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THE SWORD OF THE SPIRIT:
PENTECOSTALS AND POLITICAL POWER IN GUATEMALA

By
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Guatemala was predicted to become the first nation to become predominantly Protestant due to the tremendous growth of the Pentecostal church between 1960 and 1990. Historically, the Pentecostal church was very pietistic and did not involve itself in politics. However, the presidency of Efrain Rios Montt (1982-1983) and the election of Jorge Serrano Elías (1991-1993) reflect a change among Pentecostals with regard to political involvement. The Protestant church has moved from a marginalized minority to comprising almost twenty-five percent of the population. In the August, 1994 congressional elections, 20 of the 80 congressmen elected to office were evangelical Christians (25%). Evidence shows that Evangelicals vote for evangelical candidates though the reasons why remain unclear. Despite these developments, the Pentecostal church is still deeply divided over involvement in politics. However, although Pentecostals do not constitute a unified movement, politicians cannot ignore them because they vote in greater numbers than the rest of the population.
To the people of Guatemala . . .

"The Lord bless you and keep you; the Lord make his face to shine upon you and be gracious to you; the Lord turn his face toward you and give you peace."

Numbers 6:24-26
I would first like to thank Dr. Enrique Baloyra for encouraging me to do this research project, and whose faithful reading of the manuscript and guidance were instrumental to the quality of the final product. I would also like to thank Dr. Joaquín Roy who assumed the chair of my committee during a difficult time and helped expedite the completion of my dissertation. I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Alexander McIntire, Professor Ambler Moss, Jr., and Dr. William Iverson whose diligent reading and insightful suggestions contributed to the quality of the final draft. Special thanks are due to my brother-in-law, Dr. Barry Morstain, who helped me shape my survey instrument.

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Introduction

The Evangelical Church in Guatemala has experienced tremendous growth over the past thirty years. In the opening chapter of his study of the Protestant church in Guatemala, Gennet Maxon Emery wrote:

From 1952 to 1962 the average annual increase of the Protestant church was 5%. . . . The fact remains that Protestantism is growing and is becoming a significant factor in the culture change picture in the area. This new religion can no longer be considered a despised minority or an aberration.¹

Wilton Nelson maintains that since 1967, the annual growth rate of the Evangelical church has been 10.5 percent with the result that by 1980 there were approximately 2,316,000 adherents in a total population of 8,000,000.² He also notes that in Latin America, the Evangelical community is reckoned to be three times the number of its baptized members.³ According to Patrick Johnstone of the Worldwide Evangelization Crusade, the number of Evangelicals has tripled regionwide in the past 25 years and in some

¹Gennet Maxon Emery, Protestantism in Guatemala: Its Influence on the Bicultural Situation With Reference to the Roman Catholic Background (Cuernavaca: Centro Intercultural de Documentación, 1970), 1.


³Ibid.
countries has even sextupled (Appendix D).⁴ David Stoll has extrapolated from these numbers and has concluded if it triples again over the next 25 years, by 2010 Evangelicals will be a third of the population of Central America (Appendix D).⁵ At that point even slowed growth would make Protestants a majority in Latin America. Boaventura Kloppenburg, a Catholic Bishop from Brazil warns: "Latin America is becoming Protestant more rapidly than Central Europe did in the sixteenth century."⁶

The Protestant community's growth in Guatemala has been phenomenal, rising from 2.8 percent of the Guatemalan populace in 1950 to 20 percent in 1981 (Appendix B).⁷ A decade later, Thomas Giles estimates that 38 percent of the Guatemalan population is Protestant.⁸ The evangelical proportion of the population from 1960 to 1985 therefore increased nearly seven times.⁹ If the growth rates from

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⁴Andres Tapia, "Why is Latin America Turning Protestant?," Christianity Today, 6 April 1992, 28.

⁵David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?: The Politics of Evangelical Growth (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1990), 9. For complete figures for the entire region and individual countries see Appendix 3, 337-338.


⁷Nelson, Protestantism in Latin America, 72.


1960 to 1985 are extrapolated for another twenty-five years to 2010, Guatemala becomes 127 percent evangelical (Appendix D). The 30 percent of the Guatemalans professing Evangelical faith were largely responsible for the January 1991 election of Jorge Serrano Elías, the first Evangelical elected president in Latin America.

As in Nicaragua and Brazil, Pentecostalism has predominated. In the decade from 1970 to 1980, the non-Pentecostal denominations grew at an average annual rate of 11.7 percent while the Pentecostal groups increased at a rate of 13.3 percent each year. Denominations with the largest membership include Prince of Peace Church (Pentecostal), the Association of Central American Evangelical Churches (non-Pentecostal), Assemblies of God, Church of God (Cleveland, Tennessee), Seventh-Day Adventists, National Presbyterian, and Plymouth Brethren.

However, the balance of numerical power has now passed from the older denominations to the conservative evangelicals and, above all, to the Pentecostals. In 1936 Pentecostals accounted for only 2.3 percent of all Protestants, whereas in the sixties they accounted for over a third and in the eighties well over half.

\[\text{10Ibid., 337-338.}\]
\[\text{11Congreso "Amanecer 84", La hora de Dios para Guatemala (Guatemala: Editoriales SEPAL, 1983), 78.}\]
\[\text{12Martin, Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Basil}\]
A recent study by Servicio Evangelizador Para América Latina (SEPAL) shows that almost a quarter of the churches in Guatemala are Pentecostal while another 20 percent are neo-Pentecostal.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite its tremendous growth in Guatemala and the rest of Latin America, little study has been done on the political impact of the Pentecostal church. British sociologist David Martin maintains that:

Denominational Protestantism contains varied anticipations of democratic reform, which are organizational in the Calvinist instance and more directly theological in later evangelicalism. Such foreshadowings and congruences do not lead automatically to religio-political alliances of a democratizing nature but they do create felt and symbolic congruences around which generalized democratic sentiment can form. The organizational practices of Protestant nonconformity . . . provide a practical forum of lay participation, rhetoric, and democratic experience which can be redeployed in the political realm.\textsuperscript{14}

Pentecostals have recently gained special attention from Latin American scholars because of their amazing growth and direct ties with less advantaged classes. They have been accused of stifling any sort of consciousness raising or rebellion of such classes against the elite classes. Much of the literature analyzes Pentecostal behavior and

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\textsuperscript{13}Ross Rohde, "Decada del Desarrollo del Pastor," a paper presented at Seminario de Crecimiento Integral, Guatemala, June 4-5, 1993, 9.

questions any sort of overt political action. Paul Freston maintains that one of the reasons that there has not been much scholarly work on Pentecostals and political involvement was "they were considered to be right wing, and the religious right is of no scholarly interest. . . ." He also notes the absence of such a prediction in Pentecostal literature. The two possible reasons for this omission are that the specialists "interpreted political alienation as a part of religious ideology, i.e. as an essential and inevitable part of Pentecostalism, or studied Pentecostals at the grassroots level; studies that were rich in content but ignored the leadership." In other words, the worldview of the leaders within these dynamic institutions was not analyzed.

Yet, scholars are beginning to admit that there has been a "gradual ideological change taking place in the thinking of Pentecostal leaders" since the 1950s. While evangelical roots discouraged the leaders from intervening


17 Ibid., 9.

directly, they were giving increasing attention to
denouncing corruption and sin, including sin embodied in
power structures. Paul Freston and Rowan Ireland in their
study of Pentecostals in Brazil concluded that "Evangelicals
do and can involve themselves directly in the political
arena. And when Pentecostals become political, they do so
because of their religious beliefs, not in spite of them."¹⁹

There are signs that the position of Pentecostals in
Guatemala concerning political participation by Christians
is changing too. In 1989, there were 6 active Christians in
the 100 member Congress. Several Evangelical groups were
officially represented in the National dialogue, a
government-sponsored attempt to focus on some of the
nation's problems. Stephen Sywulka maintains that
"Evangelicals are still coming to terms with their role in
national life."²⁰ Moreover, President Jorge Serrano,
elected in 1991, was a member of Elim, a Pentecostal church.
His vice president, Gustavo Espina, was a member of a
Central American Mission church, one of the oldest
denominations in Guatemala. There are also several
Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals, including former
President Efraín Ríos Montt, running for Congress in the

¹⁹Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "Conclusion: Is this Latin
American Reformation?," in Virginia Garrard-Burnett and
David Stoll, Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America

²⁰Stephen Sywulka, "Evangelicals My Become Majority in
upcoming elections in August 1994. Furthermore, despite the bad press that Ríos Montt received during his 17 months in office following a March 1982 coup, he appears to have significant support from people who credit him with saving the country from anarchy, and who are fed up with the current corruption. A recent poll taken by *Prensa Libre* showed 31% of the people would support his candidacy for presidency.  

The indigenous population has also been greatly affected by the growth of the Evangelical Church. Protestant work among these groups who constitute 60 percent of the population continues. According to a 1973 survey, approximately 36 percent of the Protestants in the country were Mayan Indians.

The spread of Protestant groups, especially Pentecostals, has pulled people away from alcoholism, petty crime, and corruption. Conversion was also a protest against violence and the disintegration of the family brought about by the male macho syndrome. The new faith encouraged savings and discouraged smoking, generally inculcating habits aimed at some modest economic advancement under the slogan "From dirt to the sky."  

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22 "Del suelo al cielo."
welfare structure is now associated with the Protestant churches, especially clinics.

David Martin states that most Protestants in Guatemala today belong to the lower-middle or upper-lower classes. Characteristically, they are called artisans, small shopkeepers and white-collar employees, though there are a few manual workers and some professional people, especially teachers. 23 He adds that the existence of professional people is connected with the Protestant emphasis on education, including the provision of evening courses.

More recently, however, evangelist Luis Palau stated in 1989: "We are seeing the impact of the gospel on the middle class." 24 Samuel Berberián maintains, whereas the Pentecostal church has an outreach and impact among the lower class, neopentecostalism has reached the middle and upper classes, as evidenced by the large membership of the national Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship. 25 Neopentecostal churches such as Verbo have in some cases been had success among aristocratic society. 26 David Stoll, describing evangelicals in Latin America states: "Frequently

23 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 89.
26 Ibid., 21.
charismatic, their style is an effective bridge, not only to the poor, but to many middle- and upper-class Central Americans who occupy positions in the power structure and have been converted to Charismatic churches.\(^2^7\)

David Stoll argues that "churches do not represent political interests in monolithic, unchanging ways; instead they often serve as arenas for competing forces."\(^2^8\) He adds that "religious experience, . . . has a dynamic of its own that can shape political loyalties as well as be shaped by them."\(^2^9\) He concludes that Latin American Protestantism is, therefore, "a generator of social change whose direction is not predestined."\(^3^0\)

This study will look at the impact of the Evangelical church in Guatemala and attempt to determine 1) whether the Evangelical church in Guatemala is a conservative force; 2) whether it is emerging as an important influence in the formation of a coalition of different societal sectors whose convergence could precipitate a national revolt; 3) whether it will become a force for democratic change; 4) whether the recent election of Jorge Serrano indicates growing political influence of the Evangelical church in Guatemala; and 5) the

\(^{2^7}\)Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 326.

\(^{2^8}\)Ibid., xv.

\(^{2^9}\)Ibid.

\(^{3^0}\)Ibid., xvi.
degree to which the Evangelical church is likely to continue to be a political force in Guatemala.

Factors that will be considered are aspects of Evangelical theology that lend themselves to a democratic and pluralistic society (e.g., the equality of all people before the Law, the priesthood of all believers, and a congregational or Presbyterian form of church government.) This study will examine Evangelical Christianity's vision for society.

My hypothesis is that the Evangelical church, with its emphasis on the equality of all people before God, and the priesthood of all believers has been able to transcend the traditional caste system in Guatemala, and thereby become a partner for the formation of coalitions necessary to win national elections. This coalition of voters, given its representation of such diverse sectors of society, may become a vehicle for democratic change in Guatemala.

The utility of this study lies in creating a model for predicting outcomes of conflict in Latin America involving the Evangelical church which continues to grow throughout the region, and which recently played an important role in the election of Alberto Fujimori in Peru. The study will also provide a detailed analysis and assessment of recent trends and outcomes concerning the impact of the Evangelical church on contemporary politics. Finally, ecclesiastical leaders could act upon the findings of this study to
reconsider their actual influence, as well as their moral and ethical responsibilities toward their political base and society at large.

The apparent presence of widespread, religiously-motivated political activity in Guatemala presents an intriguing puzzle. Recent commentators on the Guatemalan political scene have emphasized the pervasive individualism of American social and political life. This dissertation will attempt to address several questions associated with the political activity of doctrinally conservative Christians. An obvious area of interest lies in the individual-level political behavior. Why did some people support Evangelical figures and organizations, while others did not? Is it possible to illuminate the rise and fall of figures such as Efraín Ríos Montt and Jorge Serrano Elías at the level of individual attitudes? Similarly, with which political party, if any, do the doctrinally conservative Christians identify? If so, why? In other words, what is the importance of religion on the political behavior of individual citizens?

Peter Berger of the Institute of Economic Culture in London wrote:

... if one looks at today's religious scene in an international perspective, there are two truly global movements of enormous vitality. One is conservative Islam, the other conservative Protestantism. ... The growth of Evangelical Protestantism in Latin America, a continent still
widely regarded as solidly Roman Catholic, is the most dramatic case. 31

Thus, the recent rise and fall of a politicized Christian leader, Jorge Serrano Elías, has generated a number of intriguing questions at the level of the individual citizen and at the level of the political system. At the individual level, the question raised is why some citizens apply values derived from the "private" sphere of religion to the "public" arena of politics. At the systemic level, one is led to ask what difference, if any, politicized religion will make to the practice of politics in Guatemala.

The relevant literature raises the following questions:

1) Is the role played by the Evangelical church in the recent election of Jorge Serrano Elías an indication of their influence upon political life in Guatemala or their manipulation by non-Evangelical politicians?

2) Did the Evangelicals who voted for Serrano vote for him because he took a more biblical view on the issues than did his opponents or did they vote a strict party line? Given their focus on personal purity, one would suspect that Evangelicals would use the same standard to elect public officials. One would hope to find a strong correlation between the views of the candidate and the biblical view to explain the strong evangelical support for the candidate. 32

31 Martin, Tongues of Fire, vii.

32 I intend to use surveys conducted over the past ten years by Asociación Sociológica para Investigaciones
3) Does the large percentage of the evangelical vote that Serrano received suggest that Guatemalan Evangelicals, especially the Pentecostals, have rejected the secular/sacred dichotomy between the Church and the State assumed by the Pietists, and now see it as their duty before God to elect godly officials?

4) Do evangelical voters represent all sectors of society and all walks of life in Guatemala? If the figures do reflect many sectors of society, how has Christianity effected each sector? One would expect that the figures reflect people from all sectors of society. The stronger the correlation between percentage of votes received and the representation of the diverse sectors of society, the more political leverage these sectors will have. One would also expect Christianity to have had an impact on each sector if indeed their Christianity influenced them to vote for President Serrano. For the purposes of this study, society will be broken into three areas: the Civil-social, dealing with the form of Government and its role in society, the Church, and the Family. Evangelicals who voted for Serrano will be surveyed to determine whether President Serrano's views on each of these areas influenced their vote.

5) How is the rapid growth of evangelical Protestantism similar to the Reformation and revivals in Economías y Sociales (ASIES) and data gathered by Servicio Evangelizador Para América Latina (SEPAL) during the 1985 and 1991 elections.
northern Europe, Great Britain, and North America? A strong correlation between the rapid growth in the Protestant church and an increase in both the Church's protesting and active participation in helping address the social inequalities and injustices in society could be considered an indication of such a trend.

6) Is the Evangelical church emerging as a conservative force, a vehicle for national revolt, or a vehicle for democratic change in this transformation process? This may be determined by the sectors of society that the Evangelical church actually represents. If the Evangelical church represents the traditional oligarchy, it will eventually be a conservative force. If the Evangelical church has incorporated sectors of society traditionally unrepresented and invisible, the Evangelical church could become a vehicle for democratic change or national revolt.

This study will look at the impact of the Evangelical church in Guatemala and attempt to determine 1) whether the Evangelical church in Guatemala is a conservative force; 2) is it emerging as an important influence in the formation of a coalition of different societal sectors whose convergence could precipitate a national revolt; 3) will it become a force for democratic change; 4) whether the recent election of Jorge Serrano Elías indicates growing political influence of the Evangelical church in Guatemala; and 5) the degree to
which the Evangelical church is likely to continue to be a political force in Guatemala.

Factors that will be considered are aspects of Evangelical theology that lend themselves to a democratic and pluralistic society (e.g., the equality of all people before God's Law, the priesthood of all believers, and a congregational or presbyterian form of church government). The recent spiritual awakening in Guatemala also has interesting parallels with the Great Awakenings of the early 1700s and the 1850s in the United States.

My hypothesis is that the Evangelical church, with its emphasis on the equality of all people before God, and the priesthood of all believers, along with the democratic procedures inculcated during the selection of pastors and church elders, has been able to transcend the traditional caste system in Guatemala, and thereby become a partner for the formation of coalitions necessary to win national elections. The tremendous growth of the Pentecostal movement and the Charismatic Renewal Movement over the last 25 years has made this coalition easier to achieve. This coalition of voters, given its representation of such diverse sectors of society, may become a vehicle for democratic change in Guatemala.

By Evangelical church it is meant all denominations and sects within the historical Protestant church, excluding the Church of the Latter Day Saints and the Jehovah's Witnesses.
One of the problems with most studies on the political impact of the Evangelical Church in Latin America is that the Evangelical Church in general, and the Pentecostal church in particular, has been viewed as a monolithic structure. However, the Charismatic Renewal Movement in Latin America has tended to blur the denominational distinctions. For the purpose of this study, the Evangelical Church will be divided into Non-Pentecostal, the Pentecostal and the neo-Pentecostal churches.

In this study I have designated Pentecostals to be all religious groups which 1) find their roots in the Holiness Movement, which brought about a break from traditional Protestant denominations, or 2) are so similar to these groups in general beliefs and practices that they are usually classified under this category.33 These groups generally believe that the experience of sanctification (or baptism of the Holy Spirit) is to be confirmed by a supernatural visible sign, such as speaking in tongues, visions, or dreams.

The terms Charismatic, taken from the Greek "Charismata," or "pentecostasl gifts," and neo-Pentecostal are used interchangeably in this study. This term refers to members of both Protestant and Catholic churches who began to have their own Pentecostal experiences, and vowed to stay

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within their own denominations and renew them, hence charismatic renewal. They do not care where you go to church. The only important thing is fellowship with the Holy Spirit, "turning charismaticism into a meeting ground for Protestants and Catholics, and giving Charismatics, a wider social base." 34

The utility of this study lies in creating a model for predicting outcomes of conflict in Latin America involving the Evangelical church which continues to grow throughout the region, and which played an important role in the election of Alberto Fujimori in Peru. In 1984, Jim Montgomery, a church growth planner from the Overseas Crusades Ministry, stated:

Latin America is a Catholic region, but there's no reason to assume that this need always be so. It could become an evangelical region at some point in time. I believe that if . . . Guatemala becomes the first predominantly evangelical nation in Latin America, it will have a domino effect. 35

The study will also provide a detailed assessment of recent trends and outcomes concerning the impact of the Evangelical church on contemporary politics. Finally, ecclesiastical leaders could act upon the findings of this

34Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 50.

35James Montgomery, quoted in "DAWN is About to Break on Guatemala," Global Church Growth (Milpitas, CA: O.C. Ministries), March-April, 1984, 351. [DAWN is the acronym for Discipling A Whole Nation, a Protestant ministry. James Montgomery is the president of the organization. In Latin America, DAWN is known as "Amanecer," Spanish for "dawn".] See also Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 32.
study to reconsider their actual influence, as well as their moral and ethical responsibilities toward their political base and society at large.

Sources of Data

This study will follow the campaigns of candidates from different evangelical churches during their campaign for Congressional seats in the August 1994 elections. The churches include Principe de Paz, a Pentecostal Church, Verbo, a neo-Pentecostal church, and El Camino, an offshoot of the Central American Mission, one of the oldest denominations in Guatemala that is non-pentecostal. The study will also include representative churches in indigenous areas since all three have been active in these regions. The pastors and church members will be surveyed in order to ascertain their attitudes toward political participation by Christians, and their subjective estimation of the impact of Christianity upon their personal lives and upon their vote in elections. This study will also include interviews with the candidates and other party officials. Besides the polls and statistics already mentioned above, this study will utilize statistics compiled by local scholars, foreign consultants, missionaries, and missions boards. This study will also include personal interviews with Wycliffe Bible translators to determine their observations on the impact of the Gospel upon indigenous evangelical pastors and church members.
Thus, the study will compare attitudes about Christian participation in politics from both urban and rural church leaders and congregations as well as at all levels of social strata since whereas the pentecostal movement has been most effective among the lower classes, the neo-pentecostal, or charismatic movement has been effective among the middle and upper classes of Guatemalan society.

Several problems with drawing conclusions from the above statistics remain to be solved. The researcher recognizes differences among professing Christians in spiritual, intellectual, and theological development and sophistication. The assumption that Protestant evangelism has been more effective than Catholic evangelism, resulting in true conversion of the Indians and not a syncretism between Protestant religions and the native religion, is operationally unprovable in the short term. The researcher also recognizes that the success of the Evangelical church in providing the basis for a national coalition is dependent upon the degree of cooperation between the different denominations in Guatemala, which historically has been difficult to achieve. Finally, the researcher recognizes that the Reformation in Europe, as well as the Spiritual Awakenings in Great Britain and North America took at least a generation before they had their most profound impact upon their respective nations, so what is being looked for are
precursors, not evidence of a movement coming to conclusive maturity.
Chapter I

Theory and the Relevance of Religion

"Rather than an age of rampant secularization and religious decline, it appears to be more of an era of religious revival and the return of the sacral."\(^{36}\)

---Harvey Cox

Until recently, the theories that have predominated in political science and other social sciences have generally predicted that with the advent of modernization, religion's influence on society would gradually wane. One notable exception is Daniel Levine who has argued that "religion and politics have depended upon and influenced one another in Latin America."\(^{37}\) However, the prevailing theories neither predicted nor do they adequately explain the Evangelical explosion, especially among Pentecostals, in Latin America. Rather than widespread secularization among industrialized and industrializing nations, religious revival is sweeping across the continents of the world. Is religion more significant than current theories have led us to believe? If so, what relevance does it have, and what impact will the tremendous growth of the Evangelical church have upon Guatemalan society? This chapter argues that religion is indeed significant and warrants further serious study. This

\(^{36}\)Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City (Simon and Schuster, 1984), 20.

chapter also challenges assertions that the growth of the Evangelical church in Guatemala will inhibit the democratization process in that nation, arguing that it rather may help foster further democratization there.

**Modernization Theory**

The study of religion and politics has usually been analyzed within three paradigms. These are: modernization/secularization theory, world system theory, and critical theory. Modernization theory draws very heavily from the work of Emile Durkheim's classic study of religion, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1947). Durkheim drew a distinction between beliefs and rites relative to sacred things and suggested both serve to unite religious followers into a moral community or church. Distinguishing among these three characteristics, he combined both the cultural and social organizational components into a definition to show that religion is an eminently collective phenomenon. He argued that in most elementary forms of religion these components overlap; but in a more complex, modern society, he expected the cultural and organizational aspects to separate. He predicted that modernization would lead to greater "religious

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39Ibid., 47.
individualism" or a rise in privatized religious forms largely independent of communal structures.

Modernization theory postulates that, as societies progress, a division of labor takes place whereby institutions become more complex in organization and specialized in function. In this view, such processes as bureaucratization, urbanization, industrialization, and secularization are active in producing a complex, modern society. Instead of the tribal chief acting as family, political, and religious ruler, those three functions have been separated and taken over by individuals and groups within family systems, political parties, and religious organizations. Politics, education, medicine, and other institutions become more detached from religion, and religion becomes less diffused throughout society and more limited to practice in churches or families. Religion thus becomes increasingly separated from politics and enters its own sphere.

Modernity and religion as mutually exclusive thus became the simplest way of formulating a major paradigm in the sociology of religious phenomena in Western societies. Nowhere was the paradigm thought to have greater relevance than for formerly Catholic countries such as France. Empirical studies of French Catholics confirmed the decline of religion as inevitable in a society in which modernization is an ongoing process, and this type of
research "formed the backbone of research in the sociology of religions until the late 1960s."\(^{40}\)

Even the United States has refused to obey the laws of cultural motion prescribed by modernization theorists. According to these laws, the high level of economic development in the United States over the past century should have reduced its level of religious commitment to one of the lowest in the world. But, as sociologist Robert Wuthnow points out, "among industrialized countries the United States continues to manifest one of the highest levels of religious commitment."\(^{41}\) Despite general declines in voter turnout and political participation in the populace at large, "the religiously orthodox have become more politically active in recent years."\(^{42}\)

Closely allied with modernization theory in the minds of many social science practitioners is secularization theory.\(^{43}\) In some formulations secularization would mean


\(^{42}\)Ibid.

\(^{43}\)The French term *sécularisation* achieved currency in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The original connotation of the term, as a reference to the formal separation of church and state, had established itself in English discourse by the early eighteenth century; the more contemporary connotation was recognizable by the mid-nineteenth century (The Oxford English Dictionary, 10 Vols. Oxford University Press, 1937), VIII: 366. Secularization
the demise of religion. Theories of secularization prescribe that religion, and specifically Christianity, relinquishes and is deprived of its hold on the central structures of power. It ceases to be the symbolic keystone in mechanical solidarity and is released from the centripetal pull which aligns it with elite interests and explicit party attachments. Secularization of this type has not occurred inexorably in Latin America. As a matter of fact, fundamentalism has caused modernization theory no end of grief and embarrassment. No sooner did a country like Iran undergo enormous modernization than a fundamentalist dictatorship took over. Its leaders proved not to be the disadvantaged but people who benefited materially from modernization.

Theories of secularization also specify a complementary process whereby the state takes over and develops many organizations and functions, especially in education and social welfare, which were previously under the aegis of the church. This advance of the omnicompetent state is associated with the growth of professions whose interests come to lie in the extension of state action, and with the propagation of ideologies which define the religious contribution as irrelevant to the efficient running of society. Bryan Wilson has argued that a net of rational

now generally refers to these challenges to the legitimacy of traditional faiths in addition to the associated process of church-state separation in the modern world.
bureaucratic regulation can supplant the moral densities, the conscientious sensitivities and commitments once generated by communities of faith.44

The question then becomes whether this process is contingent, i.e., dependent on specific circumstances, notably those which have obtained in Europe, or is a necessary and inevitable part of social development. If the latter is the case, then the explosion of evangelical Christianity in Latin America is simply a "temporary efflorescence of voluntary religiosity which accompanies industrialization or urbanization."45 As Methodism flourished during just such a period in Britain so Pentecostalism flourishes today in Latin America.

This may, of course, be the case. But there is the alternative view based on the notion that the European experience is contingent and fails to provide the universal paradigm which all other societies must in time approximate. According to this alternative view, the religious monopoly such as existed in Europe inhibited the adaptability of religion to social change, above all to the industrial city. However, the North American paradigm seems to show that once religion is no longer a matter of a relation of a particular


45Martin, Tongues of Fire, 294.
body to the elite and to the state, religion adapts quite successfully to a changing world. In all the proper senses of the word it becomes popular. Indeed, it shows itself endlessly inventive and actually succeeds in assuaging the anomalies and combatting the chaos of the megacity.

It may well be that the inventiveness displayed in North America has now been transplanted to Latin America and the cycle derived from Europe thereby slowed or halted, maybe even reversed. If true, then secularization as understood in the European context is a particular kind of episode. If there is a universal element to it, it is restricted to the shift from structural location to cultural influence. Should this restricted and episodic view of secularization turn out to be correct then the crossing of the "Anglo" and Hispanic patterns currently observed in Latin America is not a repeat performance of a sequence already played through and played out in Britain, but a new moment with new possibilities.

The Protestant experience in Britain exhibited a religious reawakening at the time of industrialization and urbanization that eventually faded away into ineffectiveness. The Latin experience in Southern Europe exhibited spirals of repulsion between the Catholic ghetto and the forces of militant secularism. In both, religion eventually receded as the state advanced. But in North America the factors which eventually curtailed the religious
vitality in Britain did not arise, and a new pattern emerged of immense expansive power. It is that North American pattern which has now become admixed with the Latin cultures of South and Central America. In these cultures it so happens that certain characteristic spirals of antagonism over religion appear to be weakening. This could signal a new moment in which a sizeable sector of mainstream religion rejects its old alliances on the right. It follows that as the spirals of antagonism weaken, and as there is a strong admixture of a kind of religion originally generated in North America, the old tendencies may well be nullified. Should that be so, Martin warns, the "tongues of fire" may not so easily sputter out.

**World-System Theory**

World-system theory has emerged over the past fifteen years as a leading contender with modernization theory. As the name suggests, world-system theory emphasizes the larger social, economic, and political relations that link societies together. These relations began to emerge in the

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"The phrase "tongues of fire" is often used when referring to the Pentecostal movement. The term is derived from Acts 2:3, "They saw what seemed to be tongues of fire that separated and came to rest on each of them," and is used to describe the in-filling of the Holy Spirit in Pentecostal theology. Pentecost is the Christian feast commemorating the manifestation of the Holy Ghost. All Scripture citations are taken from the New International Version Bible (NIV) unless otherwise noted."
sixteenth century, according to world-system theorists, chiefly as a result of international trade and diplomacy among the European states. Gradually, this system became the driving force of modern capitalism, and its borders came to encompass most of the globe by the end of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the contours of societal change on virtually every level must be understood in terms of the dynamics of this larger system.

The intellectual origins of world-system theory can be traced most directly to various offshoots of Marxism. Because of its epistemological assumptions about the priority of material conditions, world-system theory has paid little attention specifically to the role of religious beliefs or religious institutions. Because their principal concern is with social classes and class conflict, most Marxists de-emphasize the importance of institutions or see them as representing class interests. For example, Louis Althusser regards religion as an "ideological apparatus of the state," which he sees as a means for "ensuring the reproduction of the social order." This vision obscures


the distinction between state and civil society and fails to recognize that in the post-medieval world, the Church has not been part of the state apparatus. Scott Mainwaring asserts that "Althusser reduces religion to a tool of domination, assumes religion always has a stabilizing function, and denies that it can contest the social order." He adds that "Marx's statement that religion is the opiate of the masses also encourages this understanding by suggesting that religious organizations always serve the interests of the dominant classes." Mainwaring argues that "religion can be a powerful force in determining political orientation, frequently more powerful than class."

Applications of world-system theory to questions of religious change have focused to a great extent on the ways in which short-term changes in the world-system may affect the stability of religious institutions. Some of the arguments that have been advanced do not differ markedly from those advanced within the modernization framework. Thus, "the most that can be done by a social-scientist of religion is to show in precise detail how religion has,

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50 Ibid., 14.

51 Ibid., 12.
indeed, retreated across recent centuries and performed its 'ideological functions'."^{52}

Generally, though, world-system theory has placed greater emphasis on the abrupt, disruptive, and conflictual nature of changes in the world-economy than modernization theory. Because societies' fortunes are said to be so closely connected with the dynamics of the broader system, many things can happen over which societies themselves have little control. For instance, a periodic downturn in the business cycle can have severe repercussions for a tiny country whose economy depends heavily on exports. Or trade may be cut off because of an outbreak of war resulting in equally serious disruptions in exporting societies. Religious institutions may be caught in the middle of such changes: Pro-Western religious orientations may suddenly become unpopular because of changes in trading alliances, peasants may turn to millenarian or folk religions to revitalize economically threatened communities, and communist or nationalist movements among oppressed urban workers may strike out at traditional religious organizations.

Within a single society, the social dislocation attendant upon these broader strains may look very similar

to the observer who focuses only on that society and the observer who emphasizes world-system dynamics. What the world-system theorist insists on bringing into the picture is some understanding of the external forces that contribute to these dislocations. Two lines of inquiry are likely to follow. One stresses the ways in which regimes and elites in a particular society respond to these external forces. Rather than seeing religious conflict strictly as a domestic issue, the observer looks at it in terms of the military obligations, foreign debt, trade advantages or disadvantages, that may be inspired by broader diplomatic, military and economic considerations. The other stresses ways in which conflicts and dislocations in particular societies may exemplify patterns of a more general or systemic nature.

Critical Theory

Another perspective that bears consideration is the Frankfurt school of critical theory. Critical theory has been advanced most notably in the recent work of German sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Focused at a relatively high level of theoretical abstraction, his work is often difficult to connect with concrete developments in world politics. But it has been an appealing frame of reference, especially for theologians and others concerned with the public role of religion, because it attempts to be normative, or prescriptive, as well as empirical.
Habermas has drawn eclectically from modernization theory and from Marxism to create what he calls a reconstructive model of cultural evolution. In this model the modern epoch is characterized by an abandonment of the three-tiered or dualistic universe of traditional religion, by a reliance on scientific and technical reasoning, and by increasing state intervention to promote advanced industrial capitalism and to combat its ill effects on social life. We are, however, on the verge of transcending the modern epoch, he claims, and are moving into a postmodern period. Habermas regards this as a vital step that must be taken in order to better master the contingencies we face. The twin evils that beset us resemble the evils identified by Weber and Marx in the nineteenth century. From Weber, Habermas borrows a concern for the effects of bureaucratization, and from Marx, a focus on the evils of the capitalist market. The former is associated with the modern state, while the latter conjures up the dangers of rampant free enterprise which, to many Europeans, the United States epitomizes. Underlying both tendencies is what Habermas calls "technical reasoning." This is a reliance on instrumental logic as a means of adapting to the material environment. It contrasts with an emphasis on open and free debate about goals and values of society itself--what Habermas calls "communicative
action."[53] To gain command of our collective destinies, Habermas believes we must cultivate communicative action.

From this perspective, many of the religious movements we see emerging in various parts of the world, especially those in advanced industrial societies, can be understood as protests against the growing bureaucratization and monetization of the lifeworld. Environmentalism, home schooling, certain variants of feminist theory, and even Christian or Islamic fundamentalism may be understood as examples of such protest. Habermas suggests that we are finally becoming aware of the threats of our quality of life, our sense of our selves, and our natural environment. As a consequence, we see an increasing number of movements attempting to combat these threats. He cites the various mystical and human potential groups that have arisen in opposition to the impersonality of modern life, the efforts mounted by established religious groups to advocate equality and social justice in the name of traditional or divine values, communal experiments with the reshaping and redefinition of work, and special interest groups concerned with gender roles, the family, and environmental pollution.

Habermas takes a critical view of all these movements, however, because he regards their own theoretical vision as being too narrow. The solution, he argues, must come from a

better understanding of the communication process itself. Thus, some developments in theological hermeneutics attract him as examples of such progress. But he believes that secular philosophy, rather than religious tradition, holds the key for advancing civilization to a higher level of self-mastery and rationality. In the short term, he predicts a heightening of social unrest in which various short-lived religious movements play an important role. His long-term hope for the future lies in moving beyond religious tradition, abandoning its claim on the sacred, and moving toward a culture based on rationality.

Critique

The most consequential choice these theories pose is the valuative stance to be taken toward economic development. Most variants of modernization theory assume that economic development is both inevitable and desirable. While the transition to modernity may be painful, perhaps especially so for practitioners of traditional faiths, the overall gains must be positive. Physical health, prosperity, greater individual freedom, and cultural sophistication are the measures of these gains. World-system theory and critical theory, in contrast, are more likely to regard economic development as inherently productive of conflict, oppression, and exploitation.

What we look for in studies of religion and the state depends greatly on the stance we take toward these two
extreme interpretations of the development process. Studies conducted during the 1950's and 1960s often took an optimistic view of economic development and, in keeping with this outlook, showed how traditional religions were adapting to Westernization and saw value in the accompanying shifts toward rationalization and individual piety. More recent studies, particularly those informed by the Vietnam War and concurrent critiques of neocolonialism and dependency, have taken a more pessimistic view of economic development. It has become more common, therefore, to see analyses of the role of religion in resistance movements, of exploitive alliances between regimes and established religions, and of the political implications of millenarian, messianic, and other grass-roots religious movements.

A second valuative choice built into these theories concerns the temporal and spatial framework we decide to emphasize. The perspective implicit in modernization and critical theory uses centuries as the appropriate time frame for understanding social change. How societies have evolved since, say, the thirteenth century is the central issue. Moreover, the spatial framework is often left unspecified, except for references to the West, Europe, or the capitalist system. Against these macroscopic spatial and temporal orientations, one is likely to view the significance of religious conflict differently if it is seen as a mere blip
in some broad evolutionary scheme or if its immediate costs in human lives are emphasized.

Social scientists have therefore been hesitant to acknowledge religion's influence on political life. Princeton sociologist Robert Wuthnow argues:

In seeking to make empirical predictions, each of the three theories . . . focuses on the broad dynamics of economic and political systems as the determining forces in the modern world. All three regard religion as determined, and therefore, none take religion seriously.\textsuperscript{54}

Daniel Levine adds that social scientists and students of politics have failed to give religion any attention because they "remain wedded to the nineteenth-century liberal view that, with scientific, technological, and economic progress, religion inevitably loses its popular influence."\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, he maintains that liberal evolutionism and the Marxist stress on economics as somehow more "real," more dynamic, together lead to the view that older, supposedly more "traditional institutions," and especially religious ones are survivors—static, unchanging structures held over from the past, whose day is rapidly drawing to a close. He concludes: "To treat religious institutions as mere survivors is to miss completely their

\textsuperscript{54}Wuthnow, "Understanding Religion and Politics," 13-14.

dynamic growth and transformation, and their continuing vitality everywhere."^{56}

Moving beyond the impasse in contemporary theory, therefore, requires us to adopt an interpretive stance toward the role of theory and a more appreciative stance towards religion. I do not mean that we must abandon rigor, or the desire for objectivity, or view religious fanaticism with sympathy. But we must try to interpret the significance of contemporary events in terms of the hope for salvation and spiritual renewal, rather than trying to mold these events to fit some preconceived views about the secular movement of history. Taking into account the aims and aspirations of religious communities adds indeterminacy to our models of history.

The vitality and continued salience of religion have confounded the expectations of much conventional social science, which for a long time made secularization inevitable and desirable. Change in religion was either ignored or derived from factors supposedly more primary in the economic or political order. But a closer look affirms that religion's social and political impact follows an autonomous logic, which cannot be derived in any simple

^{56}Ibid., 4.
deductive fashion from factors like class or political affiliation.  

**Renewed Interest in Religion**

Scholars from different religious and political traditions and working in different disciplines have begun to develop a common set of themes that have created a coherent literature. These scholars now see change in religion as normal and continuous. They therefore attempt to grasp its impact on politics not as aberrant or irrational but as a logical outgrowth of central religious themes and structures. This has resulted in a shared concern to reassess "popular religion," placing it in the context of ongoing links to dominant institutions of power and meaning and to see the connections between everyday life and the high politics of "state and church" in a radically new light. Levine asserts that at a general theoretical level, these themes reveal a shared focus on the sources of change in ideas and on their links to class, context, and institutional transformations. They also point to a reassessment in social and political change.

Much of this renewed concern with religion and politics lies in a reaction to long-prevailing assumptions in the social sciences that made religion secondary to supposedly

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more immediate, "real," or rational social, economic, or political forces. Three assumptions are especially critical here: The first makes religion epiphenomenal; the second takes religious motives or groups as less-evolved alternatives to politics, at best "prepolitical" way stations; the third awaits an inevitable secularization--here religion appears mostly as a survivor from the past, doomed to privatization and disappearance. Much early work on "modernization" took these premises for granted.

Recent scholarship has turned the theoretical and methodological tables. Writers like Ajami, Arjomand, Phillip Berryman, Bruneau, Comaroff, Davis, Fields, Gilsenan, Ileto, Scott Mainwaring, Mardin, Smith, Robert Wuthnow, and others have challenged conventional expectations of secularization, showing that religion is dynamic, not static, primary, not epiphenomenal. The adoption of a phenomenological approach "demands that we take religion seriously as a source of guiding concepts and principles, instead of merely subsuming religious phenomena under secular rubrics."58 In doing so, these writers moved research about religion decisively beyond the study of documents, elite-directed programs, or classic church-state issues. Instead, there has been notable stress on discovering the sources of change in popular religion and

58Levine, Religion and Politics in Latin America, 12.
popular culture and on understanding its evolving links to dominant institutions of power and meaning.

The last few decades have witnessed a remarkable spurt of religious innovation throughout Latin America, resulting in a heightened role for the churches as institutions and enhanced participation by ordinary believers. But Latin American experience presents several phenomena that together cast doubt on the "crisis-solace" model of religious growth. Crisis-adaptation emphasizes the ability of evangelicals to transcend social dislocation by establishing new forms of community, learning new forms of discipline, and stabilizing their family situations, with the result that at least some climb higher in the class structure. 59

First, the model is too static. It assumes that both churches and their clienteles remain unchanged except for the external pressure of crisis. New work routines, growing literacy and access to media, and migration on a large scale have combined to change the ordinary rhythms of life, making popular sectors available to hear new kinds of messages and to work effectively with innovative organizational forms.

The crisis-solace model also suffers from an unfortunately patronizing tone. The expectation that a turn to religion is sparked above all by the search for solace and escape rests on the same assumptions that have long

59See for example Sheldon Annis, God and Production in a Guatemalan Town (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).
dismissed religious belief and action as epiphenomenal, presumably doomed to privatization and ultimately disappearance. Levine believes that this view is deeply flawed. He argues that "[t]o confine religion to a desire for escape is to misread the meaning of crisis and the role religion can play in crafting and supporting a response to crisis."^60

Levine and Robert Wuthnow argue that social scientists do not give credit to the shaping power of religious actors themselves. They do not recognize the sway religious leaders may hold over their followers or the role of faith in motivating people to take political action.

Max Weber saw pastoral care as an essential connection between the mystical, charismatic side of religion and its involvement in daily life. He maintained:

Pastoral care in all its forms is the priest's real instrument of power, particularly over the workaday world, and it influences the conduct of life most powerfully when religion has achieved an ethical character. In fact, the power of ethical religion over the masses parallels the development of pastoral care. Wherever the power of an ethical religion is intact, the pastor will be consulted in all the situations of life by both private individuals and the functionaries of groups.^61

Even though religious leaders themselves may not be in the forefront of international trade or diplomatic negotiations,


religious traditions are likely to be a significant part of what separates or joins two societies' cultural orientations. Religious groups can facilitate or undermine the legitimacy of alliances, and any such alliances may spell victory, defeat, or at least minor altercations in the life changes of population segments whose identities are defined by religious commitments. Wuthnow warns that "[the] significance of an educated clergy, colleges and seminaries under religious auspices, and even places of worship that can double as meetinghouses for political purposes should not be overlooked." 62

While church leaders are capable of seeing the world in secular terms, of using current sociological jargon, and in general, of displaying an up-to-date awareness of trends in social and political analysis, "their views in these areas are grounded not in sociological analysis or in political opinion, but rather in a deeper commitment to religious world views which set society (the "temporal world") in a transhistorical perspective." 63 Wuthnow concludes that social scientists have "neglected these forces because they were striving for elegant predictions based on premises about the priority of secular tendencies in modern

63 Ibid., 10.
history." He adds that "when theories shift from prediction to interpretation, then the meaning of events can be understood only if the religious meaning of those events is also included." 

Moreover, their views of religion and the nature of the Church have a major, independent impact, not so much on how they see the world, as on the meaning they accord to what they see, and thus, on the kinds of imperatives for action they draw from their social analysis. Thus, different views of the nature of religion and of the Church as a community of the faithful are closely associated with very divergent understandings of the Church's proper relation to society and politics as a whole, and have led to the development of different styles of action for dealing with the world.

Religious worldviews then pose a serious challenge to the premises of contemporary theory. It has been assumed that social theory can provide a privileged or authoritative interpretation of social events. Social theory is thus a kind of hegemonic discourse with respect to all other discourses. It claims to see more objectively, more rationally, more factually, and from a wider horizon than any other interpretation. But taking religion seriously means granting it parity as an interpretive framework.

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64 Ibid., 14.

65 Ibid.
Clearly, the startling and unanticipated development in Latin America, now spreading to the Eastern Pacific rim and Asia, is part of much wider global changes. The first of these is a world-wide growth of religious conservatism in Judaism, and in Islam, as well as in Christianity. A balance once supposed to be tipping automatically towards liberalism is now tipping the other way.

Quite what the parallel developments in Islam and Judaism portend is much disputed. Some see it as a reaction to external pressure and a reflex of fear leading to an attempt to recover "mechanical solidarity". Others see it, at least in the Islamic version, as a modernization and a radical mobilization carried out inside a conservative frame. It is significant that Catholicism also tried to create a militant fortress mentality in the mid-nineteenth century, and that it came nearest to success where it was implicated in the struggles of repressed nations. It may be that Islam stands a better chance of strengthening its "fortress," given that it has received warnings earlier in the process of disintegration and is implicated in nationalistic struggles in many societies from Algeria to Malaysia.

Whatever may be the case with multiple religious monopolies like Catholicism and Judaism, or even a single and weak "monopoly" such as orthodox Judaism in Israel, the success of evangelicalism depends rather on the reverse
process, that is on the break-up of monopolies and the restriction of religious influence to the realm of culture. David Martin argues that this distinction is absolutely crucial. He asserts:

> Whatever the surface similarities of conservative versions of all three monotheistic faiths, developments in Latin America run quite counter to those in the Middle East. Evangelical religion represents an advanced form of social differentiation and can operate best where hitherto monopolistic systems are disintegrating. 66

Once the monopolies begin to crack and to lose contact with the core structures of society, evangelical Christianity can emerge to compete within the sphere of culture. There it can stand in what were once the local territorial units of solidarity, re-forming them in an active, mobile, and voluntary format. In this way it counters chaos and restores moral densities. There is no chance it will become a substitute established church, though it may create a widely shared ethos for some oppressed ethnic group. This dramatic restriction to the cultural sphere is one aspect of secularization, but whether this means that religion has finally ceased to be socially significant depends on whether culture is regarded as impotent and dependent. If culture is regarded as without serious influence then religion is indeed marginalized beyond recovery and can be dismissed as just one leisure-time activity among others.

The debate over secularization remains relevant for two reasons. First, it is relevant because up to 1960 Catholic societies and Protestant societies had entered upon "modernity" by quite distinct paths. Not only has the 'Anglo' civilization met the Hispanic world, but the characteristic Protestant pathway in its Anglo-American variant has been crossed with the Catholic one. The specific pattern of change persisting in Catholic societies from 1789 to 1950 has given way to a criss-cross, which is a genuine new moment in modern history. This moment cannot be dismissed simply as a transfer from North to South America brought about by cultural imperialism. David Martin asserts that "what we have is an indigenous enthusiastic Protestantism rooted in the hopes of millions of Latin American poor."{67}

The wider question is whether a new movement remains, nevertheless, just part of transition within the larger and all-enveloping scope of secularization. Up to now the proponents of universal secularization have seen all Catholic societies as prefigured by France and all Protestant societies as prefigured by Sweden. But maybe Europe does not provide the universal model, and only illustrates what happens when social change occurs in states where religion has been tied to governments and to old elites.

{67}Ibid., 3.
Historically, Protestantism has not necessarily been a conservative force of the status quo. The leading and most influential proponent of this thesis in Latin America is Rubem Alves, a Presbyterian minister in Brazil. Writing in 1979, Alves maintained that "a social ethic is not an essential part of the Protestant universe." This view is echoed today by scholars such as Susan Eckstein, a sociology professor at Boston University. She argues: "Although Protestantism reflects religious defiance of Catholic hegemony in the region, its political impact tends to be conservative." According to Eckstein, "other worldly" orientation of Protestant churches in Latin America makes them tolerant of social injustice. However, José Miguez Bonino, an Argentine and prominent Methodist theologian points out that Protestantism originated as a "protest movement" and has provided the momentum for remarkable social change in other parts of the world as well as Latin America. He notes that although Protestantism has no praxis comparable to Catholicism's theology of liberation, Protestantism does not actively discourage social action, as

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70Ibid., 32.
many Latin Americans believe. Nor are Protestants puppets being manipulated by repressive governments as posited by Alves, Rolim and others. Protestants have participated in great democratic liberal struggles, the anti-oligarchic and anti-authoritarian campaigns that by the 1850s had been going on for a century. Members of Latin American Protestant congregations could be found siding with the democratic forces at the heart of the republican and antislavery struggles in Brazil (1870-1889), during the Cuban independence movements (1868-1898), and in the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). Latin American Protestants were also active in the movements opposing the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz in Mexico (1876-1910), among the tenientes (lieutenants) in Brazil of the 1920s and 1930s, in the Peruvian civiliste movement (1920-1940), on the side of the Jacobo Arbenz regime and the agrarian revolution in Guatemala (1950-1954), and in the early days of the Cuban Revolution (1953-1961). Jean Pierre Bastian maintains that in the examples above, "the identity of the Protestant movements was forged as an agent of reform that was


religious as well as intellectual and moral, a precondition for democratic modernity.  

Even today, Protestants seem to be an increasingly influential force in social and political spheres, even in places where the Protestant percentage of the population remains in single digits. For example, Protestants in Peru who account for less than 5 percent of the national population were credited with rallying key support for Alberto Fujimori in the 1990 presidential election.

Material explanations alone, though, are insufficient. Conversions long predated the 1980s debt crisis, and urbanization does not explain the popularity of Protestantism in the Guatemalan countryside. The new evangelicalism seems to meet purely spiritual needs in a way that Catholicism has not. It has been predicted that Latin America's Pentecostals will "have their biggest impact as carriers of Protestantism's traditional linkage between

\[73\text{Ibid.}\]

\[74\text{Many of the commonly cited statistics on Protestant growth in Latin America are compiled by the Servicio Evanglizador para América Latina (SEPAL), a Protestant-sponsored research organization that has attempted to collect scientific data on evangelical growth since 1980. SEPAL's methodology is derived from a research design explained in World Christianity: Central America, edited by Clifford Holland (Monrovia, CA: Missions Advanced Research and Communications Center (MARC), 1981). This methodology has recently come under fire from some academic and church scholars, who suggest that the statistics for Protestant growth may be inflated.}\]
worldly and spiritual betterment."  

Sociologist Peter Berger expects

the new Protestant internationale . . . to produce results similar to those of the preceding one—that is, the emergence of a solid bourgeoisie, with virtues conducive to the development of a democratic capitalism."  

Will evangelicalism promote capitalism in Latin America as Calvinism did in early modern Europe? Does it, like Methodism in eighteenth-century England or the "Great Awakening" in colonial America, contain the seeds of democracy? Sociologist David Martin asserts that "what happened in England from 1760 onward has happened now in South America from 1960 onward."  

He argues:

Denominational Protestantism contains varied anticipations of democratic reform, which are organizational in the Calvinist instance and more directly theological in later evangelicalism. Such foreshadowings and congruences do not lead automatically to religio-political alliances of a democratizing nature but they do create felt and symbolic congruences around which generalized democratic sentiment can form. The organizational practices of Protestant nonconformity . . . provide a practical forum of lay participation, rhetoric, and democratic experience which can be redeployed in the political realm.

Martin also maintains that Evangelicalism fosters skills and practices with implications for self-government. The

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76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 44.
participatory and autonomous structure of evangelical churches has democratic overtones. Church activists acquire skills in speech, organization, and leadership conducive to self-reliance and political action. The Protestant emphasis on literacy and preaching can also serve to challenge received authority and its respect for native languages can promote ethnic identification and cohesion.

Above all, new religion can offer a natural foundation for democracy by building communities based on fraternity, participation and equality. These networks might undergird democracy in Latin America just as voluntary associations have in the United States. They disperse power by integrating their members into a wider social milieu and creating a sense of identity.

Peter Berger of the Institute of Economic Culture in London states:

... if one looks at today's religious scene in an international perspective, there are two truly global movements of enormous vitality. One is conservative Islam, the other conservative Protestantism. ... The growth of Evangelical Protestantism in Latin America, a continent still widely regarded as solidly Roman Catholic, is the most dramatic case. 79

Despite their phenomenal growth and success, evangelicals continue to be an anomaly in the interpretation of Latin American religious life. The question then becomes, is religion an opiate of the people and an

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79 Martin, Tongues of Fire, vii.
impediment to social protest or rather their hope for a better world, and a form of social protest? Yet, in Latin America, this insight is rarely extended to Evangelicals. In a traditionally Catholic region, Evangelicals insist on breaking with Catholic mores. Downplaying the structural issues that Catholics raise, Evangelicals insist that the only genuine revolution in Latin America will be spiritual. Despite their seeming indifference to oppression, they succeed in attracting millions of poor people from a Catholic Church which seems far more socially conscious. They also succeed in organizing vital, enduring local groups where Marxists have failed. Their churches flourish amidst survivors of crushed radical movements. As a result, they remain on the fringes in most assessments of the politics of religion in Latin America, ignored except to be denounced.

Lately, those denunciations have been increasing. Alarm over Evangelicals in Latin America is nothing new, but in the 1980s it spread, especially through the Catholic Church and the left. Numerous Latin Americans assume that North American money is responsible for the multiplication of Evangelical churches. They further suspect that the U.S. government is using Evangelicals to further its own interests. Only that kind of manipulation, opponents argue, can explain how Evangelicals are able to disrupt the efforts of the left and the Catholic Church to organize the poor. Instead of an instance of popular struggle, according to
this logic, religious movements incorporating millions of Latin Americans become the negation of that struggle, a conspiracy designed to frustrate it.

With David Stoll, I will argue that such explanations are inadequate. "If religious commitments are dismissed as mere reflections of political interests, we lose sight of the new and creative responses they produce." Just as religion should not be reduced to a playing field for contending political forces, evangelical Protestantism should not be reduced to a political instrument for dominant interests. This is important because, under the influence of Catholic and Marxist thinking, many observers have come to assume that evangelical religion has easily predictable political implications.

**Protestantism in Latin America**

Though Protestants, usually missionaries from the United States, have been active in Latin America since the nineteenth century, until recently, very little literature existed to document their work. According to Virginia Garrard-Burnett:

> Until the 1960s, ... most Latin Americans perceived Protestantism to be so culturally and theologically beyond the pale of their experience

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that it remained confined to the most marginal sectors of Latin society."\textsuperscript{81}

For a variety of reasons, this perception has changed over the last twenty years, resulting in what some writers have called a "Protestant explosion."

The Protestant explosion has generated renewed interest in religion in Latin America. Several influential studies on Protestantism appeared in the 1960s, Christian Lalive d'Epinay's \textit{El refugio de las masas: estudio sociológico del protestantismo chileno}, and Emilio Willems' work, \textit{Followers of the New Faith: Culture Change and the Rise of Protestantism in Brazil and Chile}. However, these seminal works are over twenty years old and the evangelical populations of many of the nations of Latin America have at least doubled between 1960 and 1985.\textsuperscript{82}

It was not until the 1980s that the topic commanded much attention in the academic community. The recent studies are clearly indebted to the ground-breaking work of Lalive d'Epinay and Willems but tend to focus on two key questions that the past two decades have cast in high relief. The first appears simple but is elusive: why has Protestantism become so attractive to Latin Americans, especially after so many decades of marginality? The second


\textsuperscript{82}David Stoll, "A Protestant Reformation in Latin America?," \textit{Christian Century}, 17 January 1990, 44.
question is equally problematic: what kind of impact can religious change be expected to have on nations that are theologically, culturally, politically, and sociologically grounded in Roman Catholicism? Christian Lalive D'Epinay's *El refugio de los mosos* is the classic work on evangelical growth from the perspective that Daniel Levine calls the "crisis-solace" model, which treats born-again religion as a form of escapism. Lalive d'Epinay was among the first to perceive that Protestantism was becoming more popular among native Chileans. He was also one of the first to note the particular growth of Pentecostal churches, which had no association with the older "traditional" denominations that had been in the vanguard of earlier missionary movement. According to Lalive, Pentecostals re-create the traditional society of the hacienda by replacing the figure of the *patrón* with that of the pastor.

Generally, researchers from North America and Protestant Europe have shown little interest in the crisis-solace model. Instead, they tend to explain the new religion as a creative response to capitalist development and its uprooting of traditional society. The resulting "crisis-adaptation" model is exemplified by Emilio Willems's

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study of Protestants in Chile and Brazil, *Followers of the New Faith*. This school of thought emphasizes the ability of evangelicals to transcend social dislocation by establishing new forms of community, learning new forms of discipline, and stabilizing their family situations, with the result that at least some climb higher in the class structure.  

Just as Protestantism is not new to Latin America, it is also not a completely new focus of scholarly discourse. An established, if small, body of literature on this subject dates back several decades. The oldest, if least reliable, works are those works that might be called the "confessional studies" of Protestantism in the region. Books like José María Ganunza's provocatively titled *Las sectas nos invaden*, Antonio Quarrancino's *Sectas en America Latina*, and Mildred Spain's *And in Samaria: A Story of Fifty Years' Missionary Witness in Central America, 1890-1940* were usually written by religious partisans and exemplify the polemical and highly sectarian works that made up most of the early literature on the topic. With these kinds of antecedents, it is not surprising that a large portion of the contemporary scholarship on Protestantism has a strong undertone of political or theological polemic.  

Much of the modern work is based on the premise that Protestantism is inextricably bound by culture, custom, 

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*See also Sheldon Annis, *God and Production in a Guatemalan Town*. 

history, and politics to the "Protestant nations" of Western Europe and particularly to the United States. This premise has a sound historical base, given the fact that the vast majority of foreign missionaries to Latin America have come from the United States. Moreover, at least until the middle years of the twentieth century, U.S. Protestant missionaries explicitly stated that their mission was as much to encourage "a new liberal, dynamic order like that which Protestantism had inspired historically" as it was to convert Catholics to their own brand of Christianity. As a result, much of the scholarship examines Protestantism in Latin America as an external phenomenon, imposed and orchestrated from the outside.

Wilton Nelson's *El protestantismo en Centro América* typifies this genre. A missionary in Costa Rica for many years, Nelson rejects the notion that simple cultural imperialism underlies the expansion of Protestantism in Latin America. His straightforward narrative history, objectively stated, outlines the close relationship between liberal government in Central America and Protestant missionaries from the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nelson ably demonstrates that during most of the nineteenth century, almost all Protestants in Central America were foreigners--Britons,

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Americans, Germans and West Indians. It was only during the last decades of the nineteenth century that liberal leaders withdrew the legal restrictions on limited religious diversity and allowed missionaries to proselytize the general population. This change occurred because liberal leaders and missionaries shared a similar vision for modern Central America: they hoped to see increased political stability, economic development, and a cultural evolution like that of the United States. This shared vision, however, translated into a popular perception among potential converts that conversion amounted to rejection of their own Latin spiritual and cultural heritage.

The study by José Miguez Bonino, Carmelo Alvarez, and Roberto Craig, Protestantismo y liberalismo en América Latina, covers much of the same ground as Nelson's work but approaches the subject from a perspective that is both dependency-oriented and theologically based. The authors date the relationship back to 1821 and point out the parallels between the appearance of Protestantism in Central America and the emergence of the export-oriented coffee economy. Tracing this relationship into the late twentieth century, the authors suggest that this link explains why Protestantism in Central America currently tends to
translate into political passivity or even support for repressive regimes.\footnote{See Roberto Craig's chapter "El papel del protestantismo en Costa Rica: una ubicación socio-historical," 57-91.}

Although the historical sections of \textit{Protestantismo y liberalismo en América Latina} are a bit predictable and sometimes overdrawn, the theological inquiry is intriguing. Miguez Bonino, an Argentine and prominent Methodist theologian, points out that Protestantism originated as a "protest" movement and has provided the momentum for remarkable social change in other parts of the world. He notes that although contemporary Protestantism has no praxis comparable to Catholicism's theology of liberation, Protestantism does not actively discourage social action, as many Latin Americans erroneously believe. Miguez Bonino and his coauthors argue that modern Latin American Protestants' political passivity is a direct legacy of the churches' missionary heritage. They conclude that U.S. missionaries so mingled Protestant theology with their own conservative political ideology that it was impossible for Latin American evangelicals to separate one from the other.

Deborah Baldwin's \textit{Protestants and the Mexican Revolution: Missionaries, Ministers, and Social Change} and Jean-Pierre Bastian's \textit{Protestantismo y sociedad en Mexico} support Miguez Bonino's argument convincingly. Baldwin's historical study focuses on the efforts of Protestant
missionaries and converts in Mexico from the nineteenth-century Reforma of Benito Juárez through the presidency of Venustiano Carranza. According to their thesis, Protestant work in Mexico was inextricably linked with the United States and with the liberal government, just as it was in most of Latin America. Yet uniquely in Mexico, the strongest relationship lay between Protestant missionaries and so-called radical liberals, who eventually found a voice in Francisco Madero rather than the institutionalized positivism of Porfirio Díaz.

Through careful analysis of mission records, secular and religious newspapers, and archival material, Baldwin proves that American Protestant missionaries and native Mexican converts alike were early and vocal supporters of Madero's quest for the Presidency. Baldwin also demonstrates that far from being politically passive, Protestants during the Mexican Revolution readily embraced radical change. She suggests that because "converts had already broken with traditional religion," they found it easy "to break with the established [political] order." 87

Jean-Pierre Bastian's Protestantismo y sociedad en Mexico also covers the revolutionary period and brings many of the same conclusions later reached by Baldwin into a contemporary context. An ecumenical Protestant theologian,

Bastian has been a vocal critic of the ties that continue to bind Latin American Protestantism to the United States. His study of Mexico attempts to use sociological and theological evidence to prove that these ties are neither necessary nor inevitable.

Bastian takes to task the Mexican anthropologists whom, he contends, have described the "rapid spread of Protestantism as the advance guard of ideological penetration by the United States." Though he concedes that this characterization may in fact be true for those urban "national churches" that derive their theology, bureaucratic forms, technology, and funds from the United States. Bastian argues, however, that this affection for things American is emphatically not true for rural churches in the more remote areas of Mexico, particularly in the largely indigenous areas.

Bastian's contentions notwithstanding, the notion of Protestantism serving as "the advance guard of ideological penetration by the United States" has attracted a wide following among scholarly as well as popular writers. Sara Diamond's *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* and Hugo Assman's *La Iglesia electrónica y su impacto*

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en América Latina⁹⁹ represent some of the best scholarship of this school.

Sara Diamond's *Spiritual Warfare* takes a much broader look at the interplay of Protestantism, politics, and culture. Written from a Marxist perspective, the study is concerned with the growing influence of the so-called Christian Right in the United States and how its ideology influences the internal politics of Western nations, including those of Latin America. Diamond maintains that the "Moral Majority" emerged in the United States from the malaise of the presidency of Jimmy Carter to become a potent political power broker during the first administration of Ronald Reagan.

Of the two studies, Hugo Assman's *The Impact of U.S. Televangelists in Latin America* takes a much narrower focus. His study examines the types and quantities of religious programming from the United States that are broadcast in the region, specifically Brazil. Assman's analysis, however, does not take into account a significant fact: Brazil had a sizeable evangelical population long before modern televangelism came into being. Nor does he grapple with the fact that Protestantism is growing rapidly in poor rural areas of Brazil, where access to television, religious or otherwise, is limited.

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Catholic Response to Protestant Growth

Catholic commentators, also tend to attribute evangelical gains to external agents, especially North American evangelists and money.90 "But blaming evangelical growth on the United States," David Stoll argues, "suggests a deep distrust of the poor, an unwillingness to accept the possibility that they could turn an imported religion to their own purposes."91

Pope John Paul II alluded to this theory in his opening address to the Fourth General Conference of Latin American Bishops in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. The Pope stressed the danger of underestimating "a certain strategy" employing notable economic resources to crack the Catholic unity of Latin America and weaken the bonds that unify Latin American countries. Edward L. Cleary, O.P., maintains that this line of reasoning also frequently appears in interviews with Latin American bishops.92 Ten years of study have convinced Cleary that "there is not a strong relation between money spent and results."93 He concludes that "[t]he great advances seen in Protestant growth in Latin America

90See Assman, La Iglesia electrónica y su impacto in América Latina (San José, Costa Rica: Departamento Ecuménico de Investigaciones, 1987).
91Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, xvi.
93Ibid.
America are not the result of dollars from the United States." 94 Everett Wilson, a Pentecostal scholar with a doctorate from Stanford, maintains that although hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in a North American religious push into Latin America, "this effort has born little fruit," because "large growth is not typically seen in these recently arriving groups." 95 For example, in 1987 the Assemblies of God, the most successful Protestant denomination in Latin America, spent 20.5 million dollars in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to the denomination's mission board in Springfield, Missouri. Yet its national churches there reported 10.6 million members and adherents--approximately one of every 40 people in the region. 96 David Stoll argues that "[a] mere $20 million a year cannot explain these kinds of results." 97 He also maintains that "[i]f evangelical churches were really built on handouts, they would be spiritless patronage structures, not vital, expanding grass-roots institutions." 98 Joseph Davis, the program director for Domino's Foundation, a private foundation that sponsors Catholic activities in

94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Stoll, "A Protestant Reformation in Latin America?," 46.
98 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 12.
Latin America agrees with both Cleary and Wilson. In an article in *America* magazine in January 1991, he wrote:

> Although the movements of Evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity are clearly from North to South America and have been attended by politicized and ostentatious expressions, the facile invasion theory fails to take account of important facts and locates the problem in the wrong place. The sheer immensity of the conversion rate, the indigenous nature and local leadership of the individual churches, and the obviously powerful effects of the Protestant message on the poor, particularly in redefining human goals and strengthening family life, defy the categorization of Protestants as a fifth column for Washington's political goals. 99

Many Latin American clerics refer to an assortment of Pentecostal, fundamentalist, and quasi-Christian groups as "sects." The "invasion of the sects" was first mentioned at the III General Conference of Latin American Bishops held in Puebla, Mexico in 1979. 100 Antonio Quarracino, the secretary General of CELAM wrote that "the sects constitute, without a doubt, the most profound worry of the Latin American Bishops." 101 This spawned many books warning and informing Catholic believers about the beliefs and methods of the sects. However, the major problem with many of these books are that no distinction is made between legitimate Protestant denominations and groups such as the Jehovah's


Witnesses, the Mormons, the Unification church and Rosicrucians. In his opening address at the Fourth General Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM), even Pope John Paul, speaking of the proliferation of Protestant groups in Latin America, likened the "sects" to "rapacious wolves" who were devouring Latin American Catholics and "causing division and discord in our communities." This was a key point in a speech meant to give direction to the Latin American church for the coming decade. The term, "sectas," tends to perpetuate typical Catholic stereotypes and prejudices about non-Catholics. Sectas also forces global generalizations on non-Catholics, characterizations that do not fit everyone. Professor Samuel Escobar, a scholar at Eastern Baptist Seminary in Pennsylvania believes Catholic bishops use it to point to the fastest growing groups. Thus sectas mixes together Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons with a wide assortment of evangelical Christians, "brainwashing cults," and New Age groups.

This line of reasoning also overlooks the national character of Evangelical churches in Latin America, particularly the Pentecostal church, since the 1960s. In 1980, in his thesis about the Charismatic Movement in Latin

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103Ibid.
America, Samuel Berberian wrote that the missionary element had "been altogether replaced by national elements, especially with regards to leadership and dependence."\textsuperscript{104}

This point is made quite convincingly by Virginia Garrard-Burnett in her dissertation on the Evangelical Church in Guatemala. C. Peter Wagner argues:

Pentecostalism is probably the type of protestantism that is more autochthonous . . . since it is not linked institutionally with churches in other parts of the world--as a consequence it doesn't depend economically on foreign groups--it can be said that the Pentecostal church represents the real Latin American Protestantism."\textsuperscript{105}

He adds that "The foreign influence and control has been minimum in the development of Latin American pentecostalism."\textsuperscript{106}

Anthropologist David Stoll's *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?: The Politics of Evangelical Growth* is one of the first major studies to attempt a broad analysis of Protestant growth all over Latin America in light of its popularity over the last twenty years. He first traces the development of the neo-Evangelical movement in the United States and illustrates how this movement nurtured Protestant church growth in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Ecuador. Next,


\textsuperscript{106}Ibid.
he distinguishes the bewildering varieties of "theologies" that give definition to some of the most popular trends in Latin American Protestantism. However, Stoll fails to mention the Pentecostal involvement.

David Martin's *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* is the other major new book. An English sociologist of religion, Martin believes that politics per se are largely peripheral to developing an understanding of Protestantism's appeal in Latin America. He argues that the explosive popularity of Pentecostalism in the developing world can be attributed to the fact that churches offer stability and personal empowerment to their members, who tend to live in the sectors most threatened by what used to be called "progress." Martin maintains that at their most basic level, Pentecostal churches provide a way for members to regain some control over their own lives. The churches promise converts a "better life, [clearly defined] moral standards, economic prosperity, and personal dignity" at a time when other sources of authority—the traditional community, old-time Catholicism, and the hacienda—have begun to disintegrate.

Martin's most useful contribution to the literature is his observation that the rise of Methodism in eighteenth-century Britain closely parallels the growth of Pentecostalism in contemporary Latin America. Martin observes that in embracing Methodism "many people at the
margins of the social hierarchy were able to make their autonomy visible without directly challenging the whole political order."\(^{107}\)

Tracing the development of American Methodism down to the groups that are now most active in Latin America, the fundamentalists, and the Pentecostals, Martin indirectly concurs with Weber, Bonino, Diamond and Annis in concluding that Protestantism, capitalist economics, and U.S. culture are so intertwined in Latin America that it is difficult to separate one from the other. Yet, he denies that this intermingling necessarily forges what he calls "the Americanization of Latin American religion."\(^{108}\) He suggests that the converse is true: Pentecostalism in Latin America may actually represent the "Latinization of American religion."\(^{109}\) However, Martin relies heavily on other peoples' research and primarily on interviews with North American personnel.

**Protestantism in Guatemala**

The literature on the Evangelical Church in Guatemala mirrors the categories mentioned above. Virgilio Zapata Arceyuz's *Historia de la iglesia evangélica en Guatemala* and Virginia Garrard-Burnett's "A History of Protestantism in

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\(^{107}\) Martin, *Tongues of Fire*, 33.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., 282.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.
Guatemala" are more recent histories of the Evangelical church. Both Zapata and Burnett use archival material, church records, religious and non-religious newspapers, journals and publications to trace the history of the evangelical church in Guatemala. Zapata traces the history of Protestantism from the arrival of the first Protestant missionary and provides detailed histories of the origins of the predominant denominations in Guatemala. Published in 1982, Zapata's work does not chronicle the continued growth within the Evangelical churches, particularly the Pentecostal churches.

Garrard-Burnett's work traces the history of Protestantism in Guatemala while analyzing its political ramifications within the country during each successive period. She recognized the significance of the indigenous nature Pentecostal churches and her dissertation is especially valuable for its analysis of why Protestantism in the Liberal period failed to make inroads among the Guatemalan populace, in relation to the fundamentalist, evangelical Protestantism of recent years. Garrard-Burnett's work "A History of Protestantism in Guatemala" was completed in 1986 and therefore only covers up to Ríos Montt's administration. Samuel Berberián's *Two Decades of Renewal: A Study of the Charismatic Movement in Latin America* is a little-known but helpful study of the Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal churches in Latin America
and Guatemala. Berberián demonstrates the theological distinctions between the two churches, distinctions which are overlooked or blurred in the literature.

Jesús María Sarasa's Los Protestantes en Guatemala, published in 1992, is a brief survey of Protestant denominations and their beliefs. This book represents the official position of the Secretario Episcopal de América Central y Panamá and Catholic Church in Guatemala. It therefore views evangelical denominations as sects, and was written to help Catholic believers understand their methods of proselytizing and recruitment.

Gennet Maxon Emery's Protestantism in Guatemala: Its Influence on the Bicultural Situation with Reference to the Roman Catholic Background, and Albert Julian Lloret's doctoral dissertation "The Mayan Evangelical Church in Guatemala" are helpful yet dated works that discuss the growth of Protestantism among indigenous peoples. Of the two, Emery's work is more narrowly focused. He looks at Protestant growth among Mayan churches only within the Presbyterian church of Guatemala, the oldest denomination in the country. Thus, his study covers only 64 churches and 100 congregations. Emery was one of the earliest to recognize the growth of the Protestant church in Guatemala and its potential role in bringing about change.

Lloret was for many years the field director of the Central American Mission. His dissertation, therefore, is much more thorough and gives a better indication of the widespread growth of Protestantism in Mayan-speaking regions of Guatemala. Written in 1976, his research does not reflect the tremendous growth experienced by the Evangelical church among the indigenous Mayan areas of Guatemala since the earthquake in 1976 and needs to be updated. However, the Servicio Evangelizador para América Latina (SEPAL) recently completed a comprehensive study (1991) of the Evangelical church in the Cakchiquel-speaking regions of Guatemala. Their study showed that in the rural areas there was one church for every 618 people, whereas a decade earlier the figure had been one church for every 1,401 people.\textsuperscript{111}

The sociological study done by Bryan Roberts "Protestant Groups and Coping With Urban Life in Guatemala" (1967) and the anthropological study done by Jim Sexton, "Protestantism and Modernization in Two Guatemalan Towns," (1978) reflect Levine's "crisis-solace," and "crisis-adaptation" models discussed earlier. Roberts argued that membership in Protestant groups of the type in these two neighborhoods was one of the means in Guatemala City in which isolated and aspiring individuals can readily obtain community and personal contacts, activities and beliefs that

\textsuperscript{111}Rohde, "Decada del Desarrollo del Pastor," 9.
enable them to cope with the problems of urban life. He concluded that the emergence of sects can be seen as a possible stimulus of economic and social change.

Sexton accepts the sociological insecurity thesis of Roberts. He maintains that Protestantism is associated with individual modernization. He argues that a basic level of individual economic and social achievement is necessary before a chain of events lead to Protestantism. Sexton concludes that greater wealth and predisposition to change occurs in a non-material culture after accomplishing change in the material world.

Sheldon Annis's God and Production in a Guatemalan Town also reflects the crisis-adaptation model. Annis's findings suggest that Protestantism is a compelling agent of social transformation and as such threatens to undermine many traditional values of Latin Americans at a time when they are already under siege.

Despite its tremendous growth in Guatemala and the rest of Latin America, little study has been done on the political impact of the Pentecostal church. Though Pentecostals have recently gained special attention from Latin American scholars because of their amazing growth and

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direct ties with less-advantaged classes, much of the literature analyzes Pentecostal behavior and questions any sort of overt political action. One of the reasons for the lack of scholarly work on Pentecostals and political involvement was that Pentecostals "were considered to be right wing, and the religious right is of no scholarly interest. . . ." 

Yet, scholars are beginning to admit that there has been a "gradual ideological change taking place in the thinking of Pentecostal leaders" since the 1950s. While evangelical roots discouraged the leaders from intervening directly, they were giving increasing attention to denouncing corruption and sin, including sin embodied in power structures. Moreover, several studies of Pentecostals in Brazil have concluded that "Evangelicals do and can involve themselves directly in the political arena. And when Pentecostals become political, they do so because of their religious beliefs, not in spite of them." 

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114 See LaLive d'Epinay, El refugio de las masas.

115 Freston, Teocratas, Fisiológicos, Nova Direita e Progressistas, 7.


117 Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "Conclusion; Is this Latin American Reformation?," 201-202; Garrard-Burnett is referring to studies included in Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. See Rowan Ireland, "The Crentes de Campo Alegre and the Religious Construction of Brazilian Politics," 45-65; and Paul Freston, "Brother Votes for
are signs that the position of Pentecostals in Guatemala concerning political participation by Christians is changing too. In 1989, there were 6 active Christians in the 100 member Congress. By 1994, 20 of the members of Congress were evangelical Christians. However, Stephen Sywulka maintains that "[Guatemalan]Evangelicals are still coming to terms with their role in national life."

Inadequate Typologies

The major obstacles facing social scientists in the study of religion in Latin America are inadequate typologies. Typologies of the Evangelical church in Latin America carry agendas best to be avoided. Perhaps the easiest to resort to, and also the most misleading, is by denomination. The well-known church traditions--Lutheran, Anglican, Reformed, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Moravian--emerged during the Reformation in Europe, its aftermath, or on the North American frontier. Although Protestants are still organized into denominations, these entities have long since polarized along theological and political lines which crosscut their formal boundaries. Baptists tend to be stereotyped as fundamentalists, for example, but some of their churches have become quite


Presbyterians have acquired a middle-of-the-road reputation, and some are liberals; but it is less appreciated that much of the intellectual elite of fundamentalism has been Presbyterian.

Another way to characterize Latin American Protestantism is in terms of successive "waves" of arrival, including: (1) the churches of European immigrants, such as the German Lutherans in Brazil, (2) the "historical" or "mainline" denominations, (3) the fundamentalist "faith missions," and (4) the Pentecostals. While useful distinctions, this too can quickly lead to misleading inferences. The Latin America Mission arrived as part of the fundamentalist wave, for example, but has come to encourage a more open and socially responsible theology.

Argentine Theologian José Miguez Bonino follows the typology of Christian Lalive D'Epinay who applies that typology to Latin American Protestantism using two variables, the sociological type of the mother church and its sphere of penetration. Following these bases of analysis, Bonino arrives at the following types: 1) transplanted immigrant protestant churches; 2) established

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120 José Miguez Bonino, "Visión del cambio social y sus tareas desde la iglesias no-católicas," in Fe cristiana y cambio social en América Latina: Encuentro de El Escorial (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1973), 179.
denominations of protestant immigrants; 3) missionary
denominations or "traditional Protestantism," according to
how the term is used in Latin America; 4) las sectas
'conversionistas establecidas'; and 5) Pentecostal or faith
missions. However, Bonino is not clear in his typology.
Some of the denominations that he calls "sectas
conversionistas establecidas," such as the Baptists, could
be put in the category of missionary denominations.
Sociologically, there is not a great difference between
those churches in Bonino's type 4 and the Presbyterians, the
Disciples of Christ or the Methodists who are placed in type
3. Also there are major differences between these groups in
the form and sphere of penetration. These denominations
entered the continent moved by the same motivations and
using similar missionary methods. Bonino, also does not
take into account the rapid process of socialization the
churches in type 4 have undergone during the past years nor
the sectarian character of the changes that have affected
the churches of type three. Furthermore, denominations
like the Missionary and Christian Alliance, the Free
Evangelical church, and the Church of the Covenant do not
fit into Míguez Bonino's category of "sects." Also, the
enormous process of institutionalization and social
adaptation through which Pentecostal churches have passed in

121 Ibid., 179-181.
122 Ibid., 181.
the past years has made them closer to "traditional Protestantism" or at least the established conversionista denominations.123

Read, Monterroso and Johnson have classified Protestant churches into five basic types: 1) churches that are related in direct manner with non-denominational missions or missions of faith; 2) the Pentecostals; 3) the more recent denominations, such as non-denominational national churches 4) the Seventh-Day Adventist church; and 5) the traditional denominational churches.124

Orlando Costas divides Latin American Protestantism into three principal groups: historical Protestantism, evangelical Protestantism, and pentecostal Protestantism. Historical Protestantism takes its name from its connection with the churches of the Reformation. Many of these churches were begun during the second half of the nineteenth century. These immigrants include German Lutherans, Scottish Presbyterians, English Anglicans, members of the Dutch and Swiss Reformed churches, and some Welsh Baptists. These established themselves on the continent as colonists and kept their religious practices and traditions without putting emphasis on the evangelization of the nationals.

123Costas, Theology of the Crossroads, 31-33.

Later, missionaries of these groups, many from the United States and Europe, followed. Then the churches opened themselves to the national community.

However, the most characteristic form of Protestantism in Latin America up to the present has been evangelical Protestantism. The Evangelicals in Latin America are a current within the great Protestant confessions, that are associated with the free churches. The free churches are autonomous communities and independent of the State. The majority of these churches originated in Europe, established themselves or emerged in the United States, and came to Latin America through missionary work. So influential are these denominations that "evangélico" is today practically synonymous with "Protestant" in Latin America. In this sense, the continent uses the term, "evangélico," in reference to all the Protestants without taking into account their denominational affiliation. "Evangélico" is the preferred name of Protestant Christian groups that are established in Latin America.125 This evangelical Protestantism is fundamentally conservative in doctrine and firmly committed to a zealous proselytizing in the name of the Gospel. According to Samuel Escobar, "In Latin America, the majority of Protestants describe themselves as

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Evangelicals. They constitute a growing and dynamic religious minority."¹²⁶ According to its use in Latin America, the term, "evangélico," is not primarily confessional but propositional. Evangelical churches are voluntary associations of individuals of a same mind, united over the base of common beliefs with the purpose of achieving tangible and well-defined objectives. One of the fundamental objectives is the propagation of their point of view, that they consider normative for all mankind. Evangelical Protestants are characterized by their emphasis of the authority of the Bible in all questions of faith and practice; the personal conversion as a distinct experience of faith in Christ as Lord and Savior, that separates the Christian from the non-Christians and the practice of evangelization as the fundamental dimension of the Church.¹²⁷

As for crosscutting political tendencies, these are constantly developing. José Míguez Bonino uses a similar ideological interpretation with a more historical, social, and ecclesiastical basis. In the early 1970s, Míguez Bonino identified three, including: (1) evangelicals professing to turn their backs on politics, (2) "liberals" working for reform within the capitalist system, and (3) "revolutionaries" calling for radical transformation. Since


¹²⁷ Costas, Theology of the Crossroads, 40-47.
then, parts of the "apolitical" camp have aligned with the North American religious right; many liberals have become distinctly less liberal; revolutionaries have lost most of whatever constituency they could claim; and a new current of theologically but not politically conservative evangelicals has emerged. Looking at Latin American Protestantism through a fifteen-year-old typology tends to inflate the importance of the left and minimize growing political differences among theological conservatives.

Rubem Alves maintains that "to understand Latin American Protestantism, it is necessary to verify its conduct in the global context of Latin American society." Alves's focus is ideological and he uses Karl Mannheim's concept of utopia and ideology. In this sense, Alves finds the divisions of Protestantism in "the process of reorganization" through which the different groups are passing vis-à-vis the crisis of Latin American society. He considers what Protestantism could have been (utopian possibilities) and that which it has become (its ideological tendencies). For Alves then, there are two types of Protestantism, conservative and revolutionary. It is

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130Alves, "Función ideológica y posibilidades utópica del protestantismo," 15-20.
obvious that when Alves speaks of Protestantism, he is speaking of the historical Protestant church. Also, with his ideological focus he doesn't consider other possibilities within the Protestant church. Those that he calls conservatives could be those who refuse to assume any type of social responsibility because for them religion only has to do with the individual or private sphere. But there can also be Protestants committed to the "liberal project," in defense of democratic institutions, classical forms of liberty, social-economic development, and the Western capitalist system.\textsuperscript{131}

Many of the distinctions among the old typologies have been blurred by the tremendous growth by the Pentecostal movement and more recently, by the Charismatic Renewal Movement in Guatemala. Even though the majority of missionaries have come from non-Pentecostal churches, more Latin Americans have been attracted to Pentecostal churches than any other kind: two-thirds to three-quarters of all Protestants. Pentecostal churches have so outgrown others that perhaps, Donald Dayton suggests, Evangelicals should be regarded as a subset of Pentecostals rather than the other way around.\textsuperscript{132} Whereas the Pentecostal movement had been


most effective among the poor, the Charismatic Renewal Movement has a wider social base. The Charismatic Renewal Movement has been effective among the middle and upper classes of both the Protestant and Catholic churches. Catholic charismatics have taken over one influential Protestant organization, the Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship. Most prominent charismatics are from the upper classes and belong to the tight-knit "Covenant" groups with ties to the North American religious right. However, the movement is growing rapidly among the poor, where charismatics have practically taken over rural parishes and account for a growing majority of the movement in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. To date, Charismatics have shown little interest in social issues and political activism, but Mayan charismatics in Guatemala, and the class position of poorer, parish-based followers, could change this.

Recapitulation

Prevailing theories neither fully explain nor did they predict the tremendous growth of the Evangelical church in Latin America, and more specifically, Guatemala. Religious

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institutions and traditional piety are not in irreversible decline as was predicted by social scientists, but are growing and thriving. Even Harvey Cox admitted that "[r]ather than an age of rampant secularization and religious decline, it appears to be more of an era of religious revival and the return of the sacral. 135 Are there other, less materialistic, reasons that provide an adequate explanation for the tremendous church growth and the increased religious activism? Does the answer lie in viewing religion, particularly Christianity, not as a collection of theological bits and pieces to be believed and debated, but rather as a conceptual system, as a total world-and-life-view?

135Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City, 20.
Chapter II

Ideas, Religion, and Politics

"[A]ll the pregnant ideas and institutions of modern political thought are in essence secularized forms of theological doctrines and institutions."\(^{136}\)

---Carl Schmitt

Social scientists, by compartmentalizing as "religions" only "organized" religions and denominations, make three serious errors. First, they fail to recognize Christianity as a worldview. Professor Ronald Nash argues that "once people understand that both Christianity and its adversaries in the world of ideas are worldviews, they will be in better position to judge the relative merits of the total Christian system."\(^{137}\) Professor Nash agreed with William Abraham who wrote:

Religious belief should be assessed as a rounded whole rather than taken in stark isolation. Christianity, for example, like other world faiths, is a complex, large-scale system of belief which must be seen as a whole before it is assessed. . . . We need to see it as a

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metaphysical system, as a worldview, that is total in its scope and range.\textsuperscript{138} They also fail to recognize the religious nature of all competing worldviews, and the power that these ideologies have over their followers. Each of these ideologies, like religions, have a sacred text that is revered by the faithful, be it the Bible, the Koran, or \textit{Das Kapital}. More importantly, each of these competing worldviews makes important epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical assumptions. They assume for example, that knowledge is possible, and that sense experience is reliable (epistemology), that the universe is regular (metaphysics), and that people should be honest (ethics).

This chapter will argue that basic assumptions or presuppositions are important because of the way they determine the method and goal of theoretical thought. It will also argue that Christianity is a worldview, therefore the acceptance of the Christian worldview will lead a person to conclusions very different from those that would follow a commitment to the presuppositions of naturalism. In short, one's axioms determine one's theorems.

Ideas Have Consequences

Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises wrote:

The history of mankind is the history of ideas. For it is ideas, theories, and doctrines, that guide human action, determine the ultimate ends men aim at, and the choice of the means employed for the attainment of these ends.139

For von Mises, ideas have consequences. Aldous Huxley also concluded that "[m]en live in accordance with their philosophy of life, their conception of the world.140 Huxley maintained that

[i]t is light of our beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality that we formulate our conceptions about right and wrong; and it is in the light of our conceptions of right and wrong that we frame our conduct, not only in relations of private life, but also in the sphere of politics and economics. So far from being irrelevant, our metaphysical beliefs are the finally determining factor in all our actions.141

One of the unique characteristics of human beings is that they cannot do without the kind of orientation and guidance that a worldview gives. People need this guidance because they are inescapably creatures with responsibility who by nature are incapable of holding purely arbitrary


141Ibid., 291.
opinions or making entirely unprincipled decisions. People need some creed to live by, some map by which to chart their course. The need for a guiding perspective is basic to human life. The question then becomes what constitutes the overriding and decisive factor in accounting for the pattern of human action. The way a person answers that question depends on their view of the essential nature of humankind: it is itself a matter of one's worldview.

Worldviews have to do with basic beliefs about things. They have to do with the ultimate questions with which all people are confronted. They involve matters of general principle.

Worldview will be defined here as the comprehensive framework of one's basic beliefs about God, man and the cosmos. It encompasses the world, human life in general, the meaning of suffering, the value of education, social morality, and the importance of family. A worldview, then, is a conceptual scheme by which we place or fit everything we believe and by which we interpret and judge reality.

Second, a worldview is a matter of one's beliefs. Beliefs are different from feelings or opinions because they make a cognitive claim, that is, a claim to knowledge. When people claim that they "believe" something, they are
asserting something about the way things are, and they are willing to defend those beliefs with arguments.\textsuperscript{142}

Furthermore, beliefs aren't opinions or hypotheses. Belief is used here in the sense of "\textit{credo}," a committed belief (Latin for "I believe"), something a person is willing not only to argue but also to defend or promote.

Finally, the basic beliefs one holds about things tend to form a framework or pattern. Everyone recognizes, in some degree at least, that people must be consistent in their views if they want to be taken seriously. People do not adopt an arbitrary set of basic beliefs that have no coherence or semblance of consistency.

In essence, a worldview functions as a guide to life. A worldview, even when it is half subconscious and unarticulated, functions like a compass or a road map. It orients a person in the world at large, gives them a sense of what is up and what is down, what is right and what is wrong. A person's worldview shapes, to a significant degree, the way they assess the events, issues, and structures of their civilization and the times. It allows

them to "place" or "situate" the various phenomena that come into their purview.

The issue ultimately involved is whether there is a source of truth higher than, and independent of, man; and the answer to the question is decisive for one's view of the nature and destiny of humankind.

The practical result of nominalist philosophy is to banish the reality which is perceived by the intellect and to posit as reality that which is perceived by the senses. With this change in the affirmation of what is real, the whole orientation of culture takes a turn, and society is on the road to modern empiricism. The denial of universals carries with it the denial of everything transcending experience. The rejection of everything transcending experience means inevitably, though ways are found to hedge on this, the denial of truth. With the denial of objective truth there is no escape from the relativism of "man the measure of all things." 

How a person answers the basic philosophical questions concerning God, man, and the universe, ultimately determines how that person views the relationship between God and man, man's relationship to his fellow man, the relationship between Church and State, and the role of religion. The


\[144\] Ibid., 4.
answers to the cosmological, epistemological, axiological, and the teleological questions form the presuppositions from which a person develops a worldview. The term worldview refers to any ideology, philosophy, theology, movement, or religion that provides an overarching approach to understanding God, the world, and man's relation to God and the world. By presuppositions it is meant the basic way in which an individual looks at life, his basic worldview, the grid through which he sees the world. Presuppositions rest upon that which a person considers to be the truth of what exists. People's presuppositions lay a grid for all they bring forth into the external world. A person's presuppositions also provide the basis for values and therefore the basis for decisions. Since the cosmological question, which answers the origins of the universe and man, requires an element of faith in order to subscribe to a particular view, all men, therefore, are religious beings.

This raises the question of the relationship of worldview to theology and philosophy. This is a subject of some confusion since in common parlance any comprehensive perspective on things that appeal to the authority of the Bible is called "theology," and any such perspective that appeals to the authority of reason is called "philosophy." The trouble with this perspective is that it fails to make a distinction between the life-perspective every human being has by virtue of being a human being and the specialized
academic disciplines that are taught by professors of theology and philosophy. Moreover, it makes the assumption that theology cannot be pagan or humanistic and that philosophy cannot be biblical. Moreover, one does not need degrees or special skills to have a perspective on life.

A worldview is a matter of the shared everyday experience of humankind, an inescapable component of all human knowing, and as such is nonscientific, or rather prescientific in nature since scientific knowing is always dependent on the intuitive knowing of our everyday experience. It belongs to an order of cognition more basic than that of science or theory. In general, then, we can say that worldview, philosophy, and theology are alike in being comprehensive in scope, but they are unlike in that a worldview is prescientific, whereas philosophy and theology are scientific. Philosophy and religion deal with the same basic questions, though they give different answers and use different terms. The basic questions of both philosophy and religion are the questions of Being (what exists), of man and his dilemma (morals), and of epistemology (how man knows). Philosophy is universal in scope.¹⁴⁵ No man can

live without a worldview; therefore, there is no man who is not a philosopher.\textsuperscript{146}

Sociologist Gerhardt Lenski's study on religion concluded that contrary to the expectations of the nineteenth century positivists, religious organizations remain vigorous and influential in society: "religion in various ways is constantly influencing the daily lives of the masses of men and women in the modern . . . metropolis."\textsuperscript{147} Lenski added that through its impact on individuals, "religion makes an impact on all other institutional systems of the community in which these individuals participate. Hence the influence of religion operates at the social level as well as at the personal level."\textsuperscript{148}

Lenski defined religion as a "system of beliefs about the nature of the force(s) ultimately shaping man's destiny, and the practice associated therewith, shared by the members of the group."\textsuperscript{149} This definition is designed in such a way as to include under the heading of religion not only the major theistic faiths such as Christianity, Judaism, and

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid, 280.


\textsuperscript{148}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{149}Ibid., 298-299.
Islam, but also non-theistic faiths like Hinayana Buddhism, Communism, and even contemporary humanism of the type espoused by such men as Bertrand Russell or Aldous Huxley.

All are social phenomena, involving groups of men. All are systems of faith—or more accurately systems of belief accepted on grounds of faith, not empirical or logical demonstration. All are systems of faith by means of which men seek to cope with the most basic problems of human existence.

Given this definition of religion, it quickly becomes apparent that every normal adult member of any human society is religious. All intelligent human action presupposes assumptions about the nature of the forces which ultimately shape the nature and destiny of man. Because the core of every religious system involves a set of assumptions about the nature of ultimate causation, these assumptions must be taken on faith. This is not to say that every person can articulate a faith with any great measure of precision. Sometimes assumptions are half-forgotten as the patterns of action based upon them become sufficiently habitual. Even when basic assumptions have not been lost sight of, those with limited education may have difficulty articulating them, but they are present nonetheless. Human existence compels men to act on unproven and unprovable assumptions, and it makes no assumptions.

\(^{150}\) Ibid., 299.
Religious conviction effects how people think and behave. It is the filter through which people see and interpret the world. In this sense, religion is the "root" or "heart" of culture—the complex of beliefs, values, attitudes, customs, and social institutions. Faith can not be reduced to the personal, social or ecclesiastical realm, excluding the economic, social and political order. Harold Berman of the Harvard Law School has written:

People will not give their allegiance to a political and economic system, and even less to a philosophy, unless it represents for them a higher, sacred truth. 151

Thus, religion has serious social, economic, and political consequences.

The Battle for Hearts and Minds

It is often taken for granted that religion is one thing and politics another. This assumption reinforces the hegemonic position of social theory, suggesting that religion and politics are categories that have some a priori status that only the theorist can specify. But the meaning of the two is, in fact, subject to disagreement and debate. A fundamentalist may view the state as a sacred entity. A secularist may regard it as something utterly separate from religion. Conflicts between fundamentalists and

secularists, therefore, are not simply about "religion" or "politics," but are cultural battles over the very definition of these terms. Politics, after all, deals at the most general level with the organizing principles and symbols of the entire society, giving form to human community here and now. Religion, in turn, provides values and symbols giving general meaning to human existence, placing any given set of social or political arrangements in broader frameworks of significance.

Politics could mean two things in its broader, more general sense. In this sense, politics looks to the common good, as much in the national realm as in the international. It relates the fundamental values of the organized community. The values that make the internal life of a nation are those that have to be seen in its external relations. The term politics defines the means and ethics of social relations. Politics, then, is the preoccupation by all for the common well-being in terms of the nation in its internal and external relations. Every citizen has the right to "make politics" in this sense. The payment of taxes, concern over economic conditions are of a political nature, therefore the Christian has an obligation to participate.

Politics has another more specific sense too. It is the process through which groups of citizens propose to get and exercise political power in order to act according to
their own criteria and ideology is realized (politics with a small "p" as opposed to the other definition). The ideologies elaborated by these groups, if they can be inspired by Christian doctrine, can also arrive at diverse and different conclusions. Therefore, a political party can call itself Christian, less "evangelical," it just could not have an absolute value for all, neither can it express in an absolute manner, the contents of the faith.

Religious presuppositions undergird every activity of man and are the unspoken premises behind every word. Law, too, is a cultural expression of a basically religious faith. Because law governs man and society, because it establishes and declares the meaning of justice and righteousness, law is inescapably religious, in that it establishes on practical fashion the ultimate concerns of a culture. Bronislaw Malinowski and others have observed that all social organization, without exception, implies a series of norms, so that the whole of social life and activity are regulated by these norms. Law is one aspect of this normative living, and like religion, has its creed, ritual, ceremony, and form.¹⁵²

Historian Arnold Toynbee stated that by the 1950s, "the major questions confronting Western man were all

religious, because of the inevitable dependence of a society's actions on its belief. Teleological visions are agglomerations of values, often having powerful emotional force even if one is not conscious of their components. That is why they have the power to energize people in such extraordinary ways. People may risk everything, including their lives, for family, for wealth, for country, for class, or for the kingdom of God. Whittaker Chambers maintained that

A man is not primarily a witness against something. That is only incidental to the fact that he is a witness for something. A witness... is a man whose life and faith are so completely one that when the challenge comes to step out and testify for his faith, he does so, disregarding all risks, accepting all consequences.

All such visions are freighted with religious content, although this often is not recognized. They contain at least some of the components we expect to find in religions: a theory of knowledge, an authoritative literature, a theory of historical relationships, a cosmology, a hierarchy of values, and an eschatology.

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The same applies to Humanism and Marxism today. These worldviews, like all other worldviews, are at bottom religious. All are religious because they contain a theology—that is, they all begin with a statement of faith. Christianity begins with "in the beginning God." Marxism-Leninism and Secular Humanism begin with "in the beginning no God."

Even humanists such as Bertrand Russell recognized the religiosity of Marxism. He observed:

The greatest danger in our day comes from new religions, Communism and Nazism. To call these religions may be objectionable both to their friends and enemies, but in fact they have all the characteristics of religions. They advocate a way of life on the basis of irrational dogmas; they have a sacred history, a Messiah, and a priesthood. I do not see what more could be demanded to qualify a doctrine as a religion. 156

Secular Humanism is even more openly religious than Marxism. The first Humanist Manifesto described the agenda of "religious" Humanism. The 1980 preface to the Humanist Manifestoes I & II, written by Paul Kurtz, states, "Humanism is a philosophical, religious, and moral point of view." 157 John Dewey, a signatory of the 1933 Manifesto, wrote A Common Faith, in which he maintained, "Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to


sect, class or race. . . . It remains to make it explicit and militant."  

While the Humanist Manifesto II (written primarily by Paul Kurtz and published in 1973) drops the expression "religious humanism," it nevertheless contains religious implications and even religious terminology, including the statement that "no deity shall save us; we must save ourselves."  

Furthermore, in its decision in Toraco v. Watkins (June 19, 1961), the U. S. Supreme Court stated, "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others." A few years later (1965) the Supreme court allowed Daniel Seeger conscientious objector status because of his religious beliefs. He claimed to be a Secular Humanist.  

In a guest editorial for the Journal of Church and State entitled "Issues That Divide: the Triumph of Secular Humanism," Leo Pfeffer insists that Secular Humanism will triumph over its religious competitors--Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. Pfeffer argues, "In [the college arena], it is not Protestantism, Catholicism, or Judaism  

\[159\] Kurtz, ed., Humanist Manifestoes I & II, 16.  
which will emerge the victor, but secular humanism, a
cultural force which in many respects is stronger in the
United States than any of the major religious groups or any
alliance among them.\textsuperscript{161} Whittaker Chambers also argued that
"[f]aith is the central problem of this age."\textsuperscript{162} Chambers
added:

Communism is the central experience of the first half
of the twentieth century, and may be its final
experience—will be, unless the free world, in agony of
its struggle with Communism, overcomes its crisis by
discovering, in suffering and pain, a power of faith
which will provide man's mind, at the same intensity,
with the same two certainties: a reason to live and a
reason to die.\textsuperscript{163}

Communism is the great alternative faith of mankind. Like
all great faiths, its force derives from a simple vision.
Other ages have had great visions. There have always been
different versions of the same vision: the vision of God and
man's relationship with God. The Communist vision is the
vision of Man without God.

But its view of God, its knowledge of God, its
experience of God, is what alone gives character to a
society or nation, and meaning to its destiny. Its culture,
the voice of this character, is merely that view, knowledge,
experience, of God, fixed by its most intense spirits in

\textsuperscript{161} Leo Pfeffer, "Issues That Divide: The Triumph of
2 (Spring 1977): 211.

\textsuperscript{162} David A. Noebel, \textit{Understanding the Times} (Manitou

\textsuperscript{163} Chambers, \textit{Witness}, 13.
terms intelligible to the mass of men. There has never been a society or a nation without God. But history is cluttered with the wreckage of nations that became indifferent to God, and died.\textsuperscript{164} Chambers concluded that if the free world failed, the twentieth century "will be the century of the great social wars," and if it succeeded, this century would be "the century of the great wars of faith."\textsuperscript{165}

The Biblical Worldview

What then is the relationship of worldview to Scripture? The Christian answer to this question is clear: worldview must be shaped and tested by Scripture. It can legitimately guide people's lives only if it is scriptural. Consequently, it is essential to relate the basic concepts of "biblical theology" to their worldview--or rather to understand these basic concepts as constituting a worldview.

The biblical worldview, then, has some practical implications for societal, personal and cultural lives of Christians. The task of the Christian is to discern structure and direction, structure denoting the "essence of a creaturely thing," and "direction," referring to a sinful deviation from the structural ordinance and renewed conformity to it in Christ. A reformational analysis of every area of life will apply this biblical distinction

\textsuperscript{164}Ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{165}Ibid.
consistently. It will place equal emphasis on creation (structure) and on the spiritual (direction) pervading all of creation.

Moreover, the distinction between structure and direction must always be brought together under the theme of "grace restores nature." It is not enough simply to assert that creation ordinances or structures hold for reality everywhere and that a religious conflict is at work in that reality. It must be recognized that a religious conflict rages for the sake of the created structure. For the Christians, the everyday components of their lives—their family, their sexuality, their thinking, their emotions, their work—are the structural things that are involved and at stake in the pull of sin and grace. The directional battle does not take place on a spiritual plane above creaturely reality but rather occurs in and for the concrete reality of the earthly creation. This is what life and the world are all about. All of their lives, and all of the realities of their daily experience, are constituted by structure and direction, the basic ingredients of life.

This twin emphasis makes a radical difference in the way Christian believers approach reality. Because they believe that creational structure underlies all of reality, they seek and find evidence of lawful constancy in the flux of experience, and of invariant principles amidst a variety of historical events and institutions. Because they confess
that a spiritual direction underlies their experience, they see abnormality where others see normality, and possibilities of renewal where others see inevitable distortion. In every situation, they explicitly look for and recognize the presence of creational structure, distinguishing this sharply from the human abuse to which it is subject. Their sensitivities are attuned to creation and antithesis, the foundational realities that the Scriptures so clearly and consistently teach and that the religion of modern humanism so clearly and consistently denies.\textsuperscript{166}

Over one hundred years ago (1890-1891), James Orr presented the Kerr Lectures in Edinburgh, Scotland. He entitled his series "The Christian View of God and the World" and argued that Christianity possesses a Weltanschauung or Weltansicht--"a view of the world." While some Christians may consider the Christ of Christianity relevant only to matters of the heart, Orr argued His relevance for both heart and head. He maintained that "if there is a religion in the world which exalts the office of teaching, it is safe to say that it is the religion of Jesus Christ."\textsuperscript{167}

In other words, one who says he believes with his whole heart that Jesus is the "Son of God" is thereby committed to

\textsuperscript{166} Wolters, \textit{Creation Regained}, 73.

\textsuperscript{167} James Orr, \textit{The Christian View of God and the World} (Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1897), 20.
much else besides. He is committed to a view of God, to a view of man, to a view of sin, to a view of redemption, to a view of the purpose of God in creation and history, to a view of human destiny, found only in Christianity." Carl Henry agrees. He argues that "the Christian belief system, which the Christian knows to be grounded in divine revelation, is relevant to all of life."  

The doctrine of the Lordship of Jesus Christ over all things stops [Christians] from falling into the Manichean heresy that there are spheres of human existence that are diabolical and that Christ cannot be the Lord since 

[t]here is not a human being that cannot be redeemed, and therefore, there is no human situation or human action and production that could not be transformed by the redeeming power of Jesus Christ (Rom 11:36; I Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:6).  

Reformation versus Revolution  

The first implication of the reformational worldview is very broad and underlies all others. It describes the basic temper and attitude that should accompany the Christian as he or she tackles the societal, personal and cultural issues of the day. This implication is contained in the word reformation, the noun at the root of reformational. The 

168 Ibid., 4.  
obvious first one is the Reformation itself, the sixteenth-century revival of biblical religion, based on the rediscovery of the Word of God. But two other connotations of "reformation" are also present in the term reformational.

First, is that reformation means sanctification, not consecration. To sanctify (or hallow), means "to make free from sin, to cleanse from moral corruption, to purify." To consecrate, on the other hand, generally means simply "to set apart, to dedicate, to devote to the service or worship of God." Consecration therefore means external renewal; sanctification means internal renewal. The word reformation refers to sanctification in this sense of inner revitalization.

It is clearly sanctification that is meant when Christians speak of the restoration of creation through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Sanctification is the process whereby the Holy Spirit, in and through the people of God, purifies creation from sin on the basis of Christ's atonement and victory over sin and death. That purifying activity, that making holy, is a process that brings an inner renewal and revitalization of God's creatures, not just an external connection to the institutional church and its services of worship. The "Spirit of Holiness" seeks to permeate our creaturely lives, making a qualitative difference in the internal workings of family, business, art, and government.
A dualistic worldview, one that sees a basic division between sacred and secular, relegates the work of the Spirit to the sacred and holy realm, usually the institutional church, and allows only "consecration," some external connection with the sacred, for the rest of life.

The conception of sanctification, or of hallowing, as a process of progressive inner renewal in every phase of human life (not just in the context of worship activities) is a unique feature of biblical religion. In all other religions it seems that the holy belongs only to the realm of the cult, to the domain of the temple, the priest, and sacrifices. Everything outside that realm is considered "profane" or "unclean." The New Testament changes all of that. "Holiness" in the New Testament is not restricted to the cult but characterizes the entire life of God's people--private and public, personal and cultural. Pentecost means not only that the Spirit comes to renew human life from within but also that this sanctifying renewal spreads to a full range of human activities. Everything in life can be sanctified and internally renewed--our personal life, our societal relationships, our cultural activities. There is no limit to the scope of the hallowing operation of the Holy Spirit. How significant it is that the cultic terminology of the Old Testament, e.g. temple, sacrifice, priesthood,
incense, is transferred in the New Testament either to Christ or to the entire life of his body, the Church.\textsuperscript{171}

A second feature of reformation is that the avenue of this sanctification is progressive renewal rather than violent overthrow. This principle is particularly relevant on a societal and cultural plane, for it offers a biblical strategy for historical change. How ought Christians to confront minimalist art, or computer technology, or liberation theology? In light of their worldview, it is clear that God calls his people to a historical reformation in all these areas, to a sanctification of creational realities from sin and its effects. That is to say, what was formed in creation has been deformed by sin and must be reformed by Christ.

This idea of progressive renewal contained within reformation stands in stark contrast to revolution in the modern political sense. Revolution in this sense is characterized by the following features: (1) necessary violence, (2) the complete removal of every aspect of the established system, and (3) the construction of an entirely different societal order based according to a theoretical ideal. The biblical principle of reformation opposes each of these three points. In the first place, reformation stresses the necessity of avoiding violence both in the ordinary sense of harming individuals with physical or

\textsuperscript{171}Albert B. Wolters, \textit{Creation Regained}, 76.
psychological force and in the historical sense of wrenching and dislocating the social fabric. No matter how dramatic the new life in Christ might be, it does not seek to tear the fabric of a given historical situation. Secondly, it recognizes that no given societal order is absolutely corrupt; thus, no societal order need ever be totally condemned. Thirdly, it does not place its confidence in blueprints and conceptions of the ideal society that have been arrived at by scientific or pseudo-scientific speculation.

The equal emphasis of structure and direction within the reformational worldview compels, then, Christians to choose the attitude of reformation. Structure implies that in some sense every circumstance or condition participates in the creational possibilities God holds out to His creatures in His law. Nothing moves or exists except in response to God’s creational demands. God’s ordinances make themselves felt in even the most perverse human distortion. As a result, some element of every situation is worth preserving. Conversely, everything in reality falls within the scope of religious direction; everything that exists is susceptible to sinful distortion and is in need of religious renewal. Since both creational order and human perversion or renewal are present in any historical situation—and specifically in a cultural or societal establishment—a Christian’s rejection of evil must always lead to a
cleansing and reforming of created structures, not to an indiscriminate abolition of an entire historical situation.

On the positive side, reformation entails that the normality elements in any distorted situation should be sought out as a point of contact in terms of which renewal can take place. To reform means to attach oneself to those features of an established order that reflect some normality and obedience to creational law. Hence, reformation always takes as its point of departure what is historically given and seeks to build on the good rather than clearing the historical terrain radically in order to lay an altogether new foundation. As a practical matter, the holding power of God's law ensures that no human situation can ever be utterly desperate. This is true not only on the personal level but also on the plane of societal reality.

It is evident that this approach emphasizes the positive aspects of tradition, of authority, and of historical continuity. For this reason, the reformational worldview stands in some danger of being perceived as conservatism, as support for the status quo. Such a perception is of course profoundly mistaken, since reformation is inherently and by definition calling for reform. While their emphasis on the constant presence of creational structure rejects a sweeping condemnation of any distorted cultural situation as a whole, the fact that they

\[172\] Ibid., 78.
place an equal emphasis on direction—that is, on the far-reaching and profoundly distorting influences of human perversion as well as on the victorious power of salvation in Jesus Christ—implies that every situation calls for a crusading activity of societal reformation. The status quo is never acceptable. Every "establishment" needs internal renewal and structural reform. In this sense the Christian can never be satisfied with the achievements of any given economic, or political, or generally cultural state of affairs.

So their focus on structure rejects a sympathy for revolution, and their focus on direction condemns a quietistic conservatism. A program of social action inspired by reformational vision will never seek to start from scratch or begin with a clean slate. Rather, it will always seek to salvage certain elements of whatever historical situation it confronts—not only because those elements are worth saving, but also because they provide "handles" as it were, for renewal.

For Christians, this renewing orientation is particularly important, since severe social oppression and injustice can easily seduce them into identifying the whole social order (the "Establishment," the "status quo," or the "system" with the "world" in its religiously negative sense. When this fatal identification is made, Christians, like the early Pietists, tend to withdraw from all participation in
societal renewal. Under the guise of keeping itself from the "world," the body of Christ then in effect allows the powers of secularization and distortion to dominate the greater part of life. This is not so much an avoidance of evil as a neglect of duty.

From a Christian perspective, belief is a decisive factor in life even though one's professed beliefs may be at variance with the beliefs that are actually operative in one's life. It is the command of the gospel that Christians live their lives in conformity with the beliefs taught in the Scriptures.

The "Two Kingdoms" Concept in Church History

Alexis de Toqueville observed:

Every religion has some political opinion linked to it by affinity. The spirit of man, left to follow its bent, will regulate political society and the City of God in uniform fashion; it will . . . seek to harmonize heaven and earth.

Historically, a basic premise of Western civilization has been the belief that the only valid foundation for and source of social order is truth. This truth, in the form of religion, has been the mainspring of society and the structure of cultural order. The state must be grounded in truth, it was held, and religion was the vehicle of truth.

\[173\] Ibid., 5.

Orthodox Christianity insisted on the independence of Church and state as institutions, and on their interdependence, together with their mutual dependence and "establishment" on the Scriptures as the fallible truth of God.

When Christianity began its missionary activity, it came into immediate conflict with the belief that the unity of life finds expression in the state rather than in God. The result was a bitter conflict, ending with the recognition of Christianity and its independence. Some emperors sought to reduce the church to an aspect of the state, and some popes sought to reduce the state to an aspect of the church. This struggle was common to the so-called Middle Ages and Reformation eras. Thus, Jean Morely, sire de Villiers, a Reformed thinker, held that "ecclesiastical power and civil administration are two parts of the one true Church of God." Catholics and Protestants alike held that all people should be under the jurisdiction of both church and state. In England, for example, this meant that the Church of England was the ecclesiastical organization of England and the state its civil expression. All men were thus in both church and state, although not necessarily in good standing. Power and control were reserved to the ruling powers or leaders and not given to

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the mixed multitude. To surrender this principle, it was recognized, meant the surrender of the church and state to democracy, to the will of the people, and its consequences would be anarchy. The church then too could be reduced to a remnant. This belief in a given established church marked the Roman Catholics, Presbyterian and Reformed churches, the Lutherans, Anglicans, and, at the beginning and for some time, the Congregationalists. 176

On the other hand, the Baptists held to a voluntaristic church, a remnant of faith, governed by democratic processes. It should be noted that early Baptists were almost uniformly Calvinistic in the 17th and 18th centuries. 177 Since the essence of religion in the life of man is faith, the Baptists very early held to a voluntaristic church, made of members who joined on profession of faith. 178

Theology is inseparable from civil government. Every civil government, every state, represents a theology in action as surely as does every church. Every citizen must live under a theology as a member of the body politic. If that theology of state differs from the theology of the church, sooner or later, there will be a clash. 179

176 Ibid.
177 Rushdoony, Law and Society, 110-111.
178 Ibid., 111.
179 Ibid., 113.
The relationship of church and state has received much attention throughout history. There are many different perspectives on the subject. The four basic positions are the Catholic view, the Anabaptist view, the Calvinist view, and the Lutheran view.

The Catholic View

Catholic theologians have generally recognized the two kingdoms and the distinct role played by each. Looking more closely at the Catholic tradition, one finds a striking dualism. A general downgrading of the importance of earthly life, and a concomitant tendency to treat this world as simply a stage on which eternal principles are played out in preparation for salvation, is combined with a strong tradition of institutional stability, which requires that the Church recognize and deal with temporal matters on a long-term basis. Both emphases share a view which rather sharply distinguishes "spiritual" from "temporal" matters. Although the temporal sphere has its own rules and integrity, spiritual matters are more important. The former are subordinate to the latter as the body is subordinate to the soul. In medieval Europe, this view was translated directly into politics. As Walter Ullman notes, "The body-soul metaphor was constantly used to show that the inferiority of the laity and the superiority of the clergy,
to show just as the soul ruled the body, in the same manner the clergy ruled the laity."\textsuperscript{180}

Of course religion and politics were distinguished in institutional terms. This is the source of the famous "two swords doctrine," according to which the Church and political authorities divided tasks of rulership, with the spiritual sword wielded by bishops and priests, and the temporal sword in the hands of kings and princes. In this arrangement, secular power is separate from, but clearly subordinate to, the Church. Temporal power is therefore obliged to serve and protect the Church, and its exercise is subject to ecclesiastical judgment. The very notion of an ideal society, a notion embodied in the idea of Christendom, required that all social questions be fused with principles of Christian doctrine, as authoritatively laid out by the Church. The very idea of dividing human activity according to its function or sphere was quite foreign to medieval thought.

The Anabaptist View

The Anabaptists, by holding that the real church was constituted by a separated group who, upon repentance, justification and regeneration, underwent a genuine baptism for the first time, made quite clear that they did not consider the members of the state church real Christians.\textsuperscript{180}

Association with the state was at best sub-Christian, whereas the church represented the kingdom of God.

This despised group thus became the first Protestant advocates of a separation of church and state, not on rational, pragmatic, or political grounds, but as a consequence of a theology of discipleship and the church as a community of disciples. They only wanted to keep the church apart from the state. They did not have any theory of separation.

Many of the early Anabaptists believed that the state was part of the evil world-system from which believers were to separate themselves. If Satan were not actually the founder of the state, he had at least taken control of it. Consequently, believers were to separate themselves from the state as much as possible, they were not to vote, hold public office, serve in the armed services, or involve themselves with government in any other way. They were to obey the state generally, but the state had no real authority over believers, nor did the church have any authority over non-believers.

Reinforcing the negative evaluation of the state and the church, the Anabaptists used a two-kingdom concept like that of Luther, but with sharply different implications. The fourth article of the Schleitheim Confession of Faith (1527), sets forth the grounds for a separated church:

A separation shall be made from the evil and from the wickedness which the devil planted in the
world; in this manner, simply that we shall not have fellowship with them [the wicked] and not run with them in the multitude of their abomination. . . . For truly all creatures are but in two classes, good and bad, believing and unbelieving, darkness and light, the world and those who [have come] out of the world, God's temple and idols, Christ and Belial; and none can have part with the other. 181

All men are divided into two kingdoms, that of God, and that of the devil, in continuous conflict. The sense of dialectic characteristic of Luther, in which both the church and state are the battlegrounds of God and Satan, is altered, so that the church becomes the center of God's activity, while the rest of the world is under the control of the demonic. The church is separated because the children of God's kingdom should have nothing to do with the wicked. By definition all those not in the believers' church are citizens of the kingdom of darkness, since all creatures follow either Christ or Belial.

It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of their separation and their belief that the devil rules the "world," the Anabaptists held a fundamentally positive view of the government. They agreed with Luther that the instrument of the non-Christian kingdom was a sign of God's providence. The Anabaptists held that the state originated from the sin of man and at times traced its inception to the time of Noah's flood. As a punishment of sin, it expresses

God's wrath, but as a means of effecting necessary peace and order it reveals his love. Even a tyrannical government, then, upholds God's will to some degree.

Consequently, the Christians obey the state. Following the injunctions of Jesus, Paul, and the author of I Peter, the Anabaptists paid their taxes, prayed for their authorities, and rendered the normal service demanded. In the words of Menno Simons: "Taxes and tolls we pay as Christ has taught and Himself practiced. We pray for the imperial majesty, kings, lords, princes, and all in authority. We honor and obey them."182 The Anabaptists did not distinguish between good and bad governments: Government is by nature coercive in contrast with the life of the church while obedience is a way of fulfilling God's will independent of moral evaluations of government.

But the state cannot demand actions contrary to the will of God. As Simons put it "if they wish to rule and lord it above Christ Jesus, or contrary to Christ Jesus, in our consciences . . . this we do not grant them."183 Once again, this sounds like Luther, but Anabaptists held a more extensive view of the divine intention than Luther did, a view which was based on the demands of the Sermon on the

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Mount. To reverence authority and contribute taxes provides occasion for Christian humility, but Christians may not coerce or hurt anyone.

For this reason, even though the magistry is ordained by God, Christians cannot hold office. The opening sentence of Article VI of the Schleitheim Confession illustrates the paradox that "the sword is ordained of God outside the perfection of Christ," for Christians follow a higher way of life than the instrument of divine judgment and blessing in the temporal order, the way of perfection. The Article goes on to spell out why Christians cannot be magistrates. Despite the divine ordination of government, the Confession points to a radical dualism between the way of the world and the life of the kingdom. It states:

The government magistracy is according to the flesh, but the Christians' is according to the Spirit; their houses and dwelling remain in this world, but the Christians' citizenship is in heaven; the weapons of their conflict and war are carnal and against the flesh only, but the Christians' weapons are spiritual, against the fortification of the devil. The worldlings are armed with the steel and iron, but the Christians are armed with the armor of God, with truth, righteousness, peace, faith, salvation, and the Word of God. In brief, as is the mind of Christ toward us, so shall the mind of the members of the body of Christ be through Him in all things. Different principles of biblical interpretation naturally made for differences between the Anabaptists and

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184 Fosdick, Great Voices of the Reformation, 291.
185 Ibid., 292.
other Reformers. Referred to as "New Testament monism,"\textsuperscript{186} Anabaptists lived and found their norms in the New Testament.

The Anabaptists adhered to a covenant theology, in which they accepted the validity of the Old Covenant for Israel, but assumed that the New Covenant had superseded it. Under the Old Covenant, members of the community of Israel could punish by coercion and violence, and the political officials were esteemed religious leaders. In the New Covenant, however, Christ set aside coercion as a form of control and allowed only persuasion and expulsion for dealing with offenders. As one of the early Anabaptists stated, "The New Testament is more perfect than the Old. . . . Christ has taught a higher and more perfect doctrine and made with His people a new covenant."\textsuperscript{187}

The Anabaptist attitude reflects a radically religious commitment. The people of God take their norms for ethics entirely from the religious covenant to which they dedicate themselves. Concern for the survival of other aspects of existence plays no role. The experience of conversion demands a regenerate and different life. To a member of the

\textsuperscript{186}Hillerbrand, "The Anabaptist View of the State," 109.

\textsuperscript{187}Hans Pfistermeyer quoted in Guy F. Hershberger, \textit{War, Peace, and Non-resistance} (Scottdale: Mennonite Publishing House, 1940), 22-23.
kingdom of God the problems of the transient world are irrelevant.

The Calvinist View

Unlike many Anabaptists, Calvin recognized that authority of the state comes from God. Calvin also maintained, unlike many Catholic theologians, that authority came directly from God to the state rather than through the church. The believer was a citizen of both kingdoms and under the authority of both the state and the church. However, the state's authority over the believer is limited to that which God has given to the state; if the state steps beyond that authority, it acts without legitimacy, and believers are to resist it.

Furthermore, the mission of the church is to renovate the world, including the state, according to Christian concepts. And the state is to assist the church in Christianizing the world. Consequently, Calvin served as a political leader as well as a church leader in Geneva, and he saw no problem in using the machinery of the state to further his version of Christianity by punishing heretics, etc.

This does not lead us to consider the whole nature of government a thing polluted, which has nothing to do with Christian men. Government's function is no less than

that of bread, water, sun, and air. Indeed its place of honor is far more excellent. But it also prevents idolatry, sacrilege against God's name, blasphemies against His truth, and other public offenses against religion from arising and spreading among the people. Government also prevents the public peace from being disturbed; it provides that each man may keep his property safe and sound; that men may carry on blameless intercourse among themselves; that honesty and modesty may be preserved among men. In short, it provides that a public manifestation of religion may exist among Christians, and that humanity be maintained among men.

Calvin believed that "civil government has as its appointed end, so long as we live among men, to cherish and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound doctrine of piety and the position of the church, to adjust our life to the society of men, to form our social behavior to civil righteousness, to reconcile us with one another, and to promote general peace and tranquility."

The office of magistrate is approved by and acceptable to the Lord. They have a mandate from God, have been


189 Ibid., 1488.

190 Ibid.

191 Ibid., 1487.
invested with divine authority, and are wholly God's representatives, in a manner, acting as his viceregents. God has entrusted to them the business of serving Him in their office, and of exercising judgment not for man but for God. 192

The enforcement of God's law means civil government, which God's law provides for and ordains. To the civil order is given the power to enforce justice and to take human life where God's law requires it, and nowhere else. 193

Benjamin Warfield defined the Calvinist as "the man who sees God behind all phenomena and in all that occurs." 194 Reformed Calvinists contended that God "rules and governs all things according to His holy will, so that nothing happens in this world without His appointment." 195

Calvinism and Political Theory

Calvinism is rooted in a form of religion which was peculiarly its own, and from this specific religious consciousness there was developed first a peculiar theology, then a special church order, then a given political and social life, for the interpretation of the moral world-

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192Ibid., 1489.

193Rushdoony, Law and Society, 553.


195"Belgic Confession," Art. XIII.
order, for the relation between nature and grace, between Christianity and the world, between church and state, and finally for art and science. George Bancroft argued that Calvinism "ha[d] a theory of ontology, of ethics, of social happiness, and of human liberty, all derived from God." As a political name, Calvinism indicates that political movement which has guaranteed the liberty of nations in constitutional statesmanship. Calvinism was considered by many as "the highest form of development reached by the religious and political principle in the 16th century." "The fanatic for Calvinism was the fanatic for liberty, for in the moral warfare for freedom, his creed was a part of his army, and his most faithful ally in battle." In Calvinism lies the guarantee of our constitutional liberties.


198 Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, 14.

199 R. C. Bakhuizen Van Den Brink, Het Huwelijk van Willem van Orange met Anna van Saxen, 1853, 123; quoted in Abraham Kuyper, Lectures in Calvinism, 14.


201 Groen van Prinster quoted in Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, 78.
It was believed that the Sovereign God created the state and gave to it its powers and functions. The earthly magistrate held his position and exercised his powers by a divine decree. He was a minister of God under common grace for the execution of the laws of God among the people at large, for the maintenance of law and order, and for so ruling the state that it would provide an atmosphere favorable for the preaching of the Gospel. He was to so rule that the people of God, the elect, could live individually and corporately a life that was truly Christian. 202

In Calvinist political theory, which was best developed and formulated by the Puritans in America, the magistrate derived his powers from God and not from the people. Human government was divinely ordained for the realization of the purposes of God in history. His powers did not come from the people, nor was he primarily responsible to them for the stewardship of his office. Though it was true that these magistrates were elected by the people and the people had certain definite powers in the legislative process, they were not absolute in their power and were amenable to certain constitutional and elective checks which were placed in the hands of the voters. However, both the voters and the magistrates were to look to the Scriptures as a guide.

the magistrates were to look to the Scriptures as a guide for the general conduct of their government. The rulers and the people were thus subject to the revealed will of God, and the people could never take precedence over the divinely ordained powers and functions of human government.

The Puritans considered the state, which they called civil-government, to be only one form of government. The individual exercising self-restraint in conducting governance, and so is the family, the church, the school, the guild, the profession, a rich variety of private associations, and finally, civil government. All of them limited the idolization and atomization of the self, and all act to prevent any single institution from exercising tyranny. Therefore, the contention that to limit state power invites anarchy or individualism cannot be sustained.

The basic government was self-government, and only the Christian man is truly free and hence able properly to exercise self-government. A free social order rested on the premise that self-government is the basic government in the human order, and that any weakening or decline in self-government means a decline in responsibility and the rise of tyranny and slavery.

Second, next to self-government, is another basic form of government, the family. The family is man's first state, church, and school. It is the institution which provides the basic structure of his existence and most governs his
activities. Man is reared in a family, passing from the governed to the governing in a framework which extensively and profoundly shapes his concept of himself and of life in general.

Third, the church is a government and an important one, not only in its exercise of discipline but in its religious and moral influence on the minds of men. Even men outside the church are extensively governed in each area, even if only in a negative sense, by the stand of the church. The failure of the church to provide biblical government has deadly repercussions on a culture.

Fourth, the school is a government, and a very important one. The desire of statists to control education rests on the knowledge of the school’s significant part in the government of man. For formal education to be surrendered to the state is thus a basic surrender of man’s self-government.

Fifth, man’s vocation, his business, work, profession, or calling is an important government. A man is governed by the conditions of his vocation or work. In terms of it, he will educate himself, uproot his family and travel to another community, spend most of his waking hours in its service, and continually work therein to attain greater mastery and advancement. Vocations are both areas of government over man and at the same time a central area of self-government.
Sixth, private associations are important forms of government. These include a man's neighborhood, his friends, voluntary organizations, strangers he must meet daily, and other like associations. These associations have a major governing influence on man, but they can also be means and areas whereby he exercises his government over others, influencing or directing them.

Seventh, another area of government is civil government, or the state. The state is thus one government among many, and to make the state equivalent to government per se is destructive of liberty and of life. The governmental area of the state must be strictly limited lest all government be destroyed by the tyranny of one realm.

Abuses of order within the church are no more under the government of the state than abuses within the state are under the government of the church, and the same is true of every other realm of government—family, church, school, business, and the like. Reformed theologians restricted the right of rebellion against an unjust order within the state to the legitimate order within the state, i.e., to other civil magistrates, who in the name of the law moved to correct the abuses of civil order.

Calvinism and Civil Government

Calvinist political theory assigned quite different roles to church and state. Both were divinely ordained for certain definite purposes, but the purposes were not
identical, and the Puritans never confused these two institutions, or their respective roles, in their society. Because of their Calvinist heritage, the Puritans were concerned with a proclamation of the whole counsel of God to man, and for the subjection of the whole of human life to the Kingdom of Jesus Christ. They never expected the state to perform any duty which the Scriptures assigned to the church, and they were never willing to allow the church to take to itself those functions which were "secular" in nature. Both church and state had their own spheres of action and neither was to transgress the domain of the other. The state was concerned with the earthly life of the people of God and the unregenerate who might live in their midst. It was concerned with the enforcement of the Ten Commandments, not for the purpose of bringing people to a knowledge of salvation, or to force them to a kind of external righteousness as a means of earning redemption, but for the purpose of maintaining the sovereign and holiness of God for His own glory. The state, however, had no power or right to intrude on the domain of the church. The state is an instrument of common grace, while the church is an instrument of redemptive grace. Both institutions had a common theological foundation, but their spheres of activity were quite different and must remain so. In the area of their practical operation in the everyday life of the
commonwealth there was not to be a union of the church and
state as institutions.

In short, the Puritans of the seventeenth century
adapted for their own use, and placed in a Calvinistic
context, the Gelasian theory of the two swords (enunciated
by Pope Gelasius I in 494). John Davenport wrote:

These two different Orders and States, Ecclesiastical
and Civil, be not set in opposition as contraries that
one should destroy the other, but as co-ordinate
states, in the same place, reaching forth help mutually
to each other, for the welfare of both according to
God, so that both Officiers and Members of Churches be
subject in respect of outward man, to the Civil Power,
of those who bear rule in the Civil State according to
God and teach others to do so; And that the Civil
Magistrates and officers in regard to the inward man
subject themselves spiritually to the power of Christ
in Church Ordinances and by their Civil Power preserve
the same in outward Peace and Purity.\(^{203}\)

The Church and State were to cooperate in the attainment of
their respective goals, for they were both subject to the
same God. It was for this reason that the State was to
punish blasphemers and heretics. The magistrate, in the
discharge of his office was a steward unto God and he was to
be found faithful in this responsibility. It was not the
role of the magistrate to proclaim the Gospel, but it was
his duty to establish such civil conditions as to enable the
Church to perform this function. Neither was it the
responsibility of the Church to manage the civil life of the

\(^{203}\)John Davenport, *A Discourse About Civil Government*
(Cambridge, 1663), 8-9; quoted in C. Gregg Singer, *A
Theological Interpretation of American History*
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing C.,
1964), 16, f. n. 1.
people, but a faithful preaching of the Law of God was bound
to have a healthy influence on the community at large.

The Puritans held to a different conception of liberty
from that which is so prevalent in contemporary thought and
governmental theory. For the Puritans, liberty was in no
way associated with the doctrine of natural law and natural
rights, but found its origin and meaning in that covenant
which God had made with his people. Liberty was not a
natural right, but a God-given right and privilege to be
zealously guarded from despots, but also subject to precise
biblically-defined limits. Their view of liberty received
its classic definition in an address which John Winthrop
gave to the General Court of Massachusetts in 1645:

The other kind of liberty I call civil or federal,
it may also be termed moral in reference to the
covenant between God and man, in the moral law,
and the political covenants and constitutions
among men themselves. This liberty is the proper
end and object of authority and cannot subsist
without it; and it is a liberty to that only which
is good, and just, and honest. . . . This liberty
is maintained and exercised in a way of subjection
to authority, it is the same kind of liberty
wherewith Christ has made us free. 204

The most visible check on the arrogation of total power in
the central government is a system of what political
theorists used to call "lesser magistrates." These are
intermediate institutions, which formerly served to check
central power.

204Quoted in Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The
Based on their belief in the sovereignty of God and the depravity of man, they devised a system of divided authority and diffused power, where sovereignty was to lie nowhere in the civil government. Government was ordained of God for the orderly conduct of man in a fallen world. They left a legacy of a government of law not of men.

A basic postulate of the emerging body of Puritan political thought was the assumption that government was necessary because of original sin. No government had been required in the Garden of Eden, nor was any presumably in Heaven. Thus, the first function of government was to restrain selfish and sinful men. Government's more positive duty was to advance God's kingdom by effectuating the moral order in the community. This objective was, of course, integrally related to the more strictly spiritual purposes of the church. To this end, the state, might properly initiate as well as regulate conduct. Laissez-faire individualism as such was not glorified, but in practice, individual initiative and corporate or group activities were indiscriminately encouraged.²⁰⁵ Because the most important distinction that could be made between men concerned their spiritual condition, government was to rest upon this distinction. The Holy Commonwealth was to be a dictatorship of the regenerate. The unconverted should enjoy no

political privileges, although no other civil or social disabilities were to be placed upon them as a class. Whenever the policy of the state had been determined, either by statute or by magisterial interpretation of the Word of God as found in Scripture, no deviations were to be permitted. Certainly there was to be no toleration of religious differences.

The supremacy of the law of God was doubtless the fundamental Puritan political assumption. All social and political institutions and practices were measured in terms of their effectiveness in promoting the realization of that law on earth. The dominant influence in the Puritan state rested with the clergy as the chief custodians and interpreters of divine law. Holy Scripture was the principal but not only source of knowledge of that law.

Beneath the contingencies of formal organization was the insistence that political society was based on a social covenant which incorporated the church covenant. This social covenant enabled the community of the faithful to act in a political capacity, just as the church covenant constituted them a congregation for the purposes of worship. Thus, the church congregation was made the core of the local community socially as well as religiously.

The first aspect of the social-covenant relationship was that of consent. Men freely entered into covenant with one another to form a political society. As John Cotton
expressed it: "It is evident by the light of nature, that all Civil Relations are founded in Covenant." Just as Puritan theology taught that man was free to seek the gift of grace, so also did Puritan political theory base the social covenant on the free consent of the contracting parties. According to Winthrop, "The foundation of the people's power is their liberty."207

The second major aspect of covenant theory emphasized the mutual obligations that it involved. In this light, the covenant had been entered into not by the people themselves as equals, as in the eighteenth century compact theory, but between the ruler on the one hand and the people on the other. The obligations of the social covenant were also rooted in the covenant of grace. Peter Bulkeley found the authority of the magistrate to be derived from the will of God. He asserted:

Where the Lord sets himself over a people, he frames them into a willing and voluntary subjection unto him, that they desire nothing more than to be under his government. . . . When the Lord is in a covenant with a people, they follow him not forcibly, but as far as they are sanctified by grace, they submit willingly to his regiment.208

The political application of this spiritual obligation was made by John Cotton. Cotton stated:

206Quoted in Persons, American Minds, 37.
207Ibid.
208Ibid, 38.
Look what a King requires of his people, or the People of a King, the very same doth God require of his people, and the People of God . . . that is, a Governor, a Provider for, and a protector of his people. . . . And the people undertake to be obedient to his laws, to whatever he declares to be the counsel of his will. 209

The obligations of the covenant freely accepted thus exemplified Winthrop's doctrine of federal liberty. Entry into such a covenant admittedly involved the renunciation of the natural liberty to assert one's selfish will against the considered judgment of the magistrates. They, in turn, were obligated to rule in accordance with the will of God.

When both aspects of social covenant theory are kept in mind, it is apparent that, although government was presumed to be constituted voluntarily by the people, its agencies and powers were established by God; the offices were sanctified; and the magistrates were obliged to be the wish of the freemen as well. These two aspects of social-covenant theory—the voluntary compact on the one hand, and the submission to the will of God in the magistrate on the other—indicate the way in which the Puritans proposed to reconcile liberty and authority. Thus, the conception of the nature of the State and of the assumption of authority by the magistrate, and the conception of the right to defend liberty, depends on what Calvinism has placed in the

209Ibid.
foreground, as the primordial truth—that God has instituted the magistrate by reason of sin.

Calvinism, has therefore, by its deep conception of sin laid bare the true root of state-life, and has taught us two things: first, that we have gratefully to receive, from the hand of God, the institution of the State with its magistrates, as a means of preservation, now indeed indispensable. And on the other hand also that, by virtue of our natural impulse, people must ever watch against the danger which lurks, for their personal liberty, in the power of the State.

Magistrates, therefore, are instruments of "common grace," to thwart all license and outrage and to shield the good against evil. But they are more. Besides all this, they are instituted by God as His servants, in order that they may preserve the glorious work of God, in the creation of humanity, from total destruction. Sin attacks God's handiwork, God's plan, God's justice, God's honor, as supreme Artificer and Builder. Thus God, ordaining the powers that be, in order that, through their instrumentality, He might maintain His justice against the strivings of sin, has given to the magistrates the terrible right of life and death. Therefore, all the powers that be, whether in empire or in republics, in cities or in states, rule, "by the grace of God." For the same reason justice

\[210\] Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism*, 83.
bears a holy character. And from the same motive every citizen is bound to obey, not only from dread of punishment, but for the sake of conscience.

Further Calvin stated that authority, as such, is in no way affected by the question of how a government is instituted and in what form it reveals itself. He personally preferred a republic, the cooperation of many persons under mutual control since government is necessitated by the existence of sin.

In his system however, this could only amount to a gradual difference in practical excellency, but never to a fundamental difference, as regards the essence of authority. He considered a monarchy and an aristocracy, as well as democracy, both possible and practicable forms of government; provided it be unchangeably maintained, that no one on earth can claim authority over his fellow-men, unless it be laid upon him "by the grace of God"; and therefore, the ultimate duty of obedience is imposed upon us not by man, but by God Himself.

The question of how those persons, who by divine authority are to be clothed with power, are indicated, cannot, according to Calvin, be answered alike for all peoples and for all time. Yet, he does not hesitate to state, in an ideal sense, that the most desirable conditions exist, where the people themselves choose their own magistrates.
The Calvinistic confession of the Sovereignty of God holds good for all the world, is true for all nations, and is of force in all authority, which man exercises over man; even in the authority which parents possess over their children. It is therefore a political faith which may be summarily expressed in these three theses: (1) God only--and never any creature--is possessed of sovereign rights, in the destiny of nations, because God alone created them, maintains them by His Almighty power, and rules them by His ordinances; (2) Sin has, in the realm of politics, broken down the direct government of God, and therefore the exercise of authority, for the purpose of government, has subsequently been invested in men, as a mechanical remedy; and (3) In whatever form this authority may reveal itself, man never possesses power over his fellow-men in any other way than by an authority which descends upon him from the majesty of God.

The Calvinist political theory is therefore diametrically opposed to the Popular-sovereignty theory that flowed from the French revolution as well as the State-sovereignty theory developed by the historico-pantheistic school of Germany. Popular-sovereignty posits that all power, all authority proceeds from man. Thus one comes from the individual man to the many men; and in those many men conceived as the people, there is thus hidden the deepest fountain of all sovereignty.
The Historical school in Germany, a product of Germanic philosophical pantheism, shifted from popular-sovereignty to the Sovereignty of the State. Ideas are incarnated in the reality, and among these the idea of the State was the highest, the richest, the most perfect idea of the relation between man and man. Thus, the State became a mystical conception. The State was considered as a mysterious being, with a hidden ego; with a State-consciousness, slowly developing; and with an increasing potent State-will, which by a slow process endeavored to blindly reach the highest State-aim.

The shift from Popular-sovereignty to Sovereignty of the State brought about a shift in the conception of the people as well. The term, "the people," was no longer understood as with Rousseau, to be the sum total of all individuals. It was correctly seen that "the people" was no aggregate, but an organic whole. Thus, this organism must of necessity have its organic members. Slowly these organisms arrived at their historic development. By these organs the will of the State operates, and everything must bow before this will. This sovereign State-will might reveal itself in a republic, in a monarchy, in a Caesar, in an Asiatic despot, in a tyrant as Philip II of Spain, or in a dictator like Napoleon. All of these were but forms, in which the one State-idea incorporated itself; the stages of development in a never-ending process. But in whatever form
This mystical being of the state revealed itself, the idea remained supreme: the State shortly asserted its sovereignty and for every member of the State it remained the touchstone of wisdom to give way to this State-apotheosis.

Thus all transcendent right in God, to which the oppressed lifted his face, falls away. There is no other right, but the immanent right which is written down in the law. The law is right, not because its contents are in harmony with the eternal principles of right, but because it is law. If on the morrow it fixes the very opposite, this also must be right. And the fruit of this deadening theory is, as a matter of course, that the consciousness of right is blunted, that all fixedness of right departs from our minds, and that higher enthusiasm for right is extinguished. That which exists is good, because it exists; and it is no longer the will of God, of Him Who created us and knows us, but it becomes the ever-changing will of the State, which, having no one above itself, actually becomes God, and has to decide how our life and our existence shall be.

However, in Scripture, the negative commands of the Bible are based upon positive rights. When the Bible forbids murder, it protects the right to life. When the Bible forbids man-stealing, it protects the right to liberty. When the Bible forbids stealing, it protects the right to property. The commandments thus establish and protect a basic area of life. These rights are absolute and
cannot be abridged by government: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Therefore, religion and freedom are indivisible. Physical or political liberty is meaningless without spiritual liberty. External freedom is only an aspect of interior freedom. Freedom is a need of the soul, and nothing else. It is in striving toward God that the soul strives continually after a condition of freedom. God alone is the inciter and the guarantor of freedom. He is the only guarantor. Without freedom the soul dies. Without the soul there is no justification for freedom. If man is not a spiritual creature, no real liberty is possible. If man is purely physical, then he is entirely subject to the physical laws of cause and effect, his heredity, and his environment, and he is no more capable of freedom or meaningful choices than an ape or computer.

Therefore, the doctrines of original sin and the total depravity of man resulted in the belief that the power of the government must be limited. The doctrine of total depravity is a great leveler, for it means rulers are just as depraved as common people. The Puritan clergyman John Cotton articulated this fear of power when he said:

It's necessary, therefore, that all power that is on earth be limited, church power or other. . . . It's counted a matter of danger to the state to limit prerogatives; but it is a further danger not to have them limited; they will be like a tempest if they not be limited. . . . It is therefore fit for every man to be studious of the bounds which the Lord hath set; and for the people, in whom
fundamentally all power lies, to give as much power as God in His Word gives to men. . . . All entrenchment upon the bounds which God hath not given, they are not enlargements, but burdens and snares. 211

Principled Pluralism

One cannot move directly from the text of the Bible to political theory. One needs an in-between step, a framework for apprehending biblical teaching about statecraft, a worldview. A worldview attempts to provide a holistic understanding of scriptural teaching about all areas of life. It seeks to show the interrelationships among the various themes expounded in the Bible. Hermeneutically, their position is based upon biblical texts that teach that rulers are divinely ordained administrators of public justice. From these revelational pointers, man can then move on to the development of a reformational world view.

This position holds that a transformational, reformational world view, most closely approximates the biblical approach. This paradigm of society, therefore, serves as the framework for evaluating the issues of state life. It directs our efforts to define and clarify the place and task of civil government within contemporary society.

Structurally, this reformational world view offers the societal context, with its various spheres and functions, for locating and understanding the role of the state as it relates to other aspects of our life together in God's world.

Therefore this view maintains that all men live within a network of divinely ordained life-relationships. People do not find meaning and purpose either in their own individuality or as part of some collectivistic whole. Rather, people fulfill their callings within a plurality of communal associations, such as family, school, and state. God ordained each of these spheres of activity as part of the original order. Together they constitute community life. Structural pluralism means that God has created the world with various structures--civil government, marriage, the family, the church, schools, the marketplace--which order life and coordinate human interaction. Confessional pluralism refers to the right of the various religious groups that make up a society to develop their own patterns of involvement in public life through their own associations--schools, political parties, labor unions, and churches--to promote their views. The concept of sphere sovereignty teaches that each sphere in society has its own independent authority; no one sphere should dominate or usurp the role of the others. Sphere universality refers to the cooperative relationship among the various social
spheres; they should work together to promote wholesome community life.

The Old Testament teaches that Israel ought to have been (and Israel was) a Yahwistic nation with a disestablished church, that is, every jurisdiction as a matter of principle should have been under the law of Jehovah. Moreover, the New Testament teaches that the United States (and Switzerland, and every nation) ought to be a Christian nation with a disestablished church and with every jurisdiction as a matter of principle under the law of Jehovah-Jesus. This biblical and normative--by law, but not yet present in actual fact--and jurisdictional assumption is crucial. There was jurisdictional and institutional separation of church and state in the Old Testament, as illustrated by priest (Levi through Aaron) and temple in contrast to king (Judah through David) and palace. The church even then was disestablished (not-sponsored), as is illustrated by the tithe. The tithe was not a tax (not state-coerced), but a contribution (voluntary, by church persuasion). Voluntarism (as in America), rather than establishmentarianism (as in the tax-financed state-church of Germany, for example), is the biblical pattern.

The biblical concept of jurisdiction (literally, "the speaking of the law" by each sphere for its own sphere) is grounded in the sovereignty-responsibility perspective of biblical convenantualism. God determines what His law is for
each created sphere. God initiates a covenant with all men, a bond or relationship initiated by either common or redemptive grace and circumscribed by law. Man should respond personally and corporately as a dependent creature, not as if he were the autonomous Creator.

Biblically, God's covenants divide into two categories: the covenant of creation and the covenants of redemption. The covenant of creation pertains to all men and all nonecclesiastical spheres as regulative law (moral and civil). The covenants of redemption in succession have pertained to believers and the ecclesiastical sphere (the church) as restorative law (ceremonial)--God's retrieval system for sinners. This distinction is vital and helps man not "to secularize the church or sacralize the world." The church is given the sword of the Spirit and of mercy (restoration), and the state is given the sword of steel and of justice (restitution); both jurisdictions, whether of the self (e.g., controlling anger), the church (confessing anger), the state (punishing acts of anger), or the family, business, etc., are multiple authorities, separate yet interdependent, directly (not hierarchically)

212 See, for example, Jer. 33:20, 25.

213 See, for example, Eph. 2:12 and Heb. 13:20.

subordinate to God's authority. As Professor Joseph Kickasola points out, "[a] state-church, and a church-state, join together what God, for our protection and liberty, has put asunder." \(^{215}\)

Theonomists argue that both the Old and New Testaments teach institutional and jurisdictional separation of church (a disestablished church, no less) and state and family, each directly under God, to be guided by those portions of the Bible which speak to its particular sphere. The separate powers--judicial, legislative, and executive--all reflect the power of God.

They also maintain that the nontheocratic nations surrounding Israel were bound by God's law. Israel's uniqueness did not exempt its neighboring nations from obeying God's holy standards of personal and civil righteousness for His creatures. The moral-civil (nonceremonial) law, which was not limited to the theocratic nation, is not limited to the theocratic age. In general, what was binding outside Israel is binding since Israel. Covenant theology fully appreciates those Scriptures which teach that the continuities of the Testaments are far greater than their discontinuities. Theonomy, specifically, holds to a maintained-unless-modified approach, that is, the Old Testament is presumed to be maintained in the New Testament unless the New Testament modifies some feature of

\(^{215}\)Ibid.
it. This is in marked contrast to dispensational theology, which employs a repealed-unless-repeated approach, a discontinuity model that asserts that the Old Testament has been repealed by the New Testament unless the New Testament repeats some feature of it.

Jesus Christ is prophet, priest, and king, offices that correspond, respectively, to moral law, ceremonial law, and civil (judicial) law. Jesus Christ wields both the sword of the Spirit and the sword of justice in their delegated spheres. He is Lord of heaven and of all nations. Thus, everyone is bound by Christ's nonecclesiastical law, whether or not one believes in His civil lordship.

The Lutheran View

Of the three views discussed above, Luther's view was closest to that of Calvin. Luther had been an Augustinian monk. He had made Augustine the subject of study for many years, and he was greatly influenced by Augustine's view that the purpose of the state was to restrain man's sinful nature. Like Calvin, he recognized that the church and the state are each ordained by God. Like Calvin, he recognized that believers belong to both kingdoms, the church and the state, and have responsibilities to each. The belief that both human will and human reason are essentially defective and that good works are not a means of union with God led Luther, Melanchthon, and other reformers to their central theological teaching that God has ordained two distinct
realms or kingdoms, in which mankind is destined to live—the earthly and heavenly. The earthly kingdom is the realm of creation, of will and reason, and of moral duty and works. It is comprised of all the institutions and activities that contribute to man's natural or physical life, marriage, and family, business and property, government and law, and all persons participate in it.

At the same time, however, it is the realm of sin and death, corrupted by man's essential selfishness. The heavenly kingdom is the realm of faith and grace, of salvation and eternal life, in which all faithful Christians participate equally.

The two-kingdoms theory was an elaboration of Luther's earlier distinction between law and Gospel, which he

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216 The terms "realm" and "kingdom" are translations of the German term Reich and the Latin term regnum, which the reformers, particularly Luther, used interchangeably. Etymologically, regnum is related to rex, "king," whereas Reich is a cognate with the English "reach." Both terms, Reich and regnum, have two well accepted meanings according to sixteenth-century lexicons; either (1) the territory and/or people which is ruled; or (2) the reign, rulership, kingship, or exercise of government authority itself, which is also rendered in German by the term Regiment.

Luther generally used the terms Reich and regnum in the second sense of the reign or rulership of an authority. Thus, the phrase Reich Gottes, Reich Christi, regnum de, and regnum Christi denote the heavenly rule or reign or kingship of God. The phrases Reich der Welt and regnum mundi mean the rule or reign of temporal authorities.

considered to be entirely new in the history of theology. "Of this distinction between Law and Gospel," he wrote:

you will find nothing in the books of the monks, canonists, or theologians whether recent or ancient. Augustine understood this difference somewhat and showed it. Jerome and others were wholly ignorant of it. 218

Law reigns in the earthly kingdom, the Gospel in the heavenly.

The two-kingdoms theory allowed the Lutheran reformers to compare two governments, two "regimes" (Regimente), the invisible spiritual regime of the church and the visible political regime of the secular authority. This doctrine differed sharply from the Roman Catholic "two-swords" theory as it had developed since the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Papal Revolution had established a duality of spiritual and secular authority. The Church became a visible corporate hierarchical polity governed by canon law with jurisdiction not only over its own priesthood but also over the laity in a wide range of matters. This was the "spiritual sword." The "temporal sword," whose function was primarily to keep the peace and protect rights of property, was wielded by emperors and kings, now deprived of their earlier ecclesiastical supremacy, as well by feudal lords, urban authorities, and others. Papalists sometimes claimed the ultimate supremacy of the spiritual sword over the

218Ibid., 40: 486.
temporal, but the reality was generally one of competition and cooperation between them. 219

The Lutheran reformers withdrew from the church its sword-wielding character. The true church, they declared, is not governed by law but solely by Scripture. It does not exercise political power. It has no "jurisdiction." It is an invisible "communion of saints," a purely spiritual fellowship, part of the heavenly kingdom of grace, faith, and salvation. 220 To be sure, the church assumes a visible form in the earthly kingdom, but the only authority which the visible church wields in the earthly kingdom is to preach the Word and administer the sacraments. 221 This doctrine left law and politics solely to political authorities. Christians exercising political jurisdiction were to be guided not by the organized church but by their own consciences.

The two-kingdoms theory also allowed the reformers to compare the nature of citizenship in each realm. In the heavenly realm the Christian believer, Luther said, is "a private person," an individual being. In the earthly realm,


221 Luther, Luther's Works, 36: 16.
on the contrary, each person is a "public person," a "person for the sake of others," a communal being. In the heavenly realm he has a spiritual freedom; in the earthly realm he is bound by the duties of political citizenship.

The two kingdoms were not merely parallel. They also interacted with each other on at least three levels. First, the Lutheran reformers taught that it is the duty of Christians "to work the work of God in the world." As citizens of the earthly kingdom, Christians are not to withdraw ascetically from the world, abstaining from its activities and institutions, as certain Anabaptists and Spiritualists taught. Rather, Christians are to participate actively in these earthly institutions and activities, to confirm their created origin and function, and to use human will and reason, however defective, to do as much good and to attain as much understanding as possible. "God himself ordained and established his temporal realm and its distinctions," Luther wrote. "[W]e must remain and work in them so long as we are on the earth." 

Second, the reformers developed the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers. On the one hand, they abolished the special priestly jurisdiction and the traditional Roman Catholic distinction between a higher

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223Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine, 195.
224Luther, Luther's Works, 390.
clergy and lower laity. On the other hand, they transferred
to each individual believer the responsibility to minister
directly to others, to pray for them, to instruct them, and
to help them. In that sense all believers were themselves
considered to be priests to their peers. Luther argued:

[T]here is really no other basic difference
between laymen, priests, princes, bishops, or, as
they put it, between spiritual and secular, than
that of their office or work, and not that of
status, since they all have spiritual status, and
all are truly priests, bishops, and popes. But
they all do not pursue the same works.225

The third doctrine that served to bring the two
kingsdoms into interaction with each other was that of the
Christian calling (Beruf).226 Roman Catholic theology had
treated as callings, or vocations, the monastic and priestly
confessions. In contrast, Lutherans considered that every
occupation in which a Christian engages should be treated as
a Christian vocation, each one an equally virtuous and
effective calling of God, though none of them in itself a
path to salvation. Protestants

promoted a certitude of salvation and secular
preoccupation unknown to either biblical or
medieval man. . . . The Reformation did not set
out to regulate and sanctify society so much as to
make society's sacred institutions and religious
doctrines social. Protestants embraced and
enhanced secular life only after making it clear

225Ibid., 6: 408.

226Martin Luther, Martin Luther, A Selection from His
Writings, ed. and with an intro. by John Dillenberger
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), 407-412. Luther used
the term Beruf synonymously with the terms Amt (office of
function) and Befehl (command).
that, as pleasing to God a secular vocations were, they contributed not one whit to any man's salvation. 227

Both the carpenter and the prince, the housewife and the judge, should accept the Christian responsibility to perform their tasks conscientiously and in the service of others. Public officials, in particular, were said to have a special calling to serve the community. This calling might require them to adopt a Christian social ethic that differed from a Christian personal ethic. A Christian's duty in his direct relationship with God, "as a private person, a person for himself alone," is to love his enemy and to suffer injustice and abuse from his neighbor without resistance and without revenge. As a public person, serving in such offices as the military, the judiciary, or the legal profession, however, a Christian may be required to resist his neighbor and to avenge injustice and abuse, even to the point of violence and bloodshed. 228

Luther and his followers applied this doctrine, above all, in their theory of the Christian prince. The Christian prince, they argued, should be inspired to govern in a decent and godly way, promoting the well-being of his


subjects. This was interpreted to mean that a ruler in the earthly kingdom "should not tolerate any injustice but should defend against and punish evil and should help, protect, and maintain the right, according to what each one's office or station may require." 

Thus, the Lutheran concept of the prince, rooted in the theological doctrine of vocation and office, was essentially different from that of Luther's famous contemporary, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). Machiavelli's prince was to act solely from considerations of power politics. Luther's prince, however, was to strive also to do justice. The German Lutherans of the sixteenth century did not accept the Machiavellian view that makes selfishness and the struggle for power the basic principle of political action.

Vocation provides a category for examining individual responsibilities for social and political action and for church-state problems. Properly conceived, vocation recognizes that men, despite their uniqueness, do not live alone, but are members of groups as well, and that Christian faith can bear on the problems encountered within these groups.

The concept of vocation seems distinctly Protestant rather than Roman Catholic for at least two reasons. First, 

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229 See Luther, "Martin Luther: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed," in Martin Luther: Selections, 382-392.

230 Luther, Luther's Works, 32: 394.
it recognizes the equal sanctity of nonreligious and religious activities. Roman Catholicism accepts the goodness of the family, work, and political responsibility on the natural level, but sees religious ordination and life in the church as a higher good. The Mennonites, more than any other Protestant tradition, lean toward this Roman Catholic evaluation of the Church, which has led Hans Hillerbrand to wonder if the Anabaptists were not a Roman Catholic rather than a Protestant sect.

Secondly, the Protestant concept of vocation associates life in nonreligious groups with religious rather than a natural law ethic. The classical Reformation objected to the Catholic definition of two ethics, one for the clergy and a lesser one for the laity. But in trying to solve the problem to their satisfaction, Protestants wavered between perfectionist indifference to the secular world and conformity to cultural and political patterns. Vocation, seen as the concretization of an ultimate religious response to the various corporate groups, links the religious impulse of ethic with the social and cultural world. Such an ethic does not spring from a rational determination of rights and duties in family, state, and other groups, but is a "religiously grounded ethic in the fullest sense."231

Unlike Calvin, Luther hesitated to impose Christian precepts upon an unbelieving world. He distinguished between faith and reason, and he believed that Christians relate to the first kingdom, the church, primarily by means of faith in divine revelation, and to the second kingdom, the state, primarily by means of reason. In theology he emphasized reason less strongly than Calvin, but in politics he emphasized reason more strongly than did Calvin.

Luther's fundamental difference with Calvin, then, was that he did not believe Christians had the right to use the state to promote Christianity and to Christianize the world. Christians in government could invoke Christian principles in the affairs of state, only to the extent that those Christian principles could be defended and justified by natural reason.

**Christians and Government**

Despite the diverse views on government, there are essentially two strategies for Christians to arrive at their views on government and its role in society. The first is that one interpret one's faith on the basis of the political situation as Liberation theologians did in the 1960s and 70's or one begins with one's faith in order to determine the appropriate role of government. Both are an attempt by Christians to express their covenant with the Lordship of Christ. Christian faith and experience drives the agenda
for reflection and political action, based on the authority of Scripture and the work of the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{232}

More important than that above is the act from which politics responds to the essence of the Christian faith. The Gospel does not free the believer from the obligation (duty) to participate in the construction of the world, but on the contrary, it frees him from sin in order to assume with greater advantage this task. In this sense, the Christian faith returns the believer to the world as a new creature that in its Christian condition, is in optimum condition to assume with greater responsibility his Christian duty.\textsuperscript{233} Upon becoming citizens of the Kingdom of God, we do not cease to be citizens of the earth. As indicated, being Christian does not mean being anarchist, but being a better citizen. This implies taking the seed of the Gospel to the same structures of society and transforming them by the power of the Lord for his glory and the common good. It should be remembered that this common good is the general objective of politics.

This plan that leads from faith to politics not only is realist, but also legitimate. It is legitimate because faith should lead to questions over the significance of politics inside the Christian vision of existence (reality).


\textsuperscript{233}Ibid.
Christians must not permit Satan and the kingdom of darkness to be considered as absolute rulers of political power. It would be a negligence not fulfilling the Christian duty of making human life more human and renouncing the mission of expressing and affirming the lordship of Christ over all reality.  

The advantage consists in recognizing immediately the reality and importance of faith in its existential worth. A faith that only serves as a safe-conduct pass to heaven is a faith that does not make sense in biblical terms.

Christian liberty includes submission to the higher authorities with full conscience that inside the sphere to which they have been assigned, are "servants of God," and as such they maintain a particular relation with the purpose of God. It is always a liberty that contemplates "obedience as the duty of free man."  

The submission to the authorities can never be a total submission to the State in all that it does or commands. As Stephen Charles Mott states, "from the act that the conscience has to be the motivation for obeying the government one can infer the basis for disobeying the

\[\text{Ibid., 14.}\]

\[\text{C. René Padilla, "El estado desde una perspectiva bíblica," in Los Evangélicos y poder político, 36.}\]
government when its actions are not in conformity with the
voice of an informed conscience."\textsuperscript{236}

The call to submit oneself to the authorities is not a
call to obey the government unconditionally neither to
contribute to the maintaining of the status quo. The State
has the right to request submission exclusively inside of
the limits of its jurisdiction. When it demands a
submission that goes beyond these limits, resistance is an
obligation. This attitude is in harmony with the way that
Jesus himself faced the question of political power,\textsuperscript{237} and
with the attitude of the apostles when the Jewish Council
prohibited them from preaching.\textsuperscript{238}

Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is a relatively new phenomenon in
American religious history; it dates back only to about the
turn of the century, and it emerged as a conscious
counterattack on what its early leaders called "modernism,"
the attempt to adjust Christianity to science, evolution,
and liberalism. The name comes from a series of booklets
called \textit{The Fundamentals},\textsuperscript{239} issued from 1910 to 1915, which
delineated what their writers believed were the irreducible

\textsuperscript{236}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{237}Mark 13:17

\textsuperscript{238}Acts 4:19; 5:29.

\textsuperscript{239}\textit{The Fundamentals} (Chicago: Testimony Publishing
Company, 1910-1915), published in 12 parts.
doctrines of the faith, the beliefs without which Christianity could no longer be called Christianity. These fundamentals of the faith included belief in the deity of Christ, the Virgin Birth, the bodily resurrection of Christ, the imminent Second Coming, the substitutionary atonement, and—very emphatically—the verbal inspiration and inerrancy of the whole Bible.  

J. Gresham Machen (1881-1937) of Princeton Theological Seminary was perhaps fundamentalism's most brilliant advocate. Machen was a New Testament Scholar who taught at Princeton Seminary before establishing Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia in 1929 to provide an alternative to the increasingly inclusive stance at Princeton. Machen exemplified the Christian theological rejection both of the modern world itself—which he found vulgar, mechanical, increasingly dominated by "experts," and lacking in artistic creativity—and of modern theology, which he condemned as a betrayal of the historic faith. He rejected theological liberalism not just as a mistaken interpretation of Christianity but as another religion completely. "The great redemptive religion which has always been known as Christianity," he wrote in Christianity and Liberalism, "is battling against a totally diverse type of religious belief, which is only the more destructive of the Christian faith because it makes use of traditional

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240 Cox, Religion in the Secular City, p. 44.
Christian terminology."²⁴¹ For Machen, the confrontation was of sufficient seriousness that there could be no compromise.

"The Church," Machen also wrote, "is perishing today through the lack of thinking, not an excess of it."²⁴² He insisted that ideas were important and that what is today a matter of academic speculation "begins tomorrow to move armies and pull down empires."²⁴³ So telling were his arguments that the most secular periodicals commended him even when they disagreed. Both the New Republic and the Nation published articles in 1923 suggesting that the fundamentalists had logic on their side and that if the modernists wanted to redefine the faith they should at least start new churches or denominations in which to do so.

The difference between fundamentalists and evangelicals may appear minimal to many people, but to both groups the distinction is immensely important. In the United States today "evangelical" generally refers to the historic mainstream of theologically orthodox American Protestantism, going back to the earlier settlers and founding fathers (minus the deists) and including Jonathan Edwards and Charles Grandison Finney, the leaders, respectively, of the first and second "Great Awakenings" of the eighteenth and


²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.
nineteenth centuries. What confuses some people is that although this conservative theological stream has been present since the beginning, the use of the term "evangelical" to designate it is relatively recent. It started around 1940, when the National Association of Evangelicals was organized not only as a conservative alternative to the more liberal ecumenical associations that were then coming into existence (such as those that eventually produced the National Council of Churches), but also as a more moderate alternative to fundamentalism.²⁴⁴

The difference between fundamentalism and evangelicals is not by and large one of theology. The difference lies almost entirely in the way the two relate themselves to liberal Christians and to society at large. Evangelicals generally see fundamentalists as narrow, intolerant, maybe even bigoted, and unwilling to engage in social action. Most evangelicals believe they are right to remain within such "liberal" denominations as the United Presbyterians, American Baptists, United Methodists, and others, whereas almost all fundamentalists insist that true believers should obey St. Paul's command to come ye out and be separate.

Few historians study fundamentalism as an important cultural phenomenon. Cox suggests that this may be because of fundamentalism's history of conflict with liberal academicians. Whereas those who investigate religious

²⁴⁴Cox, Religion in the Secular City, 46.
phenomena also tend to grow fond of their subjects, here fondness might look like fraternizing with the enemy.

Cox argues even when theologians do pay attention to fundamentalism, they often misunderstand it. They tend to examine it as a somewhat bizarre variant of Protestantism. Most fail to recognize it not only as a theology, but also as the faith of an identifiable subculture and as an ideology.245

Viewing fundamentalism as a subculture (as well as a theology) yields a more satisfactory explanation. However, like the religious and cultural artifacts of any margined and dominated group, those of fundamentalism are also expressed in forms that should not be taken merely at face value; they are also ciphers or symbols that point toward larger issues.246 Fundamentalists are misunderstood so often by their academic critics because the critics fail to see that fundamentalism is an enclave, a little world that has been preserved by a range of alternative schools, churches, colleges, in which many of the assumptions of the premodern world still obtain. In the subculture of fundamentalism people talk and think differently. Like any subculture, fundamentalism challenges the dominant culture not so much in its explicit ideas but in its unspoken premises.

245Ibid., 50.

246Ibid., 51.
American fundamentalism is a movement that began among urban intellectuals and was best articulated by a Professor J. Gresham Machen. Why then did it come to find its home among rural white poor people and urban lower middle classes? The usual answer is that fundamentalism is the religion of the uneducated, that accepting it was largely a matter of cultural deficiency.

Fundamentalism is not only a theology and a subculture, it is also an ideology. It interprets and defends the perceived life interests of an identifiable social group. This also means that fundamentalism, like liberation theology, the religion of the Native Americans, and some other theologies, is an antimodern ideology. An ideology is a cluster of ideas and values that provides a class or a nation or some human group with a picture of the world that can guide and inspire corporate action. As an ideology, fundamentalism contains an implicit image of what society should be like. Fundamentalists not only insist on preserving the fundamentals of the faith, they also envision a world in which these fundamentals would be more widely accepted and practiced. They want not only to "keep the faith" but to change the world so the faith can be kept more easily.247

There is something logical about American fundamentalism's habit of swinging back and forth into a

247 Ibid., 61.
subculture and highly confrontational efforts to remake the whole of society. It stems from the belief that the whole world, not just some religious segment, should reflect its sacred source. This is a view of society Paul Tillich once described as "theonomous" (as opposed to "heteronomous" one in which religious values would have to be imposed). When one holds this view it is impossible to settle for the marginal role to which religion has been relegated in the modern world. One either tries to change the whole society to bring it into conformity (thus risking heteronomy) or one retreats to a smaller, more manageable subculture where a kind of minitheonomy is possible.\textsuperscript{248} Fundamentalists in their own way support this theory of the relationship between religion and civil society.

**Dispensationalism**

A much broader range of conservative Protestants, though respecting efforts like Machen's to defend classical orthodoxy, turned to a newer theological expression with which to absorb the shock of the times. This new theology was premillennial dispensationalism, which figuratively speaking, dug in its heels at every point against the new ideas of the academy. Dispensationalism arose in modern form from the works of John Nelson Darby (1800-1882), an Anglican minister who left the Church of Ireland to help

\textsuperscript{248}\textit{Ibid.}, 62.
found the movement that eventually came to be known as the Plymouth Brethren. The theology that he promoted divided the teaching of the Bible into separate dispensations, in each of which God is said to act from common principles but with varying mandates. Prophecy also features large in dispensationalism, especially the effort to perceive the divine plan for the End of the Age. Dispensationalists feel that promises made to the Hebrews of the Old Testament were not realized in the history of the church as had been commonly held but have yet to be fulfilled. The period between the age of the apostles and the End is the "church age," a historical parenthesis in which believers are to evangelize, separate from ungodliness, and prepare for the return of Christ.

The most influential formulation of dispensational teaching appeared in 1909 when the Oxford University Press published a Bible annotated by C.I. Scofield, a lawyer before becoming a Congregational minister, had undertaken a long period of private study in preparing this edition of the Scriptures, which he intended as a portable guide for missionaries more than as a polished theological system. The impact of the Scofield Reference Bible (published in a revised edition in 1967) has extended well beyond the early centers of dispensationalism to influence a wide spectrum of American Protestants. Dispensationalism, with its great
stress on biblical prophecy that has not yet been fulfilled, has remained a potent force in American religious life.

Holiness

A counterpart in spirituality to the theology of dispensationalism was provided by a group of related movements among more conservative Protestants known as Victorious Living, the Keswick Higher Life Movement, and a variety of other names. The renewed emphasis on holiness of life took many forms. Among Methodists, ecclesiastical separations had occurred throughout the nineteenth century when dissident groups such as the Free and Wesleyan Methodists felt that John Wesley's teaching on Christian perfection was being neglected. The National Campmeeting Association for the Promotion of Christian Holiness, which was formed in 1867 by John S. Inskip and several associates after a successful gathering in Vineland, New Jersey, nurtured holiness expectations among a large but mostly Methodist constituency.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century a resurgence of concern for the doctrines and practices of holiness led to significant breakaway movements from the main Methodist bodies. Methodists who continued to promote the possibility of entire sanctification and who looked for a distinct second work of grace after conversion sponsored a wide variety of camp meetings, mission initiatives, orphanages, and independent churches. Under the leadership of Daniel
Sidney Warner, the denomination now known as the Church of God, Anderson, Indiana, broke from the main denomination in 1881. Phineas F. Bresee (1838-1916), who had been a Methodist minister, was the first of the holiness advocates to use the name Church of the Nazarene when in 1895 he organized an independent congregation in Los Angeles. Soon others from mostly Methodist backgrounds who, like Bresee, emphasized the direct work of the Holy Spirit moved to create a national organization. The result was the Pentecostal Church of the Nazarene, organized in 1907. After absorbing other groups with similar aims and after dropping the name "Pentecostal" in 1919 (Nazarenes do not practice tongues-speaking), the Church of the Nazarene became a leading institutional proponent of distinctively holiness teachings.

The desire "to lay all on the altar," to be "clay in the potter's hands," to experience a "deeper work of grace," a "closer walk" with Christ, the "baptism of the Holy Ghost," a "higher life," "victorious living," or "overcoming power" extended far beyond the Nazarenes. Among those of Baptist or Presbyterian background, the holiness impulse did not usually entail belief in a conclusive postconversion experience.

Although the two movements had different origins, their themes, promoters, and expressions soon overlapped considerably. More than the modernists, the
dispensationalists and those in the holiness movements retained the nineteenth century's populist orientation, its common sense biblicism, and its revivalistic fervor even as they worked out their innovations in Christian life and thought.

Fundamentalism and Politics

There is a certain way of thinking about law and politics that is characteristic of modern industrial nations, and that religious fundamentalist movements invariably reject. This is usually presented as the public/private distinction. Its central premise is that social life can be divided into public and private realms. The function of government is to regulate behavior in the public sphere according to secular rules. Within the private sphere people are free to do as they like, in religious and other matters. Religious fundamentalists reject this method of political organization. They see the Public/private distinction as artificial; they believe in particular that religion is inseparable from law and politics.

Religious fundamentalists resist the maintenance and expansion of the public/private distinction. Standing behind this resistance is the fundamentalist's conviction that God is active in the world. Thus, people act at cross-purposes to the divine will by fencing religion into a private arena.
The belief that God is active in the world has implications for politics. His actions have a normative aspect. A world in which God is active is a world that collapses the distinction between "is" and "ought." Thus, natural events have a deeper level of meaning.

The connection between "is" and "ought" means that it is possible to have objective knowledge about how we should behave. That would be a good foundation for making laws. People would then agree once they understood the facts, even in a pluralist democracy. This is not an argument for natural law or natural right. Fundamentalists do not claim that we can reach political agreement through the use of reason alone. That belief is actually a form of idolatry, because it assumes that men and women can get along on their own. The real basis for hope in politics is that God is active in the world.

The most important way in which God's activity is manifest, from a political point of view, is that he has given Christians, in writing, the foundation of a legal code. Fundamentalists hold that law should be based on the Bible, which they look upon as the word of God. Since God intervened in human events by speaking his word to Moses and the apostles, that word should be transformed into rules of law governing society. The idea of drawing law from a sacred text is an obvious repudiation of the public/private distinction.
Dispensationalism and Politics

This attitude of political acquiescence has roots in the minority complex typical of Protestant denominations in Latin America. Evangelicals have understood themselves to be a "sacrificed and disciplined minority."249 Prior to the 1960s they felt themselves to be overwhelmed by the Roman Catholic Church, which held fast to the majority of the population, used politics to increase power, and opposed dissent to prevent any significant participation by Protestants in the centers of power. In the contemporary period, the evangelicals most susceptible to both indigenous and imported fundamentalism are those who have inherited this "oppressed conscience."

The oppressed conscience is reinforced by the religious convictions characteristic of Protestant fundamentalism. A dualism reminiscent of Anabaptist theology, with a strong emphasis on the idea of separation from the world and a corresponding estrangement from political power, is at the root of the apolitical interpretation of the principle of separation of church and state. The public sphere is understood as purely lay in character, and consequently it has nothing to do with the spiritual purity of the faith. This transcendental, vertical vision of the Christian faith,

which confines the believer within the narrow frame of the local congregation (as a refuge from the world), ends with the complete alienation of the Christians by pushing them outside the framework of society.

Fundamentalist eschatology contributes to the apolitical attitude and to the oppressed conscience. Dispensationalist and premillennial theology presupposes the vision of a fallen world, whose sinfulness is reflected on its structures and way of life. The immediate result of the dispensationalist interpretation of history and its corresponding hermeneutic is the alienation of the church from the world. In this way, politics is understood as a "thing of the world," a practice of fallen men. Therefore, the internal development of society is left to those who want to dedicate themselves to this "dirty work."

Missionaries, for example, as foreigners and because of strategic considerations, were forbidden by their boards to be involved in politics at all.

These theologies and their various strains would slowly make their way into the Guatemalan marketplace of ideas through missionaries from the various denominations. Initially, these ideas had little impact upon Guatemalan society because Protestants were a minority. Yet, despite the many obstacles and hardships they faced, the missionaries' endeavors began to pay dividends. Their schools, hospitals, and literacy programs contributed
greatly to the delicate infrastructure of Guatemalan society. Most importantly, however, Protestant theology slowly worked its way into the fabric of Guatemalan society. Both their works and their ideas have contributed greatly to a wider acceptance of democratic ideas, methods, and models.
Chapter III
Christianity and Democratization

"Political freedom, as the Western world has known it, is only a political reading of the Bible."\(^{250}\)
---Whittaker Chambers

Latin American Protestantism has recently been criticized for being both repressive and regressive. These criticisms, however, ignore the valuable contributions that Christianity has made to political theory, Church-State relations, and to democratic ideals in the past. They also reject the possibility that Protestantism may contribute to the democratization of Latin America, in general, and Guatemala, in particular, in the future. Besides the important theoretical contributions made to democracy, Protestant missionaries have always been involved in projects such as building and maintaining schools and hospitals, literacy programs, and relief efforts that created the infrastructure necessary for sustaining democracy. In other words, Protestants have been involved in endeavors usually considered "progressive" by social scientists. This chapter traces the interconnection between the three waves of political democratization and the three waves of Christian democratic impulses that have occurred during the last three centuries. This chapter also argues

\(^{250}\)Chambers, *Witness*, 16.
that Protestantism makes important contributions in preparing the moral-cultural soil for democracy, and then discusses some of the recent contributions that Protestantism has made to the moral-cultural soil in Guatemala.

**Protestantism: A Democratizing Force in Latin America?**

The term "Latin American Protestantism" suggests a homogeneity that is grossly oversimplistic. In fact, "Protestant" (evangélico) in Latin America refers to all non-Catholic Christians, and as such, comprises an immense multiplicity of dissimilar religious phenomena. These include transplanted mainline United States Protestant denominations (e.g., Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal), transplanted United States noncharismatic fundamentalist and evangelical "faith mission" churches (e.g., Southern Baptist, and Central American Mission), the churches of European immigrants (e.g., German Lutherans), transplanted United States Mormon, Jehovah's Witness, and Seventh-day Adventist churches, and a huge variety of indigenous and transplanted pentecostal churches.\(^{251}\) And, within these types of churches can be found a great variety of theological, social, and political perspectives. Indeed, Latin American Protestantism includes an entire spectrum of

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theological and political positions, from conservative reactionaries to moderate reformists to flaming radicals.

Latin American Protestantism is by now well known in popular and scholarly circles for apolitical, right-wing, authoritarian tendencies. There exists no shortage of Latin American liberation theologians, social scientists, Catholic church officials, and radical Protestants, nor of North American liberal theologians, academic scholars, and researching Ph.D. students to point out and often decry the alleged otherworldly, reactionary, and dogmatic proclivities of Latin American Protestantism. These proclivities are, in fact, often very real. Many studies reveal in Protestantism a rejection of political participation, the reproduction of clientage-patronage relations, a refusal to confront social injustices, contempt for "worldly" social involvements, authoritarian church leadership, reductionistic individualism in social analysis, frequent endorsements of repressive military dictatorships, and theological and ideological narrow-mindedness.\^{252} Certainly, none of these tendencies, when and where they do exist, qualifies Latin American Protestantism as a leading nurturer of liberal democracy.

To avoid the stereotyped caricature of Protestantism, however, we would do well to clarify three points. First, it is untrue that Latin American Protestants are disinterested in effecting social and political change, but their approach to social change, like that of their conservative North American counterparts, is radically individualistic, that is, nonstructuralist. In other words, Latin American Protestants generally believe that one changes society by converting the individual members of society. When enough people get saved, it is thought, a new morality will emerge that will eventually infiltrate the institutions of society and induce needed reforms.\textsuperscript{253} At issue, therefore, is not the end, namely, social, economic, and political improvement, but the means to that end. And there is nothing about the Protestants' current individualistic understanding of the proper means that is either immune to the potential on corporation of a more structuralist approach, or intrinsically inimical to a contribution to political pluralism and democratic participation, as Protestants become more established and sophisticated. Indeed, historically, individualism had been strongly associated with the functioning of liberal democracy.

Second, Latin American Protestants' contempt for worldly affairs, including political struggles, does not

\textsuperscript{253}See Stoll, \textit{Is Latin America Turning Protestant?}, 2-3.
automatically make them radical separatists. For in
Christian scripture, "worldly" (kosmikós) does not mean
everything in the natural and social world, but those ideas
and systems which are positively hostile to God and in the
service of evil. Yet nothing inherent in Protestantism,
including the Wesleyan-Methodist American holiness movement,
from which pentecostalism was derived, defines direct
involvement in secular political systems as innately
worldly. What is forbidden is not involvement itself, but
the sins of corruption, injustice, lying, oppression, and so
on that might attend political involvements. If and when
they do abstain from political participation, that is a
conditional position shaped by particular social
circumstances, not the inevitable outworking of their
theological tradition. Thus, changes in their social
environment could easily and quickly shift their orientation
toward heavy political involvement, similar to, for example,
the decisive shift toward activism made by Jerry Falwell and
many other North American fundamentalists in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.

254 Geoffrey W. Bromiley, ed., The Theological Dictionary
of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans

255 John Wesley, the American Holiness movement's taproot
figure, was a postmillenialist whose influence on
nineteenth-century revivalism helped produce Christian
involvement in legal, prison, slavery, education, and
political reform.
Third, we ought to be careful to distinguish the views of Protestant ministers and church spokesmen (almost always men) from the views and actions of the Protestant laity. Ideological rhetoric and actual life practice do not always correspond. Mariz rightly observes:

> There are limits on [Protestants'] abilities to put their official ideologies into effect. . . . The very process of attempting to live by [their] precepts . . . generates behavior that does not entirely reflect the values expressed in their official systems of discourse.\(^256\)

Thus, Protestant ministers may preach abstention from politics, but the preachers themselves may simultaneously curry favors from local politicians, and members of their congregations may become involved in social reform when their interests are threatened. Likewise, virtually all Latin American pentecostals, evangelicals, and fundamentalists repudiate liberation theology in public, yet church investigations have sometimes discovered covert sympathy for liberation theology among some members.\(^257\)

It must be conceded, however, that in the past, Latin American Protestantism has characteristically been conservative, politically withdrawn, and structurally authoritarian. But one should not allow these conspicuous traits to obscure a number of other less obvious but

\(^{256}\)Cecilia Mariz, "Religion and Poverty in Brazil: A Comparison of Catholic and Pentecostal Communities," *Sociological Analysis*, 53, no. 2 (supplement): 63(S)-70(S).

\(^{257}\)Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?*, 111, 212.
important features of Latin American Protestantism whose effects should, theoretically at least, directly or indirectly assist the process of Latin American democratization. Some of these features may be facilitating democratization even now, though without much recognition. Others may be having their more primary anti-democratic characteristics of Latin American Protestantism noted above, a contingent neutralization, however, subject to change in the future.

The first feature that should assist the process of Latin American democratization is that at a basic level the rapid spread of Protestantism in Latin America represents a decisive structural break with the religiously unified social pattern of monistic corporatism. Latin America's traditional, primary political culture, we have observed, presumes and promotes a harmonious society in pursuit of the common good, where social sectors are integrated by a centralized state and bound in religious unity by a single Catholic culture. Social diversity, religious nonconformity, and cultural pluralism are eschewed as detrimental to the common good. Protestantism's expansion and entrenchment, however, represents a definitive rupture in this sociocultural "organic solidarity," a driving wedge cleaving apart monistic corporatism's social-structural unity. For this reason "Protestantism has [already] played a critical, if minor, role in the overthrow of traditional
society by introducing new norms, values, and institutions contrary to the existing ones.”

Martin explains:

Catholicism symbolizes integration into a complete socio-religious system. . . . For Protestants [this] is . . . part and parcel of a society they decisively reject. Whatever their political attitudes, Protestants desire (and express) a process of social differentiation in the direction of personal choice and egalitarian participation. From their standpoint, Catholicism still appears as involved in hierarchical forms, in priestly mediation through controlled channels, and in comprehensive organic integration. . . . Protestantism initiates the era of the individual in his (or her) specifically religious incarnation, and the obverse of that is a view of society not easily amenable to holistic and structural understandings.

There has been at least one historical instance of the Protestant rupture in Latin America's sociocultural unity facilitating radical political change. According to Deborah Baldwin, Protestants prior to and during the Mexican Revolution championed the so-called "radical liberals" and Francisco Madero's race for the presidency. Baldwin observes that, rather than being politically conservative, Protestants during the Mexican Revolution eagerly embraced radical change. Because they had already disengaged from traditional religion, they found it easy to break with the


\[259\] Martin, Tongues of Fire, 265-266.

\[260\] Baldwin, Protestantism and the Mexican Revolution, 70-82.

\[261\] Ibid., 108-109.
established political arrangements. As Protestantism continues to spread throughout Latin America, it may be that, given the right conditions, the break with Latin America's religious tradition will help to facilitate a more decisive break with Latin America's longstanding undemocratic political tradition.

Second, Protestant churches, like Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEB's), create "open spaces" in civil society, as relatively politically independent intermediate-level organizations. Martin elaborates in the inescapably political dimension of these potentially democracy-sustaining open spaces:

Evangelical religion . . . passes through periods of social latency before trying to generalize peace and reconciliation from the interior of the group to the wider social world. During these periods of latency, the social changes initiated by religious faith, above all universal participation, operate at the level of culture and of symbolism. Protestantism creates a "free space," though the free space reverberates with echoes from a patriarchal past. That "free space" is temporarily protected by an apolitical stance setting up a boundary with a dangerous, corrupt, and amoral outside world. Nevertheless, the creation of any space in the conditions inherent in Latin America remains inherently political.

The third feature of Protestantism that should foster the process of Latin American democratization is that Latin American Protestant church structures are not unambiguously authoritarian, they also encourage the development of lay

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262 Ibid.

263 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 267-268.
leadership and participation in ways that partially cross-cut standard dimensions of social stratification. According to Mariz:

The experience of revealed knowledge and the assumption that any member can relate directly to God allow the development of a lay leadership. . . . Pentecostal churches consist of relatively independent small groups that are mainly led by ordinary people who have ample opportunities to develop organizational skills, including the ability to mobilize themselves for collective action.²⁶⁴

The very religious character of Protestantism itself seems to foster in believers the development of important relational and communication skills:

The importance of the written word and the theoretical elaboration of the faith has, as a consequence, encouraged people to become literate for the purpose of reading the Bible and to develop speaking skills for expounding scripture and discussing it with others. . . . The stimulus for reading, speaking, and forming opinions can be useful for individual social mobility and for the organization of political movements.²⁶⁵

According to observers, the opportunities for leadership development and shared participation afforded in most Protestant churches partially undermine the broader culture's bases of social stratification, helping to erode further the horizontal social divisions sustained by monistic corporatism. In Brazil, for example:

Pentecostalism's vision of transformation forges the possibility for negroes [black-skinned

²⁶⁴ Mariz, "Religion and Poverty in Brazil," 68.
²⁶⁵ Ibid., 65. Also see Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 175-179.
Brazilians] to be treated as equals—even better than equals—with light-skinned crêntes [Protestant believers]. Pentecostal doctrine proclaims that the Holy Spirit is no respecter of persons. In fact, crêntes commonly claim that the lower and humbler one is in the world, the more open one is likely to be to the power of the Spirit. Based on this principle... negroes discover that Pentecostalism allows them to develop a degree of authority impossible in any other social arena.266

Likewise, although Protestant churches usually do not actually allow women to become formal preaching authorities, they do typically afford environments where women experience more relational empowerment than ever before.267 To the extent that hundreds of thousands of Latin American Protestant churches provide relatively open opportunities for a wide range of believers to gain leadership skills, organizational experience, and moral authority, they function as "proto-democracies," forging personal changes at a small-group level that could have potential political ramifications at the regional and national level.268

Fourth, Latin American Protestantism contains a nascent rational individualism that should, in the long run at


268See Martin, Tongues of Fire, 284-285.
least, function to support political democratization. Stoll argues:

If we are looking for a religious movement that promotes the kind of rationalization associated with bourgeois and socialist revolutions, then pentecostalism is an interesting beast. . . . Pentecostalism places authority in a single godhead, creates universal ethical standards, and promotes individual responsibility.269

And, according to Mariz:

Pentecostalism, [even] with its otherworldliness and its respect for authority, fosters a critical, non-fatalistic outlook in life that can work against the movement's official posture of avoiding involvement in 'worldly' affairs.270

Rational individualism adheres in Latin American Protestantism, even if only latently, in many ways. Religious conversion, for example, central to the Latin American Protestant worldview, is understood as a matter of individual choice, made in a state of free will, that corresponds to a response to a message containing propositional truths.

This emphasis on achieved rather than ascribed status contrasts sharply with traditional Catholicism's Christendom notion, where all members of society are automatically Christians by virtue of their parents' faith and their own sacramentally operative infant baptism. In addition, the very experience of Protestant conversion, not to mention of the Pentecostals' "second blessing" or "baptism by the

270Mariz, "Religion and Poverty in Brazil," 65.
Spirit," involves a dramatic shaking-up of the taken-for-granted world and the embrace of a new way of seeing reality itself that explicitly devalues the prior state of perception and the reality it formed. Furthermore, the Protestants' stress on personal sanctification, on changes in personal morality to achieve a righteous life-style, is cast in a rational and individualistic mold. The spiritual introspection, methodical self-disciplined, application of faith to everyday experience, means-end mentality, and personal responsibility involved in the conservative Protestant sanctification experience all engender an ethos of rational individualism. In these and other ways, Latin American Protestantism carries and inculcates a set of beliefs and practices that are much more compatible with and supportive of democracy than the collectivism, mysticism, and traditionalism found in much of Catholic, monistic-corporatist Latin America.

Fifth, Latin American Protestantism fosters in its members a respect for law. Latin American Protestants' law-based understanding of God's will for human behavior and their focus on certain obvious political teachings in Christian scripture (Romans 13:1-7; I Peter 2:13-17) compel them conscientiously to obey the laws of the state. In the Latin American context, this can and often has translated into passive or active support for authoritarian regimes, thus undermining some of Protestantism's other pro-democracy
potential. But even this religiously grounded respect for the rule of law can cut against nondemocratic polities in two ways.

First, the New Testament passages that command submission to existing political authorities also define the ruler as being "God's servant, and agent of justice to bring punishment on the wrongdoer" and as "sent by [God] to punish those who do wrong and to commend those who do right."271 Ironically, this establishes a divine standard by which rulers themselves can be judged. This opens up the potential to conclude, when rulers violate that standard, as they often do, that political authorities have forfeited their God-given legitimacy. Hence, the command to obey contains its own potential nullification, and an invitation to critique the performance of, and for some, such as many Calvinists, to revolt against abusive regimes.

Second, the Latin American Protestants' respect for the rule of law, at least in theory and sometimes in practice, transfers the object of obedience from the specific ruler or regime to the system of laws that transcends the ruler or regime. Ultimately, it is the law itself that must be obeyed, not the person who wrote it. In the Latin American Protestant mind, in other words, no political authority is above his or her own law. Practically, this mentality functions both to undermine the personalistic caudillismo of

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271 I Peter 2:14.
monistic corporatism and to hold political authorities accountable for their own legal violations. According to Mariz, Pentecostals' respect for law-based, instead of person-based, authority and their insistence that authority figures obey God's law has freed them from the traditional submissive-authoritarian elements of Brazilian popular culture and religion. All of this promotes among Protestants a certain critical distance from the state, a moral autonomy that contains the potential for a governmental accountability that was lacking in most of Latin America's traditional Catholicism. Thus, according to Stoll:

Despite the flagrant romances between pentecostal patriarchs and right-wing regimes, congregations tend to retain considerable autonomy in their dealings with the state and society. They conform to outer constraints yet maintain a degree of independence, in a paradoxical way that critics have not captured when they accuse Pentecostals of isolating themselves from society.  

Finally, despite widespread perceptions of a totally apolitical character, in fact, Latin American Protestants, Pentecostals, Evangelicals, and Fundamentalists, have already begun to engage significantly in democratic political involvements. The notion that all Protestants shun political participation is misinformed. In fact, there exists a dynamic internal struggle in Latin American

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Protestantism about how to interact with the "world." This is not surprising, given the biblical ambiguities in the very concept "worldly" and the immense variety within Latin American Protestantism itself. David Martin maintains that "all [political] options have been explored by some Pentecostals. There is no route which Pentecostal doctrine absolutely precludes, except adherence to a movement which is doctrinally atheist." Mariz observes that the "Pentecostals' ideology does not encourage political participation, but when personal, class, or religious interests of Pentecostals are at stake, many of them do become involved in politics."

This involvement includes participation in electoral politics, both as voters and candidates. Protestants, for example, were active in Peru's 1990 presidential election: "in Peru, although Protestants still make up only 3% to 5% of the population, they helped get out the vote for [the victorious candidate] Alberto Fujimori." And in Brazil "Protestants have emerged [as elected officials] in considerable numbers in state politics. They number up to forty deputies and clearly they are beginning to constitute

273 Ibid., 19.
274 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 236.
275 Mariz, "Religion and Poverty in Brazil," 68.
a distinct Protestant political presence." Countering both the perception that Protestants avoid all political involvements and that the Protestant laity automatically follow the directives of their leaders Martin asserts:

Pentecostals do [emphasis in original] vote and not so much below non-Pentecostals in their electoral participation. ... [According to surveys of Chilean pentecostals in the early 1970s] the sympathies of the great mass of Pentecostals did not correspond to those of their leaders. The distribution of their votes accorded with their social position or, at any rate, with the distribution among comparable non-Pentecostals. More than that, 80 per cent of Pentecostals preferred [socialist candidate Salvador] Allende to [Christian Democrat Eduardo] Frei, compared with 60 per cent of non-Pentecostals. 278

At the same time, occasionally, Protestant church leaders also promote political participation for social and political reform. Brazilian Pentecostal revivalist Manoel de Melo, for example, campaigned in the early 1970s for democracy, social justice, and religious freedom, claiming that Pentecostal churches often became "marshalling grounds for the entry of ... new persons into political life." 279

Protestant political participation also sometimes has taken the form of opposition protest. In Nicaragua in the 1980s, for example, conservative Protestants became involved

277 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 259.
278 Ibid., 239-240.
in political opposition to the Sandinista regime, even at the cost of provoking government retaliation. Furthermore, in Guatemala, conservative Presbyterians have been forced to protest gross government violations of the human rights of Indians, many of whom were Presbyterian converts.  

Hence, we see that the idea of total political withdrawal by Latin American Protestants is a misnomer. Protestants have the capacity and inclination, under the right conditions, to become active in electoral, protest, and social-movement politics. Indeed, examination of those instances of involvement demonstrates, on some occasions, the power of the class interests of believers to override any apolitical tendencies in their belief systems.

Thus, in at least six different ways, Latin American Protestantism appears to possess the potential to act as a social force in support of democratization in Latin America. By breaking the social unity of monistic corporatism, creating open spaces in civil society, developing leadership and participation skills in a wide range of believers, promoting rational individualism, fostering a respect for the rule of law, and demonstrating the capacity to mobilize political participation, Latin American Protestantism displays an incipient capacity to advance democracy in Latin America. Whether that capacity eventually overrides Latin American Protestantism's current undemocratic tendencies

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appears to depend on future developments within Protestantism and changes in the social, economic, and political conditions that Protestants will have to negotiate.

As Protestantism in Latin America continues to grow into significant national minorities and, possibly, majorities (in Guatemala, for example), new and existing political parties will increasingly court the Protestant vote. Protestants often do vote, and consequently, in many countries they increasingly represent a potential political gold mine for politicians and parties who could successfully tap into the Latin American Protestant Weltanschauung. Were Protestants to become a publicly recognized political prize, this would animate the Protestants' awareness of their own political influence, decrease their sense of the inherent futility of politics itself, and further encourage their participation in democratic political processes. Finally, the coming of age of a "second generation" of Latin American Protestants in the next two decades will likely alter the political posture of Protestantism. Stoll maintains that "the history of social movements is replete with shifts from a redemptive (saving one's soul) to a transformative (changing the world) emphasis, or vice versa, often after the first generation."281 Latin American Protestantism, we have seen, actually possesses many features that could

281Ibid., 329.
potentially work to bolster democratization. As Protestantism becomes more entrenched, stable, self-confident, routinized, and sophisticated, a second generation of Protestants could very well turn its attention to matters quite different from those that occupied the first generation.\textsuperscript{282}

North American evangelicalism provides an example of such a dynamic. Arising in the 1940s out of the fundamentalist movement, the relatively homogeneous evangelicals of Billy Graham and Carl Henry's generation maintained an individualistic reductionism in social analysis and a low political profile. By the early 1970's, however, after three decades of growth and institution building, a new generation of evangelicals emerged who challenged first-generation assumptions and opened up new possibilities of theological, social, and political engagement.\textsuperscript{283}

Taken in this light, Protestantism's current relative political passivity could conceivably represent a long-term gain for democracy in Latin America, to the extent that Protestantism could ever encourage democracy. For it may afford Protestantism the undistracted opportunity to grow numerically, build stable institutions, establish an

\textsuperscript{282}Swatos, Jr., \textit{Religion and Democracy in Latin America}, 20.

\textsuperscript{283}Robert B. Fowler, \textit{A New Engagement} (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982).
alternative culture, and again the collective self-confidence necessary for a future broadening of perspectives and engagements. David Martin maintains that these kinds of self-enclosed protections constitute the paradoxical precondition of any serious revision of consciousness and social practice. A very large number of the models of change which have gone to make up our modern world were set in motion in precisely this way. . . . Religious groupings construct advanced platforms in consciousness, and test their viability in enclosed protected environments. They send out signals about what may be possible, and the wider society in time picks these up.284

Evangelical Faith and Guatemala

The most serious defenders of democratic-capitalism assert that it requires a certain "moral-cultural" soil in which to flourish. This fact has stimulated some reflection on the likely impact of the Evangelical explosion in Latin America on the region's prospects for consolidating democracy and capitalism. The prevailing wisdom in the prestige press and much of academia is that Protestant growth will, at worst, actively threaten democracy or, at best, hinder its development.

One prevailing stereotype is that of the apolitical Evangelical, who considers politics as "dirty business" with which he ought to have no contact. Another stereotype could be called the "Romans 13:1" view. Critics of Evangelicals in Latin America cite this verse which commands obedience to

284 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 287.
political authorities because they are "ordained by God" and accuse Protestants of refusing to defend democracy and human rights. These observers assert that Evangelicals give uncritical allegiance to the governing authorities, whatever their political stripe or repressive nature. A staffer from the Washington Office on Latin America, a left-leaning human rights group, for example claims that "the fatalism embodied in [Evangelical] doctrine is a near total acceptance of authority" that precludes criticism of government human rights abuse.  

Still other analysts tend to pigeonhole Evangelicals as representatives of the far right. A Los Angeles Times writer worried that "unless the fundamentalist trend is reversed," Central America would face "a strong likelihood of increased military dominance and of economic power remaining in the hands of a wealthy oligarchy."  

This chapter argues on theoretical and empirical grounds that this prevailing wisdom is off the mark, at least as concerns Guatemala. Rather than inhibiting the institutionalization of political and economic liberty, the Evangelical explosion in Guatemala is likely to make at least a modest contribution to the nurturing of the moral


soil conducive to the consolidation of democratic-capitalism.

This is so because Evangelical theology makes at least three theoretical contributions to the "fertilization" of that soil. These are the Evangelical challenge to modernity, the Evangelical challenge to liberation theology, and the Evangelical challenge to religious hegemony.

**Evangelical Contributions to Democracy**

Some analysts of religion and politics worry that the revival of conservative religion bodes ill for democratic prospects. They conclude pessimistically that such revivals will lead towards traditionalism, "backwardness," and authoritarianism and away from "progressive strides towards democracy, tolerance, pluralism, and development." But it may be that such observers are inappropriately extrapolating from their examinations of Islamic fundamentalism which is also growing dramatically throughout the world. That form of conservative religion frequently has shown itself hostile to democracy. Many forms of militant Islam demonstrate authoritarian and theocratic political tendencies, and although they resist forces of secularization, they are inimical to pluralism.

In contrast, those Evangelicals who staunchly proclaim that their message is the one "true truth" nevertheless support religious freedom, and by extension, pluralism. This is particularly true in Latin America, where Evangelicals are in the minority and face a cultural climate
where one religion, Catholicism, historically has asserted a monopoly position. The fight for religious freedom is therefore, at least in part, rooted in self-interest. Evangelicalism holds little enthusiasm for theocracy and has not asserted any doctrine comparable to the Catholic church's pre-Vatican II position against religious tolerance, viz., "error has no rights." Evangelicals, in short, tend to feel "at home" with democracy and pluralism.

As Martin observes, Evangelicals "set up communities, the political implications of which are fraternal, participatory, and egalitarian." Pentecostalism, he contends, is "sociologically consonant with democratic politics and provide[s] part of the popular cultural base on which such politics might rest. . . ." For him it is highly significant that Evangelicalism has created "free social space." In other words, in the midst of stratified, hierarchical Latin America, where democratic culture is fragile and democratic experience weak and uncertain, the movement allows for the development of a participatory and individualistic ethos with affinities to the "spirit" of democracy.

Moreover, despite the strong authority typically enjoyed by Evangelical pastors, congregants inside the

287 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 22.

288 Peter Berger in the foreword to Martin, Tongues of Fire, ix.
churches gain "hands-on" democratic experience. The political instruction that believers exercise and learn in the church is astonishing, if not always recognized. "Very few career politicians in Latin America have had a school of democracy like that which they can find in many evangelical churches." 289 Evangelical churches are a "true democracy," and "divergent opinions, discussions, debates, assemblies, elections, agreements and disagreements, are common elements of the life of many churches." 290 All can attain status, all are encouraged to take on responsibility, all have an opportunity to voice their testimonies and their opinions. Congregants may gain greater self-esteem and self-confidence because the church gives them a sense of belonging and a role to play. Often the Pentecostal emphasis on the empowerment of the Holy Spirit reduces attitudes of fatalism and increases the sense of human dignity and initiative. 291 Over time, these various attitudes may spill over into the Evangelical's social relations outside the church walls. In sum, as sociologist Peter Berger writes, the "ethos" of Evangelicalism evinces "time-honored affinities with . . . a favorable disposition toward democratic politics." 292

289 Deiros, Los evangélicos y poder político, 13.

290 Ibid.


292 Peter Berger in the foreword to Martin, Tongues of Fire, ix.
Most of the contributions the Evangelical movement can make toward the consolidation of democratic-capitalism are indirect because the movement primarily affects the moral-cultural sphere. But, over time, this sphere interacts with the political and economic spheres in diverse ways. Thus, it is best to evaluate the "public" role of Evangelicals from a long-term perspective. Headlines about Evangelical voting blocks supporting one or another political candidate, who may or may not be committed to democracy, tell us only a tiny part of the story. Voting patterns are painfully incomplete indications of the real political implications of the Evangelical explosion. Instead, the public "differences" Evangelicalism will make in Guatemala is best judged by its long-term effects: its impact on increasing people's respect for the law; its ability to inculcate individuals with responsible civic attitudes; its suspicion of statism, authoritarianism, and moral relativism; its creation of de facto religious pluralism; its encouragement of personal initiative over the forces of "fate;" and its legitimization of change, individualism, profit, and merit-based inequality. These, indeed are the criteria democratic-capitalists should use in judging Evangelicalism.

Bible-believing Christians are often suspicious of big government and Marxist rhetoric. The orthodox believer can provide scriptural justification for such free-market propositions as private property, economic initiative, and
man's creative capacity. Moreover, the orthodox believe that the Bible encourages personal transformation as a prelude to societal reform, not the reverse. They stress the first principles of personal commitment to Christ and moral regeneration, over economic and political concerns. This has won them the ire of Christian-Marxist liberationists who support wide-ranging economic redistribution projects. As a rule, orthodox believers show little enthusiasm for statist development schemes. According to Martin, "by molding individuals with some sense of their own self-hood and capacity to choose, [Pentecostals] may well be building up a constituency well-disposed to a capitalistic form of development."293

Evangelical theology's first contribution to the consolidation of democracy is metaphysical in nature. Democratic institutions must rest on the foundation of a democratic "political culture" if they are to be sustained. That political culture is comprised of certain metaphysical claims, including the claim that humans are sinful. This claim undergirds constitutional democracy's notion of accountability: government must be accountable to the governed, by way of such "Madisonian" institutions as limited authority, separation of powers, federalism, "inalienable" human rights, and equality before the law. These checks and balances deny the concentration of

293Martin, Tongues of Fire, 231.
unaccountable power in the hands of any one individual or group. They deny as well the possibility of constructing an earthly "City of God" through human efforts in the political realm. Instead, these institutions affirm that government is under a "Higher Law" though that particular term may not be employed.

The "ethos" of modernity, and specifically its claims about moral relativism, challenge these propositions of "Madisonian," or limited, constitutional democracy. "Modernity," reflects a certain worldview which rejects traditional claims about absolute truth, universal standards of right and wrong, and the idea of transcendence. This modern moral relativism attacks the core of democracy, for without absolute standards of right and wrong it is impossible to make a case for inalienable human rights. Without transcendence, it is difficult to prevent the state from asserting that it is the highest authority, a claim that is the very foundation of totalitarianism.

Evangelical theology refutes the claims of modernity. It is quick to acknowledge man's sinfulness, following the Biblical teaching of Romans 3:23 that "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God." Drawing on the creation account of Genesis, evangelical theology affirms that man was created in the image of God and endowed with dignity—assumptions crucial to the claims to inalienable human rights. Evangelicals also maintain that God stands above
politics, rendering judgment. They cite Daniel 5:21: "the Most High God is sovereign over the kingdoms of men." All of these propositions are consonant with democratic theory; indeed, they are prerequisites of such theory.

A second "theoretical" contribution Evangelicals make toward the consolidation of democracy concerns their resistance to liberation theology. In a sense, liberation theology represents the cooptation of Christian religion by secular forces. Liberation theologians articulate their ideas using Christian imagery and vocabulary, but insert radically new content into traditional terms. Liberation theology sets forth various propositions that, like some of the claims of modernity, are threatening to democracy. For one thing, some of the theologies of liberation reject or, at least de-emphasize, the traditional Christian view of the nature of man as imperfect. For many liberationists, "sin" is not so much part of the human heart as it is part of the social structure. Since evil resides in "unjust" structures, once these are destroyed and replaced by just ones, evil will be eradicated. In addition, liberation theology offers the prospect of the kingdom of God coming to earth, specifically through this process of "revolutionary transformation" of the "unjust" political and economic systems.\footnote{For a critical commentary of liberation theology, see Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, "Instruction on Certain Aspects of the 'Theology of Liberation'" in Juan Luis Segundo,}
This utopianism leaves little room for political pluralism, for all must "stand on the side of the oppressed" by participating in the "social liberation" project. There can be no criticism of this project; from the liberationists' point of view, it is the revealed will of God and the only legitimate political activity. This attitude is inherently authoritarian and tends to give government, as long as it claims itself the vanguard of the liberation project, absolute power to usher in--with coercion if necessary--the Kingdom of God on earth. Hence, many liberation theologians enthusiastically supported Sandinismo in Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista Directorate implemented an oppressive, centralized political and economic regime at a terrible cost to the citizenry. Though some rethinking is currently underway in Liberationist circles, and some leaders are backing away from the radical Marxist rhetoric of earlier days, nevertheless, some Liberationists continue to emphasize a strict "for or against the poor" dichotomy that sows the seeds of class conflict and undermines the cause of pluralism.

In contrast, Evangelical theology is skeptical of every "intellectual vanguard," is anti-utopian, and permits no political apparatus to be put in the place of God. Rather, 

Theology and the Church (Minneapolis: Seabury, 1984), 169-188 (appendix).
politics is always "under God," for, as Evangelicals quote St. Paul, "by Him all things were created . . . whether powers or rulers or authorities." Liberation Theology has made some inroads into Latin Protestantism, particularly in the "historic" or mainline denominations (e.g., Presbyterians and Methodists). But most Protestants have opted out of Protestant groups perceived to be linked with the liberation movement.

Moreover, Evangelicals offer an alternative source for fellowship and community life to the liberationists' "Christian base communities." Even committed liberation theologians, such as Phillip Berryman, acknowledge that several times as many people belong to Evangelical churches than to the "Christian base communities" that put liberation theology into practice. David Stoll adds that "liberation theology has been overemphasized as the vanguard of religious reformation in Latin America." Simply put, the really significant religious story in Latin America, in general, and in Guatemala, in particular, at least in terms of numbers, is not liberation theology, but the Evangelical explosion. The former, of course, has had a tremendous and disproportionate influence on Latin American religion, politics, and economics. But the

295 Col. 1:16.

296 Stoll, "Evangelical Awakening," 35.

297 idem, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, p. xviii.
influence of the latter in these spheres is growing. Evangelicalism, in short, is a form of institutionalized resistance to liberation theology, and the attitudes it inserts into the political sphere may counterbalance those inserted by liberation theology.

The third theoretical consideration is that of the political effect of the Evangelicals challenge to the Catholic Church's dominance in Guatemala. A significant body of literature points to the positive influence of religious tolerance and diversity on American democracy. It is likely that such tolerance will also benefit Latin democracy. Democratic theory notes a positive connection between religious pluralism and political pluralism: people who are able to tolerate others whose fundamental "first principles" are different from their own may have greater capacity to tolerate those who dissent from their political beliefs as well. Historically, the connection also seems to hold. Some of the oldest and strongest democracies, are religiously pluralistic. In contrast, states where one religion has asserted control (e.g., Orthodoxy in some Eastern European countries) have had more violent and tortured political histories. Religious diversity in Guatemala, in short, may be a significant source of strength for democratic institutions in the long term. The latter phrase is crucial, because it must be immediately admitted that in the Guatemalan situation, at least in the short
term, Evangelical growth may be increasing religious
tensions, and by extension, political tensions.

In four towns, Chajul, Las Pacayas, Alta Verapaz, and
Almolonga, Evangelicals had been elected to civic offices or
to the town's "development committee" with support from non-
Evangelicals because it was assumed that, as Evangelicals,
they avoided alcohol, were pacific, and had integrity.298

Amy Sherman discovered that a person's religious world
view is correlated with his political beliefs and
participation. She found that individuals with orthodox
Christian religion tended to be more sympathetic toward the
institutions and norms of democratic-capitalism than did
individuals with animist or pagan beliefs.

She observed few statistically significant differences
between Protestants and Catholics when only nominal
affiliation was used to distinguish between these two
groups. The only dramatic difference between Catholics and
Evangelicals that emerged when only nominal affiliation was
considered was that Evangelicals were more likely to reject
traditional religious beliefs.299

In Chimaltenango, while 56.2 percent of Evangelicals
scored low on the Traditional Belief Index (TBI), only 37.7

298 Amy Sherman, "'And Be Ye Transformed:' The Socio-
Economic Consequences of the 'Evangelical Explosion' in
Guatemala," (Ph.D. Diss., University of Virginia, 1994),
250.

299 Ibid., 176-177.
percent of Catholics scored low on the same index.\textsuperscript{300} Though not in every case were these differences significant above the 90 percent confidence level, and given the small sample size,

the frequent occurrence of this pattern suggests, at the minimum, that the Evangelicals' rejection of traditional beliefs and practices predisposed them to some development-enhancing attitudes and practices.\textsuperscript{301}

Evangelicals were slightly more likely than Catholics to affirm the merit-oriented economy (82.3\%-75.5\%); they were more likely to affirm the importance of sending one's children to school (88.9\%-82.3\%); they were less likely to accept the idea of laziness being someone's unchangeable "fate" (15.5\%-27.9\%);\textsuperscript{302} they were more likely to be literate (93.2\%-85.8\%);\textsuperscript{303} and Evangelical women were more likely than Catholic women to be able to read and write (94.4\%-79.5\%).\textsuperscript{304}

Orthodox Evangelicals and Catholics scored higher than weak Evangelicals and Christo-pagans in worldview categories. Christo-paganism, or folk Catholicism, is the syncretistic religion formed by the mixing of Mayan beliefs with the tenets of Catholicism.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{300} Ibid., 381.
\item \textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 382.
\item \textsuperscript{302} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 383.
\item \textsuperscript{304} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
However, after constructing a new composite variable called "cosmovisión," Spanish for worldview, Sherman made a surprising discovery. In Uspantan, when all 200 respondents in the Worldview and Development Survey were considered, religious orthodoxy, more than nominal affiliation, was the key determinant in predicting differential responses to various survey items. Considering the 200 respondents in Uspantan, though, nominal affiliation is a fairly strong predictor of differences. This is so, likely, because most Evangelicals in Uspantan are in fact orthodox Evangelicals, whereas at the national level, a number of Evangelicals surveyed were "moderate" or "weak" in terms of the orthodoxy of their belief. Sherman segregated the respondents into three worldview categories: Orthodox Evangelicals, Orthodox Catholics, and Christo-pagans. She did not use the "cosmovisión" variable when analyzing the 200 respondents because so few were found in the Weak and Moderate Evangelical groups. Also, proportionally, a significant number of Catholics in Uspantan regularly made costumbre or belonged to cofradías. Costumbre is the performing of certain rites believed to appease Mayan deities in Mayan religions, and the cofradías are the religious brotherhoods within Mayan religions.

Legitimation of market institutions is also likely to reinforce the political culture in which democracy can

305 Ibid., 299.
flourish. As sociologist Peter Berger asserts in his book, *The Capitalist Revolution*, "capitalism is a necessary but not sufficient condition of democracy." If this proposition is true, it follows that if evangelicals show support for the norms animating the market, and hence facilitate its institutionalization, then they will be contributing indirectly to the consolidation of democracy. In general, the empirical data suggests that Evangelicals (and Orthodox Catholics), in comparison to other worldview groups, hold relatively favorable attitudes toward democratic-capitalist institutions and norms.

Sherman's study bore this out. In her study, Evangelicals were more cooperative and more participatory. Evangelicals were also more likely than Catholics to be literate (86.5% to 67.5%). This difference also held its statistical significance (at above the 90 percent confidence level) when controlled for the ethnicity of the respondents. Similarly, twice as many Catholics as Evangelicals had received no formal schooling whatsoever (20.2 percent versus 10.1 percent).

Moreover, the large number of literate Evangelical women may demonstrate one positive effect of evangelical conversion on women. 80.5 percent of female Evangelicals

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307 Ibid., 300.
claimed the ability to read and write, compared to 67.8 percent of female Catholics. Evangelical women were also more likely than Catholic women to have received at least some formal education. Twice as many Catholic women as Evangelical women have never gone to school (18.6 percent versus 9.8 percent).

In Almolonga, 52.8 percent of the shops among those who were interviewed were owned by Evangelicals while 41.7 percent were owned by Catholics. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of the Evangelicals reported that they became owners of their own businesses after their conversion to Protestantism. This may suggest either an increased sense of initiative enjoyed by converts, or improved capital accumulation following their adoption of a Protestant "ascetic ethic" which enables them to invest in a business.

Estimates of Chajul's Evangelical population range from 25 to 35 percent, and boasts 6 main churches. A very large Pentecostal church emerged from the Catholic Renewal movement in the mid-eighties, and then split into the town's two largest congregations, (Elim and Verbo, Church of God E.C., and Prince of Peace). In the late 1980's, considerable division arose within Chajul's Evangelical community following the split that led to the founding of

308Ibid., 301.
309Ibid.
310Ibid.
separate Verbo and Elim congregations. Three of Chajul's pastors who represent Chajul's three largest churches are better educated and more articulate than the other two.\textsuperscript{311} Radio Ixil in Nebaj sponsored by Iglesia Evangélica Emmanuel has four hours of preaching and teaching in the Ixil language. Also, Bible studies are given in both Spanish and Ixil languages. The problem with lack of profundity has less to do with lack of commitment than with a lack of knowledge and lack of opportunity to study. The Evangelical laity who have come out of the Catholic Renewal Movement know more of the Scripture and can speak more intelligently and thoughtfully about their faith, having participated previously in Bible study and catechism classes.

Evangelicals in Chajul have also made important civic contributions. They have led the initiative to construct homes for the widows left homeless after the war; they are also working with the AGROS agricultural development project; they have worked with the Summer Institute of Linguistics' (Wycliffe Bible Translators) literacy program for youth along with members of the Renewal Movement; and they have held local political and administrative offices. Since the time of the violence, Evangelicals, and to some extent Renewal Catholics, have emerged as the community's leaders. The pastors committee wields significant influence locally. The pastor of the Methodist church served several

\textsuperscript{311}Ibid., 444.
years as mayor during the difficult reconstruction period, and a key Evangelical figure won the most mayoral elections in May, 1993. This same individual has headed Chajul's volunteer firefighters brigade. In addition, a local parent's group is headed by an Evangelical; an Evangelical serves as treasurer of a local cooperative; and Evangelicals dominate the civil patrols. With Evangelicals in the civil patrol leadership, fewer abuses have been reported, less than occur in other towns. 312

A local Catholic ladino schoolteacher credits Evangelicals with spurring greater enthusiasm for education. 313 When she began teaching 6 years ago, she estimates that 50 percent of the families were sending their children to school; In 1992 she estimates the figure closer to 70 percent. Moreover, the teacher maintained that Evangelicals do a better job of disciplining their children, making them into more teachable students. 314

Another contribution is the Evangelical's community activity and leadership. According to Stoll:

Charismatics and Pentecostals include most of the community leadership . . . their members [are] involved in the same kinds of activities as the Catholic catechists before the war and now. These include pursuing school educations, starting new

312 David Stoll, "Between Two Fires: Dual Violence and the Reassertion of Civil Society in Nebaj, Guatemala" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1992), 244.

313 Sherman, "Be Ye Transformed," 454.

314 Ibid., 454-455.
businesses, managing aid projects, organizing cooperatives, and running for office.\textsuperscript{315}

Before and during the time of Ríos Montt's tenure, Evangelicals became prominent in local politics. Even after Ríos Montt, there have been periods of time when numerous Evangelicals have been involved in local political positions.\textsuperscript{316} Nebaj's voter registration figures are higher than in many rural areas, but it is unclear whether this is related to the town's high numbers of Evangelicals.\textsuperscript{317}

Finally, Radio Ixil is an example of a tangible contribution made by Nebaj's Evangelicals to the whole community. Three hours per week of radio time is given over to short educational programs on the family, health, and hygiene. The station also carries the government's literacy program, CANALFA.

According to Alfred Kaltschmitt, director of AGROS foundation, a private Christian organization overseeing an agricultural development program in a tiny hamlet a few kilometers outside Chajul, Evangelical conversion has led to a certain confidence and strength among the people that was revealed in a particularly dramatic incident in 1990. One day while several Evangelical workers from this "AGROS village" were at work building a road between AGROS and

\textsuperscript{315}Stoll, "Between Two Fires," 175.

\textsuperscript{316}Sherman, "Be Ye Transformed," 452.

Chajul, they were confronted by a contingent of guerrillas from the nearby mountains. The AGROS workers were using a tractor on loan from the Guatemalan government to help clear the roadway and the guerrillas announced that they were going to burn the tractor since it belonged to "the enemy."

"It doesn't matter who it belongs to," the villagers argued, "because it's helping us build our road. And we have to have the road," they continued, "because it's the only way we'll be able to take our produce out. If you destroy the tractor we won't be able to finish and we'll probably never get another one again." Though the guerrillas did not burn the tractor they did take the battery. Kaltschmitt maintains, "What happened that day was a "sociological phenomenon."

He explains:

The Indians of that place got together with the guerrillas and made a truce without the intervention of the U.N., the military, the government, or any other bigwigs. The people themselves got together and agreed on something. And this agreement has been firm--ever since this happened, the guerrillas haven't come back, they've respected the tacit agreement. . . . This story tells us that the Ixil people are changing. Before there was a lot of anxiety, paranoia, and fear, and there was war. Now people are starting to talk and they even question the guerrillas, which was unheard of before. This proves that times have changed.


The Ixil Triangle is considered one of the areas of Guatemala least integrated with the rest of the country. Historically isolated, this region harbors a less diluted form of traditional Mayan religion than exists in other parts of the country. In *Ixil Country*, anthropologists Colby and van den Berghe reported that "Guatemala rivals the Peruvian Andes and the upper Amazon drainage as the least Hispanicized and Christianized part of the former American empire. This is particularly true of the north-western and north-central highlands which include the Ixil triangle."\(^{320}\)

According to researcher David Stoll, "the correlation between the Evangelical boom [in the triangle] and the war is inescapable."\(^{321}\) Clearly the most dramatic growth in the Evangelical churches did occur simultaneous to the outbreak of the violence, but as Stoll admits, the reasons for Protestant revival are not limited to the violence. Evangelicals did have a presence, if small, before the war. Certainly in Chajul, and to a lesser extent in Nebaj, seeds for the growth of the Evangelical community were sown long before the violence erupted. They date to the introduction of Catholic Action in the region in the mid-fifties. This group attempted to purge the Catholicism of the Ixil from


\(^{321}\)Stoll, "Between Two Fires," 125.
its syncretistic Mayan-pagan elements, and promoted Bible studies.\textsuperscript{322} This movement in turn sowed the seeds of the Catholic Renewal movement, a group of Bible-centered, charismatic faithful who placed emphasis on prayer, prophecy, and the workings of the Holy Spirit. In time, some of the Renewal leaders became progressively disenchanted with their Catholic affiliation (and the local Catholic priest) and made a final break with the church and formed large Evangelical congregations. Moreover, the breakdown of the old religious system, and the cofradías, began before the war—dissatisfaction with these structures was already bubbling, thereby providing an environment in which a new religious message would be well-received. When that message was articulated in the midst of the pain and despair of war, it won flocks of converts.

**Chajul**

In Chajul, attempts to evangelize the Ixil Indians began in the mid-1940's when itinerant Ladino (non-Indian) evangelists visited the three towns of the Triangle. Apparently the townspeople did not welcome them. According to Dwight Jewett, who has worked with the Summer Institute of Linguistics in Chajul since 1977, "if they preached in a

\textsuperscript{322}The Church's encouragement of Bible study increased after Vatican II's edicts permitting the Mass to be said in the lingua franca. This sent a message that the Mass (and the Bible) was to be understood and used by the people, not just exclusively by the priests.
tin-roofed building, townspeople would come and throw rocks to make noise. If they tried to preach in the marketplace, they'd be urinated upon."323

Sometime in the mid-sixties, Jewett continued, a man in town began a sort of Sunday school in his home at the request of one of the itinerant evangelists, and apparently this went fairly well until the local leader "fell into sin." After this, the spread of the Gospel was stymied and its influence nullified.

Some key conversions came in the early seventies, when the Primitive Methodists sent an Ixil medical missionary from Nebaj to work and witness in Chajul. The efficacy of the modern medicine he introduced helped lure villagers away from the local shamans and lent his ministry credibility. Through this medical missionary's efforts about fifteen people converted to Evangelical Christianity, including the current pastor of the Primitive Methodist Church in Chajul.

Rapid growth of the Evangelical community in Chajul began in the late 1970's and the early 1980's, when the town was ripped apart by the war. As Jewett reflected:

The political violence really shook the foundations of their [Ixils'] belief system. The folks in the old religion were doing all they knew to do, the shamans were trying to end the violence--and nothing was working. People were still getting killed. That caused a loss of confidence in the old system. You've got to understand that it's a religion of fear, of

appeasing spirits, none of which are benevolent. You're always on the defensive, always trying to dot your "I's" and cross your "T's" and do things exactly right, the way your ancestors did them. Well, they were doing all that they knew to do and the situation wasn't changing. If anything, it was getting worse. 324

The phenomenon Jewett describes is no surprise to scholars familiar with Boston University sociologist Peter Berger's work, The Sacred Canopy. In this work, Berger argues that when the "plausibility structures" of a traditional belief system are eroded or are destroyed by disconcerting events, the way is paved for acceptance of a new worldview that provides a more adequate explanation for life as it is experienced by the adherents of the old beliefs. The national growth of the Guatemalan Evangelical church following the 1976 earthquake is an example of this phenomenon.

Likewise, the Evangelical revival in Chajul follows this pattern. In the midst of the war's chaos, an Ixil couple named Ramón and Maria Bop, along with Maria's brother, 325 urged the people to repent, pray and believe, and replace their fear with a trust in a powerful, and loving God. What is most striking about their testimony regarding this period (beyond the atrocities they report of the army and the guerrillas), is their conviction that a spiritual


325 Names have been changed to protect the identity of the informants.
cause lay underneath the scourge of war. Ramón clearly interpreted the violence as a judgment from God upon the rebellion and sinful Ixil people, similar to the judgment poured out against the idolatrous and unfaithful nations described in the Old Testament. He and Maria were convinced that "God used the violence as a tool to call his people to Him. . . . The people may never have accepted the Lord had they not gone through everything they were forced to endure."326

Ramón was hunted by the military and the guerrillas at various times during his itinerant evangelism, as both sides believed that he distracted attention from their causes. The guerrillas sought him because he preached peace rather than violence. Some guerrillas converted to Christianity after hearing Ramón's preaching, thereby intensifying the guerrillas' anger with Ramón.

Threats from the military directed at Evangelicals, such as those experienced by Ramón, indicates that the explanation for Guatemala's rapid Evangelical growth forwarded by some scholars--namely, that conversions were politically convenient and were undertaken to avoid the army's wrath against Catholics--is too simplistic. While persecution of the Catholic Church in the Ixil Triangle was severe (for example, in Chajul, the Catholic church was

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326 Quoted from Linda Koehn, They Have Testified With Their Lives, forthcoming.
closed and the priest murdered on charges of gun-running to the guerrillas), the Evangelicals "did not enjoy any obvious immunity from the army from the start." Additionally, defections from the Evangelical community now, nearly ten years since the violence, have been few.

Today, about 25 to 30 percent of Chajul calls itself Evangelical, and in Nebaj estimates of the size of its Protestant community approach 35 percent. Finally, in other towns throughout Guatemala, Evangelicals were approaching 20 percent of the population before the war, so it is necessary to look for causes other than political convenience to explain the Evangelical explosion.

Nebaj

The history of the Evangelical community in Nebaj, according to Stoll, dates back to the 1920s, when a Pentecostal missionary named Thomas Pullin founded the Church of God in Nebaj. The Primitive Methodists were also active early on, but their initial successes were exclusively within the Ladino community; there were no Indian converts until the 1950s. "Until the late seventies, just before the violence, there were only two small churches in the town center of Nebaj, and not many more out in the aldeas," Stoll reports. In 1969, the Methodists counted 139

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327 Stoll, "Between Two Fires," 158.
baptized converts in the entire Ixil area. However, by 1979, SIL estimated that there were at least 2500 Evangelicals in the Ixil Triangle.

In terms of specifically "political" variables, the Worldview & Development Survey conducted by Amy Sherman was limited to three: voting, attitudes toward competitive elections, and participation. Respondents were asked for their opinion of competitive elections: whether elections were the best form of choosing leaders or were inappropriate in the Guatemalan context. Respondents were also asked whether they had voted in the most recent national election, and whether they had ever personally participated in a local "community improvement" project.

Religious conviction appeared to have some limited influence on voting patterns. The critical factor in the relationship between these two variables was the respondents' level of orthodoxy, rather than their nominal religious affiliation. The least orthodox groups (Weak Evangelicals and Christo-pagans) had the lowest voting rates. The difference between these and the rates for the other groups is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

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328 Paul Townsend, Director, Summer Institute of Linguistics, Guatemala, November 2, 1993.

329 Ibid.

330 Sherman, "Be Ye Transformed," 239.
These findings are comparable to those assessing the relationship between respondents' scores on the Traditional Beliefs Index (TBI) and their voting habits. Respondents scoring low on the TBI had the highest voting rate: 66.5 percent of these respondents, compared with 51.2 percent of those scoring high on the TBI, voted in the most recent national election.\textsuperscript{331} While orthodoxy is the most important factor, nominal affiliation does appear to have some effect. More Orthodox Evangelicals than Christo-pagans voted in the most recent national election (64.3 percent vs. 51.7 percent).\textsuperscript{332} But Traditional Catholics (68 percent) and Orthodox Catholics (67 percent) had slightly higher voting records than the Orthodox Evangelicals.\textsuperscript{333}

While there was no statistically significant differences among worldview groups as to their attitudes towards elections, Catholics on average were less enthusiastic than Evangelicals.\textsuperscript{334} Considering all three groups of Evangelicals, 65 percent on average voiced support for competitive elections.\textsuperscript{335} When all three groups of Catholics were considered, 58.4 percent on average affirmed competitive elections. The most striking difference was

\textsuperscript{331}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{332}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{333}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{334}Ibid, 240.
\textsuperscript{335}Ibid.
between Orthodox Evangelicals, 66.9 percent of whom supported competitive elections as the best system for choosing political leaders, and the Orthodox Catholics, of whom only 54.8 percent affirmed this notion.\textsuperscript{336}

Social Action

One distinguishing feature of Guatemalan Evangelicalism as it bears on community participation should be mentioned. In earlier Protestant revivals, such as those in 19th century England, Evangelical growth led to the multiplication of "societies for," societies for the improvement of this or that, the society for the eradication of this or that, the society for the encouragement of this or that. Evangelical social action in the public square had a corporate and institutional character to it. This is less the case in Guatemala, though it should be quickly added that a number of Evangelical institutions addressing various social needs do exist.

\textit{ASIDE, Asociación Indígena Para la Evangelización de Guatemala} (Indigenous Association for the Evangelization of Guatemala) for example, is deeply involved in social ministry. ASIDE was founded 13 years ago and has about 500 churches in its network. It oversees micro-enterprise development projects in eight departments of the country, and, through its literacy program, has helped over 8000

\textsuperscript{336}Ibid.
people learn to read. Its director, Reverend Domingo Güitz, maintains "The Gospel includes development. It is not just for getting people to heaven, We teach that the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit, and so good health is important too. We want wholistic development." 

In addition to ASIDE, there are a variety of small Guatemalan Christian Relief and development agencies with ties to North American Evangelical organizations (including World Vision, World Relief, and Food for the Hungry). These groups are active in micro-enterprise, health, education, and agricultural programs. A national Evangelical students' ministry called Asociación Grupo Evangélico Universitario is active at the national University of San Carlos and at Rafael Landívar University. A variety of Christian radio stations broadcast in Guatemala, the most important being Radio TGN in the capitol. While the programming of most of these stations focuses on music and preaching, many also include educational programs, carry the government's literacy program, and run short, informational training segments on health and agricultural topics. The director of TGN also serves as President of the Commission on the Social Responsibility of the Evangelical Church, a small group of pastors, church leaders, and evangelical professionals who hold seminars on political topics and publish position

337 Interview with Rev. Domingo Güitz, President, ASIDE, December 2, 1994.
papers.\textsuperscript{338} It was founded in 1983 to counteract the perception among Evangelicals that "politics is sinful, and to demonstrate that Evangelicals have a legitimate role to play in the public square.\textsuperscript{339} Finally, the Evangelical community has been very active in educational efforts. According to Estuardo Salazar, Regional Coordinator for Latin America of the Association of Christian Schools International, there are over 201 private Evangelical schools in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{340}

These institutional expressions of social action by the Evangelical community suggest that the criticism of Guatemalan Protestants as detached from social outreach is overstated. It is also evident that Protestantism can contribute to prepare the moral-cultural soil for democracy. However, it remains to be seen whether democracy will take root in Guatemala. It also remains to be seen what impact the astronomical growth among Evangelicals will have on Guatemalan politics. Will Evangelicals, who comprise more than a quarter of the population of Guatemala, remain outside the political arena or will they forever alter the political landscape of Guatemala?

\textsuperscript{338} Interview, Stephen Sywulka, Director, TGN, Radio Cultural, Guatemala City, April 7, 1995.

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{340} Quoted in Sherman, "Be Ye Transformed," 246.
Chapter IV.

The History of the Evangelical Church in Guatemala

"Go into all the world and preach the good news. . . ."
--Mark 16:15

Protestantism struggled for centuries to gain a foothold in Guatemala. Protestant missionary efforts were thwarted by persistent persecution and the threat of prosecution by the Catholic Church. Therefore, Guatemala remained virtually unreached by Protestantism from the colonial period until the mid-nineteenth century. Even after being invited by President Justo Rufino Barrios in 1871, it was more than a year before Protestant missionaries arrived. However, since that time, there have been three waves of missionary efforts and the Protestant population in Guatemala has continued to grow. The first wave of missionary efforts were dominated by the historic Protestant denominations such as the Presbyterians, the Methodists, and the Central American Mission and lasted for about three decades. The second wave consisted of the Pentecostal "faith missions." The third wave of Protestant missionary effort occurred after the earthquake on February 4, 1976 and would have a tremendous impact on Guatemala. Since that time, the Guatemalan church has become almost completely indigenous, and much of the majority of the church growth in Guatemala has been among the Pentecostal churches. This shift in church affiliation and theological outlook will
continue to have tremendous repercussions upon Guatemalan political and social institutions.

**Protestantism During the Colonial Period**

Protestantism was inimical to the values of colonial Central America. In Spanish America, the Roman Catholic Church was such an integral part of government and society that religious unorthodoxy was tantamount to unspeakable social and political deviance. The Protestant faith was tainted by association with the English, the enemies of Spain who violated the coast of the kingdom of Guatemala with traders and buccaneers. Above all, Protestants were heretics. In colonial Central America, heresy was treason and treason was heresy. 341

Even so, a few Protestants and some Protestant tracts did filter into Guatemala during the colonial period. The trials of Protestant heretics were a major preoccupation of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in the Kingdom of Guatemala. Prosecution of Protestant heretics began in the Kingdom of Guatemala in 1560, with the "reconciliation" of a teacher named Francisco. Convictions reached a climax during the reign of Philip II. Between 1556 and 1598, the

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Inquisition in Guatemala tried and executed at least twenty-one convicted Protestants in *autos de fe*.\(^{342}\)

Of these twenty-one, a majority were foreign-born, most of them Englishmen. At least two of the convicted Protestants were allegedly pirates, which indicates that they were not tried by the Holy Tribunal for their faith alone.\(^ {343}\) Yet, the very fact that political prisoners were tried and executed for their religious, rather than their political crimes, is further evidence of the strong linkage in colonial Spanish America between political and religious orthodoxy.\(^ {344}\)

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the number of Inquisitorial convictions of Protestants diminished. After 1650, no cases at all against Protestants appear in the records of the Inquisition. This was not because there were fewer Protestants during this period, but because the Inquisition had lost some of its earlier vigor, and despite the fact that Protestantism may not have carried with it the danger of the earliest days, it made little progress in colonial Guatemala.

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It was not until Guatemala gained its independence, first from Spain in 1821 and then from Mexico in 1823, that there came any change in the traditional Hispanic attitudes toward Protestants and Protestantism. In 1823, five of the states which had formerly made up the Kingdom of Guatemala, now Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, broke away from the Mexican domination to form a confederated republic known as the United Provinces of Central America. The provinces were loosely united, with Guatemala, and later San Salvador, as the seat of government.

The United Provinces was a short-lived republic. By 1840, it had broken apart into the five nations which, with Belize, make up present-day Central America. The reasons for the disintegration of the United Provinces are many and varied, but one major issue which forced the provinces apart was a question over consensus for government.

On one side of the battle lines were the proponents of the Conservative Party, members of the elite who wished to frame the government and society of independent Central America along traditional Hispanic lines. Among other things, this meant that the Conservatives supported the traditional function of the Roman Catholic Church as the premier agency in society, with tremendous influences beyond the spiritual realm. The conservatives perceived the broad role of the Church to preclude any other faith in society.
On the other side of the political controversy were the Liberals. The Liberals were in many ways the mirror opposites of the Conservatives. Like the Conservatives, however, the Liberals came from the same socioeconomic elite class. They also, like the Conservatives, had begun to define themselves along political lines during the last years of the colonial period.\(^{345}\)

The Liberals, though, were modernists. Seeking to implement some of the ideas of the Enlightenment, the Liberals hoped to "rationalize" Central America by throwing out the remnants of colonialism. From the rubble, they planned to reconstruct Central American government and society, using as models the prosperous, and Protestant, countries of Western Europe and the United States.

The Liberals believed that much of this change would come from outside of Central America, so they tried to attract foreign immigration and investment to their shores. At home, they tried to stamp out what they regarded to be the most reactionary and backward of the Spanish institutions. The single institution which the Liberals targeted as the most retarding to their program of development was the Roman Church.

The Liberals controlled the government of Guatemala and the United Provinces from 1823 to around 1840, although

their period of rule was pockmarked by sporadic civil war and civil unrest. Despite the disorder, however, the Liberals doggedly implemented a number of measures for religious reform. As early as 1829, Liberal leadership unleashed a spate of anti-clerical legislation which cut at the Roman Church by dissolving all religious orders and confiscating the orders' property. 346

In Guatemala, the Liberal program reached its apex under the rule of Mariano Gálvez, who served as Chief of State of Guatemala from 1831 to 1838. Expanding on the earlier anti-clerical legislation, Gálvez initiated a series of measures which he issued in an attempt to strip the Catholic Church of all but its spiritual functions. In 1832, the Chief of State issued a series of decrees which were designed to allow the state to monitor and regulate Church activities. He also enacted legislation which attempted to remove the Church from its position of substantial involvement in everyday life in Guatemala.

Gálvez abolished the tithe, limited church land holdings, and took all funds from the ecclesiastical treasury and placed them in the general treasury of the state. He secularized the cemeteries, and made civil marriage compulsory, although such a union could be sanctified later by a religious ceremony. The governor also

took steps to gradually decrease the numbers of monks and nuns in Guatemala, and converted book collections into public libraries.\textsuperscript{347}

In 1832, Gálvez struck what was intended to be a stunning blow to Church power. In May, 1832, the Chief of State endorsed an amendment to the federal constitution which allowed "freedom of conscience and religious toleration" to all religious sects in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{348} The amendment contrasted sharply with the original article of the 1824 Constitution which stated that "the religion of the United Provinces of Central America is Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman, with the exclusion of all others."\textsuperscript{349}

The legalization of religious toleration rectified another irregularity which had arisen out of the British incursions in Belize. This was to regularize the practice of British Protestants who lived in the territory. It also gave implicit approval for the activities of a trickle of British Protestant missionaries who had been surreptitiously crossing into Guatemala from Belize since at least the second decade of the nineteenth century.

\textsuperscript{347}Tulane University, Latin American Library, Rare Books Collection, Estado de Guatemala, Colección de los Decretos y de las Ordenes más interesantes que obtuvieron la nación emitidas por la segunda legislatura del estado de Guatemala 1830 (Guatemala: Imprenta de la Unión, 1830), 27. Also see Boletín Oficial, 10 October 1837.

\textsuperscript{348}Boletín Oficial, 10 October 1837.

\textsuperscript{349}El Estudiante Bíblico (Guatemala: Instituto Bíblico Centroamericano, n.d.), 15.
It was not until 1827, however, that British Protestants sent a major missionary expedition into the heartland of Guatemala. That year, an Anglican Bishop named Henry Dunn traveled to Guatemala City under the auspices of the British and Foreign Bible Society. In the capitol, he traveled freely, and visited with Roman Catholic clergy and laity.

Yet, Dunn left Guatemala after several months with what he called a "melancholy conviction." Upon his return to Belize, he wrote the British and Foreign Bible Society, I could dispose of any number of these productions [tracts and Bibles]; but I am not sanguine as to the good which might be expected to result. It is not for us to decide where God will give or where he will withhold his blessing, but viewed as means, I conceive millions might be circulated without the conversion of a single soul from the legal and idolatrous system of Popery.350

In another letter he wrote that "the time has not yet arrived when it is practical to effect any material good for the spiritual interests of Guatemala."351

Dunn's dismal analysis seemed to have dampened missionary spirits until after the passage of the Gálvez amendment of religious toleration. It was not until 1834 that there is record of another Protestant missionary to Guatemalan territory. That year, the Reverend Alexander

350Henry Dunn, Guatemala, [sic] (New York: G & G Carvill, 1828), 125-128.

351Ibid., 139.
Hamilton of the British and Foreign Bible Society entered Guatemala to distribute Bibles.

Oddly, Gálvez' effort to emasculate the Catholic Church by allowing the introduction of Protestantism into Guatemala seems to have attracted no other missionaries or Bible sellers, called colporteurs, other than Henderson. However, Gálvez' effort was not completely ineffectual, because after the legalization of Protestantism in 1832, a settlement of British colonists did open upon the Belizean border, near the present town of Pansos, in Alta Verapaz.

Under Rafael Carrera's rule (1840-1865), the government dismantled all of the old Liberal programs. In their place, Carrera reinstated many of the institutions of the colonial period in an attempt to recapture the Hispanic values of the past.\footnote{Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., "Social Revolution in Guatemala: The Carrera Revolt," in Robert Wauchops, ed., \textit{Applied Enlightenment: Nineteenth Century Liberalism} (New Orleans, MARI Publications no. 23, 1971), 45-68.}

A top priority in Carrera's program was to restore the Catholic Church to its old position of prominence. In 1840, Carrera annulled every piece of Gálvez' anti-clerical legislation. He restored to the Church its former lands and monies, and most importantly, he revoked the law of religious toleration. Finally, in 1852, Carrera entered
into a Concordat with the Vatican, which declared Roman Catholicism to be "the exclusive religion of the state."353

Despite the strongly pro-clerical tone of Carrera's rule, the impact of the religious laws of the earlier period was not completely nullified during the years of Conservative government. Ironically, one of the most famous of the Protestant colporteurs entered Guatemala not during the period of Liberal religious tolerance, but during the early years of Carrera's rule. This was a Belgian-born English sailor named Frederick Crowe.

Crowe was a former Anglican who had converted to the Baptist Church as a young adult and had come to Belize in 1836 on a merchant ship. In 1838, he arrived at the British settlement at Abbottsville. Abbottsville, near the Boca Nueva river, had been established by British colonists in the late 1830s. The colonists in Abbottsville were at least nominally Protestants, and until 1840 a priest of the Church of England by the name of Krause served the small community. Abbottsville was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop of the Church of England in Belize City, which was itself part of the Diocese of Jamaica. Crowe was much taken with the country, although not with the British

colony, where he recalled that "the grossest immorality prevailed and the most profane language was common." 354

Initially, Crowe conducted a school in Abbotsville, while organizing religious activities on his own time. In 1840, when the colony's clergyman, Krause, resigned from his post to move to Guatemala City, Crowe assumed his pastoral duties. He began to import Bibles to distribute in the colony and in neighboring regions, and used the New Testament as a text in his school.

In 1840, however, Rafael Carrera came to power in Guatemala. Despite his humble parentage, Carrera had come to power with the support of the urban Conservative elite. The existence of a Protestant, British settlement in national territory was inimical to the Carrera government's ideals of a Hispanic, Catholic Guatemala. Since Abbotsville had fallen into disarray, the British did not rebuild the ruined colony. In its place, Carrera replaced the Protestant British settlers with Catholic Belgians, who he believed would be more appropriate citizens for the Conservative state. 355


355 David Escobar, Federico Crowe: expediente oficiales de su residencia en, y su expulsión del territorio Guatemalteco (Aberdeen, MD: privately printed, 1984), 27.
Undaunted, Crowe decided to take advantage of the fact that he was already in the country to try to proselytize the natives. In the fall of 1843, Crowe slipped illegally southwestward to Guatemala City, where he began to peddle Protestant tracts and New Testaments. Soon after his arrival, Crowe's presence became an irritation to the local authorities, who tried to expel him for illegal possession and distribution of prohibited literature.\textsuperscript{356}

Crowe's most serious confrontation with the authorities occurred in September, 1843, shortly after his departure from Abbotsville. At that time, Crowe attended a large fair at the village of Salamá, in Alta Verapaz, to distribute his usual Bibles and tracts. After a few days at the fair, local officials issued written orders for Crowe to leave town, but only after the fair had ended.\textsuperscript{357}

The Guatemalan officials would probably have been successful in their attempt to expel Crowe, had it not been for the intervention of the British consul General, Frederick Chatfield. Chatfield, who himself was a Protestant, threw his formidable influence behind Crowe's cause. In a diplomatic exchange of notes, Chatfield thundered that the works which Crowe distributed were

\textsuperscript{356}Juan C. Varetto, \textit{Federico Crowe en Guatemala} (Buenos Aires: Junta Bautista Publicaciones, 1940), 43.

\textsuperscript{357}Escobar, \textit{Federico Crowe}, 67.
neither "impious [nor] obscene." As a result of Chatfield's intervention, the Carrera government allowed Crowe to stay, for the time being, in Guatemala.

Permission granted, Crowe returned to Guatemala City where he continued to distribute religious literature and rather audaciously gave a copy of the New Testament to Carrera, who could not read. He opened a school in the city, where he taught "Bible, reading, religious conversion, and English." The school attracted a fairly large number of students, most of whom attended to learn English. Crowe's teaching would have a particular impact on one student, the young Lorenzo Montúfar, who would later be influential in the government of the Liberal president, Justo Rufino Barrios.

Despite the modest success of Crowe's work in Guatemala City, however, Crowe's employer, the Honduras Auxiliary of the British and Foreign Bible Society, was disturbed by the rising intolerance of the Carrera government. The members of the Society's board were particularly unnerved by what they termed "the obstruction at Salamá." In 1844, the board requested that Crowe return to the now-deserted

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358 Ibid.


360 Ibid., 537.

361 British Foreign Bible Society to Morgan, 20 October 1970.
Abbottsville settlement on the Belizean border. Crowe refused, and announced to the society that he would stay in Guatemala City for at least another eight months.

The Early Days of Protestantism

The first seventy years after Guatemala's independence, Protestantism left virtually no mark on the nation's society. The failure of the faith to take root in the republic despite the efforts of a few individuals was a foreshadowing of the kinds of obstacles that would plague the work of Protestants in Guatemala for the next quarter of a century. First, Protestantism was inextricably linked to Guatemala's domestic political struggle. Liberal governments encouraged and supported Protestant work in the country, not for religious reasons, but because they believed that the presence of Protestants in the country would not act as a foil for the secular power of the Catholic Church. The Liberals also believed that laws of religious toleration would be an enticement to people in Europe and the United States, who they hoped to attract to Guatemala as immigrants and investors.

In contrast to the Liberals' affinity to Protestantism, however, were the Conservatives, who ruled Guatemala under the aegis of Rafael Carrera during the middle of the nineteenth century. Carrera and the Conservatives opposed Protestantism for the very reasons that the Liberals had endorsed it: they regarded the faith to be inimical to
Guatemala's traditional Catholic, Hispanic heritage. Thus, the Carrera administration effectively severed what limited Protestant work there was in Guatemala into two halves. Initially, there was a period of potential Protestant growth during the brief years of Liberal government following independence, and a second distinct phase of growth following the political ascendancy of the Liberal president, Justo Rufino Barrios. More importantly, however, the era of stridently pro-Catholic rule which divided these two halves assured that there was no continuity to the Protestant work in Guatemala during most of the nineteenth century.

The Protestant effort was stymied in Guatemala during most of the nineteenth century because no foreign missionary agency or Bible society exhibited more than passing interest in proselytizing the people of the republic. The relative disregard which most agencies and mission boards held for Guatemala during most of the century meant that few Protestant pioneers who came into the republic worked with little institutional support or supervision. Even during the periods of Liberal rule when the Guatemalan government made clear overtures for Protestant work, no foreign mission agency took the initiative to formally send any missionaries to Guatemala. In short, the Protestant work in Guatemala languished until nearly the last decade of the nineteenth century because of the exigencies of local government, the
human frailties of the early Protestant pioneers, and the apathy of Protestant agencies outside of Guatemala.

Frederick Crowe's expulsion did not quite ring the death knell for Protestant efforts. In 1848, only three years after Crowe's departure, the National Bible Society of Scotland began a sporadic effort to smuggle Bibles and Protestant tracts into Guatemala by way of Belize. Then, in 1856, the United States-based American Bible Society sent a Reverend W. H. Wheeler to Guatemala to distribute religious literature. Wheeler's work, however, was short-lived. The Carrera government accused Wheeler and two other Americans of subversion for refusing to carry arms in support of the government. In late 1856, the government expelled Wheeler and two other Americans from the country.

The expulsion of Wheeler was the last attempt made by any Protestant group to penetrate Guatemala during the period of Conservative rule. Protestantism would lie dormant in Guatemala for nearly twenty years. The "heretical religion" would not surface again until the Liberals retook control of the national government.

In 1871, Liberals under the leadership of Justo Rufino Barrios and Miguel García Granados drove the Conservatives out of power. Under the rule of Barrios and his followers, Guatemala would be transformed from the isolation and introspection of the Conservative years of rule to emerge as the quintessential Liberal state of Central America.
Barrios believed, as Gálvez had before him, that the Roman Catholic Church represented the very worst of Guatemala's Hispanic past. To Barrios, the Church was a monolith of conservative reactionism, with influence that reached out far beyond religious matters and threatened Liberal reform at every level. He had railed against the Church and called for the expulsion of the Jesuit order. In a series of articles that appeared in El Crepúsculo, the Liberal daily, Barrios denounced what he called the "theocratic monopoly" of the Roman church.362 In another article, he pointed to the "modernity" of countries in Europe, England, France, and Switzerland, which he credited in part to those countries' tradition of freedom of worship.363 Finally, in August 1871, Barrios declared that Guatemala "would not advance [unless] the Government introduces among us a religious reform, such as those practiced in the Republic which must serve as our models."364

On March 15, 1873, shortly after assuming the Presidency in 1873, Barrios issued the historic Declaration of Freedom of Worship. The declaration proclaimed freedom of conscience and of worship of "any and all religions."

The Declaration of Freedom of Worship specified that

362 "La unidad católica y la libertad de cultos," El Crepúsculo, 7 July 1872.

363 "Libertad de consciencia y de cultos," El Crepúsculo, 3 July 1872.

364 El Malacate, 28 August 1871.
Guatemala gave no preference to any one faith, and emphasized that the government did not "offer [to any religious group] anything more than its protection."\textsuperscript{365}

Barrios hoped that one of the benefits of such a law might be to encourage immigration to Guatemala from modern and Protestant countries such as the United States and Germany. He believed that "[t]he right to freedom of religion in Guatemala would remove one of the principal obstacles which have heretofore impeded foreign immigration to our country, for many do not wish to settle where they are not allowed to exercise their religion."\textsuperscript{366}

But for nearly a decade, the Declaration of Freedom of Worship appeared to be merely a paper reform. Not a single Protestant missionary came to Guatemala within ten years after Barrios issued the decree. Furthermore, the promise of the freedom of worship lured only a trickle of Protestant immigrants into Guatemala.

In 1876, a treaty between Guatemala and Germany guaranteed that Germans in Guatemala would be allowed absolute freedom of worship and would be permitted to build churches or chapels in the country. The Germans came to Guatemala, but apparently because of commercial, and not

\textsuperscript{365}Gobierno de Guatemala, \textit{Recopilación de las leyes emitidas por el Gobierno de la República de Guatemala}, 2 Vols., June 3, 1871-June 30, 1881 (Guatemala: Tipografía de "El Progreso", 1881), I: 174.

\textsuperscript{366}Gobierno de Guatemala, "Declaración de la libertad de cultos," March 15, 1873.
religious, considerations. The Germans who came to
Guatemala neither brought pastors with them nor built any
churches or chapels.

After ten years of inaction, Barrios took matters into
his own hands. While on a state visit to the United States
in 1882, Barrios contacted the Presbyterian Board of
Missions in New York City. The Board, which had limited
resources and was hesitant to send a missionary to such an
obscure and political volatile nation as Guatemala, turned
the request over to a committee. Impatient with further
delay, Barrios himself visited the Mission Board and
convinced them to reroute a missionary who was already
packed and ready to go to China. In November 1882, Barrios
returned to Guatemala with a Presbyterian missionary named
John Clark Hill in tow.

**The Protestant Pioneers**

The Presbyterian work began almost immediately, with
official sanction and encouragement. Hill began to hold
services in Guatemala City, in a house he rented from
Barrios at a nominal fee. Since he spoke not a word of
Spanish, Hill's congregation was made up mostly of Americans
and British citizens who lived in Guatemala City. In fact,
his congregation consisted of so many Britons that, in the
beginning, Hill conducted services out of the Church of England's *Book of Common Prayer*. 367

The Presbyterian Church was not the only denomination which had felt the call of spiritual manifest destiny at the end of the nineteenth century. Near the end of the century, almost every American Protestant denomination had added a missionary branch to its national church structure. Moreover, the movement had spurred some American Protestants to form a number of new interdenominational Bible societies and faith missions expressly for the purpose of foreign evangelization.

The missionary movement also gave new life to some of the older Bible societies that had been born out of the upheaval of the Great Awakening which had taken place in the United States during the last years of the eighteenth century, but had languished during most of the nineteenth century. Such was the case with the American Bible Society.

The American Bible Society came to Guatemala in 1892 with renewed vigor and established there a base of operations for all of Central America. The next year, the British and Foreign Bible Society sent its agent, Francisco G. Penzotti, to Guatemala having not pursued work in the

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country since the eviction of Frederick Crowe. So diligent were the agents of the two societies that in 1901 Haymaker remarked to his mission board that "the country is deluged with Bibles."

However, one of the most active groups to enter Guatemala during this time was an interdenominational faith mission known as the Central American Mission (CAM). The Central American Mission was founded in 1888 by a group of Dallas businessmen under the vision of a man named C. I. Scofield. Scofield and the other founders of CAM were premillenialists, who believed that the social tumult in the United States during the last decades of the century was the period of Great Tribulation which was to precede the dawn of the Millennial Kingdom of biblical prophesy.

A major tenet of premillenialist belief is that the world must be converted before the arrival of the new day. Scofield believed that Central America was particularly ripe for conversion and that the various Protestant denominations were remiss in their neglect of the region. To remedy this failure, Scofield and his backers founded CAM in an effort

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to save Central America and to hasten the coming of the Millenial Kingdom.\textsuperscript{370}

CAM sent its first missionary, a man named H. C. Dillon, to Guatemala in 1896, but the young man died within a few months. Three years later, in 1899, CAM's first permanent missionaries, the Reverend and Mrs. Albert E. Bishop, arrived in Guatemala City.\textsuperscript{371} Within three years, at least nine more missionaries joined the CAM in Guatemala.

Since CAM was not actually a denomination, the organization was able to put all of its money and human resources into evangelization. Within a few years, CAM missionaries had sprinkled tiny missions all over the country. CAM committed most of its efforts and resources in the capitol and in the densely populated Indian areas of the Western highlands.

Despite its efforts, however, the CAM did not attract a great number of converts in the early years. The mission was not successful in the city, where Bishop founded a church at a busy intersection where five streets came together. He christened the mission "Iglesia Evangélica Cinco Calles."

\textsuperscript{370}\textit{Central American Bulletin} (hereinafter cited as \textit{CAB}) 1 (3): 2.

After a promotional revival during which Bishop conducted loud, well-attended preaching services for 150 consecutive nights, the Cinco Calles Church prospered relatively well. In October 1889, Bishop reported, "God is meeting." However, much of the CAM's growth was at the expense of the Presbyterians, who had neither the money nor the staff to compete effectively with the new group. Shortly after the opening of the Cinco Calles Church, Haymaker complained to his mission board, "The only thing I can do is to be as ubiquitous as possible and try to hold out against . . . Central American missionaries who persistently steal my sheep. I think that it must be admitted, he added, "that the odds against me are heavy."  

The competition between the two missions in the capitol was a source of great friction. Part of the problem between the Presbyterians and the Central American Mission was theological. The CAM was premillenialist, and the Presbyterians were not. The CAM baptized by immersion, and the Presbyterians by sprinkling. Some CAM missionaries criticized the Presbyterian missionaries for working on salary rather than "on faith," while a few also accused the Presbyterians of "sectarianism."

But while the Presbyterians and the CAM bickered among themselves, other denominations were beginning to slip

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372Haymaker to PBFM, 29 October 1902, PBFM letters 1901-1902.
quietly into Guatemala. In 1901, two missionary couples from a small sect of the Pentecostal Mission, which later became part of the Nazarene Church, entered into the country. The missionaries went to Livingston, on Guatemala's disease-ridden Atlantic coast. In the first year, all four missionaries died from yellow fever. The Pentecostal Mission sent two more missionary couples as replacements in 1903 and 1904. In 1904, John Butler and Richard Anderson opened a Pentecostal-Nazarene mission in Cobán, Alta Verapaz.

At about the same time, another missionary group entered Guatemala to work in the south. In 1901, Albert Bishop of the Central American Mission had spoken at a training school for missionaries in Whittier, California about the work in Guatemala. After Bishop's talk, two young Quakers, Thomas J. Kelly and Clark J. Buckley, persuaded their Board to allow them to go to Guatemala, and they arrived in the country in the early spring of 1902. They eventually settled in Chiquimula near the Honduran border. They distributed Bibles throughout the region. During this time, however, the Quakers established no permanent mission. In autumn 1902, Kelly returned to California to recruit more missionaries to come to Guatemala. Clark stayed behind to continue the work, but died the following year. With Clark's death, Quaker work in Guatemala waned. It was not revived until 1906, when Ruth Esther Smith
arrived in Chiquimula to guide and shape the Friend's work in Guatemala for the next forty-one years.\(^{373}\)

As these new missionary groups began to trickle into Guatemala, it became evident to one and all that something had to be done to prevent the kind of strife that had divided the Presbyterian and CAM missions from poisoning relations among the rest of the denominations. Moreover, the potential for competition among the new groups was great. The theological differences which separated the Nazarenes, a so-called "holiness" church, from a mainline church such as the Presbyterian, or which separated the Friends from practically everyone, were much more pronounced than the relatively insignificant differences between the CAM and the Presbyterians.

Another reason that the missionary groups needed to reach some sort of accord among themselves was because no one denomination had the staff or the resources to evangelize all of Guatemala alone. Even the CAM, the richest of the groups in terms of manpower and funding, did not have nearly enough resources to cover the entire country. The denominations agreed that to waste scarce resources in areas where there was already another Protestant group at work was a needless duplication of

\(^{373}\)Carlos H. Marroquín Velez, ed., \textit{Así empezó . . . y creció. Crónicas de medio siglo de la obra Amigos en Centroamérica} (Guatemala: Litografía CAISA, 1983), 2.
effort, as well as a potential source of interdenominational friction.

In late 1902, the four denominations divided Guatemala by departments and informally assigned each department to a specific denomination. The divisions were made according to which denominations already had on-going work there. Those departments which still had no Protestant missions were allocated to the groups which worked in the neighboring area.

The territorial agreement divided up Guatemala as follows: the departments of Guatemala, El Progreso, Quetzaltenango, and Suchitepéquez were given to the Presbyterian Mission. CAM was given the departments of Chimaltenango, Sacatepéquez, Sololá, San Marcos, Huehuetenango, Escuintla, Santa Rosa, Jalapa, and Jutiapa. The Nazarene Mission received the departments of Alta and Baja Verapaz, and laid claim to the department of the Petén, although that region was not specifically included in the agreement, while the Friends received the departments of Chiquimula, Zacapa, and Izabal. Guatemala City was divided in half between the Presbyterian Church and the Central American Mission.

It was not until 1914 that another new mission entered Guatemala. This was the Primitive Methodist Church, a tiny off-shoot of the United Methodist Church in the United States, which came into Guatemala through the efforts of a
missionary named Charles Furnam. The original four denominations agreed to include the Primitive Methodists in the territorial division. They gave to the new church the department of Totonicapán, and part of El Quiché, which the Methodists were to share with the Presbyterians.

Two other denominations, the Anglicans and the Lutherans, were not included in these territorial divisions. These denominations organized congregations for the foreign population of the country. In 1907, the Deutsch-Evangelisches Pfarramt Kirchlich in Germany sent a pastor to Guatemala to serve the German-speaking people who had immigrated into the capitol and Alta and Baja Verapaz during the late nineteenth century. In 1929, the German Lutherans established a permanent congregation in Guatemala City called the Evangelisch-Luterische Landeskirche La Epifanía. The Deutsch-Evangelisches Pfarramt Kirchlich in Germany continued to supply pastors for the church until the beginning of World War II.374

The other denomination that ministered strictly to foreign congregations was the Anglican church (Episcopal church in the United States). Members of the Church of England, usually British diplomats, had held services in Guatemala for many years, as far back as the mid-nineteenth century. Anglicans had managed to hold services even during

374 Clifton Holland, World Christianity: Central America and the Caribbean (Monrovia, CA: Missions Advanced Research and Communications Center, 1981), 75.
the Carrera regime, when one British diplomat had noted that it was possible to worship if "made with great privacy," although he added that parties who did so sometimes got in serious trouble.

Nonetheless, through the years the Anglicans in Guatemala had failed to get either a permanent priest or a church building. It was not until 1918 that the Anglican Church recorded resident clergy in Guatemala, but by that time the Anglicans had two congregations. One congregation was located in Guatemala City, and the other on the Atlantic coast, where the church was active among Anglican Jamaicans who had come to Guatemala to work on banana plantations.\textsuperscript{375}

Neither the Anglican nor the Lutheran church made any attempt during this time to attract a native membership. Neither church offered religious services in Spanish. Instead, both catered exclusively to the foreign population. In the case of the Anglican Church, this neglect was intentional. In 1916, at a worldwide conference on missions held in Edinburgh, Scotland, the Church of England had passed a resolution which specifically omitted Latin America from its mission agenda because the area was already at least nominally Christian.\textsuperscript{376} However, the result was that

\textsuperscript{375}"The Diocese of British Honduras," \textit{The Honduras Church Evangel}, March 1918, from archives of BFBS, London.

both the Anglican and the Lutheran churches were effectively confined to the foreign population, and neither would have any major role in future Protestant growth in Guatemala.

It was the American denominations which participated in the division agreement, the Presbyterians, the Central American Mission, the Church of the Nazarene, the Friends, and the Primitive Methodist Church, which formed the core of Protestant activity during what has been called the "pioneer missionary period," from 1887 to around 1920.\textsuperscript{377} Despite their differences, these pioneer groups were at least united on a single point. They were all awed by the vastness of the job which confronted them. Their task was a formidable one: the conversion of an entire nation. But the question was, how to do it?

A number of fundamental issues faced the pioneer missionaries. The most pressing of these was just who, precisely, it was that they wanted to convert. Theoretically, the answer was everyone. But the early missionaries soon found that this was virtually impossible, for ethnic diversity, linguistic divisions, and class distinctions divided Guatemala into a series of autonomous subnational groups that did not resemble one another and did not overlap. The missionaries quickly learned that each

\textsuperscript{377}Virgilio Zapata Arceyuz, \textit{Historia de la iglesia evangélica en Guatemala} (Guatemala: Génesis Publicidad, S.A., 1982), 43.
subgroup required a different and unique approach to evangelization.

Since the earliest missionaries had settled in the capitol, the first problem in defining ministry had come with the decision of whether the Protestant churches would serve foreign Protestants, or evangelize Catholic Guatemalans. John Hill, the country's first missionary had opted to limit Presbyterian work to the English-speaking population. With the arrival of Haymaker, the focus of Presbyterian efforts shifted to Spanish work, but the mission continued to offer services at the Central Presbyterian Church in English until the early 1940s. On the other hand, CAM, which was an organization that had been founded for the express purpose of proselytization, devoted all its energies in the capitol to Spanish work from the very beginning.

Yet with this linguistic issue out of the way, another fundamental question remained. That was, in a country such as Guatemala, where a rigid class structure existed, were the missions to direct their work to the upper or lower classes? Early on, a mission teacher declared that she envisioned the Presbyterian La Patria school as a place where "the President's daughter [would sit] with barefoot

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But the Presbyterians, as well as the other denominations, soon found this goal unrealistic, as the class structure of Guatemala did not allow for this sort of intermingling. So despite their hopes, the pioneer Protestants discerned that it was necessary to target efforts at one social group, which often precluded the effective evangelization of others.

The missionaries also discovered that the people of the lower classes, who had little to lose by associating with the heretic foreigners, tended to be more receptive to their message than the members of the upper classes. In 1899, Haymaker tried to rationalize the situation to his Mission Board. "I am wondering," he wrote:

> whether the lower strata of society are not first of all to receive the Gospel with power, and push their way up into the higher ranks with the truth, than the high class people are to receive the truth and carry it down to those in the lower classes of life.\(^{380}\)

However, within a few years, when the mission's work failed to expand, another Presbyterian pastor in Quetzaltenango questioned the wisdom of the decision to convert the poor before the wealthy. "I am tempted to believe," he speculated in a letter to the Mission Board, "that if we had begun with the upper class it would have been easier to have

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\(^{380}\)Haymaker to PBFM, 12 July 1899, in PBFM letters 1882-1902.
extended the work to the poor than begin with the poor and then expect the rich to hunt up the mission."\textsuperscript{381}

In 1920, a political coalition deposed Manuel Estrada Cabrera, the Liberal leader who had ruled Guatemala as a strongman for twenty-two years. Estrada Cabrera's fall was the beginning of a new era in Guatemala. The change in government encouraged a wave of foreign immigration into the country, and with this wave came an influx of missionaries from the United States.

The arrival of the new missionaries marked the end of the pioneer period of the Protestant movement in Guatemala. No longer would it be possible to define the work of a denomination through a single personality, although in all cases the pioneer missionaries would continue to exert considerable influence in their own denominations and on the Protestant effort in general for many years to come.

By the 1920s, missionaries had resolved most of the fundamental issues which had confronted the Protestant work during the early years. Some of the issues, such as the problem of jurisdiction, were administrative and were matters which the missionaries were able to work out by common accord. Thus, the informal division agreement guaranteed that the Protestant work in Guatemala would not be derailed by personal or sectarian competition, as the

\textsuperscript{381}McBath to PBFM, 28 April 1906, \textit{PBFM Letters 1903-1911} (Guatemala City: INEP).
early conflict between Haymaker and Bishop had threatened to
do.

The pioneer missionaries defined the very nature of the
mission in Guatemala. The early missionaries, particularly
Haymaker and Bishop, were able to delineate the perimeters
of mission work for the decades that followed. They
determined that Protestant work would be limited to the
local population, but would include dialect work in
indigenous languages. By necessity, the early missionaries
focused their efforts on the masses of Guatemala's poor and
the nation's small middle sector, and reluctantly ignored
the wealthy elite in the republic.

Finally, during the first decades of the twentieth
century, missionaries created an agenda for mission work
that would, for all intents and purposes, isolate the
Protestant missionary and their converts from the rest of
Guatemalan society. The missionaries' polemic against the
Catholic church, the mother church of the vast majority of
the populace, was only one factor which assured that
Protestantism would remain an alien and often times
threatening concept to most Guatemalans. Less obvious but
equally foreign were the institutions, the schools and the
presses, established by the missionaries during the
pioneering years. Such institutions, which would flourish
in the decades to come, would offer a new life to converts
not only in the hereafter, but also in the present.
With the initial issues of the pioneer period settled, the years from about 1915 to about 1932 saw a modest but steady growth in Protestant membership and missionary activities throughout Guatemala. New missionaries brought with them specific concerns, and from these concerns there developed whole new aspects of mission work, in the fields of linguistics, education, and medicine. But the most important facet of the evangelical agenda during these years was evangelization, or as missionaries called it, "church planting."

By 1920, missions had begun to spread out, trying to cover all or at least most of the territory given to each denomination in the division agreement. The missionaries usually formed new congregations along main arteries which tied the base cities or towns with the villages in the hinterland. Usually, the path of mission work followed the main roads which transversed each denomination's territory.

Despite their vigorous efforts, not a single one of the missions outside of the capitol seems to have flourished in the early years, although the number of mission congregations, as opposed to actual membership, increased steadily. Only rudimentary records exist for the congregations in the countryside, but mission statistics indicate that church membership in Guatemala City, regardless of denomination, was by far much greater than in any other part of the country. But membership in the
capitol was not impressive either. In 1912, the Cinco Calles Church reported a total membership of 180, with an average Sunday attendance of 155, while Presbyterian attendance was probably slightly less.\textsuperscript{382}

The Protestant groups which experienced the greatest growth during the early years were those which worked in lowland or ladino areas, away from the strongly-Catholic Indian highlands. One CAM missionary remarked:

\begin{quote}
It is interesting to note how the climate and the latitude of various places here seem to effect the attitude of these people toward the Gospel, and their willingness to receive the missionaries. Just as physically one relaxes unconsciously in a low altitude, so it has proven here that the low-lying coast districts have seen the warmest reception and response to the claims of the Gospel, while on the other hand it has been the experience . . . that the tribesmen of the mountain districts have maintained for the most part a suspicious attitude.\textsuperscript{383}
\end{quote}

A new spirit of unity became manifest in 1935, when the Presbyterian Church, the Central American Mission, the Friends Mission, the Church of the Nazarene, and the Primitive Methodist Church all joined together to form a joint Evangelical Synod. The Synod was largely the creation of Paul Burgess, who dreamed of seeing a single Evangelical Church in Guatemala and the end of denominational divisions. Although the Synod's functions were more symbolic than

\textsuperscript{382}CAR, \#97 (1918): 8.

\textsuperscript{383}CAR, \#9 (1918): 14.
anything else, the symbolism of evangelical unity was powerful.

The formation of the Evangelical Synod was not the only show of evangelical unity. In 1936, the five denominations agreed to codify the way that they had divided Guatemala in 1902. This formalization of the old divisions was known as the Comity Agreement of 1936.³⁸⁴

The Comity Agreement represented more than a new spirit of accord among the evangelical churches however. The agreement was a reaction to a major change that was taking place in the Protestant work in Guatemala. This was the arrival of new, and very different evangelical groups to the republic.³⁸⁵

It was no coincidence that the mainline denominations chose to consolidate their work by forming the Evangelical Synod. The codification of the Comity Agreement demonstrates the lengths that the original denominations were willing to go to present a united front against the encroachments of the new groups, which they believed to be heretical. Pentecostal pastors were enraged. One Pentecostal writer wrote:


³⁸⁵Ibid.
The first denominations came together to try to prevent the entry of or neutralize the influence of the Pentecostals. . . . Thus very soon . . . Guatemala's [mainline Protestants denied], psychologically, and morally, the entry of the Pentecostals and of any other denomination or person whether it be evangelists, preacher or evangelical performers, which might not belong to these denominations or did not have their approval.386

The Comity Agreement became the basis of a deep and bitter schism between traditional and Pentecostal churches that plagued Guatemala Protestantism for many years.

Despite the united opposition to the Pentecostals by the members of the Evangelical Synod, growth within the traditional denominations waned during the 1930s, and reached a nadir by 1940. The departure of the pioneer missionaries contributed significantly to this decline. By the mid-1930s, Haymaker, Bishop, and Smith were all in their twilight years, and all died during the 1940s. The death of the pioneers ended the guidance and zeal that had characterized the early years of mission.

The Protestants also had simply reached the limits of their potential growth. The pioneers had envisioned that after sowing the seeds of the Gospel, Protestant missions would expand both horizontally and vertically. Therefore, the early missionaries had conducted their most successful proselytization work among the very poor and the socially

dislocated, in anticipation of expanding their work from this established base. In 1914, Haymaker wrote, "The 'publicans and harlots,' the lowest classes who have nothing by identification with anything to lose are the first to enter . . . the 'Great Unwashed,' the unbleached muslin class, mostly furnished our first adherents.387

The missionaries had hoped that the Protestant work would spread out from this disenfranchised poor vertically up to the middle sectors, and then on to the upper class. It was apparent by 1940 that this strategy had failed. A list of communicants for the Central Presbyterian Church in Guatemala City from 1924 reveals that only one of the 275 members would classify as a member of the "elite," and this was a Swiss finquero who was almost certainly a Protestant before he came to Guatemala.388

The list does not reflect the small businessmen and tradesmen, such as tailors and stonemasons, that made up almost eighteen percent of the congregation. However, the predominant occupations for members of the congregation were in the working class and the service industries. Over 43% of the members of the church worked as maids or farm workers. Moreover, the congregation of the Central Presbyterian Church was probably more cosmopolitan than any

387Haymaker, "Footnotes," 36.

388"Comulgantes," Libros de Actas 1924, Guatemala City: Archives, Iglesia Central Presbyteriana [hereinafter ICP].
other congregation in the capitol, and therefore provides evidence that, by the mid-1920s, Protestantism had not reached from the lower classes to the rest of Guatemalan society.

The Arrival of Pentecostals in Guatemala

The two new denominations which came into Guatemala in the early 1930s were the products of a religious trend known as Pentecostalism which had started in the United States around 1880. The Pentecostal movement emerged from the controversy over fundamentalism and modernism which raged in American Protestantism during the last decades of the nineteenth century and in the first years of the twentieth. By 1900, two well-known evangelists, Charles S. Pierce, and Aimee Semple McPherson, had emerged from the fray to popularize the precepts of Pentecostalism among the American public. These precepts centered on the idea that salvation came through baptism in the Holy Spirit and was manifest in "speaking in tongues," as described in the Book of Acts in the Bible.

During the first decades of the twentieth century in the United States, some of the traditional denominations fragmented over the issue of speaking in tongues and baptism by the Holy Spirit, and a number of new sects sprang up espousing the Pentecostal precepts. Between 1880 and 1926, some twenty-five "holiness" and Pentecostal churches formed in the United States, most of which had splintered off from
the Methodist Churches. Among these new sects were the
Church of God and the Assembly of God, which sent
missionaries to Guatemala in 1934, and 1935, respectively.

The missionaries of the Church of God and the Assembly
of God were not, strictly speaking, the first nontraditional
Protestant groups to come to Guatemala, nor were they even
the first Pentecostals. The first Pentecostal missionaries
to enter the country had been Charles Furnam and Thomas
Pullin, two independent missionaries who came to Guatemala
in 1916. Furnam tried to open a Pentecostal mission in
Zacapa in 1917, but Ruth Esther Smith of the Friends Mission
requested that he leave, as the Pentecostal mission violated
the terms of the informal comity agreement that the mainline
denominations had made in 1902. Furnam refused to comply
with the agreement on the grounds that it gave an unfair
monopoly to the established groups, but the Zacapa mission
failed anyway.

Furnam, next tried to open a Pentecostal mission in the
Petén in 1919, but abandoned the effort after the Nazarene
Mission informed Furnam "with kind Christian courtesy" that
the Petén lay in Nazarene territory. At this, Furnam
accused the Nazarenes of having "stolen" the Baja Verapaz
region from an independent Pentecostal missionary some years
before. From that time on, suspicion and bad feelings
between the mainline denominations and the Pentecostals
began to mount.
It would be more than a decade, however, before tension between the Pentecostals and the traditional denominations would reach a flashpoint. Deciding that opposition from the mainline denominations would prevent any development of an independent Pentecostal mission, Furnam contracted out to be a missionary for the non-Pentecostal Primitive Methodist Church.

In the meantime, several small nontraditional religious sects made an entry into Guatemala. In 1917, a German sect known as the Plymouth Brethren opened a tiny mission in El Progreso. The sect was so small and offered so little competition, however, that the Presbyterians do not appear to have registered much opposition to the presence of the mission in their territory.

However, though missionary efforts had not been as successful as originally envisioned, the institutional development accomplished during the 1920s and 1930s laid the work for potential growth in the years to come. Many of the institutional programs, particularly the transition projects, were by nature quite long-range. The translation projects were the first step in a process of conversion that might not come to fruition for a generation.

The late 1950s saw an unprecedented surge of the new missionary activity in Guatemala. Between 1954 and 1960, two new mission agencies, the Church of the Four Square Gospel, and the Source of Light Mission, started programs in
Guatemala. In addition, two groups that had made a hesitant entry into Guatemala during the Arbenz years increased their manpower and broadened their programs considerably during the second half of the decade.

The largest of these groups was the Wycliffe Bible Translators/Summer Institute of Linguistics, which had originally sent two missionaries into the country in 1952 to do linguistic work under contract to the Ministry of Education's National Indigenous Institute. 389 The other was a smaller agency called the Spanish American Inland Mission, which was run by some independent missionaries from Canada. 390 By 1963, at least three more fundamentalist organizations and a number of short-term "thrust groups" had also entered the country. 391

These new groups, all of which were fundamentalist nondenominational "faith missions," suffered from none of the stigma of association with the ousted regime that the established denominations endured during this period. The new faith missions differed greatly from the established Protestant churches in Guatemala. Whereas the original


churches were sectarian, the new groups were interdenominational. Where the traditional denominations engaged in a wide range of projects such as schools, clinics, and Indian missions, the new groups, with the exception of the Wycliffe Bible Translators, concentrated entirely on evangelization. Above all, where the established churches were divided on the question of politics, the new organizations were staunchly anti-communists.

The Latin American Mission and Evangelism-in-Depth

The greatest initiative for the new and active evangelical crusade was an interdenominational, fundamentalist faith mission called Latin American Mission (LAM). LAM was founded and supported by evangelicals in the United States, but its headquarters was in San José, Costa Rica. It was an interdenominational organization which sought to convert people to evangelical, fundamentalist Christianity, but not to affiliate the new converts with any particular denomination or dogma.

LAM began working in Guatemala in 1962. It collaborated with most of the major denominations and missionary agencies in Guatemala, to promote ambitious spiritual crusades throughout the country. LAM attempted to end the schisms which divided the various churches urging them to set aside doctrinal differences for the sake of greater outreach. Although the most traditional churches,
the Presbyterians, the Quakers, the Lutherans, and the Nazarenes, accepted the idea with some hesitation, the less doctrinaire evangelical churches embraced this broad approach with eagerness. This resulted in an even greater emphasis on the fundamentalist tone of the LAM program.  

In November 1962, LAM unleashed its massive evangelization crusade known as Evangelism-in-Depth (Instituto Internacional de Evangelización a Fondo, IINDEF) in Guatemala. Evangelism-in-depth was a comprehensive outreach program which incorporated the use of door-to-door evangelism with media campaigns, revivals, radio programs, and church programs. The LAM crusade had the most success at incorporating old methods of evangelization such as revivals and preaching meetings with new methods of sales techniques and media exposure.

The combination proved to be dynamic, and the Evangelism-in-Depth campaign was very successful. They distributed half a million Gospels, one million tracts, and native evangelists visited almost a million homes. In 1950, after nearly seventy-five years of missionary activity in Guatemala, the national census showed that Protestants

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made up less than one percent of the nation's population. During the LAM crusade in 1962 alone, however, 15,000 Guatemalans converted to Protestant Christianity. In the next few years, Protestant membership continued to grow prodigiously, although not at the pace established during the 1962 campaign.

The evangelical front continued to spread throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Evangelism-in-Depth continued as the method of conversion. However, the LAM itself diminished in importance, as churches, particularly the more traditional denominations such as the Presbyterians, began to reject its emphasis on growth over doctrine.

Nonetheless, the LAM movement revitalized the traditional churches too. By the mid-1960s, the Presbyterian Church began to emerge from the lack of direction that had plagued the church during recent years. It was the Central American Mission, however, which was most stimulated by Evangelism-in Depth. The CAM had never been as involved in ministries outside of evangelism as the other denominations, so it channeled its renewed energy into evangelism. During the 1960s, the CAM focused most of its

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\[395\] Ibid.
attention on the lower classes. It redoubled church activities in rural areas, and staged widespread tent revivals in the shanty towns of Guatemala City. The effect was galvanizing, and the CAM experienced real growth during the 1960s. By 1965, CAM's growth had reached 7.3 percent, up from a meager three percent in 1960. By the end of the decade, the CAM had reached an annual growth rate of nearly ten percent.

But CAM was the only traditional church which benefitted from the Evangelism-in-Depth campaign. The failure of Evangelism-in-Depth to attract large numbers of lasting converts to the established churches was a major factor in the decline of the program. Evangelism-in-Depth had failed to produce substantial results for the very churches which had supported it in the beginning.

In late 1954, the congregation of the Assembly of God broke down into warring factions. The source of the conflict is obscure. The Assembly of God recorded that the leader of a dissenting faction, a man named José María Muñoz, refused to accept Church discipline for acts of adultery. Muñoz and his supporters, on the other hand, argued that the source of the conflict was that the missionary refused to delegate authority to native church members.

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396 CAB, #403 (1967): 10-11.
397 Holland, World Christianity, 73.
In any event, Muñoz spearheaded an attempt to expel the American missionary and replace him with a native pastor. When his effort failed, Muñoz left the church, taking a large portion of the congregation with him. He established a new church a few doors down from the Assembly of God, and dubbed it the Príncipe de Paz Church. Príncipe de Paz mirrored the doctrine and practice of the Assembly of God in every way but one: it was, by Muñoz's design, "pure Guatemalan." It had no foreign pastors, and at first had no financial support from any source outside of Guatemala.

The appeal of a nationalistic church was infectious, and Príncipe de Paz grew meteorically. The church attracted many defectors from the Assembly of God and later from many other denominations. By 1970, it numbered several thousand members and had established several congregations outside of the capitol.

The centrifugal effects of nationalism were not limited to the Assembly of God or even to the Pentecostal Churches. Generally, there was a rough correlation between the liturgical rigidity of a denomination and its potential for fractionalization; the more formal churches seemed to have been less likely to produce splinter groups than churches which had loosely-organized liturgies and structures. But all of the older denominations suffered from some internal divisions.
The Central American Mission, which is not technically a denomination and therefore does not have a rigid church structure, was particularly balkanized. Even before the evangelical boom of the 1960s, the CAM had been the most schismatic of the traditional missions. Between 1926 and 1962, at least eight new denominations had spun off of the CAM: Iglesia Getsemani, Iglesia Nazaret, Iglesia Jeriel, Cinco Calles de 19 Calle, Iglesia Jesús Viene, the Asociación Evangélica Interdenominacional, the Misión Evangélica Independiente, and the group which eventually joined the Southern Baptist Conference. None of these early splinter groups, however, developed into denominations of any size or influence.

In 1961, a group which was to have a lasting impact on the course that Protestantism would take in the next few years in Guatemala emerged. This was a group of dissidents under the leadership of Moisés and Antonia Ríos, who had suffered a falling out with the pastor of the Cinco Calles Church. Following the example of Muñoz, they credited the difficulties to nationalistic and doctrinal differences. They then formed their own congregation, called Misión Cristiana Elim.

The Elim mission initially followed the doctrine of the Central American Mission, but in 1965, the entire congregation became Pentecostal. The change was propitious, and the congregation grew almost geometrically. By 1970,
Elim had opened several auxiliary churches in the capitol and in the countryside.\textsuperscript{398}

The conversion of the Elim church illustrates the second salient factor in the development of the indigenous churches in the late 1960s. This was that while many of the new sects splintered off from non-Pentecostal churches, virtually all of the new denominations became Pentecostal within a few years of their establishment. All of the major indigenous churches which came into existence after 1954 eventually became Pentecostal churches. Some like Príncipe de Paz or Puerta del Cielo, which broke off from the church of God, were Pentecostal to begin with. Others like El Calvario, a splinter from the Baptist and Nazarene churches, became Pentecostal churches in the mid-1960s.

The proliferation of indigenous Pentecostal sects in the late 1960s and early 1970s was only a prelude to church growth in the future. Although the number of denominations in Guatemala increased significantly between 1954 and 1975, the aggregate numbers of converts to Protestantism was not nearly as great as one would expect. Virginia Garrard-Burnett attributes this discrepancy to the fact that these new denominations had won most of their members at the expense of the mother Protestant churches.\textsuperscript{399} The shift in

\textsuperscript{398} Corral Prieto, "Las iglesias evangélicas de Guatemala," 45.

\textsuperscript{399} Virginia Garrard-Burnett, "The History Of Protestantism in Guatemala," (Ph.D. diss. Tulane University,
affiliation was clear. By 1970, sixty percent of the entire evangelical population of the country was Pentecostal. By 1985, the number of National Council--or mainline-affiliated missionaries--had fallen to 4,349, whereas evangelical or independent agencies were sponsoring 35,386 mission personnel.

The sudden popularity of Pentecostalism stemmed from both theological and sociological factors. Theologically, the Pentecostal growth in Guatemala in the 1960s was part of a larger movement called "neo-pentecostalism" that had originated in California around 1960. The neopentecostal movement differed from the older type of Pentecostalism exemplified by what were now mainline denominations such as the Assembly of God, in that it was considered to be an international and ecumenical movement, and even embraced members of the Roman Catholic Church.

In theory, the neo-pentecostal or charismatic movement sought to renovate Christians within the framework of traditional denominations. In practice, however, charismatic members usually left their old churches, often even old Pentecostal churches, to form new congregations.

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1986), 191.


401 Ibid.

402 Berberián, Two Decades of Renewal, 13-14.
Such was the case in Guatemala, although in many cases the neo-pentecostal transformations did not occur until the congregation had already separated from the church.

A second theological factor which enhanced the growth of Pentecostalism was the international ecumenical movement of the 1960s. One of the precepts of Vatican II had been to promote ecumenical fellowship among the Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox churches. During the mid-1960s, a number of mainline churches worldwide had made overtures in this direction.

To Guatemalans, who had risked ridicule and social ostracism to convert to Protestantism, the idea of rekindling any sort of relationship with Rome was completely unacceptable. As a result, mainline churches began to show fissures in yet another direction, as congregations broke away to protest their denomination's flirtations with the Catholic Church. The Pentecostal churches, however, refused to participate in the ecumenical movement, as did the CAM. To Guatemalans, this defiant anti-Catholic stance gave such churches an added attraction.

During the 1960s, Protestant churches in Guatemala witnessed a flourishing of growth that was without precedent in the nearly one hundred years that missionaries had labored in the republic. In part, the surge of growth was due to the LAM crusade, which caused a momentary truce in
interdenominational rivalries and attracted converts through high-profile, modern methods of evangelization.

Nonetheless, the central attraction of Protestantism during the 1960s was neither the LAM crusade nor the churches' political message. The key to growth lay in the establishment of indigenous churches, where Guatemalans for the first time in the history of Protestant missions, separated themselves from the foreign missionaries. Native Protestants began to worship in a form, usually Pentecostal in nature, which seemed to be untainted by association with foreign beliefs and personnel. In effect, during the 1960s, the sentiments of nationalism which had emerged during the revolutionary period were redirected from the political to the religious forum. As a result of what might be called this new "religious nationalism," the Protestant churches flourished as they never had before in Guatemala.

Evangelical Explosion

In 1975, the rate of Protestant growth hovered around seven percent. Then on February 4, 1976, a massive earthquake shook Guatemala to its foundation. The earthquake would give the evangelicals' message an urgency which it had never before carried. As a result, from 1976 on, Protestant growth in Guatemala would soar.
After the earthquake, evangelical church membership jumped by fourteen percent. Critics quipped that such a timely conversion boom was "ánima por lámina," a wordplay which loosely meant that the new converts had sold their souls for tin roofing. Yet the material consequences of the earthquake were in a very real sense responsible for boosting the evangelicals' appeal. In February, 1976 the Quaker Mission reported an observation which was true for virtually all denominations: "Hundreds of decisions for Christ have been made in these last few weeks since February 4, as Friends had endeavored to minister to body and soul."  

All denominations, whether mainline or Pentecostal, enjoyed a surge in membership immediately after the earthquake. The greatest growth, however, took place among Pentecostal groups. In the days immediately following the earthquake, this growth was accountable to the activities of El Calvario Church, a Pentecostal sect which had developed from an independent Canadian Baptist group.

El Calvario became Pentecostal in 1965. In that year, a group of churchmen had met for a prayer meeting in a believer's home. One of the members had a sudden and terrifying prophetic vision that at some time in the near

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future, Guatemala would be destroyed by a major earthquake. The vision of destruction had so horrified the prayer group that they persuaded the entire congregation of the church to put their faith into the prophecy, by converting to Pentecostalism and by stockpiling supplies for the impending disaster.

When the earthquake did strike in 1976, the Calvario Church was prepared. The congregation distributed their supplies liberally in the most stricken parts of the country. As they did so, they spread the word of their prophecy, and encouraged recipients of aid to convert to the faith, in anticipation of the days to come. As a result, people flocked in unprecedented numbers to Pentecostal churches.405

But overall, the churches which have truly flourished in Guatemala since the 1976 earthquake are the indigenous, national, and usually Pentecostal churches. Some of the largest Pentecostal churches are products of the nationalistic splits of the 1960s. Most new converts, however, are members of tiny, community sects which proliferate in all sections of the country.

Since 1976, the Protestant, and particularly the Pentecostal churches, have divided and subdivided into over 200 denominations. In a large portion of cases, the new sects formed out of two-man feuds in the mother church, when

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405Holland, World Christianity, 79.
a struggle over doctrine or power between the church leader and a member of the congregation had caused the dissident member to leave the church and create his own congregation.

The indigenous Pentecostals, who experienced the greatest surge of membership of all Protestant sects in the post-earthquake years, offered a message which promised a spiritual shelter that was quite appropriate for the political and economic uncertainties in Guatemala during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Pentecostals stressed that salvation came from personal redemption rather than from societal reform. At the same time, their fiery premillenial doctrine taught that the world would only grow worse, regardless of human effort, until Christ's return. The Pentecostals put great credence in Biblical prophesies that the world must pass through a series of disasters before the dawn of the New Kingdom. To the indigenous Pentecostals, as well as other non-Pentecostal but premillenialist churches, all of Guatemala's political and economic misfortunes were all a fulfillment of such prophecy.

The enormous growth of Pentecostal membership in the late 1970s indicated that Guatemalans found comfort in such beliefs, during a time of social change, political strife, and economic violence. In the decade from 1970 to 1980, the non-Pentecostal denominations grew at an average annual rate of 11.7 percent, while the Pentecostal groups increased at a
rate of 13.3 percent each year. However, the implications for the distribution of Protestant church growth is much clearer when one remembers that from the mid-1960s on, the emergence of new, large indigenous Pentecostal groups meant that the Pentecostal rate of growth, after about 1966, took place from a larger baseline membership than did the growth in the mainline denominations. Thus, the Pentecostal groups grew at a significantly more rapid rate than did the traditional churches. Indeed, in 1960, Pentecostals made up less than twenty percent of the Protestant population in Guatemala; by 1978, well over half of all Protestants in Guatemala considered themselves to be Pentecostals.

All Pentecostalism as a movement bases a great part of its doctrine on the book of Acts. Pentecostals “seek to return to the original christendom with the practices that characterized the first disciples of Christ.” Dr. Emilio Antonio Nuñez, Rector of Seminario Teológico Centroamericano, argues that this renewal is a "doctrinal" renewal because "they are . . . speaking of a theology of renewal, empiric, mystical, charismatic, liturgical, and ecumenical." It must be pointed out that at the end of

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406 Congreso "Amanecer 84," La hora de Dios en Guatemala, 78.
407 Holland, World Christianity, 71.
408 Emilio Antonio Nuñez, Caminos de Renovación (Grand Rapids: Outreach Publications, 1975), 21.
409 Ibid.
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the word Pentecostal was used principally as a synonym of holiness, or sanctification, as a second work of grace after salvation. The term Pentecostal did not mean "a third blessing in signs that followed, such as speaking in tongues. "Pentecostal" in these years categorically signified "having received the Holy Spirit in his sanctifying power."410

In Guatemala, the Evangelical denominations that have embraced the contemporary Charismatic movement date in from 1962-63. These groups generally do not call themselves "Pentecostals." However, their doctrine is so similar, if not identical to that of the Pentecostal churches, that one can call these denominations "neo-Pentecostals." The term "charismatics" could also be used because their doctrinal and pragmatic emphasis is centered in the "charismas," or "gifts" that according to their teaching, has been given to Christians in these "last times."411 These gifts are, principally, glossalalia, or the gift of "speaking in other tongues"; the gift of interpretation of tongues; divine healing; exorcism or the gift of casting out demons that have taken possession of people; and the gift of prophecy.

Pentecostalism has historically had outreach and impact among the lower classes of society, whereas neo-

410Ibid.
411Ibid., 151.
Pentecostalism has reached the middle and upper classes, and even on occasion to the aristocratic society. Historically, the Pentecostal Church is of a Wesleyan theology that emphasizes the experience of a second blessing, and emphasizes holiness. Neo-Pentecostalism does not emphasize the second work of sanctification at all, and less the teaching of holiness. They identify holiness as "growth in grace," identifying the baptism in the Holy Spirit as a part of the initial experience of the Christian.

The groups within the Catholic church that practice these gifts are called "Charismatics." Protestants that possess these "gifts" or "charismas" (at least in Guatemala) prefer not being called "charismatic" in order to differentiate themselves from the Catholic groups. These groups are relatively new, their emphasis is similar to the traditional Pentecostals, and they call themselves "neo-Pentecostals." Many of the largest neo-Pentecostal churches in Guatemala, such as El Shadai, Fraternidad Cristiana de Guatemala, and Verbo in the capitol, and Bethania in Quetzaltenango, were established in the 1970s.

The Impact of the Evangelical Explosion

The Evangelical church has experienced tremendous church growth during the past 40 years. In 1950 there were

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413 Ibid., 62.
72,208 Protestants in Guatemala, and by 1960, this figure had grown to 346,000. By 1980, the Protestants in Guatemala had quadrupled to 1,333,812 which represented 18.4% of the population. Seven years later, in 1987, Protestants numbered 2,668,810 or 31.6% of the population. The average annual growth rate for Protestant churches between 1983 and 1986 was 11.8%. In 1992, it was estimated that there were 9,298 churches and congregations which signified one church for every 906 inhabitants. Moreover, in 1986, the rate of growth for Protestant churches, both Pentecostal and mainline denominations combined, remained at a startling 18.5 percent a year.

The size of the Evangelical community has steadily grown, and now comprises a quarter of the population. More importantly, however, is the fact that almost 70 percent of the church growth in Guatemala has been among the Pentecostal churches. With this growth has come a greater presence in Guatemalan society at-large. It also appears


415 Ibid.

416 Ibid., 33.

417 Ibid.


that at least some of the Pentecostal churches have rejected the pietism of the historical Pentecostal churches and many of their members are beginning to involve themselves in politics. The election of Jorge Serrano Elías, a Pentecostal Christian, as president in 1991, signaled an apparent shift in Pentecostal theology regarding the participation of Christians in politics, and sparked a debate over the political role of the Evangelical church. Given the size of the Evangelical community in Guatemala, this development could drastically change the arena of Guatemalan politics. However, it remains to be seen which theology will come to dominate Evangelical opinion about participation in the political life of Guatemala.
Chapter V

The Political Metamorphosis of the Evangelical Church

"Without religion, society [is] not possible. . . ."420

---Justo Rufino Barrios

Since the first Protestant missionaries arrived in Guatemala in 1872, Protestantism has gone from a marginalized minority with little political influence or power to comprising 30% of the population today and having had two professing evangélicos hold the nation's highest political office. During the pioneering years of Protestant missions, Protestantism's fortunes were linked to whether the Liberal or Conservative party controlled the Guatemalan government. Protestantism was instrumental in building the infrastructure necessary to sustain the nation. The early missionaries built schools and hospitals, and initiated literacy programs, particularly among the poor and the indigenous. These pioneering missionary efforts were followed by the influx of Pentecostal faith missions who vied with the older established churches for converts. These first two waves of missionaries in Guatemala were characterized by their pietism as a result of the missionary attitudes about political participation and problems caused by the participation of some churches during 1944-1954.

However, the Protestant church in Guatemala has grown enormously in the last 30 years and the majority of this growth has been among Pentecostal denominations. Whereas the early Pentecostal churches in Guatemala worked mainly among the poor, the newer denominations now include members of the middle and upper-classes among their converts. Furthermore, there are signs that the attitude toward political participation has changed drastically among some of the new Pentecostal denominations, as evidenced by the election in 1991 of Jorge Serrano Elías, who was a member of El Shadai, to the presidency. Because of their numbers, this change in attitude could effect Guatemalan politics for years to come.

Marginalized Minority

In 1982, General Efraín Ríos Montt, the first evangelical President of Guatemala, led a celebration of the centennial of the first Protestant missions to Guatemala. One hundred years earlier, President Justo Rufino Barrios had invited Protestant missionaries to his country. Barrios believed that "without religion, society was not possible. . . ." Being Catholic didn't impede Barrios from seeing the necessity of enacting the Decree of Freedom of Worship and Conscience, considering said decree as the

\[42^1\] Ibid.
civil and social conquests resulting from his military victory.

The invitation began to change the concept of Protestants being the devil incarnate when people realized that John Clark Hill was meeting with the highest diplomatic officials and even the President himself. The Protestant church was responsible for building infrastructure in Guatemala. Protestant missionaries engaged in a wide range of projects such as schools, clinics, and Indian missions. Whereas established churches were divided on the question of politics, the new organizations were staunchly committed nonmilitary social reform. "Our institutions," remarked a North American Protestant missionary in Guatemala in 1910 referring to his denomination's missions, schools and clinics, "can do more than gunboats."422

Except for the Unionist hiatus during the decades of the twenties, Protestants closely associated with the Liberal governments which were in power in Guatemala from 1871 to 1944. Moreover, every president from Barrios to Estrada Cabrera considered the efforts of the Protestants to be a complement to the Liberal political agenda. So for most of their first half-century in Guatemala, Protestant missionaries enjoyed both the protection and the support of the government in their work.

The Liberal presidents who followed Justo Rufino Barrios after his death in 1885 continued to lend their backing to the Protestant missionaries with much the same enthusiasm as their Liberal predecessor. In the years immediately following Barrios' death, his successors worked to encourage further the spread of Protestant mission work in the republic. In 1897, President José Maria Rainey Barrios gave permission for Protestant colporteurs to use the official government printing press for religious tracts. A short time later, he issued free railway passes and letters of safe conduct to all traveling preachers in the country.

In 1898, Manuel Estrada Cabrera assumed the office of President of Guatemala, beginning the longest uninterrupted tenure of a head of state in the history of the republic. Like Barrios, Estrada Cabrera encouraged the presence of the Protestants to weaken the secular power of the Roman Catholic Church. He provided missionaries with a number of special concessions. He offered the missionaries police protection, the right to preach in schools and public buildings, and gave them free franking privileges to send

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424 Ibid.
their religious literature through the mail.\textsuperscript{425} He also decreed that the Protestants did not have to pay duties on any machinery that they might import from the United States, including their printing presses or equipment for medical clinics.\textsuperscript{426}

The liberal government's preferential attitude toward the Protestants was not lost on visitors to Guatemala during the Estrada Cabrera years. In 1913, an American visitor noted:

The Protestants and particularly the Presbyterian missions [have] a distinct advantage in pursuing religious work in Guatemala. The representatives of mission work today have free access and [the] favor of all officials, from the President down. . . . It is not that they [the Liberals] are religious, nor are they Protestants, but they are tired of Roman ignorance, tyranny, and superstition.\textsuperscript{427}

The missionaries themselves also realized that the support of the government gave their work a distinct advantage, but they also recognized that their association with a political faction might be of only passing usefulness. In the early part of the century, Haymaker wrote:

\textsuperscript{425} Mildred Spain, \textit{And in Samaria: A Story of Fifty Years of Missionary Witness in Central America 1890-1940} (Dallas: Central American Mission, 1940), 161

\textsuperscript{426} Edward H. Haymaker, \textit{A Study in Latin American Futures} (mimeographed), no page numbers, located in library of Seminario Teológico Centroamericano, Guatemala City.

As politics make strange bed-fellows, it also happens that in the shuffling of forces, Protestantism temporarily finds itself in alliance with agnosticism [a reference to the Liberals], facing a common, and more dangerous enemy . . . [the Catholic Church].

For the most part, the missionaries welcomed the government support, and recognized their political role. In 1914, a Presbyterian missionary summed up the collegial nature of the mission's relationship with the government. He wrote:

The Liberal Party of the country, who at first favored us mainly for the purposes of weakening the grip of the Church of Rome . . . are now waking up to the fact that they have imported a splendid moralizing force that is powerfully cooperating with their noblest patriotic efforts. The dawning of this act is one of the reasons for the multiplying of the congregation.

Yet overall, it is clear that during the period of Liberal rule, the missionaries considered their influence in Guatemala's political and economic life to be an integral part of their mission. Haymaker summed up this attitude when he wrote:

Among all the enterprises mainly conducted by foreigners, the Evangelical Mission work is conspicuous as an exception, in that it brings large amounts of money into the country, yet takes nothing out. The government recognizes this and gives us every possible encouragement.

The fall of the Estrada Cabrera government in April 1920 did not put an end to the Protestant relationship with

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428 Haymaker, A Study in Latin American Futures.


430 Haymaker, A Study of Latin American Futures.
the national government despite the missionaries close ties with the deposed Liberal Party. A cordial relationship existed between the government and the Protestant missions in the early years of the 1920s. The high point of the relationship came during the presidency of Jose Manuel Orellana, a Liberal president who served from 1921 to 1926. Orellana at one time expressed an interest in seeing a "Protestant mission in every town."\(^{431}\)

The Presbyterians, who were the first Protestants to go to Guatemala from the U.S., were soon followed by four other U.S. mission efforts: the Central American Mission (CAM), the California Meeting of Friends, the Nazarenes, and the Primitive Methodists. For approximately fifty years, the Protestants were no match for the Catholic presence. However, the missionaries were patiently laying the groundwork for future growth in the form of organizing revivals, translating the Bible into the indigenous languages, building Bible-training institutes, theological seminaries, radio stations, and publishing houses.

**Protestantism and the October Revolution**

The October Revolution of 1944 embodied in Guatemala the liberal democratic principles of the twentieth century. The constitution forged in this revolution, affirmed the

separation of the Catholic Church from the State. Although President Juan Jose Arévalo (1945-1950) considered himself to be a free thinker, he could not hide his admiration of Protestantism as an opposing current to clerical fanaticism. If the Revolution opened the doors of citizen participation, it was with the hope that many evangelicals would enter into politics, as much into various media of public administration as in a popular movement.

It was not surprising that shortly after taking office, Arbenz began to slow the tide of Americans coming into Guatemala. Under the new administration, the Ministry of Foreign Relations began to tighten up requirements for entry and residence visas for foreigners. Not long before Arbenz's inauguration, Paul Burgess wrote to the Presbyterian Board in New York that missionaries of all denominations were having considerable difficulty in obtaining residence visas from the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

As time went on, however, it became increasingly clear that the foreign missionaries were a target for the highly nationalistic Arbenz government. By 1952, missionaries found it nearly impossible to obtain visas. Missionaries who applied for visas from the Central American Mission fell under the particular scrutiny of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, perhaps because of the Mission's claims of
"apoliticism" and its unusually close ties to conservative groups in the United States.

All missionaries who applied for visas during the Arbenz years were required to add the disclaimer to their applications that they would "pay all expenses during the time and not molest the state in any way." The Ministry of Foreign Relations ordered many potential missionaries to undergo review by the National Police before the Ministry would grant their visas. Eventually, the Arbenz government made the visa application process for American missionaries such a trying and labyrinthine procedure that it effectively discouraged the growth of Protestant work. Even if the government had not created these obstacles, the Protestant work would have slowed on its own. Missionary Boards in the United States became increasingly alarmed as Guatemala began to move more and more to the left under Arbenz. In June, 1952, the government announced a radical Agrarian Reform Law, which effectively expropriated with compensation the unused lands of the vast plantations owned by the United States Fruit Company and other large plantations.

The United States government protested the attempt to expropriate the lands, and began to build a case for

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433 Ibid.
communist infiltration of the Arbenz government. At the same time, violence in the countryside began to mount, as peasants, who were eager for land and unwilling to wait for the formal redistribution process, began to take land by force. Mission Boards began to view the situation in Guatemala with anxiety. In anticipation of political unpleasantness, the boards began to make plans to reduce or withdraw their mission projects from the country.

As early as 1950, the Presbyterian Board of Missions sent the Guatemala Mission a packet of materials labeled "Confidential Crisis Strategy. Information Concerning the Experiences of Christians Under Communist Pressure," which detailed the trials of missionaries in Europe, China, and Korea. On a more practical note, the Board refused to loan the Guatemala Mission money to celebrate its Diamond Jubilee in 1953, on the grounds that "a communist uprising might prevent paying it back."

The Presbyterian missionaries tried to reassure the Mission Board. "Those of us who have lived through the

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434 For various evaluations of the Arbenz regime see Manuel Galich, ¿Por qué lucha Guatemala? Arévalo y Arbenz: Dos hombres contra un imperio (Buenos Aires: Elmer Editor, 1956); Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

435 Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, "Information Concerning the Experiences of Christians Under Communist Pressure," pamphlet from PBFM (Guatemala City: Archives, IENP).

436 PBFM to Stanley Wick, 2 March 1953, IENP.
revolution in Latin America," they wrote, "realize that the newspapers often give the impression of greater danger than actually exists." But the Presbyterian Mission Board was not convinced, and in 1954, it issued a standing order for its missionaries to evacuate the country if the political situation worsened.

Nevertheless, while the missionaries were probably never in any physical danger, the government's increasingly radical agenda posed a growing obstacle to Protestant work during the early 1950s. The problem with the expropriation of the fruit company's land had caused hostilities between the United States and Guatemalan governments, and the onus fell upon foreigners who worked in the country. In keeping with his program to rid Guatemala of foreign influence, Arbenz supported legislation designed to lessen the institutional strength of the American Missions. In 1953, the President backed a law sponsored by the Teachers Union that required that forty percent of the faculty at all private schools be assigned by the government. The National Congress vetoed the law, but had it passed, it would have cut at the heart of the Protestant's educational program.

By early 1954, the Protestant missionaries had lost the only lasting tie they had with the radical government, rural schools. In an effort to end the foreigners' prominence in

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437 Unnamed writer to PBFM, 25 June 1954, IENP.
438 PBFM to Robert Thorpe, 24 June 1954, IENP.
the national literacy program, the Arbenz government enacted a series of laws which in effect eliminated the evangelicals' teaching staff. The laws required that all reading teachers have a title or a certificate of aptitude. The missionaries reported that officials enforced the new laws rigorously in the Protestant schools, even though by one missionary's reckoning, "not even one" teacher in the government schools had such a certificate. To the missionaries, the apparently arbitrary enforcement of this law on mission schools was a clear demonstration of the present government's nationalistic anti-Americanism.

The greatest threat to the Protestant work, however, did not come from the government. The threat came from within, as the political and social changes of the Arbenz years divided the Protestant churches squarely down the middle. For the first time, the division was an ethnic one rather than among the missionaries, who opposed the radical government tooth and nail. On the other side were the Guatemalan nationals, who saw the Arbenz reforms to be the very kinds of positive changes for the future that Protestant teachings had taught them were possible.

By the end of Arbenz's first year in office, the American missionaries, reflecting the opinion of American policy-makers and businessmen in the country, were nearly united in their opposition to the regime. Although they had

439*Northern Presbyterian Annual Report, 1954, IENP.*
initially hoped that the Arbenz regime would increase social justice in Guatemala, the missionaries were convinced by 1951 that the Arbenz government was communist, and as such was a threat to their work for both religious and nationalistic reasons. To the missionaries, the national sympathy for communism was a special source of sadness, for it represented a rejection of the package of American ways and Protestant beliefs that they had preached for so many years. A Presbyterian spokesman summarized the American missionaries feeling of inefficacy at the radical popularity of the Arbenz. He wrote:

As missionaries . . . we wish to confess our failure to attain to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ in both life and teaching. We agree that . . . in the rise of Communism we should discern the hand of God held out in judgement against his Church for her failure. We confess that there is much truth in the charge: 'the measure of the success of the Communists in the modern world is the measure of the failure of the Christian Church to practice what it has been preaching.'\(^{440}\)

Yet the missionaries did not take the challenge passively. The CAM issued the battle cry to "answer the barrage of Communist literature with Christ-centered propaganda produced in quantity and quality."\(^{441}\) The Presbyterians sponsored a general seminar on Communism for the missionaries of the other denominations at the annual

\(^{440}\)Minutes of the Executive Committee, 12 September 1951, IENP.

\(^{441}\)CAR, #318 (1953): 10.
conference of the Evangelical Synod in 1951. Missionaries of all denominations thundered thinly veiled denunciations of communism from their pulpits, reasoning that all true and just government must come from God, rather than from godless ideologues.

In early 1954, an American visitor to Guatemala commented on the missionaries' siege mentality under what was by that time a distinctly radical and anti-American regime. "The disturbing factor," he wrote,

is that most missionaries seem to have one of two attitudes, both of which I must consider to be a mistake. Some feel we must play safe and not take any stand that might have repercussions later. Others feel that the end is in sight and that there is nothing to be done but keep the trunks packed to move out at a moment's notice.

"I feel," he continued, "that we need to take a very positive position, not of anti-communism, but of pro-Christ that will lead us to a complete consecration to Him so that His Holy Spirit may work."

The gravest problem of all, however, was not the division among the missionaries. Instead, the greatest disunity appeared within the churches themselves, where bitter schisms arose between those who supported the

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442 Minutes of the Executive Committee, 12 September 1951, IENP.

443 Boletín de la Iglesia Central Presbyteriana, 5 July 1953; 6 December 1953; 1 June 1952.

444 Annual Report, 1954, IENP.

445 Ibid.
government's revolutionary programs and those who did not. While the missionaries almost all opposed the most ambitious government programs, many of their parishioners were among the most active advocates of the radical reform. It was natural that the greatest advocates of the radical reform were those who had benefitted the most from it, the poor, the landless, and the illiterates. Since people of the lower classes made up the largest proportion of the Protestant membership, it was predictable that the radical reform would find considerable support in the Protestant churches.

Moreover, since church members had already deviated from social norms by joining a Protestant church in the first place often meant that, in many cases, indigenous Protestants were more open to radical change than their Catholic counterparts. To the Protestants, the next step was logical. Having thrown off religious oppression, it was now time to strike out for political freedom as well.

As early as 1951, the missionaries expressed concern at the growing radicalization of some of their members. One member of the Evangelical Synod's Literacy Campaign suggested that the Synod publish more literature for the newly literate, so as to steer them away from reading government publications. He argued that the Synod's tracts should "cover the full range of Christian truth, . . . so slanted that the humblest Christian will know what he
believes and be proof against Communist and other propaganda."^446

It was in the predominantly Indian sections of the country where the indigenous Protestants became most actively involved in the radical reform. Indeed, radicalism among indigenous Protestants had been a factor in the churches in the western highlands even before Arbenz had come into office. As early as 1944, Ubico had imprisoned three members of the CAM church in Patzicia for involvement in "a radical political uprising" against the government.^447

It was the members of the Central American Mission and the Presbyterian Church who tended to be most active in the revolutionary reforms. This was not because either of these denominations encouraged radicalism, but because they operated in the areas where the reform programs were hardest-hitting.

In Chinautla, in the Presbyterian-controlled department of Guatemala, Protestant laymen formed the leadership of the Unión Campesina, which managed the distribution of lands under the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952.^448 Indigenous Protestants also figured prominently in the Agrarian Reform movement in the Indian villages around Lake Atitlán, which

^446PBFM to Literacy Committee, 2 April 1951, IENP.

^447CAR, #276 (1948), 13.

lay in CAM territory. In several villages, Protestants formed the core of leadership of local agrarian committees and peasant leagues. In some lake villages, local elections placed Protestant leaders in public office for the first time during the early 1950s.

However, it was in the village of Magdalena Milpas Altas, in the CAM-controlled area near Panajachel where radical Protestants showed particular unity. There, activists cut across ethnic divisions. In an unprecedented action, Protestant Cakchiquels and ladino Protestants joined forces to head the leadership of the local agrarian reform.

Local Protestants, in most locations, were by no means united in their support of the radical reform. Controversy over the government program shattered the fellowship of many congregations. In some situations, the issue caused a permanent rift between a congregation and their pastor. In other cases, the controversy caused almost fratricidal division among members of the churches.

An example of a church which fractured into political factions during the Arbenz administration was the Presbyterian Quiché mission in Cantel, on the eastern border of Guatemala.

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449 Stoll, Fishers of Men, 48.


451 Ibid., 35-36.
of Sololá. After passage of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1952, the fellowship in the congregation began to break down as members of the church became active in the land distribution program. Other members opposed their activity. Some criticized the radicals from the standpoint that Protestants should not dally in politics. Still others, who were more conservative in their political views, objected to their participation on political grounds.

In 1953, the rift between the factions worsened when radical members of the congregations became very actively involved in the local Syndicate, or peasant committee. Near the end of the year, the Syndicate allegedly began to harass some conservative members of the congregation with threats of death. The conservative Presbyterians responded with a blistering public campaign against the Presbyterian Sindicalistas. They posted printed placards around the town denouncing the políticoastros evangélicos, the bad Protestant politicians. The conservatives upbraided the radicals for the moral shame they had brought to the church through their

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452 "Carta Abierta, Cantel Enero 1954, 'A los políticoastros evangélicos: David Ordóñez Colop, Gabriel Sam Chuc, Obispo Salánic Salánic, Felipe Santiago Colop García, Juan Itcep y otros, con motivo de la manifestación de los 'revolsos' no REVOLUCIONARIA del 13 diciembre próximo pasado," IENP.

453 Ibid.
political work, and exhorted them "not to use the smokescreen of religion for their vile politics."\(^{454}\)

By the beginning of 1954, the Cantel mission had split into two separate churches. The radical Protestants formed a new mission called Getsemani. The conservative Presbyterians remained part of the old congregation and continued to meet in the church building.\(^{455}\)

It is interesting to note that the American missionaries usually stood by their radical congregations. This support was present despite the fact that the growing nationalistic sentiment in the country posed a specific threat to the missionaries' work, and the new programs were often diametrically opposed to their own personal political views.

Most missionaries were determined to maintain or even expand their work during the Arbenz years, even as the political climate became increasingly threatening. The Evangelical Synod literacy campaign had continued to operate on the United Fruit Company's plantations around Tisquisate in the 1940s until large-scale strikes paralyzed the area in 1948 and 1949.\(^{456}\) Even after the expropriation issue had made the United Fruit Company a political tinderbox, the

\(^{454}\)Ibid.

\(^{455}\)Ibid.

Synod continued its literacy work in the area. As late as 1954, the interdenominational journal, *Guatemala News*, reported "a great campaign to put the Word into the hands of . . . the settlers and workers of the United Fruit Company."

Indeed, at least one mission was openly sympathetic to the radical government, even at the height of the Arbenz reforms. This was the Lutheran Church which, as a newcomer to Guatemala, was unfamiliar with the traditional political orientation of the Protestant churches. Between 1950 and 1953, the Lutheran Church in the United States sent at least five seminary students to Guatemala, specifically to work in conjunction with several government-sponsored programs.

The Missouri Synod Lutheran missionaries worked in several different locations. The most ambitious program was in Zacapa, begun in the summer of 1951. There, the seminarians worked alongside the Ministry of Agriculture's *Instituto Agropecuario Nacional* to try to improve agricultural production in a ten-aldea area. By 1952, the program had expanded to include classes in agriculture

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459 Ibid., 16 July 1951.

460 Ibid.
After the Agrarian Reform in 1952, two completely opposed attitudes arose among some of the indigenous communities. The elders of the hierarchies of cargos, linked to the Catholic Church, tended to oppose it, fearing that their own land would be taken away, while the Protestants figured in a prominent way in the new agrarian committees and campesino leagues.

The Lutheran Church conducted another social program in Guatemala City. Starting in 1952, the missionaries operated a social welfare agency which sought to improve the standard of living among the burgeoning masses of the urban poor in the capitol. This development program was apparently not tied in directly to any specific government-sponsored development project, but it operated with the government's blessing.

The relationship between the Lutheran Church and the Arbenz administration seems to have been reasonably close. Evidence of a special relationship lay in the fact that Lutheran missionaries during the revolutionary period experienced none of the problems with visas and immigration that plagued the missionaries of the other Protestant denominations. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Relations  

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461 Ibid., 24 July 1952.
462 Ibid., 16 August 1952.
in the Arbenz years seems to have often processed the papers of Lutheran applicants with remarkable alacrity. 463

Yet the Arbenz government remained somewhat suspicious of the Lutherans, who were, after all, not only Americans, but most were also of German descent. Although the Ministry of Foreign Relations did not demand the same stringent visa qualifications that it asked of other mission groups, the Ministry did require other kinds of certification from the Lutheran Mission. The Ministry of Foreign Relations insisted that the Lutheran missionaries agree to the stipulation that they return to the United States at any time that the government might judge that they acted "to the detriment of the country." 464 It also demanded that the home mission board send the missionaries the rather tidy sum of Q250 per month, so that they would not "become an economic burden to the country." 465

In effect, the Arbenz administration was suspicious of all Protestant missions, including the one denomination which actively supported the government's programs. The hostility and uncertainty took its toll on the Protestant work, and few missionaries mourned when CIA-backed forces under Carlos Castillo Armas forced Arbenz to step down in

463 Ibid., 22 July 1950; 16 July 1951; 24 July 1952; 4 September 1953.

464 Ibid., 16 July 1951.

465 Ibid., 16 August 1952.
June, 1954. Most missionaries, however, backed the Castillo Armas coup with only passive support. Although they were relieved to have the leftist government out of power, they were unsure how the new government would regard mission work, especially since so many indigenous converts had been actively involved in revolutionary programs. One missionary summed up his annual Christmas letter in 1954. "The Communists are out now," he wrote, "but they left the yarn in such a snarl that we can hardly continue the old pattern of weaving."

In summary, the revolutionary years were a time of mixed fortune for Protestant work in Guatemala. During the Arévalo administration, the institutional work of the missions flourished. From 1944 to 1950, the Protestants worked in close harmony with the government by sponsoring an extensive literacy program and by supporting the Arévalo administration's efforts to improve the plight of labor. The Arévalo administration, in turn, continued the pro-Protestant policies of the earlier governments, despite the criticism of Catholic groups in the country.

Relations between the Protestant churches and the States began to crumble, however, with the election of Jacobo Arbenz to the Presidency. Arbenz's highly nationalistic program for reform and the crisis over the

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466Christmas letter from the Paul Burgess family, 1954, IEPN.
expropriation of the United Fruit Company's lands alienated most U.S. missionaries, who eventually concurred with the U.S. State Department's evaluation that the Arbenz government was infiltrated by communists. The Arbenz administration, for its part, aggravated the deteriorating relations with the Protestant missionaries by restricting missionaries' visas and applying legislation designed to weaken the influence of the missionaries.

Not all Protestants, however, were alienated during the Arbenz period. Some foreign missionaries, particularly those with the Lutheran Mission, became actively involved in the government's most liberal reform projects. Even more important, many native Protestants who, having experienced spiritual transformation hoped to participate in the nation's political transformation, rose to positions of leadership in local land reform projects and peasant organizations. Once ignited, the flame of nationalism in the native Protestants could not be doused, and would continue to burn brightly in the years to come.

The victory of Castillo Armas was a matter of urgent concern to the Protestant missionaries. Of primary concern was the fact that Castillo had the strong backing of conservative Catholics. The battle cry of the invasion force had been "Por Dios, La Patria, y Libertad," its
banner, the sword and the cross. Protestant missionaries feared that the entire "reconquest" of Guatemala from the communists had taken on the air of a religious crusade.

Their fears were not groundless, for Castillo Armas had made it clear from the beginning that he would reward the Catholic Church for its political support in the ouster of Arbenz. A major component of Castillo's Plan of Tegucigalpa made a number of significant promises to the Catholic Church. Although the Plan of Tegucigalpa recognized the principle of freedom of worship, it also hinted that the Roman Catholic Church might regain its former position as the preeminent religious body in the republic.

The Plan pledged to restore the juridic personality of the Catholic Church. It vowed to sponsor the growth of parochial education, on the grounds that "the constraints on the Church's educational work favored the penetration of communism." The Castillo Armas regime was quite leery of Protestants. Part of this mistrust was provoked by the powerful pro-Catholic faction within Castillo's party, the Movimiento Liberación Nacional (MLN). The administration

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was also suspicious because of the large numbers of indigenous Protestants who had been active in the Arbenz reforms.

Although most of the missionaries themselves had taken no part in the reforms, and most had ardently opposed the radical government, they still fell under the watchful scrutiny of the new government. The Comité Nacional Pro-Defensa Contra El Comunismo monitored many of the missionaries' activities during 1954 and 1955. One missionary from the Presbyterian Church refused to write reports to his home board and instead sent back only newspaper clippings for information, out of fear of "eyes and ears of the Committee of Defense Against Communism." In some instances, new missionaries entering the country, particularly those associated with the Central American Mission, had to earn clearance from the Committee before the government would grant them entry visas.

To both Catholics and Protestants alike, the issue of politics and the new Catholic resurgence were clearly linked. In November 1954, a Nazarene writer complained in an open letter which appeared in the newspaper, El Imparcial:

We will know that the politics of the Vatican are against the Protestant missions, and the defamation of Protestants and restrictions on freedom of worship are

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469 Robert Thorpe to PBFM, 15 May 1955, IENP.

470 Stanley Wick to Stanley Rycroft, 7 July 1954, IENP.
conducted with the sympathy and the good will of the government, predisposing the attitude of the anti-communists against the evangelicals, and seeking the physical elimination of our ... works. 471

However, it was not the missionaries who bore the brunt of suspicion for the Protestant's relationship with the discredited regime. It was the indigenous Protestants in the staunchly Catholic Indian villages who suffered the most for their flirtation with the radical left when Castillo came to office. Within weeks after the new government took power, hostile villagers all over the highlands began to accuse the Protestants among them of being "communists, tricksters, and terrorists." 472

In the villages that surround Lake Atitlán, evangelicals who had prospered from business also were jailed as "communists." 473 In the village of Santiago Atitlán, the level of violence against Protestants was especially high, as local residents punished the evangelicals for being communists, and because they did not "participate in the world of Maximón," the deity of the local cofradía, or religious brotherhood.

By 1956, anti-Protestant activities had escalated. In September, following a particularly vicious attack on a Nazarene congregation in San Pedro Carchá, Alta Verapaz, in

473 Ibid.
which several people had been burned when angry villagers had set off rockets during a worship service, the Evangelical Synod, now the Alianza Evangélica, took action.

The alliance issued a statement to the editor of the daily newspaper, *El Imparcial*, denouncing the "acts of intolerance" which the Protestants had endured in recent years. The statement noted the fact that local authorities had been of little help in controlling the vigilante-like activities of Catholic villagers. It cited one example where the local *alcalde* had told some Nazarene pastors that "since it was difficult to stop the difficulties, it would be better if the Protestants did not meet publicly at all." In a strongly worded request, the statement called for the government to provide "energetic protection for ALL its citizens," including Protestants, so that Guatemala would "go forward to join the civilized nations."^474

Despite these problems, the late 1950s saw an unprecedented surge of new missionary activity in Guatemala. Between 1954 and 1956, two new mission agencies, the Church of the Four Square Gospel and the Source of Light Mission, started up programs in Guatemala. In addition, two groups that had made a hesitant entry into Guatemala during the Arbenz years increased their manpower and broadened their programs considerably during the second half of the decade.

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^474("Protesta contra hostilidades a los evangélicos," *El Imparcial*, 2 September 1956.)
The largest of these groups was the Wycliffe Bible Translators, known in Latin America as the Summer Institute of Linguistics, which had originally sent two missionaries into the country in 1952 to do linguistic work under contract to the Ministry of Education's National Indigenous Institute.\footnote{Informe anual del Instituto Lingüístico del Verano en Guatemala, 1983," Guatemala: Instituto Lingüístico del Verano, 1984), 7.} The other was a smaller agency called the Spanish American Inland Mission, which was run by some independent missionaries from Canada. By 1963, at least three more fundamentalist organizations and a number of short-term "thrust groups" had also entered the country.

These new groups, all of which were fundamentalist nondenominational "faith missions," suffered from none of the stigma of association with the ousted regime that established denominations endured during this period. To the contrary, these new fundamentalists went to Guatemala on the very crest of the Liberal era, for political as well as religious reasons. But where the cause in the early days had been dollar diplomacy, it was now anti-communism.

There were several reasons for the renewal of missionary interests in Guatemala in the late 1950s. First, the Arbenz affair had brought Guatemala to the attention of the general American public. Second, the closing off of Asia to foreign missionaries around this time forced American missions boards to funnel virtually all of their
resources into the western hemisphere. The third and most important reason for renewed missionary concern with Guatemala was ideological, and it reflected the conservative attitude in the United States as much as it complemented the current political climate in Guatemala.

Basically, the events in Guatemala in 1954 and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 had an enormous impact on the North American evangelical movement.

The new faith missions were vastly different from the established Protestant churches in Guatemala. They differed from the original churches in structure, purpose, and approach. Where the original churches were sectarian, the new churches were interdenominational. Where the traditional denominations engaged in a wide range of projects such as schools, clinics, and Indian missions, the new groups, with the exception of the Wycliffe Bible Translators, concentrated entirely on evangelization. Above all, where the established churches were divided on the question of politics, the new organizations were staunchly committed anti-communists.

Protestant missionaries were so concerned about the anti-Protestant tone of the new government that they sent an ecumenical delegation to the American Embassy in Guatemala City. Despite their pleas, the Constitution of 1955 rewarded the Roman Catholic Church for its efforts in the Arbenz overthrow with some of the most pro-clerical
legislation to appear since before the Liberal era. The Constitution granted the Church a juridic personality and the right to acquire and possess real property. It also permitted the establishment of new convents and the right for clergy to perform civil marriages.\textsuperscript{476} The new Constitution was easily the most pro-Catholic document to come from the government in nearly a century.

The established denominations supported the new groups and their anti-communist stance, which helped to erase much of the stigma left from the Arbenz years. Indeed, the established denominations quickly began to adopt the anti-communist rhetoric of the new missions.\textsuperscript{477} By the mid-1950s the new political attitudes were so pervasive that one CAM missionary requested of his home board that they "pray for the leaders of the . . . government. . . . They are maintaining a strict anti-communist attitude which is unmistakable and for which we praise the Lord.\textsuperscript{478}

The Presbyterian Church, like the other established churches, adopted a posture that was decidedly anti-communist and pro-democratic. Drawing from the idea that a democratically-run church laid the foundation for a democratic society, the Presbyterians during the 1960's

\textsuperscript{476}Mecham, \textit{Church and State in Latin America}, 320-321.

\textsuperscript{477}Ralph Winter, "¿Está perdida la iglesia en el tiempo actual? \textit{El Noticiero Evangélico} (n.d.), 16-17.

encouraged all evangelicals to become actively involved in politics. As early as 1963, an article in El Noticiero Evangélico outlined the need for political participation to native Presbyterians. The article exhorted:

The future government of Guatemala depends in large part on the evangelicals ... because in the Evangelical Church we learn democracy. We the evangelicals of Guatemala must recognize the responsibility that we have for the future of our beloved country. If we fail, perhaps communism will win or we will have a dictator. A Catholic country is accustomed to an autocratic government. Because of this, we say that democracy will not work in Guatemala unless it is by the evangelicals who are accustomed to the system. Spiritual and political salvation depends on the evangelicals. 

The Counterrevolution of 1954, born with ideological protection of the Catholic church in its anticommunist fight, interrupted and eventually reversed the reformist projects of Arbenz. A propagandist maneuver executed in "the name of God" and in defense of Christianity ended by covering up that which was nothing more than open foreign intervention into the internal affairs of Guatemala. Virginia Garrard Burnett asserts that the most significant trend to have emerged during the revolutionary period was "that native Protestants, having experienced a spiritual transformation, hoped to participate in the nation's political transformation." 


Corporate Visibility

After World War II, independent evangelical mission organizations were sending more and more missionaries even as the ecumenically minded denominational missions switched to mission strategies that employed fewer and fewer missionaries. In 1953, missions connected with the National Council of Churches fielded 9,844 missionaries, and explicitly evangelical or independent missions supported 9,296 missionaries. 481

The united evangelical campaign celebrated in 1957, that culminated in a magnificent parade of more than 20,000 persons, began to demonstrate the actual dimension of the evangelical community, until then considered tiny. However, it was the Evangelism In-Depth (Evangelismo a Fondo), that attracted the attention of the political power of the evangelical community.

The 1960s witnessed a flourishing of growth in the Protestant churches in Guatemala that was without precedent in the nearly one hundred years that missionaries had labored in the republic. In part, the surge of growth was due to the Latin American Mission crusade, which caused a momentary truce in interdenominational rivalries and

attracted converts through high-profile, modern methods of evangelization. The key to growth lay in the establishment of indigenous churches, where Guatemalans for the first time in the history of Protestant missions separated themselves from the foreign missionaries. Native Protestants began to worship in a form, usually Pentecostal in nature, which seemed to be untainted by association with foreign beliefs and personnel. In effect, during the 1960s, the sentiments of nationalism which had emerged during the revolutionary period were redirected from the political to the religious forum. As a result of what might be called this new "religious nationalism," the Protestant churches flourished as they never had before in Guatemala.

The growing numbers of Protestants made them a force to be reckoned with in Guatemalan society, and some politicians stated to take notice. Ydigoras Fuentes, the first popularly-elected president, boasted of his recognized political skill in presenting himself to the leadership of Evangelism-In-Depth as a pro-evangelical and anticommunist a few hours before crushing a military revolt.

From then on, the Evangelical church and its leaders obtained political visibility. Delivering Bibles to each government, participating in political campaigns, in lesser or greater degree, and presence at official functions and receiving favors on behalf of the authorities has been the
political recognition that the evangelical church has deserved.

Social Responsibility

Missionary efforts in Guatemala began to pay off in the late 1970s and early 1980s for a variety of reasons. First, on February 4, 1976, a massive earthquake which killed 20,000 persons and dislocated hundreds of thousands shook Guatemala to its foundation. This tragedy brought many missionaries to Guatemala, who administered humanitarian aid and evangelized at the same time. In 1975, the rate of Protestant growth hovered around seven percent. The earthquake gave the evangelicals' message an urgency which it had never before carried, and as a result, from 1976 on, Protestant growth in Guatemala soared.

Until 1976, the visibility of the Evangelical church at the national level was based on a purely evangelistic sense. It was only after the earthquake in February of 1976 that the evangelical community first involved itself in social action. It wasn't that the Evangelical church hadn't exercised its social responsibility, but after 1976 evangelicals integrated themselves in an organized form and at a national level in the reconstruction of the country.

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This is another sphere that goes with the spreading of the Gospel. Marco Tulio Cajas argues, "Preaching the message has never been neutral in the social context, but when it is accompanied by the delivery of material to the most needy, approaching the harsh social reality is inevitable."484

The tragedy that the country suffered mobilized, like never before, the assistance of the churches, foreign missions, and new organizations, among them Verbo church, that arrived in the country. In such an emergency situation, the churches volunteered material help to the homeless and the Evangelicals realized the situation of generalized poverty within the country. Some years later, the Commission of Social Responsibility was formed in 1983 under the direction of Dr. Emilio Antonio Núñez. But the church had already had its great lesson in service and love that it needed.

Naturally, the labors of the Commission also eventually turned to the theme of political responsibility, which was then a new theme for evangelicals. Some prominent Evangelicals had already been elected to National Congress, such as the Presbyterian Angel Martínez, but a teaching with respect to political participation had still not been articulated.

The Commission on Social Responsibility was founded to counteract the perception among Evangelicals that "politics is sinful," and to demonstrate that Evangelicals have a legitimate role to play in the public square. The Commission consisted of a small group of pastors, church leaders, and Evangelical professionals who hold seminars on political topics and publish position papers. Through the dedicated efforts of one of its members, Doctor Miguel Cadera, the Commission issued some publications to stimulate in the general public the debate over these themes that were beginning to generate interest among Evangelical leaders.

**Ríos Montt (March 1982-August 1983)**

On March 23, 1982, a coup led by high military officers unseated the government of Romeo Lucas García and placed a military junta at the head of government. The leader of the junta was a retired general and former defrauded presidential candidate, General José Efraín Ríos Montt, who would shortly declare himself president. On the night of the coup, Ríos Montt addressed the world on Guatemalan national television. "I am trusting my Lord and King, that He shall guide me," he proclaimed. "Because only He gives and takes away authority." 486

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485 Interview with Stephen Sywulka.

Ríos Montt was an evangelical born-again Christian, and a member of a Pentecostal sect called Verbo, a mission of the fundamentalist, California-based organization called Gospel Outreach. Gospel Outreach was a product of the "Jesus freak" movement of the early 1970s. It had originated as an experiment in communal living, but had evolved over the years into a rigorous and conservative fundamentalist denomination. Though it had a small following in the United States, its strict, Pentecostal, fundamentalist message had attracted an enormous following in Guatemala.

Ríos Montt had converted to the church in 1975, when he was in a period of despondency over having been denied the presidency in the 1974 election. When the office eventually became his, Ríos Montt's membership in the church overshadowed his entire period of rule. The day Ríos Montt took office, one elder of Verbo stated:

We feel a great door has been opened. We don't understand what is going to happen, but he will be operating with a power that is not like men's corrupting power. He is going to have an anointing from God. \(^{487}\)

Ironically, Ríos Montt's religious affiliations had little or nothing to do with his political ascendancy. His elevation to office in the 1982 coup came about in large part because of his popularity in the 1974 elections. In 1984, 1.

\(^{487}\) *Time*, 5 May 1982, 30.
that election, Ríos Montt had run on the Christian
Democratic ticket—as a Roman Catholic—and had won some
fifty-six percent of the vote, although a faction of the
army had annulled the results and turned the office over to
General Kjell Langerud García. Indeed, many of the military
officers who supported Ríos Montt in the coup were
completely unaware of his religious beliefs.

Evangelicals have been in the political limelight ever
since Ríos Montt, a conservative, anti-communist, military
general assumed the presidency in March 1982. On a
fundamental level, the presidency of Efraín Ríos Montt
represented just how ubiquitous the Protestant faith had
become in Guatemala—at least the brand of Protestantism
that began in the republic in the late 1950s and that has
spiraled in popularity since 1976. By their own admission,
Guatemalan Evangelical leaders had until then avoided the
"dirty arena" of politics. The events of March 1982
startled them; they felt God had "called" their Evangelical
brother to the presidency, and respecting him as a "man of
God," they supported him. One observer noted:

Most evangelicals were evangelicals before they
were [social or political activists]. They felt
their first loyalty was to an evangelical
President. . . . the Protestants had always been
a minority in Guatemala, so they united behind
Ríos Montt as someone who could bring them into
the forefront for the first time in their
history. 488

488Garrard-Burnett, "The History of Protestantism in
Guatemala," 225.
When Ríos Montt looked to the Evangelical community for counsel, despite their previous discomfort with political activity, Evangelical leaders felt they could not refuse to help. The greatest show of support for Ríos Montt's administration occurred in the fall of 1982. That year marked the one-hundredth anniversary of the arrival of the first Protestant missionaries in Guatemala. The climax of the celebrations came in October 1982 when more than 500,000 Guatemalans crowded into the Campo de Marte in Guatemala City to hear Argentine Luis Palau lavish praise upon Ríos Montt's "miracle."

Ríos Montt initiated the process towards democratization and civilian rule in Guatemala. But his controversial "beans and guns" program of pacification of the rural areas during some of the worst violence of the early 1980s led to charges that he was overseeing a slaughter of Mayans. Moreover, his evening television broadcasts, when he would openly preach to the nation and encourage conversion to a personal relationship with Christ, were an affront to those who felt religion and politics should not mix (at least not Protestant religion and politics in this predominately Catholic country).

The State Council

One of Ríos Montt's most enduring legacies to democratization in Guatemala was the creation of his
political advisory organ known as the State Council. This council was originally rejected by the parties in great measure as a result of the limited participation that they had been conceded. However, after consulting with the general over the proposed political regulation, the State Council elaborated three projects of law and sent them to the Executive. The so-called "pre-electoral laws" were the following: (a) 30-83 Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; (b) Law 31-83, the Citizen Registration Law; and (c) Law 32-83, the Political Organizations Law.

The existing electoral administrative structure which was in place when the coup occurred in March 1982 had been implemented by the military government in 1965, and was accepted by the constituents of the era. This structure was very dependent upon the Executive office. In effect, from 1965 until 1982, an electoral registry that constituted the permanent organ on political and electoral matters functioned was directed by a person who was appointed by the president. The absence of independence of the Registry and the pressure it was able to exert on the electoral Council, converted these organs into accomplices in the manipulation of the popular election processes and they eventually lost credibility.

The Law 30-83 created the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, a permanent organ, autonomous in functions and budget, with jurisdiction in all of the republic and without any formal
submission to any state authority or organ. The Citizens Registration established by the Law 31-83, is constituted in the technical office of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and is responsible for the supervision and financing for registering citizens. It was also responsible for issuing of a Neighborhood Schedule, an identification card used for voting purposes. Guatemalan citizens and political parties were suspicious of the link of the Identification Card with the Ministry of Defense and they criticized the fact that the identification card was to replace the traditional voter identification document.

The Electoral Register also worked with the creation of the voters census and relative to the registering of parties, political organizations, and candidates. The new regulation over electoral authorities and the integration of the Supreme Tribunal, after a careful selection of some notables, stamped the opening process with the required credibility.

The Law 32-83 established the foundational regulation for political parties. It eliminated the traditional prohibition for the organization and functioning of "communist and totalitarian organizations," applied since the Constitution of 1956, that had been utilized to block the formation of groups that disagreed with the interests of the groups in power, and to persecute their leaders and sympathizers. It also reduced the number of affiliates
needed to be recognized as a political party from 50,000 to 4,000, and demanded that all should know how to read and write. It established the requirement that political parties be organized in at least 50 municipalities and 12 departments. It also established as a major hierarchical organ the National Assembly, and the National Executive Committee as an organ and permanent leadership. These norms provided a common and homogenous structure for party organizations and made the internal functioning of the parties more democratic.

Since these laws were enacted, political parties and political candidates have proliferated in Guatemala. Since that time 25 new political parties representing parties on both the left and the right have been formed, and the number of candidates in presidential elections have grown from 4 in 1982 to 19 running for president in the first round of the presidential elections on November 12, 1995.

The significance of the Protestant work in Guatemala was simply that the Ríos Montt administration served to illustrate how far the Protestant faith had become woven into the social and political fabric of the republic by 1982. In a sense, Ríos Montt epitomized the main body of


\[490\text{Ibid., 21.}\]
Guatemala's Protestants. Like most Guatemalan *evangélicos* he was a relatively new convert, a Pentecostal, and active in a church which had opened in the country after the 1976 earthquake.

The Protestant centennial proved to be the single show of public support for the Ríos Montt administration during his seventeen months in power, but this display of evangelical strength along with the direction that the President's programs had taken worried the Catholic hierarchy. Some evangelical leaders felt that the enormous show of public support at the centennial suggested that the evangelical could, if mobilized, become a lasting base of political support. Some talk even circulated about the possible formation of a political party built around an "evangelical agenda," somewhat along the lines of a Protestant Christian Democratic Party. The President's brother, Mario Enrique Ríos Montt, bishop of the Diocese of Escuintla, articulated Catholic fears succinctly. "What is going on in Guatemala may have grave consequences," he warned. "It could well turn into a religious war more serious than our own political war."491 Because of this, when General Mejía Víctores took power in August 1983, the Roman Catholic hierarchy embraced the coup and proclaimed a rededication to Catholics on precisely August 15, 1983, a day of traditional celebration in the Catholic faith.

An Evangelical Government?

The ouster of Ríos Montt had surprisingly little effect on the growth of Protestantism in Guatemala. During the weeks immediately following the coup, there was a brief period of bad blood between the Protestant community and other Guatemalans. Ríos Montt's presidency had little effect on the growth one way or the other of the Protestant church in Guatemala. Servicio Evangelizador Para América Latina (SEPAL), a databank for national Protestant work estimated that the rate for church growth only increased and decreased negligibly with Ríos Montt's political fortunes. Only Verbo suffered a noticeable decline in membership when 500 people left the church after the coup.

In terms of Protestant growth, however, the Ríos Montt administration did no more than illustrate the fact that over the preceding decade, so many Guatemalans had converted to Protestantism and were present at so many levels of society, that one of their number could happen to occupy the office of the presidency. Ríos Montt's religion played no role in his rise to power, and had little to do with his overthrow.

The fall of the Ríos Montt government in August 1983 was not without some implications for the Evangelical church. The contents of the same proclamation issued by the Army revealed that it had removed Ríos Montt because of "his religious fanaticism" and the presence of elders from Verbo
Church in the government. The charge of evangelical political railroading was overstated, for despite the evangelical tone of the Ríos Montt administration, no one from Verbo outside of the President and his two advisors had held any pivotal position in government, nor had any high-ranking military officer been an evangelical Christian. The President of the Council of State under Ríos Montt was an evangelical, but he belonged to Elim which had a history of notoriously hostile relations with Verbo. Ríos Montt's "personal representative" also was a member of a Protestant church, but belonged to a denomination which fell on the other side of the mainline Pentecostal denomination.

Despite the fact that Ríos Montt had been replaced the year before, in that religious-political atmosphere, a dozen evangelicals were elected to the Constituent Assembly the following year. Although despite several differences, this group maintained certain cohesion and their participation did not reflect a true evangelical contribution.492

However, such a tense atmosphere culminated in problems for some churches and institutions. In August 1983, a few days after the coup against Ríos Montt, an emergency meeting was called in the offices of World Vision. There, the Coordinating Commission of the Guatemalan Evangelical Church (COCIEG) with representatives from the Evangelical Alliance, the Missions Council, including Elim, the Guatemalan

492Ibid., 18.
Ministers and Pastors Association and the Western Pastors Association was formed. This new interdenominational committee released a historical document known as the "COCIEG Manifesto" which stated that the Evangelical church never had ruled, nor was it looking to do so, and that, as much it demanded respect for religious freedom in the country. A member of the commission personally delivered this Manifesto to the Chief of State, General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores. In the words of a director of the Evangelical Alliance, "It was the first time that we went to the Presidential Palace not to give out Bibles, nor to ask for nothing but to demand our rights."493

This approach to the legal political forces in the country has not reduced the established power. Also in September 1985, a delegation from the Evangelical Alliance attended the dialogue between the Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity and the Religious Sector of the National Commission of Reconciliation in Quito, Ecuador. In that historic meeting, the Evangelical church presented in private the position of the Evangelical church to the leadership of the URNG demanding the end of the war and the respect for the evangelical identity, abandoning the stereotypes of "foreign sects" with those who had wanted to underestimate the

presence of the evangelical community that approaches almost a quarter of the total population.

The 1985 Presidential Election

Jorge Serrano Elías's candidacy in the 1985 presidential election marked the first time in Guatemalan history that an evangelical was running for president. Serrano Elías, who had occupied the presidency of the State Council during the Ríos Montt administration, captured the support of the evangelical leadership when he ran for office in 1984.

The Catholic church reacted with force and proclaimed its support of the Christian Democratic candidate, Vinicio Cerezo. The political campaign was emotional in religious-political terms because the Catholic church blamed Serrano for wanting to provoke a religious war. In the long run, the argument appeared so convincing that it discouraged a large number of the evangelical vote for Serrano, and caused him to lose a portion of the Catholic vote, and he came in a disappointing third in the elections. Serrano's party, an alliance of the Democratic Party of National Cooperation (PDCN) and the Revolutionary Party, only managed to capture 13.8% of the vote.\(^{494}\) It was concluded from this experience that the major obstacle facing an Evangelical presidential candidate was the lack of a unified support base among the Evangelical churches. It was also concluded

\(^{494}\)Serrano Elías finished third behind Vinicio Cerezo (38.59%) and Jorge Carpio Nicolle (20.28%).
that apparently, the disunity among the churches was greater than the attraction of having an Evangelical president for the first time.

In 1984, the Guatemalan Civic Organization was born as a support unit for Jorge Serrano Elias’s presidential campaign. It’s campaign slogan, "only a new man can do new things," had an implicit message for Evangelicals. The OCG, as it is known by its Spanish acronym, finally became a national organization with evangelicals from all denominations. Of those who won positions in the 1985 elections, Dr. Miguel Angel Montepueque, who became a congressman from Santa Rosa, stands out. But it wasn’t until 1990 when Marco Aurelio Reyes, and businessman Rudy Reyes, a member of the first Executive Council of OCG, won seats by popular election. The OCG maintained itself until 1989 as a non-partisan political association. From its bosom emerged a group lead by Abigail Morataya that constituted the original Guatemalan Reform Party, or Partido Reformador Guatemalteco (PREG).

In the presidential election itself, no candidate gained a majority of the vote, but Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian Democrats outdistanced Jorge Carpio Nicolle of the UCN, with almost 39 percent of the vote to Carpio's 20 percent. As no candidate had a majority, a run-off

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between those top candidates was scheduled for December 8, 1985. In the congressional elections, the Christian Democrats won a slim majority of seats.\textsuperscript{496}

Between the two rounds of the presidential election, political debate centered on two issues. The first was an allegation by the MLN that the first round of voting had been fraudulent. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The second centered on the run-off instructions for the losing parties to give their adherents. The PSD, PR, and PNR announced their support for the Christian Democrats. Except for the MLN, the parties of the right released their voters, suggesting that they vote for the candidate of their choosing. After the MLN's allegation of fraud had been rejected, its leadership urged its voters to cast blank or null ballots.

**Election 1990**

The first round of the 1990 national election took place on November 11, and the runoff between the top two finishers on January 6, 1991. At stake were the presidency as well as most of Guatemala's elective positions. Besides the presidency, 116 deputies were elected to the National Congress (eighty-seven from Guatemala's twenty-two departments and the Central District, Guatemala City, and twenty-nine on national slates). Municipal-level elections

\textsuperscript{496}Ibid., 71.
were held in three hundred localities, and voters elected twenty deputies to the new Central American Parliament. There were 4.4 million people eligible to vote (i.e., 18 years or older), of whom 3.2 million were registered. Approximately 50 percent of younger Guatemalans (ages 18-30) did not register. Guatemala City accounted for almost 20 percent of those registered voters, but overall, 65 percent of those registered lived in rural areas.

Perhaps the most interesting development during the election was the presidential campaign of retired General Efraín Ríos Montt. Ríos Montt was nominated as a presidential candidate by the Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco--FRG), a coalition created for the elections, which included the PID, long identified as a vehicle for the Army's more violent and corrupt elements, and a smaller party, the National Front for Unity (Frente de Unidad Nacional--FUN).

The uniqueness of the Ríos Montt campaign lay in the constitutional questions it forced the country's institutions to resolve. The Constitution of 1985 clearly excludes from the presidency any individual who became chief of state as a result of a coup d'etat, as he did in 1982.


498 Ibid.
Ríos Montt was denied a place on the ballot by election officials when he tried to register as a candidate in August. He appealed but his appeals were rejected in turn by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, The Guatemalan Supreme Court, and the Court of Constitutionality. The ruling also extended to the coalition's candidates for the Central American Parliament, since these were the national-level contests and the candidates had been linked to the Ríos Montt-Whitbeck tandem from the beginning of the registration and appeals processes.

However, despite being declared ineligible to run, throughout the presidential campaign and his appeals, his candidacy gained in overall popularity. In a mid-October poll, for example, Ríos Montt was the leading candidate, receiving 33 percent, while Jorge Carpio (UCN) received 21 percent, Elver Airs (PAN) received 13 percent, Jorge Serrano (MA) 11 percent, and the Christian Democrats less than 11 percent. In the same poll, when asked what they would do if Ríos Montt were not allowed to run, respondents most often supported Ríos Montt's associate in the early and mid-1980s, Jorge Serrano.

As a result of the court's ruling on Ríos Montt, Guatemala approached the campaign's final weeks without the most popular candidate (although he never garnered more than

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499 Ibid., 145.

500 Ibid.
one-third of the support in any poll). All candidates were generally disliked, perhaps because of the "sameness of their platforms and the violence-choked political debate." 501

Jorge Carpio Nicolle, the newspaper publisher, spent heavily in a five-year presidential campaign preceding the 1990 presidential election. Meanwhile, Jorge Serrano Elías had run a low budget campaign and barely registered in the polls until the fall when the Supreme Tribunal had declared Ríos Montt ineligible to run. Serrano Elías had been an important functionary during the repressive Ríos Montt regime and had profited from his association with the Ríos Montt campaign throughout 1990. Indeed, Serrano Elías averred that he had entered the campaign in case his "mentor," General Ríos Montt, were to be disqualified. 502

Because of this association, Serrano was installed as the early favorite in the run-off even though he and Carpio had finished virtually even in the first round of the elections. 503 He was also installed as the favorite to win the January 6, 1991 runoff, in part due to the electoral strength of Guatemalan Protestant Evangelicals. After Ríos Montt was disqualified, Serrano, the only conservative


502 Grunson, "Right-Wing Protestant," 3(A).

evangelical candidate, surged in the polls. Political analysts in Guatemala said that though Serrano Elías had not emphasized religion during the campaign, it would probably help him in the runoff. One said, "There's a significant portion of the evangelical population that will rally around him [Serrano Elías], even though the Protestant community here [does] not [have] a disciplined and well-organized base."504 Some worried that the runoff would be marred by religious recriminations. Carlos Riedel, a foreign policy adviser to Jorge Carpio Nicolle, stated, "I do not rule out that somebody, the Catholic Church, will bring it up."505

During the campaign, Carpio portrayed Serrano Elías as an incompetent businessman and a religious fanatic. But in contrast to the 1985 presidential election, in which Serrano emphasized his evangelicalism, this time he played down his fundamentalism and portrayed himself as an anti-politician.

Serrano was also likely to gain the votes of Alvaro Arzú, the former mayor of Guatemala, who ran third and was a rival of Carpio Nicolle. Serrano Elías was so confident that he would win the runoff he announced that he would name a presidential transition team the day he finished second in the first round of elections. He exclaimed, "This is an


505 Ibid.
earthquake."\(^{506}\) Jorge Skinner Lee, a senior Nationalist Centrist Union (UCN) congressman who was reelected acknowledged, "Serrano trounced us."\(^{507}\) Luis Salazar, one of Serrano's aides exclaimed, "The Lord has spoken. There's the hand of God here."\(^{508}\) Even the press seemed to sense the magnitude of Serrano's strong showing in the first round of elections. Indeed, one of the daily newspapers, *La Hora*, wrote: "Serrano's stunning show has turned the political landscape of the country on its head."\(^{509}\)

Both candidates pledged to continue the dialogue structure process. Serrano was perceived as more willing to dialogue, since he had been an active member of the National Dialogue structure in 1989, and had participated in their 1990 meeting in Spain. Serrano announced his willingness to dialogue informally before the January 6 run-off election. On January 6, 1991, consistent with poll predictions, voters elected Jorge Serrano Elías to the presidency for a five-year term beginning January 13, 1991. He won the runoff by a two-to-one-margin receiving 68 percent of the vote to 32 percent for Carpio Nicolle.\(^{510}\) Serrano thereby became the

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\(^{506}\) Ibid.


\(^{508}\) Hockstader, "Evangelical Positioned to Win," 12(A).

\(^{509}\) Ibid.

\(^{510}\) INCEP, "Guatemala: Elecciones Generales 1995," 8; Also see Grunson, "Right-Wing Protestant Elected President of
first Protestant to be elected president of the predominantly Roman Catholic, Latin American country.\textsuperscript{511}

In the Guatemalan context, however, to argue that popular support for general Ríos Montt during the campaign meant a general desire for authoritarian rule ignores many important dimensions. It is fallacious to conclude that distaste for the traditional parties and military hierarchy equals distaste for democracy. Such reasoning ignores the significance of the activities of the country's popular organizations and of the National Dialogue process. In 1990, responding to their history and taking advantage of the opportunity, even if limited, directly provided by elections, Guatemalans voted to sweep out the traditional parties and elected the candidate least involved in a conventional party, Jorge Serrano Elías. And they voted for candidates who at least apparently supported the National Dialogue, a process fraught with antimilitary implications. The history of nonrepresentation by parties and the brutality of the military provides ample evidence of voter rationality.\textsuperscript{512}

Electoral results have implications for the role of the armed forces. In the 1984 and 1985 elections the best interpretation of voting behavior was that it was a

\textsuperscript{511}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{512}Trudeau, \textit{Guatemalan Politics}, 150-151.
repudiation of the military's role in society.\textsuperscript{513} In 1990, a similar interpretation is reasonable. Both winners in the first round "succeeded as businessmen before turning to politics, lack ties to the country's political past and owe no power debts to the military".\textsuperscript{514} Moreover, the eventual victory of Jorge Serrano is significant because of his links to General Ríos Montt: Ríos Montt has been at odds with the ruling military hierarchy since 1974, when he won the presidential election but was prevented from taking office by a military clique that subsequently sent him to Spain as ambassador. In 1982, the coup d'etat that installed him in power overturned the traditional military hierarchy, and in 1990, his campaign was opposed by the military establishment. To some extent a vote for Serrano was a vote against the military.

\textbf{The Pluralist Vision}

The Evangelicals' political savvy has matured since the early days of Ríos Montt, and Evangelicals have acknowledged that they have learned some lessons. The most important concerns the value of political pluralism. In years past, Evangelicals assumed that their best political strategy was


to create a unified movement or party behind one chosen candidate. But this approach tended to alienate many voters. Marco Tulio Cajas, a middle-class evangelical who formerly headed the Guatemalan Civic Organization (OCG), explains how the Evangelicals' strategy has changed.

Cajas was Jorge Serrano's campaign manager in the 1985 Presidential election, and, like most other Evangelicals, was surprised by Serrano's dismal showing. Cajas realized that his candidate's chief failure was his imitation of Ríos Montt's earlier self-styled image as God's "anointed" political leader for Guatemala, as the Christian candidate. Having absorbed this lesson, Evangelical political leaders began to counsel their candidates in the 1990s to avoid making narrow religious appeals and to refrain from employing messianic language about their candidacies. Furthermore, Cajas remembers how pleased Evangelicals were to have three candidates in the race, thereby suggesting an acceptance and appreciation for pluralism. The OCG, a non-partisan roundtable of Evangelicals, reflected this attitude: it met regularly with political leaders from many different parties to discuss pressing issues. Though several of the OCG's members were sympathetic to Ríos Montt or to Serrano, the organization as a whole gave no endorsements.

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515Interview with Marco Tulio Cajas, Guatemala City, June 16, 1994.
Critics might argue that this evolution reveals only that Evangelicals have become more sophisticated in politics, not that they have a newfound commitment to pluralism. But Cajas argues differently. His democratic commitments stem from a religiously-informed, "Federalist Papers" defense of democracy. He supports democracy as the form of government best suited to the reality of human falleness and the need to keep power limited, divided, and accountable. His defense of pluralism is linked to his understanding of the need for a strong civil government to buttress strong democratic institutions. Other evangelicals are less sophisticated in their support for democracy. For many of them, political participation is less a theoretical exercise than simply a way to promote honest, "clean" government and support political leaders who are expected to uphold the rule of law impartially.

Meanwhile, Cajas continues to press for a "maturation" among Guatemalan Evangelicals in understanding their civic responsibilities. He cites the participation of the Evangelical Alliance, a national group of Evangelicals representing most of the Protestant denominations, in the peace talks between Guatemala's leftist guerrillas and the current government as a great step forward in this regard.

Manuel Conde, a young, articulate Evangelical from a family of political leaders, was the Alliance's delegate to
the talks. He later became the chief government negotiator with the guerrillas under President Jorge Serrano. He agrees with Cajas that the Evangelical community has learned important lessons about political participation, and that Protestants are unlikely to retreat from political activism despite their ambiguous experiences with the political limelight during Ríos Montt's and Jorge Serrano's presidencies. Speaking shortly after the May, 1993 coup in Guatemala and Serrano's exile, which embarrassed many Evangelicals, Conde said:

In the Evangelical community today there is a new vision of politics. The two political experiences at the highest levels of government have not been very good for the church. But we are convinced that the presence of Evangelicals is needed in the political sphere. We need political reform in Guatemala, and the Evangelicals are able to do much to help in this. The Evangelical community is assuming more responsibility regarding life in this world; before the emphasis was more on life in the next. The Evangelical church is learning about participating.

Conde believes that the Evangelical Church learned from Ríos Montt's tenure not to place evangelicals exclusively in positions of influence and counsel. In Conde's opinion, the Verbo Church was far too influential during Ríos Montt's presidency, when opinions and input of other groups ought to

516 Interview with Manuel Conde, Guatemala City. Conde's tragic personal history seems to symbolize the tumults of Guatemalan politics and perhaps has especially suited him to the task of peace-maker. His father was a Congressman who was assassinated by the military; his grandfather has served as President of the Congress until he was killed by the guerrillas.

517 Ibid.
have been sought. By contrast, Serrano went too far the other way, strictly limiting the participation and leadership of evangelicals, leaving very few Protestants in his administration.

In the 1970s, Bryan Roberts, an American sociologist studied two marginal areas of Guatemala City to determine the social significance of Protestant groups. He concluded that although political participation was low in Pentecostal groups, evangelical membership was one of the means by which individuals could climb socially and overcome the problems of urban life better than Catholics. Cajas maintains that "it isn't strange then that 20 years later, second- and third-generation evangelicals are showing interest in political participation as a result of their new social status or as bearers of the interests of the class to which they belong."\(^{518}\)

This last factor shouldn't go unnoticed, without understanding that the Evangelical citizen is not someone "sent from heaven," that he occupies a social-economic position which he necessarily takes into consideration while deriving at a political stance.

Naturally, social ascent providing a better education and a better economic position, one must recognize also the personal prestige of some evangelicals that have occupied

positions by nomination or by popular election. It would be a long list if all the evangelicals who have been active in Guatemalan politics were named.

The failed experience of 1985 in obtaining the first evangelical president caused disenchantment, especially in some Pentecostal groups that had been supporting political preferences with prophecies and visions. This appeared to counsel political equanimity and evangelical caution. Therefore, the evangelical churches during the 1990 election, unlike in 1985, demonstrated less visible support for any of the evangelical presidential candidates.

Evangelicals have occupied positions in practically every party, including Serrano Elías and Ríos Montt. Although they both formed a part of the same government in 1982-1983, they competed separately in 1991. To them are added Fernando Leal and businessman Kurt Meyer, presidential candidates of Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR). The Secretary General of this party, Renán Quiñónez, was an active member of Verbo. In the Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN), Oliverio García Rodas, is a member of El Camino, and in the organization of the city campaign was Luis Angel Bolaños, former leader of INTECAP and member of Belén church.

The hierarchy of the Catholic church again reacted violently about a religious war, this time opposing the legal registration of Ríos Montt. Although he led all
public opinion polls, his intentions to run failed against the combined forces of the Cerezo government, the extreme right, and the militant Catholic church.

The campaign was converted into a duel between the candidacy of Ríos Montt and all the other forces combined. When the popularity of Ríos Montt secured his victory if they would let him participate, even the clandestine Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo--PGT) opposed his candidacy. The formal argument was based on the application of an article of the Constitution while Ríos Montt and his followers were claiming their human rights. The arguments were prolonged and passionate, even among the evangelicals. In the center of the controversy it was debated whether the people had the right to elect whomever they wanted.

But in this campaign, neither the speeches or strategy of Ríos Montt nor Serrano Elías appealed directly to the Evangelicals. However, a third current emerged, the theory of "The government of God," based on an articulated position with biblical principles. Called "reconstructionism," that looks for principles of government in the Old Testament, this current has been the only position known in Guatemalan media that responds to the questions of political theory. Again, the polls showed that the religious factor was practically irrelevant in preferences.
The religious theme was used again by the opponents of the Serrano Elías campaign. However, Catholic Committees, paid advertisements and political declarations didn't prevent Serrano Elías from being elected. The election of Serrano Elías inaugurated a new stage in Guatemalan history and in the political task of the evangelicals in influencing the policy of the country.

Congressional Elections of August, 1994

A wide spectrum of churches were represented by evangelical candidates in the Congressional elections of 1994. Among those running were ex-president Efrain Ríos Montt, Marco Tulio Cajas, who had managed Jorge Serrano Elías' unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1985, and Miguel Angel Pappa. Many of the early polls showed that almost 31% of the population would have voted for Ríos Montt for president had he been able to run. On the basis of Ríos Montt's popularity, the FRG won 28.3% of the vote. The FRG gained 32 seats of the 80 seats in the new Congress (40% of the seats). The party also won 4 of the 9 seats in the capitol with Partido Avanzada Nacional (PAN) capturing the other 5 seats. The FRG fielded

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519 Prensa Libre (Guatemala City), 9 June 1994, 2.


521 Karl Arevalo V., "FRG logra 32 curules y el PAN 24," Prensa Libre, (Guatemala City), 16 August 1994, 2.
representatives in 11 of the 16 departments. Moreover, evangelicals filled 20 of the 80 seats which is almost identical to the percentage of evangelicals in the general population. Sixteen of the seats were captured by members of Verbo. Casting a pall on the results of the election however was the fact that only 18.5 percent of the eligible voters participated in the elections.

It is significant that Verbo captured 16 of the 20 contested seats in the new Congress. Marco Tulio Cajas considers "the leadership of Verbo as having the most advanced political thought concerning Christian participation in politics."

The 1995 Presidential Elections

Most analysts predicted that Alvaro Arzu of PAN would win the election on November 12. The greatest challenge to a PAN victory was from Alfonso Portillo Cabrera of the FRG. PAN is considered the second-most important political party in Guatemala (behind the DCG). Although most consider PAN a conservative, modernizing party, Arzu was unable to win the confidence of traditional sectors of the business community. As ex-Mayor of Guatemala City (PAN continues to control the

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522 Ibid.

523 Mario Antonio Sandoval, "Las cifras de la elección," Prensa Libre (Guatemala City) 12 August 1994, 10.

524 Interview with Marco Tulio Cajas, Guatemala City, June 16, 1994.
mayor's office), his party is largely urban based. Both the conservative agro-export sector and a large part of the rural population, however, showed a preference for Ríos Montt.

PAN leaders had hoped that if Ríos Montt were excluded from running the popularity of the FRG would diminish, since the FRG's appeal is directly related to the general's candidacy. At the same time, the widely expressed fears of a Ríos Montt candidacy, especially from political groups from the center and center-left, were expected to be harvested by PAN. With this in mind, PAN leaders quietly began approaching progressive leaders in Guatemala to form a united front against Ríos Montt. One of the reasons PAN did not win much support from other parties is that it refused to consider giving the formal electoral alliances shared billing. Anyone interested in PAN had to trade in their party affiliation for the PAN logo.

PAN's two selling points were that Arzú was not Ríos Montt and that, while the party was a major force in the congressional politics in the past, its members kept their noses relatively clean in the midst of scandalous levels of corruption.

The danger for PAN lay in the fact that much of its support came from a modernizing business sector that feared both Ríosmonttismo and progressive alternatives. A move to the left could have jeopardized this backing, and forced a
decision between authoritarianism and structural reform, in which case class allegiance would have most likely prevailed.

What appeared to be a two-way race for the presidency between PAN and FRG, became a three-way contest. The Christian Democrat Party (DCG), the National Centrist Union (UCN), and the Social Democrat Party (PSD), in mid-April formed an electoral coalition in the hope of creating a center-left front that would attract all those who feared a victory by the FRG. Immediately after the announcement of the new alliance, 8 of the 12 DCG congressional deputies abandoned the party, and began negotiations with the FRG. At the same time, at least one of the UCN deputies quit the party, which is already torn by internal power disputes following the June 1993 assassination of its founder and leader Jorge Carpio Nicolle. The PSD, also suffering from internal problems, has no presence in the current Congress.

While some political analysts viewed the triple alliance as the best vehicle for defeating Ríos Montt and moving forward a progressive agenda, the legacy of corruption and opportunism weighed heavily in any assessment of their credibility. Both UCN and DCG deputies were among the "purgeables" within the congress that was forced out of office in elections in August, 1994.

The triple alliance named Fernando Andrade Díaz-Durán, who was foreign minister under the Christian Democrat
government, its presidential candidate. Andrade Díaz-Durán had the confidence of important sectors in the army and was reportedly on friendly terms with one of the URNG commandantes. Díaz-Durán was considered an important player in the transition from military rule to a civilian-elected government although his nomination as foreign minister was at the military's behest. Human rights groups, however, distrusted Díaz-Durán, citing his ties to the military, and one human rights advocate said Andrade Díaz-Durán had access to clandestine jails in the early 1980's.

The outcome of the elections largely depended on the ability of parties to activate the immense majority of voters who refused to cast their ballots in recent elections. In the congressional elections of August 1994 only 18% of the electorate voted.

Moreover, all three of the parties had a reputation of being willing to compromise with whoever is in power. The PSD had formed an alliance with ex-President Jorge Serrano, whose attempt to close down congress, the supreme court, and to muzzle the press led to his removal in May 1993. The Christian Democrats in the past have made alliances with Serrano, and Ríos Montt, and are widely perceived as having led a corrupt government that failed to confront military influence and investigate human rights abuses.

Political analysts consider the Christian Democrat alliance with the FRG in 1994--which led to Ríos Montt's
election as President of Congress—to be part of a strategy to weaken PAN, which the DCG considers its principal enemy. DCG Secretary General Alfonso Cabrera had also come out in favor of Ríos Montt's right to run for President of the Republic, which would have divided the conservative vote, and improved the chances for a center-left coalition.

As it stood, little had changed that could have raised voter interest, since the options ranged from a "center-left" alliance of parties known for opportunism and corruption; a relatively honest, yet conservative and urban-based party that did not address pressing issues of land tenure, indigenous autonomy and military impunity; and an "old-testament-style" authoritarian party with an ex-military dictator as its candidate.

What could have sparked the interest of the silent "majority" would have been constitutional reforms resulting from the peace negotiations, the participation of the URNG in the election process, and the position taken by popular movement and indigenous groups. In the past, most of these sectors called for abstention from elections, arguing that no political parties provided options that favored their interests. Leaders from the DCG-PSD-UCN alliance has met with URNG leaders to discuss the possibility of an alliance.

In a surprising development, the Revolutionary Party (PR) switched its name to the New Guatemala Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala--FDNG. The FDNG was at
a distinct disadvantage in the November elections however since it was late entering into the presidential race and didn't decide on its candidate, economist Jorge del Valle, until August 28.\textsuperscript{525} Nevertheless, the participation of the popular movement at its core gives it an as yet unquantifiable potential to mobilize support.

The Executive committee of the FDNG consisted of academics Antonio Móbil, Héctor de León and Mariela Aguilar; human rights activists Nineth Montenegro, Rosalina Tuyuc and Factor Méndez; trade unionists Otto Zeizing and Miguel Angel Albizúrez; women's rights activist Edna Rodríguez, along with leaders of small political organizations Victor Hugo Godoy, Mario Alfonso Bravo, and José Cruz.

The FDNG compared itself with the broad-based appeal of the Workers Party (PT) in Brazil and the African National Congress in South Africa. Some of its members also hearken back to the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution, the "democratic spring" when different social sectors united to replace an obsolete authoritarianism with a decade of social, economic, and political reform.

Several other candidates surfaced late in the campaign, although none of them had broad support. Most notable among those candidates was retired General Héctor Alejandro Gramajo Morales. Just weeks after announcing his candidacy,

\textsuperscript{525}"Partido Revolucionario cambia de nombre y de símbolo," \textit{Prensa Libre} (Guatemala City), 26 August 1995, 8.
this Harvard-educated ex-Defense Minister was ordered by a U.S. court to pay 47 million dollars in damages to eight victims of human rights violations that took place while he was an army official. Although in Guatemala it is hard to say whether such a ruling favored or hurt his campaign, Gramajo, as a "moderate" military man, suffered from both labels. Those who want a moderate look for a civilian, while those who favor a military leader are not happy with a moderate.

In the election on November 12, 1995, the PAN candidate won 36.5% of the vote, while Alfonso Portillo, standing in for Ríos Montt for the FRG, won 22% of the vote. The second round runoff between Arzú and Portillo will be interesting because the Electoral Tribune is predicting an abstention rate of between 60-65 percent for the second round. In a close election, Alvaro Arzú and PAN won the runoff election January 7, 1996 with 51.2% of the electoral vote. Election results show that he won on the strength of the vote in the capitol which is PAN's base since Portillo and FRG won 16 of the 23 departments, including

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526 "Resultados finales de la elección," Prensa Libre (Guatemala City), 26 November 1995, 2.

527 "El TSE espera 65% de abstención en la segunda ronda electoral en enero," Prensa Libre (Guatemala City), 19 November 1995, 2.

many in the Western Highlands where a majority of Guatemala's indigenous population lives.\textsuperscript{529}

Arzú will take power with his party in control of the National Congress having won a large number of mayoral seats during the first round in November. However, the narrow margin of victory plus the low voter turnout (38\%) may limit his ability to deliver all the promises that he has made. Mario Antonio Sandoval, a columnist for the Prensa Libre observed, "There are victories and there are victories. This one is as tight as Kennedy and Nixon, plus barely a third of the people bothered to vote, so he is entering office in a very weak and uncomfortable position."\textsuperscript{530}

The Future Role of Evangelicals in Guatemalan Politics

Evangelical churches in Latin America, have for the most part, been movements of the self-improving stratum of the lower classes. Researchers have concentrated on evangelicals in villages and poor urban neighborhoods. They have yielded concepts like migration, acculturation, and modernization to describe the adjustment of marginal populations to larger social forces. The resulting studies suggest the ability of evangelical Christianity to empower individuals, reform families, and elevate community morals. But until recently, evangelical movements were relatively

\textsuperscript{529}Ibid. Also see "Arzú camina hacia la Presidencia," Siglo Veintiuno (Guatemala City), 8 January 1996, 3.

\textsuperscript{530}Ibid.
small except in Chile and Brazil, and they had not influenced the Hispanic elites of the region. Consequently, what has not been asked is whether born-again religion can effect social change on a larger scale. Now that born-again Christianity is breaking through its previous ceiling in the middle class, disseminating higher in the social scale, and broadening its vision, its success raises new questions. What will it look like when practiced by elites? Will upper-class Evangelicals behave any differently than upper-class Catholics?

David Martin's examination reveals that Evangelical attitudes are diverse. He concedes that Evangelical theology does tend to foster a suspicion of political activity, but notes that Evangelicals do vote, and in numbers comparable to non-Evangelicals. Some display traditional "hacienda" type political styles, where the pastor directs his flock's votes much like the "patron" did his worker's. Others support populist leftists, and still others support candidates pledging anticommunism, strict law enforcement, and national security. 531 Though their political involvement varies, Martin does note important similarities in Evangelical attitudes. Most significantly, their God-centered theology makes them anti-Marxist 532 -- an attitude certainly conducive to the stability of democracy.

531 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 236 and 239.

532 Ibid., 236-237.
It would be an overstatement to suggest that Guatemalan Evangelicals have a well-developed philosophy of the relationship between religion and democracy or even a mature conception of their "public" role. This ought not to be surprising; after all, Evangelicals have had a long historical presence in the United States but only in recent decades have they begun to grapple seriously with their role in the "public square."

However, some observers believe that Guatemala may be the country in Latin America where such a "public philosophy" of Evangelicalism will develop. Since Evangelicals are more numerous relative to total population in Guatemala than anywhere else in Latin America, Guatemala is, in the words of one scholar, "the crucible where the public role of Evangelicals will be forged."533

Chapter VI
Guatemalan Evangelicals and Their Political Views

Guatemala is "the crucible where the public role of Evangelicals will be forged."\textsuperscript{534}

The tremendous growth of evangelicals and the election of the first evangelical president, Jorge Serrano Elías, in 1991 raises several questions. The first is, "Were evangelical voters instrumental in the election of Jorge Serrano Elías as president?" If so, "Do evangelicals represent a monolithic voting bloc?," and "Will evangelicals become an important political force in Guatemala?" It also raises the question as to whether the involvement of Pentecostal evangelicals represents a shift away from the pietism of the historical Pentecostal church.

In an attempt to answer these questions we will now turn to several empirical studies. Along with the survey that I conducted between April, 1994 and and July, 1995, two other studies will be utilized. One was conducted by Dr. Amy Sherman while doing research for her dissertation in 1994 and the other was conducted by the Asociación de Investigaciones y Estudios Sociales (ASIES), and the University of Pittsburgh entitled, "La Cultura Democrática de los Guatemaltecos" in 1993. This survey was taken one

\textsuperscript{534}Ibid.
week before the attempted coup by President Jorge Serrano Elías.

The Survey Instrument

The survey consisted of 38 questions with a total of 76 variables. There were also 6 additional questions for pastors with another 14 variables (See Appendix A). One section, questions 1-6 gathered demographic information: age, gender, ethnicity, civil status, and income. A second section, questions 7-16, collected information regarding the respondents' church background and biblical training. This section included questions on the type of church the respondents attended, the length of time attended, membership, biblical training, and position, if any, within the church. The third section, questions 17-24, explored the respondents' personal attitudes about politics, and political affiliation, if any, as well as their opinion about the political participation of evangelicals in politics. The fourth section, questions 25-30, gathered data on voting patterns in the August, 1994 congressional elections, as well as the presidential elections of 1984-1985 and 1990-1991. In addition, question 31 sought to learn the perception among the populace of Ríos Montt as a presidential candidate. The fifth section, questions 32-38, gathered data on the standards and political issues that evangelicals were employing to distinguish between candidates, whether those issues were being addressed within
the respondents' church, and whether the respondents agreed that the church should address those issues. The sixth section gathered data on pastors' views on evangelical political participation and the pastors' use of the pulpit to touch upon political themes.

**Methodology and Sample**

My original sampling strategy was based on a number of conditions, some of which I was not able to fulfill because of financial or other constraints beyond my control. First, I wanted to provide a diverse representation of some of the most important Mayan language groups (Quiche, Cakchiquel, Tzutujil, and Kekchi). I was only able to include two of the groups in the formal survey. Secondly, I had also hoped to do the survey among Non-Pentecostal, Pentecostal, and Catholic churches in several areas outside the capitol. Though I was able to do the survey in three areas outside Guatemala City, I was not able to conduct the survey to the extent that I would have wished due to time constraints, and the difficulty I encountered in getting permission to conduct the survey. I had also planned to conduct the survey among the same groups within Guatemala City, including Verbo, but was unable to obtain permission from the ruling eldership.

Third, I wanted to include towns of varying size, degrees of isolation, and levels of ethnic heterogeneity. I was forced to conduct the majority of my research in the
four major universities of Guatemala, Universidad de San Carlos, Francisco Marroquín, Rafael Landívar, and Mariano Gálvez. In addition, the survey was conducted at the Seminario Teológico Centroamericano (SETECA). Although SETECA is the seminary for the Central American Mission, students from all denominations study there.

The survey was conducted during the weeks of October 20-November 5, 1994, November 26-December 10, 1994, January 18-February 8, 1995, and March 30-April 20, 1995 at the universities mentioned above. Also among those surveyed were staff and visitors at Instituto Frederico Crowe in Guatemala City, as well as pastors and members who attended a conference on prayer held at El Shadai October 30-31, 1994. The survey was also conducted among members and pastors during a pastors conference at Monte Sion in Quetzaltenango, a city of 500,000 about 4 hours west of Guatemala City. Also included in the survey were members of Iglesia Centroamericana Bethlehem in San Juan Comalapa, Chimaltenango, and members of the youth choir in Iglesia Centroamericana Emmanuel in San Pedro La Laguna, Sololá.

The survey was conducted among students and staff at the four universities, and among students and pastors at the Theological Seminary. While the samples at Francisco Marroquín and Rafael Landívar tended to be younger, the sample at Mariano Gálvez seemed to have a better distribution with regard to age, though the ratio of male to
female was about 2 to 1. The national ratio is reported as 50-50 though there are no official statistics.

The pastors conference in Quetzaltenango, and the pastors courses at SETECA gave me a greater cross sample of pastors from outside the capitol. In an attempt to offset the numbers of the conferences and to compare attitudes, I also conducted the survey within the School of Theology at Mariano Gálvez, and among seminarians from the Presbyterian Seminary of Guatemala.

The churches where the survey was conducted included El Shadai, one of the largest Pentecostal churches in Guatemala City. Both Jorge Serrano Elías and Gustavo Espina attended El Shadai before the autogolpe, or coup, in May, 1993. The survey was also conducted at Capernaum, a small Central American Mission church in Boca del Monte situated just outside the capitol. I tried on several occasions to do the survey at Verbo, the church that Efrain Ríos Montt and several other members of Congress attend, but was refused permission. A church elder told me that it was due to all the international attention and negative press that they had received.

The survey itself was very well received by both students and faculty at all the universities. One professor told me that several of his students had complained that the survey was too long. He told me that he particularly liked the fact that I had included the indigenous ethnic groups in
question #4. Several people thought that the survey was being done by supporters of Ríos Montt in order to gauge his popularity in the 1995 presidential elections.

A few people asked for blank copies of the survey. One liked the type, another liked the way my questions were framed and wanted to use it as a guide for a project she had to do for one of her classes that included formulating a survey.

While there were occasions where some people didn't have time to do the survey (in some instances it was a polite way to say they didn't want to do it), there were only a few people who actually refused to do the survey, two Catholics and two Evangelicals. The Catholics, one at Francisco Marroquín and one at Mariano Gálvez, both began to fill out the survey and refused to finish. I suspect that it was due to the heavy emphasis on Evangelical views. However, two students at SETECA refused to complete the survey, even after I had gently prodded them.

The most common complaint by Catholics was that I used the word pastor instead of priest in my survey. I had contemplated using pastor/priest, but the chairman of my committee, who is Catholic, didn't think it would matter. In fact, those who complained were very few.

The survey was usually conducted at a cafeteria at the universities because of the large number of students and staff that could be found there during lunch and breaks. I
discovered that it was best for people to do the survey while I was there because very few who said they would return them the next day inevitably forgot to do them or continually forgot to bring them back. That happened on one occasion at Francisco Marroquín, and one time at Rafael Landívar, where I continually returned to the campus to retrieve the survey, and the person had forgotten to bring it.

At USAC, I conducted the survey between classes at various schools since each school is self contained. Among the schools surveyed were the School of Engineering, the School of Communications, the School of Law, the School of Humanities, and the School of Political Science. The survey was usually done before classes or between classes.

In an attempt to address the concerns of investigators about the heterogeneity within Guatemalan Protestantism, I have coded respondents into six categories based on the name of the church they regularly attend.

(1) Catholics will be used as a base category for comparison with Protestant\textsuperscript{535} groups.

(2) Historic Protestants such as the Methodists, Presbyterians, Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Mennonites represent some of the oldest and most established churches

\textsuperscript{535}The terms "Protestant" and "evangelical" will be used interchangeably. In Guatemala, as in the rest of Central America, nearly all Protestants are called evangelicals.
in Guatemala. I hypothesize that these evangelicals may be more likely to adhere to a social gospel and less likely to accept a world-aversive, dispensationalist\textsuperscript{536} conception of the relationship between religion and politics.

(3) Pentecostals are clearly the most numerous and visible of the Protestant groups active in Guatemala. Pentecostal denominations such as the Assembly of God, Four Square Gospel Church, the Church of God and others tend to stress the importance of a dramatic personal conversion experience and empowerment through the Holy Spirit, sometimes manifested through glossolalia (speaking in tongues), "divine healing" (via the laying on of hands), or other charismatic acts. I hypothesize that most Pentecostals would subscribe to some variant of millennial, dispensationalist thought, and therefore be less likely to become politically active.\textsuperscript{537}

(4) The Neo-Pentecostals represent the fastest-growing sector of the evangelical church in the last decade. Neo-Pentecostals are believed to come from a higher social strata than most other Pentecostals. Included in this group

\textsuperscript{536}Dispensationalism is the belief that history is divided into seven time periods each with specific tasks set out by God. During the current "dispensation" Christians are to prepare for the Second Coming (and a 1000 year period during which Christ will bring perfect peace and justice) through massive attempts at evangelization.

\textsuperscript{537}For a more complete definition of Pentecostalism see Donald W. Dayton, Theological Roots of Pentecostalism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan) 1987.
are members of Verbo, El Shadai, Elim, Fraternidad Cristiana, and Lluvias de Gracia.

(5) I will use the term "sects" to refer to groups such as Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Seventh Day Adventists. Because sects have pursued an aggressive evangelization campaign in Guatemala and throughout Central America and hold different theological views than evangelicals, I have included them as a separate category.

(6) The percentage of Guatemalans who profess no religious affiliation is significant, according to contemporary survey data. It should also be noted that the "religiously non-affiliated" often believe in God. They are most often simply non-participants in institutional religion.

Hypotheses

The data generated by my survey instrument allowed me to test a number of hypotheses related to the potential for political mobilization and participation among Guatemalan Protestants. In each case I compare Historical, Pentecostal, and Neo-Pentecostal Protestants against each other and a base-line of Catholics and religiously non-affiliated individuals.

A. The reigning empirical assumption is that the recent wave of Protestant expansion in Guatemala has been highly Pentecostal in orientation and based on recruitment from the lower classes. By way of contrast:
**H₁:** Neo-Pentecostals will rival the social standing of the Historic Protestants, and both Historic Protestants and Neo-Pentecostals will rival the social status of Catholics.

**H₂:** The increased social status of members of Neo-Pentecostal churches has translated into political involvement which represents a shift in thought concerning political involvement.

**B. It has also been assumed that because of the historic stance of the Pentecostal churches vis-a-vis the "world" that this new movement would be apolitical, and therefore not a threat to existing political parties and regimes. Again, by way of contrast:**

**H₃:** The democratic method inculcated within evangelical churches has translated into increased participation of national elections by evangelicals.

**H₄:** Evangelicals use the same criteria used for selecting pastors, elders, and deacons when voting in national elections.

**Measures of the Variable**

**H₁:** In the first case, the dependent variables are the demographic questions concerning education and income. The independent variable is the type of church to which the respondents belong.

**H₂:** The dependent variable for this hypothesis is the answer to the questions pertaining to voting in the 1985 and the 1990-91 presidential elections, and the 1994 congressional elections. Again, the independent variable for this hypothesis is the type of church that the respondents belonged to.

**H₃:** The measure of this hypothesis has two parts. In the first measure, the dependent variable is an item in which respondents answer
whether they voted in the first round of the presidential elections of 1985, the elections of 1990-91, and the congressional elections in August 1994. The independent variable is the type of church to which the respondents belonged.

The dependent variables for the second part of this hypothesis is the answer to the question, "Did you vote in the August 1994 elections?" The independent variable is the frequency of which the respondents voted in church elections.

H4: The dependent variable to this hypothesis are the responses to the question, "Which characteristics are most important when choosing a political leader?" The independent variable again is the type of church to which the respondent belonged. 

The class composition of the Protestant community will be relevant to the nature of any Protestant political movement that might be constructed. If Protestants prove to come from extremely heterogeneous groups this could provide a strong base for a successful political coalition.

**Sample Characteristics**

In the survey (n=1100), 624 of the respondents were male and 476 were female. These figures favor males because the figures include pastors who without exception were male, even though there were females studying at both the Central American Seminary, and in the School of Theology at the evangelical university, Mariano Gálvez. Eighty percent of those surveyed were between 18-39 years old. About 45% (43.7%, n=481) of those surveyed identified themselves as Catholics, while 46.2% (n=508) percent identified themselves
as evangelicals. A little over three percent (3.5%, n=34) identified themselves as other, including those who identified themselves as Mormons, and Jehovah's Witnesses, while 5.6% (n=62) identified themselves with no church. About 75% (72.8%, n=801) were members of their church and over 35% (36.1%, (n=397) of those who were members of their church had been members for less than ten years. More than 30% (n=341) had been members for more than ten years. Slightly more than fifty percent (50.6%, n=557) of those that were members had some biblical training. Inferences shall be made only for urban Guatemala.

**Demographics of the Sample**

The sample divided fairly evenly between male and female respondents (58.1% and 41.9%, respectively). The median age of the respondents was between 25-39 years of age. Slightly over 37.3% were married and 58.2% were single (Table VI-1).

While the sample was somewhat representative of the Guatemalan population as a whole, there were at least 3 important exceptions which resulted from the deliberate design of the interviewing strategy. The first concerned ethnicity. Nearly eighty-four percent of those surveyed were Ladino. While this overrepresented "Ladinos" in terms of the national population, it was to be expected since most of the sample was taken in the capitol. The second exception concerned religion. Estimates of the size of
Guatemala's Evangelical community range from 20% to 35% percent of the population. Amy Sherman's study, ASIES 500, found that 28.8% percent of the surveyed population was Evangelical.\textsuperscript{53}\textsuperscript{5} My survey overrepresented the number of Evangelicals. Since I was primarily interested in comparing individuals of differing religious beliefs, and I had divided the Protestant church into two categories, I wanted to ensure that I had a usable number of evangelicals. I therefore conducted the survey in areas where there were high concentrations of evangelicals such as churches, SETECA, and at Universidad Mariano Gálvez, the evangelical university in Guatemala City.

Because most of the research was conducted at the major universities, the respondents in the sample are "overeducated," reflecting the educational levels of both students and professors. Also, since I didn't distinguish between having some education and having completed a level, the figures tend to result in an "overeducated" sample.

\textbf{Socio-Economic Status:}

In terms of socio-economic status, many of the respondents in the sample were poor by almost any definition of that term. Nearly 50 percent made less than Q12,000 a year which is a little more than $2,000 a year. Moreover, 84% of the sample earned less than $10,000 a year. It also

\textsuperscript{53}\textsuperscript{5}Sherman, "Be Ye Transformed," 167.
must be remembered that as low as the figure appears to Americans, the sample included more ladinos than indigenous peoples who tend to earn much less than ladinos.
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Source: Survey, Guatemala, April 1994-April 1995
What Role Does Religion Play?

Bastian argues that there is little continuity between the "historical" Protestants of the mainline denominations--Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Lutherans--and Evangelical Pentecostals. The first Latin American Protestants, Bastian argues, were associated with the radically liberal minorities who questioned the region's corporatist social order. Pentecostals, in contrast, come out of a popular, Catholic, and shamanistic religious culture that, instead of rejecting corporatism, reinforces it. This has implications for the social contributions to be made, according to Bastian. While historical Protestantism was "a religion of literacy and education characterized as "civil and rational"--hence a vehicle for "liberal democratic values"--Pentecostalism represents "religions of oral tradition, illiteracy, and effervescence" that reinforce "caudillistic models of religion and social control." Consequently, sectarian Protestantism in Latin America has "no relation whatsoever to religious reform and . . . even less to do with political and social reform." The "heterodox religious effervescence that we are witnessing in Latin America is none other than a renewal of

'popular religion,' of rural Catholicism without priests." Lalive D'Epinay concluded that Pentecostalism represented a profound and mystical accommodation to the status quo. Over the decades, many critics have reiterated that Pentecostal churches provide their members with false, unrealistic solutions to their real interests.\textsuperscript{541}

\textbf{Evangelical Sample}

Whereas the Catholic respondents in the survey were also equally divided among male and female among the Protestant churches, the ratio was about 60\% males to 40\% females (Table VI-2). This is due to the survey being done at a pastors conference and at the Seminario Teológico Centroamericano which has a predominately male student population.

Also, among the Protestant churches, the non-Pentecostal respondents tended to be more ethnically diverse, less educated, and accordingly, poorer than both the Pentecostal and Catholic respondents. Whereas 85\% of Pentecostal respondents and 95\% of Catholic respondents identified themselves as ladinos, 57\% of the non-Pentecostal respondents did so. Non-Pentecostal respondents were also poorer than their Pentecostal and Catholic counterparts with

\textsuperscript{540}Ibid., 332, 344.

35% of the respondents earning less than Q3,000 ($500.00) annually. Also, only a little more than seven percent of the non-Pentecostal respondents earned more than Q60,000 annually whereas almost 19% of the Pentecostal respondents and 20% of the Catholic respondents earned Q60,000.

While the Non-Pentecostal respondents represented more ethnic diversity and were poorer, the profile of the Pentecostal church was almost identical to the Catholics. A large percentage of each group identified themselves as ladino (84.8%, 94.7%, respectively) as opposed to members of one of the indigenous groups in Guatemala. They were also more likely to be better educated as well. This is significant since the ASIES study showed that education was a significant factor in determining support for the system. Those who had the least education demonstrated the highest level of support for the system, while those with the highest level of education demonstrated the lowest level of support for the system (the reverse of Costa Rica and Panama). It must be added, however, that the residents in the capitol, as a group, were the most educated in the country and therefore, as a result, the level of support for the government is lowest in the capitol.
**TABLE VI - 2**

Demographic Characteristics of the Evangelical Sample

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</table>
Voting

In the first round of the 1990 elections, a slightly larger percentage of Non-Pentecostal and Pentecostal respondents voted for a candidate (Jorge Serrano Elías) because he was an evangelical than had done so in the first round of the 1985 elections (Table VI-3). Almost seventy-five percent of Non-pentecostals and eighty percent of Pentecostals voted for Serrano in the 1990 presidential elections because he was evangelical. Over ninety-eight percent (98.4%) of those who voted for Serrano Elías in the first round of the presidential elections in 1990, voted for Serrano Elías in January, 1991. Also 25.2% of those who didn't vote for Serrano Elías in the first round, voted for him in the second round, while only 3.4% of those who voted for Serrano Elías in the first round didn't vote for him in the second round.

TABLE VI - 3

Non-Pentecostals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% voted for Serrano</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% voted for Serrano because he was an evangelical</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pentecostals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% voted for Serrano</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% voted for Serrano because he was an evangelical</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The importance of a candidate being evangelical in determining whether a Protestant respondent voted for that candidate is corroborated by the results of the survey question concerning the criteria used for selecting a leader. Not surprisingly then, most Non-Pentecostals and Pentecostals thought that being an evangelical was an important criteria for voting for a potential candidate. Forty-five percent of Non-Pentecostal respondents thought being evangelical was the most important (44.9%) or very important (45.8%) in selecting a potential leader, and 40% of Pentecostals (40.7%, and 39.6% percent respectively) thought that being evangelical was an important trait in a potential leader. While few Catholic respondents felt being evangelical was the most important or a very important characteristic when choosing a leader, almost one-quarter of the Catholic respondents thought that it was an important characteristic for a potential leader.

Evangelical

Although a little less than thirty percent (29.5%) of all respondents believed that being an evangelical was important when electing a political leader, this number increased significantly among evangelical respondents (Table VI-4). Of the 375 respondents who voted for Jorge Serrano Elías in the 1991 elections (35.7% of the respondents that voted in the 1991 presidential elections), 187 (49.9%) voted for him because he was an evangelical, while 181 voted for
him for reasons other than because he was an evangelical. In the first round of that election, of 265 that voted for Serrano Elías, 157, or 59.2% voted for him because he was an evangelical. In the 1985 presidential election, of the 145 respondents who voted for Serrano Elías, 100 (68.9%) voted for him because he was an evangelical. It appears, then, that those evangelicals who vote, consistently vote for candidates simply because they are evangelicals.

In the 1990 election, the turnout for all Evangelicals was equal to that of the entire voting population. The levels of abstentionism were the same for all populations. However, if one considers the total by ethnicity, evangelical ladinos actually had a turnout level that was higher than the general population by 5-6%, while indigenous Evangelicals (64.3%) demonstrated a turnout level 10 points lower than the Indian population as a whole, and 12 to 15 points below any other category of eligible voters. Though there is no comparative data in order to determine whether the high voter turnout among Evangelicals was due to the presence of Serrano, a viable presidential candidate in the elections, a larger percentage of Evangelicals who voted for Serrano in 1990-1991, voted for him because he was an evangelical.

Also given Serrano's ties to the Ríos Montt administration and his austere economic policies, it was presumably on the basis of religion and not ethnicity that
Indians would vote for the first elected Protestant president in Latin America. The results of the survey taken 1994-1995 correspond with an earlier study in 1993 that discovered that the entire evangelical vote for Serrano was almost 16 points more than the total Catholic vote for the same candidate (47.9% to 32%, respectively)\(^{542}\), and 10 points more than the general population reflected in the 1993 survey.\(^{543}\)

While a majority of evangelicals vote for evangelicals in elections, it is also clear that evangelical candidates are also able to attract a significant portion of the Catholic vote. In the 1990-1991 elections Jorge Serrano Elías garnered about a third of the vote (33.1%) among Catholic respondents. Moreover, they voted for Serrano Elías for reasons other than his being evangelical. Almost 95% of the Catholic respondents who voted for Serrano in the 1990-1991 elections did not vote for him because he was an evangelical.

This also held true for Ríos Montt's possible candidacy. Approximately fifty percent of Non-Pentecostals and Pentecostals (46.6%, 51.1%, respectively) said they would vote for Ríos Montt if he could run. Even more significantly, a quarter (25.1%) of Catholic respondents


\(^{543}\)Ibid.
said that they would vote for Rios Montt. When those respondents who answered maybe are factored in, the figure for Catholic respondents shoots up to slightly more than forty percent (40.9%).

**TABLE VI - 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is being an evangelical an important characteristic for a leader?</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Non-Pent</th>
<th>Pent</th>
<th>Cath</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Important</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other traits that were deemed most important to the respondents in the survey with regard to choosing a leader were honesty, responsibility, and being a good leader. An overwhelming majority 98% (97.9%, n=1048) of the respondents believed honesty was an important trait for a political leader with close to 80% (79.96%, n=838) saying that honesty was the most important characteristic when choosing a political leader.

An identical amount of the respondents, 97.9% believed that responsibility was an important characteristic when choosing a political leader. More significantly, 66.6% believed that it was the most important characteristic.

Almost 50% (50.4%, n=500) believed that being a good leader was the most important characteristic when choosing a political leader. When combined with very important and
important, 93% (92.8%) of the respondents believed that it was an important factor when choosing a political leader. About 70% (68.8%) of those surveyed believed that having an iron fist was an important characteristic of a political leader.

The biblical perspective of the candidate was not as significant to the respondents in the survey. While about sixty-five percent (64.7%) believed that the candidate's biblical perspective was important when choosing a leader, only 27.5% believed that it was the most important.

Church Elections and Voting

Among Evangelicals 86.7% of non-Pentecostal respondents elected their deacons and elders, while only 41.4% of the Pentecostals elected their officials. Those respondents whose church voted for elders, and deacons (n=301), 66.4% (n=200) always voted in those elections and another 9% (8.9%, n=27) voted frequently, while less than 5% (3.65%, n=11) never voted. Those respondents who said that they always voted in church elections voted more frequently in national elections. One hundred twelve of 192 (58.3%) respondents who always voted in church elections voted in the congressional elections in August, 1994. More importantly, it must be noted that these 112 respondents represent 71.8% of those who voted in the August, 1994 elections. Forty-five percent of those who always voted in church elections (n=85) voted for Serrano Elías in January,
1991. However, when we examine the valid responses, the 85 respondents represent 81.7% of those who answered both questions. The 85 also represents exactly one-third of the valid responses. The 189 who always voted in church elections represent almost 75% of the valid responses.

**Presidential Election of 1985**

Over 90% (90.2%) of those who always voted in church elections voted in the first round of the presidential election of 1985. Of this figure, 41.8% voted for Serrano Elías. Moreover, 87.9% of those who voted in church elections participated in the elections of 1985. This figure represented only 28.3% of all the respondents who participated in the first round of the election of 1985, but 48% of them voted for Serrano Elías. Those who didn't elect church officials or who never voted in church elections represented 52% of those respondents who voted for Serrano Elías in 1985.

Only 13.4% of those who participated in church elections abstained during the first round of the presidential election of 1985, while 14.2% of those who didn't elect church officials or who never voted in church elections abstained.

**Presidential Elections of 1990-1991**

In the first round of the presidential election 1990-1991, 85.6% of those who always voted in church elections...
voted in the first round of the elections. Of this group, 46.3% voted for Serrano Elías. This figure is slightly higher than the figure for all who participated in church elections (84.7%). Among those that didn't elect church officials or never voted in church elections, 87.4% voted in the first round, and only 32.3% voted for Serrano Elías. This may be due to the fact that this figure represents a majority of Catholic respondents. Those who voted in church elections represented 27.4% of all the respondents who voted in the first round. Also, the abstention rate was 15.3% among those who voted in church elections whereas the abstention rate was only 14.3% among those who didn't elect church officials or never voted in church elections.

Over ninety percent (90.2%) of those who always voted in church elections voted in the second round of the presidential elections of 1991. Of this figure, 52.1% voted for Serrano. Those who voted in church elections represented 27.8% of the respondents who voted in the second round of the presidential elections. Also, among those who voted in church elections, the abstention rate was only 6.1% whereas the abstention rate of those who didn't elect their church officials or never voted in church elections was 13.5% during the second round of the presidential election of 1991.
Congressional Elections of August 1994

A little more than 75 percent (75.4%) of those who voted in the first round of the 1990-1991 presidential election voted in the congressional election of 1994. Of this figure, 70.1% of the total represented the evangelical vote. However, 59.9% of those who didn't vote in the first round in 1990 voted in the congressional elections of 1994. A little over twenty-eight percent (28.5%) of the respondents who always voted in church elections voted in the August, 1994 congressional elections. More importantly, over eighty percent (81.2%) of those who said they always voted in church elections voted in the congressional elections in August, 1994. The figure for those who voted in church elections at least sometimes and who voted in the August, 1994 elections represents 36.2% of the respondents who voted in the elections. A little more than fifty-six percent (56.4%) of those who participated in church elections voted in the congressional elections of 1994. A slightly higher percentage of those who didn't elect church officials or never voted in church elections (57.2%) participated in the congressional elections. This figure is so high because of the large number of Catholic respondents in the survey who do not elect church elders.

It is apparent that the evangelical community believes that it has an obligation to vote. This is demonstrated by the low abstention rates for evangelicals during the
presidential elections. The entire evangelical population showed a 13 point lower level of abstentionism in the congressional elections of 1994 than indigenous. Evangelical ladinos actually had a turnout level that was higher than the general population by 5-6%.544 When the Ladino subset of evangelicals is combined with indigenous evangelicals, the gap in turnout level is as high as 20 points.545 Evangelicals are not immune from abstaining from voting however since less than twenty percent of the population voted in the congressional elections of 1994.

Ríos Montt

Three-hundred and seventy-three respondents (35.49% n=1051) said that they would vote for Efraín Ríos Montt if he could run for president (Table VI-5). Another 18% (17.8%, n=188) said that they might vote for Ríos Montt. While almost 24% (23.7%, n=249) answered that they would not vote for Ríos Montt, only 15.2% (n=160) of the respondents said that they would never vote for Ríos Montt. Among the 155 respondents who identified themselves as non-Pentecostals, 101 (65.2%) said that they would vote for Ríos Montt for president (See Table VI-5).


545 Ibid., p. 9.
Among Pentecostals, 152 of the 218 respondents, nearly 70%, said that they would vote for Ríos Montt if he was a candidate for president. Even among Catholic respondents, 192, or 41% (n=468), said that they would vote for Ríos Montt if he were the presidential candidate.

In terms of ethnicity, 37 of the 51 (72.5%) respondents who identified themselves as a member of one of the Mayan ethnic groups said that they would vote for Ríos Montt. When the income of those respondents who were disposed to vote for Ríos Montt is considered, fifty percent or more of the respondents from each income group said that they would vote for Ríos Mont.

**TABLE VI - 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Pent</th>
<th>Pent</th>
<th>Pent</th>
<th>Cath</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Eta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, almost 50% (46.6%) of non-Pentecostals, and slightly more than fifty percent (51.1%) of Pentecostals answered that they would have voted for Ríos Montt had he been able to run. These figures may be explained by people's perception of Ríos Montt's administration during 1982-1983. Most believe it to be a time of relative peace and perceive Ríos Montt as being honest.
Preaching on Political Themes

Religion did not seem to matter with regard to pastors preaching about abortion (Table VI-6). Every category was above 90%. There was more of a disparity between Evangelicals and Catholics with regard to pastors preaching about homosexuality, whereas all categories among evangelicals were above 90% saying that pastors could preach on homosexuality at least sometimes. Only 80.4% of Catholic respondents agreed that priests could preach on the theme of homosexuality. One would expect such high figures since the Bible is explicit in its prohibition of homosexuality. Catholic respondents were more likely to oppose preaching on these topics than any category among the evangelical churches.
TABLE VI - 6

Is it alright for pastors to preach on the following political themes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquency</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian reform</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greatest surprise was the difference in the attitudes toward pastors preaching about more political themes such as the guerrillas and agrarian reform between Catholics and evangelicals (56.4% and 51.5%, respectively, compared with 66.6% and 68.8% for non-Pentecostals, 57.4% and 53.6% for Pentecostals, 72.2% and 52.6% for neo-Pentecostals and 65.4% and 67.8% for charismatics). Many critics compare the evangelical church with the Catholic church which is often viewed as more "progressive." These figures show that the evangelical church is at least as
"progressive" as the Catholic church on these issues (Table VI-7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Abort</th>
<th>Homo</th>
<th>Guerr</th>
<th>Agrfm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Pentecostal</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
<td>92.4%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pietism and Political Participation

Although there are some within evangelical circles who recognize that the evangelical church is "the best organized minority in the nation," with a responsibility to offer an alternative to the squalid prevailing norms, there is still a strong strain of pietism that runs through the evangelical community. All three churches were evenly split on the issue of political involvement.

The ambivalence among evangelical respondents is reflected in the data reflecting whether evangelicals should be involved in politics. Both non-Pentecostal and Pentecostal respondents were almost evenly split on the issue. Among non-Pentecostal respondents 46.6% answered yes, while 52% said no. Slightly more than fifty percent (51.7%) of Pentecostal respondents thought that evangelicals should be involved in politics while 47.9% thought that

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evangelicals should not be involved. However, Protestant respondents were no more divided over the issue than Catholic respondents. Catholics too, were evenly divided on whether evangelicals should be involved in politics. Fifty-two percent (52.3%) of Catholics thought evangelicals should be involved in politics while 47.5% thought that they shouldn't be involved.

Pentecostals were more likely to believe that evangelicals should involve themselves in politics (70.1%), and that involvement in politics was a calling (41.1%). Catholics were least likely to believe that evangelicals should involve themselves in politics and were least likely to see a political career as a calling, or vocation (17.9%). The percentage of non-Pentecostals and Pentecostals was almost identical with respect to politics being a calling (29.9%, 30.0%), respectively.

Pietism was slightly more evident within the Non-Pentecostal churches with 46.6% of Non-Pentecostal respondents answering yes while 52% thought that evangelicals should not be involved with politics. Among Pentecostals and Catholics, 51.7% and 52.3% percent respectively thought that it was alright for evangelicals to be involved in politics. Pentecostals and Catholics were evenly split over whether evangelicals should be involved in politics. Among non-Pentecostals, 76.5% of those who believed that evangelicals should be involved in politics
had some biblical training, while 23.5% did not. Those who had biblical training and believed that evangelicals should be involved in politics represented 36.6% of all non-Pentecostal respondents. Among Pentecostals, 70.1% of those who had some biblical training believed that evangelicals should be involved in politics. This figure also represents 35.9% of the total number of Pentecostal respondents. Among neo-Pentecostals, 91.1% of those who had some biblical training believed evangelicals should be involved in politics. It is interesting to note that among Catholic respondents, only 42.50% of those who believed that evangelicals should be involved in politics had some biblical training while 57.7% who had no biblical training believed that evangelicals should be involved in politics.

About 90% (89.3%) of the respondents believed that it was a Christian duty to vote. Even among the respondents who had no church affiliation, 82.5% said that Christians had the duty to vote. Over 95% (96.8%) of non-Pentecostals believed that Christians had a duty to vote. More importantly, 96% of those who had some biblical training believed that Christians had the duty to vote. This figure represented 56% of all non-Pentecostal respondents. However, it must be noted that 97.8% of those who said that they had no biblical training believed that Christians should have the right to vote. Among Pentecostals, about 70% (69.9%) of those who had some biblical training believed
that Christians had a duty to vote. Almost 95% (94.4%) of those who had some biblical training believed that Christians had a duty to vote. Seventy-seven percent (77.8%) of those who had some biblical training believed that Christians had a duty to vote. Almost 94% (93.3%) of those who had some biblical training believed that Christians had the duty to vote. Among Catholics, though almost 91% of those who had some biblical training believed that Christians had a duty to vote. This figure only represents 40.8% of those who believed that Christians had a duty to vote. Close to 60% of those who had no biblical training believed that Christians had the duty to vote.

Only 30.4% of the non-Pentecostal respondents who had some biblical training believed that involvement in politics was a calling of God, while a little more than 45% (45.2%) who had some biblical training believed that political involvement was a calling of God. A little less than 50% (47.7%) of those who had no biblical training believed that political involvement was a calling of God.

Among Pentecostal respondents, over 75% (75.4%) of those who believed that political involvement was a calling of God had some biblical training. Of those who believed that political involvement was not a calling of God, 63.8% had some biblical training. This demonstrates the division within the church concerning political involvement with both parties using scriptural support for their position.
More than 55% (55.8%) of Catholics did not think that political involvement was a calling of God, while only 18.1% believed that it was (Table VI-8). Moreover, only 10.9% of Catholic respondents who believed that political involvement was a calling of God had biblical training. Over half (52.2%) of the Catholics who had biblical training believed that political involvement was not a calling of God.

Though many evangelicals do not run for office, it appears that Christians in Guatemala take their voting privilege seriously. In the 1994 congressional elections, 83.3% of those who believed it was a Christian's duty to vote participated in the August elections. Eighty-eight percent of those who believed that it was a Christian obligation to vote, participated in the first round of the presidential election of 1990-1991. Furthermore, of these, 34.8% voted for Serrano Elías. An almost identical number voted in the second round of the 1990-1991 presidential election. Of the almost 89 percent, 48.1% voted for Serrano. In the first round of the 1985 presidential election, the figure for those who believed that it was a Christian obligation to vote who participated in the election also hovered around ninety percent (88.7%). Of this figure, 27.5% voted for Serrano Elías. Only 11.1% of these respondents abstained.
Should Evangelicals be Involved in Politics?
Is Political Involvement a Calling?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Involved (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Calling (Yes/No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Pentecostal</td>
<td>59.6% (39.7%)</td>
<td>29.9% (66.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>50.7% (48.7%)</td>
<td>30.0% (44.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>52.4% (47.4%)</td>
<td>17.9% (55.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although evangelicals believed that they had a duty to vote, this did not translate into an affiliation with one of the political parties. Less than 10% (9.5%, n=105) of the 1,073 respondents belonged to or identified themselves with a particular party. Of those almost 42% (41.9%, n=44) identified themselves with PAN, while 17.1% identified themselves with FRG.

Pastors

Forty-three of the 67 (64.2%) pastors voted in the August, 1994 congressional elections, while 35.8% did not participate. Over ninety percent of the pastors participated in the second round of the 1990-1991 presidential election. Of this group, 69% voted for Serrano Elías. Nearly ten percent (9.3%) of the pastors who responded to the survey abstained while 11.4% of church members abstained. According to church members, ninety-one percent of the pastors had not supported a candidate from the pulpit while a little more than 6.4% had supported a
candidate from their pulpit. Of those whose pastor had supported a candidate (n=44), 80% responded that their pastor had supported an evangelical candidate. A little more than forty-seven percent of the respondents said that from among the evangelical candidates their pastors had supported Serrano Elías, while 30% had supported Ríos Montt.

Among the congregants, over thirty percent (32.4%, n=330) responded that it was not appropriate for pastors to preach on political themes, while almost 10% (9.5%, n=97) said that it was never right for pastors to preach on political themes. A little more than 25 percent (25.3%) said that it was alright for pastors to preach sometimes on political themes. Though more than twenty percent (23.5%) of the congregants thought that pastors could preach on political themes, only 21.2% said that their pastor had preached on a political theme.

Almost 94% (93.8%) stated that their pastor had not supported a political party from the pulpit, while less than 5% (4.5%) answered that their pastor had supported a political party. Among the respondents who said that their pastor had supported a political party from the pulpit, fifty percent had supported MAS, Serrano Elías' party. Twenty-one percent of respondents said their pastor had supported Ríos Montt.

Among pastors, over eighty-five percent (85.9%) said that they would not use their church for a political
meeting. Pastors were even more adamantly opposed when asked if they had ever used their church for a political meeting. Over 95% (96.3%) said that they would never use their church for a political meeting. Only 2% (1.9%) said that they had used their church for a political meeting many times, and another 2% (1.9%) said that they had used their church for a political meeting once.

Moreover, when asked if they would use their pulpit to support a political party, 96.3% of the pastors said that they would never use their pulpit to support a political party, while 2% said that they had many times and another 2% said that they had supported a political party from their pulpit once. However, 10% said that they had supported a political party from the pulpit. Among the 90% of pastors who responded, most stated emphatically that they would not support a political party from the pulpit.

Biblical Perspective of Political Parties

Thirty-one percent (31.7%) of the respondents thought that the FRG had the most biblical perspective on abortion. However, this figure was equally divided between those who had some biblical training (50.9%) and those who had no biblical training (49.1%).

Among those stating that they attended no church, 37.5% believed that the FRG had the most biblical perspective on abortion. None of them had any biblical training. Among non-Pentecostals, 32.6% believed that the FRG had the most
biblical perspective on abortion. Those who had some biblical training represented 71.4% of the total. Over fifty percent (51.7%) of Pentecostals thought that the FRG had the most biblical perspective on abortion. Of this figure, 73.3% had some biblical training while a little over a one-quarter (26.7%) didn't have any biblical training.

The FRG was also perceived to be the party with the most biblical perspective on abortion among Catholics (20.3%). However, of this figure, only 36.6% said that they had some biblical training, while 63.4% said that they had no biblical training. For many however, these figures probably reflect the respondents' predilections towards a particular political party rather than an accurate assessment of the party's position.

The survey results demonstrate that the Pentecostal church, particularly the members of the Pentecostal church rival the social status of both the Non-Pentecostal and Catholic churches. The percentage of Pentecostals who earned above Q36,000 per year were only slightly less than the Catholic respondents (14.5%, 15.4%, respectively, earned between Q36,001-Q60,000), and 18.6% of Neo-Pentecostals earned above Q60,000 compared to 20.8% of the Catholic respondents who earned over Q60,000.

Pentecostals are also voting more than their pietistic ancestors. Not only are they voting but they are becoming candidates and successfully running for office as evidenced
by the large number of evangelical congressman elected to office. Twenty-two evangelicals were elected to Congress when Serrano Elías was elected as president in the 1990-1991 elections and twenty evangelicals were elected to the congress in the 1994 elections included in the study.

Indians voted more for Serrano than would Catholics of similar ethnic background. Given Serrano's ties to the Ríos Montt administration, it was presumably on the basis of religion and not ethnicity that the indigenous voted for Serrano. The total vote of the evangelical population for Serrano was almost 16 points more than the total Catholic vote for the same candidate, and 10 points more than the general population reflected in the 1993 survey. The other sharp divisions are in the vote for the UCN--Jorge Carpio, or MAS--Serrano Elías, on the basis of religion, on the basis of the vote among ladinos, with Catholics supporting the UCN and Protestants supporting MAS and the Evangelical candidate, Jorge Serrano. Among ladinos, Protestants voted 12% more than Indigenous Protestants, and almost 23% more than Catholic Indians. Protestant ladinos voted in higher percentages for Serrano, (anywhere from 5% to 25% more than their Indian co-religionists, who, in turn, voted for Serrano at higher rates than either Catholic ladinos or Catholic Indians.

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547 Ibid., 9.
548 Ibid.
Evangelical ladinos had a turnout level that was higher than the general population by 5-6%, while indigenous Evangelicals demonstrated a turnout level 10 points lower than the Indian population as a whole, and 12 to 15 points below any other category of eligible voters.\footnote{Ibid., 8.}
Chapter VII
Conclusions

"... evangelical Protestantism could potentially be both more revolutionary and more subversive than conventional forms of political mobilization."

Although there can be no denying that the Evangelical church has been steadily growing in Guatemala since Protestants first arrived over one hundred years ago, it wasn't until after the earthquake of 1976 that the church experienced its phenomenal growth. From a marginal minority, evangelicals grew to between 20-30 percent of Guatemala's population today numbering more than 2 million people. Nearly 75 percent of the growth that the Evangelical church has experienced in Guatemala since 1976 has been among the Pentecostal churches. More importantly, whereas earlier Pentecostals were predominately from the lower class in Guatemala, today Pentecostal churches are filled with many middle- and upper-class members, particularly in the capitol.

Moreover, the Pentecostal church's position regarding political participation has slowly changed from the pietism that characterized the historical Pentecostal church to one in which 25 percent of the National Congress elected in 1994 were evangelicals, many of whom attended Pentecostal

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550 Garrard-Burnett, "Conclusion: Is this Latin America's Reformation?", 207.
churches. Some Pentecostal churches, such as El Shadai, have even actively campaigned for political candidates. This represents a dramatic break with the dualism exhibited in earlier Pentecostalism where there existed a sharp division between "the church" and "the world." Moreover, the Pentecostal church's apolitical stance differed from political indifference of others because it was principled and based on transcendental foundations.

It should be noted that two of the last four heads of state have been evangelicals, an unprecedented turn of events in a region where elites have been almost exclusively Catholic. Also the presidencies of Efraín Ríos Montt and Jorge Serrano Elías represent a shift in the attitude toward political participation and serve as examples to other evangelicals who have political aspirations. Ríos Montt's brief rule in 1982-1983 was simply the most visible sign of the emergence of evangelicals and their connections.

**Explosive Church Growth**

The number of evangelicals in Guatemala grew slowly for almost one hundred years. Their numbers exploded after the earthquake in 1976. Evangelical attendance at large outdoor revival meetings made evangelical leaders the tremendous political potential within the Evangelical church. It was then that many of the churches so prevalent in politics today such as Verbo, Elim, and El Shadai were established. These represent some of the largest churches in the nation.
Moreover, these congregations include members from the upper-middle and upper classes of Guatemalan society.

The astronomical growth cannot be solely attributed to crisis-solace paradigm which maintains that the growth of the Evangelical church, particularly in the rural area, was due to the persecution of the Catholic church in the early eighties. Stoll reports that the church was growing rapidly from the start of the violence, before the apparent immunity of the Evangelical church from army repression. It was only after 1982, when Ríos Montt came to power that a clear identification between the army and the Evangelical church emerged. Even then, as the born-again general preached amnesty and reconciliation over the radio, his troops were burning down evangelical churches along with everything else in the countryside.\footnote{Stoll, \textit{Between Two Fires}, 178.} Stoll's observations coincide with the report of Ricardo Falla, a Jesuit priest who also claimed indiscriminate killing by the army.\footnote{Falla, \textit{Masacre en el selva}, 115.}

The evangelical growth was occurring in urban areas as well. Again the crisis-solace model does not hold up because, if the displacement of rural population to urban areas were the explanation for the growth of evangelical churches, one would expect to see similar growth in the Catholic church as well. The Catholic church, however, did not experience the astronomical growth that the Evangelical
church did. Moreover, the growth of the Evangelical church was at the expense of the Catholic church.

To explain the growth of evangelicalism in Guatemala purely in terms of North American influences, whether they be implicitly or explicitly political, would be both patronizing and inaccurate.

The whole conspiracy theory that there's a spook behind every evangelical doesn't take into account the pastoral crisis in the Catholic church. It's much easier and more convenient to attribute growth of Protestant churches to the CIA or North American imperialism.553

In fact, most evangelical churches, schools, and broadcasts are firmly rooted in Guatemalan culture, with little or no direction from North America. Almost all evangelical pastors are Guatemalan. By contrast, 86.7% (603) of Catholic priests are foreigners and only 13.3% (93) are Guatemaltecos.554 In this sense, the evangelical movement is far more populist and indigenous than is the ecclesiastical structure of the country's Roman Catholicism.

David Stoll posits three possible scenarios that could result from the tremendous growth of the Evangelical church in Latin America. The first is a direct confrontation with the Latin American state which implies that a shift from a


554Dennis Smith, "Guatemala in Numbers," (Manuscript), 1.
redemptive to a transformative focus would have to take place within the Church. Since evangelicals have rarely challenged the state, they have been accused of having been coopted by Latin America's authoritarian tradition. Stoll cautions against such premature conclusions, however, since "the social processes associated with the Reformation unfolded over centuries." 555

The history of social movements is replete with shifts from a redemptive (saving one's soul) to a transformative (changing the world) emphasis or vice versa, often after the first generation. 556 As Paul Freston and Rowan Ireland have shown, evangelicals can and do involve themselves directly in the political arena. And when Pentecostals become political, they do so because of their religious beliefs, not in spite of them.

However, most critics believe that there is one critical way in which the Latin American Protestant movement does fit the model of the European Reformation: it is a genuine movement of protest. It always signifies a rejection of the status quo. Evangelicals are those "who [have] symbolically repudiated what previously held [them] in place, vertically and horizontally." 557

557 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 285.
Guatemala, like most countries in Latin America, is still overwhelmingly Catholic in creed and culture. The decision to leave the Church is in itself a radical act, and often no one is more aware of that fact than those who choose to do so. However, oftentimes, the passive resistance of evangelicalism is all too easy to overlook.

Political scientist James Scott has called passive resistance the "weapon of the weak": through subterfuge, evasion, and noncompliance, society's most marginal members can defend and even advance their interests without engaging in the confrontational behavior that invites reprisals.\textsuperscript{558}

Within this context Latin American Protestantism can be seen as a type of rebellion, the personal protest of the voiceless and powerless. Protestants by definition do not buy into the traditional Catholic-centered status quo, even when they obediently acquiesce to the political or economic "authorities in power." Evangélicos may be "model citizens," but their religious identity carries with it a degree of noncompliance. Virginia Garrard-Burnett believes this "suggests that evangelical Protestantism could potentially be both more revolutionary and more subversive than conventional forms of political mobilization."\textsuperscript{559}


\textsuperscript{559}Garrard-Burnett, "Conclusion: Is this Latin America's Reformation?," 207.
Giving moral reformers the benefit of the doubt, the second scenario has the diverse sects extending from the lower into the middle classes, coalescing into an evangelical establishment—a process already under way—and then impressing their standards upon national life. Though this process appears to have far to go with the rise and fall of Ríos Montt and Serrano Elías, these failures have been blamed on personal weaknesses of the individuals and not the evangelical community at large. By gradually renegotiating their position with the dominant classes, according to this scenario, a rising middle sector could conceivably produce a more democratic, open system without overthrowing the old power structure.

Though a bit utopian, evangelical missions and churches are at least producing new leaders for popular movements. One example is the Summer Institute of Linguistics in Peru. Much of the leadership of current native rights organizations in the Peruvian Amazon comes out of its bilingual schools.

"You have to take a long perspective," argues Presbyterian missionary and anthropologist David Scotchmer, "because in the short term, yes, evangelical religion is reactionary. But a lot of the second and third generation lose their spiritualism and start asking different questions.

560 Interview with Harold Caballeros, Pastor, El Shadai Church, November 29, 1994.
of the Bible."\textsuperscript{561} As long as evangelical churches grow rapidly, these effects are masked by the continuous influx of new members. But growth has its limits. Subsequent generations usually fail to maintain the fervor of the first but do find themselves in new and challenging situations in which they use their Protestant inheritance in new ways.

There is, of course, a third scenario: that evangelical Protestants will fail to be a major force for social change. The bitter sectarianism of so many evangelicals, their avoidance of a political agenda, and the isolation of the "reformers within the reformation" make this the most defensible scenario at present among many analysts.

This sectarianism is best illustrated by the division within the evangelical church over political participation. The confusion within evangelical churches concerning political involvement may reflect the theological confusion within the church itself. This confusion results from several factors. Often, there is a mixing of theological positions within the various churches in Guatemala. While there are many denominations within Guatemala, and many have their own seminaries, oftentimes many study at the Seminario Teológico Centroamericano which has a dispensationalist perspective. Many within the congregations have little or no theological training and receive much of their training

\textsuperscript{561}Quoted in Stoll, \textit{Is Latin America Turning Protestant?}, 330-331.
within the church or via the radio which is also dominated by the Central American Mission's TGN, Radio Cultural. This is particularly true of church members outside the capitol, many of whom are dependent upon the radio for their instruction. This situation is exacerbated by illiteracy among the pastorate, particularly in the outlying areas. Though SETECA is trying to remedy this, the problem is still an acute one.

Also, the Guatemalan Evangelical Church has a very interesting family tree. Many of today's churches can trace their roots to either the historical Presbyterian church, which established the first missions in Guatemala, or the Central American Mission's Cinco Calles Church. Charles Furnam, though a Pentecostal, contracted himself out to the non-Pentecostal Primitive Methodist Church because of the opposition from the mainline denominations to pentecostal missionaries.

The identity crisis among Guatemalan churches is further compounded by interdenominational Pentecostal faith missions. The Holiness Movement, of which these denominations were a part, was descended from the Methodist church. Many of the traditional churches split over the doctrines of "speaking in tongues," and "baptism by the Holy Spirit."

Yet, despite this sectarianism, there is still room for hope. It cannot be denied that where traditional social
organization is breaking up, evangelical churches constitute new, more flexible groups in which participation is voluntary, where leadership is charismatic, and which are therefore more adaptable to rapidly changing conditions.

**Pietism and Political Involvement**

Although there are some within evangelical circles who recognize that the Evangelical church is "the best organized minority in the nation," with a responsibility to offer an alternative to the squalid prevailing norms, there is still a strong strain of pietism that runs through the evangelical community. The church is evenly divided over political participation. There are two reasons for this division within the church. The first is the hangover of pietism within the historical Pentecostal church that views the world, and especially politics, as evil. Secondly, some Pentecostals' attitudes have been influenced by events that occurred while evangelical leaders, such as Ríos Montt and Serrano Elías, were in office. Ríos Montt has been accused of killing 100,000 people while fighting leftist guerrillas in Guatemala. Serrano Elías abolished the Congress in an attempt to fight political corruption and eventually had to flee the country.

Moreover, those who think that the Christians should be politically involved do not constitute a monolithic bloc of

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voters. Those who voted in elections represented a broad political spectrum. But, is this a bad thing? Does not this broad spectrum represent a pluralism, that rather than being disdained, should be applauded? Cajas sees it as such. He believes that it is healthy for both the Evangelical church in Guatemala and Guatemalan society at large that there exists such a diversity of opinions among evangelicals.

The Evangelical church in Guatemala, whether it acknowledges it or not, has always had some degree of political involvement. Whether it was the tacit approval of a certain administration or the direct involvement in the political system, the fortunes of the Evangelical church have in some way been tied to the political process within the nation.

Because of the stark polarization of politics in Guatemala, it is easy to overlook the significance of nonconfrontational institutions that appear totally subordinate to the state, such as evangelical churches. Certainly, espousing born-again salvation and political neutrality help Ixils distance themselves from political confrontation. But the value of these discourses is not just defensive: they also help Ixils construct more equitable social relations with ladinos.

Evangelical claims for the world-changing potential of moral commitment may not seem very credible. Still, the
conflict of assumptions between evangelicals and most scholars is so obvious that it calls for scholars to look at their own. Because of the long rivalry between Hispanic and Anglo colonialism, North American scholars want to banish the characteristic prejudices of Anglo-moralism from their studies, and hence they have made an historical-structural view almost normative. The same historical-structural assumptions are shared by the majority of Latin American intellectuals, as illustrated by the common practice of addressing a contemporary issue by explaining the history of it, starting with the Spanish Conquest. This reasoning is very deterministic. It implies that changes in direction are extremely constrained or impossible. It also helps foment views that change can only be achieved through revolutionary violence.

Evangelicals are not immune to explaining the tragedy of Guatemala in terms of structure and history, but their religious assumptions provide a distinct source of hope. While most remain pessimistic about changing the country, they make much of the ability of individuals to change themselves, their families, and their immediate surroundings. Given the popularity of this "conversionist" or "revivalist" view of the possibilities open to Guatemalans, can any such changes be seen on the local level in Nebaj? There can be no doubt that the answer to this
question, given the evidence provided by the studies done by Sherman and Stoll, is a resounding yes!

Evangelical churches in Latin America have, for the most part, been movements of the self-improving stratum of the lower classes. Until recently, evangelical movements were relatively small except in Chile and Brazil, and they had not influenced the Hispanic elites of the region. Consequently, what has not been asked is whether born-again religion can effect social change on a larger scale. Now that born-again Christianity is breaking through its previous ceiling in the middle class, disseminating higher in the social scale, and broadening its vision, its success raises new questions. Will upper-class evangelicals behave differently than upper-class Catholics? How are the aspirations of evangelical elites constrained by the political economies in which they find themselves? Can evangelical practices change those political and economical systems?

Born again religion is spilling beyond conventional boundaries and reaching into the upper class. If one focuses on institutional beliefs, claims, and practices, it is easy to conclude that many evangelical churches seek to avoid the wider society and to withdraw into an ecstatic social world. Neo-Pentecostal churches tend to be more urban, literate, prosperous, and higher in the social scale than traditional Pentecostals. Unlike most Guatemalan
evangelicals, who are poor, neo-Pentecostals come mainly from the managerial and upper classes which continue to fatten on agribusiness exports to the United States, a regressive tax system and sundry monopolistic structures concentrating income in their hands. A thousand or more people at a service is not unusual. These are superchurches. They are known for their warmth thanks to their well-organized networks of "house churches." These smaller-scale worship groups and Bible studies meet in homes and neighborhoods. If you don't like one house worship group, you can always try another, or move on to the latest superchurch to become fashionable, as did many members of the Word Church who left for El Shadai in the late 1980s.

Neo-Pentecostal congregations have so many connections with national institutions that they have created the impression that evangelicals as a group are moving from political withdrawal to engagement. Born-again religion has percolated upward into social strata whose members habitually engage in politics, hence they are receptive to the admonitions of evangelical theologians for "social responsibility." The emergence of congregations in wealthy neighborhoods, together with upward mobility in older denominations, has created a new stratum of evangelical professionals eager to project their principles into society and politics.
It should be added, however, that despite the attention to flamboyant elite churches, evangelicals are still underrepresented in the upper strata compared to the lower. In the capitol, elite evangelicals cluster in less than a dozen churches, including Word, Elim, Christian Fraternity, El Shadai and Shekinah which have drawn on the charismatic renewal or split off from other churches that did. Even in the most prestigious churches, the upper class (owners of substantial firms or properties) are outnumbered by the upper-middle-class (such as managers and professionals) and lower-middle class (such as taxi drivers and schoolteachers). Of the Guatemalan elite, that is, owners of plantations or firms, only a small percentage has turned evangelical to date. One missionary estimated that even if 30 percent of the country as a whole is evangelical, as few as 5 percent of the elite might be.563

Evangelicals are more inclined to vote for an evangelical than others but there does not seem to be a consensus about the criteria used to determine just what being evangelical entails. This was demonstrated by the lack of a significant difference between evangelical and Catholic respondents as to which party had the most biblical position concerning several of the leading issues in the congressional elections of 1994. The lack of significant

563 Stoll, "Jesus is the Lord of Guatemala," in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Accounting for Fundamentalisms, 108.
difference makes it likely that PAN or FRG were selected due to party preference or religious orientation rather than whether their view of the issues were biblical.

Despite this lack of criteria, however, just being evangelical was important in determining whether a candidate received an evangelical respondent's vote. With a higher percentage of evangelicals voting than other groups, this certainly could produce profound results in Guatemalan electoral politics.

This is particularly significant when one considers that evangelicals are more likely to vote than Catholics. Since, Protestantism is therefore not necessarily an electorally demobilizing experience, there is greater potential for the Evangelical church to become an important political actor in Guatemala. Also, though Protestants do reject violence as a form of political action, it does not necessarily follow that they support the status quo, but prefer to bring about change peacefully and lawfully.

What remains is the distinction made by Donald Dayton between direct social action, the impact of which seems slight at present, and the possible longer-range social impact of Protestantism. Not only is this the latest stage of a centuries-old struggle between Anglo Protestantism and Hispanic Catholicism, it is also a struggle for modernity against the Catholic spiritual monopolies that have discouraged the kind of pluralism necessary for a democratic
society. This is where the seemingly divisive sectarianism of congregational religious life has performed a historical duty, by opening up space for new forms of association, authority, and dissent. Like conversionist religion in general, evangelical Protestantism can therefore be regarded as a way for believers to alter their cultural inheritance. It is a popular new orientation to being Latin American that could, conceivably, open up the sadly diminished panoramas of the 1990s.

However, Pentecostalism has made extensive inroads into the upper-middle and upper classes in Guatemala. Many of the newer Pentecostal churches are mostly comprised of middle-class congregations. This shift cannot be explained by the crisis-solace model.

It is obvious that evangelicals have not turned their backs on the world like historical Pentecostals have in the past. Even if one is not inclined to accept the political impact of the evangelical church from the results of the survey, it must be admitted that due to the drastic difference in its world view and its tremendous growth, the Evangelical church could become an important political actor in Guatemala. It has resulted so far in the election of the first Protestant president in Latin America as well as numerous congressmen. Also, because Pentecostals are less likely to advocate the violent overthrow of the system, they
are viewed as "conservative" by their "progressive" critics in Guatemala and the United States.

Furthermore, Guatemalan Pentecostals, like Pentecostals throughout Latin America, are in no sense a uniform or monolithic movement. On the question of involvement in politics, for example, there is a range of attitudes. Political withdrawal or passivity seems more characteristic of Pentecostals converted by missionaries than those who have an autochthonous or indigenous origin. Among indigenous groups in three regions, 69% of those surveyed affirmed that "evangelical Christians should become involved in politics" despite the respondents' strongly pessimistic view of politics. Carmelo Alvarez writes: "It is not possible to deny that, historically speaking, it meant taking positions of antagonism and rejection of the world, society, and the sociopolitical arena. However [there is evidence to suggest] . . . the overcoming of this antagonism."

Pentecostalism shows significant signs of entering the public arena as an increasingly political force that would support candidates while openly grappling with the implications of the evangelical life for a wide range of social and economic issues. Neo-Pentecostalism, as a middle-class and upper-middle-class phenomenon, has mirrored

and advanced the political positions of the nation's professional and business people.

Since 1985, evangelicals have begun to be more visible both at the polls and as political candidates. This, in and of itself, marks a monumental shift in Pentecostal policy concerning involvement in "the world." It is too early to tell whether this new involvement on the part of Pentecostal churches will be transformed into a movement that will permanently shape Guatemalan politics. The 1991 presidential elections demonstrated that their political involvement was capable of electing an evangelical candidate to the presidency. However, the presidential elections of 1996 demonstrated that a political party need only to win the popular vote in the capitol to win an election. Although, the FRG captured almost every department outside of the capitol, the margin of victory by PAN in the capitol vaulted it to victory.

Furthermore, the old-style Pentecostalism of the rural and urban poor may eventually become openly politicized. Presently, there are few signs of this happening, but as Rios Montt and Serrano Elías took their faith to the public square, they also legitimized evangelicalism as a religion that has something to say about how the country should be run. Currently, however, old-style Pentecostals remain skeptical or even strongly opposed to openly politicized religion. Though PAN won by a large margin in the capitol,
FRG won most of the departments outside of the capitol including areas with predominately indigenous populations.

There are encouraging trends within the Evangelical Church that may bode well for both Guatemala and evangelical candidates in future elections. First, there has been tremendous growth of evangelical Christianity within the indigenous areas of Guatemala. The most significant trend however is the increased political participation of evangelicals in elections, particularly in areas outside of the capitol. The significance of these two trends was illustrated in the recent presidential elections where Ríos Montt's party, the FRG, won almost every department outside of the capitol.

Evangelicals are no longer on the periphery of political dialogue. Though they are not at the present time a monolithic bloc of votes, they are a political force to be reckoned with. As evidenced in the 1996 presidential elections, a party only need to win decisively in Guatemala City to win an election.

Social Status of the Pentecostal Church

The survey demonstrated that the social neo-Pentecostals today do rival the social standing of the historic Protestants, and both of these groups rival the social status of the Catholics. Once concentrated among the lower classes of Guatemalan society, the Pentecostal church has gradually reached Guatemala's middle and upper classes.
The greatest concentration of middle-and upper-class Pentecostal congregations are in urban areas such as Guatemala City and Quetzaltenango. Furthermore, this increased social status among the members of Neo-Pentecostal churches has translated into political involvement which represents a tremendous shift in thought concerning the topic. There also seems to be a correlation between the democratic method inculcated in church elections for elders and pastors and voting in national elections. However, the criteria that evangelicals use to select a leader, besides that the candidate be evangelical, are not clear. It is evident that a candidate's being evangelical does represent a certain preconceived idea, and that it seems to be a positive one. Moreover, this change in social standing has translated into political involvement which represents a tremendous shift in orientation by Pentecostals in Guatemala.

**Political Involvement**

It is also evident that, in some churches, the attitude toward political involvement is beginning to change. Pentecostals, particularly those from churches formed in the early 1980s, are indeed becoming more politically involved. Not only are they voting, but also running for office, creating organizations and editing magazines through which to continue the debate about the involvement of evangelicals in politics. The fact that the
issue is even being discussed represents a significant shift in long-held views about political participation. Though there has been increased involvement of the Pentecostal church in elections, the church is divided as to the extent of involvement there should be by members of the church. The churches are evenly divided over whether evangelicals should be involved in politics. However, the same dichotomy appears among the Catholic respondents with regard to evangelicals.

The results of the survey clearly indicate that the most important criteria used by evangelicals in selecting a political leader is their being a part of the evangelical community. However, the survey results are not as clear on what characteristics "evangelical" implies. There are, however, several currents within Guatemala where these questions are being hammered out. Evangelicals from both non-Pentecostal and Pentecostal denominations are members of the International Alliance of Evangelical Political Parties and Movements, a group that is wrestling with strategies for different countries within Latin America.

Not only are evangelicals voting, but they are also voting for evangelical candidates. Candidates have sometimes attempted to utilize their religion to get elected as Serrano did in 1985. However, since Serrano finished a disappointing third in 1985, evangelical candidates have toned down their rhetoric and no longer attempt to appeal to
purely religious issues. However, it has been Catholics, and not evangelicals, who have often raised the specter of religious wars in Guatemala. However, despite "evangelical" being the most important criteria in selecting a candidate, evangelicals are not quite certain exactly all that the term "evangelical" entails.

Participation in church elections wasn't significant in determining whether someone participated in national elections. However, evangelicals have had a higher voter turnout in recent elections than Catholic voters. This may be due to Catholics having less confidence in the system than evangelicals as the ASIES study found. One possible explanation is that Catholics, who do not hold elections to elect officers within the church, have always experienced political, cultural, social and economic hegemony, and elections and voting were viewed as essential to establishing and maintaining a liberal democracy.

It remains to be seen what the long-term political effects of the tremendous church growth in the 1970s and 1980s will be in Guatemala. Though the 1996 presidential elections demonstrated that it is possible for a candidate who wins only in the capitol to win the election, merely based on numbers alone, no politician will be able to ignore 20-25 percent of the electorate.

After growth leveled off during the late 1980s and 1990s, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of
Pentecostals. In the past three years revival has broken out once again in Guatemala and new members are once again pouring into churches.\textsuperscript{565} No one yet knows what the impact of this latest revival will be on the Guatemalan political process.

1) SEXO  ___varón  ___mujer
2) EDAD  ___18-24  ___25-39  ___40-59  ___60-79 ___80-99
3) ESTADO CIVIL  ___soltero/a (nunca casado/a) ____ casado/a ____ divorciado/a ____ viudo/a
4) ¿A qué grupo étnico pertenece?  ___Ladino  ____Cakchiquel  ____Quiché  ____Mam  ____otro
5) ¿Qué nivel de educación tiene?  ___escuela primaria  ____escuela secundaria  ____universidad  ___licenciatura  ___
6) ¿Qué monto de ingreso se aproxima al ingreso anual de su familia (incluya todos los miembros de su domicilio):  ____menos de Q3.000  ____3.001-6.000  ____6.001-12.000  ____12.001-24.000  ____24.001-36.000  ____36.001-48.000  ____48.001-60.000  ____60.001-72.000  ____72.001-84.000
7) ¿Por cuánto tiempo ha sido cristiano?  ____menos de un año  ___1-5 años  ____6-10  ____11-15 años  ____16-20 años  ____21-25 años  ____26-49 años  ____50+ años
8) ¿A qué iglesia pertenece?  ____iglesia no-pentecostal  ____iglesia pentecostal  ____iglesia neo-pentecostal  ____iglesia católica  ____iglesia carismática  ____otra  ____ninguna
a) Nombre de la iglesia

9) ¿Es miembro de esa iglesia? ___SI ___NO

10) ¿Por cuánto tiempo? ___menos de un año ___1-5 años ___6-10 años ___11-15 años ___16-20 años ___21-25 años ___26-49 años ___50 años

11) ¿Tiene capacitación bíblica? ___SI ___NO

12) ¿Donde recibió su capacitación bíblica? ___SETECA ___Universidad Mariano Gálvez ___un instituto bíblico ___otro ___________________________

13) ¿Qué nivel de capacitación tiene?

14) ¿Tiene algún cargo en esa iglesia? (por ejemplo, pastor, anciano, diácono) ___SI ___NO ¿Si contestó SI, qué cargo tiene?

15) ¿Por cuánto tiempo ha tenido este cargo?
___menos de un año ___1-5 años ___6-10 años ___11-15 años ___16-20 años ___21-25 años ___26-49 años ___50+ años

16) ¿Elige la membresía de su iglesia a los ancianos y diáconos?
¿Vota en estas elecciones? ___SI ___NO
¿Si contestó SI, vota:
___siempre ___muchas veces ___no importa
___algunas veces ___nunca
17) ¿Cree que los evangélicos deben involucrarse en la política? ____SI ____NO
    ¿Si contestó NO, por qué?
    ____________________________________________________________

18) ¿Pertenece a un partido político? ____SI ____NO

19) ¿Si contestó SI, a cuál partido pertenece?
    ____PAN ____DCG ____UCN ____FUN ____PR ____CAN
    ____PREG ____AP-5 ____FUR ____PSD ____FRG ____
    otro______________________________

20) ¿Por qué pertenece a este partido?
    ____________________________________________________________

21) ¿Por cuánto tiempo ha pertenecido a este partido?
    ____Menos de un año ____1-5 años ____6-10 años
    ____11-15 años
    ____16-20 años ____21-25 años

22) ¿Cree que dedicarse a la política es un llamado de Dios?
    ____NO ____SI ____NO SE
    ¿Si contestó NO, por qué?
    ____________________________________________________________

23) ¿Ha aspirado a algún puesto político? ____SI ____NO
    ¿Si contestó SI, en qué partido fue candidato?
    ____________________________________________________________
    ¿Para qué puesto fue candidato?
    ____________________________________________________________

24) ¿Tienen los cristianos el deber de votar? ____ SI
    ____NO ____NO SE
25) ¿Votó en las elecciones de agosto de 1994?
   _ SI   ____NO   ____ME ABSTUVE

26) ¿Por qué partido votó usted en las elecciones legislativas recientes?

27) ¿Por qué votó usted así?

28) ¿Votó por Jorge Serrano Elías en la elección presidencial de enero de 1991?
    ____SI   ____NO   ____ME ABSTUVE
    ¿Si contestó SI, votó por él porque era evangélico?
    ____SI   ____NO

29) ¿Votó por Jorge Serrano Elías en la primera vuelta de la elección presidencial en noviembre de 1990?
    ___SI   ____NO   ____ME ABSTUVE
    ¿Si contestó SI, votó por él porque era evangélico?
    ____SI   ____NO

30) ¿Votó por Jorge Serrano Elías en la elección presidencial del 1985?
    ____SI   ____NO   ____ME ABSTUVE
    ¿Si contestó SI, votó por él porque era evangélico?
    ____SI   ____NO

31) ¿Votaría usted por Efraín Ríos Montt si fuese candidato nuevamente?
    ____SI   ____NO   ____TAL VEZ   ____NUNCA   ____NO SE
    a) ¿Si contestó NUNCA, por qué?
b) ¿Si contestó SI, por qué?

32) ¿Cuáles de las características siguientes son más importantes al elegir un líder político:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>la más importante</th>
<th>muy importante</th>
<th>importante</th>
<th>no muy importante</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Bien-Conocido</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</table>

33) ¿Ha apoyado su pastor a algún candidato político desde el púlpito?
   __SI   __NO
   ¿Si contestó SI, a quien apoyó?

34) ¿Está bien que los pastores prediquen sobre temas políticos?
   ____NUNCA   ____NO   ____NO SE   ____ALGUNAS VECES   ____SI
   a) ¿Si contestó NUNCA, por qué?

   b) ¿Si contestó SI, por qué?
35) ¿Ha predicado su pastor sobre temas políticos?
   ____SI  ____NO
   a) ¿Si contestó SI, sobre cuál(es) tema(s) predicó?

36) ¿Está bien que los pastores prediquen sobre:
   el aborto
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   la corrupción
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   la inflación
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   la violencia
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   la delincuencia
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   el desempleo
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   la guerrilla
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   los derechos humanos
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
   la homosexualidad
   ____NUNCA  ____NO  ____NO SE  ____ALGUNAS VECES  ____SI
la pena de muerte

____NUNCA   ____NO   ____NO SE   ____ALGUNAS VECES   ____SI

la reforma agraria

____NUNCA   ____NO   ____NO SE   ____ALGUNAS VECES   ____SI

el juego

____NUNCA   ____NO   ____NO SE   ____ALGUNAS VECES   ____SI

37) ¿Ha apoyado su pastor a algún partido político desde el púlpito?

____SI   ____NO

Si contestó SI, a cuál partido apoyó él?

__________________________________________________________

38) ¿En las elecciones legislativas de agosto de 1994, qué partido tenía la perspectiva más bíblica sobre:

el aborto  ____________________________________________

la planificación familiar _________________________________

la privatización de empresas y bienes del Estado _______

la corrupción  _________________________________________

la homosexualidad _____________________________________

el presupuesto nacional _________________________________

los derechos humanos _________________________________

la amnistía política y fiscal ____________________________
1) ¿Usaría usted su iglesia para una reunión política?
   ____NUNCA _____NO _____NO SE _____ALGUNAS VECES _____SI

2) ¿Ha usado usted su iglesia para una reunión política?
   ____NUNCA _____UNA VEZ _____UNAS VECES _____MUCHAS VECES _____SIEMPRE

3) ¿Apoyaría usted a algún partido político desde el púlpito?
   ____NUNCA _____NO _____NO SE _____ALGUNAS VECES _____SI

   ¿Si contestó NUNCA, por qué?

4) ¿Ha apoyado usted a algún partido político desde el púlpito? _____SI _____NO

   ¿Si contestó SI, a cuál partido apoyó?

   ¿Por qué apoyó usted a este partido?

   ¿Si contestó NO, por qué?
5) ¿Apoyaría usted a algún candidato político desde el púlpito? ___NUNCA  ___NO  ___NO SE  ___ALGUNAS VECES  ___SI
¿Si contestó NUNCA, por qué?

¿Si contestó SI, por qué?

6) ¿Ha apoyado a algún candidato político desde el púlpito? ___SI  ___NO
¿Si contestó SI, a quién(es) apoyó usted?

¿Por qué apoyó usted a este candidato?
## Appendix B

**ESTIMATES OF PROTESTANT REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

Protestants as Percentage of Total National Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>83.0</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>9.9</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
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Appendix C

Estimate of Evangelical Population in Latin America and the Caribbean

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Population</th>
<th>Evangelical Population</th>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>30,600,000</td>
<td>1,438,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>77,000</td>
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<td>56,000</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>6,200,000</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>29,400,000</td>
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Note: "Evangelical population" here refers only to theologically conservative Protestants, not all Protestants.

---

Appendix D

Estimate of Evangelical Growth Factors in Latin America from 1960 to 1985 with Extrapolation to 2010

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>(x)</th>
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<td>2.11</td>
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<td>Dom. Rep.</td>
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<td>El Sal.</td>
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<td>1.95</td>
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VITA

Thomas Metallo was born in Baltimore, Maryland. He and his wife, Joyce, were missionaries with Youth With A Mission for six years. Tom lived in Belize, Central America for two years and has traveled extensively throughout Mexico and Central America. While living in Belize, he worked among the Kekchi, Mopan Maya, and Garifuna people groups, and he was Youth With a Mission's liaison to the U.N. refugee office. Tom has also worked with displaced peoples in the Petén, Guatemala.

In 1986, Tom returned to the United States to finish his education. He earned an A.B. in History, Political Science, and Mathematics from Indiana Wesleyan University in 1988, and then completed a M.A. in Public Policy at Regent University in 1990. He was selected for Who's Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges at both institutions, and he was also selected as Outstanding Student in the School of Public Policy at Regent University. He worked on his doctorate in International Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, Florida from 1991-1996. His areas of concentration are Latin America and Security and Conflict. He is fluent in Spanish and has conducted academic research in Nicaragua and Guatemala while doing research on his Master's thesis and his doctoral dissertation, respectively.

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