further and say that, in this case, man's action actually is God's action. . . . 13

I do not know how to understand this last sentence except as saying that some particular ("in this case") human action is God's creative or redemptive act. Later in the same essay Christ's life is identified as just such an action.

Ogden's position in this statement is clearly in line with that of other process philosophers and theologians on the same topic. David Griffin, who, as mentioned above, criticizes Ogden's reluctance to go beyond a subjective
criterion of revelation, insists that God's action in Christ must be understood in an objective sense. This same position, sometimes even stronger, is true of every process oriented Christology of which I am aware, including Hartshorne's and I do not think that Ogden either can or does avoid it.

He must affirm objective, space-time, historical action for God. But how is this to fit in with the requirements of demythologizing? Ogden's method, as an implication of his criterion of intelligibility, forbids any use of objective, empirical language in relation to God. Nor are there any objective criteria by which to judge the characteristic acts of God. We are left with the proposition that God's actions both are and are not historically objective.

If Ogden cannot avoid the incompatibility on this point then premise (e) of the argument will not stand and the conclusion fails. Theology could be differentiated from philosophy, on Ogden's view, as long as there are unique historical revelations of God. These would not be included in a general analysis of the meaning of human existence, that is, philosophy. If Ogden's process metaphysics stands there remains distinguishing material and his argument for the containment of theology within philosophy will not hold.

2. Existential and process thought.

My concern in this critique is with the two arguments which I have formulated with Ogden's system. The above remarks concerning internal consistency, however, find their validity
only within a broader context which has already been suggested. Might it not be that existentialism—at least the Heidegger-Bultmannian brand—and process thought are incompatible at important points?

This is, of course, a complex and broad question. There has been one recent attempt to at least survey the terrain in response specifically to Ogden, namely in John Cobb and David Griffin's *Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition*. The authors list what they consider to be three major areas of agreement and six areas of disagreement between Whiteheadian process philosophy and Heideggerian existentialism.

The areas of agreement which they identify are the following: (1) Existence precedes essence, or, we are what we decide to be. (2) Our existence is radically contingent. Finally, (3) existence is a being-in-the-world, or, occasions are always part of the actual world.

However, existential and process philosophy are seen to disagree on the following: (1) For Heidegger man is a single entity, destined for death; for Whitehead he is a series of occasions each dying individually, but each passing into eternity. (2) For Heidegger *Mitsein* is superficial, while for Whitehead relatedness is absolute. (3) For Heidegger, nature is the world in which being exists, for Whitehead occasions are the world: there is no radical separation. (4) For Heidegger the future holds no new possibilities, while for Whitehead it is essentially novel. (5) For Heidegger, man is absolutely free of the past, while for Whitehead he is relatively free,
but incorporates the past. Finally (6) human existence is for Heidegger \textit{Geschichte} and not part of the history of events, while for Whitehead there is only one process of emergence.

As helpful as this survey is, it does not fill the real need for a lengthy in-depth treatment of the compatibility of Ogden's two main sources. It also leaves out basic epistemological questions which I would hold to be the real nemesis of Ogden's system. Clearly, this is not the place to supply that need in general.

I do want, however, to develop briefly some tensions between these philosophical systems many of which are illustrated in Ogden. Two are of particular importance. There is, first, the disagreement indicated in points (2) and (4) above between the isolated autonomous self of Heideggerian existentialism and the totally integrated man of process philosophy to whom God gives initial aim for every actual occasion. In Ogden this appears as the dilemma that the man Jesus is, in fact, a characteristic act of God, yet there is no objective criterion whereby to determine that he is. I shall deal with this dilemma in the next section in more detail.

The crucial difference which Ogden's first argument illustrates is, however, the final one above, point (6). The existentialism from which Ogden draws his epistemology and concept of history makes a radical divide between the self,
including God, and the objective space-time events of ordinary history. For Bultmann this is the difference between *Geschichte* and *Historie*. While Ogden does not often use the same terminology the distinction between objective and existential knowledge is a defining characteristic of the method of demythologizing. The distinction is quite similar to that between the rational and the historical in Kant's *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone*. The events of history do not condition the decisions and potentials of the rational will. For Bultmann it is only in the revelation of Jesus that the two realms are brought together, but Ogden will allow for no exceptions. That is the central contention of *Christ Without Myth*.

In the philosophy of organism, however, there is only one history: the process of actual occasions. Mental and physical poles are unified and God's determination of initial aims is just as much a part of the event as is the occasion's self-determination.

Thus, the incompatibility in Ogden's argument for the identity of theology within philosophy is really a symptom of a larger difficulty. His existential epistemology affirms the divide between history and reason--Lessing's ditch--while his process metaphysics denies it.

Underlying both of these disagreements within Ogden's system is an even more basic one. From the point of view of
the process philosopher the existentialist commits what Whitehead called the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." In essence, this fallacy consists of deriving, in some way, the concrete (becoming) from the abstract (being). In his 1929 review of Sein und Zeit Hartshorne says of phenomenologists and existentialists that "they have sought to explain the definite by the indefinite." Ogden is guilty of the same, by Hartshorne's standards, when he derives the reality of God from subjective faith, in recognizing concrete authenticity from subjective responses, and in separating metaphysics from history. The "definite" for Ogden, as for Heidegger, is the being of the self, when he denies the activity of God in concrete history. Yet when his metaphysics affirms the creative action of God in history it is becoming that is the "definite" and concrete. But Ogden cannot have it both ways. As it stands the elements of his system are incompatible at this point.
B. The Metaphysical Argument and the Criterion of Truth

1. The Nature and Necessity of Faith

Ogden's second argument restated. - Ogden's second argument for the identity of theology and philosophy is really an argument equating Christian theology with the right philosophy. It consists of the following steps:

(a) An existentialist epistemology is compatible with a process metaphysics.
(b) Unavoidable faith implies a real God.
(c) A process metaphysics implies panentheism.
(d) Panentheism, plus the principle that God is the paramount example of metaphysical categories, implies that God is to be understood in analogy with the self, and that the world by analogy is God's body.
(e) It follows that every act and event are, in part, God's action.
(f) Analogous to man, some of God's actions are more characteristic than others.
(g) Those actions are characteristic to which I respond by realizing authentic human existence.
(h) The life of Jesus most fully represents God's character.
(i) Therefore, Christian theology, i.e., the understanding of existence based on Jesus' life, is also the right philosophical understanding of man and God in general.

The nature of faith. - I have already argued that Ogden's system is incoherent and that his epistemology fails to show that theology is to be understood as identical to philosophy. I want now to turn to Ogden's metaphysics and the argument to be found there. In this section I want to
show that, in fact, Ogden's system lacks any clear criterion that would allow for the equation of theology and philosophy. To see this we shall have to work through the argument step by step, looking at each step for the standard that would clearly allow for the identifying of Christian theology and the "right" philosophy.

The basis of the argument--and of the entire metaphysical construction--is unavoidable faith. A great deal has been said regarding Ogden's argument for the necessity of faith, however the only detailed response to his definition of faith has been Langdon Gilkey's.19 His criticisms are threefold.

First, Gilkey argues that Ogden's concept is basically essentialistic and thus in contradiction to his existentialist tenets. It is essentialistic in that faith is understood as a precondition of rationality, faith is "constitutive" of human being as such.20

Second, Ogden is wrong in thinking that his notion of faith corresponds to a Christian view. The latter sees faith as the answer to the problem of sin, not only of meaning. Third, and closely connected, is Gilkey's criticism that Ogden's faith is not religiously adequate. It fails to resolve man's consciousness of guilt. Thus, it avoids man's central problem and the real source of religion.

To summarize these objections, Gilkey sees Ogden's view of man as a strange combination of existentialist epistemology in which "faith precedes and conditions theological and
philosophical articulation," and "process rationalism" in which ontology will "provide the answers to our existential problems of faith and non-faith." Ogden ends up, Gilkey alleges, with a faith that has an existential status though it lacks the existentialist's content. It overcomes ignorance, not sin and guilt.

I am not convinced that Ogden is guilty as charged. Faith, as a phenomenon, is unavoidably and always present for Ogden. "Unfaith" is, in fact, never present. Authentic existence, however, is possible only when faith is properly understood and rationalized. Philosophy does not make faith possible, it seeks to understand what is there--often unconsciously. There is, then, no contradiction here, but there remains the question of whether Ogden's anthropology is essentialistic or existentialistic.

I have indicated already that Ogden is very unclear as to the real content of what he refers to as an "existentialist anthropology." This must, first of all, be modified by a process concept of God as the giver of initial direction. Gilkey is undoubtedly correct at the point of recognizing a second modification, namely unavoidable faith. I would, however, be cautious in understanding Ogden's use of "constitutive." Although it has undeniably essentialist connotations, as do other of his terms, it is used to modify "event." Faith is an inevitable experience for man, not part of his being. Again, however, it is difficult to make any evaluative judgment
here without clearer development of content on Ogden's part. It is, however, the matter of the "inevitability" of faith that needs comment.

The inevitability of faith. Ogden's argument for the inevitability of faith and God's reality has engendered more response than any other of his theses. Let me summarize his argument.

Ogden claims that (especially) scientific and moral questioning presupposes religious boundary question. "Reality" is to be defined in terms of relevance to a context. It therefore follows that God's existence, as the ground of meaning that makes questioning at the boundary possible, is necessarily a reality. I want to conclude that Ogden's argument is seriously lacking and does not prove nearly as much as he thinks it does. I shall begin by noting a number of responses that it has provoked.

A frequent criticism of the argument as a whole is that, whatever the internal fallacy might be, its success it definitional only. Note the comments of Richard Vieth and then Ray Hart:

The conclusion is...merely a trivial tautology, persuasive only to one who already "accepts the notion of 'God,'..."23

A caesura between premise and conclusion is avoided, I think, only because the conclusion is already present in the premise, packed into Ogden's understanding of "meaning" and "ultimacy." ...in short, it is a definitional or stipulative victory that Ogden wins.24

The criticism is that, even granting the first premise, the existence of meaning only posits a necessary grounding in an
ultimate being if one can supply some clear argument for the
transition, or if one begs the question by defining "meaning"
as "ultimately grounded meaning." Flew adds the somewhat
sarcastic conclusion:

The temptation is to ease an intractable task by
construing the term "God" for apologetic purposes
in some very thin and secular sense, but then in the
expansive environment of dogmatic theology to revert
to a more traditional and substantial interpretation. 25

Richard Vieth's analysis and response is probably the
most detailed one available. He criticizes not only the
relationship between premises and conclusion as just indi-
cated, but also questions Ogden's evidence for the first
premise, 26 namely that it is universally assumed that moral
and scientific questioning leads to questions of ultimate
meaning. Ogden presents it as a priori, that is, all men
necessarily have that confidence in meaning. There are,
however, too many counter-examples to let this stand.
Sartre, Camus, even Stanley Kubrick, and many other prominent
names, are obvious cases. Thus, even Ogden's first premise
fails according to Vieth.

In the expositional sections of this dissertation I
discussed this argument of Ogden's as consisting of two
stages. The first deduces the necessity of meaning tran-
cendentally from the possibility of various types of discourse.
That is, moral discourse, for example, presupposes structure,
order, or meaning in life. Without meaning, moral discourse
would be pointless and even impossible. If Ogden intends here
simply the traditional "self-referential" argument against
the skeptic—that the very affirmation of non-meaning establishes meaning—then I have no objection. None of Vieth's factual objections are to the point against such a logical argument. There seems, however, to be more to the argument, as I have previously demonstrated. I am convinced that Ogden is correct in this as well, that is, that moral, scientific, and religious meaningfulness rationally require a specifically telic ordering of our lives and environments. Vieth misunderstands Ogden at this point. It is not that Sartre, Camus, Kubrick, or others consciously or verbally accept this thesis, but that the logic of their denials in different ways actually establishes it.

I am not certain that Ogden's method of argument will accomplish his purpose. However, C. S. Lewis' appeal to the inevitable and universal behavior of promising, excusing, judging, praising, and so forth seems to be a more effective argument. Nevertheless, I find Ogden's conclusion, per se, acceptable.

The second stage of the argument, however, is more difficult to deal with. It consists of the deduction of the reality of the ground or source of meaning—God—from the reality of meaning (including value, etc.) itself. This Ogden accomplishes simply by noting that, when one properly understands the first part of the argument, the issue of God's reality becomes pointless. The peculiarity of Ogden's argument is, of course, that he attempts the transition on a priori
grounds rather than a posteriori. The latter would amount to some version of the teleological argument which Ogden rejects. It is perhaps even more curious that he does not make use of Hartshorne's modal ontological argument. He does evaluate it positively but the argument as such is never built into the system. Meaning, he holds, has no alternative. Meaning is not an empirical state of affairs which might have been otherwise.

There is, however, clearly something wrong with Ogden's a priori argument. It seems trivially true that if meaning demands a ground, then real meaning demands a real ground. But what Ogden nowhere proves, is that meaning necessarily (a priori) implies a ground. Proving that faith in meaning is inevitable is not equivalent to proving that meaning requires a source. Again, if he were to use the teleological argument, the transition would be clear, but he cannot. I must conclude, then, that the second part of Ogden's argument fails. It lacks a crucial premise.

There is, in addition, another structural problem. I refer to the assumption on Ogden's part that the grounding of meaning is to be identified as a specifically process God.

Clearly, there is a break in the line of argument here. Belief in meaning is unavoidable. Meaning requires a ground. Real meaning requires a real ground. But from here to a process God there is no direct link. Ogden's problem is somewhat unique. Whitehead and Hartshorne avoid it by beginning with metaphysics rather than epistemology. As we have seen,
Ogden must begin anew by deriving his metaphysics in terms of its compliance with his criteria and its satisfactory fit with his particular epistemology. I rather think that Ogden's system is, at this transition, inelegant at best. Ogden cannot be accused of proceeding entirely without grounds. However, I see no clearly logical derivation of his process metaphysics from the existential epistemology.

Others have made the same criticism in different ways. Gilkey insists that Ogden's process development of God and metaphysics is in contradiction to his original argument (à la Toulmin) for the unavoidability of faith as a boundary question.

Toulmin makes clear...that rational inquiry, as he understands it, arrives at a limiting question of a "religious" sort because it cannot answer ultimate questions metaphysically...And yet, having just used this man's understanding of "reasoning" to establish the reality of God, Ogden introduces the third section of his essay with the proposal that "the starting point for a genuinely new theistic construction" is the "reformed subjectivist principle"...And so, having established the ultimate order of things via Toulmin, off we go on a speculative ontology...- an enterprise which Toulmin has just assured us is impossible and vain.30

R. S. Heimbeck adds a parallel criticism.31 He notes that in going beyond Toulmin one requires an independent argument to allow God's existence to remain "checkable." Hartshorne does this by means of his ontological argument. Ogden, although he accepts the argument as valid, does not clearly incorporate it into his system nor does he develop any further argument. Heimbeck concludes:
There seems to be a tendency on the part of representatives of the newer theologies to regard metatheological scepticism as an ally in the struggle against classical theism. The metatheological sceptic from his side may not be as sanguine about such an alliance.  

As I have indicated, these criticisms are well taken. However, the line of thought it successful only in showing inelegance in the system, not inconsistency. Nevertheless, this is sufficient to show that faith does not directly imply a process metaphysics. The tie between theology and philosophy is not to be found here.

2. The Truth-Criterion for Theology

Theology and truth. - Ogden's second argument hinges ultimately on the identity of what is seen in Christ and what is known originally by all men concerning the possibility of authentic existence. Following the examination above of the basis of the system, we now ask for the criterion of truth for a specific theology that allows Ogden to conclude that theology is to be understood as the correct analysis of faith.

First, then, given Ogden's definition of theology, why ought one to think that its content is true? I shall examine to begin with, two criticisms of Ogden's approach and reject them as shortsighted.

Herndon Wagers, Ogden's colleague at Southern Methodist University, has simply noted that Ogden is vague on the question of what counts as the criterion of truth in theology. He is particularly distressed with Ogden's position, borrowed from Toulmin, that various "fields of experience" each have
their own standards of what counts as true within them. Thus, the most one can say about theological truths is that they comprise those statements "worthy of acceptance" within that particular logical type of statement. Wagers is accusing Ogden, in effect, of not defining "worthy." By itself, it does not suffice to distinguish between what is accepted and what ought to be accepted.

Frederick Streng's criticism is more narrow. He argues a) that Ogden provides for no strict distinction between Christian theology and theology in general in terms of truth criteria. Thus, the former has no special or unique standards. b) This must imply that there is some general religious consciousness that is universal in order to supply the basis of an existential theology as such. The import of the criticism is that Ogden has no reason to speak of Christian theology. Despite all the talk of the decisiveness of Jesus, he plays no role for Ogden in establishing a uniquely Christian truth-criterion, and thus leaves theology with only the possibility of a general standard.

Both of these criticisms ignore some important facts in Ogden's theology. Christian theology for him, is simply the result of one tradition of interpretation of the ground of meaning. Thus its initial criterion of truth must be that of adherence to its own tradition. Beyond that there must be, and is, a criterion of truth for revelations in general:
that of characteristic representation of the nature of God. That indicates the ultimate truth-criterion, namely a general criterion of metaphysical truth.

Just as theology as a discipline is contained in philosophy, so there must be concentric criteria for truth. In order, then, to understand the nature of truth for theology we shall have to examine each circle individually.

Theology and Scripture. - The first question concerns Ogden's attitude toward Scripture. It has been noted by some that for someone who wants to break down the barriers between theology and philosophy, Ogden has a high regard for the biblical record. William Hordern, in particular, is surprised by this situation. Ogden's theologian is bound to a particular text, while the philosopher can gain the same truth by roaming freely through human experience.

For Hordern, this duality is evidence for internal inconsistency, primarily because he classifies Ogden as part of the "theological left," along with, for example, Fritz Buri. He sees Ogden's claim that authentic existence is an original possibility as tantamount to Buri's "dekerygmatization," that is, the denial that salvation comes through Christ. This claim, he thinks, would clearly conflict with any emphasis or regard for a special revelation focusing on Christ.

A quite different criticism comes from those concerned with the integrity of the biblical text. Kenneth Hamilton's comments are typical of those who see Ogden as playing fast
and loose with Scripture.

Ogden's quotations from the New Testament support his case only when their context is ignored and adjacent passages suppressed.

Both of these criticisms are particularly interesting in light of Ogden's "The Authority of Scripture" (1976) which reasserts his commitment to the dependency of Christian theology on the New Testament.

It would undoubtedly be interesting to analyze carefully Ogden's use of Scripture, but that goes beyond my concern here. It is sufficient to note that adherence to Scripture does function for Ogden as the initial truth criterion for theology.

I agree with Ogden here, though I am not always happy with his exegetical practice. This now leads us to examine the standard for truth in relation to determining the decisiveness of Christ.

The decisiveness of Christ. - A frequent criticism of Ogden is the claim that he simply fails to specify any adequate meaning for "decisive." That is, after qualifying his view by claiming that the Christ-event is neither necessary, nor does it provide any new information about human existence, decisiveness becomes a meaningless quality.

James Robinson, in his review of Christ Without Myth, recognizes that Ogden has not really worked out a credible view of "decisiveness," although he thinks that the beginnings are there.

Ogden is, I think, on the track of a basic breakthrough when he identified the "decisiveness" of Jesus and the kerygma in the emergence of the word, which not only talks about, but actually bestows.
Ogden's "On Revelation" certainly fulfills some of Robinson's prophesy in developing the concept by distinguishing between actualizing authentic existence (Bultmann's position), and objectifying it. Russell Pregeant's work amplifies this notion.

Delwin Brown also tries to support Ogden by claiming that his view of "re-presentative" decisiveness amounts to a separation of source and norm which he feels is viable given a Whiteheadian metaphysics. That is, for Ogden, Christ is the mediating source of our concepts of authentic existence but not their norm. It is not the case that theological statements are limited to that which is "given in, implied by, or at least consistent with the Christ event."

What these criticisms really overlook, however, is that Ogden's notion of "decisive" is tied to his doctrine of analogy. A revelation of human existence is decisive when it is analogous to divine existence. That there be such a standard for decisiveness is essential to Ogden's second argument for the identity of theology and philosophy. Without it, premise (g) in the above summary cannot be established. I must turn, then, to an examination of my contention that Ogden's concept of decisiveness is clarified by his doctrine of analogy.

Is there a criterion for a valid analogy? - The equation of Christian theology with the right philosophy depends ultimately on Ogden's doctrine of analogy. Without it God's action in general, and the decisiveness of Jesus in particular, is
unidentifiable. We need, then, at this point to take a closer look at this specific doctrine. The search for a criterion for analogy consists simply of this: How can one determine which acts are characteristically God's? We can best begin by noting a number of possibilities that clearly will not work in Ogden's system.

It is quite apparent that Ogden does not share the traditional orthodox commitment to the inspiration of Scripture, and thus special revelation cannot be the source. Ogden has told us that there is no content revealed anywhere beyond what is already known generally by revelation, that is, the meaning disclosed by an analysis of faith. Although, as we have noted, Ogden does speak of the authority of Scripture, it is a heavily qualified and conditioned authority, and, curiously enough, he has next to nothing to say about the Old Testament. His references to Scripture are almost always in relation to the Gospels. In any case, it is clear that for Ogden an authoritative Scripture is at best a secondary source of knowledge of God. Its content must first be verified by some more final criterion.

It is also clear that metaphysics cannot be his source. While it is true that the metaphysical structure provides Ogden with the methodological principles for explicating deity, nevertheless the actual contents of a doctrine of God are gained by a procedure of analogy with the human self. That includes even his dipolarity.48 Metaphysics gives Ogden a method of
analogy, but not the detailed attributes of the nature of God. For example, that some of God's actions are characteristic and, especially, which are characteristic, is known only by analogy. Thus, metaphysics, in Ogden's system at least, cannot be the direct source of identifying characteristics of God's actions. We know God from man, not the other way around.

History also cannot be the source of Ogden's knowledge of God's acts, in particular the details of the life of Jesus. That, of course, gets the cart before the horse, since what we need is a criterion that ensures the representative nature of Jesus' life. Why him, and not Buddha, Socrates, or Hitler for that matter? Ogden cannot really claim to hold to the traditional concept of the incarnation. Jesus' human life is God's only in the sense that he fully carries out God's initial aim. But Jesus was not God in any sense in which any of us are not at least potentially capable of being God. His life was neither necessary nor unique for Ogden. Thus Jesus cannot be the direct source of knowledge of God.

The only direct statements that Ogden makes that might help us are that those acts are characteristic of God which express "the ultimate meaning of man's existence" or "the ultimate truth of his existence." This, however, only prompts a further question: What is the ultimate truth about man's existence? To this Ogden does have an answer. It is that anthropology found in (Heidegger's expression of) Christian faith.

It is this subargument of Ogden's second argument that
appears to me to be circular.

The argument that underlies propositions (g) and (h) really as follows:

(j) What is authentic human existence (and that it is possible) is known by revelation in Jesus.

(k) What is characteristic of God is known by what is authentically human.

(l) That Jesus' revelation is true is known by its being characteristic of God (analogously).

Thus, if we already know authentic existence, then the revelation in Jesus is irrelevant or redundant, but certainly not decisive or necessary for objectification. In this case, and my impression is that this is the direction in which Ogden is moving, Christian theology must lose its specific identity. In other words, it becomes meaningless to say that Christian theology is the true position.

The alternative, that is, that we do not know what authentic existence is, would leave us without a basis for analogy. We would then have no means of recognizing characteristic acts of God since we do not know which of our own are authentic.

Ogden's argument to equate Christian theology with the right philosophy thus fails at the level of theology. He lacks any sustainable criterion by which to identify Jesus as a "representative" act of God. How is man to know how to apply the principle that he is the "image of God." Ogden seems to totally ignore the ethical dimensions of personhood. (In fact,
his discussion of the self is generally much too meager.) If lack of ethical perfection in any way reduces or distorts true personhood, then Ogden must provide a criterion for establishing analogies. Just which actions are characteristic and represent God to us? He admits himself the obvious point that many, perhaps most, do not. As I see it, this leaves Ogden only one choice if he rejects the necessity of the revelation in Jesus. He must establish a criterion of truth for metaphysics—apart from any reference to Christian theology. This would, in fact, provide a framework for a purely philosophical theology, that is, a theology wholly contained within philosophy, as Ogden wants but at a steep price. First, the end product must now cease to deserve the title "Christian." It has become an entirely natural theology with dependence neither on the person of Jesus nor on Scripture. This alone would seem to make this an unattractive option since Ogden has always insisted that he is doing explicitly Christian theology and in agreement with that particular tradition derived from the biblical witness.

Furthermore, since Ogden has committed himself to the priority of epistemology, that is, that metaphysics cannot be more than the analysis of the self as it experiences, it is from the outset difficult to see how there could be a truth criterion for metaphysics that permits recognition of man's true potential unless he already experiences it.

Let us, however, set aside all of this and ask whether Ogden does have a workable truth criterion for metaphysics.
That he wishes to move in this direction is indicated by his inclusion of contingent anthropology in metaphysics in recent essays. If so, then Ogden has established that theology logically can be contained within philosophy. He will, however not have proved that theology is, in fact, part of philosophy since his argument against the possibility of God's direct revelation in history fails.

3. The Adequacy of Ogden's Truth Criterion for Metaphysics

The clarity of the criterion. Superficially at least, there are two lines of argument in Ogden that provide us with a truth criterion for metaphysical systems. We shall see that they finally reduce to one.

First, Ogden states straightforwardly that the criterion of truth for a metaphysical system is its total fit through the whole of experience. Metaphysical systems are complete ontologies and they stand or fall as wholes. They cannot be falsified by individual facts.

The second line of thought begins with Ogden's definitions of theology and philosophy. They are the analysis of faith; and faith is a universal and constitutive phenomenon. This must mean that philosophical and theological statements are true, if they are universally recognizable descriptions—existential descriptions.

To get clearer on these two lines of thought, let me use one of Ogden's examples: the abandonment by modern, secular man of classical theism and "substance" metaphysics. This
rejection indicates the following. (1) What is rejected is not an isolated piece of the classical puzzle but the entire board. This reflects the first approach. (2) The reasons for the rejection have to do with the failure, so Ogden thinks, of classical theism to measure up to man's perception of his possibilities as indicated by unavoidable faith. Here we see Ogden's second approach. (3) Most importantly, however, the rejection does not involve the abandonment of either Christianity or faith as such.

This leads to a crucial problem in Ogden's thought that we must get clear on: does the content of faith logically precede the content of theology and metaphysics, or is it posterior and therefore conceptualized by theology and metaphysics, or does, in fact, faith in a strict sense have no content but occur always in connection with theology and metaphysics?

Gilkey, as we have seen, argues that Ogden's view is an incoherent combination of the first (existential) and second (process) options. My own position is that Ogden's view is really the third option above, that is, that faith, per se, has no content apart from its existentialist conceptualization in theology. This results in the situation that faith is to some extent independent of its conceptualizing theory, and yet understood only in terms of it.

This involves complications, but I want only to point out that this interpretation brings Ogden's two lines of thought together. Although faith may well be a universal phenomenon, it is conceptualized and understood by various whole ontologies.
Thus, the real question of truth for metaphysics is for Ogden the question of the choice of the "right philosophy:" an adequate total theological and metaphysical system.

We should note that this is not Hartshorne's criterion of metaphysics. Although he is the source of much of Ogden's metaphysical framework, there is a significant difference between their criteria for metaphysical truth. For Hartshorne, any, even one, restriction on the applicability of a metaphysical statement dooms it. Secondly, Ogden's criterion has a more subjective ring to it. He speaks of unavoidable belief.

One could wish that Ogden had spelled out this notion of "unavoidable belief" carefully, and perhaps that can be expected in the future. I shall, therefore, make only a few critical comments concerning what must be understood as two characteristics of one criterion, not two separate criteria: coherence and unavoidable belief.

(1) Coherence.

I want here only to point out the curious position and interpretation of a coherence component in Ogden's criterion. Langdon Gilkey's criticism is, I think, essentially well taken and needs only to be generalized.

Ogden's urge to build a metaphysical system fits neither his existentialist epistemology, nor his (Toulmin's) analytic argument for its basis. In particular, a criterion that rests heavily on a concept of coherence seems out of place.
His understanding of existentialist knowledge as the proper form for theology and philosophy ought to require that metaphysical statements be closely and individually linked with directly existentialist analysis. He has claimed, after all, that any statement about God is also a statement about man and the possibilities of his existence. This explains, I think, his reluctance to part with anthropological claims in his metaphysical scheme, but it does not allow for metaphysical claims to stand as true when they conflict with or are not established by experience. One may want to maintain them and hope for further evidence to clarify the situation, but one cannot speak of them as true. 54

It is also the case that his analytic argument for God's reality, as well as his view of God's action, commits him to an analogical speaking of God. I shall have more to say on this below; for now I note that this also commits him to a set of highly descriptive and empirically checkable propositions about what is real.

Ogden's view of the scope of analogy is, if anything, more restrictive than Thomas', in that it is based on selfhood alone. Our knowledge of God is limited to what can be known of the human self. Thus, again, it would inconsistent to claim truth for a theological statement for which there was no experiential backing. I conclude, therefore, that Ogden's understanding of metaphysical truth conflicts with other elements, and critical ones at that, of his system.
(2) Unavoidable belief

It is this second characteristic of metaphysical truth on which Ogden gives us somewhat more detail. With one exception, in "The Criterion of Metaphysical Truth. . ." (1975), Ogden discusses unavoidable belief in the context of how one ought to choose the correct conceptualization of faith. This is, of course, an all-important problem in a system in which faith is continuous with theology and philosophy and thus, although it is a level of cognitive awareness, is understood rationally only through them. I will deal with this context in a separate section to follow, and comment here first on Ogden's statement in the context of elaborating a criterion of truth for metaphysics.

Let me repeat his statement:

What, then, is the criterion of a metaphysical truth? I submit that it is the criterion of unavoidable belief or necessary application through experience. Those statements are true metaphysically which I could not avoid believing to be true, at least implicitly, if I were to believe or exist at all; or, alternatively, they are the statements which would necessarily apply through any of my experiences, even my merely conceivable experiences, provided only that such an experience was sufficiently reflected on.55

There are two problems with this criterion. First, Ogden appears to be giving two alternative expressions for the same criterion, but they are not equivalent. Second, the criterion, especially in its first version, is not sufficient to establish metaphysics.

Let me explain. Is "unavoidable belief" intended to be the same criterion as "necessary application?" In the latter expression Ogden sounds deductive. That is, he talks of
applying metaphysical statements rather than constructing them. If the term "necessary" is used here as a synonym for a priori, then Ogden may well be indicating a criterion similar to Hartshorne's notion of nonrestrictiveness.

The difficulty is that Ogden allows for contingent metaphysical statements, those about my own existence, and these are clearly not subject to necessary application. It may be, then, that Ogden has two criteria, despite his talk of the criterion. The criterion of unavoidable belief can apply to contingent statements and it therefore is not equivalent to "necessary application" if we have properly understood it. Statements which describe, without exception, my actual experiences could not be false. Those, however, which I cannot avoid believing to be true, may yet be false. Those, however, which I cannot avoid believing to be true, may yet be false, or at least might have been.

I must conclude then, that no final judgment can be made regarding the success of Ogden's truth criterion for metaphysics. It has not been stated with sufficient clarity to determine precisely its meaning. Aside from the ambiguity of Ogden's criterion, what it permits is incompatible with a key element of his system: metaphysics' source in self-analysis.

The consistency of Ogden's criterion. - What is most amazing about Ogden's metaphysics is his ability to derive so much from so little. Flew's criticism at this point it too narrow. Ogden is not limited just to the confines of his
argument for the reality of God, but by his epistemology in general. Nevertheless, this provides little additional freedom.

As I have indicated, the source of metaphysics is, for Ogden, the self's analysis of itself. This is enough to provide an existentialist characterization of man and to demonstrate the reality of God. But I fail to see how it can provide the principles of analogy which Ogden simply adopts as part of a total metaphysical system. For Whitehead the principle that God is the primary metaphysical example derives ultimately from the principle of relativity,56 and the ontological principle,57 which, together, give us the principle that all causes are actual and related (either positively or negatively) to all other actual entities.

The difficulty is that in Whitehead's system these principles are derived from empirical generalizations. To recall his well-known definition of metaphysics:

The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.58

I do not see how Ogden's epistemology can provide them.

Now Ogden certainly provides good reasons for connecting his process metaphysics to his existential epistemology. But nowhere is there a clear derivation of the sort he himself has required of others, most particularly in "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle." Here it is stated that one's meta-
physics must be established "methodically and critically by deriving it entirely from one's theory of cognition." He is explicit that mere "correlation" or "isomorphism" is not enough.

What I am proposing is that his own system fails to live up to this standard. It is anything but clear how one could derive a process metaphysics, in particular the principles that develop the nature of God, from Ogden's existentialist epistemology. What is missing in particular, is the derivation of the proportionality factor for analogy. In Thomas' system, for example, the finite/infinite proportion is provided by the cosmological argument; in Schleiermacher, whose epistemology is closer to Ogden's, it comes from the discovery of a feeling of absolute dependence.

In Ogden, this factor, namely the doctrine that God is absolutely relative, is a proposition of the metaphysical system. Ogden might, of course, argue that it can be derived from his epistemology. My point is only that he has not done so and it is not clear how that could be accomplished.

4. The Same Problem

Let me, then, summarize where this discussion of Ogden's second argument has taken us and what we must now conclude. Theology, for Ogden, is initially defined by the tradition that results from the revelation that is its derivative source. But this immediately pushes us to a more fundamental question. What is the criterion by which one determines a true revelation?
In particular, why should we conclude that the revelation of the possibility of human authentic existence in the person of Jesus is, in fact, the truth? Ogden suggests here that the answer lies in the concept of "decisiveness." A revelation is true if it decisively represents the self God is. That is, it is a characteristic act of God if it, by analogy, portrays true selfhood.

This answer, however, is unsatisfactory in that it only demands a further criterion. How do we know the truth about God's self which allows us to understand an act as characteristically his? The only answer here has to be a criterion of metaphysical truth. We have looked at Ogden's criterion and found it lacking in some respects. There is simply no clear connection between his existentialist epistemology and his process metaphysics.

In reality, however, the second argument for the identity of theology within philosophy fails not only for lack of any conclusive truth criterion that could establish the identity. Essentially, it fails for the same reason that invalidated the first argument. Ogden, by his epistemology, has already been forced to deny the possibility of an objective criterion for acts of God. As I have already argued, any attempt to recognize an historical event as God's characteristic action must be myth. Thus, while it has other serious defects as well, Ogden's second argument fails for the same reason as did the first.
The underlying problem, then, in Ogden's system is the tension between the concrete God of his process metaphysics and the non-objective God demanded by his "secular" and existentialist epistemology. I see no way of building an internally consistent system without giving up one of these two tenets.
C. Concluding Remarks

My objective in this dissertation was to synthesize Ogden's many isolated statements about theology and philosophy into a logical sequence and then test the consistency of the resulting arguments. I did, however, begin by claiming to want to make some contribution to the discussion of the relationship of theology and philosophy. Thus, at least a few final remarks are in order.

(a) I have concluded that Ogden's arguments are unsound. They also miss the crux of the issue. He supposes that he has solved the problem of relating theology and philosophy by denying any uniqueness of content for the former. Theology, then, is part of philosophy.

Ogden forgets that, traditionally, Christian theologians have not regarded content, the events of Christ's life and most notably the resurrection, as identifying a unique discipline. They are usually the first to note the historical nature of Christian assertions. Thus, the central items of Christian theology belong equally to the disciplines of archaeology, history, even linguistics. Certainly its contents overlap many other disciplines as well, including the sciences and philosophy.

While it is certainly true that theologians, Thomas, for example, have claimed doctrines unknown outside their discipline, for example the Trinity, what has traditionally
specified its distinctiveness is its **source**. I noted this at the beginning by quoting Thomas, Locke, and Kierkegaard. It is here that the argument must focus. Once Ogden gives up the source-uniqueness of revelation, he really has no choice but to try to dissolve theology into philosophy.

(b) Probably the most frequent modern and contemporary proposal to justify a unique source, and therefore a distinct discipline, has been the attempt to isolate some identifying type of knowledge. Philosophers and theologians have suggested various types of knowing from religious intuition to mystical or religious experience to divine encounters. Some have argued for unique objects of knowing that distinguish theology such as the "feeling of absolute dependence," the "holy," or simply the religious aspect of existence. Currently there is a vast variety of suggestions based on the notion of a religious "language-game," following some remarks of Wittgenstein. Many of these include the view that theology is a type of extremely general theoretical knowledge that leads to the formulation of world-views. Thus, it is seen as non-empirical, or, better, **pre-empirical**, in that it conditions how one perceives the world. James Hall has suggested that it is "categorical." Theological statements are regarded as the "fundamental and categorizing expressions in terms of which a person views the world 'theistically' (i.e., sorts events in terms of a theistic model)." All of these suggestions have the serious disadvantage of stipulating a unique and non-ordinary type of
(c) Until the Age of Reason, and perhaps still today, the majority view among Christian theologians was surely that the uniqueness of the source of theology stems from its divine origin. Aquinas and Locke, for example, are explicit on the point that theology is distinguished as a separate science, not by its specific content so much as by its character as being revealed from God. This revelatory character is held to be knowable by ordinary means. Philosophy is man's reasoning about existence; theology is the study of God's authoritative word on the subject.

(d) I would argue, then, that even if Ogden were successful, and he is not, in showing that the content of theology and philosophy coincide, there remain a number of possibilities for distinguishing theology by its source. Perhaps it is the product of a unique way of knowing or experiencing. But it may also be the study of a previously given divine revelation. I find Ogden's dismissal of "classical theism" totally unconvincing, which leaves the viable option of an objectively justifiable revelation to man from God, a position which I consider not only tenable, but true. It is not my intention, however, to argue for that position here. My point is only that the factor of source is the crucial one, and that Ogden side-steps it.
(e) It cannot simply be taken for granted that theology deserves to be cited among the academic disciplines. If its existence cannot be justified, then it ought to go the way of alchemy, astrology, or phrenology. It is surely correct that if one can ignore or discard claims to a unique source, theology must dissolve into metaphysics. Ogden's arguments, however, against the objective action of God in history, in creation, redemption, or revelation, fail by way of being internally contradictory.
NOTES

Chapter I.

1. This would be true at least given conventional interpretations of Kant, although the preface to Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone indicates some tendencies toward a coordinationist view.

2. I, Q. 1, Art. 1.

3. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. XVIII.

4. Philosophical Fragments

5. An excellent discussion of these shifting roles can be found in Wayne Pomerleau, "The Accession and Dismissal of an Upstart Handmaid", Monist 60, 2 (April, 1977).


7. See his "Philosophy and Religion in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Continuities and Discontinuities" Monist 60, 2 (April, 1977), 269. Ogden's role is briefly mentioned on p. 275f.


13. Note e.g., Church Dogmatics II, 1, p. 73 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1957).


15. Ogden, "Reality", p. 57.


19. Sein und Zeit (1927), 427 n. 1. This is Ogden's translation in "Temporality", p. 382.


22. Ogden, Christ, p. 127.


25. See Ogden, "Project", p. 163.


27. Ibid., p. 160.

28. Ibid.

29. Perhaps the best statement by Bultmann himself is found in his recent Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1958).

30. Ogden, Christ, p. 46.

31. Ibid., p. 47.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 48.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

36. Ibid., p. 67.

37. Ibid., p. 75.

38. Included in The Reality of God and Other Essays, p. 20.


41. Ibid., p. 217f.


44. We shall have occasion later on to discuss the problem of Ogden's mixing of Hartshorne and Whitehead. An excellent discussion of differences can be found in David Griffin, "Hartshorne's Differences from Whitehead"


53. In *The Reality of God and Other Essays*.

54. See esp. p. 23.


57. In earlier essays, e.g. "The Lordship of Jesus Christ", *Encounter*, XXI, 4 (Fall, 1960), 408 (page references here and below are to the publication in *The Reality of God*), p. 198, Ogden seems content to discuss adequacy merely in relation to the general Christian tradition, i.e. theology must be authentic ("Concern", p. 64). Only in more recent writings, especially "The Authority of Scripture for Theology", *Interpretation*, 30, 4 (July, 1976), 242, does he seek to define the
relation more specifically to the Bible itself with some care. One exception is a section in Christ, pp. 13-17.

58. Ogden, "Project", p. 171.
60. Ibid., p. 203.
61. Ibid.
62. Ogden, Christ, p. 17.
63. Ibid., p. 18.
64. Ibid., p. 40.
65. Ibid., p. 54.
66. Ibid., p. 43.
67. Ibid., p. 23.
68. Ibid., p. 72.
69. Ibid., p. 75.
71. Ogden, Christ, p. 112.
72. Ibid., p. 117.
73. Ibid., p. 134ff.
74. Ibid., p. 130.
75. Ibid., p. 134f.
76. Ibid., p. 146.
77. Ibid., p. 153.
78. Ibid., p. 147.
79. Ibid., pp. 160-164.

82. Ogden, "Significance", p. 17.


84. Ogden, "History", p. 170f.

85. Ibid., p. 172.

86. Ibid., p. 176.

87. Ibid., p. 17f. See *Process and Reality*, p. 521.

88. See the previous discussions of Ogden, *Christ* and "Lordship".

89. This essay appeared in German translation in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (1969) but with an extended footnote commenting on Bultmann's response to Ogden. "Bultmann's Demythologizing" and *Christ*. This response was translated and appeared along with a discussion by Hartshorne as well as Ogden's remarks ("The Possibility and Task of Philosophical Theology") in the *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* (1965).

90. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962.


92. Ogden, "Understanding of Theology", p. 166f.


94. See Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 179.

95. S. Ogden, "The Possibility and Task of Philosophical Theology", *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, XX, 3 (March, 1965), especially pp. 277-278.

96. Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 182.

97. Ibid., p. 190.

98. Ogden, "Prospects", esp. pp. 73-76.
99. Ibid., p. 81f.

100. Ogden, "Theology and Metaphysics", p. 18.

101. S. Ogden, "The Challenge to Protestant Thought", Continuum, 6, 2 (Sept., 1968), p. 239.

102. For a sampling of comments see the discussion in chapter V.


108. "What is Theology?", Journal of Religion, LII, 1 (Jan., 1972), 22 was reissued in the Perkins School of Theology Journal, 26, 2 (Winter, 1973), along with four major statements of commentary and critique, as well as a lengthy "Response" essay by Ogden.

110. Ogden, "Significance", p. 244f.

111. Similar discussion can be found in an earlier essay done for the centenary lectures in honor of F.D. Maurice in 1972, "The Reformation that We Want," Anglican Theological Review, 54, 4 (Oct., 1972), 260, esp. p. 262f. Some specific applications of Ogden's view of the authority of Scripture in relation to denominational doctrinal standards can be found in "Doctrinal Standards in the United Methodist Church", Perkins School of Theology Journal, 28, 1 (Fall, 1974), 19.

112. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XLVI, 1 (March 1978). This essay appeared too close to the completion of this dissertation to take any real account of it in the text.

113. A distinction which was first argued in Ogden, "Possibility."


115. In addition, this essay provides a helpful summation of B. Lonergan's theological method and epistemology. Further remarks on Lonergan can be found in his contribution (#3) to "A Colloquy on Bernard Lonergan", Perkins School of Theology Journal, 28, 3 (Spring, 1975), 35.


117. Ibid., p. 164.

118. Ibid., p. 167.

119. See also "Christology Reconsidered: John Cobb's Christ in a Pluralistic Age", Process Studies, 6, 2 (Summer, 1976), 116 for similar considerations.
Chapter II.
1. See Ogden, "Reality", p. 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Ogden, "Concern", p. 60.
6. Ibid., p. 64.
11. Ibid., p. 213.
13. Ibid.
15. See ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
25. Hartshorne's discussion of this point can be found particularly succinct in "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," Review of Metaphysics, IV, 1 (Sept., 1947), p. 24.


30. Ogden, "Reality", p. 46.


32. I shall expand on this point in IV, B.

33. Ogden, "God and Philosophy", p. 150.

34. Ogden, "Possibility", p. 278.

35. See Ogden, "The Authority of Scripture for Theology", Interpretation, 30, 2 (July, 1976), p. 244.

36. See ibid., p. 246.

37. Ibid., p. 255, n. 25.


39. Ibid., p. 179.


41. Ogden, "God and Philosophy", p. 172.

42. See ibid.

43. See Ogden, "Lonergan", ad passim.

44. Ogden, "Reality", p. 57.


46. Ibid., p. 163.

47. Ibid. The quote is from Process and Reality, p. 83.

48. Ibid., p. 162f.
49. Ibid., p. 167.

50. Note, in general, "Prospects" and his "The Reformation that We Want", Anglican Theological Review, 54, 4 (Oct., 1972); see also "Reality", p. 3.

51. Ogden, "Lonergan", p. 156.

52. Ibid., pp. 156-157.

53. Ibid., p. 163.


56. Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 56.

57. See section II, A above.


59. See ibid., p. 161.

60. Ibid., p. 166.


63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 181.


66. This is constructed primarily on the basis of ibid., p. 182.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.


70. Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 183.

72. Ibid., p. 495.
74. Ogden, "History", p. 6.
75. Ogden, Christ, pp. 18-19.
76. Ibid., p. 53.
78. See Ogden, "Myth", p. 104.
79. Ibid., p. 105.
80. Ibid., pp. 107-109 contains a justification of this point.
81. See ibid., pp. 111-113.
82. Ibid., p. 116.
83. Ibid., p. 118.
84. See ibid., p. 104f.
86. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 41.
89. Ogden, "Prospects", p. 73.
90. Ogden, "Love Unbounded", p. 11.
91. Ogden, "Project", p. 161. See also the discussion in Christ, p. 24f.
92. See e.g. Ogden, "Love Unbounded", p. 11.
93. See the discussion in Ogden, "Myth", p. 105f.
94. Ogden, Christ, p. 39.
95. See ibid., p. 40.
96. Ibid., p. 41.

98. Ogden, "Myth", pp. 103-104.


100. Ogden, "Myth", p. 117.


102. Ogden, Christ, p. 32.


104. See e.g. Ogden, "Bultmann's Demythologizing", pp. 165-171.


108. Ibid.

109. See the discussion in ibid., pp. 165-171.

110. See Ogden, Christ, p. 76f. Bultmann does, however, argue for the mythical nature of the resurrection accounts.


112. See above, p.38

113. See esp. Ogden, Christ, chapter 9.

114. Ibid., p. 146.

Chapter III.

1. This appeared, along with the other major papers of the consultation in *The Future of Philosophical Theology*, ed. by R. Evans (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971).

2. This diagram is based on the content of the above-mentioned essay.

3. Ogden, "Task", p. 56.

4. Ibid., p. 58.

5. Ibid., p. 59.


10. Ibid., p. 70.

11. Ogden, "Possibility", p. 278.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 277.


22. Ibid., p. 218.

23. See ibid.
27. Ogden, "Reality", p. 33.
28. Ibid., p. 35. A parallel discussion can be found in "Function", p. 106f.
30. Ogden, "Reality", p. 34.
32. Ibid., p. 107. Ogden is quoting William James.
33. Ogden, "Reality", p. 38. Here Ogden is drawing from Stephen Toulmin, particularly his An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).
34. Ibid., p. 39.
35. Ibid.
37. Ogden, "Reality", p. 23.
38. Ibid.
40. See his The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle: Open Court, 1962), p. 110.
42. Ogden, "Christian Proclamation", p. 93.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ogden, "Reality", p. 25.
47. Ibid., pp. 130-132.
48. In "God and Philosophy".
51. Ibid., p. 172. Similar discussions are in "Criterion", and "Falsification."
52. Ogden, "God and Philosophy", p. 171; see also "Objectivity", p. 190.
53. I take this to be the equivalent to Whitehead's "adequacy."
54. Ibid., p. 173.
56. See, e.g. Ogden, "Natural Theology", p. 114.
57. See Ogden, "Task", pp. 58 and 60.
58. Note the discussion in Ogden, "Understanding of Theology". The argument on pl 58 of "Task" easily appears contradictory. Note particularly the statement at the top of the page, that "existential faith,...is a mode of understanding", whereas in the main body of the argument it is said to "precede reason" and "seek understanding." The key to the distinction lies in the word "reflective". Faith is encountered understanding preceding reflective understanding. Unfortunately the word "reflective" is nowhere clarified and elsewhere in his writings Ogden is concerned to argue for the reflectiveness of faith taken in the broad sense.
59. Ibid., p. 58.
60. Ibid., p. 62.
61. "Philosophy of religion" is used only in "Task." On p. 63 it appears to be relatively unimportant while on p. 66 it seems to be identical with "philosophical theology."
62. The argument of the next paragraph is from *ibid.*, p. 61.


64. *Ibid.*, p. 64.


67. See Ogden, "Task", p. 63.

68. See Ogden, "Project", p. 171, although here this is said simply to be the task of philosophy.


73. For the following see *ibid.*, pp. 47-48.


75. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 41f.

76. See above, section II, B.

77. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 41.

78. Ogden, "Criterion", p. 47.

79. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 42.

80. Ogden, "Criterion", p. 47.


83. This fits with what was said in the preceding section regarding the necessity of metaphysics.
84. Ogden, "Christology", pp. 380-381.
85. Ibid., p. 381.
86. Ibid., p. 382.
87. Ogden, "Concern", p. 60.
89. Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 176.
90. Ogden, "Prospects", p. 66.
91. Ogden, "Task", p. 73.
92. Ogden, "Christology", p. 375.
93. This is developed in Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 180f.
94. Ibid., p. 181.
96. For the following see Ogden, "Falsification", p. 21f.
97. Ibid.
98. See ibid., p. 49f.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., p. 41.
101. Ibid.
102. See ibid., and "Bultmann's Demythologizing", p. 500f. It is difficult not to see some inconsistency between "Falsification" on the one hand and "Christology" and "Objectivity" on the other. My interpretation tries to eliminate it, but I may well be accused of somewhat forcing the sense of "Falsification", esp. p. 40.
103. Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 190.
104. Ibid.
106. Ibid., p. 378.
Chapter IV.

1. Ogden, Christ, p. 112.
2. Ogden, "History", p. 112.
4. See Ogden, Christ, p. 141-144.
5. Ibid., p. 143.
6. Ibid., p. 145.
8. P. 133, above.
12. Ibid., p. 57.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 57.
17. Ogden, "Reality", p. 57.
18. Ibid., p. 58.
22. Ibid., p. 58.
24. Ibid., p. 10.
29. See Ogden, "History", p. 12.
32. Ogden, "History", p. 10.
33. Ibid.
34. Ogden, "Reality", p. 63.
35. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ogden, "Reality", p. 63.
43. Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 7.
44. (LaSalle: Open Court, 1962).
45. One can find it well developed in many of Hartshorne's works.
47. Ogden, "Reality", p. 59.
49. Ogden, "Reality", p. 60.
51. See Ogden, "Temporality", p. 152.
52. Ibid., p. 154.
53. See ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 13.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 15.
58. Ibid., p. 17.
60. Ogden, "History", p. 17.
61. See Ogden, "Lordship", p. 203.
62. Ibid., p. 201.
63. Refer to section II, C, above.
67. See ibid., p. 226.
68. See ibid., p. 227.
69. Ibid.
70. See Ogden, "Understanding of Theology", p. 168.
73. Ogden, review of Principles of Christian Theology, p. 264.
74. See e.g. Ogden, "History", p. 7.
75. See esp. Ogden, "Reality", p. 59.
76. Ogden, "History", p. 12.
77. Refer to section IV, B above.
78. Ogden, "History", p. 10.
81. Ibid.
82. The following is developed in ibid., p. 156f.
84. See ibid., p. 13f.
86. Ogden himself admits this in "Revelation", p. 271.
87. Ibid., p. 282.
88. Ogden, "Task", p. 74 (my emphasis).
89. Ogden, "Revelation", p. 282.
90. Ogden, "History", p. 15.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. This is equivalent to Whitehead's "subjective aim."
94. See esp. Ogden, "Project."
95. The clearest version of the following argument can be found in Ogden, "Revelation", p. 284f.
96. Ogden, "Revelation", p. 287.
97. Ibid., p. 284.
98. This is Ogden's spelling to indicate the repetitive and non-unique nature of special revelation. It simply presents again what is already known by original revelation.

100. Ogden, "Revelation", p. 285. See also Christ, p. 142f.


102. This is examined in detail in section IV, 4 below.

103. See Ogden, "History", p. 17, and Christ, p. 159f.

104. Ogden, "Task", p. 76.

105. Ogden, "Reality", p. 49.

106. Ibid., p. 60.


112. Ogden, "Task", p. 69.

113. Ibid., p. 71. It is used here interchangeably with "philosophical theology." Note also "Reality", p. 27: "theistic philosophers."

114. Ogden, "Task", p. 65f.

115. Ogden, "Natural Theology", p. 115.


117. See Ogden, "Task", p. 65.

118. Ibid., p. 63.

119. This is especially clear in ibid., p. 72.

120. See the discussion in Ogden, "Revelation", p. 49f.

121. Ibid., p. 49.

122. See especially Ogden, "Project", p. 171.

123. See III, B and C, above.
124. Ogden, "Revelation", p. 262.
125. Ogden, "Possibility", p. 278. See also "Task", p. 60, but compare "Task", p. 72.
129. Ogden, "Revelation", p. 46.
130. Ibid., p. 48.
132. Ogden, "Falsification", p. 43.
133. See e.g. Ogden, "Concern", p. 61.
134. See the discussion in Ogden, "Christology", p. 380f.
135. See Ogden, "Objectivity", p. 190.
136. See Ogden, "Christology", pp. 380-381.
Chapter V


5. Ibid., p. 95.


10. See Ogden, "History," p. 4.

11. Ibid., p. 12.

12. Ibid., p. 13.


16. For the following see Ibid.

17. In The Philosophical Review, 38, 3 (May 1929), 284.

18. One of the few relevant discussions of this difference between Hartshorne and Heidegger can be found in Ralph James, "Process Cosmology and Theological Particularity," in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Brown, James, Reeves, eds. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). See also his The Concrete God (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), chapter 4.

20. Ibid., p. 452.
21. Ibid., p. 455.
22. Note, e.g., its use in Ogden, "Revelation."
25. Flew, op. cit., p. 155.
26. For the following see Vieth, op. cit., p. 39f.
27. A contemporary version can be found in P. F. Strawson, Individuals (Garden City: Anchor, 1963), pp. 23-34.
28. See his The Case for Christianity (New York: MacMillan, 1943), chapters 1-3. This is an example of what has come to be identified as a "pragmatically self-referential" argument; see Boyle, Grisez, and Tollefsen, Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976).
29. I realize, of course, that I am departing here from Ogden's interpretation of Whitehead's sequence, but I am quite confident that the standard interpretation is the correct one. The outlines of Whitehead's epistemology show clearly the influence of his metaphysics. Knowing is just one kind of concrescence into actual occasion.
32. Ibid., p. 42.
34. Ogden's most succinct statement, and the one of which Wagers focuses, is in "Myth," p. 111f.
35. In fairness to Ogden one might note that in "Myth" the argument is not applied to theological statements in general but only to mythical statements as they are existentially interpreted.


39. Ibid., p. 49.


42. See the Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XVII, 4 (May, 1962), 359.

43. Ibid., p. 362.

44. See section C, 1 of chapter IV.

45. See his "Matthew's 'Undercurrent' and Ogden's Christology," Process Studies, 6, 3 (Fall, 1967), 181.


47. Ibid., p. 42. Brown claims that Ogden's work is the most fully developed attempt at such a theology (ibid., O. 52).

48. In Whitehead, however, each pole is arrived at individually by separate arguments and not by analogy.


50. Ibid.

51. As we have seen, Ogden argues that Heidegger's philosophy is unintentionally but explicitly Christian in origin.

52. Refer back to section III, C, 3 on this point.


54. Note Ogden, "Christology," p. 381.


60. Ibid.


62. Ibid., p. 205.
APPENDICES

A. Biographical Note
B. Index to Ogden's Works
Biographical Note.—Schubert Ogden was born in Cincinnati, Ohio on March 2, 1928. He received his bachelor's degree from Ohio Wesleyan University. After a year's graduate study in philosophy at Johns Hopkins, as a fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, Ogden entered the University of Chicago, from which he was granted the B.D. in 1954 and, two years later, the Ph. D. Some of his work there was under Charles Hartshorne, shortly before the latter left for Emory University, although his dissertation, later published as *Christ without Myth* (1961), was concerned with the philosophical and theological implications of Rudolf Bultmann's concept of "demythologizing."

In 1956 he became an instructor of philosophical theology at the Perkins School of Theology of the United Methodist Church located on the campus of Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas, quickly advancing (by 1965) to the rank of Professor. During these years he continued to concern himself with the relationship of philosophy and theology within the context of Bultmann and Heidegger, publishing a number of articles, as well as the above-mentioned *Christ without Myth*. He also authored over thirty reviews for the *Perkins School of Theology Journal*, for whom he served as book editor, and translated and edited a number of Bultmann's works, which appeared as *Existence and Faith* (1960).

During these years the influence of Hartshorne increasingly found its place in Ogden's thinking and in 1962 he spent a year at Marburg University, where Bultmann was professor of
New Testament and Theology, as Guggenheim fellow and Fulbright scholar, working on the relationship between Heideggerian existentialism and the process philosophy of Whitehead and Hartshorne. This development culminated in the publishing, in 1966, of the essays in The Reality of God. In 1969 Ogden became University Professor of Theology at the University of Chicago Divinity School, long the bastion of process thought. He has been a prolific writer of articles in recent years, concentrating primarily on issues of definition and method within theology and philosophy. Some of these have appeared in the Journal of Religion of which he was co-editor for 1972/73 and to which he continues to serve as consultant. Frequently these essays have been dialogues with other theologians and philosophers, among them A. Flew, MacKinnon, Lonergan, and Cobb.

In 1972 Ogden returned to his position as Professor of Theology at Perkins School of Theology. He is also the director of the graduate program in religion at the parent institution, the Southern Methodist University, and an ordained minister of the United Methodist Church. For 1978, he served as president of the American Academy of Religion.
B. Index to Ogden's Works

The following is a partial index of major topics in Ogden's works. It is by no means exhaustive either in listings or in headings. It will, nevertheless, serve well as an introduction to the more important discussions of main issues. It also indicates the passages in Ogden which have been the primary sources of this dissertation. A few comments are in order.

1. The page numbers frequently indicate only the initial page of a lengthy discussion.

2. When no page number follows the title abbreviation, the entire work focuses on the topic.

3. The following title abbreviations are used:

AST  "The Authority of Scripture for Theology" (1976)
BDHD "Bultmann's Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar Theism" (1964)
BNQ "Bultmann and the 'New Quest!'" (1962)
BPD "Bultmann's Project of Demythologizing and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy" (1957)
BS  "Beyond Supernaturalism" (1963)
CBL "Colloquy on Bernard Lonergan (3)" (1975)
CM  Christ without Myth (1961)
CMT "The Criterion of Metaphysical Truth and the Senses of Metaphysics" (1975)
CNT "A Christian Natural Theology?" (1971)
CP  "The Christian Proclamation of God to Men of the So-Called 'Atheistic Age'" (1966)
CPT "The Challenge to Protestant Thought" (1968)
CT  "The Challenge to Protestant Thought" (1968)
DD  "The Debate of Demythologizing" (1959)
DS  "Doctrinal Standards in the United Methodist Church" (1974)
FB  "Falsification and Belief" (1974)
FT  "Faith and Truth" (1965)
GAH "What Sense Does It Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?" (1963)
GP  "God and Philosophy" (1968)
HCT Handbook of Christian Theology, "Destiny and Fate" (1958)
HDGF "How Does God Function in Human Life?" (1967)
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title and Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>&quot;Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle&quot;</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUDG</td>
<td>&quot;Love Unbounded: The Doctrine of God&quot;</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>&quot;The Meaning of Christian Hope&quot;</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>MT*</td>
<td>&quot;Myth and Truth&quot;</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>&quot;On Revelation&quot;</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>&quot;The Point of Christology&quot;</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>&quot;The Promise of Faith&quot;</td>
<td>1966</td>
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<td>PPET</td>
<td>&quot;Present Prospects for Empirical Theology&quot;</td>
<td>1969</td>
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<td>PTPT</td>
<td>&quot;The Possibility and Task of Philosophical Theology&quot;</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>&quot;Response&quot;</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>RG</td>
<td>&quot;The Reality of God&quot;</td>
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<td>RW</td>
<td>&quot;The Reformation that We Want&quot;</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>SRB</td>
<td>&quot;The Significance of Rudolf Bultmann&quot;</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>&quot;Systematic Theology&quot;</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<td>SWU</td>
<td>&quot;The Strange Witness of Unbelief&quot;</td>
<td>1966</td>
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<td>TB</td>
<td>&quot;Theological Briefs: 'I Believe In'&quot;</td>
<td>1976</td>
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<td>TG</td>
<td>&quot;The Temporality of God&quot;</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<td>TM</td>
<td>&quot;Theology and Metaphysics&quot;</td>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>&quot;Theology and Objectivity&quot;</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<td>TP</td>
<td>&quot;Theology and Philosophy&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;The Task of Philosophical Theology&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;Toward a New Theism&quot;</td>
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<td>UT</td>
<td>&quot;The Understanding of Theology in Ott and Bultmann&quot;</td>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>WDM*</td>
<td>&quot;What Does It Mean to Affirm, 'Jesus Christ is Lord'?&quot;</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<td>WN</td>
<td>&quot;Wie neu ist die 'neue Frage nach dem historischen Jesus'&quot;</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>&quot;Welch's Polemic: A Reply&quot;</td>
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<td>ZF</td>
<td>Zur Frage der 'richtigen' Philosophie&quot;</td>
<td>1964</td>
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*N.B.: For these essays the index will refer to the page numbers as they appear in The Reality of God and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), since this is often easier to locate.
analogy - RG57, GAH 9
  in Bultmann - SRB 16, GAH 6, PTPT 271, TG 386, 390, BDHD 500
  in Hartshorne - GAH 10, TPS, BDHD 509, B 515, RG 56

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  and Hartshorne - SRB 17, BDHD 497, 505, BS 15
  and Heidegger - BPD 160, SRB 10, OD 19, GAH 3, LUDG 11
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