For my Father and Mother, whose unwavering devotion to the Word I will forever treasure. I humbly dedicate to them this work in hopes that they may be pleased with it.
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Sean Turchin, a genuine Kierkegaardian and a lifelong friend.

Rebecca Rudnick, a true dialectician at heart.
Abstract

In 1849, Kierkegaard praised Hamann’s dedication to written and spoken language as derived from the Divine Logos. This thesis examines Hamann and Kierkegaard in order to understand both thinkers’ impact upon verbal and written communication. Hamann’s dedication to the idea of communication as given graciously and solely by God is apparent in his authorship. Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication is ultimately one of Christian existence. Given the fact that Kierkegaard owed much to Hamann and was perhaps even led back to faith in God through his exhaustive reading of the German linguist, this thesis examines the possibility of a Hamannian impact upon Kierkegaard’s conception of communication. The research question throughout this thesis is: What is Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication?
# Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction and Presentation of the Problem ........................................1

Chapter Two: Literature Review.........................................................................................7
  I.  Research Concerning Kierkegaard.............................................................................7
  II. Research Concerning Hamann...............................................................................9
  III. Research Concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard..............................................12
  IV. Research Concerning Indirect Communication..............................................13
  V.  Research Concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard in the area of Indirect Communication..........................................................17

Chapter Three: Historical-Critical Methodology.............................................................19
  I.  Guidelines to an Historical-Critical Analysis.......................................................19
  II. Procedures...........................................................................................................23

Chapter Four: Historical and Theological Foundations...............................................25
  I.  Kierkegaard and Hamann: Reason and Language.............................................25
     A. Hamann and the Enlightenment.................................................................25
     B. Kant and the Enlightenment......................................................................28
     C. An Answer to the Enlightenment: Hamann’s Language Theory................32
     D. The Logos as Communication..................................................................41
     E. The Error of Human Reason......................................................................49
  II. Indirect Communication in the Thought of Kierkegaard...............................51
     A. Parabolic Communication: A Relational Tool............................................51
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>B. Concepts of Indirectness in the Authorship..............................55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Background to the Lectures: The Effects of the Corsair Affair on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kierkegaard’s View of Communication..........................................62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Lectures on Communication and the Meaning of Indirect Communication...75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. The Communication of Knowledge..................................................84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. The Communication of Capability................................................88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication: References to Hamann............94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Opposition to System..............................................................96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Socratic Ignorance...............................................................99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. References to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s Early Authorship...............106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. The Concept of Humor............................................................110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Christianity as Indirect Communication.........................................117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Existence and Christianity.....................................................118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Paradox and Absolute Paradox................................................124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. The God-Man and Indirect Communication: The Sign of Offense.........127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Incognito and Indirectness: The Form of a Servant......................132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Revelation and Communication: God’s Own Speaking.......................140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: Results.................................................................143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Indirectness, Language, and Reason............................................143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Mass Media: Critical Applications..............................................144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Faith as Existence-Communication.............................................145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: Conclusions.............................................................147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Implications.................................................................................147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. Suggestions for Further Research..............................................150

Notes.................................................................................................152

Bibliography......................................................................................158
Chapter One: Introduction and Presentation of the Problem

Throughout his authorship, the Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) developed a method of indirect communication which became an essential aspect of his thought. Indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s thought is recognizable by the use of pseudonyms, the employment of concepts such as irony and humor, and ultimately deals specifically with Christian existence. It is well known that a great deal of Kierkegaard’s thought concerning indirect communication derives from his admiration of Socrates. However, one influence on Kierkegaard’s thought has traditionally been less acknowledged: that of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). This researcher asserts that Kierkegaard was extremely influenced by the thought of Hamann, and that this influence reaches into the area of indirect communication. The research question surrounding this thesis is: What is Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s theory of communication?

Through the voice of the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard once wrote of Hamann: “With all his life and soul, to the last drop of blood, he is concentrated in a single word, the passionate protest of a highly gifted genius against a system of existence” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 224). What Kierkegaard means is that Hamann, above all else, is concerned with the Logos, the Creator (German 49), the divine Word. In addition, Kierkegaard also recognizes just how starkly Hamann’s views contrast those of the Enlightenment and the systematic philosophies of his Rationalist contemporaries. There is a sense in which the above quotation could be applied to Kierkegaard’s life and authorship as well, in all its enigmatic passion and charisma. For throughout the entirety of his writings,
Kierkegaard is not only concerned with the problem of how the single individual may become a true Christian through faith, but also with how the individual stands in relation to the inscrutable, divine God and the Word Incarnate.

This researcher’s main objective is to investigate Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication. In his article “Hamann and Kierkegaard,” Ronald Gregor Smith writes that between Kierkegaard and Hamann there “was an extraordinary connection” (Smith, “Hamann and Kierkegaard” 52). Although it has been said that only Socrates impressed Kierkegaard unqualifiedly as a thinker (Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel 345), it has also been noted Hamann may have been the only author who profoundly influenced Kierkegaard’s thought (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.1 164). However, some scholars have chosen not to recognize this connection, while others believe that Kierkegaard’s interest in Hamann was merely a passing phase. Therefore, this researcher examines the thought of both Hamann and Kierkegaard in order to explore the evidence behind these claims. While many scholars agree that Hamann provided inspiration for Kierkegaard’s thought, debate nevertheless remains over to what extent the former affected the latter. Therefore, the research question surrounding this thesis: What is Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication?

Throughout this project, this researcher will show how Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication relates to his authorship, to the concept of religious communication, and finally to Christian existence. Kierkegaard began dealing with the concept of communication early in his career; in fact, the subject arises over and over throughout his entire authorship. (For the purposes of this study, the researcher has chosen four major works which deal heavily with Kierkegaard’s concept of indirect communication: Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The Point of View on My Work as an
Author, as well as numerous entries in Kierkegaard’s journals.) As early as 1847 he had mapped out a model of communication in his journals which is significant to his published writings. He writes, “When I think of communicating, I think of four parts 1) the object, 2) the communicator, 3) the receiver, 4) the communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 1 306). Here he deals with what would eventually become a basic model for communication studies. Yet Kierkegaard has not been thoroughly examined by communication scholars. While Kierkegaard has traditionally not been understood from the standpoint of the communication discipline, this researcher believes such an understanding is indeed necessary. Perhaps many communication scholars simply have not researched Kierkegaard enough to realize his importance to communication, or have simply chosen to not accept his theory as valid for the discipline. Whatever the reason, Kierkegaard lacks any effectual presence in the field of communication (Herrmann 71), and his expansive model of indirect communication continues to remain obscure to the field. However, “While at present Kierkegaard does not attract the attention of communication scholars either with reference to the purpose of his writing or his views on Christian existence, his contributions to an understanding of communication are undoubtedly relevant to…communication theory” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 128). Perhaps there will always be a need for research relating to Kierkegaard, no matter how extensive the research may be in the field in the future, for “it follows that another 150 years from now, the need for fortified, accelerated, and expanded Kierkegaard research may be monstrous” (Lønning 178). Therefore, it is imperative to show how Kierkegaard’s understanding of communication relates to the realm of Christian communication and Christian existence.

Now, Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication, according to Kierkegaard scholar Walter Lowrie, has to do with his notion of inwardness, subjectivity, and existence (Lowrie 630).
The model can be broken down into two relational aspects, both of which it is imperative here to at least introduce. First, the concept of indirect communication relates to Kierkegaard’s authorship itself. In *The Point of View on My Work as an Author* (1848), Kierkegaard stresses the central theme of his writings: to show what it means to become a Christian. He writes:

> The contents of this little book affirm, then, what I truly am as an author, that I am a religious author, that the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the problem ‘of becoming a Christian,’ with a direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours all are Christians of a sort (Kierkegaard, *The Point of View* 6).

Kierkegaard saw that Christendom in his own day had become mere objective adherence, that is, it was regarded as simply a regurgitation of facts with no substance or personal examination behind them. What was needed instead was faith.

Indirect communication is readily observable in the authorship by Kierkegaard’s more than occasional use of pseudonyms. By the aid of pseudonymity, he developed an “aesthetic disguise” (14) through which he presented esthetic, ethical, and Christian categories. This often confusing aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought has led critics such as Louis Mackay to say that “there can be no such ‘point of view’ for Kierkegaard’s writing, only points of view” (Evans, *Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments* 4). However, this charge is refuted by the fact that Kierkegaard makes a clear distinction from his own viewpoint and those presented by the medium of indirect communication (via the pseudonyms) in an appended section to *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (hereafter *CUP*) entitled “A First and Last Declaration.” In formally acknowledging himself as the author of all the pseudonymous literature (a fact already known throughout Denmark), Kierkegaard also states his purpose in using pseudonyms. “My pseudonymity or polynymity has not had a casual ground in my *person*…but it has an *essential* ground in the character of the *production*...” (Kierkegaard,
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 551). He continues, saying, “What is written therefore is in fact mine, but only in so far as I put into the mouth of the poetically actual individuality whom I produced, his life-view expressed in audible lines” (551). Kierkegaard is referring in the latter statement to the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, but we can safely assume that he also is referring to his other pseudonyms as well. He takes responsibility for the content, but makes his aim clear, mainly, that the pseudonyms often present “life-views” consistent with those in which many men and women exist. The pseudonyms, functioning as indirect communication, are actually leading towards what it means to become a Christian, i.e. they both present esthetic and ethical snapshots to show how Christianity stands in marked contrast to the categories in which people typically find themselves living. Hamann wrote exclusively under pseudonyms as well, and his pseudonymous activity always serves a purpose, albeit a somewhat different purpose than found in Kierkegaard’s writings.

Certainly a key inspiration for Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms is found in the Socratic method of indirectness. From Socrates he learned the “maieutic method (the method of midwifery) to bring to birth thoughts which the learner already obscurely possessed” (Lowrie 630). According to C. Stephen Evans, “Socrates practiced indirect communication through his use of the ‘maieutic method,’ rather like the method of a midwife who does not give birth herself but assists another to do so” (Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 10). To Kierkegaard, the maieutic method necessarily involves the category of reflection in order to be successful. In his communication model Kierkegaard says, “When in reflection upon the communication the receiver is reflected upon, then we have ethical communication. The maieutic. The communicator disappears, as it were, makes himself serve only to help the other to become” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 307). This Kierkegaard labels “the communication of
capability” (307). One must notice how in the maieutic method the communication is reflected upon as well as the receiver. The communicator himself “disappears” so that the communication can be reflected upon more clearly. In Kierkegaard’s use of the maieutic method in his unsigned works, “the author is absent from his work, so that the reader may be free to determine the meaning of the work” (Shakespeare 170). Kierkegaard’s style of standing at a distance from the pseudonyms, as we will uncover later in detail, means that Kierkegaard, as the object of communication, disappears. The reader is then left as the receiver to be faced with truth and make an ethical choice of whether or not to accept it.

The second function of indirect communication examined herein deals not only with the receiver’s relation to God, but God’s relation to the individual through divine revelation. To Kierkegaard, God reveals himself to mankind indirectly through the person of Christ. It was not directly recognizable that Christ was God; rather it is to be believed. Christ, as we shall examine, is Himself the essence of indirect communication. The condescension, the way He lived His life and His speech to mankind all constitute indirectness.

But where does Hamann fit into all this? Again we return to our research question: What is Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication? In order to begin to answer this question, this researcher will set the foundation in the beginning of chapter four of this thesis by examining the thought of Hamann as it relates to his own times. Only then will one be able to understand the ideas he was combating and also the reason his writings were so intriguing to Kierkegaard.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

There are five main areas through which this researcher reviews the literature examined for this project: research concerning Kierkegaard, research relating to Hamann, research concerning indirect communication, research relating to Kierkegaard and Hamann, and lastly, research concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard in the area of indirect communication.

*Research Concerning Kierkegaard*

Based on the literature reviewed for this project, it appears that research about Kierkegaard in the English language has increased so significantly in recent years that to describe even half of it at length would prove to be a seemingly endless process. Instead, this researcher seeks to incorporate into this chapter a review of some of the major secondary sources used in this thesis which are related to Kierkegaard. Since J. Heywood Thomas pointed out that much of the literature surrounding Kierkegaard in the English language tends to be “of introductory nature” ([Philosophy of Religion in Kierkegaard’s Writings](#), i), Kierkegaard research has expanded greatly and is now in abundance. However, this does not mean that there exists no room for new research. Given the fact that Kierkegaard’s own body of literature is vast and often taken out of context, it appears that there will always be a need, as Per Lønning suggests, for new research in the field of Kierkegaard studies (178).

Walter Lowrie (1938), David Swenson (1941) and Hermann Diem (1966) all offer what are arguably still the most definitive introductions to the thought of Kierkegaard available today.
Joakim Garff (2005) offers the most complete biography of Kierkegaard, and placed along side each other, all of these act as excellent introductions to Kierkegaard’s life and thought.

Throughout this thesis, the works of C. Stephen Evans are relied upon heavily, especially *Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript* (1999) and *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self* (2006). In the former, Evans investigates the works behind the Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, while in the latter he presents major Kierkegaardian themes within the proper scope of Christianity.

Niels Thulstrup’s book *Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel* (1980) displayed the predominant view among scholars as to Kierkegaard’s understanding of and opposition to the German philosopher. Recently however, new scholarship has challenged this traditional view. Jon Stewart’s *Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered* (2007) offers a definitive reassessment of Kierkegaard’s treatment of Hegel.

Additional Kierkegaard research emerging recently offers a variety of concentrations. Jacob Howland further investigates the influence of Socrates in *Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith* (2006). Jon Stewart edits the multi-volume work *Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries* (2007, 2008), which investigates the importance of German thought for Kierkegaard. The works are broken up into three tomes consisting of German philosophical, theological, and literary influences (Stewart ed., *Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries Vol. 6*). Central to the study is the contention that “apart from his contemporary Danish sources, the German sources were probably the most important in the development of his thought generally” (ix). Ronald M. Green’s article “Kant: A Debt both Obscure and Enormous” located Tome I is of importance to this thesis. Green shows both how
Kierkegaard with agrees with Kant on a few issues, while vehemently disagreeing with him on others. Stewart’s own article in Tome I entitled “Hegel: Kierkegaard’s Reading and Use of Hegel’s Primary Texts” continues his argument put forth in Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered.

Craig Hinkson’s article Will the Real Martin Luther Please Stand Up! Kierkegaard’s View of Luther versus Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition (2002) published in the International Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 21 explores the profound connection between Luther and Kierkegaard. Steven Shakespeare’s Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God (2001) heads toward the direction of establishing a Kierkegaardian theory of language. Shakespeare contends that Kierkegaard’s use of language is central to his model of indirect communication. Mark C. Taylor (2000), in his work Journeys to Selfhood, discusses the importance of Hegel to Kierkegaard, and the latter’s scathing critique of Hegelianism. Alastair Hannay’s Kierkegaard and Philosophy (2003) is composed of several essays focusing on a variety of subjects including the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, the importance of Lessing to Kierkegaard, paradox, despair, and humor. Sean Turchin (2006), in his master’s thesis, examines Kierkegaard as the chief influence upon the theologian Karl Barth’s Epistle to the Romans.

Research concerning Hamann

Translations of Hamann’s writings and research about him are difficult to obtain in English. In fact, “The task of putting the whole of Hamann into English is virtually impossible” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 13). For this reason, Ronald Gregor Smith writes that Hamann “will always remain enigmatic, and illuminating in snatches, like lightening flashing across a rich and
mysterious landscape” (13). Perhaps one reason that Hamann has not been completely researched is that he is an extremely difficult writer to translate (O’Flaherty, *Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann* 8). Furthermore, as Terrence German points out, “No one will ever be able to systematize totally the thought of Hamann” (viii). Walter Lowrie, the Kierkegaard scholar, describes his readings of Hamann: “I was prepared to delve, but had not expected to find the digging so hard” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, *Johann Georg Hamann* 167). It remains then, that no matter how much we learn from Hamann, and we can actually learn a great deal, he will always remain somewhat of a mystery, an enigmatic figure who with keen awareness and insight, wrote critically of his own times as a “preacher in the wilderness.”

Research on Hamann appears to be relegated to religious and philosophical studies. In the English language, writers such as James O’Flaherty (1952, 1979) and Stephen N. Dunning (1979) successfully examined Hamann’s language theory, showing its focus on elements of communication. However, after meticulous research, it appears that Hamann has not been studied specifically by communication scholars. Terrence German’s book *Hamann on Language and Religion* (1981) explores the importance of Hamann’s views concerning language and communication, and the author deals in depth with the significance of Hamann’s understanding in regards to the communicative acts of writing and speaking. German, as many other scholars both before and after him, heavily relies on a few key works in order to complete his task. These include: the Roth-Wiener edition of Hamann’s writings (1924), Joseph Nadler’s edition of Hamann’s works (1949-57), and the Ziesemer-Henkel edition of Hamann’s letters (1955-75), none of which have been completely translated into English.

At this point it is necessary to mention that two more prominent anthologies in the English language are available and used throughout this study. Ronald Gregor Smith (1960) has
translated sections of Hamann’s major works in his *J.G. Hamann*, while more recently Kenneth Haynes (2007), in his book *Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language*, offers a slightly more comprehensive translation. Haynes, however, is concerned more with Hamann’s writings in the areas of language and philosophy, while Smith offers more diverse material by including both excerpts from Hamann’s *Biblical Reflections* and a sampling of his letters. Gwen Griffith Dickson (1995) is also responsible for translating a number of Hamann’s works into English.

Crucial to this study are the writings of the Hamann scholar James O’Flaherty. In his book *Johann Georg Hamann*, O’Flaherty gives a detailed biographical account of Hamann’s life and examines his thought through the major works. O’Flaherty deals in depth with Hamann’s understanding of Socratic existence, his views on human reason, and shows how Hamann’s concern for language “provides the center around which his thought revolves” (O’Flaherty, *Johann Georg Hamann* 112). Of interest to O’Flaherty is also how language is a “reflection of the Logos” (112) to Hamann. O’Flaherty also focuses on Hamann’s understanding of Christ as the Paradox.

In his book *Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Hamann*, O’Flaherty scrupulously details Hamann’s language theory and examines the concept of unity in Hamann’s thought. He points out that “thought and language are inseparable for Hamann” (47) and gives the necessary backdrop for understanding Hamann in relation to the thoughts of his contemporaries. That is, he deals with Hamann’s language theory as a communicative tool used to combat the tenets of the Enlightenment. While, O’Flaherty does not openly deal with indirect communication in this text, he does present an insightful and thought-provoking assessment of Hamann’s views concerning communication via his language theory. O’Flaherty also focuses on how symbols play a major role in Hamann’s language theory.
In his text, German specifically tends to focus on Hamann’s style of creativity and his understanding of communication as stemming from God as the Creator. German eventually comes to the conclusion that Hamann’s is so concerned with the idea of communication that “His life is a communication” (175).

Frederick Beiser, in his book *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (1987), gives a detailed background of Hamann and shows how influential he was in countering the tenets of the Enlightenment. Beiser acknowledges that Hamann influenced Kierkegaard, but he does elaborate in detail on this issue. To Beiser, what is striking about Hamann’s thought is its modernity and “foreshadowing of contemporary events” (17). He also outlines what he views as four points of contention between Hamann and his contemporaries.

Other works about or concerning Hamann available in English includes Isaiah Berlin’s work entitled *The Magus of the North: J. G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern Rationalism* (1965); Walter Leibrecht’s *God and Man in the Thought of Hamann* (1966); Walter Lowrie’s “Johann Georg Hamann: An Existentialist” (1950); W.M. Alexander’s *Johann Georg Hamann: Philosophy and Faith* (1966); Jonathan Sheehan’s *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship Culture* (2005); and Denis Thouard’s article about Hamann and Socrates entitled “Hamann and the History of Philosophy,”, to be found in *The History of Scholarship* (2007).

Research Concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard

In his article on Kierkegaard’s view of Luther, Craig Hinkson (2002) writes that Kierkegaard “received a thorough initiation to Luther’s world of thought while yet a student by his intensive reading” of Hamann (Hinkson, *Will the Real Martin Luther Please Stand Up!* Kierkegaard’s View of Luther versus the Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition 71). Hinkson
expounds on Hamann’s critique of the Enlightenment, and compares Hamann’s crusade against
it to that which Kierkegaard battled in his own times.

In his article “Hamann and Kierkegaard,” published in the journal Kierkegaardiana
(1964), Ronald Gregor Smith points out the “extraordinary connection” between Hamann and
Kierkegaard (52). Smith examines the link between Kierkegaard in the area of humor and
mentions that Hamann influenced Kierkegaard “in his very existence” (52). In the end, however,
Smith contends that Kierkegaard ended an irrationalist, and moved away from Hamann later in
his career as an author. However, this researcher contests this view. The way Smith understands
it, there exists a major break between Kierkegaard and Hamann in the area of faith, because
Kierkegaard took faith to extremes. This researcher challenges Smith’s understanding of
Kierkegaard in chapter four of this thesis. Nevertheless, Smith makes note of the fact that the
relationship between Kierkegaard and Hamann goes deeper than simply their shared
understanding of indirectness through the use of pseudonyms (63).

Research Concerning Indirect Communication

Harry Broudy (1961) in his article “Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication,” published
in The Journal of Philosophy, examined Kierkegaard’s view of indirect communication via
subjective thought. Broudy dealt with the five apparent problems of communicating
subjectively, and attempted to answer them in detail. However, Broudy failed to realize the
importance of communication to Kierkegaard’s view of Christian existence, for he asserts that
Kierkegaard is “neither clear nor convincing” as to why “the subjective thinker has to
communicate at all” (228). Furthermore, he insists that the subjective thinker is interested in his
own existence and his own thinking alone (226). Broudy apparently ignores the fact that to
Kierkegaard, true subjectivity requires of the individual a relationship in “fear and trembling” before an almighty God.

According to Andrew Herrmann, early attempts by communication scholars to integrate the thought of Kierkegaard into the communication field focused on rhetoric (72). Such researchers as Anderson (1963), Scott (1967), and Stewart (1972) all made attempts introduce minor aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought into communication studies via rhetorical studies (Herrmann 72). Matthew T. Althouse (2004) also explains Kierkegaard from the standpoint of rhetoric in his article entitled “Moving Kierkegaard toward Critical Rhetoric” in The Review of Communication. Herrmann interestingly notes that only two researchers, Schrag (2003) and Peters (1999) have attempted to recently establish a Kierkegaardian theory of communication (73). However, he writes that “Kierkegaard is conspicuously absent from most recent communication literature” (73). This thesis differs from that of Schrag and Peters in that this researcher is not attempting to establish a new theory, for Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication stands on its own. Rather, this researcher investigates the importance of indirect communication upon Kierkegaard’s authorship and examines that indirectness in the light of Hamann’s influence.

Nerina Jansen, a professor of communication theory, has also presented Kierkegaard’s views on communication (1990, 1997). In the article “Service in Deception of the Truth: Magister Kierkegaard and the Problem of Communication,” located in the International Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 12, Jansen explains that Kierkegaard thinks of communication as a mode of existence (115). Jansen also attempts to relate Kierkegaard’s views on communication to contemporary issues in communication theory.
In “The Individual versus the Public: A Key to Kierkegaard’s Views of the Daily Press,”
in the International Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 13, Jansen again deals with Kierkegaard from
the standpoint of communication, setting the historical stage to present Kierkegaard’s view of the
media in the light of his battles with the press.

Herrmann’s article entitled “Kierkegaard and Dialogue: The Communication of
Capability,” in the journal Communication Theory (2008), examines the basics of Kierkegaard’s
model of indirect communication. Herrmann’s study, while referring to Socrates, does not make
mention of Hamann. While Herrmann at least touches on some of the elements of indirect
communication, he fails to take notice of the relationship of indirect communication to
Christianity, without which the proper framework for interpretation of Kierkegaard’s model is
lost.

J. Kellenberger’s article entitled “Kierkegaard, Indirect Communication, and Religious
Truth,” located in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (1984), deals with the
concept of indirect communication and its relation to the religious thinker. Kellenberger
discusses the differences between direct and indirect communication and between objective and
subjective truth. Kellenberger notes the importance of indirect communication for religious
understanding and offers personal examples of indirect communication throughout the article.

A proper approach to Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication is seen in C. Stephen
Evans work entitled Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript (1999). Evans defines indirect
communication, deals with the subject at length, and presents it in light of Kierkegaard’s
pseudonymous literature, and imperative concepts such as subjectivity, humor, faith, and
Christian existence.
Author Jørgen Bukdahl (1961), in his work *Søren Kierkegaard and the Common Man*, illuminates Kierkegaard’s communicative relationship with the common man in his native land of Denmark. Central to Bukdahl’s study is Kierkegaard’s love of interpersonal communication, and how Kierkegaard witnessed the transformation of a society “based on a rigid, hierarchical, but “face-to-face” absolute monarchy” into “a modern mass society based on anonymous forces of the marketplace and popular sovereignty” (xi). Naturally, Bukdahl also examines Kierkegaard’s own indirect method and contrasts it to his fondness for direct and interpersonal communication with the common man.

In addition, Thomas C. Oden’s *Parables of Kierkegaard* (1978) not only anthologizes many of Kierkegaard’s most well-known parables, but also gives a necessary understanding for parables as part of Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication. According to Oden, indirect communication is Kierkegaard’s main method for communicating in a meaningful manner (ix). Kierkegaard’s use of parabolic communication serves his aim as an author for five important reasons, which are discussed in chapter four of this thesis (x).

George Pattison examines indirect communication in the thought of Kierkegaard in two engaging articles, both published in the journal *Kierkegaardiana*. The first, entitled “‘Who’ is the Discourse? A Study in Kierkegaard’s Religious Literature” (1993), studies the communicative aspects of Kierkegaard’s Discourses, comparing and contrasting them to the indirect, pseudonymous works. Pattison’s later work “The Theory and Practice of Language and Communication in Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses” (1998), discusses the importance of language in both Kierkegaard’s direct discourses and his pseudonymous literature. Pattison’s point is that the language of the Discourse serves the purpose of Christian communication (93-4). To Pattison, metaphorical language is essential to the indirectness of faith (94).
Research Concerning Hamann, Kierkegaard, and Indirect Communication

Of particular importance here is Craig Hinkson’s insight concerning indirect communication in his work “Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the Maieutic Art” (2001). Hinkson writes that in Hamann’s *Socratic Memorabilia* (1759), the author practices indirect communication “with consummate skill” (4). If Kierkegaard indeed learned the method of indirect communication from Hamann—and Hinkson thinks this is likely—it was through reading *Socratic Memorabilia* (4). This concept is elaborated on in by this researcher in chapter four of this thesis. Hinkson also points to a relationship between Hamann and Kierkegaard in the indirectness of revelation (6), and makes a strong, luminous claim for a remarkable relationship between the two thinkers. Albert Anderson’s article “Hamann,” located in *Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Vol. 10* (1982), principally examines Hamann’s relation to Kierkegaard in the area of humor. Anderson inspects both the writings of Hamann and Kierkegaard, and declares the connection between Kierkegaard and Hamann in the area of humor to be one of immanent importance. By examining Kierkegaard’s relation to Hamann in the area of humor, it becomes clear that not only did Kierkegaard hold Hamann in high regard because of his humorous bent, but also that Hamann “recognizes clearly that humor cannot in principle be expressed in direct forms of language” (Anderson 134). The concept of humor as it relates to Hamann and Kierkegaard is dealt with in chapter four of this thesis.

J. Heywood Thomas also links Hamann with Kierkegaard in his article “Christianity as Absurd,” published in *Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Vol. 2* (1978). Thomas writes that Kierkegaard owed much to Hamann, including the recovery of his Christian faith as a young man, for it was Hamann who “taught him that faith was not an operation of reason,” a subject dealt with in the first part of chapter four of this thesis. Thomas also notes this same significance

James O’Flaherty, in his book *Johann Georg Hamann*, links Kierkegaard and Hamann in two places. First, he notes that in his *Socratic Memorabilia* Hamann used a form of indirect communication, and that indirect communication was later to be developed and made famous by Kierkegaard (88). Secondly, near the close of his work, O’Flaherty mentions the difficulties in reading and deciphering the works of Hamann, and writes that comparatively, Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication is “crystal clarity itself” (167).

Recently, in the article “Hamann: Sharing Style and Thesis,” found in *Kierkegaard and his German Contemporaries*, Sergia Karen Hay (2008) investigated Kierkegaard’s relationship to Hamann based on the former’s use of the latter in both in the published works and in the journals. Hay gives a background to Hamann’s life and works before delving into Kierkegaard’s references to Hamann. Hay writes, “Kierkegaard clearly noticed Hamann’s emphasis on style which is particularly remarkable for its use of pseudonyms, metaphor, and references to obscure works in foreign languages” (106), and briefly mentions that Kierkegaard adapted some of Hamann’s communicative devises as his own. Hay also states that the relationship between Hamann and Kierkegaard is worth more investigation (108).
Chapter Three: Historical-Critical Methodology

The path for conducting an historical-critical analysis is outlined by Raymond K. Tucker in his book *Research in Speech Communication*. Tucker points to basic four-point model for successfully conducting performing such a study.

1) Discover and Structure the Research Problem

This was the first step this researcher sought to develop in this project. This study came into being after analyzing Kierkegaard’s theory of communication for well over year. During that time, this researcher sought to understand many of Kierkegaard’s concepts on a personal and academic level. Investigating Hamann’s relation to Kierkegaard’s theory of communication first of all narrows the approach. Secondly, it allows this researcher to make the claim of originality in the field of communication. The importance of discovering and structuring the research problem is common to any research method (Tucker 76). However, “Historical-critical research begins when you question some idea, event, development, or experience of the past” (72).

2) Choose the historical or critical approach to be used

Step two is vital, because it affects not only this research, but the conclusions as well. Here there are three methods which may be used: descriptive, experimental, or historical. For the purposes of this study, this researcher does not merely offer a descriptive look, but hopes to shed light onto the issue as well. A critical approach is necessary to assess Kierkegaard’s indirect communication and Hamann’s view of language. All the while this researcher realizes that this choice of the historical or critical “will likely be combined” in the final analysis (78).
3) Collect and Verify the Evidence or Data

Evidence is the backbone of historical-critical research (79). Evidence related to this project has been copiously collected, and that which has not fit the nature of this study has been discarded. Our primary sources include four major works by Søren Kierkegaard: *Philosophical Fragments*, its follow-up *Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity*, and *The Point of View on My Work as an Author*, plus selected entries from Kierkegaard’s journals, mainly in the areas of communication, objectivity and subjectivity, faith, reason, and Christianity, to name a few. While Kierkegaard’s works can be expensive to purchase, this researcher has been fortunate enough to personally own many of them. Other sources come from this university’s library. Hamann’s works, in contrast, are very difficult to obtain. For sources related strictly to Hamann, this researcher focuses on materials such as *Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language*, which provide us with several of his collected writings.

Our secondary sources are in abundance. The bulk of these which give Kierkegaard the proper framework include such as scholars C. Stephen Evans, Jon Stewart, and Craig Hinkson, and Hamann scholars like James O'Flaherty. These provide us the most accurate views of Hamann and Kierkegaard available today.

4) Interpret Data and Draw Conclusions

According to Tucker, “The conclusions [of the study] should be limited to the available data” (77). However, he also explains the importance of the researcher in relation to his information. “They have a better command of the information, a better perspective of the problem, and a better idea of how various puzzle parts fit together than do most people” (77). It appears that this “unique perspective” is in fact dialectical. On the one hand the researcher has
the “unique opportunity to take command of the research,” while on the other hand, the conclusions of the research “should be limited by the available data” (77). One would do best to interpret Tucker’s message as such: the researcher should not take liberties with the conclusions, distorting them in relation to the research conducted; however, the researcher’s conclusions should also be his/her own.

The importance of historical-critical research is multitudinous. Since this researcher desires to ascertain the meaning and reliability of past facts, make comparisons of likeness and difference, and draw conclusions from an in-depth examination of past facts, it is important to use the historical-critical methodology here (68). Other important reasons for this type of study are that it broadens the professional base (66) and allows for a greater understanding of the present by examining the past.

According to Tucker, there are four goals of the critical researcher (78).

1) The critical researcher should aim for dependability, validity and reliability.

However, Tucker goes on to make it clear that statistical reliability is not as important to the critical researcher as the reliability of the evidence. He writes, “…often excellent criticism distinguishes itself because other critics have not agreed” (78). This researcher distances himself from the liberal scholarship surrounding Kierkegaard. The main secondary sources used for this study are both dependable and reliable: they give insight into Kierkegaard’s work and many are unsurpassed scholars in their field.

2) Dependability relies on clarity and accuracy of style
Therefore, this researcher has revised and rewritten this thesis numerous times, so that it could be as clear and as accurate as possible. Tucker makes it clear that it is through dependability that this is accomplished. Furthermore, for the critical researcher to receive results, both accuracy and clarity of thought are essential.

3) Excellence in criticism also results from authenticity of sources

This researcher has not resorted to use sources that are unscholarly or invalid. Rather, the sources reflect the originality of the topic to communication studies. Here, Tucker adds an important point. “The critical methodologist has, perhaps, greater freedom in imposing his or her personal stamp or mark on the study,” but the expectation is higher as a result.

4) Excellence is also determined by the criteria of the application: Can the results be applied to life?

Tucker makes it plain that the critical methodologist must always seek to be relevant. It is this researcher’s opinion that this study is relevant in our world today. Pains have been taken to present it as such throughout this thesis. To communicators, this study is essential, for discussion throughout this thesis will go to the very root and meaning of communication. To Christians and Christian communicators, this study is vital, for Kierkegaard’s model builds an understanding of knowing ourselves and recognizing the communication between God and man through the person of Christ. Therefore, this study is relevant and has the opportunity to contribute to the field of communication.


Procedures

This study came about after researching indirect communication in the thought of Kierkegaard for a considerable amount of time. The following is a step-by-step analysis of how this study will be conducted.

The first real step in this process is the gathering of materials. This researcher relies heavily on collected research from journal articles, commentaries, and books relating to the subjects. In the case of Hamann’s writings, anthologies of his works have been used only because they comprise the totality of works available in English to this researcher. The collected materials all aid this research, some more than others. The majority of articles dealing with Kierkegaard come from Kierkegaardiana, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, and The International Kierkegaard Commentary.

The second step that goes into this study is the reading of its major texts: Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The Point of View on My Work as an Author. All of these works explain Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication and are essential to understanding indirect communication.

The third step in this study deals with the writing and here it is imperative to understand how this researcher has chosen to include or exclude content. In interpreting both Kierkegaard and Hamann, it is necessary to deal with their major concepts. It is this researcher’s opinion that these many of these major concepts can be understood from a communication standpoint. Concepts such as knowledge, reason, and language all relate to the field of communication from a philosophical point of view. God, His relation to us, and how we communicate with one another all are associated with a Christian understanding of communication. This researcher has
chosen to integrate these concepts so that the validity of this study cannot be questioned. In addition, this researcher has included not only content pertinent to communication, but also that which lends itself to a deeper understanding of Kierkegaard in general. For instance, chapter four discusses *The Corsair*, the newspaper with which Kierkegaard was engaged in a dreadful attack, and shows how that event was influential for Kierkegaard’s subsequent thoughts relating to communication. This researcher also touches on Kierkegaard’s principle of subjectivity, since it is necessary to an understanding of his model of indirect communication. In fact, all ideas and concepts which may at first glance appear as overtly philosophical are indeed extremely necessary to understanding both Hamann’s language theory and Kierkegaard’s conception of indirect communication.

In the fourth step, this researcher has chosen to break things up into what is considered the most logical manner. For instance, it is necessary to first give a background of Hamann so that his language theory makes sense. It is necessary to discuss Hamann before we discuss Kierkegaard so that this study remains chronological and it can be seen more easily how Hamann influenced Kierkegaard. After discussing Hamann and Kierkegaard, this researcher then moves into references to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s writings, in which major ways are presented as to how Hamann influenced Kierkegaard. Lastly, this researcher deals with Christianity as indirect communication, in which links are presented between Hamann, Kierkegaard, and the concept of faith. This order appears to best serve the purposes of this thesis. This study ends with conclusions and implications for further research.
Chapter Four: Historical and Theological Foundations

The first step of an historical-critical study is to establish the proper historical settings. There are four main areas of investigation set forth in this chapter. First, this researcher discusses Kierkegaard and Hamann from the standpoint of reason and language. Second, indirect communication in the thought of Kierkegaard is examined. Third, it is necessary to further elaborate on Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication given his references to Hamann. Lastly, in the section entitled “Christianity as Indirect Communication,” this researcher investigates the thoughts of both Hamann and Kierkegaard and their emphases on indirectness in the areas of Christian existence, faith, and the Incarnation of Christ.

Kierkegaard and Hamann: Reason and Language

Hamann and the Enlightenment

During the mid-to-late 18th century, a course of literary events in Europe not only challenged but shook the traditional foundations of both philosophy and cultural thought. It changed the way “not only Europeans but practically the whole world conceived of itself, of nature, of religion, of human history, of the nature of knowledge, of politics, and of the structure of the human mind in general” (Pinkard 2). Indeed, the significance of German philosophy during the Enlightenment cannot be downplayed, for its remnants have affected countless generations. One solitary tenet was reinforced above all else: the primacy of human reason. “Philosophers loyal to the Enlightenment bestowed enormous authority upon reason, which was the Enlightenment’s sovereign standard of truth, its final court of intellectual appeal” (Beiser 1).
In short, reason became the end-all, the last word of truth, the supreme faculty encompassing human knowledge. Philosophers sought to prove the supremacy of reason, and in doing so, offered a system critical of traditional viewpoints in general and of theology in particular. However, one seminal figure offered a perspective contra the Enlightenment, a viewpoint which sought to put reason in its proper place.

It is in Hamann, often referred to as the “Magus of the North,” that we see the workings of a communicative genius both linguistically and philosophically. As a philologist he extensively studied Greek, Latin, English, Hebrew, Arabic, French, to a degree Egyptian hieroglyphics, as well as Persian, Tibetan, and Latvian (German 12). His interests ranged from “…ancient and contemporary; sacred and secular; historical, political, economic, theological, literary, and journalistic” (Haynes ed. viii). Early in his writing career, Hamann realized that if the Rationalists were correct, i.e. if man’s reason is the supreme lens through which he views the world, the concept of faith is then reduced to nothingness. Since man is depraved, his reason capabilities are flawed; therefore, man must be guided by something more than reason alone. Ultimately, Hamann says that “the reality of man’s life depends utterly upon God, upon man’s response to God’s Word in him” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 82). To Hamann, it is faith which “transcends the criticism and demonstration of reason” (Beiser 17).

Through Hamann’s conversion to Christianity in 1758 at the age of twenty-nine, his thought suddenly and irrevocably turned to Christian doctrine. Only a year earlier he had traveled to London from his home in Königsberg, East Prussia on an obscure “diplomatic and business mission” (Beiser 19), which “apparently involved negotiations with the Russian and English governments concerning trade in the Baltic” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 29). It is important to understand that Hamann was, at the time, a well-versed student of the Enlightenment. However,
when his mission fell through, he quickly sank into a life of disrepute and “sought to lose himself in dissipation” (O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 22). Through his despair however, Hamann began rigorously reading the Scriptures and came to true faith in Christ. This change brought about, according to Ronald Gregor Smith, “tumultuous certainty; grounded on an intense, reiterated, highly individual reading of the whole Bible, not once, but twice through, the New Testament even three times; and taking him through absolute despair in himself to absolute confidence in the Lord of the Word…” (41). Shortly after his conversion, Hamann writes in his Biblical Reflections concerning the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy, “In spite of the light which God sheds in our souls by his Word, he wants to be near to us himself. He is where his Word is, he is where his Son is. If his Word is in us, his Son is in us; if his Word is in us, the Spirit of this Word is in us” (129). Hamann, having already developed a strong background in linguistics, had now become consumed by God as the Logos and the creator of all communication. “It is my same old tune,” he writes, “but through language all things are made” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann 19). Hamann scholar James O’Flaherty writes:

This…was an insight which he gained principally through his conversion by the Biblical word. Just as the living organisms were called into being by the word of God, so man’s spiritual life is re-created by that same word as it is spoken through the Gospel. But the power of the word to create is a characteristic not only of the divine word; it is also a characteristic of the human word, in so far as it partakes of the nature of the divine word. For Hamann, it is therefore permissible to speak of human speech as “creative energy,” if one remembers that the transcendent God of the Biblical revelation is the constant source of that energy for him (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann 19).

We shall return to Hamann’s conception of language later. But it is imperative to see just how Hamann’s life and work were shaped by his conversion to Christianity, because it provides the backdrop for understanding both the laws that govern his thought and his unwavering stance against rationalism.³ His conversion proved to be of such importance because it would play the predominant role throughout his life and writings. Author Sergia Karen Hay writes that “This
experience was absolutely decisive for the rest of Hamann’s life; it shifted his attention from business and writing projects consistent with the goals of the Enlightenment to a thoroughgoing commitment to theological concerns and religious life” (98). Henceforth, he “devoted his life to a series of communicating experiences with God which were all conversion experiences, for conversion was a sequential experience, a series of great moments” (German 2). Ultimately, Hamann’s critique of reason presents the problems inherent to Christian communication, while delineating the necessity of faith.

Bearing in mind Hamann’s acknowledgement of God as the supreme communicator, we must understand how his major concepts refute those of the Enlightenment. Hamann struck out against the idea that reason alone was man’s self-governing agent in general and against the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in particular.

*Kant and the Enlightenment*

It is vital to present Kant’s views on reason and God, because without them we severely lack the proper framework for interpreting the thought of Hamann in detail. Since much of Hamann’s attack against the Enlightenment is aimed specifically at Kant, it naturally follows that Hamann cannot be understood unless the ideas which he refuted are taken into account. A certain understanding of Kant is necessary in order to assess and gain further insight to both Hamann’s language theory and his understanding of faith in God.

The expansion of human reason was not the only product of the Enlightenment. Indeed, the Enlightenment can also be regarded as “a movement of thought based on a basic trust in the human being’s capacity to secure its own basis for the traditional supports of human life (morality, religion and the state); Enlightenment was to replace a capricious tradition of
unsupported appeals to revelation, scriptural authority and the like” (Hannay, *Kierkegaard and Philosophy* 53). That is, we could say that the idea of Enlightenment celebrated human endeavor and human reasoning, while casting away traditional viewpoints. Kant’s thought has exceptional significance here, for after him, nothing would again be the same (Pinkard 15). With the publication of his first major work, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1784), he laid out his view that “from now on, we moderns had to depend on ourselves and our own critical powers to figure things out” (Pinkard 20). In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he writes, “Mathematical and scientific knowledge find their basis and justification in the intuitions and categories of the understanding, since the latter are the necessary conditions of human thought” (Kant qtd. in Gill, “Kantianism” 223). According to Kant, man’s faculty of reasoning is limited and relegated within the empirical world, those things which can be readily known, observed, measured, and experimented with.

Not only did Kant succeed in forever changing how metaphysics were viewed, but he elevated reason to its highest form within the empirical world. In doing so, he discounted the importance of language while damaging concepts in Christianity. It has been said that “It would not be overstating the case to say that Kantian philosophy delivered a severe blow to theology” (Turchin 7). According to C. Stephen Evans:

A large strand of theology since Kant has doubted that it is possible to conceive of God, has claimed that it is not possible for human language to refer to a God who is not part of a temporal, created world. Of course if we cannot conceive of God, then we also cannot conceive of God creating the world or atoning for sin through the person of Jesus. And if such things cannot be conceived they cannot be believed either (Evans, *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self* 185).

Kant undermined theology by altering metaphysics and through his use of the “categorical imperative.” In his philosophy we have on the one hand, the noumenal realm (or the
essence of things “as they are in themselves”), while on the other the phenomenal realm (“the world of things as they appear to us in sense experience”) (Miller & Jensen D-20, D-22). To Kant, we purely reason to that which lies in the phenomenal realm of experience. Since we can know nothing of things in and of themselves, barricades are constructed to the noumenal world. In other words, the noumenal becomes unknowable. The noumenal is not open to our sense experience, and therefore it cannot be known. To Kant, all knowledge is based on experience or empirical data. This position represented a problem for traditional viewpoints in both philosophy and theology. Kant philosophy represented a direct attack upon theology because “the problem was no longer the Lutheran disparagement of fallen reason’s ability to obtain knowledge of God, but rather the self-imposed restrictions of reason itself. God had effectively been relegated to the realm of transcendence as the utterly unknowable Ding an sich” (Turchin 7). From Kant, it followed that “No longer do we form concepts based on our experience; rather, the concepts exist first and shape all our experience” (Miller & Jansen 254). Through this viewpoint, Kant attempted to reconcile rational thought with empiricism (Shakespeare 3).

The change brought to the area of metaphysics was severely damaging as well. What had originally been known as “the queen of all sciences” (Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason 41) and had traditionally been seen as the “inquiry into the supernatural” or the “quest for God” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 48) became something else entirely. Instead, Kant viewed the metaphysician as “the alleged purveyor of a synthetic a priori truth” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 48). This has sweeping ramifications for the existence of God in particular. To Kant, God is entirely unknowable because he surpasses the standard for knowledge from an empirical standpoint. So by denying the traditional mode of metaphysics, Kant instead constructed his own systematic method. His writings provided the “foundations for the new kind
of metaphysics,” which would lead him to the belief that “reason has the ability to give a final critique of the powers of the human mind” (Evans, *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self* 52).

We have seen how Kant was able, through the Enlightenment, to cast doubt on traditional institutions. The effects of his views are widespread, for they also pose a problem for the subject of communication. It follows that if we can only have knowledge of the phenomenal, then how can we communicate what lies beyond that which is observable? How is it possible to communicate what we cannot experience? Kant’s epistemology appears to leave no room for this possibility.

Even further problems arise for communication from Kant’s philosophy when we take into consideration the communication of theological ideas. Obviously, if reason acts as man’s final authority, then there is no reason for him to be held accountable to God. Since God is utterly unknowable and man’s reasoning ability seemingly autonomous, there is no exchange of communication between God and man. To Kant, “the religious individual’s knowledge of God is completely derivable from his understanding of moral law” (Evans, *Kierkegaard’s Fragments* and *Postscript* 42). What is morally good, according to Kant in his categorical imperative, is good will itself. In other words, reason alone constructs that which is good. Kant’s ground for ethics lies in man’s reasoning capacity as it singlehandedly becomes the foundation for morality. Kant writes, “In matters of religion, reason is the highest interpreter of Scripture” (qtd. in Green 180). In his *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Kant asserts, “I take the following proposition to be a principle requiring no proof: *Whatever, over and above good life-conduct, man fancies that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious illusion and pseudo-service of God*” (Kant 158). It is obvious, as Kierkegaard⁴ would later write, that Kant “declares the relationship to God to be a kind of mental weakness, a hallucination” (Kierkegaard,
Journals and Papers Vol. 2 515). Kierkegaard understood that Kant’s moral rationalism had reduced God “to a regulative idea and morality…to something already embedded in our actual practices” (Hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy 13). To Kant, reason only works with that which is rational. Any attempt to go beyond that, to a relationship with God, he deemed utterly irrational. Kant also appears to minimize with the concept of divine revelation in the Scriptures. He believes that Christianity can become discoverable apart from revelation and argues that “faith in such a revelation is not essential, since the content of that revelation is accessible to reason” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 240).

One can easily observe how Kant’s thought played a pivotal role in the reversal of traditional concepts as man’s reason became sovereign. The philosophy produced by the Enlightenment challenged knowledge of anything beyond reason and in doing so, set limits on communication as well. If God is unknown and revelation is a mere product of “religious illusion,” then belief is of little use. Of what use then is communication of God if He is forever completely unknowable? It was Hamann who would offer a scathing critique of Kant’s radical ideas, for according to him, Kant had overlooked several key communicative aspects in his thought. No one was more capable of leading the attack against Kant than was he.

An Answer to the Enlightenment: Hamann’s Language Theory

This researcher gave earlier a brief outline of Hamann’s conversion to Christianity and showed how this experience shaped his subsequent thought. As a contemporary critic of the Enlightenment, Hamann recognized that Kant’s appeal to reason raised problems for the understanding of communication both verbally and conceptually. However, he did not seek to refute the enlightened philosophical ideals with philosophical arguments (Haynes ed. x). Rather,
Hamann’s attack is more indirect in nature. He employs various literary devices to aid in his attack. Irony, poetry, satire, and humor are all utilized as part of an overall strategy to lead away from the teachings of the Enlightenment. Kenneth Haynes writes that in refuting the enlightened view of reason, Hamann relies heavily on “mockery to deny a philosophical problem its status as a problem, to be freed from its grip” (x). This by no means should indicate that Hamann is unwilling to address any issue directly, for he often does so with biting wit and craftiness. For example, near the opening of his *Socratic Memorabilia* (1759), Hamann warns that he has chosen to write in Socratic fashion. “I have written about Socrates in a Socratic way. Analogy was the soul of his reasoning, and he gave it irony for a body” (Haynes ed. 7). In other words, Hamann, who undeniably admires Socrates, wants to embody Socratic style of living when writing about Socrates. Though Socrates himself was no writer, he used a great deal of analogy and irony in his thought. In the same way, Hamann employs these literary devices throughout his writings. This is one way through which he became a creative, original writer. It has been debated as to whether or not Hamann was a philosopher, and indeed it is a label he would doubtless vehemently refute, but this much is undeniable: he has a profound, almost subterranean understanding of language as his support. Since Hamann seeks creativity and originality he will employ all the methods at his disposal.

Hamann understood that language was originally molded on reality, and this understanding served to encourage his love of linguistics (O’Flaherty, *Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann* 23). That is, language is not based on mere abstraction as voices of the Enlightenment would claim, but is shaped in actuality. Kierkegaard would later claim that it is a consideration of language in the abstract that leads us to doubt the possibility of communication (Shakespeare 81). Language conveys meaning, which is in fact, the high purpose for which it
was created (O’Flaherty, *Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann* 23). To Hamann, language is also symbolic. Symbols play a significant role in our understanding of language. Symbols are powerful because they give us a sense of reality – they can communicate ideas to us in an indirect manner. We associate symbols with both words and concepts. Therefore, symbols can cause us to relate a certain thing to something else. Signs and symbols can be interpreted, and here appears to be Hamann’s fascination with them in relation to language. Symbols, as language, are given by God. In fact, Hamann’s “whole life can be summed up in the effort to discover and interpret, and create ‘language’” (German 34). He also views language as being analogous, and this theme of unity runs throughout his writings. We have the ability to communicate with each other and also with God. Hamann writes in his *Aesthetica in Nuce* (*Aesthetics in a Nutshell*):

This analogy of man to the Creator endows all creatures with their substance and their stamp, on which depends fidelity and faith in all nature. The more vividly this idea of the image of the invisible God dwells in our heart, the more able we are to see and taste his loving kindness in creatures, observe it and grasp it with our hands. Every impression of nature in man is not only a memorial but also a warrant of fundamental truth: Who is the Lord. Every reaction of man unto created things is an epistle and seal that we partake of the divine nature, and that we are his offspring (Haynes ed. 79).

Hamann notes that God allowed man to name the animals at creation, and this is evidence of the fact that God as the ultimate Creator has also given man the ability to become a creator. As man is made in God’s image, so a certain analogy exists between God and creation. God “gives all creatures their content and character” (Hamann, qtd. in German 40). To Hamann, the entirety of nature echoes God as Sovereign Lord and Creator. The analogy between God and man exists in man’s ability to “partake in the divine nature” and to be called “his offspring.” Therefore, the communication between God and man is not a superficial one, but one of profound mystery.
We could say that Hamann is concerned with two aspects of communication. Throughout his authorship, he is “dealing first with the ordinary difficulty inherent in communication among human beings and secondly with man’s communicative dependence upon God” (German 142). He hails the creativity of man, but recognizes that all creativity comes from God alone as the supreme Creator. Now, Hamann was entranced by both the written word and the spoken word, and the best of example as to his formulation of language and communication is that of Scripture. He believes that God, as the divine Word, has always existed. Through the creative act of speaking, God brought all things into existence. He also inspired man, giving to him the ability to write the Scriptures, His Word to mankind. Hence, man as the recipient of God’s creation is also a creator, but only because God has allowed him to be so – for all communication derives from God. “In Hamann’s eyes all divine activities in creation find as their goal God’s honor and glory, for God is the acting force in creating” (German 158). As much as anything, this is one idea that permeates Hamann’s writings. It is one concept he can never get away from: God must receive glory for creating us and giving us the ability to create.

In fact, Hamann’s attack against the Kantian notion of reason is partly aided through his conception of God as the almighty Creator. He saw that in general, the enlightened view of reason posed a danger to the reality of faith and understood that many enlightened thinkers had not taken language into consideration in their attempts to raise reason to new heights. While expansive in nature, Hamann’s language theory is necessary to understand, for once it is grasped, “an understanding of the rest of his thought inevitably follows” (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language 4). According to James O’Flaherty, language constitutes the ground for Hamann’s total philosophy (4).
In his major work *Aesthetics in a Nutshell* (1762) Hamann writes, “Speak that I may see Thee!” We can gain tremendous insight into his language theory from this statement alone, for as we shall see, it has multiple meanings. Hamann often asked of people “Speak that I may see Thee,” because to him, “speech revealed his inner soul” (German 50). The theme runs throughout the course of his works and his life as well. Author Terrence German points out that Hamann sought the unification between his life and authorship. “Hamann sought to have every word he wrote contain a quality that united it with his own physical personality. He thought as much with his belly as with his brain. He attempted to give his words the physique of his own physique” (German 10). Other writers can perhaps separate their work from their personal life, their words from their way of living. But to Hamann, this is impossible. He attempts to live, breathe and embody his communication with others. As Ronald Gregor Smith points out, Hamann’s thought and actions are “thoroughly integrated” (*J.G. Hamann* 25). In communicating with others, Hamann “does not make any distinction between his private and public life. He is not different as an author from what he is in his ordinary life” (25). He must seek to live the truth that he believes, and living the truth is for Hamann as important as communicating truth. The German writer and philosopher Lessing, a key figure during the Enlightenment, had once written, “What does the private life of a writer matter to us?” (qtd. in Haynes ed. 69fn.). Hamann says in contrast, “True, one can be a man without finding it necessary to become an author. But whoever expects his good friends to think of the writer apart from the man is more inclined to poetic than to philosophical abstractions” (Haynes, ed. 69). Hamann has the sincere desire to create, and as a product of the divine Creator he must live in a responsible manner. In fact, he feels bound to do so by the Creator. “Speak that I may see thee!” By speaking through the medium of print, Hamann is communicating his true self.
Hamann’s attack against the enlightened view of reason is grounded in the importance of language. It is language that appears to precede reason, inasmuch as reason would not be able to express itself unless there was a means to do so. Language gives us an outlet for reasoning, but reasoning has its limits. James O’Flaherty says that language was the “prismatic medium through which Hamann saw experience or reality” (O’Flaherty, _Unity and Language_ 4). In his _Socratic Memorabilia_, Hamann writes and dedicates to his friends, Kant and Berens (both of whom tried in vain to bring Hamann back to rationalism after his conversion to Christianity), a piece of literature that diametrically opposes their views of reason. Therein Hamann says, “Our own existence, and the existence of all things outside us, must be believed and cannot be established in any other way” (Smith, _J.G. Hamann_ 181). Here he is making his claim for faith, the foundation of which the rationalist thinkers of the enlightenment would seek to completely separate from reason.

Hamann would eventually state that “Reason is language, logos” (Hamann qtd. in German 7). As Terence German writes, “Reason is based on language as its organ, its source” (53). Hamann himself, in a letter to his friend Herder, exclaims, “All chatter about reason is pure wind: language is its organ and criterion…” (Hamann, qtd. in German 53). Hamann is not saying that reason is the written language or even just the spoken language; instead, language reaches down into the bones of man (German 7). Without language and its ability to be communicated, reasoning or cognition would be nothing. Hamann mentions elsewhere that language is as the mother of reason. It would seem that language gives us the ability to reason in the first place. So by holding human reasoning and comprehension in such high regard, thinkers of the Enlightenment had denied language as reason’s very source. Hamann understands that language is given to man by God. He also suggests that reason is first and foremost an offense to
itself (Anderson 114). That is, reason has its limitations. Hence, man cannot know everything by the aid of reason alone. Those enlightened minds who seek to know everything by the sovereign aid of reason are deceiving themselves. The deception lies in the fact that our reason can reveal nothing to us directly. God is the ultimate creator and He has revealed Himself through His Word. This is one way in which God, as Spirit, communicates with man. Hamann writes in *Biblical Reflections* (1758), “It is the greatest contradiction and misuse of our reason if it wants to reveal. A philosopher who, to please his reason, puts the divine word out of our vision is like those Jews who, the more firmly they seem to cling to the Old Testament, the more stubbornly they reject the New Testament” (Smith, *J.G. Hamann* 120).

Hamann encourages his reader to the particular embodiments and expressions of reason, which consist in ways of speaking, acting and writing (Beiser 18). To the Magus, writing is a wonderfully creative talent, but the art of speech is the embodiment of language. “The written word is always deficient to in relation to the spoken word. The great writer must make the written word re-express the sign of his speech” (German 51). The heart of language is its spokenness (53).

Hamann believes that speech is the purest form of communication. Perhaps this insight came about from his studies on speech patterns. He had examined the variance of speech patterns amongst different people and different cultures (German 49). By doing so, he understood how “speech varied in the streets, shops, schools, stadiums, and fields; people talked differently on different occasions” (49). Hamann was enamored by both how and why the common man, through and across different cultures, used language in the creative and communicative act of speech. By doing so, he had come to realize the significance of language not only in human beings, but in the rest of creation as well. As humans, we communicate
differently and speak various languages and dialects. Humans are diverse as is language, but this
diversity points back to the almighty Creator as the source. To Hamann, the tongue, mouth, and
lips all work together to form human speech with which we communicate with others and most
importantly, with God (49). He understood how languages change over time, how they differ
from culture to culture. However, speech is always the primary vehicle through which people
communicate with each other (54). According to Hamann we should always seek to speak better
(54). Therefore, we should constantly value our speech and use it correctly, for language and the
ability to communicate are gifts to mankind, gifts that “have value or worth” (45). Kierkegaard
often writes on the beauty of his native language and obviously values the speech process. He
writes, “Language is an ideality which every man has gratis. What an ideality – that God can use
language to express his thoughts and thus man by means of language has fellowship with God”
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 3 13). But Kierkegaard also sees in language a danger as
well. It is often by the use of language that man becomes viewed as a hypocrite. The gift of
language “permits a person’s life to express the lowest while his mouth prattles on about the
highest and to give assurances that this is what concerns him” (14). Kierkegaard understands
that when language is used incorrectly, it can be just as powerful in a negative way. “Language,
the gift of speech, engulfs the human race in such a cloud of drivel and twaddle that it becomes
its ruination” (14). Therefore, to both Kierkegaard and Hamann, language must be used
properly, for its power is great. Proverbs 18:21 says that “Death and life are in the power of the
tongue, and those who love it will eat its fruit” (NASV).

It is evident that Hamann was, according to Terrence German, “in love with the act of
communication” (42). He viewed life itself as a communicative, creating experience of flesh and
spirit (42). To Hamann, ordinary human language is “molded on reality” (O’Flaherty, Unity and
Language 12) and is not merely abstract. Mankind is not autonomous, able to communicate and create on his own accord as many in the Enlightenment would claim. Rather, he is dependent upon God for all his abilities, and Hamann’s writings always recognize this fact. He knows his abilities to communicate and create as a human being come from God alone, are formed and given by Him. Hamann addresses this theme in “The last will and testament of the Knight of the Rose-Cross,” (hereafter KRC) (1772), when he says that the “origin of human language” is “certainly divine” (Haynes ed. 100). Paradoxically, language is essentially and naturally human as an activity involving relationships with others (Dickson 239). We cannot express ourselves in any other way than humanly. Language cannot be extracted from our lives. Hamann understands that language is designed by God as an interpersonal communication. Hamann scholar Gwen Griffith Dickson points out that “language is a matter of human interpersonal relations because of the fact that we require instruction in order to possess and use language” (239). To Hamann, this paradox is seen in the principle of the communicatio idiomatum which can be defined as the “interchange of properties” (Haynes ed. 99) or “intimate togetherness” (O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 128). The communicatio idiomatum is the theological doctrine, made use of by Luther, ‘that while the human and divine natures in Christ were separate, the attributes of the one may be predicated of the other in view of their union in the one person of the Savior” (Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, qtd. in Haynes 99). Hamann often uses this term to relate the close knit between the divine and human elements in the process of language (O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 128). It is easily observable that unity has a predominant role in Hamann’s authorship. In KRC He states, “This communicatio of divine and human idiomatum is the fundamental law and the master-key of all our knowledge
and of the whole visible economy” (Haynes ed. 99). Without the divine intervention of God into human activities, there is no human knowledge, creation, or communication.

The totality of Hamann’s language theory can be viewed in light of his understanding of God. Through God’s creation and condescension He communicates with us. Hamann can admire the spoken word because God first spoke the Word into existence, both in creation and in giving the Scriptures to man. God also speaks through His Son in the person of Christ. These truths became the bedrock of Hamann’s linguistic philosophy; they are the ideas which he knows his reason cannot explain, but ones that must be believed.

*The Logos as Communication*

The idea of the divine Logos so inspired and enthralled Hamann that he could say, “Without Thee I am nothing; Thou art my entire being” (qtd. in German 5). Hamann was changed completely by his perception of God, and the Logos dominated his thought and life. Ronald Gregor Smith writes, “Everything was for Hamann a sign or symbol of the divine” (J.G. Hamann 64). However, what exactly does Hamann mean by the *Logos*? This researcher has found that Hamann’s conception of the Logos can be explained in at least three different ways.

First of all, when Hamann speaks of the *Logos* he is referring to The Word in the form of Scripture, both spoken and written. God spoke the word into existence (Genesis 1:3) and continued to communicate His word as an author to men, who are also writers of Scripture. Through His word to us, God teaches us how to live; through this word we gain a deeper understanding of our sinful condition and of His grace. Through His word He has chosen to reveal to us certain truths. Through His word, which communicates with us, we in turn learn
how to communicate with Him. Therefore, we can say that “the Word of God is God’s speaking” (Barth 15).

Hamann understands that there can be no act of communication without God’s own speaking. Terrence German writes, “The Holy Spirit was very condescending is His activity of writing for man about man, but Hamann is always grateful to the Holy Spirit, because man in himself is not capable of any form of communication with God unless God initiates the communication” (135). God’s speech to us throughout Scripture is many things: a creation, a declaration, a judgment, a love immeasurable, a poetic gift. While God’s speaking is all of this, it nevertheless remains His mysterious speech. Hamann recognizes that our reason cannot begin to grasp the unfathomable aspect of God’s intervention as the Author. The Author chose to create through “poets and prophets” in the Scripture (Hamann, qtd. in German 148). These poets, prophets, and writers are an “extension of the creative activity of God Himself” (148). To Hamann, God is the ultimate Poet who often seeks to communicate with us through devices (such as poetry and parables) we are capable of understanding. Scripture speaks to us through poetry and parables, through prophets and disciples; these are the ones through which God has chosen to convey His word. To Hamann, God’s word is not a dead work of art, but is instead the word of truth which is powerfully alive. God’s word continues to live through its being proclaimed and preached. The theologian Karl Barth says, “…God’s Word is to be regarded as a living, actual, and present factor, the Word of God which now both is and should be proclaimed and heard” (15). Preaching is not merely communicating; rather, if done correctly, it is the proclamation of Truth communicated to the individual. Through the foolishness of man’s, Scripture is communicated as a living Word as it is received and penetrates the heart of man.
Secondly, when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to the word as spoken at creation. Hamann places emphasis upon creation because he believes that creation itself speaks volumes about its Creator. It surely must have been of interest to him that God himself, as the Word, brought creation into existence by speaking. In *KRC* Hamann writes:

> Every phenomenon of nature was a word, -- the sign, symbol and pledge of a new, secret, inexpressible but all the more fervent union, fellowship, and communion of divine energies and ideas. All that man heard at the beginning, saw with his eyes, looked upon, and his hands handled was a living word, for God was the word. With this word in his mouth and in his heart the origin of language was as natural, as close and easy, as a child’s game (Haynes ed. 109).

Hamann believes that God has placed his stamp upon creation, and that He intended a “communion” or unity among creation and the divine. In the above quote he also relies heavily on two scriptures passages. The first is I John 1:1: “What was from the beginning we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, concerning the Word of Life” (NASV). The second is John 1:1: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (NASV). Both of these passages speak of God’s presence at the beginning of creation. God spoke all things into existence and placed language into both the mouth and heart of mankind. Terrence German is correct when he says that “language reaches down into the bones of man” (7). Hamann understands that the origin of language is easily discernable (“as a child’s game”) because all that man understood at creation was the Word.

> God speaks and says: “Let Us make man in Our own image, according to Our likeness” (NASV). The writer of Genesis says, “God created man in His own image, in the image of God He created them” (NASB). Hamann rejoices in this inscrutable idea of man being formed in God’s image. In *Aesthetics in a Nutshell* he addresses the issue:
The will of the Author in this unravels the most convoluted knots of human nature and its destiny. Blind heathens acknowledged the invisibility which man has in common with God. The veiled figure of the body, the countenance of the head, and the extremities of the arms are all visible schema in which we move along; yet in truth they are nothing but a finger pointing to the hidden man within us (Haynes ed. 64).

That which is hidden within us constitutes the image of God. David as the writer of the Psalms pays homage to this fact by saying “I will give thanks to You, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made” (NASV). Just as God’s word in the form of scripture is a communication to us, so is His creation a communication. In fact, Hamann sees the entirety of creation as an act of speech. “Speak, that I may see you! -- -- This wish was fulfilled by creation, which is a speech to creatures through creatures; for day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows knowledge. Its watchword traverses every clime to the end of the world, and its voice can be heard in every dialect” (Haynes ed. 65). Hamann is referring here to Psalm 19:2-4, which says, “Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech or language, where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world” (NKJV). Hamann’s perception of natural language is founded upon this view presented in Scripture. Natural language, as opposed to abstract language, carries with it signs and symbols “for real objects and relations between them” (O’Flaherty, *Unity and Language* 27). Nature is a sign or symbol through which God conveys and communicates His authority as Creator. We see this in Romans 1:18-20. Paul writes: “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress truth in unrighteousness, because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them. For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse” (NASV).
One way God has chosen to reveal Himself is via the natural world. It is this precept that guides Hamann’s language theory. He seeks to communicate through his own writings the message that God communicates to us each day. He is able to exclaim “Nature and Scripture, then, are the materials of the beautiful, creative, and imitative spirit” (Haynes ed. 85), because he understands that humans are created in God’s image, the same God that wishes to communicate his handiwork through nature. Hamann senses that God formed within nature a necessary and recognizable union. Humans are in unity with God because they are created in His image. Signs and symbols are in unity with language because it is through them that we communicate. Form cannot be divorced from content (O’Flaherty, *Unity and Language* 17). Hamann writes, “The senses and passions speak and understand nothing but images. All the wealth of human knowledge and happiness consists in images. The first outburst of creation, and the first impression of its chronicler; -- --the first manifestation and the first enjoyment of nature are united in the words: Let there be light!” (Haynes ed. 64). The concept of unity plays a major theme throughout Hamann’s writings. The culmination of unity is found in the Trinity – God the three in one. In Him there is “unity in trinity and trinity in unity” (Barth 15). As Hamann says:

The book of creation contains examples of general concepts which God wished to reveal to creatures through creation. The books of the covenant contain examples of secret articles which God wished to reveal to man through man. The unity of the Author is mirrored even in the dialect of His works – in all of them a tone of immeasurable height and depth! A proof of the most splendid majesty and total of self-emptying! (Haynes ed. 75).

Again Hamann writes, “If one single truth like the sun prevails, it is day” (78). The Light of the World communicates with us, both by His written word and spoken word.

God’s very breathing into mankind constitutes communication. The concept of unity further plays out in Hamann’s writings when we consider that God breathed the breath of life
into mankind (Genesis 1:7). “The ‘breath’ of God gives union to body and soul. Body and soul should not war against each other because they are in a ‘unity’ by the power of God’s breath as He gives us our breath which flows forth from us in speech” (German 55). To Hamann, the creative and communicative act of speech is only possible because God breathed life into us. “Man speaks with his breath. His breath flows from his mouth in the spoken word to others. His breath symbolizes the life which God gave to us” (55). It is remarkable that Hamann observes God’s act of breathing life as communication, especially given the age in which he lived. Such a viewpoint gives precedence to language and speech over the position of autonomous human reasoning. Furthermore, the concepts of language and speech are amplified when we consider their source as coming directly from God, who lovingly created man in his image.

Lastly, we see that when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to the Word Incarnate in the person of Christ. Hamann’s thinking is guided by the central Christian paradox, the Word made flesh, which offers both forgiveness and restoration to mankind (Smith, J.G. Hamann 65). In his Biblical Reflections, Hamann says:

How God the Son lowered himself! He became a man, the least among men; he took the form of a servant; he became the most wretched among men; he became sin for us. How God the Holy Spirit lowered himself, when he became a historian of the smallest, most insignificant events on earth, in order to reveal the decisions, the mysteries and the ways of the godhead to man in man’s own language, man’s own affairs, man’s own ways (66). God’s appearing through the person of Christ in the flesh we shall call the Communication of Condescension. The very act of Christ’s condescension to us is the height of communication, for God in the flesh speaks through Christ. Christ’s appearing in the form of man is also the lowering of unfathomable love. Ronald Gregor Smith says, “The condescension of love is not, however, a mere tour de force, to attract our attention or engage our admiration. But it is the necessary mode of God’s speech with us” (66). The incarnation, as Hamann understood it,
defies human cognitive powers. Kierkegaard would later deal with this same concept at multiple times throughout his own authorship. Both Kierkegaard and Hamann would assert that the incarnation cannot be described successfully by reason. Sin has affected human reason. Therefore, the incarnation stands as a paradox that must be believed and taken as faith. Rather than assert (as would thinkers of the Enlightenment) that God is utterly unknowable, Kierkegaard emphasizes a bridge between the empirical to the noumenal that – that of true faith.

This researcher has attempted to explain how Hamann understood that it cannot be proven that God is the Author of creation or Scripture, but rather it must be believed. So it is with the Incarnation. These things must be taken on faith. The individual is in need of Christ in the flesh since because of sin the learner has “become untruth in time” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 32). To restore this relationship which sin has damaged, the Communication of Condescension is necessary. Sin has severely injured our being made in the image of God. Hamann writes:

Here reason sinks down, and it is on this basis that the decision of God rests to save fallen man, to restore this image. How much it has cost that I am saved! Unfathomable God, thou hast nevertheless considered this race worthy of the costly ransom. And that we are so worthy in our salvation is due to the worth which thou hast ascribed and communicated to us in creation. To restore this likeness God had to assume the likeness of men. Both are equally great mysteries (Smith, J.G. Hamann 125).

Here Hamann recognizes the inscrutable acts of creation and incarnation. Man was created in the image of God, but sin separates man from the Creator. Christ comes into the world and says “I am the Way” offering salvation. Through His “costly ransom” He renews man. It is unfathomable to Hamann that Christ chose to take on human form and communicate with humans as one of them. On this point he says, “You come to me? Oh! God and His Son are so gracious that They come to us” (Hamann, qtd. in German 159). The Word becomes flesh, and
communicates with created beings in order to “make all things new.” “God not only created heaven and earth for us, but He came into the world to be with us in flesh and blood. The creativity of this act consists in His self-communication” (German 159).

It is interesting that Hamann and Kierkegaard both refer to Christ as a “stumbling block” and a “sign of offence,” (as further expounded upon in this chapter under the heading “Christianity as Indirect Communication”). In his Biblical Reflections Hamann writes:

Reason is inclined to serve an unknown God, but is infinitely remote from knowing him. It does not wish to know him – and what is even more astonishing, when it does know him it ceases to serve him. This is why God discloses himself so late and so slowly, for he knows that knowledge of him is a stumbling-block and an offence to man, that he is foolishness and a thorn in the flesh to him as soon as he wishes to reveal himself and make himself known (Smith, J.G. Hamann 136).

That is, Christ’s revealing of Himself, His communication with us in the flesh mankind views as foolishness. Man cannot understand the paradox of the God-man. We can harken back to Hamann’s idea that “reason is first and foremost an offence to itself” (Anderson114). Human reason takes offence at the very Creator who gives man the ability to reason in the first place. Kierkegaard deals with Christ as a sign of offense in the pseudonymous works Philosophical Fragments and Training in Christianity. In Training Kierkegaard (through the pseudonym Anti-Climacus) sets out two distinct ways in which the offence takes root. The offence either has to do with the God-Man’s “loftiness” and “exaltation” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 84, 96) or it has to do with His lowliness, “that He who is God is this lowly man, suffering like a lowly man” (84). Man is offended in the first sense by the fact that the man speaking claims to be equal with God (84). Here, human reason is offended and may say, ‘An individual man like us wants to be God’ (105). In the second instance man is offended by His lowliness, by the fact that “one who gives Himself out to be God shows himself to be the poor and suffering and at last
the impotent man” (105). The man who takes offence at God’s lowliness in the flesh may speak thus: “Supposing for an instant that thou art God, what folly and madness it is that thou art this lowly, poor, impotent man!” (105). To Hamann, Christ chose to reveal Himself regardless of His knowledge of man’s offence towards Him. Hamann would stand in agreement with Kierkegaard who writes, “The possibility of offence is…every instant present, and constitutes at every instant the yawning gulf between the individual and the God-Man, across which only faith can reach” (139).

The Error of Human Reason

This researcher has explained how the Enlightenment sought to heighten the reason of man while defining God as utterly unknowable. In refutation, Hamann sought to combat the Enlightenment’s views with his own theory of language which was based in the divine Logos as Creator and Redeemer of mankind’s fallen nature. In order to do so, Hamann placed great importance upon God as the origin of communication with mankind. Enlightened reason would seek to counter this viewpoint. Hamann sought to combat rationalism in his own day while Kierkegaard focused on the errors of Idealism during his time. However, Kierkegaard and Hamann would both seek to present man’s reasoning capabilities as flawed by depravity. Hamann’s critique of thinkers of the Enlightenment, as has been shown, centers on the concepts of language, the Logos, and faith. To him, the Enlightenment’s fundamental flaw was to deny these three concepts their proper roles.

To Hamann, the rationalists constantly search for truth. However, their searching is in vain because they believe God as the Truth remains unknowable. In Aesthetics in Nuce Hamann writes, “Yes, you delicate critics of art!, you go on asking what is truth, and make for the door,
because you cannot wait for an answer to this question” (Haynes ed. 77). Since rationalism has chosen not to consider the Divine, it can only offer hopeless solutions. To the rationalists, human reason offered freedom from existing norms. However, Hamann would say, “All the colors of the most beautiful world grow pale once you extinguish its light, the firstborn of creation” (78). Without God there would be no reasoning ability in the first place. To Hamann, everything becomes dim when we seek to place faith solely within our reasoning and cognitive powers. The world then indeed appears a much different place, for we have then failed to take into account its Creator and the sustainer of all life. This Creator seeks to communicate with us, but the rationalists fail to take this into account.

Enlightened philosophers are content in their attempts to follow their own system. Hamann says that even “The devils believe and tremble!—but your senses, crazed by the subtlety of reason, tremble not” (Haynes ed. 90). Rather, “You congratulate yourself secretly on your blindness when God on the cross is numbered among the criminals…” (91). The one who thinks he lives by reason alone is foolish, blind, and arrogant. He has not taken into account God’s laws or His communication with mankind. He does not understand that God gave him the ability to become a creator, that God gave him language which proceeds reason. The rationalists do not understand the concept of language in the biblical sense. “The enlightened rationalists who seek to explain speech without recourse to the breath of God interfere with God’s manifestation to us through speech” (German 56). God does speak, through signs and symbols; He speaks through nature, through the Scriptures, through His Son, and through the continuing proclamation of his Word. The rationalists are the “healthy who need no physician” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 121). God communicates with mankind, but that does not mean that all things are revealed to us. In his Biblical Reflections Hamann writes, “The curiosity to know things which
are too high for us, which are beyond our horizon, which are unfathomable precisely because of the weakness which makes the future so obscure to us, has led men into many such ludicrous methods and errors” (123). The Enlightened philosophers deny their own human weaknesses and fail to understand that they are living in error. The same reason which they seek to exalt has erred and failed them. Still, they vehemently deny the possibility of communication with anything beyond the empirical realm. Hamann writes in KRC, “Come on, do you not know by now, philosophers!, that there is no physical connection between cause and effect, means and intent, only a spiritual and ideal one, that is, blind faith, as the greatest earthly chronicler of his country and of the natural church has proclaimed!” (Haynes ed. 103). To Hamann and (as we shall see) Kierkegaard, individual faith is the key to a personal, communicative relationship with Christ. It is the Son of Man who came to communicate His message of redemption and salvation from the fall, from depraved reason. Therefore, we are commanded to fear Him and keep His commandments, which is the whole duty of man10.

Indirect Communication in the Thought of Kierkegaard

_parabolic communication: a relational tool_

Excepting his use of pseudonyms, one of the most easily recognizable forms of indirectness in Kierkegaard’s authorship is his use of parables. Kierkegaard had an amazing ability to tell stories, and from his parables we can glean many invaluable truths. In fact, Thomas Oden has remarked that no writer in Western tradition has made more persistent use of the parable as a means of communicating moral and spiritual insight than Kierkegaard (Oden vii). According to Oden, “Kierkegaard is one of the few writers…who was himself a literary critic, who himself offered a detailed theory of (indirect) communication that accounted for his
writing in parable and story form under pseudonyms, and who clearly envisioned parabolic communication as an integral part of his philosophical method” (Oden viii). Above all, parabolic communication is a relational tool to Kierkegaard. It is a device that constitutes indirectness since it removes the communicator and allows the recipient to focus on that which is being communicated.

That Kierkegaard used stories to illustrate his message I think, can be traced back to a very influential period of his life—his childhood. Kierkegaard’s father had a unique gift of story-telling as well, and his manner of doing such was influential to Kierkegaard as a young boy (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.1 32). So at an early age he learned the art of epic narrative, drama, and dialectics. They all became sources of his story-telling when he became an author.

One of Kierkegaard’s best known parables comes from his private journals and has to do with the attack upon the Established Church of his time, which he believed failed to resemble the Christianity in the New Testament. It is entitled “The Obedient Hound” and I quote it in full here for two reasons: first, that it may show the power behind Kierkegaard’s parables as a relational form of communication; secondly, to demonstrate that it can aid our perspective when later in this chapter we discuss Kierkegaard’s attack upon established Christendom.

Imagine a big, well-trained hunting dog. He accompanies his master on a visit to a family, where, as all too often in our time, there is a whole assembly of ill-behaved youths. Their eyes hardly light upon the hound before they begin to maltreat it in every kind of way. The hound, which was well trained, as these youths were not, fixes his eye at once upon his master to ascertain from his expression what he expects him to do. And he understands the glance to mean that he is to put up with all the ill-treatment, accept it indeed as though it were sheer kindness conferred upon him. Thereupon the youths of course became still more rough, and finally they agreed that it must be a prodigiously stupid dog which puts up with everything. The dog meanwhile is concerned only about one thing, what the master’s glance commands him to do. And, lo, that glance is suddenly altered; it signifies—and the hound understands it at once—use your strength. That instant with a single leap he has seized the biggest lout and thrown him to the
ground—and now no one stops him, except the master’s glance, and the same instant he is as he was before.—Just so with me (Kierkegaard, Attack Upon Christendom x).

The parable obviously has application to Kierkegaard’s attempt to speak directly, as he did later in his career, about the problems in Christendom. Another such parable comes from very early in Kierkegaard’s authorship and appeared in he beginning of Either/Or. Entitled “The Happy Conflagration,” it shows “what happens to those who try to warn against the present age” (Oden 3). “In a theater, it happened that a fire started offstage. The clown came out to tell the audience. They thought it was a joke and applauded. He told them again, and they became still more hilarious. This is the way, I suppose, that the world will be destroyed—amid the universal hilarity of wits and wags who think it is all a joke” (Kierkegaard, Either/Or 30).

Now, according to Thomas Oden, Kierkegaard used parabolic communication for five reasons (x). First, the practice was an “excellent weapon in his philosophical-polemical arsenal. A second reason is that “he quite evidently relishes meeting his reader in this way. He takes delight in leading his readers along a path, only to arrive at an unexpected junction where he suddenly leaves them to make a decision about a set of events” (xi). This has the affect of disarming the reader, “putting him or her in a non-defensive, receptive frame of mind that allows the author to enter more deeply into personal communication with the reader” (xii). A parable requires a deep self-examination (xii) and can be personally related to one’s situation very easily.

The third reason Oden believes Kierkegaard uses parables is that they are an essential part of indirect communication, which is in turn a central part of Kierkegaard’s authorship. “Each parable aims to challenge the subjective consciousness of the individual reader in its own way” (xiii). Oden writes that parables fall clearly into Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication because “they confront us with a choice between possibilities of self-
understanding, so that in the process of having to choose, we discover ourselves, or something of ourselves” (xiii). The fourth reason has to do with the third, in that Kierkegaard uses parables to bring about self-awareness in his readers. The fifth reason according to Oden is that “they are by the author’s intention, designed to serve oral traditions” (Oden xvi). Oden explains:

As a distinctive literary genre, the parable, by definition, is intended to be remembered, to lend itself to oral retelling. Memorability is thus a crucial criterion for any parable. Therefore an austere writer of parables has precisely in mind the detachability of the parable from its original context, otherwise his purpose is defeated. If, before telling or commenting upon the parable of the prodigal son, one were required to place it in its original historical context, the parable would seldom be told or remembered. But, it has been remembered, and it has been appropriated in and out of many historical contexts… (xvi).

The point here is that parables direct themselves particularly to memory, oral repetition, and adaptation (xvii).

Kierkegaard’s use of parables certainly plays a major role in his indirect communication model. While he frequently uses parabolic communication as indirectness, it is also obvious that parables serve another purpose when they are used by the pseudonyms. When a pseudonym is the author of a work, Kierkegaard is once removed from the communication. However, when a pseudonym utilizes parabolic communication in a pseudonymous work, Kierkegaard is then doubly removed from the communication instead.

Hamann also shows a love for parabolic communication. In *Aesthetics in a Nutshell* he writes likely his most famous words: “Poetry is the mother-tongue of the human race, as the garden is older than the ploughed field; painting, than writing; song, than declamation; parables, than logical deduction; barter, than commerce” (Haynes ed. 63). Here, Hamann gives us an example of his preference for analogical rather than logical thinking. James O’Flaherty explains the importance of analogical thinking to Hamann. “Whereas the rationalist establishes a
principle, whether deductively or inductively, and thereupon proceeds to draw inferences from it, the intuitive thinker establishes a model on nonrational grounds, as, for example, instinct or faith, and thereupon proceeds to draw parallels to the model” (O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 87). Hamann thinks “it is more natural for man to think in metaphors or parables, which involve analogical thinking, than to arrive at deductions” (88). In his Biblical Reflections, Hamann writes, “All mortal creatures are able to see the truth and essence of things only in parables” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 87). Parabolic communication helps us understand things in an indirect manner. Parables give us a mental image of that which is being communicated. Thus Hamann writes, “Senses and passions speak and understand nothing but images” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 196). Parables allow us to see things from a symbolic point of view. It is worth noting here that Hamann and Kierkegaard after him both stress the importance of parabolic communication, as form of indirectness.

**Concepts of Indirectness in the Authorship**

Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms throughout much of his career as an author is both well known and extensively researched. However, its nature is often misunderstood. Throughout postmodernity, as Kierkegaard’s thought has been interpreted and applied to various educational disciplines, the Christian aspects of his thought have often been disregarded. In such cases, the answer as to why Kierkegaard employed pseudonyms as part of his method of indirect communication remains ignored as well. When Kierkegaard’s overtly Christian message is either disregarded or misinterpreted, danger in turn arises; for without taking into account the Christian message of his writings, the proper perspective for interpretation is lost. Louis Pojman writes, “Sometimes Kierkegaard is interpreted as a poet, sometimes as the Father of Existentialism, sometimes as the scourge of Idealism. The important thing is to see that
Kierkegaard’s fundamental purpose was to make eminently clear what Christianity is all about” (Pojman 4). Conversely, such writers as Roger Poole have claimed that there is no correct way to read Kierkegaard, whose writings will always remain ambiguous and mysterious since, “Kierkegaard’s writing has made all solutions impossible” (Poole 1). From his perspective, Poole groups Kierkegaard with such Deconstructionist thinkers as Jacques Derrida, by claiming that Kierkegaard “demonstrates that a meaning can be so long deferred that it would finally be merely naïve to ask about it” (2). According to Poole, “Kierkegaard writes text after text whose aim is not to state a truth, not to clarify an issue, not to propose a definite doctrine, not to offer some “meaning” that could be directly appropriated” (7). This view is an example of the kind of misinterpretation which fails to take into account the Christian aspect of Kierkegaard’s authorship, of which indirect communication plays an integral role. Rather than defer or fail to present meaning, Kierkegaard takes his receiver on a journey through the categories of the esthetic and ethical in order to arrive to the religious. A definite, concrete process, one through which Kierkegaard seeks to move the individual reader toward Christianity, is pervasive throughout the authorship.

Kierkegaard’s “first authorship” (1841-1846) he refers to as esthetic writings because they represent not only various literary and poetic opinions of the pseudonyms, but also characterize the categories in which most people live. In an amazingly short period time, Kierkegaard wrote the bulk of his pseudonymous literature. From 1843 to 1846 his major works included Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, Stages on Life’s Way, and CUP, as well as the Discourses accompanying each work. Until “A First and Last Declaration” was appended to the end of CUP in 1846, he had made no “official acknowledgement” that the pseudonymous works actually belonged to him (Swenson
17). Although the majority of Denmark regarded Kierkegaard as the author of the pseudonymous works, his “Declaration” is nevertheless imperative to understanding the thought behind the pseudonyms. Kierkegaard writes:

My pseudonymity or polyonymity has not had an accidental basis in my person… but an essential basis in the production itself, which, for the sake of the lines and of the psychologically varied differences of the individualities, poetically required as indiscriminateness with regard to good and evil, brokenheartedness and gaiety, despair and overconfidence, suffering and elation, etc., which is ideally limited only by psychological consistency, which no factual person dares to allow himself or can want to allow himself in the moral limitations of actuality. What has been written, then, is mine, but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have placed the life-view of the creating, poetically actual individuality in his mouth, for my relation is even more remote than that of a poet, who poetizes characters and yet in the preface is himself the author. That is, I am impersonally or personally in the third person a souffleur [prompter] who has poetically produced the authors, whose prefaces in turn are their productions, as their names are also. Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I have no opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning except as a reader, not the remotest private relation to them, since it is impossible to have that to a doubly reflected communication (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 625).

The opinions presented by the pseudonyms are theirs alone. In order to serve the purpose of indirect communication, Kierkegaard must distance himself from the production of the pseudonymous authors. This concept allows the array of pseudonymous authors such as Johannes Climacus, Johannes de Silentio, Victor Eremita, Frater Taciturnus, Constantine Constantius, and Vigilius Haufniensis to present their own opinions on such subjects as philosophy, religion, poetry, art, and literature. Kierkegaard “is not the author of their opinions, but only the responsible individual who has given poetic life to the authors, each one of whom speaks for himself” (Swenson 17). The fact that Kierkegaard refers to his fictitious authors as “individuals” is significant as well. The pseudonyms are individuals in the Kierkegaardian sense. The opinions they represent are their own. Although the reader may be able to see traces of Kierkegaard in some of the pseudonyms, it would not be fair to attribute their opinions to him,
since at times the pseudonyms present life-views contrary to one another. Therefore, the argument that Kierkegaard simply used the pseudonyms as a mask for presenting his own views simply does not apply. David Swenson says:

One guiding idea runs through this maze. His purpose is to explain and solve the riddles of the life of reason and freedom. Not, however, in such a way as merely to increase the store of human knowledge. He had diagnosed the evil of his day as a confusion of knowledge with life, and he did not intend to contribute to this confusion by adding a few more paragraphs to help make a systematic result. It was necessary to teach men what it means to live, and to this end he wished to place before them living personalities who think and speak for themselves (Swenson 17).

Rather than using the pseudonyms to present his own opinions, Kierkegaard in effect, turns them into living writers with opinions of their own. The pseudonyms represent different characters on different paths of life. If the reader examines what the pseudonyms have to say, he or she may recognize something of themselves (McPherson 158). In this sense, “Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity is the curtain separating him from the drama he stages” (Taylor 102).

Kierkegaard’s aim throughout his writings is displayed in The Point of View. Kierkegaard’s “first authorship” is often categorized as his esthetic production, while his “second authorship” (1846-1855) represents the religious. However, as Kierkegaard writes, “The religious is present from the beginning. Conversely, the aesthetic is present again at the last moment” (Kierkegaard, The Point of View 12). Clearly, he anticipated the denouncement that he had become a religious writer only after running through the esthetic stage. “The first group of writings represents the aesthetic productivity, the last group is exclusively religious: between them, as the turning point, lies the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This work concerns itself with and sets ‘the Problem,’ which is the problem of the whole authorship: how to become a Christian” (13). Throughout The Point of View Kierkegaard maintains that he had been from the beginning a religious author; he had not become one with age or passing time. That from the
beginning of his authorship he had been a religious writer concerned with how the single individual becomes a Christian is evidenced by the “Upbuilding Discourses.” Even during the esthetic production, characterized by indirect communication, Kierkegaard published these overtly theological writings under his own name, employing direct communication. The Discourses, each one as an accompaniment to a major work were generally published around the same time as the pseudonymous works. For example, the pseudonymous “twin” works Repetition and Fear and Trembling found their way to the printer on October 16, 1843 under the pseudonyms Constantin Constantius and Johannes de Silentio, respectively. On the same day, the work Three Upbuilding Discourses appeared. This allowed Kierkegaard the ability to publish the pseudonymous works as indirect communication while presenting his own thought in the Discourses. The very structure of the authorship itself proves Kierkegaard a religious author, indeed a Christian one. Here we have one example of a dialectical approach to Kierkegaard’s authorship. On the one hand, we have Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings which are bound in indirect communication and through which various life-views are often presented. (One must remember the reason these life-views are presented: In order to bring the individual reader to the point of choosing whether or not to accept Christianity.) On the other, the Discourses, to which Kierkegaard readily attaches his name. In the introduction to Edifying Discourses, Paul Holmer writes, “Each discourse is calculated to bring the reader, whatever his aesthetic and intellectual capacity, into conversation about religious and Christian concerns” (Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses vii).

However, we cannot alienate the Discourses from the rest of Kierkegaard’s authorship. Neither can we completely isolate his pseudonymous authorship from his direct, signed works. Rather, it is important to view the entire authorship in totality. Only then can one begin to
understand the fullness of Kierkegaard’s Christian message. Kierkegaard’s aim was to lead away from speculative thought and from Christianity simply as objective adherence, as he believed Christendom had become during his day. He understood that the majority of people in his times considered themselves Christians; however, they did not know what it means to exist in Christianity. To Kierkegaard, Christendom as he saw it in Denmark had become nothing more than a ritualistic claim accepted by the mass public. Individuality had become widely ignored. Christendom as a type of popular folk religion denied personal examination and appropriation which is central to the very teachings of Christianity. We can easily make parallels to our own times by understanding what Christendom had become in Denmark according to Kierkegaard. He saw how “it is difficult for anyone to become a Christian in truth because everyone is a Christian of a sort. Being a Christian is confused with being a nice, respectable person who works hard, fulfills family responsibilities, and perhaps even goes to church on Sundays now and then” (Evans, *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self* 4). In this respect, the truth of Christianity is hidden from view. People may have objective knowledge of Christian principles, but they deceive themselves into believing that these acts alone constitute the whole the whole truth of what it means to be a Christian. “Such a Christianity makes no real difference to anything or anyone, and Kierkegaard saw very clearly that its major function was simply to legitimize the status quo of an emerging bourgeois culture” (Evans, *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self* 4). In order to reform and “reintroduce Christianity into Christendom,” Kierkegaard understood that the individual must be made aware of his or her existence, and ultimately see what it means to exist as an individual in Christianity. Hence, we have Kierkegaard’s focus on subjectivity and inwardness. It is individual and personal belief in God which brings about faith. Kierkegaard’s focus on “the single individual” then, is an attempt to lead others toward what it means to exist
“alone face to face before God” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers Vol. 2* 402). Kierkegaard’s call to “live as an individual” always involves living as an individual before God. He writes, “But the all-knowing One, who in spite of anyone is able to observe it all, does not desire the crowd. He desires the individual; He will deal only with the individual, quite unconcerned as to whether the individual be of high or low station, whether he be distinguished or wretched” (Kierkegaard, *Purity of Heart* 185). One can certainly gain objective knowledge of Christianity by being part of the crowd, but one can never become a Christian by its aid. Each man only finds true faith by being alone before God. By mere objective knowledge, as we will see shortly, one does not come to any personal appropriation of the truth. That is, objective knowledge cannot make any eternal decision to accept Christianity. Christianity can only be accepted subjectively through individual terms.

Hermann Diem points out that it is the “greatest possible misunderstanding” of Kierkegaard’s teaching to say that he “seeks truth in the subjective (psychological) sphere” or that he makes the subjective an object of personal feeling11 (Diem, *Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence* 38f). Rather, “the point is not to think truth but to live in truth. This means that truth is no longer to be conceived as an objective statement about certain relations of being, but as a form of existence in which such relations are actualized” (38). The pseudonym Johannes Climacus writes, “Christianity wants to give the single individual an eternal happiness, a good that is not distributed in bulk but only to one, and to one at a time” (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript* 130).

Faith is not gained through the imposition of another’s belief into one’s own life. Rather, the Gospel must be believed through inwardness and personal appropriation of the truth. In his writings on communication, Kierkegaard distinguishes between objective knowledge and
subjective existence and between direct and indirect communication by introducing “the communication of knowledge” and the “communication of capability.” We can gain further insight into the Kierkegaardian concepts of inwardness, objectivity, and subjectivity by examining his understanding of communication.

*Background to the Lectures: The Effects of the Corsair Affair on Kierkegaard’s View of Communication*

In 1847, Kierkegaard wrote as part of his planned lectures on communication:

But I also find everywhere that men are preoccupied with the WHAT which is to be communicated. What occupies me, on the other hand, is: what does it mean to communicate—of this I know I have read nothing at all in the productions of the modern period, nor have I heard anything spoken about it. Once long ago, in antiquity, primarily in Greece, I find that men occupied themselves with this problem (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 1 304).

Drafted but never published or delivered, these lectures nevertheless play an important role in Kierkegaard’s thinking concerning the area of communication. The date 1847 is itself important because the author had already published CUP (nearly a year before), which addressed what it means to become a Christian and in which he dealt with the problem communication in great detail. The lectures, then, did not constitute the complete formulation of his thoughts on communication; rather, they serve to further illuminate the subject. Hence, the lectures are extremely important in order to fully grasp Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication. Although the lectures on communication have traditionally been examined far less than many of Kierkegaard’s major works, they are necessary to understanding his model of indirect communication, for as he says, “If anyone were to ask me how I regard these lectures in relationship to my whole effort as an author, I would answer: I regard them as a necessary concession, for which I intend to bear responsibility” (302). Before examining the lectures in
detail, we must catch a glimpse of an event which affected Kierkegaard’s life both personally and as an author during 1846-47.

By 1847, Kierkegaard was in the midst of his attack on *The Corsair*, the Danish comic/gossip newspaper of which it has been said, “…its real editors hid behind the blackguards who were ready to suffer the penalties of the law for libel. All reputable men declared that it was a scandal which ought to be abated—yet secretly read it with malicious enjoyment” (Lowrie, *A Short Life of Kierkegaard* 176). Kierkegaard eventually would suffer a great deal of public ridicule and became nothing more than a caricature at the hands of the powerful newspaper with “the largest circulation in Denmark” (176). In fact, the paper had achieved a circulation that greatly outnumbered any in Denmark (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol.2* 347). The weekly paper had attained such vast readership and circulation by “providing for the common people the delectable spectacle of the upper classes exposed to the vilest derision” (*The Point of View* 164). David Swenson writes concerning *The Corsair*: “It dealt in attacks on public men, in caricatures and satires, and even exploited the secrets of private life. Evidence is not wanting that it frequently descended to the level of blackmail. No one respected it, but everyone feared it; it was read everywhere, by high and low alike” (19). *The Corsair* appeared to never miss the slightest chance to single out and slander certain individuals, much to the secret delight of the public.

Under the ownership and operation of Aaron Goldschmidt, a talented Jewish writer and journalist (Bukdahl 147), *The Corsair* amassed such a large circulation by appealing especially to the “lower classes” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 10). The paper mixed “fact, rumor, and gossip” (Kjær-Hansen, qtd. in Jansen 10) in order to attract readership. Its power as a product of mass consumption stemmed from the facts that it was not only read by everyone but also feared by all, for “nobody knew when he or she would appear in it” (Jansen 10).
Goldschmidt himself hid behind *The Corsair*, and he and his fellow journalists cloaked themselves in anonymity. The paper’s “effectual editor,” P.L. Møller, did the same. But how could *The Corsair* operate under anonymity, given the fact that in Denmark “all periodicals were obliged to supply the name of a person to be held legally responsible for everything that appeared in the relevant issue” of a paper (Bredsdorff 129)? The answer is quite simple. During Goldschmidt’s six-year reign at *The Corsair*, the names of at least fourteen different people appeared as legally responsible editors (129). The names were those of real, existing persons; however, these individuals were not connected to the paper or responsible for its content. As Elias Bredsdorff explains, “Most of the editors at *The Corsair* were mere stooges: shop assistants, sailors, and dock workers who were paid for the use of their names, thus covering up for the real editor, whose name never appeared on the journal” (129). This anonymity afforded Goldschmidt, Møller, and other journalists the luxury of spreading gossip and slandering others, but it just as importantly removed them from being held responsible for the paper’s content. As a result, no one dared stand up to criticize or ridicule *The Corsair*’s practices, for doing so meant certain slander. *The Corsair* stands out as only one example of mass media in Kierkegaard’s Denmark, but its importance cannot be overstated. It has been written of the state of journalism at the time: “Proper journalists would hardly have worked for the daily press, which was in fact served by failed students, mediocre people who did the job as a sideline, often somewhat unsavory types” (Stangerup 124). Nevertheless, the press had an enormous impact on society. As a widely-read newspaper, *The Corsair* specifically succeeded in affecting both the state of journalism and the perception of journalism in Denmark at the time.

Goldschmidt himself was given to the political liberalism of the times, and he “represented the young Denmark that had been inspired by the French revolution of July 1830
and had now turned against what it called ‘men of stagnation’” (Bukdahl 84). His newspaper demanded the complete abolition of the institution of monarchy (Bredsdorff 129). The contents of The Corsair reflected its political leanings. “Without being linked to any political party it expressed extreme radical views; in some respects it may even be regarded as a precursor of socialist ideas. Most of all, The Corsair aimed at being witty – and often was, though many of its jokes have lost their flavor today. Its humor ranged from the very crude to the very sophisticated…” (130). Jørgen Bukdahl writes that “Kierkegaard viewed aristocratic National Liberalism, with its army of journalists and its command of the press, as a deception of the people, misleading and actually insulting to the common man…” (85). Goldschmidt was likely motivated to appeal to the common man by pushing his agenda of national liberalism. The paper’s popularity was doubtless aided in part by its political stance. Since The Corsair was largely based on French radical periodicals, it was the kind of journal the likes of which Denmark had never seen (Bredsdorff 128). It would certainly appear as if dawning liberalism had found its mouthpiece (Stangerup 120).

The Corsair debacle had sweeping ramifications for all parties involved. As Howard and Edna Hong acknowledge in the introduction to The Corsair Affair, the event has been called “the most renowned controversy in Danish literary history” (Kierkegaard, The Corsair Affair vii). The events that unfolded between Goldschmidt, Kierkegaard, and Møller through the medium of print reverberated throughout Copenhagen and “was as wrenching as it was decisive for each of them in ways that were completely unexpected” (Perkins, The Corsair Affair xiv). For our purposes, we shall see that the battle particularly had enormous effects upon Kierkegaard and his subsequent thought. Throughout the entire affair we have two very distinct and separate views represented. On the one hand we have Kierkegaard’s view that The Corsair disrupted and
confused society with its appeals to the masses through disreputable content. It was well known that *The Corsair* singled out and slandered certain individuals for the purpose of stirring up gossip. This was all done in the name of readership and circulation. Kierkegaard believed that the purpose of the paper was “merely to make money by fair means or foul” (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol.2* 348). He writes that the paper attacked “peaceable and respectable men, who in honorable seclusion follow their vocations in the service of the state; excellent men, in many ways deserving well, and in none having made themselves worthy of ridicule” (Kierkegaard, qtd. in Swenson 98).

There is a sense in which journalism is a business like any other practice. Writers, editors, and publishers alike rarely are willing to give away what power they have obtained. As a result, they often adhere to those ideals which will best serve their own interests. One goal of the daily press is to reach the greatest amount of people possible. Its power to influence public opinion, to sway the masses, is almost unprecedented. So, on the other hand we have the views of Goldschmidt and Møller, both of whom doubtless desired to remain shrouded in anonymity and perceived Kierkegaard a threat to the basic tenets of journalistic practice. They were likely comfortable with the status quo, for the greater the circulation, the more people they reached. The greater the level of reach, the more influence the paper gained in society. The greater this influence, the more money *The Corsair* could make. The practices of *The Corsair* represented a dark side of journalism, but unfortunately a very real side—and one that is to a certain extent still recognizable today.

Now, Kierkegaard scholars are somewhat at odds over exactly who should be held responsible (Goldschmidt or Møller) for the leveling of Kierkegaard in the press (Perkins ed. xxiii). The general view is that Møller initiated the attack while Goldschmidt perpetuated it.
For our purposes it is necessary to shed light on the details of the affair, for it became a driving force behind Kierkegaard’s view of communication.

Kierkegaard had previously received favorable reviews from *The Corsair*. Goldschmidt had praised both *The Concept of Irony* (1841) and *Either/Or* and certainly respected Kierkegaard as a brilliant author whose pseudonymous literature was unsurpassed in Denmark (Bredsdorff 131). For his part, Kierkegaard had befriended Goldschmidt when the latter lacked any person of distinction with whom he could converse (Lowrie 348). In fact, it is clear that Kierkegaard recognized Goldschmidt’s talent and often encouraged him to quit *The Corsair* (348). He likely recognized that Goldschmidt was capable of producing literary material which could greatly surpass any success through *The Corsair*. In any event, the two often discussed articles that had appeared in *The Corsair* and Kierkegaard made suggestions for new subjects to Goldschmidt (Bukdahl 83). However, we shall see that from Kierkegaard’s point of view newspapers should appeal to the individual rather than the masses. They should strive to aid the individual’s development in a positive way. He believed that a newspaper, even a satirical one like *The Corsair*, could be used “to address the individual reader as a human being” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 11). “In *The Corsair*, or any other satirical newspaper, Kierkegaard foresaw the possibility of using satire and irony to awaken the reader. But this is precisely what Goldschmidt did not do. Kierkegaard thus accused Goldschmidt of cowardice: instead of using the potentialities of his medium, Goldschmidt made himself a nonentity by hiding behind *The Corsair*” (12). One mistake of the daily press was its insistence to write for—and thereby actually create—a mass public. As Kierkegaard says:

The whole population of Copenhagen had become ironical and witty…This irony was of course nothing but, in essence, vulgarity; and in spite of a not inconsiderable degree of talent in the man who was its originating force, by passing over to these thousands of
people it became, essentially, a mob trait which is always only too popular. In view of
the proportions of the little country, it threatened a complete moral dissolution
(Kierkegaard, qtd. in Swenson 96).

Denmark was a small country and could not withstand such a force as *The Corsair* in
Kierkegaard’s view. Goldschmidt may have been a talented young man, but he had helped to
produce a crowd that secretly welcomed the vulgarity of *The Corsair*. By allowing themselves
to be taken in by the publication, people were actually permitting it to control the way they
thought, acted, and lived.

Although *The Corsair* had been favorable to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous literature in
the past, he did not welcome the paper’s praise. Given his already dim view of *The Corsair*,
Kierkegaard would rather have his pseudonyms attacked than acclaimed—and he said so.14
Møller began the actual attack in 1845 by writing an unfavorable, overly-critical review of part
of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous *Stages on Life’s Way* (1845), which appeared in the annual
publication *Gæa*. It was obvious that Møller had failed to rightly understand the work or the
view of one of its pseudonymous authors, Frater Taciturnus.15 Kierkegaard responded promptly
with a pseudonymous article of his own printed in the daily paper *The Fatherland*. In the article
he spoke of Møller’s position as *The Corsair’s* effectual editor. In doing so, Walter Lowrie
writes that Kierkegaard thereby revealed Møller’s secret connection with the “disreputable
paper” (*The Point of View* 164) and ruined Møller’s opportunity to “attain the university chair he
so coveted” (164). However, there is some contention between scholars on this view. Robert
Perkins points out that there is evidence that Møller’s position at *The Corsair* could have at least
moderately been known to those with whom he sought such a decorated position months prior to
Kierkegaard’s response (*The Corsair Affair* xviii). According to Perkins, Goldschmidt himself
attempted to transfer the blame for Møller’s non-appointment to Kierkegaard, perhaps because
he had personally told Kierkegaard of Møller’s involvement with the paper (xx). However, if Goldschmidt had broken silence and related the issue of Møller to Kierkegaard, how many other people had he told as well? Perhaps Kierkegaard’s article succeeded in making it more widely known that Møller was intimately involved with the scandalous paper, but it would appear that evidence of his association was already not lacking.

In any event, *The Corsair* struck back with ferocity, as Møller began the attack on Kierkegaard that would last for an extended period of time. His first article, Lowrie notes, included a caricature of Kierkegaard. Lowrie writes that “for the course of about a year almost every number of the *Corsair* carried one or more caricatures designed to make Denmark’s greatest writer ridiculous in the eyes of the vulgar” (*A Short Life of Kierkegaard* 164). A week rarely passed without the production of at least one or more (and sometimes four) articles mocking Kierkegaard’s physical appearance (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol.2* 351). These articles and caricatures were of such interest to society that other papers printed them as well (351). Constant references were made to Kierkegaard’s unique attire and he was often depicted as unkempt and slightly deformed in the caricatures. His pseudonymous characters were attacked repeatedly, but always in such a way as to make it painfully obvious that Kierkegaard was the intended subject of ridicule. As a result, he became a “standing comic figure” to the public.

Rather than understanding that *The Corsair* stooped to malice and slander in order to gain readers, the public took delight in the depictions of Denmark’s greatest writer. David Swenson says that the attack sunk deeply into the consciousness of Copenhagen (21). He writes, “The articles were illustrated with pictures of Kierkegaard walking through the streets, his umbrella under his arm, and one trouser leg depicted as considerably longer than the other. The result of this campaign was that Kierkegaard could not show himself on the streets without being
followed by a gaping and howling mob of boys and young men” (20). Elias Bredsdorff describes the situation this way: “The Corsair’s cartoons had made SK the target of mob-ridicule in Copenhagen. Prostitutes accosted him in the streets as ‘Mr. Either/Or,’ and people stared at his trousers and laughed knowingly. SK suffered unspeakably” (141). The effects of the affair far outlasted the debacle itself. Kierkegaard would publically suffer the effects for two more years, and he was mocked, laughed at and taunted for the rest of his life (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 353). The derision begun by one newspaper had infected the mob (354). Kierkegaard wrote of the struggle in 1848:

"They have infected the air for me…Curiosity surrounds me everywhere. I travel five miles out to my dear forest district—ah! everywhere curiosity. And so I am wasted upon Denmark…My Christian name exists as a nickname for me which every school-boy knows. Ever more frequently the same name is now used by authors, in comedies it now appears regularly, and everybody knows that it is I (qtd. in Lowrie 354)."

Lowrie relates the story of the attack which likely affected Kierkegaard the most. It deals with the event in Kierkegaard’s life which caused him considerable suffering: the breaking of his engagement to his fiancée Regina Olsen in 1841.

"But to the most shameful of all the attacks of The Corsair (he was pictured sitting astride a young girl and beating her, and the motto was ‘Frater Taciturnus chastises his girl’) his reaction was anything but extravagant: ‘Here now, little Corsair! It is womanish to torment a man with his love-affair; it is a womanish thing under the impression of love disdained to continue to run after a person in the street and call him names. Be a man, hold your peace’" (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 356).

In a separate depiction, Frater Taciturnus “is surveilling his battle forces (a pitiable crowd without arms and legs,” and yet another shows Kierkegaard as “the centre of the universe” (Bredsdorff 139).

During the period of the attack against The Corsair, Kierkegaard’s journals became extraordinarily voluminous (Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard181). His writings on the press
and the state of journalism in Denmark could fill multiple volumes and as a result could be studied almost inexhaustibly. Indeed, “Few people have devoted so much time and space to the press as did SK, and written as critically about it as he did” (Stangerup 119). Although Kierkegaard had previously maintained an unfavorable view of the press in general and journalists in particular, the affair of the *Corsair* appears to have considerably coarsened that view. Through the *Corsair*, we see Kierkegaard’s most obstentious critique of the media.

During the period he wrote, “The tyranny of the daily press is the most wretched, the most contemptible of all tyrannies; it is the begging tyranny—in the same way that a beggar to whom we all say “No” eventually extorts something from us by running up and down the street after us” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers Vol. 2* 478). It is clear from another journal entry a year later that Kierkegaard believed the press possessed too much power – power to slander the individual and negatively influence the public.

The government cannot prohibit the possession of dangerous weapons, because they are too powerful and go beyond the human. Accordingly, the government cannot prohibit oral communication, which is a gift of God, but it could very well prohibit the daily press, because it is a much too gigantic means of communication (479).

One must think that Kierkegaard specifically had *The Corsair* in mind when he wrote in 1847:

> The daily press is and remains the evil principle in the modern world. In its sophistry it has no limits, since it can sink to ever lower and lower levels of readers. Consequently it stirs up so much foulness and meanness that no state can cope with it. There will always be only a few who truly see the untruth in the existence of the daily press, but of these few, again, there will be very few with the courage to express it, because it is outright martyrdom to break with the majority and the large audience who will immediately persecute the one that does (479).

Yet this is exactly what Kierkegaard did. He attacked the press for its hostility and in turn found himself the subject of ridicule, which caused him much public and inward suffering. Kierkegaard loved and valued interpersonal communication. His daily walks through the streets
of Copenhagen were of great enjoyment to him because he could directly speak with common
technology, whom he loved and appreciated. Jørgen Bukdahl gives an example of how important
personal communication was to Kierkegaard: “In matters concerning the common people he was
direct, without ulterior motives or condescension…He had a rare capacity for sharing the
thoughts of common people, for entering into their mental universe” (86). However, the same
public now stood to deride him. Rather than be pleased by his company, “people joined in the
general laughter with malicious glee, mocking the defenseless Kierkegaard…” (90).
Nevertheless, he remained a friend to the people (Bukdahl 90).

While there are countless references to the effects The Corsair had upon Kierkegaard’s
communication with others, it is necessary to point out two journal entries which sum up the
suffering he endured through the attack. The first is from 1849, the second from 1850.

O, the way I lived with the common man; there perhaps is not one in the whole
generation who could do it, and how few are they who understand him and understand
the callousness and cruelty of class distinctions that ordinarily underlie associations with
the common man. And then to have this forbidden me, to have it regarded as ridiculously
overplaying the part, and that I cannot ever do anything more for the common man,
because for him I exist as a sort of half-looney. And that this has come about by means
of those “who take the part of the common man against the aristocrats.” How tragic!
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 6 231).

He goes on to lament the loss of this intimate interpersonal communication:

But the common man whom I loved! It was my greatest joy to express some measure of
love to the neighbor; when I saw this loathsome condescension toward less important
people, I dared say to myself, “I do not live like that.” It was my consolation to alleviate
this when possible; it was my pleasure, my blessed diversion. My life was made for that.
So when I have to bear the derision of the common man it saddens me indescribably.
There was in fact hardly anyone around here who loved the common man this way—and
now to see him turned against me in hostility. A journalist who tricks the common man
out of his money and in return give him confused concepts is regarded as a benefactor—
and the person who sacrificed so much, every advantage of solidarity with the upper
class, is represented as an enemy of the common man, as someone to insult (311).
The effects of *The Corsair* attack were great, for even after the ordeal was long over, Kierkegaard still endured humiliation from the very public to which he had reached out.

It has been noted that Kierkegaard’s battle with *The Corsair* is the hinge on which his canon pivots (Bukdahl 83). Indeed, his confrontation with *The Corsair* and his view of the press are both important for several reasons. First of all, I mention them here because they give the backdrop to the times in which Kierkegaard wrote his lectures on communication. Kierkegaard’s understanding of communication vastly differed from those typical of an age in which the natural sciences had been accepted and “proclaimed as the way in which the human being, through his/her own intellectual efforts, could discover the whole truth about himself/herself and his/her world” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 5). He doubtlessly saw this shift as degrading to the individual, for he “lamented this state of affairs by pointing out that the distinction between knowledge (science) and the art of existence had disappeared and the art of existence was now communicated as scientific knowledge” (5). The effects were detrimental to the individual. “The individual, who had become anonymous as a result of social transformations, could now be studied as an ‘object’ without any real intervening ‘spiritual qualification’” (5). Second of all, the communication Kierkegaard writes about relates to inwardness, ultimately to Christianity, and differed vastly from the type of communication offered by *The Corsair* as a representative of the press, with its biases, libelous content and malicious insults. Kierkegaard writes that the press, as a “disproportionate medium of communication” (*Journals and Papers* Vol. 6 483), failed to understand or accept his teachings concerning the single individual (481). If this is true, it also failed to recognize his teachings on inwardness, subjectivity, and existence.

Thirdly, *The Corsair* may have given Kierkegaard a renewed reason to continue with his model of communication and further expound on the relation of indirect communication to
Christianity. Whether or not this was the case, the affair with *The Corsair* eventually rejuvenated him as an author. He had previously considered *CUP* to be his last work as an author (hence the ‘Declaration’ in which he acknowledges himself to be the author of all the pseudonymous works), and he had hoped to take a position as a pastor in the country (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol.2* 362). Now he knew he must endure and continue as an author. From *Either/Or*, edited by the pseudonymous Victor Eremita, to *CUP*, by the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, pseudonyms had been artfully employed as one function of indirect communication. After the debacle with the *Corsair* things would be different. From then on Kierkegaard instead mostly communicated directly with his audience and sought to deal exclusively with religious themes. However, it is important to note that indirect communication still remained a decisive theme in his writings inasmuch as he used direct communication to expound on this model of indirect communication. The effects from the *Corsair* were severe, but they eventually gave Kierkegaard renewed strength as an author. He realized he must stay the course and continue writing. He still desired to communicate with the single individual “whom with joy and gratitude” he called “his reader” (Kierkegaard, *Edifying Discourses* 1). In particular, the entire experience fixed his attention upon the influence of the press, which had the effect of reducing individuals to a mass, “the public” (Lowrie, *A Short Life of Kierkegaard* 184). Through the event with the *Corsair*, Kierkegaard reached an important conclusion well before our current time. The power of the press, if unbridled and uncontrolled, could filter down through society, influencing and changing the way people thought and acted. For example, he noticed that the public did not claim responsibility for the content they had received, but then again neither did the journalists accept responsibility for the content they printed and released to the mass public (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers Vol. 6* 516). The concept of journalistic responsibility (or the
lack of it) of the times is seen in the example of *The Corsair*. By hiding behind anonymity the editors denied responsible for the paper’s productions. However, if the editors would not take responsibility for the content, what kind of message was being sent to the public? Could it serve to enrich the lives of others, or was it a collective effort of negative messaging actually working against the interests of the people? In a strict sense, the objective of newspapers to get hold of the public en masse was in direct opposition to Kierkegaard’s main goal of aiding the individual to ponder his or hers’ existential relationship to Christianity through inwardness. Rather than give up his authorship, he decided to stay the course. He felt it his duty before God to do so.

“There is a word which for me is a magic formula: Obedience is more precious to God than the fat of rams. If my meager effectiveness, a nothing compared to the task, disappears, humanly speaking, I shall still keep on: Obedience is more precious to God than the fat of rams” (*Journals and Papers Vol. 1* 481).

*Lectures on Communication and the Meaning of Indirect Communication*

We have seen that Kierkegaard was concerned with what it means to communicate. To expound further on this concept, we could say that he was concerned with communicating truth subjectively, i.e. through personal appropriation to the truth. His pseudonymity is such an excellent example of indirect communication because any interference from the communicator is thereby removed, allowing the receiver to dwell on the communication itself. In order to communicate indirectly, Kierkegaard realized that he must not hinder the communication by being the focus of attention. Instead, the individual must personally relate to the communication. This is especially true in matters of ethical-religious communication. This mode differs from the purely objective one, through which the individual may learn and gain knowledge of concepts. However, objective or direct communication does not require reflection upon the communication
– it is simply knowledge without productive, personal results. In order to get hold of the individual, Kierkegaard employed the indirect method through which he hoped to make people aware of their conditions and to allow them to reflect personally on the message received. His communication lectures assist us in better understanding this principle.

Section one of the lectures “describes the problem of communication in modern society,” while the second part deals with the “dialectic of ethical and ethical-religious communication” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 117). Kierkegaard begins by presenting what he understood as the dishonesty of his time-period. This dishonesty takes the form of self-deception, rather than intentional deception. Society, as Kierkegaard saw it, lacked the proper perspective of understanding the concept of existence. To him, the mass majority of people deceive themselves into being unconcerned with their existence. Kierkegaard recognized that people “cling to the generation,” or adapt themselves to that which the current generation deems popular or essential. The “dishonesty of the modern age” is, in one sense, its “lack of primitivity” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 292). C. Stephen Evans says that Kierkegaard’s use “primitivity” is best understood as “authenticity” (Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 236). “It does not mean that an individual should necessarily forego modern conveniences or ‘return to nature.’ Rather, the idea is that there is something within the self that is not merely the creation of society, a set of potentialities that is truly God-given. The individual must try to discover what God intended him or her to be and must then become this…” (236). Kierkegaard observed that modern society demands the attention of the individual. With each generation comes an ever-changing, accelerated lifestyle. In such haste, the concept of the individual is ignored. Rather than seeking what it means to live as an individual, one usually adapts to the demands of the age. “One of the tragedies of modern times is precisely this –to have abolished the “I,” the
personal “I” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 1 302). The result is that everyone simply becomes part of the crowd. There is no personal examination when one is simply part of the crowd; one does not “occupy himself with the problem of what it is to be a human being” (304), what it means to communicate, or with what it means to personally be a Christian. Kierkegaard writes:

If I were to imagine a human being who was brought up in such a manner and lived out his life in such a manner that he never got any impression of himself but always lived by adaptation and comparison—this would be an example of dishonesty. And this is precisely the state of affairs in modern times. The history of the generation runs its course, it is true, but every single individual should still have his primitive impression of existence—in order to be a human being (292).

As society becomes more advanced, confusion increases. People begin to devalue the meaning of their own existence before an almighty God. They lack the authenticity individuals, and by doing so, deceive themselves.

What haste, what confusion—as if by an earthquake! Young people, even children, are aware of how fraudulent everything is and what nothingness it is to be a human being, how everything depends on clinging to the generation, following the demands of the age, which nevertheless are always changing. Thus the life of the generation hisses and fizzes uninterruptedly; although everything is a whirlwind, a single-shot is heard, the ringing of bells, signifying to the individual that now, this very second, hurry, throw everything away, reflection, quiet meditation, reassuring thoughts of the eternal, or if you come too late you will not go along on the generation’s expedition, which is just pulling out… (293).

Kierkegaard’s critique of his times by no means indicates that he was “insensitive to new possibilities for individual self-expression in his day” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 117). As Climacus writes in CUP, “…because of the copiousness of knowledge, people in our day have forgotten what it means to exist, and what inwardness is…” (249). Climacus is concerned in this passage with what it means to exist religiously. He writes, “If people had forgotten what it means to exist religiously, they had probably also forgotten what it means to
exist humanly” (249). Therefore, Kierkegaard deemed it necessary to bring the individual along, step by step, towards Christianity, the highest mode of existence. In order to accomplish this task, he had to employ an indirect method. “The movement described by the authorship is this: from the poet (from aesthetics), from philosophy (from speculation), to the indication of the most central definition of what Christianity is…” (Kierkegaard, The Point of View 142). He believed that personal appropriation to the truth had been lost in modernity. In addition, “Modernity eliminates the possibility of religious subjectivity and inwardness which are definitive of authentic existence” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 117).

Thus, while technology and “the means of communication” can serve positive purposes, they do not come without certain dangers when used incorrectly. It is clear to see from reading the lectures that Kierkegaard was a critic of the mass media. To him, technology advances and demands the individual’s attention. When what is needed is comprehension of individual existence before God, reflection on Christianity and the Word, and “reassuring thoughts of the eternal” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 293), instead the individual begins to regard science, scholarship, and the news of the day as all-important themes worthy of the most acute attention. He writes,

The means of communication become more and more excellent, printing can be done more and more rapidly, with increasing speed—but the communications become more and more hurried and more and more confusing. And if anyone dares, both in the name of primitivity and God, to resist it—woe unto him! Just as the individual is seized by a whirlwind of impatience to be understood immediately, so a generation domineeringly craves to understand the individual at once. This produces dishonesty (293).

The dishonesty of which Kierkegaard speaks is the failure of the generation to be guided by a higher power. Instead, it places faith in man’s achievements rather than taking into account the slow process of becoming an individual in the Christian sense.
Tracing the steps of this confusion, Kierkegaard interestingly points to scholarly periodicals and the daily press as two great hindrances to becoming an individual. First, he discusses how the scholarly periodicals in his day had deviated from their original course. “The idea of the periodicals was to aid in perspective, but then the periodicals proceeded to become an independent literature. This is the modern age’s misfortune. The periodicals became more and more ephemeral; ultimately the demands of the age became the demands of the moment” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 294). According to Kierkegaard, the periodicals have “the power of the moment and the power of circulation” (294). The scholarly periodicals had erred from their original purpose by attempting to reach the masses rather than tailoring content toward the individual. He explains that now “Journal literature abandons criticism and writes for the mass” (294). We can see why Kierkegaard was so concerned with the state of communication. He understood how people want to be communicated to directly in the moment; they want to immediately grasp the communicated message without examining first what it means to communicate. His critique of the modern age is that they demand everything “in the moment.”

Second, the daily press provides further means for instantaneous communication. It is particularly fascinating to examine Kierkegaard’s critique of media from its historical perspective. In our own times, as instantaneous communication via the mass media appears to demand our attention more and more, Kierkegaard’s warning of the power of media to distort and define human existence should be given attention. However, his position has been widely ignored by the field of communication. It should be noted that the daily press was the only real means of mass communication in Kierkegaard’s day. Hence, we have the popularity of newspapers such as the Corsair, which could easily reach the masses. While newspapers have dramatically changed in both style and content since Kierkegaard’s day, their power nevertheless
has not decreased. Kierkegaard’s criticism of the daily press can still be applied today. Nerina Jansen writes:

Nowadays public opinion can be employed effectively by the wielders of power—on an international, national, or local scale—to control people’s thoughts and actions, and nobody thinks of questioning the legitimacy of the explanations and justifications that are offered; they operate in the name and in the interest of “the public”…The immense power of the mass media in manipulating the content of people’s lives has not diminished since Kierkegaard’s time; it has increased (Jansen, “The Individual versus the Public” 19).

The press focuses on the power of circulation (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 294) and fails to take responsibility for its content. We have seen how Kierkegaard believed that neither the press nor the public was willing to take responsibility for the content produced and received. In particular, he witnessed how the journalist failed to take responsibility for the production of content by hiding behind anonymity. But the journalist defends himself against all attacks by pointing to the fact of daily readership. Kierkegaard writes, “…the journalist defiantly points to his thousands of subscribers and his power at the moment. Nor is there a redeeming outlook for the near future, for the journalist has become a type; the individual dies but the journalist never dies—there only get to be more and more of them” (295).

The power of the press is its ability to create the crowd and then to control its thoughts. In the swarming crowd, the individual becomes anonymous. Personal identity vanishes. “Face-to-face interpersonal communication between two people or a small group of people was no longer the only form of communication. The daily press addressed a large audience that was normally unknown both to the journalist and to the other readers” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 5). Kierkegaard had his pseudonyms, but we have seen how they serve the purpose of bettering the existence of others by showing them in a personal way the categories in which they abide, in hopes that they would become individuals and be transformed by the truth
of Christianity. In stark contrast, the press operated sometimes under anonymity as a way of avoiding responsibility for content. The daily press exposed the personal lives of others in a strange mix of fact and fiction in the name of consumption. Kierkegaard writes that the press was influential in forming public opinion, deceiving others into believing that their opinions should mirror those of the press. In 1853 he wrote in his personal journals:

The demoralizing character of the press can also be seen in the following way. In each generation there are hardly ten who, Socratically, most of all fear to think wrong, but there are thousands and millions who are all too afraid of standing alone with an opinion, be it ever so right. But when something is printed in the newspaper, this is *eo ipso* sure proof that there is a goodly number who want to have or express the same opinion—*ergo*, you may well venture to have the same opinion. In fact, if the daily press, like some other occupational groups, had a coat-of-arms, the inscription ought to be: Here men are demoralized in the shortest possible time, on the largest possible scale, at the cheapest possible price (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers Vol. 2*).

And in 1848 he wrote:

That the press which has demoralized the states can also be seen in the following way: Only a person of wide culture can read the newspapers and remain unscathed, and there are not many of these in any generation—and the few there are scarcely read newspapers any more. But the mass read the newspapers, the mass for whom this unwholesome diet is in and of itself most pernicious. The same thing can be seen in another way. The press wants to influence by means of coverage, but coverage is simply the power of the lie, a sensate power of fists. One is reminded of Goethe’s words: We have abolished the devil and gotten devils (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers Vol.2*).

The press operated under the assumption that it was a friend of the people, but it really worked against them. It succeeded in deceiving men and women through lies, slander, and gossip. There is an overwhelming amount of greed and lust for power at work here. As the daily press became more popular and etched its mark into society, the generation became “trapped in the perplexity of existence as never before” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers* 295). Because of the press, people became increasingly concerned with what the papers had to say on issues such as
social reform. They were more interested in stories of gossip than with what it means to become an authentic individual self.

Above all, Kierkegaard denounced the press because he believed that as an organization, it kept people from coming to genuine faith in Christ. People formed their opinions based on the material presented in the pages of the newspaper rather than seeking out for themselves the truth of Christianity. Kierkegaard’s scathing critique of the media points to its power to inhibit others from realizing the essential quality of Christian inwardness. It led people into a demoralizing existence and kept them from realizing that living in Christianity is the highest form of existence attainable. In a journal entry from 1849 he writes:

Even if my life had no other significance, well, I am satisfied with having really discovered the absolutely demoralizing existence of the daily press. Actually, it is the press, more specifically, the daily newspaper, and the whole modern way of life corresponding to it, which make Christianity impossible. Think of Christ. The idea that he would use a newspaper to proclaim his teaching is nonsense and blasphemy on seventeen grounds, and this is one of them: the imprint of the personality of the I who is speaking must fall upon every word he says—but communication by means of journalism is an abstraction, which supposedly is superior to individual personality—and with Christ the very opposite is the case (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol.2 485).

It is worth recalling that Kierkegaard considered it his chief task in life to help others improve the quality of their own existence. To him, the answer to the existential dilemma of life could not be found within vogue philosophy, or in the press masquerading lies as truth. It could not be found in the crowd, for it bred irresponsibility and loss of personality. Rather, to be aware of one’s own existence is to consider one’s helpless state before the almighty God. The single individual, therefore, is “principally a Christian concept, which played a decisive role in his declaration of the sole re-medium, the only way in which it should be preserved; that is, through the imitation of Christ. Only as the single individual is a man able to imitate Christ” (Thulstrup, “The Single Individual” 11). As the press evaded the thoughts and opinions of others, it gained
the masses. However, Kierkegaard considered the crowd to be untruth. Only the single individual existing before God recognized and sought to obey truth. Kierkegaard gives a good summary of what he means by ‘the single individual’ in his journals.

“The single individual”—of course, the single individual religiously understood, consequently understood in such a way that every one, unconditionally every one, yes, unconditionally every one, just as much as every one has or should have a conscience, can be that single individual and should be that, can stake his honor in being willing to be that, but then also can find blessedness in being what is the expression for true fear of God, true love to one’s neighbor, true humanity, and true human equality… (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 415).

How this category is to be taught and communicated Kierkegaard deals with in the lectures. There are two main categories we shall examine in detail within the lectures: the communication of knowledge and the communication of capability.

The lectures are designed to contrast the communication offered by the mass media to the majority of society with Kierkegaard’s own views on ethical and ethical-religious communication. However, his main point is to present ethical-religious communication as the highest form of communication, since it is communication of truth. Certainly he envisioned actually presenting the lectures, for he writes that throughout the course of the address he would communicate directly the concept of indirect communication (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 300). His purpose is to show how “the ethical and ethical-religious have to be communicated existentially and in the direction of the existential” (301). We will see in this discussion how Kierkegaard accomplishes this goal, and also that that which he considers “existential” differs vastly from the conventional application of the term in postmodernity.
The Communication of Knowledge

In his journals on communication Kierkegaard writes that “All communication of knowledge is direct communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 308). Direct communication is the communication of objective knowledge from the communicator directly to the receiver. More specifically, direct communication aims at objective understanding (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 96). In the communication of knowledge the object is reflected upon. Objective thinking differs from subjectivity because the former “seeks to impart truth by simply communicating results” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 630). In CUP the pseudonym Johannes Climacus writes, “Objective thinking is completely indifferent to subjectivity and thereby to inwardness and appropriation; its communication is therefore direct” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 75). Objective thinking is concerned only with results (73) rather than personal appropriation. The goal of objectivity is pure knowledge. Reflection on that which is being communicated takes place in the objective sense when the learner grasps the concepts intellectually (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97). This differs from subjectivity, which requires double-reflection upon the communication. Double-reflection, as we will see, is “rooted in the character of existence” (96). C. Stephen Evans writes: “Direct communication, which aims at objective understanding, does not require this doubleness. What is communicated directly is essentially intellectual content, and when the recipient of the communication understands the ideas (possibilities), the communication is successful. The recipient only has to grasp the possibilities intellectually (first reflection); no double reflection is necessary” (96). Thus in CUP Climacus says, “To objective reflection, truth becomes something objective, an object, and the point is to disregard the subject. To subjective reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse
oneself, existing, in subjectivity” (192). Double reflection in Kierkegaardian terms is “An instance of indirect communication requiring artful suppression of the communicator, who as a ‘subjective existing thinker’ becomes aware on second reflection that the truth he has acquired ‘interests’ his existence, and that it cannot simply be appropriated by another without being acquired by the same process of reflection, which the indirect method is designed to stimulate” (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol.2* 631). Reflection is a key aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought in general, and plays a decisive role in his model of indirect communication.

For Kierkegaard, objective thinking is a theoretical and detached kind of thinking that is indifferent to a specific individual person (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 118). Kierkegaard does not want to do away with direct communication. Viewed as objectivity, it may at times be a necessary form of communication. From *CUP* onward, he would employ direct communication as a way of presenting religious truth. That is, he would speak to his audience directly. Kierkegaard understood that direct communication is a “suitable mode for conveying knowledge hitherto unknown to the recipient” (119). However, it has its limits in that it can only convey knowledge. Jansen writes, “What is required from the communicator in direct communication is competence and an ability to transmit knowledge to the recipient, while the only requirement for the recipient is to be in a position to receive the knowledge” (119). As we have seen from Evans, the communication is successful when the receiver does understand the intellectual content being transmitted.

Kierkegaard does not think that direct communication should never be employed. Indeed, it is a “necessary first step in ethical-religious communication where recipients need to become acquainted with the contents of the Christian message” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 119). However, Kierkegaard notes that this knowledge is only a preliminary step
(Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers* 289). He writes, “Here is an element of knowledge and to that extent an object. But it is only a first thing. The communication is still not essentially of knowledge but a communication of capability. That there is an element of knowledge is particularly true for Christianity; a knowledge about Christianity must certainly be communicated in advance” (289). So Kierkegaard is not denying that direct communication can be used in matters pertaining to the objective knowledge of Christian principles. However, such knowledge is only preliminary. If an individual does not subjectively appropriate the truth of Christianity to his own life – if he remains unaware of the power of this truth to personally transform his own existence, then the truth *eo ipso* does not become truth to him. Mere knowledge of the ethical-religious is not enough to make one a Christian.

Kierkegaard’s argument against the objective in the lectures is based on the fact that “The modern age has—and I regard this as its basic damage—abolished personality and made everything objective” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers* 304). We have seen that in the lectures Kierkegaard is concerned with what it means to communicate. He understood that by making everything objective “men do not come to dwell upon the thought of what does it mean to communicate but hasten immediately to the *what* they wish to communicate” (304). We will see shortly that by making everything objective, the communicator is “saved from the pangs of delay” (304). That is, the communicator ignores the fact that coming into subjective relation to the truth proves to be a long, tedious process.

We have seen that the communication of knowledge has no care for the individual and does not answer the fundamental problem of what it means to exist. Since it is unconcerned with existence, objective thinking does not require a double reflection, whereby the individual personally appropriates the message. In *CUP* Climacus writes:
The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into something accidental and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing something. The way to the objective truth goes away from the subject, and while the subject and subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this is precisely its objective validity, because the interest, just like the decision, is subjectivity. The way of objective reflection now leads to abstract thinking, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of various kinds, and always leads away from the subjective individual, whose existence or nonexistence becomes, from an objective point of view, altogether properly, infinitely indifferent, altogether properly, infinitely indifferent…(193).

Objective reflection leads away from the subjective individual and is indifferent towards him. Objective reflection sees the individual as “something accidental,” merely as an object, rather than an existing subject. When something is communicated objectively, the learner or recipient may in fact gain quite a bit of knowledge. However, especially in the case of ethical-religious communication, there is a difference between merely having objective knowledge and being able to apply knowledge of something to one’s own life. In objective communication, “the learner gains the ability to parrot what the communicator says but has no genuine understanding of the content” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s *Fragments and Postscript* 97).

In his communication lectures, Kierkegaard writes that the modern age has forgotten what it means to exist because science and scholarship, which work in their proper sphere, have invaded ethics. He writes, “Everything has become science and scholarship…there is a whole aspect of art which science and scholarship have taken possession of—or wish to take possession of—this is the ethical” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers* 268). However, science, as objective understanding, cannot address the fundamental issues of man’s existence. An individual’s life can only be qualitatively improved by receiving, reflecting upon, and appropriating ethical-religious truth. Pure objective knowledge amounts to nothing in the realm of Christian truth unless that knowledge is backed up by genuine faith. “Knowledge, theoretical sentences, can be communicated in a way which is unsuitable for practical capability” (Bejerholm 54).
Kierkegaard allowed himself to write under the pseudonyms for this very reason. He believed if he had communicated that specific material directly, the point would be missed. “Then the reader is led into misunderstanding—he gets something more to know, that to exist also has its meaning, but he receives it as knowledge so that he keeps right on sitting in the status quo” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 260). The communication of ethical-religious truth is concerned with individual appropriation, practical application, examination, and action. It is in this sense that Kierkegaard views it as subjective.

*The Communication of Capability*

We have seen that direct communication has the ability to transmit knowledge of concepts, but only in an impersonal way. However, ethical-religious truth is subjective in Kierkegaard’s thought, since it is truth which has not only been received but has been doubly-reflected upon. He understands truth as subjective because it relates to the individual—it desires to get hold of the individual. It is existential truth because it concerns existence. It is imperative to understand that that which Kierkegaard understands as ‘existential’ differs dramatically from modern or postmodern interpretations of the term. Existential thinking is “dialectical and paradoxical” (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol.2* 631) and deals with “Christianity as a way of existence” (Evans, *Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript* 30). The one who has received the ethical-religious as truth must be concerned with existence, must have come to the realization that Christianity is a way of living. Obviously Kierkegaard’s use of the term ‘existentialism’ relates to individual existence, the highest and most authentic form of which is existence in the truth. However, human beings are flawed. Therefore, existence is “namely finitude, imperfection, process of becoming, and effort” (Lønning 147). Existence is a continual striving.
In the lectures Kierkegaard writes, “All communication of capability is more or less indirect communication” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers* 308). He then proceeds to break down the communication of capability into three parts: 1) The communication of esthetic capability, 2) The communication of ethical capability, and 3) the communication of ethical capability (282). It is necessary for us to view these three types of indirect communication as distinct from one another. Kierkegaard’s model calls for the breakdown in the following way:

1. When the emphasis is equally upon the communicator and the receiver, then we have the communication of esthetic capability (283).
2. When the emphasis is predominately upon the receiver, then we have the communication of ethical capability (283).
3. When the emphasis is predominately upon the communicator, then we have the communication of religious capability (283).

For our purposes we shall examine the last two modes of indirect communication in detail.

Kierkegaard describes ethical communication as “*training or upbringing*” (279). The emphasis is upon the receiver in communication here because the communicator is in the Socratic sense acting as a midwife, assisting in the birth of knowledge. Kierkegaard differs from Socrates in that Socrates believed that “basically every human being possesses the truth” (Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments* 13). Kierkegaard would take a different approach to Socrates, and this is especially seen in *Philosophical Fragments*. Kierkegaard explains that the learner is not truth but is untruth. Only the teacher (God) is truth, and between the learner and God there is an infinite qualitative distinction. In a journal from 1849, Kierkegaard writes, “There is an endless yawning qualitative difference between God and man. This signifies, or the
expression for it is: A man can do nothing at all, it is God that gives all, it is He how bestows
upon man faith, &c. This is grace, and here lies Christianity’s first” (qtd. in Lowrie 9).

However, in the communication of ethical truth, the communicator comes into a maieutic
relationship with the receiver, who learns to “stand alone by another’s help” (Kierkegaard 280).
While the communicator or teacher offers assistance to the learner, the learner must come to the
knowledge of truth in a personal way. The maieutic keeps the communicator from merely being
mimicked and instead the receiver of the communication personally appropriates the truth
(Jansen “Deception in Service of the Truth” 121). The communicator as the object is removed,
he “in a sense disappears, steps aside” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 283). The maieutic
teacher is in a sense a servant. He “makes himself serve only to help the other to become” (307).
Ethical communication is indirect communication because the communicator drops away. The
communication of the ethical takes place in “the medium of actuality” (275), meaning that “the
communicator or teacher himself exists in it and in the situation of actuality, is himself in the
situation of actuality that which he teaches” (275). The ethical requires that the communicator or
teacher must live what he communicates as truth.

“When the ethical communication also contains initially an element of knowledge, we
have the ethical religious, specifically Christian communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and
Papers 307). Kierkegaard describes ethical-religious communication as direct-indirect. This
differs from ethical communication which is “unconditionally indirect” (Jansen, “Deception in
Service of the Truth” 123). There is some objective knowledge, as we have seen, that is
necessary in Christianity. Jansen writes, “Although the communication of religious capability is
indirect, a direct communication of some knowledge is first required. After the initial
communication of knowledge the same relationship as in the ethical obtains” (123). Unlike
objective communication, ethical-religious communication (the communication of Christian truth) reduplication is necessary. Evans writes, “Here the aim of the communication is self-understanding. The individual in this case must not only understand the intellectual content (first reflection) but also relate that content to her own existence (second reflection)” (Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97). However, “being in truth implies a process which is never complete” (Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence 38). Therefore, “the communication cannot simply be in the form of ‘results,’ but must itself reflect the ‘process,’ ‘the way’…” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97). The receiver is “not only aware of certain possibilities (ideas), but in her existence actualizes those ideas reduplicates them” (97).

Kierkegaard interestingly points out that ‘receiver’ is an active word, rather than a passive one (Journals and Papers 270). The term implies that the receiver is acting upon the communication, appropriating it. This is not to say that truth can be whatever one wants it to be, but rather that the receiver appropriates truth to the extent that he makes it personal, relating to it in a personal manner. Through the process of examination, he or she accepts it as truth and then begins to live in that truth.

In ethical-religious communication the emphasis is on the communicator. According to Kierkegaard, the teacher has authority in ethical-religious communication “with respect to the element of knowledge which is communicated” (Journals and Papers 289). However, the communicator of ethical-religious truth must realize that God is his master. The true communicator is the One who has given men the knowledge and ability to communicate (271).

Kierkegaard writes in the lectures, “There remains only one communicator: God” (272). This brings important questions as to whether or not the communicator has the right to influence directly. Kierkegaard writes, “The communicator always influence only indirectly, (1) because
he must always express that he himself is not a master-teacher but an apprentice and that God, on
the other hand, is his and every man’s master-teacher, (2) because he must express that the
receiver himself knows it, (3) because ethically the task is precisely this—that every man comes
to stand alone in the God-relationship” (273). God is truth and because He has chosen to reveal
Himself to us, we can live in truth. Evans writes, “…The point of the story is that we humans
lack the truth, and that we need a divine Teacher who not only brings us the truth, but transforms
us into the kinds of beings who are capable of receiving the truth” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith
and the Self 13). Truth does not lie in the subject, and hence the maieutic form by itself is not
enough in the communication of Christian truth. As Kierkegaard writes:

Yet the communication of the essentially Christian must end finally in “witnessing.” The
maieutic form cannot be the final form, because, Christianly understood, the truth doth
not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it), but in revelation which must be
proclaimed. It is very proper that the maieutic be used in Christendom, simply because
the majority actually live in the fancy that they are Christians. But since Christianity still
is Christianity, the one who uses the maieutic must become a witness. Ultimately the
user of the maieutic approach still remains rooted in human sagacity, however sanctified
and dedicated in fear and trembling this may be. God becomes too powerful for the
maieutic practitioner and then he is a witness, different from the direct witness only in
what he has gone through to become a witness (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2
383).

Kierkegaard makes an important point here that the Christian communicator must eventually
become a witness for the truth. By becoming a witness, the Socratic maieutic takes on a new,
higher form.

From reading Kierkegaard’s lectures on communication we can come to a deeper
understanding of his ideas on indirect communication and Christianity as ethical-religious
communication. It must be noted, however, that the process of becoming an authentic individual
may indeed be a long process. One does not immediately become that, but does so over time.
This is Kierkegaard’s viewpoint and it is presented near the end of the first communication
lecture. He says that those who hasten to communicate their message are “happily saved from the pangs of delay” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers* 304). Pure objective thought ignores a basic Christian concept—that of individual reflection and primitivity (or authenticity).

Primitivity in Kierkegaard’s thought is based on being an individual before God. Becoming an individual before God can change our conception of communication. Communication then becomes a way of existence as the individual comes to terms with his existence before his Creator. Evans writes:

> The importance of the idea that God calls us to be individuals is that it keeps in focus the primacy for human beings of the task of relating to God. Furthermore, it reminds us that God is a personal being, and that we can relate to him in a personal way, not merely as the issuer of universal edicts or commands, or the creator of universal traits and qualities. God’s omniscience is quite capable of conceiving a task for every individual as that unique individual (Evans, *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self* 236).

To Kierkegaard, an individual who seeks primitivity may not advance in his communication and his living as quickly as others. That individual would rather reflect on what it means to communicate, what it means to be a human being, what it means to be a Christian—for these are the “certain fundamental questions which otherwise are usually so taken for granted that it does not occur to anybody to dwell upon them” (Kierkegaard *Journals and Papers* 305). The primitive individual would rather seek out what it means to communicate or what it means to live in Christianity, because then he will not attempt to advance unknowingly through life, but will rather have a better idea of what it means to be a Christian. Kierkegaard writes:

> Take the ultimate. How would it go in life with the person who only moderately seriously took Christ’s command to seek first the kingdom of God. I wonder if he would not soon come to stand as if abandoned and infinitely far, far behind all the others! For the others scramble for the take; everyone takes his share of the finite and usually takes it first; but poor pious poky Peter, he immerses himself more and more in this “first the kingdom of God.” And even if he does not take hold of God’s kingdom, it will always have the result that his life becomes tried in the spiritual trials of Christianity. For soon, soon he will be ridiculed, pitied, laughed at, he who became nothing at all—and this one
becomes for sure by taking seriously seeking God’s kingdom first. –But this seeking first the kingdom of God is nevertheless real primitivity (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 305).

Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication: References to Hamann

Earlier in this chapter this researcher investigated the concepts of reason and language and showed that Hamann and Kierkegaard shared a certain understanding in these areas. We then took leave of Hamann in order to examine Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication. Now, we shall see how the relationship between the two runs deeper than has previously been mentioned. Kierkegaard references Hamann on multiple occasions throughout both his published works and personal journals. The content of Kierkegaard’s references to Hamann coupled by his use of Hamann’s major concepts suggests that the relationship is one of exceptional importance. For our purposes, there are four ways to investigate Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s thought: Socratic ignorance, the idea of humor, indirect communication, and Christian existence. Indirect communication as it relates to Christian existence is discussed mainly under the heading “Christianity as Indirect Communication.”

Some scholars raise interesting questions by suggesting that Kierkegaard became less and less reliant upon Hamann as time went by. However, Hamann appears in Kierkegaard’s journals from 1836 to 1850. This means that Kierkegaard had read Hamann well before defending his thesis, The Concept of Irony with continual references to Socrates, and was affected once again by the Magus’ thought during the writing of Training in Christianity. References to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s major works are to be found in Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety (1844), and CUP. The concepts he may have learned from Hamann were well in place by the time he wrote Training in Christianity, in which Kierkegaard deals in detail once again with indirect
communication. According to Craig Q. Hinkson, we cannot exclude the possibility that Kierkegaard read Hamann exhaustively (Hinkson 17). In a journal entry corresponding to Training in Christianity (hereafter Training), he harkens back to a previous journal entry from 1839 when he writes: “Here a passage in one of my oldest journals (from the time I was reading Hamann) could be used: Young man, you who still stand at the beginning of the way, oh, turn back in time” (Hay 99). Here we see two important points. First, that even as late as 1850, Kierkegaard was still making use of Hamann’s writings. Kierkegaard had not by-passed Hamann; rather the latter had affected him so that he still recalled Hamann’s words. Secondly, Kierkegaard notes the specific period when he was engrossed with reading Hamann (Hay 99). Whether or not he read Hamann during the latter period of his writing career, it is clear that thoughts of Hamann nevertheless lingered. Another reason Kierkegaard appears to have read Hamann comprehensively is found in a journal article from 1844-45. One immediately will take note of how closely Kierkegaard appears to have read Hamann. He writes, “There is something rather curious about this: Hamann says that God forgets nothing but that there are ideas and flashes which men get no more than once in a lifetime—and this statement appears twice in the third and in the fifth volumes. I have marked them in my copy” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 204).

As well as offering references to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s writings, this chapter seeks to uncover the myriad ways in which the former influenced the latter. Since Socratic existence, the concept of humor, and Christian existence are all major themes throughout the entirety of Kierkegaard’s works, it would seem that Hamann’s influence was not merely a passing phase. When one admires another so much, as Kierkegaard did Hamann, the influence does not simply cease. The proposal of this thesis, to state again, is to find Hamann’s influence upon
Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication. Although Kierkegaard himself used direct communication exclusively in his “second authorship,” he nevertheless still applied indirect communication to Christianity. If he was so strongly influenced by Hamann in the area of indirect communication, then Hamann’s importance cannot be underestimated.

**Opposition to System**

Now, one way in which Kierkegaard uses the writings of Hamann is, according to Terence German, as part of his arsenal to discredit the philosophy of Hegel in matters of language and religion. By the time Kierkegaard began his writing career, Hegelian philosophy had already entrenched itself in European thought. Its basic tenets were visible in Denmark as well, and reverberated throughout the Church and Christendom. But Kierkegaard offered a definitive break from the Hegelian movement, and in doing so, he presented a view of Christianity markedly different from the present age. To Hegel, “all history was governed by a completely undeviating development following certain laws, a development which it is possible with absolute certainty to show in an irrefutable and convincing way” (Thulstrup 58). Hegel’s philosophy was characterized by the claim to have raised philosophy to the level of science by making it systematic (Evans, *Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript* 18). From this point of view it becomes at least vaguely apparent that Hegel wished to show through his system how philosophy leads to truth, truth that is both knowable and definite. As he says, “true philosophy leads to God” (Hegel, qtd. in Crites 99). Such a viewpoint stands in direct opposition to Kierkegaard, who says, "Away from speculation! from the system, etc., -- to become a Christian” (Kierkegaard, *The Point of View* 75).
Whether or not Hegel intended to do away with philosophy all together, he certainly attempted to sum it up via his elaborate System. For this reason Mark C. Taylor writes, “All of modern philosophy is a footnote to Hegel” (ix). A pivotal figure in the history of Western thought and culture, Hegel developed a system that marks both a noteworthy closure and a seminal opening (Taylor ix). Indeed, Hegel’s system of philosophy directly influenced nineteenth-century thinkers such as Fichte, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher, while notably, and most importantly, providing the basis of Marxist doctrine (ix, 9). Hegel’s detailed system of thought did not only affect philosophy, but was carried on and applied to other fields of study. Taylor explains that the pioneering work of Hegel has left an indelible impress upon the areas of philosophy, religion, sociology, phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, structuralism, and liberal Protestantism (9). From a communication standpoint, Hegel’s influence also extends to the area of cultural communication, or, “how communication actually makes communities” (Shepherd & Rothenbuhler 9).

Based on his broad interpretation of Kant towards ethical-religious matters, Hegel formulated the idea of a “folk religion” and proposed the idea that the duty of religion must be to “nourish the common spirit of a whole culture” (Crites 35). Kierkegaard had observed first-hand, and therefore knew well, the affects that such a brand of Christianity had on believers in his day. In Hegel’s view, religion then becomes a cultural expression (35), and is markedly rooted in the existence of the group, or system. Kierkegaard claimed that as the individual became more wrapped up in Hegel’s system, he lost the individual mark of Christianity; that is, Christianity became a fashion instead of the type of inward reflection necessary for the individual to understand his existence and duty before the eternal God.
We have seen how Hamann developed a severe hatred of the system of the Enlightenment after his conversion to Christianity. Just as he struck out against the Enlightenment, so Kierkegaard opposed German Idealism and particularly the effects of the Hegelian system of existence. Indeed, both men shared a hatred of the “system” and of speculation (Smith, “Hamann and Kierkegaard” 54). In CUP, Climacus discusses how Hamann’s genius has gone unrecognized, mainly because his thought has been summarized and categorized by Michelet, the historian. The injustice done to Hamann is great, since he who fought against the system merely becomes part of the system. Climacus writes:

I will not conceal the fact that I admire Hamann, although I readily admit that, if he is supposed to have worked coherently, the elasticity of his thoughts lacks evenness and his preternatural resilience lacks self-control. But the originality of genius is there in his brief statements, and the pithiness of form corresponds completely to the desultory hurling forth of a thought. With heart and soul, down to the last drop of blood, he is concentrated in a single word, a highly gifted genius’s passionate protest against a system of existence. But the system is hospitable. Poor Hamann, you have been reduced to a subsection by Michelet. Whether your grave has ever been marked, I do not know; whether it is now trampled upon, I do not know; but I do know that by hook or by crook you have been stuck into the subsection uniform and thrust into the ranks” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 250).

Climacus expresses grief over Michelet’s systematizing of Hamann into a single paragraph, through which the historian thereby enlists him in the ranks of the existential system. Both Kierkegaard and Hamann abhorred the idea of the system in which the individual is ignored. Climacus writes, “…the system is hospitable—there is plenty of room” (250). Terrence German writes, “Kierkegaard disliked historians who sought to describe earlier creative thinkers within the confines of a paragraph of their uncreative thought, just as Hamann despised so-called historians who could encapsulate earlier ages in a systematically constructed, unliving fashion” (10). James O’Flaherty points out on numerous occasions Hamann disclaims a desire for system on the grounds that it is a hindrance to the truth (Unity and Language 4). Perhaps
Hamann’s detestation of system is found in its attempt to sum up everything in whole – a power which lies beyond human cognition. O’Flaherty writes: “On his [Hamann’s] view, unaided reason cannot arrive at an adequate conception of the whole, for reason is essentially analytic and divisive in nature. Appealing to Paul’s word concerning the atomistic nature of reason (I Corinthians 13:12) Hamann says, ‘Our thoughts are nothing but fragments. Indeed we know in part’” (Unity and Language 5). Hamann was also highly critical of those who constructed and held to the system of the Enlightenment. Enlightened thinkers not only clung to Reason as their god, but sought to gain and confuse the crowd. Here, the parallel to Kierkegaard runs even deeper. Both men despised the system: Hamann the Enlightenment, Kierkegaard the tenets of Idealism and the influx of Hegelian thought into Christendom. Hamann believed that the Enlightenment had brought about a dramatic change in society, whereby people stopped thinking for themselves. He thought that ‘the public’ had lost the very kind of written and spoken experience it needed (136). He sought to “lead people to see that they should view their existence in this world in time in a new manner” (136). If people rather than having faith in their own cognitive powers realized that their existence depended solely upon God, they would be led to a higher form of living.

_Socratic Ignorance_

Any discussion of Hamann and Kierkegaard would be incomplete without examining the importance of Socrates to both thinkers. We noted in chapter one of this thesis that Hamann’s _Socratic Memorabilia_ was written to Kant and Berens in an attempt to show them the error of their ways in regards to the enlightenment. For this reason, _Socratic Memorabilia_ has been dubbed a “desperately serious declaration of war upon the spirit of his age” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 53). That Hamann had the claims of enlightened thought and Kant and Berens in mind is evident
from the title page of the work, which reads: “With a double dedication to Nobody and to Two” (Haynes ed. 3). Denis Thouard says that Hamann’s double dedication plays on the relationship with the reader and provides for oblique channels of communication (Thouard 421). The ‘Nobody’ is Hamann’s double dedication represents ‘the public,’ which accepts en mass the teachings of the enlightenment without examining its major tenets. German writes, “‘Nobody’ stands for the god who really is a nobody because he (it) is composed of the ignorance of the public masses. It (he) is the spirit of the age which worships something which really cannot be found in the nothing which it really is. Everybody knows this Nobody and yet Nobody cannot be identified” (33). The danger of enlightened reason is its ability to set up a false god instead of worshiping the one true God as the giver of life and reason.

In the dedication is an example of Hamann’s dialectical “coincidence of opposites” in that the work is written to “Nobody and to Two.” It is as if the title, Socratic Memorabilia, and the dedication itself are both “the face of the work, but a masked face” (Thouard 421). This keeps in unity with Hamann’s use of pseudonyms throughout his career. The second part of the dedication is aimed at Kant and Berens, with “the hope that it can free them from Nobody” (33).

But why write to Kant and Berens about Socrates? Socrates was “much in vogue in the Enlightenment” (Thouard 414). Thinkers of the enlightenment misinterpreted Socrates and claimed him as their own. They claimed to understand Socratic ignorance and applied it to their own rationalistic views (German 34). Doubtless Hamann, as an admirer of Socrates, wanted to show how rationalism had erred in choosing Socrates to be its representative. However, by choosing to write about Socrates, Hamann turns the tables on the enlightenment by showing how Socratic ignorance differed dramatically from modern-day perceptions. This in turn afforded
him the opportunity to show the error of human reason and proclaim faith as the highest form of existence. O’Flaherty writes:

It is highly significant that Hamann formally commenced his attack on the Enlightenment in the year 1759 with the Socratic Memoirs. For precisely by choosing Socrates, the favorite philosophic paragon of the rationalists, he declared most effectively his purpose “to deceive others in their faith.” While his contemporaries…were being swept along by the flood tide of confidence in human reason, pregnant with “eternal truth,” Hamann alone raised his voice in defiant protest. This protest took the form of a reinterpretation of Socrates to the eighteenth century reader…just at the time when the Enlightenment was at its zenith, to offer, like a bolt from the blue, such a challenge to the pervading faith of the age (Unity and Language 42).

In order to write about Socrates correctly, Hamann had to take on a different persona. Thouard says, “…in the refusal of the ideas of his time Hamann takes on the disguise of his preferred precursor, Socrates…” (421). When Hamann says that he has “written about Socrates in a Socratic way,” he is essentially employing the Socratic ideas of analogy and irony as forms of communication. “The analogy is supposed to direct the reader towards a typological interpretation, elements within the work being related to elements outside it, e.g. Socrates himself. Irony works here as a parody of rhetorical accommodation, the adaption of the orator’s discourse to his audience” (Thouard 422). Of Socrates Hamann says, “Analogy was the soul of his reasoning, and he gave it irony for a body” (Haynes ed.7). Both analogy and irony are two forms of indirect communication, which Kierkegaard recognizes Socrates as exemplifying through the concept of the maieutic. Hamann recognizes that the irony in Socrates’ thought was essentially his ignorance. He had not only coined the phrase “Know Thyself!” but sought to live it out. In order to teach others to become cognizant of their existence, Socrates always claimed he was ignorant—he could only aid others in coming to the truth. As Kierkegaard, via Climacus, would suggest, the way of the Socratic presents an interesting approach to the interpersonal, communicative relationship between teacher and learner. Climacus writes, “Between one human
being and another, this is the highest: the pupil is the occasion for the teacher to understand himself; the teacher is the occasion for the pupil to understand himself” (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 24). The maieutic allows for the wall between teacher and learner to be broken down, because the teacher recognizes that he has not the power to directly lead the individual to the truth. If the learner is to come to the truth, he must do it himself. Craig Hinkson writes that “Socrates came to regard the attainment of self-knowledge as his divinely imposed mission. Moreover, he held that this was the life-task of every human being. But what was the point of such self-knowledge? For Socrates, it could be but one thing: to serve as a guide to how one should live” (Hinkson 2). Climacus notes that Socrates “refused to accept honor or honorific appointments or money for his teachings” (23) because he considered himself merely the occasion for learning.

Hamann recognizes ignorance to be a genius quality belonging to Socrates, and it is the idea of this ignorance which he uses against Kant and Berens. He writes, “Socrates, gentlemen, was no mean critic...he distinguished what he did not understand from what he did understand in them, and he made a very equitable and modest inference from the comprehensible to the incomprehensible” (Haynes ed. 8). So through Socrates, Hamann is showing the limits of human reason. The very notion of Socratic ignorance is the recognition of a distinction between what one knows and what one does not know (Hay 106). Hamann’s portrayal of Socrates doubtless made an impression on Kierkegaard. He “not only credits Hamann with being the one who really understood the meaning of Socratic ignorance, but he also interprets Hamann as a living example of it” (Hay 107).

Now, Kierkegaard recognized Socrates to be the greatest ironist who ever lived, and Hamann as the greatest humorist. In a journal entry in 1844, Kierkegaard writes:
Is it not remarkable that the greatest master of irony and the greatest humorist, separated by 2,000 years, may join together in doing and admiring what we should suppose everyone had done, if this fact did not testify to the contrary. Hamann says of Socrates: “He was great because he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not understand.” If only Socrates could have had an epitaph! Many an innocent person has drained the poisoned cup, many a one has sacrificed his life for the idea, but this epitaph belongs to Socrates alone: Here rests Socrates; he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not understand. Or perhaps better simply to quote Hamann’s words (Journals and Papers Vol. 2 203).

In another entry from the same year, Kierkegaard writes:

The age of distinction is long past, because the system abrogates it. He who loves it must be regarded as an oddity, a lover of something that vanished long ago. This may well be; yet my soul clings to Socrates, its first love, and rejoices in the one who understood him, Hamann; for he has said it best that he taught young people and made fun of the Sophists and drained the poisoned cup: Socrates was great because he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not understand (204).

In making a distinction between what he knew and did not know Socrates points to the fact that human reason has its limits. In the above quote, Kierkegaard laments the fact that the ‘system,’ seeks to sum up and define everything in its own terms. But to Kierkegaard, both Hamann and Socrates stand in stark contrast to those who would hold to any ‘system.’ Hamann rightly recognizes that Socrates’ genius was in his ignorance; in distinguishing what he understood from what he did not understand, Socrates shows the limits of human reason. Hinkson writes, “Whether his ignorance was pretended or not (and Kierkegaard believes that it was genuine), antiquity’s use of the term to describe Socrates indicates that his stance was not merely one of ignorance wishing to be instructed, but ignorance used to unmask the sham ‘knowledge’ (3). Hamann uses Socrates in just this way, in order to appeal to Kant and Berens, both who both make bold claims for knowledge (Hay 103).

The point is that Socrates, by aid of the maieutic, was able assist others in an indirect manner. Rather than lecture, he conversed (Hinkson 3). This allowed the learner to come into a
personal relationship with that which was being communicated. Socrates, Hamann and
Kierkegaard stand in agreement that “the ethical individual is not one who merely talks about the
ethical: he or she lives it” (4). Hamann’s purpose in praising Socrates is to show that reason is
not unbridled but indeed has its limits. As will later be discussed at length, faith steps in where
our reasoning ability fails. To Hamann, Socratic ignorance is of utmost importance because it
shows that reason is flawed and thereby limited. For this reason he could write, “Our own being
and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and cannot be established in any other
way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181).

Kierkegaard shows in his journals how Hamann is regarded by his generation in much the
same way as Socrates was regarded by the Sophists of his own time. He writes, “Hamann’s
relationship to his contemporaries—Socrates’ to the Sophists (who could say something about
everything)” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 201). Hamann recognized that the
rationalists of his day deceived themselves into making Socratic ignorance something it was not.
He writes in his Socratic Memorabilia:

The views of Socrates may be put in these raw accents when he said to the sophists, the
learned men of his time, ‘I know nothing.’ That is why these words were a thorn in their
flesh and a scourge on their backs. All the ideas of Socrates, which were thrown out as a
piece of his ignorance, seemed as terrible to them as the hair on Medusa’s head, the
centre of the aegis. The ignorance of Socrates was sensibility. But between sensibility
and a proposition is a greater difference than between a living animal and its anatomical
skeleton. The old and new skeptics may wrap themselves as much as they please in the
lion-skin of Socratic ignorance, they still betray themselves by their voices and their ears.
If they know nothing, does the world need proof of it? Their hypocrisy is ridiculous and
shameless (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181).

Socratic ignorance is therefore important because it shows us that our reasoning ability is
not autonomous. Neither then is our communicative ability. There are some things which
cannot be reasoned to or communicated completely, because they cannot be understood
completely. Rather, they must be believed. In his journal entry from 1836-37 entitled “Something About Hamann,” Kierkegaard pays homage to Hamann by noting that “…in our time when the most recognized achievement of thought holds that the important thing is to live for one’s age…” Hamann rather refused to simply conform to the times (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 200). Rather than praise man’s reason and knowledge to the highest degree, Hamann understands that faith in God goes beyond reason. In a letter to Jacobi on November 2, 1783, Hamann says, “You know that I think of reason as St. Paul does of the whole law and its righteousness—that I expect of it nothing but the recognition of error, and do not regard it as a way to truth and life…” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 248). Hamann then references I Corinthian 220 to back his point that “there is wisdom which is not of earth, or of man, or of the devil, but a secret and hidden wisdom of God which God ordained before the ages to our glory—which none of the rulers of this world can understand.”(248). In 1836, Kierkegaard writes:

Hamann draws a most interesting parallel between the law (Mosaic law) and reason. He goes after Hume’s statement: “The last fruit of all worldly wisdom is the recognition of human ignorance and weakness.” Hamann goes on to say “Our reason…is therefore just what Paul calls law—and the command of reason is holy, righteous, and good; but is it given to make us wise? Just as little as the law of the Jews justified them, but is to bring us over from the opposite, how unreasonable our reason is, that our faults should increase through it, as sin increased through the law” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 199, 575).

In another entry from 1849, Kierkegaard says:

Hamann rightly declares: Just as “law” abrogates “grace,” so “to comprehend” abrogates “to have faith.” It is, in fact, my thesis. But in Hamann it is merely an aphorism; whereas I have fought it through or have fought it out of a whole given philosophy and culture and into the thesis: to comprehend that faith cannot be comprehended or (the more ethical and God-fearing side) to comprehend that faith must not be comprehended (205).

As pointed out earlier, Hamann writes in Socratic Memorabilia, “Faith is not a work of reason and therefore cannot succumb to any attack by reason; because believing happens as little
by means of reasons as tasting and seeing” (Smith, *J.G. Hamann* 182). To Hamann, faith lays “outside the sphere of our powers of cognition” (258), and is in fact a mode of existence. Through faith we are led into a communicative relationship with God and are able to communicate the Word as witnesses to the Truth.

*References to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s Early Authorship*

That Hamann played a major role in Kierkegaard’s development as a Christian thinker, I believe cannot be denied. That he meant much to Kierkegaard’s development as a writer early in his career is especially important, as we have pointed out. For our purposes here, it is necessary to examine three early works by Kierkegaard in which Hamann is referenced. These are *Either/Or*, *Fear and Trembling*, and *Repetition*.

In the first part of *Either/Or* the pseudonymous writer “A” quotes Hamann “to illustrate the connection between a reader and writer” (Hay 101). “That is, if a person belongs to ‘the reader’s sect,’ if he in one way or another distinguishes himself as an alert and diligent reader, others begin to nurture the notion that a minor author might emerge, for as Hamann says: ‘out of children come adults, out of virgins come brides, out of readers come writers’” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or* 245). Hamann certainly was in love with the communicative power of language, and it shows in the above quotation. Kierkegaard equates diligence with being a good reader and also with becoming a writer. I do not think it a stretch to say that one can see Hamann’s concept of unity as visible and at work in this quote as well. Just as children become adults, so good readers are capable of becoming writers. An age-old adage is evident: if an individual wants to become a better writer, he/she must not only practice writing, but read vociferously as well.
In the introduction to *Fear and Trembling*, the “dialectical lyric” in which Kierkegaard (using the pseudonym Johannes *de silentio*) deals with Abraham as the ultimate model of faith, he uses an obscure quote from Hamann: “What Tarquinius Superbus said in the garden by means of the poppies, the son understood but the messenger did not” (Hay 101fn). Lowrie explains this epigraph in the editor’s introduction to *Fear and Trembling*:

In *Fear and Trembling* the very name of the pseudonym, Johannes *de silentio*, suggests mystery, and the motto on the back of the title page, which he got from Hamann, recalls the well-known story of old Rome, which relates that when the son of Tarquinius Superbus had craftily gained the confidence of the people of Gabii he secretly sent a messenger to his father in Rome, asking what he should do next. The father, not willing to trust the messenger, took him into the field where as he walked he struck off with his cane the heads of the tallest poppies. The son understood that he was to bring about the death of the most eminent men in the city and proceeded to do so (Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* xvii).

Ronald M. Green writes:

From the outset, by means of the famous epigraph drawn from Hamann, Kierkegaard signals that not everything that follows is at it seems. Beyond this, there is evidence that Kierkegaard designed *Fear and Trembling* as a text with hidden layers of meaning. In *The Point of View on My Work as an Author*, Kierkegaard tells us that the most important ethical and religious truths cannot be communicated directly, as though one were writing on a blank sheet of paper. They demand instead creative endeavor by the author and a corresponding effort by the reader that involves “bringing to light by the application of a caustic fluid a text which is hidden under another text” [PV 40] (Green 257).

Indeed, not everything is as it seems. In *Fear and Trembling*, it appears that the pseudonym Johannes *de silentio* uses the epigraph from Hamann not only to alert the reader to the task of thinking dialectically, but also to show the faith of Abraham in his willingness to sacrifice his son Isaac. That which appeared as nonsense, Abraham took instead in faith. His faith surpassed mere reason. By faith, Abraham trusted that he was to offer his only son Isaac as a sacrifice, and believed God able to raise him from the dead. Only when Abraham had bound Isaac on the altar was it revealed that God had rewarded his faith by providing the sacrifice.
silentio uses the story of Abraham’s unsurpassed display of faith as an example of how faith supersedes human reason. According to Green:

The use of Abraham also conveys a new emphasis on faith as a way of life. This emphasis is meant to replace the centuries-old understanding of faith as merely an acceptance of dogmatic truths. Abraham is a fitting choice to communicate this lesson because his hallmark is not intellectual achievement but a prodigious ability to live trustingly and obediently. In the margin of a draft of the “Eulogy on Abraham,” Kierkegaard makes this point even clearer by ending the section with a definition of faith “not as the content of a concept but as a form of the will” (Pap. IV B 87 p. 2). The emphasis on willing and acting rather than thinking and reasoning is also highlighted by the sheer irrationality of Abraham’s faith, his belief “by virtue of the absurd” that he will get Isaac back (Green 259).

Kierkegaard’s pseudonym communicates to the reader that Abraham is the ultimate example of faith’s ability to eclipse reason. That Hamann is used at the outset of this endeavor is indeed intriguing since a basic Hamannian theme is the inability of the rational to reach into the realm of faith. “Without faith we cannot understand even creation and nature” Hamann writes in his Biblical Reflections (Smith, J.G Hamann 137). In fact, to Hamann, reason is inclined to untruth. He regards our knowledge as fragmentary and prone to doubt. However, faith that is grounded in something other than God leads to untruth as well. Only faith in God can lead to truth. Without faith, the world cannot receive the truth. As Hamann writes in his Golgotha and Scheblimini:

All our knowledge is in part, and all human grounds of reason consist either of faith in truth or doubt of untruth, or of faith in untruth and doubt of truth…But if the understanding believes in lies and enjoys it, doubts truths and despises them with disgust as bad food, then the light in us is darkness and the salt in us has lost its savor—religion is pure church parade, philosophy is an empty word-display, superannuated and meaningless opinions, out-of-date rights without power…What is truth? A wind that blows where it lists, whose sound one hears, but does not know whence it came and whither it goes—a spirit whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him (Smith, J.G. Hamann 231-32).
That is not to say that faith does away with reason completely. To Hamann, both reason and faith are necessary for one’s own instruction and for teaching others (255). “Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God” (NASV). Faith is not the product of human reason, but faith is given to man by God.

In the twin work Repetition, Kierkegaard (through the pseudonym Constantin Constantius) references Hamann once again. Constantius refers to his work as “an essay in experimental psychology” (Kierkegaard, Repetition 1). In CUP Climacus gives us a better understanding of this experimental mode. “The significance of this experimental form is that by this means of communication ‘itself forms an opposition (to itself), and the experiment establishes a yawning chasm between reader and author, puts the separation of inwardness between them, so that direct understanding is made impossible’” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 22). C. Stephen Evans notes that this experimental form is related to indirect communication. “Not only does Kierkegaard attempt to distance himself from the reader via the pseudonyms; some of the pseudonyms attempt to do the same thing by writing in the form of an experiment” (22). It follows that if readers of the pseudonymous literature are to take the contents of the book as true, they will be forced to stake themselves to that truth and take responsibility for it (22). In other words, the reader will be unable to simply accept the contents as truth without first personally examining them. The removal of Kierkegaard and to a certain degree the pseudonymous Constantius, allows the reader to personally grasp the content, rather than simply accepting it because a credible source writes it.

In Repetition Constantius writes:

Let everyone pass what judgment he will upon what I have said with regard to repetition. Let him also pass what judgment he will upon the fact that I say it here in this way,
expressing myself after Hamann’s example ‘in diverse tongues’ and speaking the language of Sophists, of quibbles of Cretans and Arabians and Creoles, babbling indifferently rebus and principles, arguing now in a human way, now in an absolute way (Kierkegaard, Repetition 35, 163).

Kierkegaard’s use of Hamann here indicates that he is employing basically the same type of literary devices as Hamann. That Hamann spoke ‘in various tongues,’ I think, can be understood in a few different ways. First of all, Hamann, as a philologist, did speak in different tongues. However, he also did so metaphorically, as a way to communicate his message to thinkers of the Enlightenment, who likely were not willing to give him a proper hearing or at least, doubtless misunderstood his purposes. He took on a different style of communicating when writing about Socrates, and appears to do so as a relational tool at other times. It is interesting that Hamann always writes under pseudonyms, creating a style that must have influenced Kierkegaard a great deal. Both Hamann and Kierkegaard also wants their readers to realize that following their writings can prove an enormously difficult task (Hay 102), because they use all the linguistic and literary tools available to effectively communicate their ideas. In Repetition, Constantin Constantius does the same thing. He expresses himself in different ways, some of which may not be immediately recognizable to the reader, or which may even appear contradictory at times.

*The Concept of Humor*

As has been mentioned, Kierkegaard viewed Hamann as the greatest humorist to have ever lived. This is evident from an earlier quote in which Kierkegaard ties Socrates and Hamann together as “the greatest ironist” and “the greatest humorist,” respectively (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 203). In a journal entry from 1837, Kierkegaard identifies Hamann as a humorist. I quote it in full because it shows best Kierkegaard’s perception of humor and how Hamann can be viewed as such.
Hamann could become a good representative of the humor in Christianity (more about this another time), but in him the trend toward humor necessarily developed one-sidedly (a) because of the humor intrinsic to Christianity, (b) because of the isolation of the individual conditioned by the Reformation, an isolation which did not arise in Catholicism, which since it had a Church could oppose “the world,” although in its pure concept as Church it probably was less able to be predisposed to do this, and in any case it nevertheless could not develop humor to an apex opposing everything and thereby rather barren, at least devoid of prolific vegetation and bearing only a dwarfed scrawny birch (the reason this was not the case with Hamann is to be found in his profound sensibility and enormous genius, which had depth corresponding to the degree of its narrowness in width—and Hamann found a real delight in inviting his knowledge-greedy contemporaries, platter-lickers, to his long-necked stork flask—but just the same he can be a very good representative for the true center of this position), and (c) because of his own naturally humorous disposition. Thus one can truthfully say that Hamann is the greatest humorist in Christianity (meaning the greatest humorist in the view of life which itself is the most humorous view of life in world-history—therefore the greatest humorist in the world) (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 251-52).

It is important for us to remember that by humor we are referring to that which is witty or absurd. Humor can be described as “that quality which appeals to a sense of the ludicrous or absurdly incongruous” (Palmer ed. 497). To Kierkegaard, humor revolves around what he calls a “contradiction” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 11). Evans notes that ‘contradiction’ in this way is best understood as ‘incongruity’ (13). He writes:

The kind of humor that strikes us as deep humor does so because it reminds us of or even illuminates the deep incongruity that lies at the base of our own nature. Every honest human being experiences a “contradiction” between the ideal self and the actual self. The people whom we regard as the greatest saints are precisely those who do not view their own accomplishments all that seriously because they are keenly conscious of how far short of their ideals they fall (12).

Humor is then a communicative tool used by Kierkegaard throughout his writings to help the reader realize the importance of personal existence. Hamann is such a great example of a Christian humorist to Kierkegaard precisely because he understands the condition of human existence and what it means to strive towards a higher meaning of existence in Christianity.
According to Evans, there are three different types of theories related to humor: relief theories, superiority theories, and incongruity theories (Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 82). Relief theories “generally focus on humor as a pleasurable experience, which consists in or is casually related to a discharge of accumulated tension or energy” (82). Superiority theories see humor as a pleasant experience of oneself as superior (82). Incongruity theories view humor as that which “arises through some contrast between what we would normally expect and the actual course of our experience. The incongruity must be one that is experienced as pleasant, of course” (82). Kierkegaard’s own use of humor is a version of incongruity theory, however, he incorporates elements of both relief and superiority theories into his writings as well (84). “The notion of superiority is significant in relation to humor because it is the possession of a superior position that enables an individual to experience incongruity as pleasant rather than painful. Also implicit in his [Kierkegaard’s] view is the notion that humor provides a relief from the vexations of life” (84). In order to gain a deeper understanding of the communicative and literary role played by humor in Kierkegaard’s authorship, we will briefly examine the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, “author” of both Philosophical Fragments and CUP.

Now, Climacus himself is not yet a Christian, but he wishes to become one. Therefore, he is not ideologically opposed to Christianity. However, Climacus is a speculative individual. In CUP we see that Climacus became an author partly because his studies “had led him to the conclusion that there was confusion lurking in the relation between Christianity and Hegelianism” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 23). Climacus wants to investigate this to see how true Christianity differs from the vogue Hegelianism of the time. Still, Climacus represents an individual who knows what Christianity is but does not necessarily understand what it is to be a Christian. Evans writes, “Climacus respects Christianity because, if
true, it is the most serious and important thing a person will face in existence, since Christianity claims that a person’s relationship to it will determine his eternal destiny. He also respects Christianity because he can see that it is a strenuous way of life; existing as a Christian requires a rare courage and determination” (24). Climacus’ speculation is found in the fact that he is an “existing humorist” (65). By using Climacus as a humorist, Kierkegaard is “aiming at the illusion of ‘Christendom’” (52). “This illusion is grounded in the idea that being a Christian is something easy, something that everyone is as a matter of course” (52). Kierkegaard uses Climacus as a communicator in order to remove this illusion from the reader. Christianity is extremely difficult to live. It is not something that can be taken lightly, that everyone can claim by tradition and without examination. The communicator’s primary tools for removing the illusion are irony and humor (105). Humor in Climacus’ sense then, is found in its ability to communicate “unity of jest and seriousness” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 81), which becomes a riddle to the recipient—a riddle that the recipient must solve for himself (Evans 107).

Humor in the thought of Kierkegaard is to be understood in relation to the existence stages of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. Humor lies between the ethical and the religious spheres. It lies before one reaches the religious, not after, as speculative thinkers would claim. In CUP Climacus writes:

Thus humor is advanced as the final terminus a quo in relation to the Christian-religious. In modern scholarship, humor has become the highest after faith. That is, faith is the immediate, and through speculative thought, which goes beyond faith, humor is reached. This is a general confusion in all systematic speculative thought, insofar as it wants to take Christianity under its wing. No, humor terminates immanence without immanence, still consists essentially in recollection’s withdrawal out of existence into the eternal, and only then do faith and paradoxes begin. Humor is the last stage in existence-inwardness before faith (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 291).
“Humor arises from juxtaposing the God-idea with the sundry concerns of daily living” (Hinkson 13). Humor is also the “outer costume” of the truly religious individual (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 12). Kierkegaard intends to describe humor as a pervasive feature of human existence and a special “boundary zone” that lies between the ethical and religious spheres (12). Kierkegaard links humor to the ethical way of life and ultimately to Christianity because he understands that the humorist “has taken the humor which is a general element of life and made it the fundamental ground of his distinctive way of life…The humorist in Kierkegaard’s special sense has learned to smile at the whole of life, because she has learned to smile at herself” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 87).

Kierkegaard uses humor as indirect method of relating to the reader. Humor is also indirect communication in the sense that it is used at times through the pseudonymous authors. Humor in the religious sense takes on a “higher perspective” than humor as it is normally thought of (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 89). Evans writes:

This apparent higher perspective, which in the case of the pure humorist is illusory, can only be found in the Christian doctrines of grace and forgiveness. If there is a place for humor in Christianity, it must surely rest on these two doctrines. Despite the fact that life is earnest for the Christian, there is also a place for the humorous smile and even for laughter. (Perhaps it is partly because of the fact that life is earnest; I think that the incongruities which strike us as most deeply humorous usually relate to what we care deeply about.) That place or humor is provided by the grace of God and the forgiveness which is offered freely in Christ. It is this which makes it possible for the earnest individual to smile at the contradiction between his life and the ideal he sees in Christ (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 89).

The Christian humorist is able to understand and relate the concepts of contradiction, incongruity, and paradox—all of which are important elements in the Christianity presented in the New Testament through the life of Christ. Hamann, as we shall see, is the representative of the ultimate humorist because he recognizes Christ, the God-Man, as the paradox and sign of
contradiction. Hamann uses these themes in an amazing display of wit to combat thinkers of the Enlightenment and to show that the highest form of existence—faith—is to be found in that which is seemingly absurd.

In a long journal entry from 1837 Kierkegaard writes,

The humorous, present throughout Christianity, is expressed in a fundamental principle which declares that the truth is hidden in the mystery, which teaches not only that the truth is found in a mystery (an assertion which the world generally has been more inclined to hear, since mysteries have arisen often enough, although the ones initiated into these mysteries promptly apprehended the rest of the world in a humorous vein), but that it is in fact hidden in the mystery. This is a view of life which regards worldly wisdom humorously to the nth degree; otherwise the truth is usually revealed in the mystery…The humorous in Christianity appears also in the statement: My yoke is easy and my burden is not heavy, for it certainly is extremely heavy for the world, the heaviest that can be imagined—self-denial. The ignorance of the Christian (this purely Socratic view, as in a Hamann, for example) is, of course, also humorous, for what is its basis but a forcing of oneself down in this way to the lowest position and looking up (that is, down) at the ordinary view, yet in such a way that behind this self-degrading there lies a high-degree of self-elevating (the humility of the Christian which in its polemical form against the world increases his own wretchedness, while on the other hand it its normative form it involves a noble pride (the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist) or in its abnormality a haughty isolation from the course of events (the historical nexus) (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 253).

Kierkegaard is certainly not regarding Scripture as humorous here in our normal definition of the word. Rather, he is saying that the true humorist not only realizes just how contradictory Scripture appears to the unbeliever, just how the truth goes against what we as humans would expect it to be. Kierkegaard also gives reference here to the life of the humorist which he expounds upon in a later journal entry from the following year: “The humorist, like the beast of prey, always walks alone” (263). The true humorist is embodied in Hamann precisely because he did not give in to the demands of the age and remained an individual. For instance, after his conversion to Christianity, he sensed how offensive his new-found faith had become to his family and friends (Anderson 113). “Hamann countered these affronts to his integrity with
biting wit. The audacity of invoking unacceptable manners and morals, and particularly of human sense and reason in the face of divine revelation, appealed to his sense of humor—a sense he discerned as fundamental to his posture” (114). Hamann does not want to prove his faith. He felt it ludicrous “to try to defend Christianity with evidences of human sense and reason comparable to the grounds his opponents had chosen” (114). One sees evidence of Hamann’s humor here also. It would indeed be ridiculous to want to prove by the aid of fallen reason that God exists. Hence, Hamann employed Socrates (114) as one of the greatest thinkers of all time because he recognized the limits of his reason. Hamann holds instead that faith has no need to prove God’s existence (an idea further expounded upon later in this thesis). It suffices to say here that for an individual to want proof when belief is all one can have, appeals to Hamann’s sense of humor (128). Albert Anderson points out that the best example of Hamann’s humor is his “discovery (which he returns to many times) of how often a particularly prominent writer or spokesman will, without his knowledge and even against his will, witness to some profound aspect of Christian reality” (124). Hamann believes that examples of this are evident in Scripture and in the everyday world. It is a testament to the communicative power of the Scripture to reach men in ways which defy reason.

While Kierkegaard sees Hamann as the world’s greatest humorist, he thinks that Hamann goes too far in one of his more humorous statements. In a journal entry from 1837 Kierkegaard writes: “Isn’t Hamann being extremely ironical when he says somewhere that he would rather hear the truth from the mouth of a Pharisee against his will than from an angel or apostle?” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 202). In another entry Kierkegaard makes it clear that he believes that Hamann has gone too far in this witty statement. “Humor can therefore approach blasphemy; Hamann would rather hear wisdom from Balaam’s ass or from a philosopher against
his will than from an angel or apostle” (257). Here we witness a break between Kierkegaard and Hamann. However, Hamann’s point may be that the truth from the mouth of a Pharisee would be precious simply because of its rarity. Nevertheless Kierkegaard believed Hamann bordered on the blasphemous with the statement.

Humor in the Kierkegaardian sense, is a form of indirect communication along with irony, and both are “employed by persons whose subjectivity has been sufficiently developed that they are aware of the infinite ethical demand and/or the absolute nature of the God-relationship” (Hinkson 14). That Kierkegaard enlists Hamann as the greatest example of a Christian humorist is imperative to our understanding of Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication.

Christianity as Indirect Communication

In the first part of this chapter, this researcher focused on the subject of communication and examined the idea of God, the Logos, as the creator and sustainer of human communication. There the idea was presented that both Hamann and Kierkegaard placed emphasis upon language and believed human reason to be both depraved and incapable of expression were it not for language. Throughout this thesis, this researcher has investigated Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication and shown its importance to his authorship and to both the practice and theory of communication. No discussion of Kierkegaard’s thought and/or relation to Christianity, however, would be complete without understanding Christianity as indirect communication. Also, in order to examine to the fullest extent Kierkegaard’s relation to Hamann, it is necessary to consider the role of communication in the concept of faith. In
particular, I examine how the Word is revealed through the person of Christ in the form of indirect communication and the role of faith as existence-communication given this revelation.

*Existence and Christianity*

To say that Christendom in Kierkegaard’s day was a reflection of true Christianity would indeed be a pure prevarication. Rather, Christendom had become the most severe of distortions. Christendom had claimed to raise Christianity to the form of mere objective adherence, and the result was that the masses claimed to be perfectly fit Christians, but had not the slightest inkling of what it meant to exist in Christianity. To Kierkegaard, the majority of people simply sought to keep the “rules” of Christianity while they collectively ignored Christ’s teachings. Since he believed this to be the case, he viewed Christendom as a dangerous misrepresentation of the Christianity demanded by the New Testament. Hermann Diem writes that “the church itself had watered down the Christianity of the New Testament, adapting it to the weakness of the natural man” (*Kierkegaard: An Introduction* 101). Kierkegaard believed that established Christendom was not even remotely in the character of striving in the direction of the Christianity in the New Testament (Garff 747).

The result of this misappropriation of truth in Denmark at the time was that people, while saying they were perfecting Christianity, sought to “cheat God out of Christianity” (Kierkegaard, *Attack upon Christendom* 33). A century before, Hamann had sought in his onslaught against autonomous reason, to make his contemporaries aware that their reason was limited and flawed. By placing primacy upon language and the Word as communicative acts given and constituted by God, Hamann hoped to lead individuals to understand that the highest mode of existence was composed of faith. In his attack, Kierkegaard attempted to address the hindrance posed to
Christianity by Christendom, thereby making people aware of their situation. He felt compelled by “providence” to do as much (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction 107). However, he did not consider himself a reformer or prophet, but rather likened himself unto “an unusually talented police detective” (Garff 748). “His job was only to reveal the present state of Christendom in the full depth of its deception” (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction 107).

So, it was that in 1855, while engaged in his attack on the State Church and established Christendom, Kierkegaard wrote in an article published in The Fatherland:

And this in my opinion is the falsification of which official Christianity is guilty: it does not frankly and unreservedly make known the Christian requirement—perhaps because it is afraid people would shudder to see at what a distance from it we are living, without being able to claim that in the remotest way our life might be called an effort in the direction of fulfilling the requirement…So then we “Christians” are living, and are loving our life, just in the ordinary human sense. If then by “grace” God will nevertheless regard us as Christians, one thing at least must be required: that we, being precisely aware of the requirement, have a true conception of how infinitely great is the grace that is showed us (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom 38).

Before going further, the question must be raised as to why Kierkegaard viewed Christendom the way he did. Certainly he had a keen sense of the Danish mind and culture, for he was “Danish to the core of his being” (Skjoldager 147). We have seen how interpersonal communication was to him the greatest enjoyment and played a major role in his conception of the common man. He knew his fellow countrymen, understood the troubles they faced, and recognized the faults within society. However, the matter can be taken to a deeper level. Kierkegaard understood human nature and existence. He also knew that conforming to the requirements of Christianity proves to be a rigorous and life-long process. Therefore, it was his purpose to indirectly help individuals overcome the categories in which they lived and the meaninglessness in which they strove, in order to help them understand the truth. To the end of his life he felt it his providential task to communicate truth (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction 107), even if it meant attacking
established Christendom in the process. To Kierkegaard, Christendom had forgotten what it means to deny the self. In a journal entry from 1854 he says, “…to such a degree has self-denial, the point of Christianity, been forgotten and to such a degree have earthly well-being and comfortable mediocrity been idolized” (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers Vol. 3* 217). He goes on to write:

Religion in this country consists essentially of getting married and then being active in earning a living, acquiring for oneself and his own, and yet—this is characteristic of Denmark—not without sympathy for those in need, especially the needy with families, for the business of family and livelihood is the earnestness of life. And if one is so fortunate as to acquire wealth, it is assumed in Denmark that he is particularly beloved by God. And then, incidentally, one goes to church occasionally, once or twice a year to communion, pays the pastor his dues—and that is Christianity (217).

Certainly this must be viewed as the height of irony: that which is the actual state of Christianity, Christendom, in no way resembles Christianity. If Kierkegaard is correct in his assertions, then it would follow that those who outwardly express that they exist in Christianity and yet are guilty of living in categories foreign to it, really know not what it means to exist in relation to Christianity at all. Living as such is self-deception. One can also be deceived into living in such a way if Christianity is communicated improperly, as Kierkegaard believed was often the case. It is clear, then, that Christianity in Kierkegaard’s day was equated with being a decent human being. However, in order to understand Kierkegaard’s rejection of the established norms of Christendom we must briefly investigate what ideas and practices in particular he understood as being in opposition to Christianity.

That Christendom had come to represent something entirely different than the Christianity of the New Testament is evident in the popular teachings of several individuals of Kierkegaard’s time. For instance, first we have the teachings of J.L. Heiberg²⁴, the poet and literary critic who “brought the treasure of Hegelian philosophy up from Germany” (Kirmmse
Heiberg held the culture which flourishes in literature and philosophy in high esteem, while viewing religion merely as “a matter only for the uncultured” (Heiberg, qtd. in Kirmmse 143). Secondly, there was H.L. Martensen, who as author Bruce Kirmmse asserts, was a modified Hegelian. With Martensen, speculative thought stormed, albeit briefly, through the university scene (171). Martensen maintained “religion is a communal activity, a common understanding, not a private, individualistic relation to God” (180). Thirdly, but certainly of no less importance, was Grundtvig, who has been titled “the most gigantic and protean figure of the Danish Golden Age” (198). Grundtvig sought to blend society and history with religion and can be properly viewed as one who brought about a new understanding of Christianity and as “an awakener of national popular culture” (198). As far as religion in concerned, Grundtvig would emphatically hold to the notion that reason has within it the power to lead us directly to the “boundaries of revelation” (205) and believed that the powers of Christianity rested within his own communal, folk interpretations (213).

For our purposes, it is important to understand how these ideas were communicated to the public and how they became entrenched in Christendom; for they had profound implications on Christian existence, i.e., the way that people thought and lived in Christendom. To Kierkegaard, Christendom had succeeded in gathering the whole of society, and the whole of society considered itself Christian. However, people commonly lived in marked contrast to Christianity because Christendom taught them that examination and personal appropriation to the truth were unneeded. The dominance of folk religion was all too real—for it gathered the crowd and then failed to teach them the basic truths of Christianity. Therefore, being a Christian was synonymous with being a decent, respectable person. Kierkegaard’s purpose, to repeat, was to
act as a “corrective.” For him, to exist as a Christian was to seek to exemplify the life of Christ. Christendom had erred from this in many ways, only a few of which we shall examine.

First of all, Kierkegaard understood that in Christendom, the mass of people were comfortable with their lifestyle and with the teachings that Christianity was a “gentle, life-beautifying, and ennobling ground of comfort” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 199).

Secondly, people were born into Christendom; that is, from birth they had considered themselves Christians simply because they lived in a “Christian land.” For one to consider him/herself a Christian by these requirements is to Kierkegaard utter nonsense. He writes, “We are all Christians by birth—in Christendom” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 164). By hailing Christianity as to be precisely this—that one is born into it and quite comfortable—is to make Christianity itself into “complete nonsense” (164). That being a Christian is viewed in this way may attract a greater number of people, but has the effect of secularizing Christianity and lowering its strict requirements. Instead of following Christ and imitating him, one gets the notion that by simply by living a moral lifestyle, one might find earthly happiness through Christianity. Kierkegaard writes:

*Imitation, the imitation of Christ*, is really the point from which the human race shrinks. The main difficulty lies here; here is where it is really decided whether or not one is willing to accept Christianity. If there is emphasis on this point, the stronger the emphasis the fewer the Christians. If there is a scaling down at this point (so that Christianity becomes, intellectually, a doctrine), more people enter into Christianity. If it is abolished completely (so that Christianity becomes, existentially, as easy as mythology and poetry and imitation an exaggeration, a ludicrous exaggeration), then Christianity spreads to such a degree that Christendom and the world are almost indistinguishable, or all become Christians; Christianity has completely conquered—that is, it is abolished! (Kierkegaard, *Judge for Yourself!* 188).

Instead of making clear the unconditional requirement of Christianity – that one cannot serve two masters – those who communicated the message instead taught that Christianity guaranteed “the
greatest possible earthly advantage, enjoyment, etc. (189). “This is a cheap edition of what it is to be a Christian. Yet this is the actual state of affairs, because the preachers’ declaiming about the lofty virtues etc. during a quiet hour on Sunday does not alter the actual state of affairs on Monday, since people account for such a proclamation as being the preacher’s official job and his livelihood, and since many a clergyman’s life certainly is not different from that actual state of affairs…(189). The abasement of Christianity meant that “a whole man’s life is secularized, his every thought from morning until evening, his waking and dreaming” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 165). As such, there were no clear lines between Christianity and secularism. To Kierkegaard more and more people may have taken part in established Christendom, but they did so without examining what it means to exist as a Christian or understand its requirements. He writes, “let us not gloss over the Christian requirement, so that by suppression or by falsification we may bring about an appearance of decorum which is in the very highest degree demoralizing and is a sly death-blow to Christianity” (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom 39).

Christian existence is markedly different from human existence, as shown by the life of Christ. Christian existence means that one may indeed be forced to suffer; it means that one must live in contemporaneousness with Christ; it means that one is aware of the eternal as having infinitely more meaning than this present life. Rather than focusing on the blessedness of the eternal, established Christendom focused on the advantages and gains one could experience from Christianity. In a journal entry from 1853, Kierkegaard discusses this difference. “Christianity teaches that this life is a life of suffering—but then comes eternity…Christendom has invented a refinement: Christianity is to enjoy this life, raised to a higher power because there is an eternity” (Journals and Papers Vol. 4 471). To Kierkegaard, Christendom took the teachings of eternity and applied them to earthly life (470), the result of which could only be that those who
considered themselves Christians existed happily and comfortably in their ignorance of what it meant to truly be a Christian. In a journal entry from 1854-55, Kierkegaard writes how Christendom differs dramatically from the Christianity of the New Testament.

God wants to be loved. This is why he wants Christians. To love God is to be a Christian. God, of course, knows best how agonizing this is, humanly speaking, for a man. He says it as clearly as possible. To love God is possible only by clashing with all human existence (hating father and mother, hating oneself, suffering because one is a Christian etc.) “Man’s” rascally interests these days center on securing millions of Christians, the more the better, all, if possible, for in this way the whole difficulty in being a Christian vanishes; being a Christian and being a human being are synonymous, and we stand where paganism left off (Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers Vol. 3* 58).

*Paradox and Absolute Paradox*

As J. Heywood Thomas points out, the idea of paradox runs throughout Kierkegaard’s authorship (“Paradox” 192). The idea, however, has special prominence in *Philosophical Fragments, CUP, and Training*. Paradox can be defined as that which is “contrary to appearance, plausibility, or probability” (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol.2* 633). Both Hamann and Kierkegaard speak of the paradoxical nature of God, and on this point it can said that there is a link between the two in the area of indirect communication. In *Philosophical Fragments*, the pseudonym Johannes Climacus uses Socrates as an example of a paradoxical thinker. To Kierkegaard, Socrates always sought to better know himself, a claim evidenced by the Socratic maxim. It was Socrates’ paradoxical nature which inclined him to examine “whether he…was a more curious monster than Typhon or a friendlier and simpler being, by nature sharing something divine. This seems to be a paradox” (Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments* 37). Climacus goes on to write, “But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a mediocre fellow” (37). In dealing with the idea of paradox in relation to Socrates, Climacus is
thereby setting the stage to show the fallibility of human reason in understanding Christ as the Absolute Paradox. A paradox in general challenges both our reasoning capacity and our ability to communicate.

To both Kierkegaard and Hamann, paradox takes on its highest form in Christ as the God-Man. It appears likely that Kierkegaard found Hamann’s treatment of paradox fascinating, and both thinkers would advocate that “paradox was the very thought-form of religion” (Thomas, “Paradox” 201). To Hamann, paradox is the “vehicle for the expression of spiritual truth” (O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 90). As James O’Flaherty points out, “Since God has condescended to reveal Himself in lowly, even contemptible form—as the Scriptures everywhere attest—the paradox possesses the highest possible legitimation” (90). In Biblical Reflections Hamann writes, “One must view with astonishment how God accommodates Himself to all small circumstances, and prefers to reveal His government through the everyday events of human life rather than the singular and extraordinary events…” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 90). Hamann was so impacted by the idea of the paradox that he would come to an understanding of paradoxical language as being markedly opposed to that of rational communication. “As a natural idiom of the spirit, paradoxical language stands in strong contrast to logical discourse, which seeks to eliminate the paradox entirely, and in doing so becomes in Hamann’s eyes merely empty discourse” (90). In Socratic Memorabilia (in which it must be recalled how Hamann used Socrates to discredit the rationalists of his day), Hamann points out that “even the Greeks accepted the paradox as a matter of course when they spoke of the gods, and that it was only the rationalists among them who rejected it” (90-1). Hamann believes that the paradoxical nature of Christ as the God-Man is seen in the fact that He reveals Himself to us in the strangest way possible, a way which defies human reason. He writes:
What man would, like the Apostle Paul, venture to speak of the foolishness of God, of the weakness of God. None but the Spirit which searches the deep things of God would have disclosed this prophesy to us, the fulfillment of which is evident in our own day more than ever: that not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called to the Kingdom of Heaven, and that God willed to reveal His wisdom and power in that he chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, that he chose the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty, that he chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to naught those things that are…(Hamann, qtd. in O’Flaherty 90).

It appears that to Hamann, the Paradox defies human understanding; it can only be believed upon rather than reasoned to. Revelation in Christ is cast in the form of a paradox (157). Craig Hinkson notes that Erwin Metzke, the Hamann scholar, elicits a few phrases Hamann uses to describe God (6). “He is the ‘hidden,’ ‘invisible’ one, the ‘incomprehensible’ one, ‘the great and unknown’ ‘God’…. There is an ‘infinite misrelationship of man to God’….God is the ‘transcending’ and ‘annihilating of all human concepts’” (qtd. in Hinkson 6-7). The Paradox then does not directly appeal to man’s reason, for paradox by its very definition implies illogicality. Kierkegaard, heavily impressed by Hamann’s views of reason as being inferior to faith, appears affected by Hamann’s idea of the paradoxical nature of faith. In a journal entry (referred to earlier) from 1849, Kierkegaard makes mention of Hamann’s statement “Just as ‘law’ abrogates ‘grace,’ so ‘to comprehend’ abrogates ‘to have faith’ (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol.2 205). Kierkegaard remarks that this very idea is his thesis, and what he has struggled to show is “to comprehend that faith must not be comprehended” (205).

Now, just as Hamann realized that the enlightened thinkers of his day would do away with the paradox, so Kierkegaard found himself defending the paradox against the likes of Idealism represented in his day by the Hegelians. “Kierkegaard contends that the Hegelian thinkers wanted to dissolve the paradox by saying that viewed eternally it was not a paradox” (Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox 112). Perhaps this is one reason Kierkegaard stresses the
paradox throughout his writings and especially in *Philosophical Fragments*. Another reason would evidently be found in his contention that many throughout Christendom had forgotten what it meant to exist in Christianity. “It seems indubitable, then, that the point of talking about the Paradox in the *Fragments* is that it is an answer to the question which was Kierkegaard’s great question, namely, ‘What does it mean for me to become a Christian?’” (111).

Kierkegaard’s own treatment of the God-Man as the paradox appears to have been influenced by Hamann. For example, after making mention of Hamann in *Philosophical Fragments*, Climacus writes that the paradox is “the originator who hands over all the splendor to understanding” (Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments* 53). The divine Paradox gives us the ability, or inability, to reason in the first place. Having seen the basics of how the concept of paradox plays an important role in both Kierkegaard’s writings and Hamann’s, it is necessary to deal with the idea from the standpoint of the God-Man as the offense, through which we gain greater insight into indirect communication.

*The God-Man and Indirect Communication: The Sign of Offense*

In the first part of chapter four, this researcher coined the phrase “the Communication of Condescension” to describe how God, through the person of Christ, communicates with us. The term is meant to imply that Christ, through his condescension, not only communicates with mankind in the ultimate way, but is the very meaning, the definitive structure of communication itself. As the Word, He *is* communication. In order to properly understand Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication, we must examine his concept of the God-Man.

With the publication of *Training in Christianity* in 1850, Kierkegaard began his campaign against official Christendom (Kirmmse 379). *Training* marks the beginning of the
movement in which he “no longer takes time to discourse in detail upon ethics or Christian love or the psychology of the individual but moves steadily into an increasingly open posture of conflict with the established Church and the Golden Age notion of Christian culture” (379). In the outline on the contents page of the book, Kierkegaard makes it clear that the purpose of *Training* is partly “for revival and increase of inwardness” and a “biblical exposition”.

Specifically, it sets forth the requirements of Christianity, as noted by Kierkegaard in the editor’s preface. “Yet indeed the requirement ought to be uttered, plainly set forth, and heard” (Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity* 7). To Kierkegaard, people should be aware of the rigorous requirements of Christianity, regardless of whether or not they chose to accept them.

One thing was certain: these requirements were not be upheld by the established Order. Thus, it has been written that *Training* was “a sort of time bomb that could only be diffused with an ‘admission’ or ‘confession’ …that the religion preached officially in Denmark was a domesticated, mild form of ‘the Christianity of the New Testament’” (Kirmmse 380). In *Training* Kierkegaard deals with such concepts as: Christianity as the Absolute, the suffering of Christ, absolute paradox, the sign of offense, Christ’s use of indirect communication, and His desire to draw all unto Himself.

Technically, *Training* is written by the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, with Kierkegaard appearing as the editor. Disagreement exists as to exactly how Anti-Climacus stands in relation to the other pseudonymous works. In the introduction to *The Sickness unto Death*, Howard Hong writes, “Obviously the pseudonym Anti-Climacus has a special relation to the pseudonym Johannes Climacus…The prefix ‘Anti’ may be misleading, however. It does not mean ‘against.’ It is an old form of ‘ante’ (before), as in ‘anticipate,’ and ‘before’ also denotes a relation of rank, as in ‘before me’ in the First Commandment” (Hong, qtd. in Perkins, *International Kierkegaard*
Commentary: Practice in Christianity 2). The idea then would be that Anti-Climacus comes before Johannes Climacus in the sense that he has taken the necessary step of becoming a Christian. Some scholars, such as Robert Perkins, assert however that the pseudonym is explicitly set against Johannes. Whatever the case, whereas, Johannes is a skeptic, Anti-Climacus “looks at Christianity from an ideal, committed stance (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 216). Kierkegaard conceived of Anti-Climacus as an ideal character, and therefore he was fit to address the severe errors of Christendom. Anti-Climacus’ attack then is actually a direct one, for since he is a Christian, he can address from within (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 6 175). As Kierkegaard wrote of his new pseudonym in 1849:

Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus have several things in common: but the difference is that whereas Johannes Climacus places himself so low that he even says himself that he is not a Christian, one seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he regards himself to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high level...his portrayal of ideality can be absolutely sound and I bow to it. I would place myself higher than Johannes Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus (174-75).

It is clear then, as C. Stephen Evans states, that Anti-Climacus is distinctively different from the earlier pseudonyms and must be considered separately (Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 6). It is important to note also that Kierkegaard chooses to communicate through Anti-Climacus since he expresses the views that “lie at the core of Kierkegaard’s own thought” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 8). By 1855, five years after the publication of Training, Kierkegaard noticed how the situation in Christendom had become even more dreadful. In an article published in The Fatherland that year he writes that if Training could be written over, he would have not communicated through the pseudonym but would have done so directly. The article gives us a glimpse of his earlier thoughts as concerns the rebellion of Christendom against the Christianity of the New Testament.
My earlier thought was: if the Establishment can be defended at all, this is the only way, namely, by pronouncing a judgment upon it poetically (therefore by a pseudonym), thus drawing upon “grace” raised to the second power, in the sense that Christianity would not be forgiveness for merely what is past, but by grace would be a sort of dispensation from following Christ in the proper sense and from the effort properly connected with being a Christian. In that way truth would enter into the Establishment after all: it defends itself by condemning itself; it acknowledges the Christian requirement, makes for its own part an admission of its distance from the requirement and that it is not even an effort in the direction of coming closer to it, but has recourse for grace “also with respect to the use one makes of grace” (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom 54).

Now that we have a proper understanding of how Kierkegaard viewed Christendom in his day, we turn to his concept of the God-Man and His communication with us through his condescension.

In Training, Kierkegaard places emphasis upon Christ as a stumbling-block and the sign of offense. To those who refuse to accept Him, he is also viewed as “the sign of contradiction.” It is precisely the embodiment of indirectness that Christ is a sign. Signs convey meaning to us, but only if we understand their meanings. Kierkegaard writes that “a sign is a sign only for one who knows that it is a sign, and in the strictest sense only for one who knows what it signifies” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 124). To Kierkegaard, a sign is the negation of immediacy; that is,” it is not the immediate thing it is” (124). “A nautical mark is a sign. Immediately it is a post, a light, or some such thing, but a sign it is not immediately, that it is a sign is something different from what it immediately is” (124). I may recognize something to be a sign. But to Kierkegaard, the very fact that I recognize it as such means that the sign signifies something. This means that the sign is indeed something else than that which it is immediately (124). A sign of contradiction is that which “draws attention to itself, and then, when attention is fixed upon it, shows that it contains a contradiction” (125). It is the greatest contradiction, “the highest, the qualitative contradiction,” to be both God and an individual man (125). Christ is therefore the sign of contradiction, since He as a man, claims to be God.
“Immediately He is an individual man, just like other men, a lowly, insignificant man; but the contradiction is that He is God” (125). Kierkegaard uses a variety of terms to describe the God-Man: the sign of offense, the Absolute Paradox, the absurd. C. Stephen Evans writes, “Christian faith is faith in the incarnation, the fact of the God-man, which he [Kierkegaard] sees as the “Absolute Paradox.” The paradox is called the absurd, and brings with itself the possibility of offense” (Evans, *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self* 118). It is imperative to understand here that the God-Man as the Paradox is viewed as being absurd by human reason. “Instead of the paradox being the absurd, it is the understanding that is the absurd or has been made the absurd by the paradox” (Walsh 36). In *Philosophical Fragments*, Climacus tells us that human understanding alone cannot fathom the paradox. He poses the question: is a paradox such as this conceivable? (Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments* 47). Climacus goes on to say:

> The understanding certainly cannot think it, cannot hit upon it on its own, and if it is proclaimed, the understanding cannot understand it and merely detects that it will likely be its downfall. To that extent, the understanding has strong objections to it; and yet, on the other hand, in its paradoxical passion the understanding does indeed will its own downfall. But the paradox, too, wills this downfall of the understanding, and thus the two have a mutual understanding, but this understanding is present only in the moment of passion (47).

In other words, reason cannot understand the paradox and therefore takes offense at it. The “mutual understanding” of which Kierkegaard speaks takes place when the paradox wills the downfall of human reason in the moment the learner accepts the paradox in faith as Truth. Here one sees how faith reaches beyond reason in matters pertaining to Christianity, since depraved reason is unable lead one to true faith in Christ. This is in fact, to reiterate once again, Hamann’s main point: faith is different from reason, and therefore the primacy must be placed upon belief (Thomas, *Subjectivity and Paradox* 57). Howard Hong points out that to Kierkegaard, the sphere of knowledge and the sphere of faith are qualitatively different (*Journals and Papers* Vol.2 845).
This idea is one of which Hamann would doubtless approve. In a letter to Jacobi, Hamann says that he expects nothing from reason “but the recognition of error, and I do not regard it as a way to true life…” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 248). Hamann says, “Without the word—no reason, no world” (248). While he is referring in this passage to language, the term ‘word’ could easily take on a double meaning. That is, without the Word, God as the Creator of all communication and who Himself is the ultimate Paradox, human reason would not have the possibility of existence.

The Absolute Paradox of which Kierkegaard speaks appears as a contradiction. According to Evans, Kierkegaard is not referring to what we would think of today as a logical contradiction (120). Rather, he suggests that “contradiction” can best be thought of as “incongruous” (120). Certainly, to the unbeliever, both Christ and His teachings must be absurd, since they require and demand faith, the character of which offends human reason (Thomas, “Christianity as Absurd” 58).

**Incognito and Indirectness: The Form of a Servant**

Christ’s indirectness is also seen in his incognito, or what Kierkegaard terms his “unrecognizableness.” He writes: “What is unrecognizableness? It means not to appear in one’s proper role, as, for example, when a policeman appears in plain clothes. And so unrecognizableness, the absolute unrecognizableness, is this: being God, to be also an individual man. To be an individual man…is the greatest possible, the infinitely qualitative, remove from being God, and therefore the profoundest incognito” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 127). Kierkegaard is not saying that God has not revealed Himself to us, but rather that God veils Himself by revealing Himself through the person of Christ in the appearance of a man. To appear in this way is Christ’s “almightily maintained incognito” and His will “His free
determination” (131). This is evident in that Christ took on the form of a servant to become man. Philippians 2:7 says, “But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men” (NKJV). To Kierkegaard, Christ appears in this fashion because He must be the object of faith (137). Hamann himself makes mention of Christ as a servant on many occasions. In his *Aesthetics in a Nutshell*, Hamann writes that the first sign by which Jesus reveals His majesty is “in his form of a servant” (Haynes ed. 87). And again he writes, “How God the Son lowered Himself! He became a man, the least among men; he took on the form of a servant; he became the most wretched among men; he became sin for us” (qtd. in Smith, *J.G. Hamann* 66). Hamann also recognizes that Christ did so in order to reveal to mankind the mysteries of the godhead “in man’s own language, man’s own affairs, man’s own ways” (66).

If it was immediately and directly recognizable that Christ was God, no faith in Him would be required. To Kierkegaard, Christ binds Himself to His incognito, he wills to be the offense and the sign of contradiction in order to save men. “It was Christ’s free will and determination from all eternity to be incognito” (128). In another passage from *Training*, Kierkegaard writes, “It is a strange sort of dialectic: that He who almightily…binds himself, and does it so almightily that He actually feels Himself bound, suffers under the consequences of the fact that He lovingly and freely determined to become an individual man—to such a degree was it seriously true that He became a real man; but thus it must be if He were to become the sign of contradiction which reveals the thoughts of the hearts” (131). So Christ binds Himself to His almighty incognito to the point where it is not directly observable or knowable that He is God. To Kierkegaard, Christ does this so as to be the object of faith, whereby man is then faced with a
choice of whether to believe or be offended at Christ. This is one of the points Kierkegaard believed established Christendom failed to recognize. He writes:

But they confuse the Christian conceptions in every way. They make Christ a speculative unity of God and man; or they throw Christ away all together and take His teaching; or for sheer seriousness they make Christ a false god. Spirit is the negation of direct immediacy. If Christ is very God, He must be unrecognizable, He must assume unrecognizableness, which is the negation of all directness. Direct recognizableness is precisely the characteristic of the pagan god (135).

To Kierkegaard, Christ wills to be the essence of indirectness because He is the object of faith. “He requires faith, requires that He become the object of faith” (142). Because Christ requires faith in Him, He wants all to believe in Him, and therefore He cannot be directly recognizable. No matter how much we as human beings want Christ to be directly recognizable, He must remain unrecognizable in order to be the object of faith. By being the object of faith, He shows that human reason has its limits. Kierkegaard writes,

But now in the case of the God-Man! The true God cannot become directly recognizable; but direct recognizableness is what the merely human, what the men to whom He came, would pray and implore of Him as the greatest alleviation. And it was out of love He became man! He is love; and yet every instant He exists He must crucify as it were all human compassion and solicitude—for He can only be the object of faith (Training in Christianity 137).

Christ’s unrecognizableness is inexplicably connected to His indirect communication with us, and these two concepts are an offense to reason, they pose the question as to whether or not the learner will receive His communication. To want God to appear in a recognizable fashion is to elevate human reason to its highest peak. However, faith in God defies human reason, and therein stems the fact that Christ is the object of offense. Kierkegaard writes that Christ “was very God, and therefore to such a degree God that He was unrecognizable, so that it was not flesh and blood, but the exact opposite of flesh and blood which prompted Peter to recognize Him” (128). Rather than appeal to our reason, Christ demands faith for belief in God.
There exists “a yawning gulf between the individual and the God-Man” (139). In *Training*, Kierkegaard refers to the cause of this gulf as the possibility of offense, while at other times he refers to this divide as caused by sin. God’s perfect divinity is the “infinite qualitative distinction” between God and man. Since man’s reasoning capabilities are flawed by sin, he cannot reason to God. Only faith can reach across the “yawning gulf” and bridge the divide between God and man. God is accessible, but only through faith. Here, one can hear echoes of Hamann, for he specifically denounced human reason and its inabilities.

Offense can be defined as “a temptation in the sense of trial which might deter one from faith” (Lowrie, *Kierkegaard Vol. 2* 632). To Kierkegaard, every paradox of faith is a stumbling-block to our understanding, but the greatest offense is the incognito of the God-Man (632). It is likely that Kierkegaard was affected by reading Hamann’s approach to reason’s offense at the God-Man. What Hamann has to say in this area sounds almost Kierkegaardian in nature. He writes in his *Biblical Reflections*:

This is one of the countless contradictions in our nature which we cannot solve. Reason is inclined to serve an unknown God, but is infinitely remote from knowing him. It does not wish to know Him—and what is even more astonishing, when it does know him it ceases to serve him. This is why God discloses himself so late and so slowly, for he knows that the knowledge of him is a stumbling-block and an offense to man, that he is foolishness and a thorn in the flesh to him as soon as he wishes to reveal himself and make himself known to him. When Jesus said that he was the Son of God, thus disclosing the most comforting, important and new truth, the Jews lifted stones, rent their garments, and condemned him as a malefactor (Smith, J.G. *Hamann* 136-37).

To Kierkegaard, everyone must pass through the offense and there can only be two results: either an individual is offended and remains in sin, or one accepts Him. “The possibility of the offence is not to be avoided, thou must pass through it, and thou canst be saved from it in one way only—by believing” (Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity* 100). For our purposes,
we will examine two distinct types of offense through which we as humans view Christ, his life, and his communication with us.

The first type of offense we examine here has to do with Christ’s loftiness (Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity* 87). Here, “the possibility of offense is the fact of being an individual man, a lowly man—and then acting in a way suggestive of God” (99). Niels Jørgen Cappelørn dubs this type of offense the first stage of offense proper. He writes, “…this first stage appears when human beings understand Christ to be a completely ordinary person who lacks means and whose low status is well known, and yet claims to be God. Here, the designation “human” or “man” in “God-man” is taken for granted, and offense arises because of the category “God” (Cappelørn 113). The believer is not immune from being offended of God in this sense. Rather, “In reality, offense is possible anytime. For the believer, it can break out at any moment” (Cappelørn 113). Kierkegaard points to Matthew 11:6, which he parallels with Luke 7:23, as examples of offense at Christ’s communication. Kierkegaard relates the story of how an imprisoned John the Baptist sent messengers to Christ to ask whether or not He was the promised Savior. Christ only answers: “Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see; The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them. And blessed is he, whosoever is not offended in me” (NKJV). Christ does not directly answer John’s question. Kierkegaard writes:

So Jesus does not answer *directly*. He does not say, Tell John that I am the Expected One. That is, He requires faith, and therefore to an *absent* person cannot make a direct communication. To a person who was *present* He might well say it directly, because a person on the spot, beholding the speaker, this individual man, and because of the contradiction involved in His appearance, would not in fact receive a direct communication, inasmuch as the contradiction intervenes between what is said and what
is seen, viz. what the speaker is, judging by appearances (Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity* 96).

Kierkegaard’s point here is that Christ did not answer in a straightforward manner because it was not directly obvious to the human eye that Christ was indeed who He said He was (97). The offense, to reiterate, takes place in this instance when an individual perceives that Christ equates Himself with God (His loftiness). Kierkegaard, through the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, dwells on Christ’s miracles and teachings, which are usually taken as proofs of Christianity (Cappelørn 113). John certainly understood by Christ’s answer that He was God, but are Christ’s miracles proof that Christianity is Truth? Christ’s concluding sentence to John, “blessed is he who is not offended in me,” Kierkegaard takes as a “decisive expression: Christ invokes these proofs, but in the same breath, he rejects the idea that they can serve as the basis for establishing a true relationship with Him” (Cappelørn 113). However, the whole aim of apologetics is to want to communicate and prove Christ’s validity. Kierkegaard writes, “But behold how different is the custom in Christendom! There they have written these huge folios which develop the proofs of the truth of Christianity. Behind these proofs and folios they feel perfectly confident and secure from every attack; for the proofs and the folios regularly with the assurance, *ergo* Christ was what he said He was” (Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity* 98). However, to attempt to prove what Christ demands we take upon faith is to do a disservice to Him. For He says, “Blessed is He who is not offended in me.” Kierkegaard writes, “That is, He makes evident that in relation to Him there can be no question of any proofs, that a man does not come to Him by the help of proofs, that there is no *direct* transition to this thing of becoming a Christian, that at the most the proofs might serve to make a man attentive, so that once he has become attentive he may arrive at the point of deciding whether he will believe or be offended” (Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity* 98).
Proofs cannot lead a man to faith in Christ. The only way to come to faith in Christ is to believe. Hamann stands with Kierkegaard on this point. In a letter to Jacobi in the winter of 1786, Hamann wrote, “For if it is fools who say in their heart, There is no God, those who try to prove his existence seems to me to be even more foolish. If that is what reason and philosophy are, then it is scarcely a sin to blaspheme it” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 253). In his Biblical Reflections Hamann writes, “it is the greatest contradiction and abuse of reason when reason itself tries to reveal” (119). To Hamann the fact that Christ is God is the *communicatio idiomatum*, the “interchange of properties” to which we made reference earlier. The “communication of idioms” finds its origin in Luther’s “The Word Made Flesh” (Haynes 99f). This can also be seen as a dialectical statement; for something that is the Word, is also something that is the Flesh. How can we as human beings offer proofs on how such a divine act is possible? It supersedes our reason, so that we can only make two choices, as Kierkegaard would point out: either believe or reject Christ. In his work *Philological ideas and doubts*, Hamann writes that “Nothing could be more ridiculous than to conduct a proof that is the contrary of a truth that has been not firmly proven” (Haynes, ed. 119). Hamann writes in *Socratic Memorabilia*, “Our own being and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and cannot be established in any other way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181). A few sentences later he expounds on this statement. “What one believes has for that reason no need to be proved, and a proposition can be irrefutably proved without for that reason being believed” (182). To Hamann, to want to prove something is to do so strictly by the aid of reason. If it could be proven that Christ was the God-Man then belief in him would not be required. To want to prove this matter is to turn Christ’s indirect communication into direct communication, doing away with the necessity of belief. This does not mean that God can only be speculated of or is somehow a
theory. Rather, quite the opposite is the case. He is nevertheless the Truth, but He is Truth which must be believed. “Flesh and blood are hypotheses,” writes Hamann. “The Spirit is truth” (qtd. in Smith, J.G. Hamann 54-5). According to Ronald Gregor Smith, Hamann would seek to show that “truth is not to be measured by human opinions, or taste, or probability” (54). Hamann writes, “Lies and novels, hypothesis and fables, must be probable; but not the truths and basic teachings of our faith” (qtd. in Smith 54). It is this statement that Kierkegaard would uphold in making his claim on the indirectness of faith. The Truth comes only through faith, despite the desire of human reason to prove that which can only be believed. Thus Hamann and Kierkegaard stand in agreement that rather than being proved, Christianity must be believed, with Christ as the object of faith. Kierkegaard makes clear that proofs such a miracles can only aid the receiver to become attentive of the Absolute Paradox (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 98). The cause of this offense, to reiterate again, is in this sense that a man equates Himself with God. To Kierkegaard, one who is offended in this situation may say ‘An individual man like us wants to be God’ (105), and therein lies the offense.

The second form of offense in Training has to do with Christ’s lowliness. Here, one is offended by the fact that God is man, or that “the one who gives Himself out to be God shows Himself to be the poor and suffering and at last the impotent man” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 105). In His lowliness, Christ suffers (106). In His lowliness Christ communicates to us that He is actually God. To question this is to take offense. Christ’s lowliness is seen in the fact that He is poor and must suffer. One takes offense at these qualities because Christ is God. Our reason might be inclined to say that He should not have to suffer in this way, or that He should be rich rather than lowly. However, once again Kierkegaard writes that Christ must be the object of faith. It is His divine will to be so.
Revelation as Communication: God’s Own Speaking

Throughout this thesis I have shown how Hamann was enamored by the spoken and written word. He also places primacy upon language, which is given to man by God and used by Him to communicate with us. To Hamann, God’s speech with us is seen throughout nature and through the Word, both written and embodied in the form of Christ. God’s veiled revelation to us in the person of Christ is to Hamann the most mysterious of all paradoxes. Ronald Gregor Smith writes that Hamann is adamant that Christ’s condescension is not meant merely “to attract our attention or engage our admiration. But it is the necessary mode of God’s speech with us” (J.G. Hamann 66). Hamann rejoices in the fact that the God-Man would condescend to our level and communicate with us. Kierkegaard, in a journal entry from 1839, shows how affected he was by Hamann’s conception of the God-Man. He writes:

Precisely because there is such a thing, one must say that the God-man idea is not merely an object of cognition but is also an edifying or up-building thought which disperses all dissatisfaction with the world, rectifies every mistake, a thought which steps forth consolingly when even the great in the world seem so petty, when the mind is alarmed over how the insignificant in the world can still get their rights, too (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol.2 201).

That Christ indirectly communicates with us as one seemingly insignificant is an astounding paradox.

Kierkegaard makes further use of his communication model to describe Christ’s indirectness through His own speaking. Parabolic communication, which Christ uses quite often in Scripture, is an example of indirect communication. However, Christ’s indirectness can be seen through all that he says. For example, in Training Kierkegaard uses the example of the statement “I and the Father are One” to express Christ’s indirectness. The fact that Christ expresses He is God is indeed a direct statement. However, when Christ makes this statement,
He who is Himself the essence of indirectness, the statement is communicated indirectly.

Kierkegaard writes:

> When one says directly, ‘I am God; the Father and I are one,’ that is direct communication. But when he who says it is an individual man, quite like other men, then this communication is not just perfectly direct; for it is not just perfectly clear and direct that an individual man should be God—although what he says is perfectly direct. By reason of the communicator the communication contains a contradiction, it becomes indirect communication, it puts to thee a choice, whether thou wilt believe Him or not (134).

In a journal entry from 1850, Kierkegaard deals with indirect communication. He also acknowledges that he has begun to doubt whether or not he, as a mere human being, had the right to use indirect communication.

> It is not true that direct communication is superior to indirect communication. No, no. But the fact is that no man has ever been born who could use the indirect method even fairly well, to say nothing of using it all his life. For we human beings need each other, and in that there is already a directness. Only the God-Man is in every respect indirect communication from first to last. He did not need men, but they infinitely needed him; he loves men, but according to his conception of what love is; therefore, he does not change in the slightest toward their conception, does not speak directly in such a way that he also surrenders the possibility of offense—which is his existence in the guise of a servant (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 384).

Another journal entry from two years earlier gives us another example of how the God-Man embodies indirect communication and how indirectness can be used in Christianity.

> Unqualified indirect communication belongs to being more than human, and no man, therefore, has the right to use it. The God-man cannot do otherwise, because he is qualitatively different from man. In paganism it is demonic, but this has no place in Christendom. In paganism, therefore, the abstract indirect method could certainly be used, for the possibility of offense was not present. And also thus in relation to Christendom (which is very far from being purely Christian, but is closer to paganism) [it may be used] by one who has not unconditionally stepped forth as personally being Christian in the decisive sense. For where the proportions are such as these, offense cannot become more than a kind of awakening (383).
Christ’s indirectness represents problems for our understanding of communication both verbally and conceptually. Even Christ’s claim in John 8:32, “And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free” is certainly uttered directly, but when Christ utters it, it becomes indirectness. What truth? Whose truth? Christ’s truth. The Absolute Truth. But how shall we know it? By our cognitive abilities? No, we have already seen how human reason cannot reason the things of God. We know this truth indirectly because of faith. The truth can only be understood indirectly, since it is communicated indirectly.

Christ at all moments binds himself to his incognito (Training in Christianity 131), so that He must communicate indirectly. To Kierkegaard, He can do no other, since He must be the object of faith. The fact that He is the object of faith is an offense to reason. However, if Christ communicated directly, He would then cease to be the object of faith (140). So, He equates Himself with God, but it cannot be proven that He is God, for He appears on earth as an individual man. To attempt to prove Christ is God is to do so by human reason, a reasoning ability which is fallen and sinful. But Christ would dispel all human reason by offering the existing individual faith. Christ’s indirect communication with us is an attempt to draw us to Him in faith. It is one central point in which Hamann and Kierkegaard stand together. Primacy is placed upon faith as the highest mode of existence. We receive this faith through indirect communication.
Chapter Five: Results

Results are of crucial importance to the historical-critical study. This project has yielded several findings which can prove beneficial to the field of communication. Specifically, I have attempted to deal with communication from a Christian perspective, and this study has produced findings in that area as well. The following results come after presenting this research in light of Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication, and understanding this content from an historical-critical point of view.

First of all, the results of this study show that language has primacy over reason. This has sweeping ramifications for our conception of communication. Hamann’s thesis, that language has primacy over reason, means that we communicate through language and not solely through our ability to reason. That is, reason cannot communicate without language (whether it be spoken, written, or communicated through symbols) as its guide. In presenting Hamann’s language theory as one based on communication, this research clears the way for the possibility of further study in this area.

Secondly, Kierkegaard’s view of the press allows for an historical and critical look at the media, which can easily be applied to the way the media operates in our own time. I have shown how Kierkegaard’s criticism of the media is worthy of study, although it typically receives scant attention at best. Kierkegaard’s belief, that the media had the power to destroy individuality while creating a mass public, amounts to a serious look at mass media. This researcher has also found that Kierkegaard’s battle with the press greatly affected his theory of indirect communication.
Thirdly, this study has resulted in the application of the Scriptural idea of God as the Divine Logos to communication. To Hamann, God as the Logos is the greatest form of communication. This led to this researcher’s examination of the various ways in which God communicates to mankind. “The Condescension of Communication,” a term which has been coined by this researcher, has resulted from the depths of this research as well. Kierkegaard’s conception of the God-Man as indirect communication has implications far beyond that which this researcher could previously imagine. This researcher was surprised to find the importance of this concept to Kierkegaard’s model. As a result, Kierkegaard’s presentation of Christ as the essence of indirectness perfected has implications for how communication is typically viewed as well.

This research has shown several ways in which Kierkegaard appears to be influenced by Hamann in the area of indirect communication. My findings show that Kierkegaard and Hamann share a certain understanding of the importance of parabolic communication as a form of indirectness. They both see that parables are a significant mode of indirect communication in that parables relate to us a moral or truth in an indirect manner. Parables are analogical in nature, and cause us to see things differently than simply by “discursive thinking” (O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 87). Another way Kierkegaard was influenced by Hamann is in the area of humor. Kierkegaard placed humor in a high position between the ethical and the religious spheres, and this is likely due to the impact Hamann made upon him as a humorist. Ultimately, humor is a communicative tool that plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication.
A connection also exists between Hamann and Kierkegaard (as mentioned in the first part of Chapter Four), in the area of language. Language is a powerful tool given by God, and plays an important role in the communicative processes of writing and speaking.

This study has also found a link between Hamann and Kierkegaard which goes beyond simply the fact that they shared an understanding of certain concepts. This link is understood only after researching Kierkegaard and Hamann in their historical contexts and understanding how they combated certain thinkers. This thesis set out to examine the influence of Hamann on Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication. One link is found in Socrates, whom both thinkers admired. The importance of Socratic ignorance to both Hamann and Kierkegaard cannot be downplayed. My research points to the fact that Kierkegaard was affected by Socrates’ method of indirectness, seen most clearly in the concept of the maieutic relationship between communicator and recipient. Hamann also pays homage to Socrates. Here the link between Socrates and Kierkegaard appears to extend to Hamann as well, for Kierkegaard takes to heart Hamann’s view of Socratic ignorance. This finding is backed by Kierkegaard’s mention of Hamann’s understanding of Socrates in his journals.

Lastly, the greatest link to indirect communication between Hamann and Kierkegaard has been found in concept of faith, inasmuch as faith leads to a personal relationship with Christ, whereas human reason, because it is fallen in nature, is unable to do so. This research has shown that faith is a form of indirectness to both thinkers. Hamann is concerned with existence in much the same way as Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard himself shows in CUP faith is existence-communication. We can understand this concept by saying that communication becomes a mode of living, and faith a form of existence. Doubtless Hamann, who himself possessed an extraordinary view of communication and recognized the primacy of faith, would stand in
agreement with Kierkegaard on this point. Faith is a product of accepting Christ as the paradox which surpasses human reason. Furthermore, Christ demands belief through his indirect relation to us. Therein lies the necessity of indirect communication.
Chapter Six: Conclusions

Implications

Both Kierkegaard and Hamann practiced indirect communication with excellence. On one hand, they share a common bond of pseudonymity. While Kierkegaard writes occasionally under his own name, Hamann writes exclusively under pseudonyms. However, Kierkegaard (to this researcher’s knowledge) goes to much greater lengths both to explain his pseudonymity and to allow his pseudonyms to be living, breathing characters with opinions of their own. Hamann’s pseudonymity is a relational tool, but this researcher has found no evidence that Hamann actually attempted to create characters for the same reasons as did Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard himself perfects this mode of indirectness to such a degree that he could stand at a distance, allowing the pseudonyms their poetic license. To get hold of the individual, to make him/her aware of Christianity appears to be Kierkegaard’s ultimate goal. In this researcher’s opinion, misinterpreting Kierkegaard as an irrationalist, as one who advocated complete subjectivity, or as the originator of existentialist doctrine, ignores a major fact. Kierkegaard sought to make people aware of their existence by using themes with which they were familiar: poetry, literature, ethics, and concepts like irony and humor. By presenting both the aesthetic and the ethical positions, he shows not only how most people exist in these categories, but also how these categories (while not all together bad) nevertheless differ from the religious and overtly Christian mode of living. This can be compared with Hamann’s purpose throughout his writing career, which is to dispel the notion that human reason is an all-encompassing faculty with the ability to transcend or even regulate faith. For Hamann, rather, faith is the highest form of existence, a claim Kierkegaard would later assert himself. However, as J. Heywood Thomas
has pointed out, Kierkegaard cannot be seen as a mere parody upon Hamann (Thomas, Philosophy of Religion in Kierkegaard’s Writings 59). Heywood’s point is an important one: Kierkegaard was influenced considerably by Hamann, but also sought out his own unique path. Kierkegaard’s admiration of Hamann is not to be viewed as merely a “slavish imitation” (Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox 57).

Nevertheless, this research has yielded several ways in which Kierkegaard appears to be affected by the thought of Hamann. Another area Kierkegaard and Hamann share in common when it comes to indirect communication is the influence of Socrates. We have seen in this thesis how Socrates, through aid of the maieutic method, practiced indirect communication in a nearly flawless manner. Both Hamann and Kierkegaard respected Socrates and speak of him with reverence. However, they both differed from Socrates in that Socrates would hold that the learner possessed the truth in some form and all that the teacher had to do through communication was bring that truth to life. Hamann and Kierkegaard on the other hand, focus on man’s depravity and inability to attain truth without the power of God. Nevertheless, Both Kierkegaard and Hamann owe tremendous debts to Socrates.

Perhaps the greatest connection between Kierkegaard and Hamann has to do with faith. Hamann would say that faith is not an operation of reason, as we have seen. Kierkegaard would stand in agreement with this statement, adding one fact. Man is separated from God by sin. Hence, there is a divide between man and God that man cannot reach by any capability of reason. Only faith can bridge the gap between God and man.

Kierkegaard’s conception of both faith and communication are expanded when one takes into account the concept of existence. In CUP, Kierkegaard refers to the fact that faith is
existence-communication (358). In other passages, this researcher has seen that Kierkegaard actually refers occasionally to communication as a form of existence. This is a striking conclusion, since he also places such emphasis on existence. The highest form of existence for the individual is living a life of faith as a follower of Christ. So, it appears that when Kierkegaard refers to faith as existence-communication, he is saying that faith is the highest form of existence which can be communicated. However, it is also imperative that the one communicating Truth be viewed as a subject and understand his subjective relation to the Truth. This means that the one communicating the Truth has personally appropriated it to his/her life. This is not complete subjectivity as many would claim. Rather than taking the Truth for the purpose of drawing one’s fanatical conclusions of it, subjectivity to Kierkegaard means that the individual personally appropriates himself to the Truth in relation to God. The individual stands only before God in his/her relationship with Him. All men who wish to become Christians must ponder their existence, for sin has affected man’s very existence. Kierkegaard’s authorship shows how the highest form of existence, faith in Christ, is possible.

This researcher has attempted to show that Hamann had a tremendous influence upon Kierkegaard and specifically point out how Kierkegaard’s communication model is valid to the field of communication. Having dealt with the affair of The Corsair, I have dealt with Kierkegaard’s relation to the media and also proposed that his own model differs vastly from many others in the fact that it is overtly Christian. It deals with how we communicate knowledge and how we communicate Truths which transcend reason. Lastly, as faith is existence-communication, Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication is not a model by which we simply assess communication, but is a model by which we should seek to live. In this thesis we have understood that God is the highest form of communication and that the highest form of
existence is that of personally being a Christian. As Christians, our communication is to differ dramatically from the rest of the world. Scripture gives the model for communication in the person of Christ, who in indirectly relates himself to us, who loves us, and who lives His life to die for us.

Suggestions for Further Research

Further research certainly remains to be done in this area. However, Hamann’s writings are still very obscure, and it remains difficult to find very solid interpretations of his work. This could pose a hindrance to further research concerning Hamann. One must then deal with the fact that Hamann is difficult to interpret. However, Hamann has much to say about communication, and I have attempted to, in effect, clear the path for further exploration of his thought from the standpoint of communication. In an age in which our communications get faster and faster, one could examine Hamann’s statements concerning reason and correlate them accordingly. For if Hamann was so against the enlightened thinkers of his day, what would he think of science, scholarship, and mass communications in our own? We could ask nearly the same question of Kierkegaard as well. He who battled with the media so much in his day, who attacked it, viewed it with scorn, and was a severe critic of the media—how would he view the media and their claim of objectivity today? How would he view the movements we have made in all forms of communication away from Christian principles? Kierkegaard research continues to grow considerably. However, his communications model has not been successfully integrated into the communication field and his theories have been widely ignored, as I have shown. However, faith as existence-communication is one of the most arresting thoughts which could be explained and appropriated to Christian communication. This researcher has attempted to guard against interpreting Kierkegaard and Hamann from a postmodernist point of view, for it appears that
would neither thinker justice and would only succeed in taking enormous liberties with their thoughts. Therefore, any discussion of Hamann and/or Kierkegaard in the future, should take this to heart, should seek to interpret each man from a theological or religious point of view. It is God which dominates both men’s thoughts. Therefore, any research in the field of communication must take Christianity into consideration and seek to incorporate each writer’s major themes into the research.
Notes

1. In his work *Golgotha and Sheblimini* (1784), Hamann appears under the pseudonymous writer who describes himself on the title page as a “Preacher in the Wilderness” (Haynes ed. 164).

2. Terrence J. German explains in the Preface of his *Hamann on Language and Religion* that Hamann was frequently called the “Magus” or “Wizard of the North” “because his works appear to be enigmatic and perhaps unclear” (vii).

3. Hamann’s conversion experience is laid out in full by Ronald Gregor Smith in *J.G. Hamann* which serves as a mini-biography on Hamann. It also serves a great purpose by presenting excerpts of many of Hamann’s best-known works. See also James O’Flaherty’s *Johann Georg Hamann* for further research into Hamann’s conversion.


5. 1 Corinthians 1:21: “For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe,” (KJV).

6. John 14:6: “Jesus saith unto him, ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father but by me,’” (KJV).

7. Revelation 21:5: “And he that sat upon the throne said, Behold, I make all things new. And he said unto me, Write; for these words are true and faithful,” (KJV).
8. 1 Corinthians 1:23: “But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness.”

1 Peter 2:7-8: “Unto you, therefore, who believe he is precious, but unto them who are disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner, And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them who stumble at the word, being disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed.”


10. Ecclesiastes 12:13: “Let us hear the conclusion on the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man.” Hamann makes reference to the verse at the conclusion of Aesthetica in Nuce, directly before making mention of Revelation 14:7. He writes: “Let us now hear the conclusion of his newest aesthetic, which is the oldest: ‘Fear God, and give the glory to him, for the hour of his judgment is come: and worship him that made the heaven, and earth, and the sea, and the fountain of waters!’”

11. Diem refutes and quotes So H. Höffding, S. Kierkegaard als Philosoph, 1922, pp. 74ff. Höffding says that Kierkegaard “sought truth in the subjective (psychological) sphere,” and that he “made it an object of personal feeling.”

12. Peder Ludvig Møller (1814-1865) the Danish writer and critic, was the “effectual editor” of the Corsair. Møller was secretly involved with the paper, writing for it anonymously.

13. Here, the Hongs, in their introduction, quote Paul Rubow’s Goldschmidt og Nemesis, pg. 118.
14. *The Corsair* had praised one of the pseudonyms, Victor Eremita of *Either/Or*, claiming him to be immortal to literature. Kierkegaard replied directly to the paper under the guise of the pseudonym: “…cut short these sufferings—slay me, but render me not immortal.” Walter Lowrie deals with this account at length in his two-volume biography on Kierkegaard.

15. Møller writes concerning the section ‘Guilty!’/‘Not Guilty?’: “He does not care about the reader, for he writes for his own comfort; he is not concerned about being known as a classic author, for he writes without form. He moves about in the language as an English clown, walking on his hands and turning somersaults in it, but he has no style, for he uses superfluous words and says everything that comes to his head,” (Hong, ed., 100).

16. See, for instance: Smith, Ronald Gregor. “Hamann and Kierkegaard.” *Kierkegaardiana. Vol. 5.4* (1962-1964), 53-67. Smith believes that Kierkegaard moved away from the teachings of Hamann, and incorrectly posits that Kierkegaard ended his life an anti-rationalist. He writes: “What I wish to maintain is that concurrently with the weakening of Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard reached a more and more unsatisfactory understanding of Christian existence” (54). Smith is basically alluding to the possibility that not only did Kierkegaard cast off any Hamannian influences later in life, but also that by doing so, Kierkegaard became disenchanted with Christianity. This viewpoint fails to take into consideration Kierkegaard’s purpose of acting as a reformer, albeit one without authority. It also misses the point that Kierkegaard always saw Christianity as the highest attainable mode of existence attainable.

17. Georg Frederick Hegel (1770-1831), the German idealist philosopher of whom Kierkegaard was severely critical. In Kierkegaard’s *Journals and Papers, Vol.2*, Howard Hong writes, “Kierkegaard’s writings contain from the beginning a polemic against the Danish Hegelians,
but they also constitute a reckoning with Hegel’s basic philosophic ideas. In contesting Hegel, Kierkegaard treats him as the chief representative of the trend in the modern world which is undermining the beliefs of Christianity” (577). Scholarship within the last few years has emerged, however, to show what an extreme debt Kierkegaard owed Hamann. See John Stewart, *Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered*.

18. I Corinthians 13:12: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then, face to face; now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known” (NKJV).

19. Hamann appears in *Socratic Memorabilia* as the pseudonymous “Lover of Boredom.” The entire phrase as it appears on the title page is: “Collected for the Boredom of the Public by a Lover of Boredom.” This appears to be both an attempt at humor and irony. According to Terrence German, Hamann foresaw the possibility of his writings being grouped together with other ‘enlightened’ works (31). Having previously been a child of enlightenment himself, he “had spent much time in the boring pursuit of the enlightened search for knowledge through the reading of vast amounts of material which in itself was trite” (32). The irony in the statement appears in the sense that Hamann was actually a “lover of creation” (32) and “most assuredly could not be a lover of the type of activity which produces the boredom which consistently oppresses the ‘Pubic’” (32).

20. I Corinthians 2: 6-8: “Yet we do not speak wisdom among those who are mature; a wisdom, however, not of this age nor of the rulers of this age, who are passing away; but we speak God’s wisdom in a mystery, the hidden wisdom which God predestined before the ages to our glory, the wisdom which none of the rulers of this age has understood; for if they had understood it they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (NASV).
21. Genesis 22:1-2. “And it came to pass after these things, that God did test Abraham, and said unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold here I am. And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.”

Hebrews 11:17-19. “By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac; and he that had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, Of whom it was sad, In Isaac shall thy seed be called; Accounting that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead, from which also he received him in a figure.”

22. Genesis 22: 11-13. “And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of heaven, and said, Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I. And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do anything unto him; for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me. And Abraham lifted up him eyes, and looked, and, behold, behind him a ram caught in a thicket by his horns: and Abraham went and took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering in the stead of his son.”


25. H.L. Martensen (1808-1884), the “modified Hegelian” whose Moral Philosophy encompassed Hegelian views, including that “the state is the true developmental medium of the self” (Kirmmse 173).

26. N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). According to Kirmmse, Grundtvig was “surely the most gigantic and protean figure of the Danish Golden Age. Poet and pastor; politician and prophet; theologian and philologist; historian and popular educator – this titan broke all normal boundaries in his relentless and almost unlimited productivity” (Kirmmse 198).
27. In a journal entry from 1849 Kierkegaard wrote concerning how Anti-Climacus stands as a judge against established Christendom:

If I have represented a person so low that he even denied being a Christian, then the opposite also ought to be represented. And Christendom does indeed greatly need to hear the voice of such a judge—but I will not pass myself off as the judge, and therefore he also judges me, which is easy enough and quite appropriate, for anyone who cannot represent ideality so high that he is judged by it himself must have a poor understanding of it (Journals and Papers Vol. 6 178).


29. Mark 6:3. “Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joseph, and of Judas, and Simon? And are not his sisters here with us? And they were offended at him.”

I Peter 2: 7-8. “Unto you, therefore, who believe he is precious, but unto them who are disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner, And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offense, even to them who stumble at the word, being disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed” (NKJV).

30. A reference to Luke 2:34. “And Simeon blessed them, and said unto Mary, his mother, Behold, this child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel; and for a sign which shall be spoken against” (NKJV).


32. See Matthew 11:1-5.
Bibliography


“Who’ is the Discourse? A Study in Kierkegaard’s Religious Literature.”


